पुण्यपत्तनविद्यापीठपुरस्कृता संस्कृत-प्राकृत-ग्रन्थमाला
प्रथमो ग्रन्थः

रामानुजविरचितं

श्रीभाष्यम्

सर परशुरामभाऊ-महाविद्यालयस्य भूतपूर्वप्राचार्येण
भाण्डारकर-प्राच्य-विद्या-संशोधनमन्दिरस्थसंशोधनविभागस्य भूतपूर्वाध्यक्षेण
करमरकरकुलावतंसेन दामोदरसूनुना रघुनाथशर्मणा
विरचितैराङ्ग्लभाषानुवादटिप्पण्यादिभिः समेतम्

१·१·५–२·२·४२ – सूत्रात्मको द्वितीयो विभागः

★

पुण्यपत्तनविद्यापीठाधिकृतैः
१८८४ शाके] [१९६२ ख्रिस्ताब्दे
प्राकाश्यं नीतः

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Volume I

Śrībhāṣya of Rāmānuja

edited

with a complete English Translation, Introduction, Notes and Appendices

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CONTENTS

[115] ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् ॥ ५ ॥ (अधिकरण ५—सूत्राणि ५—१२)

'यतो वा इमानि' (तै. ३।१।१)

इत्यादिजगत्कारणवादिवाक्यप्रतिपाद्यं सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति समस्तहेयप्रत्यनीककल्याणगुणैकतानं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यम्, इत्युक्तम्। इदानीं जगत्कारणवादिवाक्यानाम्, आनुमानिकप्रधानादिप्रतिपादनानर्हता, उच्यते—' ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् ' इत्यादिना।

इदम्, आम्नायते छान्दोग्ये

'सदेव सोम्य, इदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (छा. ६।२।१)
'तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' (छा. ६।२।३)

इति,

'तत्तेजोऽसृजत' (छा. ६।२।३)

इत्यादि—

तत्र संदिह्यते—किं सच्छब्दवाच्यं जगत्कारणं परोक्तम्, आनुमानिकं प्रधानम्-उत, उक्तलक्षणं ब्रह्म ?–इति।

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[115] On account of the 'reflecting' (the cause of the world is not Pradhāna) not referred to in the Śrutis ॥ 5 ॥

(Adhikarana 5 — Sūtras 5-12)

It has been (already) said that what is to be desired to be known is Brahman, omniscient, omnipotent, quite uniform, possessed of auspicious qualities opposed to all fit to be abandoned, fit to be propounded in passages discoursing about the cause of the world, such as

'From whom again these (beings)' (Tait. 3 1 1)

—Now is being stated the unfitness of the passages discoursing about the cause of the world to propound the Pradhāna to be known by inference, by (the Sūtra)

'On account of the 'reflecting' (the cause of the world) is not (Pradhāna) not referred to in the Śrutis.'

and the following (Sutras)

This is stated in a Sruti passage in the *Chāndogya* —

'Existence, alone, (my) dear, was (all) this, in the beginning, one alone, without a second.' (Chā. 6 2 1)

'It reflected—Let me be many, let me procreate.' (Chā. 6·2·3)

And also

It created fire (or heat)' (Chā. 6·2·3)

etc. There it is doubted — Whether the cause of the world, denoted by the word *'Sat'* is the Pradhāna to be known by inference, mentioned by others (i. e. the Sāmkhyas) or Brahman already defined.

[116] किं प्राप्तम् ? प्रधानम्, इति। कुतः ?

'सदेव सोम्य, इदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (छा. ६।२।१)

इति, 'इदं' शब्दवाच्यस्य चेतनभोग्यभूतस्य सत्त्वरजस्तमोमयस्य वियदादिनामरूपविकारावस्थस्य वस्तुनः कारणावस्थां वदति। कारणभूतद्रव्यस्यावस्थान्तरापत्तिरेव हि कार्यता। अतो यद्द्रव्यं यत्स्वभावं च कार्यावस्थं तदेव द्रव्यं कारणावस्थं सत्त्वरजस्तमोमयं च कार्यम्, इति गुणसाम्यावस्थं प्रधानमेव कारणम्। तदेव, उपसंहृतसकलविशेषं सन्मात्रम्, इति

'सदेव सोम्य, इदमग्र आसीदेकमेव' (छा. ६।२।१)

इति, अभिधीयते। तत एव च कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वम्। तथा सत्येव, एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिपत्तिः। अन्यथा,

'यथा सोम्य, एकेन मृत्पिण्डेन' (छा. ६।१।१)

इत्यादिमृत्पिण्डतत्कार्यदृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोर्वैरूप्यं च, इति जगत्कारणवादिवाक्येन महर्षिणा कपिलेनोक्तं प्रधानमेव प्रतिपाद्यते। प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तरूपेणानुमानवेषमेव चेदं वाक्यम्, इति सच्छब्दवाच्यम्, आनुमानिकम्, एव-इति। एवं प्राप्ते, अभिधीयते—

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[116] What is (the prima-facie view) reached? The Pradhāna. Whence? The passage

'Existence alone, (my) dear, was (all) this, in the beginning, one alone, without a second.' (Chā. 6·2·1)

speaks of the state as a cause, of the thing denoted by the word 'Idam', that has become the object of enjoyment for the sentient constituted of the qualities of goodness, energy, and ignorance (darkness) and conditioned by the modifications of name and form such as the sky etc.; for, the nature of an effect is the attainment to another condition by a substance that has become the cause. Therefore, a substance whatever and of what nature it be and which has the condition of an effect — that same substance, and of that nature, has the state of a cause; and the effect is constituted of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas — and so Pradhāna alone in the state of equilibrium of the qualities is the cause. And that same is mere existence with all the distinctive attributes withdrawn,— and so it is stated

'Existence alone in the beginning, my dear, was all this one alone.' (Chā. 6 2·1)

And owing to that very reason, there is the non-distinction (identity) between the cause and the effect. Only in those circumstances the solemn declaration about 'by the knowledge of one, the knowledge of everything' can be accounted for. Otherwise, there would be the incompatibility between the illustration and the thing to be illustrated,— the clod of earth and its effect, in the passage beginning with

'As, my dear, by the one clod of earth' (Chā. 6·1·1)

and so is propounded the Pradhāna alone declared by the great sage Kapila, in the passage discoursing about the cause of the world. And this passage is in [illegible]

stated (in reply) —

[117] 'ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम्' इति ।

यस्मिञ्छब्द एव प्रमाणं न भवति तत्, अशब्दम्, आनुमानिकं प्रधानम्, इत्यर्थः। न तत्, जगत्कारणवादिवाक्यप्रतिपाद्यम् । कुतः ? ईक्षतेः । सच्छब्दवाच्यसंबन्धिव्यापारविशेषाभिधायिन ईक्षतेर्धातोः श्रवणात् ।

'तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' (छा. ६।२।३)

इति, ईक्षणक्रियायोगश्च, अचेतने प्रधाने न संभवति । अत ईदृशेक्षणक्षमः, चेतनविशेषः, एव सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिः पुरुषोत्तमः सच्छब्दाभिधेयः । तथा च सर्वेष्वपि सृष्टिप्रकरणेषु, ईक्षापूर्विका, एव सृष्टिः प्रतीयते ।

'स ऐक्षत लोकान्नु सृजै'

इति ।

'स इमाँल्लोकानसृजत' (ऐ. १।१।२)

'स ईक्षांचक्रे। स प्राणमसृजत' (प्र. ६।३।४)

इत्यादिषु ।

ननु च कार्यानुगुणेनैव कारणेन भवितव्यम् । सत्यम् । सर्वकार्यानुगुण एव सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिः सर्वसंकल्पः पुरुषोत्तमः सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरकः । यथा, आह—

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[117] 'On account of the reflecting, (the cause of the world) is not (Pradhāna) not referred to in the Śrutis.'

In respect of which the 'word' itself is not the authority, that is 'Aśabdam,'—Pradhāna to be known from *inference*—*this* (is) the *sense*. (And) that is not intended to be propounded by the (Śruti) passages discoursing about the course of the world. Whence? On account of the 'reflecting'. On account of the reference to (the hearing of) the root 'Īkṣ' denoting the particular working relating to the expressed sense of the word 'Sat'. And further, the association with the reflecting-process referred to in (the passage)

'It reflected—Let me be many, let me procreate' (Chā 6·2·3)

is not possible in the case of the non-sentient Pradhāna. Therefore, some particular sentient (being) alone competent for such 'reflecting,' omniscient, omnipotent, the highest Puruṣa, is the object denoted by the word 'Sat'. And similarly in all the creation-sections, without exception, creation is apprehended as being preceded by 'reflecting' in passages like the following and others—

'He reflected—Let me indeed create the worlds.'

And also

'He created these worlds.' (Ait. 1·1·2)

'He reflected. He created Prāṇa (vital breath)' (Pr. 6·3·4)

I say (says the objector)—The cause has, for the matter of that, to be in conformity with the effect—True (what you say). Surely in conformity with the effect, here is the omniscient, omnipotent, with thoughts fulfilled, the highest Puruṣa with the subtle sentient and the non-sentient as his body, as says (the group of the following passages)—

'परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते
स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च।' (श्वे. ६।८)
'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद्यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः।' (मु. १।१।९)
'यस्याव्यक्तं शरीरं, यस्याक्षरं शरीरं, यस्य मृत्युः शरीरम्, एष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मापहतपाप्मा' (सुबा. श्रु.)

इत्यादि। तदेतत्—

'न विलक्षणत्वात्' (ब्र. सू. २।१।४)

इत्यादिषु प्रतिपादयिष्यते। अत्र सृष्टिवाक्यानि न प्रधानप्रतिपादनयोग्यानि, इत्युच्यते। वस्तुविरोधस्तु तत्रैव परिहरिष्यते।

यत्तु, उक्तम्—प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तयोगात्, अनुमानरूपम्, एवेदं वाक्यम्, इति — तदसत्, हेत्वनुपादानात्।

'येनाश्रुतं श्रुतम्' (छा. ६।१।१)

इति, एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञाने प्रतिपादयिष्यते, सर्वात्मना तदसंभवं मन्वानस्य तत्संभवमात्रप्रदर्शनाय हि दृष्टान्तोपादानम्। ईक्षत्यादिश्रवणादेव हि, अनुमानगन्धाभावोऽवगतः। ॥५॥

[118] अथ स्यात्—न चेतनगतं मुख्यम्, ईक्षणम्, इहोच्यते। अपि तु प्रधानगतं गौणम्, ईक्षणम्।

'His supreme power is heard to be definitely multifarious, and knowledge, strength, activity (are all) natural (in Him)'. (Śve 6·8)

'Who, the omniscient, all-knower, of whom the penance is constituted of knowledge.' (Mu. 1·1·9)

'He whose body is the Unmanifest, whose body is the Imperishable, whose body is Death — this one, the inmost Soul of all beings, with all sins destroyed' (Subā. Śrū.)

And (all) this would be propounded in the Sūtra—

'No, on account of being different' (Br Sū II·1·4)

Here, it is stated that the passages dealing with creation are not competent to propound Pradhāna The factual contradiction, however, would be repudiated there itself.

As to what has been said — On account of the association with the solemn declaration and the illustrative instance, this passage surely has the form of an inferential syllogism —

That is false, on account of the non-acceptance of a logical mark; for, when it is intended to be propounded that there is knowledge of all by the knowledge of one in the passage,

'By which the unheard of becomes heard' (Chā. 6·1·1)

for the benefit of one who considers the utter impossibility of this, this illustrative instance is given in order to point out merely the possibility there of the absence of even the tinge of inference. it is indeed, patent from the hearing itself of (the words) 'reflecting' etc. ॥ 5 ॥

[118] Now it might be (says the objector)—that the actual ([illegible] metaphorical) [illegible] the metaphoric [illegible] with a metaphorical reflecting in passages —

'तत्तेज ऐक्षत' (छा. ६।२।३)
'ता आप ऐक्षन्त' (छा ६।२।४)

इति, गौणेक्षणसाहचर्यात्। भवति च, अचेतनेष्वपि चेतनधर्मोपचारः। यथा—'वृष्टिप्रतीक्षाः शालयः'। 'वर्षेण बीजं प्रतिसंजहर्ष,' इति। अतो गौणम्, ईक्षणम् इति—इमाम्, आशङ्कामनुभाष्य परिहरति।

गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् ॥ ६ ॥

यत्, उक्तम्—गौणेक्षणसाहचर्यात्, सतोऽपि, ईक्षणव्यपदेशः सर्गनियतपूर्वावस्थाभिप्रायो गौणः, इति। तत्, न।

'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा' (छा. ६।८।७)

इति, सच्छब्दप्रतिपादितस्य, आत्मशब्देन व्यपदेशात्। एतदुक्तं भवति—

'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स त आत्मा' (छा. ६।८।७)

इति, चेतनाचेतनात्मकप्रपञ्चोपदेशेन 'स त आत्मा', इति, आत्मत्वोपदेशोऽयम्, न, अचेतने प्रधाने संगच्छते, इति। अतः, तेजोबन्नानाम्, अपि परमात्मा, एव, आत्मा, इति तेजःप्रभृतयोऽपि शब्दाः परमात्मन एव वाचकाः। तथाहि—

'*That Light reflected*' (Chā. 6·2·3)
'*Those Waters reflected.*' (Chā. 6·2·4)

And there is the metaphorical use of the quality of a sentient in respect of even a non-sentient, just as in — 'The paddy crops are waiting for showers of rain' 'The seed became delighted by the shower.' Thus the reflecting is metaphorical.

Having stated this doubt, (the Sūtrakāra) removes (the same)

If (you say that the statement about the 'reflecting' is) metaphorical, (we say) 'No', on account of the word 'Ātman'. ॥ 6 ॥

As to what has been said viz., on account of the association of the *metaphorical 'reflecting', the statement about the 'reflecting' even about* the 'Sat' is metaphorical, being concerned with the state invariably prior to creation. — That (does) not (stand to reason) on account of the reference by the word Atman, to the thing propounded by the word 'Sat' in the passage

'*All this has that as the Self. It is the Reality. It is the Ātman*' (Chā 6·8·7)

This is what is intended to be said—that this statement about the non-sentient Pradhāna as being possessed of the nature of Ātman in (the passage)

'*All this has that as the Self. It is the Reality. It is the Ātman.*' (Chā 6·8·7)

in respect of the worldly existence constituted of the sentient and the non-sentient in (the passage) 'He (is) your Self.' dose not go well. And therefore, even the word 'Tejas' and others, are denotative of the Paramātman, because the Paramātman is the Self even of Light, Water and Earth. To explain the same — on account of the 'entering within' itself of the Paramātman, there is the nature of a substance of Tejas and others, and attaining to the various names in (the passage)

'हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि'
(छा. ६।३।२)

इति, परमात्मानुप्रवेशात्, एव तेजःप्रभृतीनां वस्तुत्वं, तत्तन्नामभाक्त्वं च, इति—
'तत्तेज ऐक्षत' (छा. ६।२।३)
'ता आप ऐक्षन्त' (छा. ६।२।४)

इति, अपि मुख्य एव, ईक्षणव्यपदेशः। अतः साहचर्यादपि
'तदैक्षत' (छा. ६।२।३)

इति, अत्र गौणत्वाशङ्का दूरोत्सारिता—इति सूत्राभिप्रायः ॥ ६ ॥

[119] इतश्च न प्रधानं सच्छब्दप्रतिपाद्यम्—

तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात् ॥ ७ ॥

मुमुक्षोः श्वेतकेतोः,
'तत्त्वमसि' (छा. ६।८।७)

इति, सदात्मकत्वानुसंधानमुपदिश्य तन्निष्ठस्य तस्य
'तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्येथ संपत्स्ये' (छा. ६।१४।२)

इति, शरीरपातमात्रान्तरायो ब्रह्मसंपत्तिलक्षणो मोक्षः, इति, उपदिशति। यदि च प्रधानम्, अचेतनं कारणमुपदिश्येत, तदा तदात्मकत्वानुसंधानस्य मोक्षसाधनत्वोपदेशो नोपपद्येत।

'Goodness! having entered into these three divinities with this Living Self, may I manifest names and forms' (Chā. 6·3·2)

and so, the reference to the 'reflecting' is, verily, non-metaphorical, in

'That Light reflected' (Chā. 6·2·3)
'Those Waters reflected' (Chā. 6·2·4)

Therefore, also on account of the association, any doubt about the metaphorical use in (the passage)

'That reflected' (Chā. 6·2·3)

becomes far flung away — This (is) the sense of the Sūtra. ॥ 6 ॥

[119] And for this reason also, Pradhāna is not the thing to be propounded by the word 'Sat'—

On account of the instruction about salvation for one firmly devoted to that (Sat) ॥ 7 ॥

Having instructed about the relation to the nature of having 'Sat' as the Self of Svetaketu desirous of salvation in (the passage)

'That thou art' (Chā. 6·8·7)

he instructs — salvation characterised by merging into Brahman, with the falling of the body coming in between (as described) is (in the case) of one firmly devoted to that (Sat) in (the passage)

'For him, there is delay only so long as he is not freed (from the body)' (Chā. 6·14·2)

If on the other hand, the non-sentient Pradhāna had been declared as the cause, in that case, the instruction about the relation to the nature of having that as the Self being the means of salvation would not stand to reason. There would be the merging into the non-sentient for him firmly devoted to that as hinted in (the passage)

'यथाक्रतुरस्मिँल्लोके पुरुषो भवति तथेतः प्रेत्य भवति' (छा. ३।१४।१)
इति तन्निष्ठस्य, अचेतनसंपत्तिः, एव स्यात्। न च मातापितृसहस्रेभ्योऽपि वत्सलतरं शास्त्रम्, एवंविधतापत्रयाभिहतिहेतुभूताम्, अचित्संपत्तिम्, उपदिशति, प्रधानकारणवादिनोऽपि हि प्रधाननिष्ठस्य मोक्षं नाभ्युपगच्छन्ति। ॥ ७ ॥

[120] इतश्च न प्रधानम्—

हेयत्वावचनाच्च ॥ ८ ॥

यदि प्रधानमेव कारणं सच्छब्दाभिहितं भवेत्, तदा मुमुक्षोः श्वेतकेतोस्तदात्मकत्वं मोक्षविरोधित्वात्, हेयत्वेनैव, उपदेश्यं स्यात्; न च तत्क्रियते प्रत्युत, उपादेयत्वेनैव
'तत्त्वमसि' (छा. ६।८।७)
'तस्य तावदेव चिरं' (छा. ६।१४।२)
इति, उपदिश्यते।—॥ ८ ॥

[121] इतश्च न प्रधानम्—

प्रतिज्ञाविरोधात् ॥ ९ ॥

प्रधानकारणत्वे प्रतिज्ञाविरोधश्च भवति। वाक्योपक्रमे हि, एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं प्रतिज्ञातम्। तच्च, कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वेन, कारणभूतसद्विज्ञानात, तत्कार्यभूतचेतना-

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'Whatever thought a person entertains in this world, so he becomes, having departed from here.' (Chā. 3·14·1)
Nor again, for the matter of that, would the Sāstra (far) more affectionate than thousands of fathers and mothers, give instruction about the merging into the non-sentient that has become the cause of discomfiture due to the three kinds of torments of this nature. Even those who hold Pradhāna to be the cause do not, indeed, admit salvation for one firmly devoted to Pradhāna. ॥ 7 ॥

[120] And for this reason also, not Pradhāna (sat-śabda-pratipādya)

On account of the absence of the statement about (its) being fit to be abandoned. ॥ 8 ॥

If Pradhāna alone as the cause (of the world) were to be denoted by the word 'Sat', then having that as its Self should have been taught to Śvetaketu desirous of Salvation, as fit to be abandoned on account of its being opposed to salvation. That is, however, is not done. On the contrary that is taught as being definitely fit to be resorted to, in (passages like)
'That thou art' (Chā. 6·8·7)
'For him, there is delay only so long as' etc. (Chā. 6·14·2)
॥ 8 ॥

[121] And for this reason again, not Pradhāna (sat-śabda-pratipādya)

On account of the contradiction with the solemn declaration ॥ 9 ॥

If Pradhāna were to be the cause, there would further arise contradiction with the solemn declaration. In the introductory part of the passage (concerned) the knowledge of everything by the knowledge of one, has been solemnly declared. And that has got to be reasonally explained only

चेतनप्रपञ्चस्य ज्ञाततया, एव, उपपादनीयम्। तत्तु प्रधानकारणत्वे, चेतनवर्गस्य प्रधान-कार्यत्वाभावात्, प्रधानविज्ञानेन चेतनवर्गविज्ञानासिद्धेः, विरुध्यते।—॥ ९॥

[122] इतश्च न प्रधानम्—

स्वाप्ययात् ॥ १०॥

तदेव सच्छब्दवाच्यं प्रकृत्य आह—

'स्वमन्तं मे सौम्य विजानीहि'

इति।

यत्रैतत्पुरुषः स्वपिति नाम सता सोम्य तदा संपन्नो भवति। स्वमपीतो भवति। तस्मादेनं स्वपितीत्याचक्षते। स्वं ह्यपीतो भवति।' (छा ६।८।१)

इति, सुषुप्तं जीवं सता संपन्नः, स्वमपीतः—स्वस्मिन्प्रलीनः—इति व्यपदिशति। प्रलयश्च स्वकारणे लयः। न च, अचेतनं प्रधानं चेतनस्य जीवस्य कारणं भवति। 'स्वमपीतो भवति'—आत्मानमेव जीवोऽपीतो भवति—इत्यर्थः। चिद्वस्तुशरीरक तदात्मभूतं ब्रह्म, एव जीवशब्देन, अपि, अभिधीयते, इति नामरूपव्याकरणश्रुत्योक्त तत्, जीवशब्दाभिधेयं ब्रह्म सुषुप्तिकाले, अपि प्रलयकाले, इव नामरूपपरिष्वङ्गाभावात्, केवलसच्छब्दाभिधेयम्, इति—

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owing to the worldly existence—sentient and non-sentient that are effect of that, being known from the knowledge of the Sat which is the cause, owing to the non-difference between the effect and the cause But that would be contradicted if Pradhāna were the cause, on account of the impossibility of the knowledge of the sentient-group by the knowledge of Pradhana as the sentient-group is not possessed of the nature of an effect of Pradhāna । 9 ॥

[122] And for this reason also, the Pradhana (is) not (sat-sabda-pratipādya)

On account of the merging into oneself ॥ 10 ॥

Referring to the same thing expressed by the word 'Sat', he now says.

'My dear, know well from me the dream-state '

And also

' Where this person is supposed to sleep, then with the Sat my dear, does he become united, becomes merged into oneself Therefore, they call him ' He sleeps', for, he becomes merged into himself '

(Cha 6 8 1)

Thus he refers to the sleeping (individual) Self united with the 'Sat' as 'merged into oneself,' 'dissolved into oneself ' And dissolution is the sublation into one's own cause Not indeed can the non-sentient Pradhāna be the cause of the sentient Jiva 'Merged into oneself' means that the Jiva gets merged into the Ātman himself Brahman itself having the sentient thing as its body, which has become the Self of that is expressed even by the word 'Jiva —and so that Brahman spoken of in the Sruti passage dealing with modification in name and form and expressed by the word 'Jiva', is expressed by the word 'Sat' alone on account of the absence of all round contact with name and form even at the time of deep sleep, as at the time of dissolution — and therefore it is stated —

'सता सोम्य तदा संपन्नो भवति स्वमपीतो भवति' (छा. ६।८।१)

इत्युच्यते।

तथा समानप्रकरणे नामरूपविभागपरिष्वङ्गाभावेन प्राज्ञेनैव परिष्वङ्गात्,

'प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरम्' (बृ. ४।३।२१)

इत्युच्यते। आ मोक्षात्, जीवस्य नामरूपपरिष्वङ्गात्, एव हि, स्वव्यतिरिक्तविषयज्ञानोदयः। सुषुप्तिकालेऽपि हि नामरूपे विहाय सता संपरिष्वक्तः, पुनरपि जाग्रद्दशायां नामरूपे परिष्वज्य तत्तन्नामरूपा भवन्ति, इति श्रुत्यन्तरे स्पष्टमभिधीयते—

'यदा सुप्तः स्वप्नं न कथंचन पश्यत्यथास्मिन्प्राण एवैकधा भवति। तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मनः प्राणा यथायतनं विप्रतिष्ठन्ते।' (कौ. ३।३)

'तथा त इह व्याघ्रो वा सिंहो वा वृको वा वराहो वा दंशो वा मशको वा यद्यद्भवन्ति तदा भवन्ति।' (छा. ६।९।३)

इति,

'तथा सुप्तं जीवं प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तः' (बृ. ४।३।२१)

इति च वदन्ति। तस्मात्, सच्छब्दवाच्यं परं ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञः परमेश्वरः पुरुषोत्तम एव। तदाह वृत्तिकारः— 'सता सोम्य तदा संपन्नो भवति' इति संपत्त्यसंपत्तिभ्यामेतदध्यवसीयते।

'With Sat, my dear, does he become united ; becomes merged into oneself.' (Chā. 6·8·1)

Likewise, in a similar context, it is stated

'Completely united with the Intelligent Ātman, he knows nothing external, nor the internal.' (Br. 4·3·21)

on account of an all-round contact with the Prājña himself, owing to the absence of an all-round contact with the divisions of name and form. Till salvation, there is indeed, the rise of knowledge of objects over and above himself in the case of Jīva, only on account of the all-round contact with name and form. Even at the time of deep sleep, indeed, having cast off name and form, closely contacted with 'Sat', and having once again established close contact in the waking state, there arise various kinds of names and forms—This has been clearly expressed in other Śruti texts. (as under)—

'When one, fast asleep, does not see any dream whatsoever, then in him, Prāṇa remains in one form. From that Ātman here, verily, the Prāṇas are stationed in various abodes as suited.' (Kau. 3·3)

'In the same way, they here — whether tiger, or lion, or wolf, or boar, or fly, or mosquito, — whatever they are, they become again.' (Chā. 6·9·3)

Similarly, the Sruti speaks of the Jīva in deep sleep as —

'Completely united with the Intelligent Ātman.' (Br. 4·3·21)

Therefore, what is expressed by the word 'Sat' is the Highest Brahman, omniscient, the highest Lord, the highest Purusa. And there says the Vṛttikāra—This is ascertained by the merging and non-merging as in (the passage) With Sat, my dear, does he become united'.

'प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्त' इति चाह—इति ॥ १० ॥

[123] इतश्च न प्रधानम्—

गतिसामान्यात् ॥ ११ ॥

'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीन्नान्यत् किंचन मिषत्स ऐक्षत लोकान्नु सृजा इति। स इमाँल्लोकानसृजत' (ऐ १।१-२)

'तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाश सम्भूत । आकाशाद्वायु । वायोरग्नि । अग्नेराप । अद्भ्यो पृथिवी' (तै २।१)

'तस्य ह वा एतस्य महतो भूतस्य निश्वसितमेतद्यदृग्वेद' (बृ २।४।१०)

इत्यादिसृष्टिवाक्यानां या गति' — प्रवृत्तिः, — तत्सामान्यात्तत्समानार्थत्वादस्य। तेषु सर्वेश्वरः कारणमवगम्यते। तस्मात्, अत्रापि सर्वेश्वर एव कारणम्, इति निश्चीयते ॥ ११ ॥

[124] इतश्च न प्रधानम्—

श्रुतत्वाच्च ॥ १२ ॥

श्रुतमेव ह्यस्यामुपनिषदि, अस्य सच्छब्दवाच्यस्य, आत्मत्वेन नामरूपयोर्व्याकर्तृत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तित्वं सर्वाधारत्वम्, अपहतपाप्मत्वादिकं सत्यकामत्वं सत्यसंकल्पत्वं च

And the Sruti also states 'Completely united with the Intelligent Atman' ॥ 10 ॥

[123] And for this reason also, Pradhāna (is) not (sat-śabda-pratipādya)

On account of the sameness of import ॥ 11 ॥

'Ātman alone, verily, was all this in the beginning, nothing else, blinking, He reflected — Let me, indeed, create these worlds He created these worlds.' (Ait. 1 1 2)

'From that, this Ātman, verily, the Ākāśa originated, from Ākāsa Vayu, from Vāyu Agni from Agni Āp, from Āp Pṛthivi' (Tait 2 1)

'Of that great Being, verily, is the breathing forth what is this Rgveda' (Br 2-4-10)

— of these and similar passages dealing with creation, what is the import — pointing out—, owing to the sameness of this with that (import) on account of having the same meaning In all those, the over-Lord is apprehended as the cause Therefore, here also, is ascertained the over-Lord himself as the cause. ॥ 11 ॥

[124] And for this reason also, Pradhāna is not (sad-śabda-pratipādya)

On account of its being spoken of in the Śrutis ॥ 12 ॥

It has already indeed been spoken of (heard) in this Upanisad, in the case of this, expressed by the word 'Sat', the nature of a modifier in name and form, owing to its being the Ātman, omniscience, omnipotence being the support of all, having the sins destroyed etc and having (all)

'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि' (छा. ६।३।२)
'सन्मूलाः सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सदायतनाः सत्प्रतिष्ठाः' (छा. ६।८।४)
'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा'— (छा. ६।८।७)
'यच्चास्येहास्ति यच्च नास्ति सर्वं तदस्मिन्समाहितम्' (छा. ८।१।३)
'तस्मिन्कामाः समाहिताः। एष आत्मापहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोकोऽविजिघित्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः' (छा. ८।१।५)

—तथा च श्रुत्यन्तराणि

*'न तस्य कश्चित्पतिरस्ति लोके न चेशिता नैव च तस्य लिङ्गम्।
स कारणं करणाधिपाधिपो न चास्य कश्चिज्जनिता न चाधिपः॥'* (श्वे. ६।९)
'सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचित्य धीरो नामानि कृत्वाभिवदन्यदास्ते' (तै. आ. ३।११)
'अन्तःप्रविष्टः शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मा' (,, ,,)
*'विश्वात्मानं परायणम्
पतिं विश्वस्यात्मेश्वरं शाश्वतं शिवमच्युतम्'* (ना. १३।१)
*'यच्च किंचिज्जगत्यस्मिन्दृश्यते श्रूयतेऽपि वा।
अन्तर्बहिश्च तत्सर्वं व्याप्य नारायणः स्थितः॥'* (ना. १३।१)

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desires fulfilled, as also having (all) thoughts fulfilled, in (the passages)—

'By this Living Self having subsequently entered, let me manifest names and forms.' (Chā. 6·3·2)

'Dear one! these beings have their root in Sat, have their abode in Sat, and have their stability in Sat.' (Chā. 6·8·4)

'All this has that as the Self; It is Reality (or Truth). That is the Ātman.' (Chā. 6·8·7)

'And further whatever of this is here, and whatever is not, all that is collected together in this.' (Chā. 8·1·3)

'In him desires are collected together. This Self with sins destroyed, bereft of old age, bereft of death, bereft of grief, without hunger, without thirst, with desires fulfilled, with thoughts fulfilled.' (Chā. 8·1·5)

And likewise, there are other Śruti passages —

'No one is the protector for him in the world, neither any Controller; nor is there any characteristic mark about him. He is the cause, the Lord of the sense-organs; and there is no one progenitor for Him, nor a lord.' (Śve. 6·9)

'In that, having collected together all forms, the wise one, having assigned names, stays on speaking.' (Tait. 3·11)

'Entered within, the Controller of the people, the Ātman of all.' (Tait. 3·11)

'The universe-Self, the highest refuge, the protector of the universe, the Controller of the Ātmans, eternal, auspicious, undeviating.' (Nā. 13·1)

'Whatever is seen in this world, seen or heard, within or without — having pervaded all that, stays on Nārāyaṇa.' (Nā. 13·1)

'एष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मापहतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायण'　　　　(सुबालो)

इत्यादीनि—

तस्मात्, जगत्कारणवादिवाक्यानि न प्रधानप्रतिपादनयोग्यानि। अतः सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिः सर्वेश्वरो निरस्तसमस्तदोषगन्धः, अनवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणगणौघमहार्णवः पुरुषोत्तमो नारायण एव निखिलजगदेककारणं जिज्ञास्यं ब्रह्म, इति च स्थितम्।

अत एव निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रब्रह्मवादोऽपि सूत्रकारेणाभिः श्रुतिभिर्निरस्तो वेदितव्यः, पारमार्थिकमुख्येक्षणादिगुणयोगि जिज्ञास्यं ब्रह्म, इति स्थापनात्। निर्विशेषवादे हि साक्षित्वम्, अपि, अपारमार्थिकम्। वेदान्तवेद्यं ब्रह्म च जिज्ञास्यतया प्रतिज्ञातम्। तच्च चेतनम् इति

'ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम्'　　　　(ब्र सू १।१।५)

इत्यादिभिः सूत्रैः प्रतिपाद्यते। चेतनत्वं नाम चैतन्यगुणयोगः। अत, ईक्षणगुणविरहिणः प्रधानतुल्यत्वम्, एव। किं च निर्विशेषप्रकाशमात्रब्रह्मवादे तस्य प्रकाशत्वमपि दुरुपपादम्। प्रकाशो हि नाम स्वस्य परस्य च व्यवहारयोग्यतामापादयन् वस्तुविशेषः। निर्विशेषस्य

'This one, the inner Self of all beings, with sins destroyed, divine, refulgent, the one Nārāyana'　　　　(Subalo)

etc

Therefore, the passages dealing with the cause of the world are not competent to propound Pradhāna And therefore, it is established that the highest Purusa Nārāyana who is omniscient, omnipotent, the over-lord, with all tinge of blemish banished away, the great ocean having the flow of hosts of innumerable, unsurpassed and unlimited auspicious qualities is alone the Brahman desired to be known, (and) the only cause of the entire world

For this very reason, the doctrine of Brahman being pure sentiency without any distinctive attributes, also should be known to be brushed aside by the Sūtrakāra by means of these Sruti passages, on account of the establishment of Brahman, which is intended to be known, as associated with the actual non metaphorical reflecting' for, in the doctrine of (Brahman being) without distinctive attributes, being the witness (in the case of Brahman) is not real Further, Brahman known from the Vedanta texts is solemnly declared as being intended to be known And that is propounded as being sentient in the Sūtras beginning with

'On account of the 'reflecting' (the cause of the world is) not (Pradhāna) not referred to in the Srutis'　　　　(Br Sū I 1 5)

'Being sentient' means—association with the quality 'sentiency' Therefore, of one void of the quality 'reflection' there is verily, the same nature as Pradhāna And further, in the doctrine of Brahman being without distinctive attributes its illumined nature is also difficult to explain logically Illumination indeed means a particular entity producing fitness for practical dealing in respect of itself and others On account of the

वस्तुनः, तदुभयरूपत्वाभावात् घटादिवत्, अचित्त्वम्, एव।

तदुभयरूपत्वाभावेऽपि तत्क्षमत्वमस्ति, इति चेत्—तत्, न। तत्क्षमत्वं हि तत्सामर्थ्यम्, एव। सामर्थ्यगुणयोगे हि निर्विशेषवादः परित्यक्तः स्यात्।

अथ श्रुतिप्रामाण्यात्, अयमेको विशेषोऽभ्युपगम्यते, इति चेत्—हन्त तर्हि तत एव सर्वज्ञता सर्वशक्तित्वं सर्वेश्वरेश्वरत्वं सर्वकल्याणगुणाकरत्वं सकलहेयप्रत्यनीकता, इत्यादयः सर्वेऽभ्युपगन्तव्याः। शक्तिमत्त्वं च कार्यविशेषानुगुणत्वम्। तच्च कार्यविशेषैकनिरूपणीयम्। कार्यविशेषस्य निष्प्रमाणकत्वे तदेकनिरूपणीयं शक्तिमत्त्वम्, अपि निष्प्रमाणकं स्यात्। किं च निर्विशेषवस्तुवादिनो वस्तुत्वमपि निष्प्रमाणकम्। प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमस्वानुभवाः सविशेषगोचरा इति पूर्वमेवोक्तम्।

तस्मात्, विचित्रचेतनाचेतनात्मकजगद्रूपेण 'बहु स्याम्,' इति, ईक्षणक्षमः पुरुषोत्तम एव जिज्ञास्यः, इति सिद्धम् ॥ १२ ॥ *ईक्षत्यधिकरणं समाप्तम्* (५)

[125] एवं जिज्ञासितस्य ब्रह्मणः, चेतनभोग्यभूतजडरूपसत्त्वरजस्तमोमयप्रधा-

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absence of having those two forms, in the case of a thing without any distinctive attributes, there would be definitely a non-sentient nature as in the case of jar and others.

If (the objector says) that even in the absence of having those two forms, there is competency for that, (we reply)—that (is) not so. Competency for that is, indeed, just the strength for that. In (admitting) the association with the quality—strength, the doctrine (that Brahman is) void of any distinctive attributes would be (as good as) given up.

Now (if you say) that only this particular attribute is admitted on the authority of the Sruti—Then goodness! for that very reason, omniscience, omnipotence, being the Lord of all lords, being the mine of all auspicious qualities, being the rival of all fit to be abandoned etc.—(all these) ought to be admitted (as well) ! Being possessed of power *means being favourable to (the production of) a particular effect.* And that can be pointed out only from the particular object. If the particular effect is not to be amenable to any means of proof, being possessed of power also to be pointed out by that only, would also be not amenable to any means of proof. And further, for one who holds the doctrine of the entity (Brahman) being without any distinctive attributes, the nature as an entity would also be not amenable to any means of proof. It has been already stated that direct perception, inference, scriptures, self-experience have within their province only (entities) with particular attributes.

Therefore, it is established that the highest Puruṣa alone is fit to be desired to be known, fit for 'reflecting' as in 'let me be many' in the form of the world constituted of various sentient and non-sentient entities. ॥ 12 ॥

Here ends the Īksatyadhikaraṇa (5).

[125] In this manner, has been stated the exclusion of Brahman desired to be known, from Pradhāna constituted of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, of non-sentient nature and that has become the object of enjoyment for the

नात्, व्यावृत्तिः, उक्ता। इदानीं कर्मवश्यात्, त्रिगुणात्मकप्रकृतिसंसर्गनिमित्तनानाविधानन्तदुःखसागरनिमज्जनेन, अशुद्धात्, शुद्धात्, च प्रत्यगात्मनः, अन्यत्, निखिलहेयप्रत्यनीकं निरतिशयानन्दं ब्रह्म, इति प्रतिपाद्यते।

आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात् ॥ १३ ॥ (अधिकरण ६–सूत्राणि १३–२०)

तैत्तिरीया अधीयते—

'स वा एष पुरुषोऽन्नरसमयः' (तै. २।१।१)

इति प्रकृत्य,

'तस्माद्वा एतस्माद्विज्ञानमयात्। अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमयः' (तै. २।५)

इति।

तत्र संदेहः—किमयम्, आनन्दमयो बन्धमोक्षभागिनो जीवशब्दाभिलपनीयात्, अन्यः परमात्मा, उत स एव? इति। किं युक्तम्? प्रत्यगात्मा, इति। कुतः?

'तस्यैष एव शारीर आत्मा' (तै. २।६)

इति, आनन्दमयस्य शारीरत्वश्रवणात्। शारीरो हि शरीरसंबन्धी जीवात्मा।

[126] ननु च जगत्कारणतया प्रतिपादितस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणः सुखप्रतिपत्त्यर्थम्, अन्नमयादीननुक्रम्य तदेव जगत्कारणम्, आनन्दमयः, इत्युपदिशति। जगत्कारणं च

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sentient. Now here is propounded Brahman—the rival of all fit to be abandoned, (and) unsurpassed bliss—as different from an entity subject to Karman, and impure owing to its plunging into the ocean of various infinite miseries caused by the contact with the Prakṛti constituted of the three Guṇas, and different from the pure inmost Ātman, as well.

Constituted of bliss, on account of repetition. ॥ 13 ॥

(Adhikarana 6–Sūtras 13–20)

The followers of the Tittiri school read (lit. study) starting with

'This, Puruṣa here, verily, constituted of the essence of food' (Tait. 2·1·1)

and ending with

'From that constituted of Vijñāna, there is another, the inmost Ātman constituted of bliss.' (Tait. 2·5)

—There (arises this) doubt—Is this 'constituted of bliss,' the highest Ātman, different from the inmost Ātman sharing in bondage and freedom thereof, and being described by the word 'Jīva', or, is he (the inmost Ātman) himself? (Now) what (is the) proper (view)? He is the inmost Ātman; Whence? On account of the statement in the Śruti about him constituted of bliss, as associated with the body—

'Of him, this one, verily, is the embodied Ātman.' (Tait. 2·6)

—The embodied one (is) indeed, the Individual Ātman, in relation with the body.

[126] But I say (says the objector)—The Sruti having begun with 'constituted of food' and others for the sake of easy apprehension of the Highest Brahman that has been propounded as being the cause of the world, instructs that the same cause of the world is constituted of bliss. And it has

'तदैक्षत' (छा. ६।२।३)

इति, ईक्षणश्रवणात् सर्वज्ञः सर्वेश्वर इत्युक्तम् । —सत्यमुक्तम् । तत्, तु जीवान्नातिरिच्यते ।

'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि' (छा. ६।३।२)

'तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो' (छा. ६।८।७)

इति कारणतया निर्दिष्टस्य जीवसामानाधिकरण्यनिर्देशात् । सामानाधिकरण्यं हि, एकत्वप्रतिपादनपरम्, यथा 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः' इत्यादौ । ईक्षापूर्विका च सृष्टिः, चेतनस्य जीवस्योपपद्यते, एव । अतो

'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' (तै. २।१।१)

इति, जीवस्य, अचित्संसर्गवियुक्तं स्वरूपं प्राप्यतया, उपदिश्यते । अचिद्वियुक्तस्य स्वरूपस्य लक्षणम्, इदमुच्यते—

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. २।१।१)

इति । तद्रूपप्राप्तिः, एव हि मोक्षः ।

'न ह वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति । अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः' (छा. ८।१२।१)

इति । अतो जीवस्याविद्यावियुक्तं स्वरूपं प्राप्यतया प्रक्रान्तम्, 'आनन्दमयः,' इत्युपदिश्यते ।

been said that the omniscient over-lord is the cause of the world, on account of the statement in the Śruti about 'reflecting' viz.

'*That reflected.*' (Chā 6·2·3)

—True, (this) has been stated. But that is not over and above the *Jīva on account of the pointing out to the case-co-ordination with Jīva of* that pointed out as the cause, in (passages like)

'*By this Living Self, having subsequently entered, let me manifest names and forms.*' (Chā. 6·3·2)

'*That thou art, (O) Śvetaketu.*' (Chā. 6·8·7)

—Case-co-ordination is indeed, calculated to the propounding of oneness, as in (passages like) 'This (is) the same Devadatta.' Creation preceded by reflection does stand to reason in respect of the sentient Jīva. For this very reason, the nature of Jīva divorced from contact with the non-sentient is declared as being fit to be secured in

'*The Brahman-knower secures the Highest*' (Tait 2·1·1)

—This is spoken of as the definition of the nature (*of Jīva*) divorced from the non-sentient.

'*Existence, Knowledge, Infinite Brahman*' (Tait 2·1·1)

Salvation, indeed, (consists of) definitely the attainment of its nature, as in (the passage)

'*Not indeed, is there the destruction of the agreeable and the disagreeable in the case of one having a body; him not having a body, touch not the agreeable and the disagreeable.*' (Chā. 8·12·1)

Therefore, the nature of Jīva divorced from Avidyā, introduced as being fit to be secured, is spoken of as 'constituted of bliss.'

तथाहि—शाखाचन्द्रन्यायेन, आत्मस्वरूपं दर्शयितुम्, 'अन्नमयः पुरुषः' इति प्रथमं शरीरं निर्दिश्य, तदन्तरभूतं तस्य धारकं 'पञ्चवृत्तिप्राणम्,' तस्याप्यन्तर्भूतं 'मनः' तदन्तर्भूतां च 'बुद्धि'—'प्राणमयः' 'मनोमयः' 'विज्ञानमयः'—इति तत्र तत्र बुद्ध्यवतरणक्रमेण निर्दिश्य, सर्वान्तरभूतं 'जीवात्मानम्'—

'अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमयः'   (तै. २।५)

इति, उपदिश्य, आन्तरात्मपरम्परां समापयति। अतो जीवात्मस्वरूपमेव

'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति'   (तै. २।१।१)

इति प्रकान्तं ब्रह्म, तदेव, 'आनन्दमयः' इत्युपदिष्टम्, इति निश्चीयते।

[127] ननु च,

'ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा'   (तै. २।५)

इति, आनन्दमयादन्यत्, ब्रह्म, इति प्रतीयते। नैवम्। ब्रह्मैव स्वस्वभावविशेषेण पुरुषविधत्वरूपितं शिरःपक्षपुच्छरूपेण व्यपदिश्यते। यथा, अन्नमयो देहावयवी स्वस्मादनतिरिक्तैः स्वावयवैरेव

'तस्येदमेव शिरः'   (तै. २।१)

To explain the same—In order to demonstrate the nature of Ātman according to the maxim of 'the branch and the moon,' having first pointed out to the body as Purusa constituted of food (and) having pointed out the Prāṇa with his five functions lying within, and the supporter of that, (and) having pointed out in succession, in order to bring it home in different phases, the Prāna with his five functions, lying within and the supporter of that (i. e. the body), the 'mind' lying within even that (Prānamaya Atman) and the 'Buddhi' lying within that (Manomaya Atman) as 'constituted of Prāṇa' 'constituted of mind' 'constituted of Vijñāna', (and) having declared the Jīvātman lying within all, as

'There is another, the inmost Ātman, constituted of bliss.'   (Tait. 2·5)

(the Sruti) concludes the series of Atmans within. Therefore, it is ascertained that Brahman is spoken of as 'constituted of bliss', which is introduced as the nature of the Jīvātman himself, in

'Brahman knower secures.'   (Tait 2·1·1)

[127] But I say (says the objector)—It is apprehended that Brahman is something else than the one 'constituted of bliss', in (the passage)

'Brahman, the tail, the stability'   (Tait. 2·5)

—(We reply)—Not so. Brahman itself, as possessed of the human form with its peculiar characteristics, is pointed out in the form of the head, the sides, and the support. Just as (the Ātman) constituted of food, with the body and the limbs, has been pointed with his limbs themselves not different from himself, as having the head, the sides and the support in (the passage)

'Of him, this alone, the head,'   (Tait. 2·1)

इत्यादिना शिरःपक्षपुच्छवत्तया निदर्शितः, तथा, आनन्दमयं ब्रह्म, अपि स्वस्मादनतिरिक्तैः प्रियादिभिर्निदर्शितम्। तत्र, अवयवत्वेन रूपितानां प्रियमोदप्रमोदानन्दानाम्, आश्रयतया, अखण्डरूपम्, आनन्दमयं

'ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा' (तै. २।५)

इत्युच्यते। यदि च, आनन्दमयादन्यत्, ब्रह्म, अभविष्यत्, एतस्मादानन्दमयादन्योऽन्तर आत्मा ब्रह्म—इत्यपि निरदेक्ष्यत। न चैवं निर्दिश्यते। एतदुक्तं भवति—

'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' (तै. २।१।१)

इति प्रक्रान्तं ब्रह्म,

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. २।१।१)

इति लक्षणतः सकलेतरव्यावृत्ताकारं प्रतिपाद्य, तदेव

'तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मनः' (तै. २।१।१)

इति, आत्मशब्देन निर्दिश्य, तस्य सर्वान्तरात्मत्वेन, आत्मत्वं व्यञ्जयद्वाक्यम्, अन्नमयादिषु तत्तदन्तरात्मतया, आत्मत्वेन निर्दिष्टान् प्राणमयादीनतिक्रम्य,

'अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमयः' (तै. २।५)

इति, आत्मशब्देन निर्देशम्, आनन्दमये समापयति। अतः, आत्मशब्देन प्रक्रान्तं ब्रह्म, आनन्दमयम्, इति निर्श्चीयते, इति।

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in the same way, Brahman also constituted of bliss is pointed out with (qualities) 'dear' etc. not different from itself. There in (the passage)

'Brahman, the tail, the stability.' (Tait. 2·5)

is spoken of, the one constituted of bliss, possessed of an undivided form, as being the resort of 'being dear', 'joy', 'great joy' (and) 'bliss' shown up as the limbs. If Brahman had been something else than one 'constituted of bliss', it would have been also pointed out as Brahman, another inmost Ātman, other than this Ātman here, constituted of bliss; but it is not pointed out thus. This is what is intended to be said—

Having propounded Brahman introduced in the passage—

'The Brahman-knower secures the Highest.' (Tait. 2·1·1)

as having the form of exclusion from everything else, from the definition

'Existence, Knowledge, Infinite Brahman.' (Tait 2·1·1)

—having pointed out the same by the word 'Ātman' in the passage

'From that, verily, from this Ātman,' (Tait. 2·1·1)

the passage suggesting its nature as Ātman owing to its being the Ātman within all, having gone beyond the 'constituted of Prāṇa' etc. pointed out as Ātman as being the various inmost Ātmans within the 'constituted of food,' etc., finishes off the reference as Atman, with the 'constituted of bliss' in the passage —

'There is another, the inmost Ātman, constituted of bliss.' (Tait. 2·5)

And so, Brahman introduced by the word 'Atman' is ascertained as 'constituted of bliss.'

[128] ननु च,

'ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा' (तै. २।५)

इत्युक्त्वा

'असन्नेव स भवति, असद्ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत् ।
अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्वेद सन्तमेनं ततो विदुः ॥' (तै. २।६)

इति ब्रह्मज्ञानाज्ञानाभ्याम्, आत्मनः सद्भावासद्भावौ दर्शयति, न, आनन्दमयज्ञानाज्ञानाभ्याम् । न च, आनन्दमयस्य प्रियमोदादिरूपेण सर्वलोकस्य सद्भावासद्भावज्ञानाशङ्का युक्ता । अतः, न, आनन्दमयमधिकृत्य, अयं श्लोक उदाहृतः । तस्मात्, आनन्दमयादन्यत्, ब्रह्म—नैवम् ।

'इदं पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा' (तै. २।१)
'पृथिवी पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा' (तै. २।२)
'अथर्वाङ्गिरसः पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा' (तै. २।३)
'महः पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा' (तै. ३।३)

इति, एवमुक्त्वा तत्र तत्रोदाहृताः

'अन्नाद्वै प्रजाः प्रजायन्ते' (तै. २।२)

इत्यादयः श्लोकाः, यथा न 'पुच्छ'मात्रप्रतिपादनपराः, अपि तु, अन्नमयादिपुरुषमात्रप्रतिपादनपराः; एवम्, अत्रापि, आनन्दमयस्य, अयं

'असन्नेव' (तै. २।६)

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[128] But I say (says the objector) — Having stated

'Brahman, the tail, the stability' (Tait. 2·5)

(the Sruti) points out in (the passage)

'If he knows Brahman as non-existent, he becomes non-existent itself; if he knows that Brahman is, then they know him to be existent.' (Tait. 2·6)

to the existence and non-existence of the Ātman by the knowledge and ignorance of Brahman, and not by the knowledge and ignorance of (Brahman) as 'constituted of bliss'. And further, it is not proper that there should be doubt about the knowledge of the existence and the non-existence of the one 'constituted of bliss' (and well-known) in the whole world in the form of 'dear', 'joy' etc. And therefore, this verse has not been cited referring to the one 'constituted of bliss'. Therefore, Brahman is something else than the one 'constituted of bliss.' — Not so.

'This (is) the tail, the stability.' (Tait. 2·1)
'Pṛthivī (is) the tail, the stability.' (Tait 2·2)
'Atharvāngirasa (is) the tail, the stability.' (Tait. 2·3)
'Mahas (is) the tail, the stability.' (Tait. 3·3)

— this having been stated, just as the verses quoted in various places such as

'From food, verily, beings are brought into being.' (Tait. 2·2)

are not intent upon propounding (Brahman) only as 'the tail', but are intent upon propounding only the Puruṣa constituted of food etc.; in the same manner the verse

'Being, verily, Asat' (Tait. 2·6)

इति श्लोको न, आनन्दमयव्यातिरिक्तस्य पुच्छस्य। आनन्दमयस्यैव ब्रह्मत्वेऽपि प्रियमोदादिरूपेण रूपितस्य, अपरिच्छिन्नानन्दमयस्य सद्भावासद्भावज्ञानाज्ञानशङ्का युक्तैव। पुच्छब्रह्मणोऽपि, अपरिच्छिन्नानन्दतयैव हि, असिद्धता।

शिरःप्रभृत्यवयवित्वाभावात्, ब्रह्मणः, न, आनन्दमयं ब्रह्म, इति चेत्—ब्रह्मणः पुच्छत्वप्रतिष्ठाभावात्, पुच्छम्, अपि ब्रह्म न भवेत्।

अथ, अविद्यापरिकल्पितस्य वस्तुनः, तस्याश्च, आश्रयभूतत्वात्, ब्रह्मणः 'पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा' इति रूपणमात्रम्,—इत्युच्येत—हन्त, तर्हि, असुखाद्व्यावृत्तस्य, आनन्दमयस्य ब्रह्मण' प्रियशिरस्त्वादिरूपणं भविष्यति। एवं च,

'सत्य ज्ञानमनन्त ब्रह्म' (तै २।१)

इति, विकारास्पदजडपरिच्छिन्नवस्त्वन्तरात्, व्यावृत्तस्य, असुखाद्व्यावृत्तिः, आनन्दमयः,—इत्युपदिश्यते। अत', च, अखण्डैकरसानन्दरूपे ब्रह्मणि, 'आनन्दमयः' इति मयट् 'प्राणमयः' इव स्वार्थिको द्रष्टव्यः। तस्मात्, अविद्यापरिकल्पितविविधविचित्रदेवादिभेदभिन्नस्य जीवात्मनः स्वाभाविकं स्वरूपम्, अखण्डैकरसं सुखैकतानम् 'आनन्दमयः' इति, उच्यते,—इति, आनन्दमयः प्रत्यगात्मा, इति। एवं प्राप्ते,—प्रचक्ष्महे—

[129] 'आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात्'। आनन्दमयः परमात्मा। कुतः? अभ्यासात्।

about 'constituted of bliss is not concerning 'the tail' over and above the 'constituted of bliss- Even though the 'constituted of bliss' is Brahman, it is certainly proper (to entertain) the doubt about the knowledge and ignorance respectively of the existence and the non-existence of the 'constituted of infinite bliss' and indicated as having the form 'dear' (and) 'joy' etc For Brahman as 'the tail' cannot be established merely by being infinite bliss.

If it be argued—On account of the absence of being possessed of limbs such as head etc, in respect of Brahman, Brahman is not constituted of bliss—(we reply)—Brahman would not be 'the tail' as well, on account of the absence of its being the tail or the stability

If it be argued—Brahman is merely indicated as 'the tail (and) the stability', on account of the thing being imagined by Avidyā and Brahman being its resort—(we reply)—Goodness then! In the case of Brahman constituted of bliss, and excluded from non-happiness, there would be indication' of being 'the head', 'dear' etc And thus is described in

'*Existence, Knowledge, Infinite Brahman*' (Tait 2 1)

the exclusion from non happiness of Brahman excluded from everything else subject to modification, non-sentient (and) finite, as 'constituted of bliss' And therefore, in the case of Brahman of the form of being undivided, uniform, and bliss, *Mayat* in 'Ānandamaya' should be taken in the same sense as the (original) word as in 'Prāṇamaya'. And therefore, the original undivided uniform nature continuously associated with happiness, of the Jīvātman distinct owing to various and variegated distinctions such as god etc, superimposed by Avidyā is spoken of as 'constituted of bliss'—and so the 'constituted of bliss' is the inmost Ātman This (prima facie view) being reached, we say (in reply)—

[129] 'Constituted of bliss on account of repetition' The Anandamaya (is) the Paramātman How? On account of repetition

'सैपानन्दस्य मीमांसा भवति' (तै २।८)

इति, आरभ्य—

'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते' (तै २।९)

इत्येवम्, अन्तेन वाक्येन शतगुणितोत्तरक्रमेण निरतिशयदशाशिरस्कः, अभ्यस्यमानः, आनन्दः, अनन्तदुःखमिश्रपरिमितसुखलवभागिनि जीवात्मनि, असंभवन्, निखिलहेयप्रत्यनीकं कल्याणैकतानं सकलेतरविलक्षणं परमात्मानमेव स्वाश्रयम्, आवेदयति। यथा, आह—

'तस्माद्वा एतस्माद्विज्ञानमयात् । अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमयः' (तै २।५)

इति। विज्ञानमयो हि जीवः, न बुद्धिमात्रम्। मयट्प्रत्ययेन व्यतिरेकप्रतीतेः। प्राणमये तु, अगत्या स्वार्थिकः, आश्रीयते। इह तु तद्वतो जीवस्य संभवात्, न, अनर्थकत्वं न्याय्यम्। बद्धो मुक्तश्च प्रत्यगात्मा ज्ञाता, एव, इति, अभ्यधिष्महि। प्राणमयादौ तु मयडर्थासंभवोऽनन्तरमेव वक्ष्यते।

कथं तर्हि विज्ञानमयविषये श्लोके

'विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते' (तै २।५)

In the passage beginning with

'*This is the consideration of Ānanda*'. (Tait 2 8)

and ending with the sentence

'*From whom words turn back*' (Tait 2 9)

'Ānanda' being repeated, in the order in which the succeeding is multiplied a hundred fold, culminating in an unsurpassed condition, not possible to exist in the Jivātman experiencing an iota of limited happiness mixed with endless misery, proclaims as its resort the Paramātman himself, the rival of everything fit to be abandoned, continuously associated with the auspicious (and)different from everything else As says (the Sruti)—

'*From this here, constituted of Vijñāna, there (is) another inmost Ātman constituted of bliss*' (Tait 2 5)

—Vijñānamaya is indeed the Jiva, not merely intelligence, on account of the apprehension of something over and above, by (the use of) the suffix 'Mayat' In (the case of the expression) 'Pranamaya', however, (the suffix) is taken as referring to the same sense, there being no other course (i e alternative) In the present case (of Vijñānamaya), however, there being the possibility of Jiva possessed of that (Vijñana), it is not reasonable to take that (suffix) as meaningless (i e having no additional meaning) We have already stated that the inmost Ātman, whether in bondage or released (from the bondage) is the Knower himself Impossibility of the sense of the 'Mayat' (suffix) in 'Prānamaya' etc. would be stated immediately below

How then, does the use of merely the word 'Vijñāna' stand to reason in the passage—

'*Vijñāna performs the sacrifice*' (Tait 2 5)

इति केवलविज्ञानशब्दोपादानम्, उपपद्यते? ज्ञातुरेवात्मनः स्वरूपमपि स्वप्रकाशतया · विज्ञानम्, इत्युच्यते, इति न दोषः। ज्ञानैकनिरूपणीयत्वाच्च ज्ञातुः स्वरूपस्य। स्वरूपनिरूपणधर्मशब्दो हि धर्ममुखेन धर्मिस्वरूपम्, अपि प्रतिपादयति गवादिशब्दवत्।

'कृत्यल्युटो बहुलम्' (पा. सू. ३।३।११३)

इति वा कर्तरि ल्युडार्थीयते। नन्द्यादित्वं वाश्रित्य

'नन्दिग्रहि' (पा. सू. ३।१।१३४)

इत्यादिना कर्तरि ल्युः। अत एव

'विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते कर्माणि तनुतेऽपि च' (तै. २।५)

इति यज्ञादिकर्तृत्वं विज्ञानस्य श्रूयते। बुद्धिमात्रस्य हि न कर्तृत्वं संभवति। अचेतनेषु हि चेतनोपकरणभूतेषु विज्ञानमयात्प्राचीनेषु, अन्नमयादिषु न चेतनधर्मभूतं कर्तृत्वं श्रूयते। अत एव चेतनम्, अचेतनं च स्वासाधारणैः, निलयनत्वानिलयनत्वादिभिः, धर्मविशेषैः, विभज्य निर्दिश्यद्वाक्यं

'विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च' (तै. २।६)

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in the verse referring to Vijñānamaya?—(The answer is)—Even the nature of the Ātman although (*eva*) the knower, is spoken of as Vijñāna owing to his self-illumining nature—and so, there is no flaw (in our statement) on account of the nature of the knower being fit to be pointed out by knowledge alone; for, the word denoting the characteristic pointing out to the nature (of an object), propounds also the nature of the 'Dharmin' through the 'Dharma', like the word 'Go' and others; or the affix 'Lyu' is resorted to in the sense of an 'agent' in accordance with (the Sūtra)

'The Kṛtya affix, Lyu, has more than one (sense)' (Pā. 3·3·113)

Or, by taking this (root 'Jñā') to be included in (the group of roots) beginning with 'Nanda', there is the affix 'Lyu' in the sense of the agent in accordance with (the Sūtra)

'(The group of roots beginning with) Nand and (the group of roots beginning with) Grah'. (Pā. 3·1·134)

And therefore, the nature of an agent for the sacrifice and others in the case of Vijñāna is stated in the Śruti—

'Vijñāna performs the sacrifice, and also performs actions.' (Tait. 2·5)

For, the nature of an agent is impossible in the case of mere intelligence. For, in the case of the non-sentient 'Annamaya' etc. that are prior to the 'Vijñānamaya' and which are the instruments (of enjoyment) for the sentient—the nature of the agent—the characteristic of a sentient—is not mentioned in the Srutis. Therefore, for this very reason, the passage pointing to the sentient and the non-sentient, having differentiated (them) on the basis of special attributes peculiar to themselves, such as being the abode and not being the abode, speaks of the sentient having that (Vijñāna) as its 'Guna' by the word 'Vijñāna' in

'Vijñāna and Avijñāna'. (Tait. 2·6)

इति विज्ञानशब्देन तद्गुणं चेतनं वदति । तथा, अन्तर्यामिब्राह्मणे

'यो विज्ञाने तिष्ठन्' (बृ. ३।७।२२)

इति, अस्य काण्वपाठगतस्य पर्यायस्य स्थाने 'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्' इति पर्यायमधीयाना माध्यन्दिनाः काण्वपाठगतविज्ञानशब्दनिर्दिष्टो जीवात्मा, इति स्फुटीकुर्वन्ति । 'विज्ञानम्' इति च नपुंसकलिङ्गं वस्तुत्वाभिप्रायम् । तदेवं विज्ञानमयात्, जीवात्, अन्यः, तदन्तरः परमात्मा, आनन्दमयः । यद्यपि

'विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते' (तै. २।५)

इति श्लोके 'ज्ञान'मात्रम्, एव, उपादीयते, न 'ज्ञाता'—तथापि-

'अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः' (तै. २।४)

इति तद्वान् ज्ञातैवोपदिश्यते ।

'यथान्नाद्वै प्रजाः प्रजायन्ते' (तै. २।२)

इति, अत्र श्लोके केवलान्नोपादानेऽपि

'स वा एष पुरुषोऽन्नरसमयः' (तै. २।१)

इति, अत्र नान्नमात्रं निर्दिष्टम् । अपि तु तन्मयस्तद्विकारः । एतत्सर्वं हृदि निधाय सूत्रकारः स्वयमेव

'भेदव्यपदेशात्' (ब्र. सू. १।१।१८)

इत्यनन्तरमेव वदति ।

Similarly, the followers of the Mādhyandina school reading the variant 'Who staying in the Atman,' in place of the reading in the Kāṇva recension,

'Who staying in the Vijñāna', (Br 3·7·22)

in the Brāhmaṇa-passage dealing with the Inner Controller, make explicit that the one pointed out by the word 'Vijñāna' in the Kānva recension is the Jīvātman. And the neuter gender in 'Vijñānam' is intended to show its nature as an entity. Therefore, in this way, the inmost and other than the Jiva constituted of Vijñāna, is the Paramātman constituted of bliss. Although in the verse

'Vijñāna performs the sacrifice'. (Tait. 2·5)

only 'Knowledge' is to be understood, not the 'Knower', still because of (the passage)

'There is another Inmost Ātman constituted of Vijñāna' (Tait 2·4)

the Knower possessed of that (Vijñāna) is pointed out. Just as in the verse

'From food, verily, beings are brought into being' (Tait. 2 2)

even though only 'food' (by the word 'Anna') is understood, only 'Anna' is not pointed out in the passage

'He, verily, this one, the Purusa constituted of food'. (Tait. 2·1)

but on the other hand, 'constituted of that', 'modification of that'—Having borne all this in mind, the Sūtrakāra himself would be speaking immediately after (in the Sūtra)—

'And on account of the reference to difference'. (Br Sū. I 1·18)

यदुक्तं जगत्कारणतया निर्दिष्टस्य,

'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य' (छा. ६।३।२)

'तत्त्वमसि' (छा. ६।८।७)

इति च जीवसामानाधिकरण्यनिर्देशात्, जगत्कारणमपि जीवस्वरूपान्नातिरिच्यते, इति कृत्वा जीवस्यैव स्वरूपं

—*'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्'* (तै. २।१)

इति प्रक्रान्तम्, असुखाद्व्यावृत्तत्त्वेन, आनन्दमय इत्युपदिश्यते—तदयुक्तम्। जीवस्य चेतनत्वे सत्यपि

'तदैक्षत। बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति। तत्तेजोऽसृजत' (छा. ६।२।३)

इति च स्वसंकल्पपूर्वकानन्तविचित्रसृष्टियोगानुपपत्तेः। शुद्धावस्थस्यापि हि तस्य सर्गादि-जगद्व्यापारासंभवो

'जगद्व्यापारवर्जम्' (ब्र. सू. ४।४।१७)

'भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाद्' (ब्र. सू. ४।४।२१)

इत्यत्र, उपपादयिष्यते। कारणभूतस्य ब्रह्मणो जीवस्वरूपत्वानभ्युपगमेनैव

'अनेन जीवेनात्मना' (छा. ६।३।२)

As to what has been said (by the Pūrvapakṣin) viz.—Even the cause of the world is not over and above the nature of the Jīva on account of the pointing out to the case-co-ordination with Jīva in the case of one pointed out as the cause of the world in

'By this Living Self, having subsequently entered'. (Chā. 6·3·2)
'That thou art' (Chā. 6·8·7)

—having taken this into account, the nature of Jīva himself introduced in the passage

'The Brahman-knower secures the Highest' (Tait. 2·1)

is spoken of as 'Ānandamaya' owing to its being excluded from non-happiness.—(All) this is improper, on account of the impossibility of the association of the Jīva though sentient, with endless (and) variegated creation preceded by self-thinking in

'It reflected,— Let me be many, let me procreate—It created Tejas'. (Chā. 6·2·3)

The impossibility of activity connected with the world, like creation etc. in the case of Jīva even in the pure state, would again be set forth (in the Sūtras)—

'Barring the operation with the world' (Br. Sū. IV. 4·17)

'And on account of the characteristic of the enjoyment alone being the same'. (Br. Sū. IV. 4·21)

If it be objected— How can stand to reason the reference in the case-co-ordination in

'By this Living Self' (Chā. 6·3·2)

' तत्त्वमसि '　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(छा ६।८।७)

इति सामानाधिकरण्यनिर्देशः कथमुपपद्यते ? इति चेत्—कथं वा निरस्तनिखिलदोषगन्धस्य सत्यसंकल्पस्य सर्वज्ञस्य सर्वशक्तेः, अनवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणगणस्य सकलकारणभूतस्य ब्रह्मणो नानाविधानन्तदुःखाकरकर्माधीनचिन्तितनिमिषितादिसकलप्रवृत्तिजीवस्वरूपत्वम् ?

अन्यतरस्य मिथ्यात्वेन, उपपद्यते, इति चेत्—कस्य ? भोः किं हेयसंबन्धस्य, किं वा हेयप्रत्यनीककल्याणैकतानस्वभावस्य ? हेयप्रत्यनीककल्याणैकतानस्य ब्रह्मण', अविद्याश्रयत्वेन हेयसंबन्धप्रतिभासो मिथ्यारूपः, इति चेत्—विप्रतिषिद्धम्, इदमभिधीयते। ब्रह्मणो हेयप्रत्यनीककल्याणैकतानत्वम्, अविद्याश्रयत्वेन, अनन्तदुःखविषयमिथ्याप्रतिभासाश्रयत्वं च, इति। अविद्याश्रयत्वं तत्कार्यदुःखप्रतिभासाश्रयत्वं चैव हि हेयसंबन्ध'। तत्संबन्धित्वं तत्प्रत्यनीकत्व च विरुद्धमेव। तथापि तस्य मिथ्यात्वात्, न विरोधः, इति मा वोचः। मिथ्याभूतम्, अपि, अपुरुषार्थ एव यन्निरसनाय सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते, इति ब्रूषे। निरसनीयापुरुषार्थयोगश्च हेयप्रत्यनीककल्याणैकतानतया विरुध्यते।

'*That thou art*'　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(Chā 6 8 7)

if Brahman that has become the cause, is not just admitted to have the nature of the Jiva ?— (We ask)— How can there be the nature of the Jiva, the mine of different kinds of endless miseries, dependent upon Karman, associated with all activity, thinking blinking etc , in the case of Brahman from which even a tinge of blemish is banished away, which is w th thoughts fulfilled, omniscient, omnipotent, possessed of hosts of unlimited unsurpassed and innumerable auspicious qualities, (and) which has become the cause of everything ?

If it is argued that it stands to reason owing to the false nature of the other—(we ask)—Whose ? My dear sir, (is there the false nature) of the relation with things fit to be abandoned, or of (Brahman) possessed of an auspicious uniform nature, the rival of things fit to be abandoned ? If it be said that (in the case) of Brahman uniformly auspicious and the rival of things fit to be abandoned, the appearance of the relation with things fit to be abandoned is of a false nature owing to its being the resort of the beginningless Avidyā,—(we reply)—It is contradiction in terms that you are saying —viz in the case of Brahman (1) being of uniformly auspicious nature and the rival of things fit to be abandoned and (2) being the resort of the false appearance referring to endless miseries owing to its being the resort of Avidyā For, a relation with things fit to be abandoned is indeed, being the abode of Avidyā, and being the resort of the appearance of misery, the effect thereof Being related to that and being the rival of that is, verily, contradictory Still, do not say that there is no contradiction on account of its false nature You yourself say that even when that is regarded as false, that is indeed, not the human purpose in life, for the demolishing of which the Vedānta texts are commenced The association of what is not the human purpose in life to be demolished, is contradicted by being uniformly auspicious and being the rival of things fit to be abandoned

किं कुर्मः ?

'येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति' (छा. ६।१।१)

इति, एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं प्रतिज्ञाय,

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' (छा. ६।२।१)

इत्यादिना निखिलजगदेककारणतां

'तदैक्षत बहु स्याम्' (छा. ६।२।३)

इति, सत्यसंकल्पतां च सर्वज्ञस्य सर्वशक्तेः, अनवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणस्य सकलकारणभूतस्य ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्य, तस्यैव ब्रह्मणः

'तत्त्वमसि' (छा. ६।८।७)

इति, सामानाधिकरण्येन, अनन्तदुःखाश्रयजीवैक्यं प्रतिपादितम्। तदन्यथानुपपत्त्या ब्रह्मण एव, अविद्याश्रयादि परिकल्पनीयम्, इति चेत्—श्रुतोपपत्तयेऽप्यनुपपन्नं विरुद्धं च, न कल्पनीयम्। अथ, हेयसंबन्ध एव पारमार्थिकः, कल्याणैकतानता तु मिथ्याभूता—हन्त, एवं तापत्रयाभिहतचेतनोज्जिजीविषया प्रवृत्तं शास्त्रं तापत्रयाभिहतिरेव तस्य पारमार्थिकी, कल्याणैकतानस्वभावस्तु भ्रान्तिकल्पितः, इति बोधयत्, सम्यगुज्जीवयति।

अथ, एतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षया ब्रह्मणो निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रस्वरूपातिरिक्तजीवत्वदुःखि-

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If (it were argued)—What shall we do? Having solamnly declared the knowledge of all by the knowledge of one in (the passage)—

'By which the unheard of (becomes) heard' (Chā. 6·1·1)

and having propounded in (the passage)—

'Existence, alone, my dear, was all this in the beginning'. (Chā. 6·2·1)

being the only cause of the entire world and the nature of having thoughts fulfilled in (the passage)

'It reflected— Let me be many'. (Chā 6·2·3)

in the case of Brahman the omniscient, omnipotent, with unlimited, unsurpassed (and) innumerable auspicious qualities, (and) which has become the cause of all, oneness of that same Brahman with Jīva, the resort of endless misery, has been propounded by means of the case-co-ordination in (the passage)

'That thou art'. (Chā. 6·8·7)

Owing to the impossibility of accounting for it otherwise, being the resort of Avidyā etc. has to be fancied in the case of Brahman—(If the Pūrvapakṣin says so, we reply)—Even in order to make the Śruti passage reasonable, anything unreasonable or contradictory should not be imagined. If on the other hand, the relation alone with the thing fit to be abandoned is real, but the uniform auspicious nature is false—Goodness! then the Śāstra commenced with the desire of reviving the sentient one struck down by the three torments would be reviving (him) very well (indeed), enlightening him—Being struck by the three torments in his case is real, while the uniform auspicious nature is fancied by illusion!

Now, if with a desire to avoid this blemish it be argued—that being miserable, (and) being the Jiva over and above the attributeless and pure

त्यादिकं सत्यसंकल्पत्वकल्याणगुणाकरत्वजगत्कारणत्वाद्यपि मिथ्याभूतम्, इति कल्पनीयम्, इति चेत्—अहो, भवतां वाक्यार्थपर्यालोचनकुशलता! एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञानं सर्वस्य मिथ्यात्वे सर्वस्य ज्ञातव्यस्याभावाद्, न संपत्स्यते। यथा-एकविज्ञानं परमार्थविषयं तथैव सर्वविज्ञानम्, अपि यदि परमार्थविषयं तदन्तर्गतं च तदा तज्ज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम्, इति शक्यते वक्तुम्। न हि परमार्थशुक्तिज्ञानेन तदाश्रयम्, अपरमार्थरजतं ज्ञातं भवति।

[130] अथ, उच्येत—एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञाया अयमर्थः—निर्विशेषवस्तुमात्रम् एव सत्यम्, अन्यत्, असत्यम्—इति। न तर्हि,

'येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातम्' (छा. ६।१।१)

इति श्रूयेत। येन श्रुतेनाश्रुतमपि श्रुतं भवति, इति ह्यस्य वाक्यस्यार्थः। कारणतयोपलक्षितस्य निर्विशेषवस्तुमात्रस्यैव सद्भावश्चेत्प्रतिज्ञात',

'यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातम्' (छा ६।१।१)

इति दृष्टान्तोऽपि न घटते। तत्र मृत्पिण्डविज्ञानेन हि तद्विकारस्य ज्ञातता निदर्शिता। तत्रापि तद्विकारस्यासत्यता, अभिहिता, इति चेत्—मृद्विकारस्य रज्जुसर्पादिवदसत्यत्वं शुश्रूषो', असिद्धम्, इति प्रतिज्ञातार्थसंभावनाप्रदर्शनाय,

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consciousness etc, (and) having thoughts fulfilled, being the mine of auspicious qualities, (and) being the cause of the world etc. also in the case of Brahman sohuld be regarded as false—Oh! what (marvellous) skill of your honour in carefully looking into the meaning of a passage! The solemn declaration of the knowledge of all by the knowledge of one, would not be feasible, on account of the absence of everything to be known, if everything is to have a false nature! As the knowledge of one relates to Reality, if exactly in the same way, the knowledge of all were to relate to Reality, (and) were to be included in it, then (only) would it be possible to say that by that knowledge, there is the knowledge of all Not, indeed, by the knowledge of the real conch-shell does its resort, the unreal silver, become known!

[130] If it be (further) said—This is the import of the solemn declaration of 'the knowledge of all by the knowledge of one'—The attributeless thing is the only Reality everything else is unreal—In that case it would not have been stated in the Sruti—

'By which the unheard of becomes heard, the unthought of, thought (and) the unknown, known' (Chā 6 1 1)

The sense of the passage is indeed—when the thing is heard, an unheard thing becomes heard. If the existence of merely an attributeless thing alone characterised as being the cause, is solemnly declared, (then in that case) even the illustrative instance

'Just as, my dear, by a lump of clay everything constituted of clay (becomes) known' (Cha 6 1 1)

would not fit in There (in the illustrative instance) indeed, has been pointed out by the knowledge of a lump of clay, the known-ness of its modification If it be argued that there also has been stated the unreal nature of its modification,—(we reply)—The unreal nature of the clay-modification, is not

'यथा सोम्य' (छा. ६।१।१)

इति प्रसिद्धवदुपन्यासो न युज्यते। न च तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यजन्यज्ञानोत्पत्तेः प्राग्विकार, जातस्य, असत्यतामापादयत्, तर्कानुगृहीतं, अननुगृहीतं वा प्रमाणमुपलभामहे, इति-अयमर्थः—

'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः' (ब्र. सू. २।१।१५)

इत्यत्र वक्ष्यते।

तथा—

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (छा. ६।२।१)

'तदैक्षत। बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति। तत्तेजोऽसृजत' (छा. ६।२।३)

'हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि' (छा. ६।३।२)

'सन्मूलाः सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सदायतनाः सत्प्रतिष्ठाः' (छा. ६।८।४)

'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम्' (छा. ६।८।७)

इत्यादिना, अस्य जगतः सदात्मकता, सृष्टेः पूर्वकाले नामरूपविभागप्रहाणं, जगदुत्पत्तौ सच्छब्दवाच्यस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वव्यतिरिक्तनिमित्तान्तरानपेक्षत्वं, सृष्टिकाले, अहमेव, अनन्त-

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a proved thing for the hearer, like that of the rope-serpent—and so is improper the introduction as if well-established in the form

'*Just as, my dear*' (Chā. 6·1·1)

for illustrating the possibility of the solemnly declared import. And (further) we do not come across (any) means of proof, whether favoured (i. e. supported) or not favoured by logical reasoning, pointing out to the unreal nature of the multitude of modifications, prior to the rise of knowledge produced by passages like 'that thou art'—this import would be stated in (the Sūtra)

'*That being not different, on account of the words* '*Ārambhana*' *etc.*' (Br. Sū. II. 1·15)

Similarly, by

'*Existence alone, my dear, was all this in the beginning, one alone, without a second.*' (Chā. 6·2·1)

'*That reflected,—Let me be many, may I procreate. It created Tejas.*' (Chā. 6·2·3)

'*Good, I, by this Living Self, having subsequently entered these three divinities, let me manifest names and forms*'. (Chā. 6·3·2)

'*Dear one, all these beings have their root in Sat, have their abode in Sat and have their stability in Sat.*' (Chā. 6·8·4)

'*All this has that for the Ātman.*' (Chā. 6·8·7)

etc. have been propounded many endless particularities which could be known only from the Sāstra, such as—the world having the Sat as its Ātman, the abandonment of division in name and form at the time prior to creation, not being dependent on a cause over and above itself, on the part of Brahman expressed by the word 'Sat', in (the matter of) the creation of the world, the particular thought (of Brahman) not common to others viz. I

स्थिरत्रसरूपेण 'बहु स्याम्' इति, अनन्यसाधारणः संकल्पविशेषो, यथासंकल्पम्, अनन्तविचित्रतत्त्वानां विलक्षणक्रमविशेषविशिष्टा सृष्टिः, समस्तेष्वचेतनेषु वस्तुषु स्वात्मकजीवानुप्रवेशेन, अनन्तनामरूपव्याकरणं, स्वव्यतिरिक्तस्य समस्तस्य स्वमूलत्वं स्वायतनत्वं स्वप्रवर्त्यत्वं, स्वेनैव जीवनं स्वप्रतिष्ठितत्वम्, इत्यादि—अनन्तविशेषाः शास्त्रैकसमाधिगम्याः प्रतिपादिताः। तत्संबन्धितया प्रकरणान्तरेषु, अपि, अपहतपाप्मत्वादिनिरस्तनिखिलदोषतासर्वज्ञतासर्वेश्वरत्वसत्यकामत्वसत्यसंकल्पत्वसर्वानन्दकरणानिरातिशयानन्दादयः सकलेतरप्रमाणाविषयाः सहस्रशः प्रतिपादिताः। एवम्, अनन्यगोचरानन्तविशेषणविशिष्टप्रकृतब्रह्मपरामर्शितच्छब्दस्य निर्विशेषवस्तुमात्रोपदेशपरत्वम्, असंगतत्वेन, उन्मत्तप्रलपितायते। त्वंपदं च संसारिविशिष्टजीववाचि। तस्यापि निर्विशेषस्वरूपोपस्थापनपरत्वे स्वार्थः परित्यक्तः स्यात्। निर्विशेषप्रकाशस्वरूपस्य च वस्तुनो हि, अविद्यया तिरोधानं स्वरूपनाशप्रसङ्गादिभिर्न संभवति, इति पूर्वम्, एवोक्तम्। एवं च सति समानाधिकरणप्रवृत्तयोस्तत्त्वमिति द्वयोरपि पदयोर्मुख्यार्थपरित्यागेन लक्षणा च समाश्रयणीया।

[131] अथ, उच्येत—समानाधिकरणप्रवृत्तानाम्, एकार्थप्रतिपादनपरतया

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myself may be many in endless movable and immovable form, at the time of creation, creation in conformity with the thought, of entities endless (and) variegated, characterised by undefined, particular order, the manifestation of the endless names (and) forms by the entering within all the non-sentient entities, of the Jiva, having itself as the Ātman, having itself as the source, having itself as the abode capability of being impelled by it, living by virtue of itself, being established in itself, on the part of everything over and above itself. Owing to being connected with that, have been propounded also in other contexts, in a thousand ways, the nature of having all blemishes driven away such as 'the nature of having all sins destroyed', omniscience, overlordship, the nature of having desires fulfilled, the nature of having all thoughts fulfilled, the cause of all bliss, and being the unsurpassed bliss and others, not within the province of all other means of proof. Thus, that the word 'Tat' referring to Brahman, the matter in hand, not perceptible by anything else, and particularised by endless attributes, is calculated to point to the attributeless thing alone, is (just) the prattle of an intoxicated (boor) owing to its being irrelevant The word 'Tvam' again is expressive of the Jīva characterised as being associated with worldly existence If that were to refer to be establishment of the attributeless nature, its own (i. e primary) sense would be (as good as) abandoned The screening by Avidyā of an entity having the nature of light without attributes, is indeed not possible owing to the undesirable contingency of the destruction of the nature and others, —This has already been stated And such being the case, Indication has got to be resorted to by the abandonment of the primary sense (in the case) of even both the words 'Tat' and 'Tvam' introduced as being in case-co-ordination

[131] If it were argued—There is no undesirable contingency of (resorting to) Indication, (in the case) of (words) introduced as being in

विशेषणांशे तात्पर्यासंभवात्, एव विशेषणनिवृत्तेः, वस्तुमात्रैकत्वप्रतिपादनात्, न लक्षणाप्रसङ्गः। यथा-'नीलम् उत्पलम्' इतिपदद्वयस्य विशेष्यैक्यप्रतिपादनपरत्वेन नीलत्वोत्पलत्वस्वरूपविशेषणद्वयं न विवक्ष्यते। तद्विवक्षायां हि नीलत्वविशिष्टाकारेण, उत्पलत्वविशिष्टाकारस्य, एकत्वप्रतिपादनं प्रसज्यते। तत्तु न संभवति। न हि नैल्यविशिष्टाकारेण तद्वस्तूत्पलपदेन विशिष्यते। जातिगुणयोरन्योन्यसमवायप्रसङ्गात्। अतः, नीलत्वोत्पलत्वोपलक्षितवस्त्वैक्यमात्रं सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रतिपाद्यते। तथा 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः' इति, अतीतकालविप्रकृष्टदेशविशिष्टस्य तेनैव रूपेण संनिहितदेशवर्तमानकालविशिष्टतया प्रतिपादनानुपपत्तेः, उभयदेशकालोपलक्षितस्वरूपमात्रैक्यं सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रतिपाद्यते। यद्यपि 'नीलम्' इत्याद्येकपदश्रवणे प्रतीयमानं विशेषणं सामानाधिकरण्यवेलायां विरोधात्, न प्रतिपाद्यते, तथापि, वाच्येऽर्थे प्रधानांशस्य प्रतिपादनात्, न लक्षणा, अपि तु विशेषणांशस्य, अविवक्षामात्रम्। सर्वत्र सामानाधिकरण्यस्य, एष एव स्वभावः, इति न कश्चिद्दोषः, इति—

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case-co-ordination on account of the propounding of oneness alone of *entities*, because of the negation of attributes on account of the very impossibility of the import in respect of the attribute-portion owing to their being calculated to propound one entity. As for instance, in respect of the pair of words 'blue', 'lotus'—a pair of attributes about the nature as 'blue-ness' (and) 'lotus-ness', is not intended owing to its being calculated to propound the oneness of things characterised (by those attributes); for, if there were the intention to point out that, there will be the undesirable contingency of stating the oneness of the form particularised by 'lotus-ness', with the form particularised by 'blue-ness'. That, however, is not possible. Not indeed, can a thing be particularised (by designating it) by the word 'lotus', owing to the form particularised by 'blue-ness'; otherwise there would be the *undesirable sequel viz.* the mutual intimate relation between genus and quality. Therefore, only the oneness of things characterised by 'blue-ness' and 'lotus-ness' is propounded by the case-co-ordination. Similarly, on account of the impossibility of the statement viz. 'This is that Devadatta' *particularised by past time and distant region as particularised by the near* region and the present time in the very same form, the oneness of the form itself characterised by the twofold time and region is propounded by the case-*co-ordination in (the passage) 'This is that Devadatta'.* Even though the qualifying attribute being apprehended on hearing the one word 'blue' etc. is not propounded on account of contradiction at the time of (hearing) the case-co-ordination, still there cannot be 'Indication' on account of the statement of the main part of the thing denoted; but on the other hand (there is) only the non-intention to state the qualifying-attribute-part. Everywhere this, verily, is the nature of case-co-ordination and so, there is no flaw whatsoever.

तदिदम्, असारम्। सर्वेष्वेव वाक्येषु पदानां व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धार्थसंसर्गविशेषमात्रं प्रत्याय्यम्। तत्र समानाधिकरणप्रवृत्तानाम्, अपि नीलादिपदानां नैल्यादिविशिष्ट एव, अर्थो व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धः पदान्तरार्थसंसृष्टोऽभिधीयते। यथा—'नीलमुत्पलमानय' इत्युक्ते नीलिमादिविशिष्टम्, एव, आनीयते; यथा च 'विन्ध्याटव्यां मदमुदितो मातङ्गगणस्तिष्ठति' इति पदद्वयावगतविशेषणविशिष्ट एव, अर्थः प्रतीयते, एवं वेदान्तवाक्येषु, अपि, सामानाधिकरण्यनिर्देशेषु तत्तद्विशेषणविशिष्टम्, एव ब्रह्म प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। न च विशेषणविवक्षायाम्, इतरविशिष्टाकारं वस्त्वन्येन विशेषितव्यम्। अपि तु सर्वैरपि विशेषणैः स्वरूपमेव विशेष्यम्, तथाहि—

भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तानां शब्दानाम्, एकस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिः सामानाधिकरण्यम्। अन्वयेन निवृत्त्या वा, पदान्तरप्रतिपाद्याकारात्, आकारान्तरयुक्ततया तस्यैव वस्तुनः पदान्तरप्रतिपाद्यत्वं हि सामानाधिकरण्यकार्यम्। यथा, 'देवदत्तः श्यामो युवा लोहिताक्षः, अदीनः, अकृपणः, अनवद्यः,' इति। यत्र तु, एकस्मिन्वस्तुनि समन्वयायोग्यं विशेषणद्वयं समानाधिकरणपदानिर्दिष्टम्, तत्रापि, अन्यतरत्पदम्, अमुख्यवृत्तम्, आश्रीयते, न द्वयम्

All this (is) unsubstantial—In the case of all sentences, indeed, what is to be apprehended is the particular contact with the sense established by etymology of the words. There in the case of words 'blue' etc. although introduced in case-co-ordination, only the sense particularised by 'blue-ness' etc. is denoted as established by etymology (and) as being in contact with the sense of other words. Just as when it is said 'Bring the blue lotus', only the one particularised by 'blueness' is brought; and just as from (the passage) 'In the Vindhya forest stays the host of Mātaṅgas, merry with intoxication,' is apprehended only the sense particularised by the qualifying attributes known from the pair of words: so also, in the Vedānta passages, is to be apprehended Brahman only, particularised by those various qualifying attributes in the references in case-co-ordination. Not again when there is the intention to state a qualifying attribute, should a thing with a form particularised by another (attribute) be particularised by another, but on the other hand, (in the case of an object) *its own form alone is to be particularised* by all the qualifying attributes without exception. To explain the same—

Case-co-ordination is the pointing out to one and the same object by words responsible for different activity. The purpose of case-co-ordination is, indeed, that the same thing is fit to be pointed out by another word, owing to its being associated with a form other than the form pointed out by another word, affirmatively or negatively, as in 'Devadatta, brown-coloured, young, red-eyed, not-poor, not-miserly, not-blameworthy.' Where, however, is mentioned by words in case-co-ordination, a pair of attributes incapable of being co-related in one object, there also, either word is resorted to as used primarily, (and) not both, as in 'Vāhīka, a bull'. *In the case of the blue lotus,*

—यथा 'गौर्वाहीकः' इति। नीलोत्पलादिषु तु विशेषणद्वयान्वयाविरोधात्, एकमेव, मयाविशिष्टं प्रतिपाद्यते।

[132] अथ, मनुषे—एकविशेषणप्रतिसंबन्धित्वेन निरूप्यमाणं वस्तु विशेषणान्तरप्रतिसंबन्धित्वात्, विलक्षणम्, इति, घटपटयोरिव, एकविभक्तिनिर्देशेऽपि, ऐक्यप्रतिपादनासंभवात्, समानाधिकरणशब्दस्य न विशिष्टप्रतिपादनपरत्वम्, अपि तु विशेषणमुखेन स्वरूपमुपस्थाप्य, तदैक्यप्रतिपादनपरत्वम्, एव, इति। स्यात्, एतत्, एवं यदि विशेषणद्वयप्रतिसंबन्धित्वमात्रम्, एव, ऐक्यं निरुन्ध्यात्। न च, एतदस्ति। एकस्मिन्धर्मिणि, उपसंहर्तुमयोग्यधर्मद्वयविशिष्टत्वम्, एव हि, एकत्वं निरुणद्धि। अयोग्यता च प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धा घटत्वपटत्वयोः। 'नीलम्' 'उत्पलं' इत्यादिषु तु, दण्डित्वकुण्डलित्ववत्, रूपवत्त्वरसवत्त्वगन्धवत्त्वादिवत्, च, विरोधो नोपलभ्यते। न केवलम्, अविरोधः, एव, प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदेन, एकार्थनिष्ठत्वरूपं सामानाधिकरण्यम्, उत्पादयत्येव धर्मद्वयाविशिष्टताम्। अन्यथा, स्वरूपमात्रैक्ये, अनेकपदप्रवृत्तौ निमित्ताभावात्, सामानाधिकरण्यम्, एव न स्यात्। विशेषणानां स्वसंबन्धानादरेण वस्तुस्वरूपोपलक्षणपरत्वे सति, एकेनैव

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etc. however, on account of the non-contradiction about association with the pair of qualifying attributes, only one (thing) is pointed as particularised by both.

[132] If you think—A word in case-co-ordination is not calculated to propound a particularised thing on account of the impossibility as (in the case) of the jar and the cloth although mentioned in one and the same case, of the propounding of oneness, because a thing being described as being related to one attribute, is different on account of its relation with another attribute; but on the other hand, having established its nature through the agency *of the qualifying attribute, is calculated to propound only its* oneness—(our reply is)—It would be so if the mere relation with the two attributes alone were to block oneness. But it is not so; for, being particularised by two characteristics unfit to be brought together in one and the same object, alone obstructs the oneness. In the case of 'jarness' and 'clothness' the unfitness is established by other means of proof, but in the case of 'blue', 'lotus' etc. no contradiction obtains, as in 'being possessed of the staff and 'being passessed of the ear-ring' and also in 'being possessed of colour' 'being possessed of flavour' 'being possessed of smell' etc Not only is there non-contradiction itself (but) the case-co-ordination directly referring to one object in accordance with the distinction of the cause of activity does put forth being particularised by two characteristics. Otherwise, if there be identity only in form, there would not exist case-co-ordination itself on account of the absence of the cause for the use of more than one word. If the qualifying attributes were calculated to point out to only the nature of a thing by ignoring their relation (with the object), because the thing is pointed out by only one (attribute), another characteristic is sheerly meaningless. In admitting a difference between another characteristic

वस्तु, उपलक्षितम्, इति, उपलक्षणान्तरम्, अनर्थकम्, एव। उपलक्षणान्तरोपलक्ष्याकारभेदाभ्युपगमे तेनाकारेण सविशेषत्वप्रसङ्गः। 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः' इत्यत्रापि न लक्षणागन्धो विद्यते । विरोधाभावात् । देशान्तरसंबन्धितया, अतीतस्य संनिहितदेशसंबन्धितया वर्तमानत्वाविरोधात्। अत एव हि, 'सोऽयम्' इति प्रत्यभिज्ञया कालद्वयसंबन्धिनो वस्तुनः, ऐक्यमुपपाद्यते वस्तुनः स्थिरत्ववादिभिः। अन्यथा, प्रतीतिविरोधे सति, सर्वेषां क्षणिकत्वम्, एव स्यात्। देशद्वयसंबन्धविरोधः, तु, कालभेदेन परिह्रियते। यतः समानाधिकरणपदानाम्, अनेकविशेषणविशिष्टैकार्थवाचित्वम्, अत एव—

'अरुणयैकहायन्या पिङ्गाक्ष्या गवा सोमं क्रीणाति' (तै. सं. ६।१।६)

इत्यादौ, आरुण्यादिविशिष्टैकहायन्याः क्रयः साध्यतया विधीयते। तदुक्तम्—

'अर्थैकत्वे द्रव्यगुणयोरैककर्म्यान्नियमः स्यात्' (जै. सू. ३।१।१२)

इति।

[133] तत्रैवं पूर्वपक्षी मन्यते—यद्यपि, 'अरुणया' इति पदम्, आकृतेरिव गुणस्यापि द्रव्यप्रकारतैकस्वभावत्वात्, द्रव्यपर्यन्तम्, एव, आरुणिमानम्, अभिदधाति, तथापि, एकहायनि, अन्वयनियम', अरुणिम्नः, न संभवति। एकहायन्या क्रीणाति, तच्च,

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and the form of the thing characterised, there would be the undesirable contingency of the thing being with an attribute owing to that form. In 'This is that Devadatta' there is not even a tinge of Indication, on account of the absence of contradiction, because there is no contradiction in being related with the region nearby, in the case of one in the past being related with another region For this very reason, indeed, the oneness of a thing related with two times is accounted for, by the recognition in the form 'This (is) he', by those who speak of the stability of things Otherwise if there be a contradictory apprehension there would be verily, momentariness for all The contradiction in respect of two regions however can be removed by the difference in time Because the words in case-co-ordination are expressive of one object particularised by more than one attribute, for that very reason the purchase is enjoined for being gone through of the one-year-old (cow) particularised by reddish-ness etc in

'He purchases Soma by (the exchange of) reddish coloured, one-year old (and) tawny-eyed cow' (Tait Sam. 6 1 6)

The same has been said in—

'On account of the substance and quality referring to one and the same action, there would be the rule about the object being one' (Jai Su 3 1·12)

[133] Here the Pūrvapaksin thinks thus—Although the word 'Arunayā', on account of having the same nature in the form of the mode of a substance even in the case of a quality as in configuration denotes the red colour extending right up to the substance still the association with the 'one-year-old (cow)' is not possible in the case of redness, on account of the impossibility of enjoining two senses viz 'He purchases by the one-year-old

'अरुणया,' इत्यर्थद्वयविधानासंभवात् । ततश्च, 'अरुणया' इति वाक्यं भित्त्वा प्रकरण-विहितसर्वद्रव्यपर्यन्तम्, एव, अरुणिमानम्, अविशेषेण, अभिदधाति । 'अरुणया' इति स्त्रीलिङ्गनिर्देशः प्रकरणविहितसर्वलिङ्गकद्रव्याणां प्रदर्शनार्थः । तस्मात्, एकहायनि, अन्वयनियमः, अरुणिम्नः, न स्यात्, इति । — अत्र, अभिधीयते — अर्थैकत्वे द्रव्यगुणयोः, ऐककर्म्यात्, नियमः स्यात् । अरुणया, एकहायन्या-इति, आरुण्य-विशिष्टद्रव्यैकहायनीद्रव्यवाचिपदयोः सामानाधिकरण्येन, अर्थैकत्वे सिद्धे सति, एक-हायनीद्रव्य-आरुण्यगुणयोः, 'अरुणया' इति पदेनैव विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन संबन्धितया, अभिहितयोः क्रयाख्यैककर्मान्वयाविरोधात्, अरुणिम्नः क्रयसाधनभूतैकहायन्या, अन्वय-नियमः स्यात् । यदि, एकहायन्याः क्रयसंबन्धवत्, अरुणिमसंबन्धोऽपि वाक्यावसेयः स्यात्, तदा वाक्यार्थद्वयविधानं स्यात् । न चैतदस्ति । 'अरुणया' इति पदेनैव, अरुणिमविशिष्ट-द्रव्यम्, अभिहितम् । एकहायनीपदसामानाधिकरण्येन तस्य, एकहायनीत्वमात्रम्, अव-गम्यते, न गुणसंबन्धः । विशिष्टद्रव्यैक्यमेव हि सामानाधिकरण्यस्य, अर्थः । भिन्नप्रवृत्ति-निमित्तानां शब्दानाम्, एकस्मिन्नर्थे सामानाधिकरण्यम्, इति हि सामानाधिकरण्यलक्षणम् । अत एव हि 'रक्तः पटो भवति'—इत्यादिषु, ऐकार्थ्यात्, एकवाक्यत्वम् । पटस्य भवन-क्रियासंबन्धे हि वाक्यव्यापारः । रागसंबन्धः, तु रक्तपदेनैव, अभिहितः । रागसंबन्धिद्रव्यं

(cow)' and that too 'by a reddish-coloured one'. And therefore, (the word) 'Aruṇayā' by breaking the sentence expresses without any reservation, the reddish colour right up to the entire object enjoined in the context. The association of the feminine gender in 'Aruṇayā' is meant to point out to the substances of all genders enjoined in the context. Therefore, there cannot be any rule about the (invariable) association with the one-year-old of reddish colour.— Here, *it is stated (in reply)—On account of the substance and quality referring to one and the same action, there would be the rule about the object being one. When the oneness of the object is established by the case-co-ordination of* the two words expressive of the object particularised by red colour and the one-year-old object, in—By the red-coloured, by the one-year-old—there can be invariable association of reddish colour with the one-year-old that has become the means of purchase, on account of the absence of contradiction in respect of the association with the one act called the purchase, of the one-year-old object and the reddish-colour quality denoted as connected by the relation of the qualifier and the qualified by the word 'Aruṇayā' itself. If the relation with the reddish-colour also were to be concluded from the sentence, like the relation with the purchase, *in the case of the one-year-old* (cow) then there would be the enjoining of two senses in the sentence. This is not the case however. By the word 'Aruṇayā' itself has been denoted a substance particularised by reddish-colour. By the case-co-ordination with the word Ekahāyanī is understood only its being one-year-old and not its relation with the quality; for, surely the oneness of the object particularised is the sense of the case-co-ordination. The characteristic of the case-co-ordination is indeed this—coexistence in one and the same object of words responsible for different activities. And therefore, indeed, in 'there is a red cloth' and others, there is the idea of one sentence on account of there being only one sense. The operation of the sentence is in respect of the relation with the

पटः, इत्येतावन्मात्रं सामानाधिकरण्यावसेयम् । एवम्, एकेन गुणेन द्वाभ्यां बहुभिर्वा, तेन तेन पदेन समस्तेन व्यस्तेन वा, विशिष्टमुपस्थाप्य सामानाधिकरण्येन सर्वविशेषण-विशिष्टोऽर्थ एकः, इति ज्ञापयित्वा तस्य क्रियासंबन्धाभिधानम्, अविरुद्धम् । 'देवदत्तः श्यामो युवा लोहिताक्षो दण्डी कुण्डली तिष्ठति ।' 'शुक्लेन वाससा यवनिकां संपादयेत् ।' 'नीलमुत्पलमानय ।' 'गामानय शुक्लां शोभनाक्षीम् ।'

'अग्नये पथिकृते पुरोडाशमष्टाकपालं निर्वपेत्' (तै. सं. २।२।२)

इति—एवम्–'अरुणया, एकहायन्या पिङ्गाक्ष्या सोमं क्रीणाति,' इति। एतदुक्तं भवति–यथा 'काष्ठैः स्थाल्याम्, ओदनं पचेत,' इति, अनेककारकविशिष्टैका क्रिया युगपत्प्रतीयते, तथा समानाधिकरणपदसंघाताभिहितम्, एकैकं कारकं तत्तत्कारकप्रतिपत्तिवेलायाम्, एव, अनेकविशेषणविशिष्टं युगपत्प्रतिपन्नं क्रियायाम्, अन्वेति, इति न कश्चिद्विरोधः, 'खादिरैः शुष्कैः काष्ठैः समपरिमाणे भाण्डे पायसं शाल्योदनं समर्थः पाचकः पचेत्,' इत्यादिषु इति ।

[134] यत्तु—उपात्तद्रव्यकवाक्यस्थगुणशब्दः केवलगुणाभिधायी, इति 'अरुणया' इति पदेन केवलगुणस्यैव, अभिधानम्, इति—तत्, नोपपद्यते । लोकवेदयोः,

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process of being of the cloth The relation with the redness, however, is denoted by the word Rakta itself This much only—that the cloth is a substance related to redness—is to be concluded from the case-co-ordination In this way, having established a substance as particularised by one, two or many qualities, by means of the various words severally or collectively, (and) having made known that there is only one substance particularised by all qualifying attributes, by means of case-co ordination (one can say) the denotation of its relation with action is not contradictory, as in (the passages) 'There stands Devadatta brown, young, red eyed, with a staff, (and) with ear rings', 'One should make a curtain with a white cloth', 'Bring a blue lotus', 'Bring a cow white, pleasant-eyed,'

'One should offer flour-cake on eight potsherds to Agni, the path-maker,' (Tait Sam 222)

In the same way (has to be understood the passage) *'He purchases Soma by means of reddish, one-year old, brown-eyed (cow)'* This is what is meant to be said—Just as in (the passage) 'One should cook rice in a saucer, by (fuel) sticks of wood,' (only) one act is apprehended simultaneously, as particularised by more than one Kāraka case, in the same way each and every Karaka denoted by the collection of words in case-co ordination becomes associated with the action, being simultaneously apprehended as particularised by more than one qualifying attribute at the time of apprehension of the various Karaka cases —and so, there is no contradiction in 'An expert cook should cook the Sali rice mixed with milk, in a vessel of even dimension, by means of dry Khadira-sticks' etc

[134] As to (the contention) that there is the Denotation by the word 'Arunayā' of only the quality, because the word denoting a quality in a sentence with substance given denotes only the quality,—it does not stand to reason,

द्रव्यवाचिसमानाधिकरणस्य गुणवाचिनः क्वचिदपि केवलगुणाभिधानादर्शनात्। उपात्तद्रव्यकवाक्यस्थं गुणपदं केवलगुणाभिधायि, इत्यपि, असंगतम्। 'पटः शुक्लः' इत्यादिषु उपात्तद्रव्यकेऽपि गुणविशिष्टस्यैव, अभिधानात्। 'पटस्य शुक्लः' इति, अत्र शौक्ल्यविशिष्टपटाप्रतिपत्तिः, असमानविभक्तिनिर्देशकृता, न पुनः, उपात्तद्रव्यकत्वकृता। तत्रैव 'पटस्य शुक्लो भागः' इत्यादिषु समानविभक्तिनिर्देशे शौक्ल्यविशिष्टद्रव्यं प्रतीयते।

यत्पुनः क्रयस्य, एकहायन्यवरुद्धतया, अरुणिम्नः क्रियान्वयो न संभवति, इति तदपि विरोधिगुणरहितद्रव्यवाचिपदसमानाधिकरणगुणपदस्य तदाश्रयगुणाभिधानेन क्रियापदान्वयाविरोधात्, असंगतम्। राद्धान्ते च, उक्तन्यायेन, अरुणिम्नः शाब्दद्रव्यान्वये सिद्धे, द्रव्यगुणयोः क्रयसाधनानुपपत्त्या, अर्थात् परस्परान्वयः सिध्यति, इत्यपि, असंगतम्। अतः, यथोक्त एव, अर्थः। तस्मात्, 'तत्त्वमसि'—आदिसामानाधिकरण्ये पदद्वयाभिहितविशेषणापरित्यागेनैव, ऐक्यप्रतिपादनं वर्णनीयम्। तत्तु—अनाद्यविद्योपहितानवधिकदुःखभागिनः शुद्ध्यशुद्ध्युभयावस्थात्, चेतनात्, अर्थान्तरभूतम्, अशेषहेय-

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because it is not found anywhere that there is the denotation of only the quality, of (the word) expressive of the quality in case-co-ordination with (the word) expressive of substance in worldly speech or in Vedic usage. That the word (expressive) of a quality, in a sentence with the substance given, is denotative only of the quality, is also incompatible, on account of the denotation of (the cloth) only as particularised by the quality, even though the substance is given in (expressions) like' Cloth (is) white' and others. In 'Of the cloth, white—' here the absence of apprehension of the cloth particularised by whiteness is due to its non-mention in the same case, and not again, due to there being the substance given. And there again in (expressions) like 'The white portion of the cloth', when there is the mention in the same case, is apprehended a substance particularised by whiteness.

Again as to (the contention)—that the association with the action, of the reddish colour, is not possible owing to the purchase being restricted to the one-year-old—that too is incompatible on account of there being no contradiction in being related with the word denoting action by the denotation of the quality resorting to that, of the word denoting a quality, (and) in case-co-ordination with the word expressive of a substance void of contradictory qualities. In the conclusive view, when the association of the reddish colour with the substance denoted by the word is established according to the reasoning adduced, it is also improper that there should be the mutual association on account of the sense, on account of the impossibility of accounting for the substance and quality (both) being the means of purchase. And so, the sense is as has been declared before. Therefore, in case-co-ordination as in 'That thou art' and others, the propounding of oneness has to be described even without abandoning the qualifying attributes denoted by the two words. And that, however, is not possible in the case of one not admitting the highest Ātman, having a uniform nature of having hosts of unlimited auspicious qualities, being the rival of everything fit to be abandoned, who is a different entity

प्रत्यनीकानवधिककल्याणगुणगणैकतानं परमात्मानम्, अनभ्युपगच्छतो न संभवति।

अभ्युपगच्छतोऽपि समानाधिकरणपदानां यथावस्थितविशेषणविशिष्टैक्यप्रतिपादनपरत्वाश्रयणे त्वंपदप्रतिपन्नसकलदोषभागित्वं परस्य प्रसज्येत, इति चेत्—नैतदेवम्। त्वंपदेनापि जीवान्तर्यामिणः परस्यैव, अभिधानात्। एतदुक्तं भवति—सच्छब्दाभिहितं निरस्तनिखिलदोषगन्धं सत्यसंकल्पत्वमिश्रानवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणगणं समस्तकारणभूतं परं ब्रह्म

'बहु स्याम्' (छा. ६।२।३)

इति संकल्प्य, तेजोबन्नप्रमुखं कृत्स्नं जगत्सृष्ट्वा, तस्मिन् देवादिविचित्रसंस्थानसंस्थिते जगति, चेतनं जीववर्गं स्वकर्मानुगुणेषु शरीरेषु, आत्मतया प्रवेश्य, स्वयं च स्वेच्छयैव जीवान्तरात्मतया, अनुप्रविश्य, एवंभूतेषु स्वपर्यन्तेषु देवाद्याकारेषु संघातेषु नामरूपे व्याकरोत्। एवंरूपसंघातस्यैव वस्तुत्वं शब्दवाच्यत्वं च, अकरोत्, इत्यर्थः।

'अनेन जीवेनात्मना' (छा. ६।३।२)

जीवेन मयेति निर्देशो जीवस्य ब्रह्मात्मकत्वं दर्शयति। ब्रह्मात्मकत्वं च जीवस्य जीवान्तरात्मतया ब्रह्मणोऽनुप्रवेशात्, इति, अवगम्यते।

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from the sentient (Jīva) in both the states of purity and impurity, and sharing in the unlimited misery brought near by the beginning-less Avidyā.

If it is argued—That even in the case of one who admits (such a Paramātman) there would be the undesirable contingency of the Highest sharing in all the blémishes apprehended from the word Tvam, in admitting the words in case-co-ordination as calculated to propound oneness particularised by the qualifying attributes as they are—(we reply)—This is not so, on account of even the word Tvam denoting the Highest alone, the Inner Controller of Jīva. This is what is intended to be said—The Highest Brahman denoted by the word Sat, with (even) the tinge of all blemishs driven off, with hosts of unlimited, unsurpassed, innumerable and infinite auspicious qualities, mixed with the nature of having all thoughts fulfilled, (and) which has become the cause of everything, having thought

'May I be many' (Chā. 6·2·3)

—having created the entire world, light, water, earth being the foremost, having made the sentient class of Jīvas enter as Ātmans within bodies in conformity with their deeds, in that world constituted of the variegated configurations of gods and others; (and) having itself voluntarily subsequently entered as the Inner Ātman of the Jīvas, manifested name and form in the aggregates, configurations of gods etc. thus coming into being, extending right upto itself—The sense is that it made the aggregate thus formed, into an entity and fit to be expressed in words. (In the passage)

'By this Living Self'. (Chā. 6·3·2)

the reference—by me, by the Jīva—points out to the Jīva's having Brahman as the Ātman. It is known that Jīva's having Brahman as the Ātman is from the subsequent entering of Brahman as the Inner Ātman of the Jīvas,

'इदं सर्वमसृजत । यदिदं किं च । तत्सृष्ट्वा । तदेवानुप्राविशत् । तदनुप्रविश्य । सच्च त्यच्चाभवत् ।' (तै. २।६।१)

इत्यत्र, 'इदं सर्वम्' इति निर्दिष्टं चेतनाचेतनं वस्तुद्वयं 'सत्-त्यत्'-शब्दाभ्यां 'विज्ञाना-विज्ञान'शब्दाभ्यां च विभज्य निर्दिश्य चिद्वस्तुन्यपि ब्रह्मणोऽनुप्रवेशाभिधानात्। अत एवं नामरूपव्याकरणात्सर्वे वाचकाः शब्दाः, अचिज्जीवविशिष्टपरमात्मवाचिनः, इति, अवगतम्, इति।

किं च,

'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं' (छा. ६।८।७)

इति चेतनमिश्रं प्रपञ्चम् 'इदं सर्वं' इति निर्दिश्य, 'तस्यैष आत्मा,' इति प्रतिपादितम्। एवं च सर्वं चेतनाचेतनं प्रति ब्रह्मण आत्मत्वेन सर्वं चेतनं जगत् तस्य शरीरं च भवति।

तथा च श्रुत्यन्तराणि—

'अन्तः प्रविष्टः शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मा' (तै. आ. ३।११।२)

'यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन्पृथिव्या अन्तरो यं पृथिवी न वेद यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं यः पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयति स त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः' (बृ. ३।७।३)

इति प्रारभ्य,

Because here in

'(It) created all this, what all is this. Having created it, entered the same, after. Having entered that subsequently became Sat and Tyat.' (Tait. 2·6·1)

there is the mention of Brahman's subsequent entering even into the sentient entity, having pointed out after dividing the two entities, sentient and non-sentient, mentioned in 'All this' by the words 'Sat (and) Tyat' (as also) by the words 'Vijñāna (and) Avijñāna'. Therefore, thus it is ascertained that all expressive words are expressive of the Paramātman particularised by the non-sentient (and) the Jīva through the manifestation of name and form.

And further, having pointed out to the worldly existence mixed with the sentient by 'All this' in (the passage)—

'All this has that for its Ātman'. (Chā. 6·8·7)

'This is its Ātman' has been propounded. And in this way, owing to Brahman being the Ātman with reference to all—sentient and non-sentient—the entire sentient world again, becomes his body.

And to this effect other Śruti passages—

'Entered within, the Controller of the people, the Ātman of all.' (Tait. Ā. 3·11·2)

—Beginning with

'Who residing in the Earth, is different from the Earth, whom the Earth knows not; whose body is the Earth; who controls the Earth inside,—He is your Ātman, the inner Controller, immortal. (Bṛ. 3·7·3)

'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरो यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा शरीरं य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति स त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृत ' (बृ ३।७।२२)

इत्यादि ।

'य पृथिवीमन्तरे सचरन्यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं योऽपामन्तरे संचरन्यस्याप शरीरं' (सुबालो.)

इत्यारभ्य,

'योऽक्षरमन्तरे संचरन्यस्याक्षर शरीर यमक्षर न वेदैष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मापहतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायण ' (सुबालो.)

इत्यादीनि सचेतनं जगत्तस्य शरीरत्वेन निर्दिश्य, तस्य, आत्मत्वेन परमात्मानम्, उपदिशन्ति। अतः, चेतनवाचिनोऽपि शब्दाः, चेतनस्याप्यात्मभूतं चेतनशरीरकं परमात्मानमेव, अभिदधाति। यथा, अचेतनदेवादिसंस्थानपिण्डवाचिनः शब्दाः, तत्तच्छरीरकजीवात्मन एव वाचका। 'चत्वारः पञ्चदशरात्रा देवत्वं गच्छन्ति,' इत्यादिषु 'देवा भवन्ति,' इत्यर्थः। शरीरस्य शरीरिणं प्रति प्रकारत्वात्। प्रकारवाचिनां च शब्दानां प्रकारिणि, एव पर्यवसानात्, शरीराभिधायिनां शब्दानां शरीरिपर्यवसानं न्याय्यम्। प्रकारो हि नाम, 'इदम् इत्थम्'

'Who residing in the Ātman is different from the Ātman, whom the Ātman knows not, whose body is the Ātman, who controls the Ātman inside,—He is your Ātman, the inner Controller, immortal,' (Br 3·7 22)

etc,—Beginning with

'Who moving about the Earth within whose body is the Earth, who moving about the Waters within, [whose body is the Waters' (Subalo)

'Who moving about the Imperishable within, whose body is the Imperishable, whom the Imperishable knows not This one, the inmost Ātman of all beings, with sins destroyed, divine, refulgent, the one Nārāyana' (Subālo)

etc,—(these Sruti passages) having mentioned the sentient world as being his body, declare the Highest Ātman as its (i e of the world) Ātman Therefore, the words also expressive of the sentient denote the Highest Ātman as being the Atman even of the sentient (and) having the sentient as His body, as the words expressive of non-sentient configuration and bodies of gods etc, are assuredly expressive of the Jivatman having those particular bodies In passages like 'The four performing the sacrifice Pañcadaśarātra attain to god-hood' the sense is—'They become gods', on account of the body being just a mode of the one having a body On account of the words denoting the mode culminating in the thing itself possessing the mode, the culmination of words denoting the body, in the Ātman possessing a body is justifiable. A mode is, indeed the portion apprehended as 'thus' in the case

इति प्रतीयमाने वस्तुनि, 'इत्थम्' इति प्रतीयमानोंऽशः। तस्य तद्वस्त्वपेक्षत्वेन तत्प्रतीतिः, तदपेक्षत्वात् तस्मिन्नेव पर्यवसानं युक्तम्, इति तस्य प्रतिपादकोऽपि शब्दस्तस्मिन्नेव पर्यवस्यति। अत एव, 'गौः,' 'अश्वः,' 'मनुष्यः' इत्यादिप्रकारभूताकृतिवाचिनः शब्दाः प्रकारिणि पिण्डे पर्यवस्यन्तः, पिण्डस्यापि चेतनशरीरत्वेन तत्प्रकारत्वात, पिण्डशरीरक-चेतनस्यापि परमात्मप्रकारत्वाच्च, परमात्मन्येव पर्यवस्यन्ति, इति सर्वशब्दानां परमात्मैव वाच्यः, इति परमात्मवाचिशब्देन सामानाधिकरण्यं मुख्यम्, एव।

ननु 'खण्डो गौः,' 'खण्डः शुक्लः' इति जातिगुणवाचिनाम्, एव पदानां द्रव्यवाचि-पदैः सह सामानाधिकरण्यं दृष्टम्। द्रव्याणां तु द्रव्यान्तरप्रकारे मत्वर्थीयप्रत्ययो दृष्टः, यथा 'दण्डी,' 'कुण्डली' इति। नैवम्। जातिर्वा, गुणो वा द्रव्यं वा—न, एतेषु, एकमेव सामानाधिकरण्ये प्रयोजकम्। अन्योन्यस्मिन्व्यभिचारात्। यस्य पदार्थस्य कस्यचि-त्प्रकारतया, एव सद्भावः, तस्य तदपृथक्सिद्धिस्थितिप्रतीतिभिः, तद्वाचकानां शब्दानां स्वाभिधेयविशिष्टद्रव्यवाचित्वात्, धर्मान्तरविशिष्टतद्द्रव्यवाचिना शब्देन सामानाधि-

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of a thing being apprehended as 'This thus'. The culmination in the same (*Prakārin*) of that (*Prakāra*) is proper on account of the apprehension of that (*Prakāra*) being dependent upon that thing (*Prakārin*), owing to its depending upon that —and so, the word denoting that (*Prakāra*) culminates in the same (*Prakārin*). For this very reason, the words expressive of configuration constituting the mode, such as 'bull', horse', 'man' etc.,—culminating in the body possessing the mode, culminate into the Paramātman himself on account of the body itself being the mode owing to its being the body of the sentient, and on account of the sentient also with the specific form for his body, being the mode of the Paramātman—and so, the case-co-ordination with the word expressive of the Paramātman, is surely to be primarily understood, because the Paramātman alone is the expressed sense of all words.

But I say (says the objector)—Case-co-ordination is seen of the words expressive only of genus and quality as in 'Broken-horned, bull' 'Broken-horned, white' with the words expressive of substance; but when substances are the modes of other substances, there is seen a possessive termination as in 'Possessed of staff' 'Possessed of ear-rings'—(we reply)—Not so; whether it is a genus, or a quality or the substance—out of these not one alone is the producing cause of the case-co-ordination, on account of there being the mutual violation. In the case of which object there is existence only as the mode of something,—of that object the case-co-ordination with the word expressive of that substance particularised by another characteristic, is quite proper on account of the words expressive of that denoting the substance particularised by their expressed sense by means of the establishment, existence, (and) apprehension not separate from it. Where again, being the

करण्यं युक्तमेव । यत्र पुनः पृथक्सिद्धस्य स्वनिष्ठस्यैव द्रव्यस्य कदाचित् क्वचिद्द्रव्यान्तरं प्रकारत्वम्, इष्यते तत्र मत्वर्थीयप्रत्ययः, इति निरवद्यम् ।

तदेवं परमात्मनः शरीरतया तत्प्रकारत्वात्, अचिद्विशिष्टस्य जीवस्य जीवनिर्देशविशेषरूपाः 'अहं' 'त्वं' इत्यादिशब्दाः परमात्मानम्, एव, आचक्षते, इति

'तत्त्वमसि' (छा. ६।८।७)

इति सामानाधिकरण्येन, उपसंहृतम् । एवं च सति, परमात्मानं प्रति जीवस्य शरीरतया, अन्वयात्, जीवगता धर्माः परमात्मानं न स्पृशन्ति, यथा शरीरगता बालत्वयुवत्वादयो धर्मा जीवं न स्पृशन्ति । अतः,

'तत्त्वमसि' (छा. ६।८।७)

इति सामानाधिकरण्ये, 'तत्' पदं जगत्कारणभूतं सत्यसंकल्पं सर्वकल्याणगुणाकरं निरस्तसमस्तहेयगन्धं परमात्मानम्, आचष्टे । 'त्वम्' इति च तमेव सशरीरजीवशरीरकम्, आचष्टे, इति सामानाधिकरण्यं मुख्यवृत्तं प्रकरणाविरोधः सर्वश्रुत्यविरोधः, ब्रह्मणि निरवद्ये कल्याणैकतानेऽविद्यादोषगन्धाभावश्च । अतः, जीवसामानाधिकरण्यमपि, विशेषणभूतात्, जीवात्, अन्यत्वमेव, उपपादयति, इति विज्ञानमयात्, जीवात्, अन्य एव, आनन्दमयः परमात्मा ।

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mode of another substance is desired (to be understood), sometime somewhere (in the case) of a substance established separately (and) referring only to itself, there (there is scope for) possessive termination—and so (everything) is without any blemish (whatsoever).

Therefore, in this manner, words 'Aham', 'Tvam', etc specially pointing out to Jiva, declare the Paramātman himself on account of the Jīva particularised by the non-sentient, being His mode owing to his being the body of the Paramātman—this has been concluded by the case-co-ordination in

'*That thou art*'. (Chā 6.8.7)

And this being the case, on account of the relation in respect of the Paramātman, of the Jiva as being the body, characteristics belonging to the Jīva do not touch the Paramātman, just as the characteristics, childhood, youth etc. belonging to the body do not touch the Jīva. Therefore, the word 'Tat' in the case-co-ordination

'*That thou art*' (Chā 6.8.7)

speaks of the Paramātman that has become the cause of the world, (who is) with thoughts fulfilled, the mine of all auspicious qualities, (and) with every tinge of blemish driven away, and the word 'Tvam' speaks of the same (Paramātman) having for His body the embodied Jiva—and so, (there is) the case-co-ordination having the primary sense, non-contradiction with the context, non-contradiction with all Sruti (passages), and the absence of (even) the tinge of blemish, Avidyā etc. in the blameless Brahman uniformly auspicious Therefore, because the case-co-ordination of Jiva establishes the Paramātman being different from the Jiva that has become the qualifying attribute, the Paramātman constituted of bliss is different from the Jiva constituted of Vijñāna.

[135] यदुक्तम्—

'तस्यैष एव शारीर आत्मा' (तै. २।६)

इति, आनन्दमयस्य शारीरत्वश्रवणात्, जीवादन्यत्वं न, संभवति, इति—तदयुक्तम्। अस्मिन्प्रकरणे सर्वत्र

'तस्यैष एव शारीर आत्मा। यः पूर्वस्य' (तै. २।३।४-५)

इति परमात्मन एव शारीरात्मत्वाभिधानात्। कथम्?

'तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः' (तै. २।१)

इति, आकाशादिसृज्यवर्गस्य परमकारणत्वेन प्रतिज्ञातजीवव्यतिरिक्तस्य, एकस्य ब्रह्मण आत्मत्वेन व्यपदेशात्, तद्व्यतिरिक्ताकाशादीनाम्, अन्नमयपर्यन्तानां तच्छरीरत्वम्, अवगम्यते।

'यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं यस्यापः शरीरं यस्य तेजः शरीरं यस्य वायु शरीरं यस्याकाशः शरीरं यस्याक्षरं शरीरं यस्य मृत्युः शरीरमेष सर्वभूतान्तरात्माऽपहतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायणः' (सुबालोपनिषत्)

इति सुबालश्रुत्या सर्वतत्त्वानां परमात्मशरीरत्वं स्पष्टमभिधीयते। अतः,

'तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मनः' (तै. २।१)

इति, अत्रैव, अन्नमयस्य परमात्मा, एव शारीर आत्मेत्यवगतः। प्राणमयं प्रस्तुत्याह

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[135] As to what has been said viz.—on account of the statement about the Ānandamaya being with the body in

'Of him, this one alone is the embodied Ātman' (Tait. 2·6)

(his) being different from the Jiva, is not possible—that (is) not proper, on account of the statement about the Paramātman being the embodied Ātman in

'Of him, this one alone is the embodied Ātman, who of the preceding' (Tait. 2·3·4-5)

everywhere in this section How? On account of the reference as the Ātman of one and the same Brahman whose difference from the Jīva is solemnly declared owing to its being the original cause of the class of things created like Ākāśa and others in

'From that, verily, from this Ātman, Ākāśa originated' (Tait. 2·1)

Ākāśa and others—right up to one constituted of food, over and above itself—being its body, is known. In (the passage)

'Of whom, the Earth is the body, of whom Water is the body; of whom Light is the body, of whom Wind is the body, of whom Ākāśa is the body; of whom the Imperishable is the body; of whom Death is the body. This, the inmost Ātman of all beings, with sins destroyed, divine, refulgent, the one Nārāyana' (Subālopaniṣat)

—by this Subālaśruti (text) is clearly declared all elements being the body of the Paramātman. Therefore in

'From that, verily, from this Ātman' (Tait. 2·1)

—here, verily, the Paramātman himself is understood as the embodied Atman of the one constituted of food. Introducing the one constituted of Prāṇa says (the Sruti)

'तस्यैष एव शारीर आत्मा । यः पूर्वस्य' (तै २।३)

इति । 'पूर्वस्य' अन्नमयस्य यः शारीर आत्मा श्रुत्यन्तरसिद्धः परमकारणभूतः परमात्मा, स एव तस्य प्राणमयस्यापि शारीर आत्मा, इत्यर्थः । एवं मनोमयविज्ञानमययोर्द्रष्टव्यम् । आनन्दमये तु,

'एष एव' (तै २।६)

इति निर्देश, तस्यानन्यात्मकत्वं दर्शयितुम् । तत्कथम् ? विज्ञानमयस्यापि पूर्वोक्तया रीत्या परमात्मा, एव शारीर आत्मा, इत्यवगत । एव सति, विज्ञानमयस्य यः शारीर आत्मा स एव, आनन्दमयस्यापि शारीर आत्मा, इत्युक्ते, आनन्दमयस्याभ्यासावगतपरमात्मभावस्य परमात्मन स्वयमेव, आत्मा, इत्यवगम्यते । एवं च स्वव्यतिरिक्तचेतनाचेतनवस्तुजातं स्वशरीरम्, इति स एव निरुपाधिक शारीर आत्मा । अत एव, इद परं ब्रह्माधिकृत्य प्रवृत्त शास्त्रं शारीरकम्, इत्यभियुक्तैरभिधीयते । अतः, विज्ञानमयात्, जीवादन्य एव परमात्मा, आनन्दमय ॥ १३ ॥

[136] आह—न, अयम्, आनन्दमयो जीवादन्य', विकारशब्दस्य मयट्प्रत्ययस्य श्रवणात् ।

'Of him this one alone is the embodied Ātman, who of the preceding' (Tait 2 3)

The sense is—which embodied Ātman 'of the preceding' constituted of food,—the Paramātman that has become the original cause established in another Sruti—that same is the embodied Ātman of that constituted of Prana also The same is to be understood in respect of the one constituted of mind and one constituted of Vijñana In the case of the one constituted of bliss however, the reference as

'This one himself' (Tait 2 6)

is to point out to his having none else as his Atman How is that? In the case of one constituted of Vijñāna also, the Paramātman himself is understood as the embodied Ātman in the aforesaid manner This being the case, what is the embodied Atman of one constituted of Vijñana that same is the embodied Ātman of one constituted of bliss—with such a statement in the case of the Paramatman constituted of bliss whose being the Paramatman is known from the repetition (of that expression) it is known that he himself is the Ātman And thus the whole aggregate of entities—sentient and non sentient over and above himself—is his body and so he alone is the embodied Ātman without any (limiting) adjuncts For this very reason this Sastra proceeding as referring to the Highest Brahman is designated Śariraka (dealing with the embodied one) by the experts Therefore the one constituted of bliss is the Paramatman different from the Jiva constituted of Vijnana ॥ 13 ॥

[136] (The Pūrvapakṣin) says—Not this Anandamaya is other than the Jiva on account of the *Mayat* termination being known as a word expressing modification

'मयड्वैतयोः' (पा. सू. ४।३।१४३)

इति प्रकृत्य

'नित्यं वृद्धशरादिभ्यः' (पा. सू. ४।३।१४४)

इति विकारार्थे मयट् स्मर्यते । वृद्धश्च, अयं 'आनन्द' शब्दः । ननु प्राचुर्येऽपि मयडस्ति—

'तत्प्रकृतवचने मयट्' (पा. सू. ५।४।२१)

इति स्मृतेः । यथा—'अन्नमयो यज्ञः,' इति । स एव, अयं भविष्यति । —नैवम् । 'अन्नमयः' इत्युपक्रमे विकारार्थत्वं दृष्टम् । अतः, औचित्यात्, अस्यापि विकारार्थत्वम्, एव युक्तम् । किं च, प्राचुर्यार्थत्वेऽपि जीवादन्यत्वं न सिध्यति । तथाहि—आनन्दप्रचुरः, इति, उक्ते दुःखमिश्रत्वम्, अवर्जनीयम् । आनन्दस्य हि प्राचुर्यं दुःखस्य, अल्पत्वमवगमयति । दुःख-मिश्रत्वम्, एव हि जीवत्वम् । अतः, औचित्यप्राप्तविकारार्थत्वम्, एव युक्तम् । किं च, लोके 'मृन्मयं' 'दारुमयं' इत्यादिषु, वेदे च,

'पर्णमयी जुहूः' (तै. सं. ३।५।६)

'शमीमय्यः स्रुचः । दर्भमयी रशना' (तै. ब्रा. ३।८।२)

Starting with

'The Mayaṭ, again, in these two' (Panini 4·3·143)

Mayaṭ is declared to have the sense of modification in

'Always in respect of Vṛddha, Śara etc.' (Panini 4·3·144)

This word 'Ānanda' belongs to the *Vṛddha* (group). But I say (says the objector)—There is *Mayaṭ* even in (the sense of) abundance, on account of the declaration (by the Smṛtikāra) in

'The Mayaṭ (termination) is expressive of something referring to the original matter' (Panini 5·4·21)

—as in (the passage) 'Sacrifice abounding in (Maya) food.' (and) that same (*Maya* meaning abounding in) would be this one—(we reply)—Not so. In the introduction of 'Annamaya', there is seen (the *Mayaṭ*) having the sense of modification. So, on account of propriety, it is proper that this one also has the sense of modification alone. And further, even though it has the sense of abundance, being other than Jīva cannot be established. To explain the same thing—When it is stated that he abounds in *Ānanda*, (his) being mixed up with misery cannot be avoided; for, the abundance of bliss makes one comprehend the meagerness of grief. Being mixed up with misery is indeed, the nature of Jīva. Therefore, (*Mayaṭ's*) having the sense of modification alone dictated by propriety is proper. And further, on account of the abundance of use in the sense of modification, of the *Mayaṭ* in popular parlance as in 'constituted of clay' 'constituted of wood' etc., and in the Vedas as in

'Ladle made of leaves' (Tai. Saṁ. 3·5·6)

'Spoons made of Śamī; girdle made of the Darbha grass' (Tai. Brā. 3·8·2)

इत्यादिषु, मयटो विकारार्थे प्रयोगबाहुल्यात्, स एव प्रथमतरं धियमारोहति। जीवस्य च, आनन्दविकारत्वम्, अस्त्येव। तस्य स्वत आनन्दरूपस्य सतः संसारित्वावस्था तद्विकार एव, इति। अतः, विकारवाचिनो मयट्प्रत्ययस्य श्रवणात्, आनन्दमयो जीवात्, अनतिरिक्तः, इति। तदेतदनुभाष्य परिहरति।

विकारशब्दान्नेति चेन्न प्राचुर्यात् ॥ १४ ॥

नैतद्युक्तम्। कुतः? 'प्राचुर्यात्' परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि, आनन्दप्राचुर्यात्। प्राचुर्यार्थे च मयटः संभवात्। एतदुक्तं भवति—शतगुणितोत्तरक्रमेण, अभ्यस्यमानस्य, आनन्दस्य जीवाश्रयत्वासंभवात्, ब्रह्माश्रयोऽयम्, आनन्दः, इति निश्चिते सति, तस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि विकारासंभवात्, प्राचुर्येऽपि मयड्विधिसद्भावाच्च, 'आनन्दमयः परं ब्रह्म,' इति, औचित्यात् प्रयोगप्रौढ्या च मयटो विकारार्थत्वम्, अर्थविरोधान्न संभवति। किं च, औचित्यं प्राणमये, एवं परित्यक्तम्। तत्र विकारार्थत्वासंभवात्। अतः, तत्र पञ्चवृत्तेर्वायोः प्राणवृत्तिमत्तामात्रेण प्राणमयत्वम्। प्राणापानादिषु पञ्चसु वृत्तिषु प्राणवृत्तेः, प्रचुरत्वात्, वा। न च प्राचुर्ये मयट्प्रत्ययस्य प्रौढिर्नास्ति। 'अन्नमयो यज्ञः,' 'शकटमयी यात्रा'—इत्यादिदर्शनात्।

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etc., the same (sense of modification) rises to the mind first of all. And undoubtedly Jīva has the nature of modification of bliss, because (although) the Jīva has by himself the nature of bliss, his state as being in worldly existence, is certainly the modification of that. And so, on account of the *Mayaṭ* termination being known to be expressive of modification, the Anandamaya is not over and above the Jīva.—Having amplified this (as the view of the Pūrvapaksin) (the Sūtrakāra) refutes (the same)—

> If on account of the word (Ānandamaya suggesting) modification, (Ānandamaya is) not (the Paramātman), (we reply) no, on account of (the sense of) abundance ॥ 14 ॥

This (is) not proper. Whence? 'Prācuryāt'—On account of the abudance of bliss in the Highest Brahman and on account of the possibility of *Mayaṭ* in the sense of abundance. This is what is intended to be said—When it is definitely ascertained on account of the impossibility of Jīva being the resort of bliss being repeated in succession multiplied a hundredfold, this bliss has Brahman for its resort, there being no possibility of any modification in that Brahman, and on account of the existence of directive about *Mayat* even in the sense of abundance, it is not possible owing to the sense-contradiction for *Mayat* to have the sense of modification, on account of propriety in 'Anandamaya is the Highest Brahman', and owing to the frequency of such use. And further, propriety has been discarded already in respect of Prāṇamaya, on account of the impossibility of the sense of modification with reference to it. Therefore there, being Prāṇamaya exists merely owing to the possession of functions of the vital airs on the part of the wind with its five functions, or on account of the abundance of the function of the vital air (breath) in the functions, Prāna, Apāna etc. Nor again is there not the frequency of the *Mayat* termination in the sense of abundance, as is seen in 'Yajña abounding in Anna'. 'Procession abounding in carts' etc.

यदुक्तम्—आनन्दप्राचुर्यम्, अल्पदुःखसद्भावम्, अवगमयति, इति, तदसत्। तत्प्रचुरत्वं हि तत्प्रभूतत्वमेव। तच्च, इतरस्य सत्तां न, अवगमयति, अपि तु तस्याल्पत्वं निवर्तयति। इतरसद्भावासद्भावौ तु प्रमाणान्तरावसेयौ। इह च प्रमाणान्तरेण तदभावोऽवगम्यते—

'अपहतपाप्मा' (छा. ८।१।५)

इत्यादिना। तत्र, एतावदेव वक्तव्यम्—ब्रह्मानन्दस्य प्रभूतत्वम्, अन्यानन्दस्य स्वल्पत्वमपेक्षते, इति। उच्यते च—

'तत एको मानुष आनन्दः' (तै. २।८)

इत्यादिना जीवानन्दापेक्षया ब्रह्मानन्दो निरतिशयदशापन्नः प्रभूतः, इति।

यच्चोक्तम्—जीवस्य, आनन्दविकारत्वं संभवति, इति तदपि नोपपद्यते। जीवस्य ज्ञानानन्दैकस्वरूपस्य केनचिदाकारेण, मृद इव घटाद्याकारेण, परिणामः सकलश्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायविरुद्धः। संसारदशायां तु कर्मणा ज्ञानानन्दौ संकुचितौ, इत्युपपादयिष्यते। अतः, विज्ञानमयात्, जीवात्, अन्य एव परमात्मा ॥ १४ ॥

[137] इतश्च, जीवादन्य 'आनन्दमयः'—

तद्धेतुव्यपदेशाच्च ॥ १५ ॥

As to the statement—that the abundance of bliss implies the existence of a little misery,—that is false. Abounding in something is nothing but the existence of that thing in great measure, and that does not imply the existence of anything else, but on the other hand shuns its being in a small measure. The existence and the non-existence of another are to be determined by other means of proof. Here, however, the absence of that is known by another means of proof,—

'*With sins destroyed*' (Chā. 8·1·5)

etc. There, this much alone can be said, that the abundance of bliss in Brahman is in relation with the little measure of another bliss; and it has been stated in

'*Therefore, that one human bliss*' (Tait. 2·8)

etc., that the bliss of Brahman as compared with the bliss of Jīva is in great measure, having attained to the maximum position.

And as to what has been stated that the Jīva's being constituted of bliss, is possible—that also does not stand to reason. The modification of Jīva with his uniform nature of knowledge, bliss, alone, in any form like that of the clay in the form of jar etc. is in contradiction with all Śrutis, Smṛtis and logic. In the state of worldly existence, however, knowledge and bliss (of Jīva) become contracted owing to (his) Karman—this will be expounded (later). Therefore, the Paramātman is, verily, different from the Jīva constituted of Vijñāna. ॥ 14 ॥

[137] For this reason again, 'the one constituted of bliss' is different from the Jīva—

On account of the reference to (His) being the cause of that (bliss) ॥ 15 ॥

'को ह्येवान्यात्कः प्राण्यात्। यदेष आकाश आनन्दो न स्यात्। एष ह्येवानन्दयति' (तै. २।७)

ते, एष जीवान्, आनन्दयति, इति जीवानामानन्दहेतुरयं व्यपदिश्यते। अतश्च, आनन्द-तव्याद्, जीवाद्, आनन्दयिता, अयम्, अन्यः, आनन्दमयः परमात्मा, इति विज्ञायते। नन्दमय एव, अत्र, 'आनन्द'शब्देन, उच्यते, इति च, अनन्तरमेव वक्ष्यते ॥ १५ ॥

[138] इतश्च, जीवादन्य 'आनन्दमयः'—

मान्त्रवर्णिकमेव च गीयते ॥ १६ ॥

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. २।१)

ति मन्त्रवर्णोदितं ब्रह्मैव, आनन्दमय इति गीयते। तच्च जीवस्वरूपाद्, अन्यत् परं ब्रह्म थाहि—

'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' (तै. २।१)

ति जीवस्य प्राप्यतया ब्रह्म निर्दिष्टम्।

'तदेषाभ्युक्ता' (तै. २।१)

ति, तद्ब्रह्म, अभिमुखीकृत्य, प्रतिपाद्यतया परिगृह्य, ऋगेषा, अध्येतृभिरुक्ता। ब्राह्मणो-क्तस्यार्थस्य वैशद्यम्, अनेन मन्त्रवर्णेन क्रियते, इत्यर्थः। जीवस्योपासकस्य प्राप्यं ब्रह्म

'Who again would be breathing, who would be living, if this Akāśa were not Ānanda (bliss)? This one alone makes one blissful.' (Tait. 2·7)

-here, because this one makes the Jivas blissful, he is declared to be the ause of the bliss of the Jivas. And therefore, it is definitely known that this ighest Atman constituted of bliss, the dispenser of bliss, is other than the Jiva, whom bliss is to be dispensed. That by the word 'Ānanda' here the one onstituted of bliss (i. e Paramātman) alone is mentioned—this will be stated mmediately after. ॥ 15 ॥

[138] And for this reason also, 'the one constituted of bliss' is ifferent from the Jiva—

And the same is sung in the words of the Mantra (S'ruti) assages ॥ 16 ॥

Brahman alone mentioned in the words of the *Mantra* in

'Existence, Knowledge, Infinite Brahman' (Tait. 2·1)

is the one constituted of bliss is sung. That again, is the Highest Brahman ther than the nature of Jiva. To explain the same—

In (the passage)

'The Brahman-knower secures the Highest' (Tait. 2·1)

Brahman has been mentioned as something fit to be secured by the Jiva.

'There this (Rk) has been stated' (Tait. 2·1)

—this Rk has been stated by the students, pointing out to that Brahman and accepting (Brahman) as fit to be propounded The sense is, that by this wording of the *Mantra* is made clear the subject-matter stated in the *Brāhmaṇa*. Brahman is the thing to be secured by the Jiva (who is) the

तस्माद्विलक्षणमेव, अनन्तरं च

'तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः' (तै. २।१)

इति, आरभ्य, उत्तरोत्तरैः, ब्राह्मणैः, मन्त्रैश्च तदेव विशदीक्रियते। अतः, जीवात्, अन्य 'आनन्दमयः' ॥ १६ ॥

[139] अत्र, आह—यद्यपि, उपासकात् प्राप्यस्य भेदेन भवितव्यं तथापि न वस्त्वन्तरं जीवात्, मान्त्रवर्णिकं ब्रह्म। किंतु तस्यैवोपासकस्य निरस्तसमस्ताविद्यागन्धं निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रैकरसं शुद्धस्वरूपं तदेव

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. २।१)

इति मन्त्रेण विशोध्यते। तदेव च

'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते। अप्राप्य मनसा सह' (तै. २।४, २।९)

इति, वाङ्मनसा, अगोचरतया निर्विशेषम्, इति गम्यते। अतः, तदेव मान्त्रवर्णिकम्, इति तस्माद्, अनतिरिक्त आनन्दमयः, इति। अतः, उत्तरं पठति—

नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः ॥ १७ ॥

परमात्मन इतरो 'जीव'शब्दाभिलप्यो मुक्तावस्थोऽपि न भवति मान्त्रवर्णिकः। कुतः? अनुपपत्तेः। तथाविधस्य, आत्मनो निरुपाधिकं विपश्चित्त्वं नोपपद्यते। इदमेव

worshipper; therefore, (Brahman) is undoubtedly different from him. And further on, beginning with

'From that, verily, from this Ātman, Ākāśa originated.' (Tait. 2·1)

the same is being clarified by means of successive passages from the *Brāhmaṇas* and by the *Mantra* (-portions). And therefore, 'the one constituted of bliss' is other than the Jiva. ॥ 16 ॥

[139] —Here says (the Pūrvapakṣin)—Although the thing to be secured is bound to be different from the worshipper, still the Brahman (referred to) in the *Mantra* (-portions) is not a different thing from the Jiva, but, what is the pure nature of the same worshipper, from which the entire tinge of Avidyā has been driven away, (and) which has the uniform essence of attributeless pure sentiency—that same is clearly disclosed by the *Mantra*

'Existence, Knowledge, Infinite Brahman.' (Tait. 2·1)

And that same is apprehended as attributeless, owing to its not being within the ken of mind and speech, in accordance with

'From whom words turn back along with the mind, without having reached it'. (Tait. 2·4, 2·9)

And so, because that same is the thing described in the words of the *Mantra* —the Ānandamaya is not over and above that.—So, (the Sūtrakāra) gives the (following) reply—

Not the other, on account of the impropriety ॥ 17 ॥

The one other than the highest Ātman, fit to be described by the word 'Jiva', cannot be the one described in the words of the *Mantra*, even though in the condition of a released one. Whence? On account of the impropriety. Of the Atman of that nature, being wise without any limiting adjuncts is improper. This same—being wise without any limiting adjuncts—

हि निरुपाधिकं विपश्चित्त्वं

'सोऽकामयत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति'　　　　　(तै २।६)

इति सत्यसंकल्पत्वप्रदर्शनेन व्यपदिश्यते। विविधं पश्यच्चित्त्वं हि 'विपश्चित्त्वम्'। पृषोदरादित्वात्, पश्यच्छब्दावयवस्य यच्छब्दस्य लोपं कृत्वा व्युत्पादितो विपश्चिच्छब्दः। यद्यपि मुक्तस्य विपश्चित्त्वं संभवति तथापि तस्यैवात्मनः संसारदशायाम्, अविपश्चित्त्वम्, अपि, अस्ति, इति निरुपाधिकं विपश्चित्त्वं नोपपद्यते। निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रतापन्नस्य मुक्तस्य विविधदर्शनाभावात् सुतरां विपश्चित्त्वं न संभवति, इति न केनापि प्रमाणेन निर्विशेषं वस्तु प्रतिपाद्यते, इति च पूर्वमेवोक्तम्।

'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते'　　　　　(तै २।४)

इति च वाक्यं यदि वाङ्मनसयोर्ब्रह्मणो निवृत्तिमभिदधीत, न ततो निर्विशेषतां वस्तुनोऽवगमयितुं शक्नुयात्। अपि तु वाङ्मनसयोस्तत्राप्रमाणतां वदेत्। तथा च सति, तस्य तुच्छत्वमेवापद्यते।

'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति'　　　　　(तै. २।१)

इत्यारभ्य, ब्रह्मणो विपश्चित्त्वम्, जगत्कारणत्वम्, आनन्दैकतानत्वम्, इतरान्प्रत्यानन्दयितृत्वम्, कामादेव चिदचिदात्मकस्य कृत्स्नस्य स्रष्टृत्वम्, सृज्यवर्गानुप्रवेशकृततदात्मत्वम्,

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is, indeed, referred to by pointing out the nature of having thoughts fulfilled in (the passage)

'He desired—Let me be many, may I procreate' (Tait 2 6)

'Being wise' is perceiving in a varied manner The word Vipaścit has been derived by the elision of the syllable Yat which is a part of the word *Paśyat on account of its belonging to the* Prsodara *group* Although being wise is possible in the case of the released one, still in the case of the same Ātman there is also the condition of not being wise in the state of worldly existence—and so, being wise without any limiting adjuncts is not proper (i e is out of question). Because in the case of the released one who has attained to the state of attributeless pure sentiency, being wise is all the more impossible on account of the absence of varied perception an attributeless thing cannot be propounded by any means of proof whatsoever—this has already been stated And if the passage—

'From whom words turn back'　　　　　(Tait 24)

were to state the turning away of Brahman from speech and mind, *that would not enable one to comprehend the attributelessness of a thing* as a consequence of that, but on the other hand, that would speak of speech and mind as not being the means of proof thereof And if that were the case, there would result but its unsubstantial nature Beginning with (the passage)

'The Brahman-knower secures'　　　　　(Tait 2 1)

having propounded in the case of Brahman being wise being the cause of the world being uniformly bliss, being the bestower of bliss in respect of others, being the creator through mere desire, of everything—sentient and non-sentient,—being its Ātman resulting from subsequent entering the class of created (entities), being the cause of fear and non fear, being the controller of the Wind and the Sun etc, being possessed of maximum bliss multiplied

भयाभयहेतुत्वम्, वाय्वादित्यादीनां प्रशासितृत्वम्, शतगुणितोत्तरक्रमेण निरतिशयानन्दत्वम्, अन्यच्च, अनेकं प्रतिपाद्य, वाङ्मनसयोर्ब्रह्मणि प्रवृत्त्यभावेन निष्प्रमाणकं ब्रह्म, इत्युच्यते, इति भ्रान्तिजल्पितम्।

'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते' (तै. २।९)

इति यच्छब्दनिर्दिष्टम्, अर्थ

'आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान्' (तै २।४)

इति, आनन्दशब्देन प्रतिनिर्दिश्य तस्य ब्रह्मसंबन्धित्वं 'ब्रह्मणः' इति व्यतिरेकनिर्देशेन प्रतिपाद्य, तदेव वाङ्मनसागोचरं 'विद्वान्,' इति तद्वेदनम्, अभिदधद्वाक्यं जरद्गवादिवाक्यवत्, अनर्थकं वाच्यानन्तर्गतं च स्यात्। अतः, शतगुणितोत्तरक्रमेण ब्रह्मानन्दस्य, अतिशयिततां वक्तुमुपक्रम्य, तस्य, इयत्ताया अभावादेव वाङ्मनसयोस्ततो निवृत्तिः

'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते' (तै २।९)

इत्युच्यते। एवम्, इयत्तारहितं ब्रह्मण आनन्दं विद्वान् कुतश्चन न बिभेति, इत्युच्यते। किं च, अस्य मान्त्रवर्णिकस्य विपश्चितः

'सोऽकामयत' (तै. २।६)

इत्यारभ्य, वक्ष्यमाणस्वसंकल्पावक्लृप्तजगज्जन्मस्थितिजगदन्तरात्मत्वादेर्मुक्तात्मस्वरूपात्, अन्यत्वं सुस्पष्टमेव ॥ १७ ॥

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a hundredfold step by step, and many a different (quality), it is stated that Brahman is not subject to any means of proof, owing to speech and mind not going upto Brahman—All this is just a deluded prattle The object pointed out by the word Yat, in

'From whom words turn back' (Tait. 2 9)

—having again referred to it by the word Ananda in the passage

'The knower of the bliss of Brahman' (Tait 2 4)

having propounded its relation with Brahman by pointing out its difference by (the expression) 'of Brahman,' directly mentioning its apprehension by (the expression) 'the knower' (of) that same which is not within the ken of speech and mind—the passage would be meaningless like the passage—an old bull etc not being directly concerned with the expressed sense Therefore, having started to speak of the excessive nature of the bliss in Brahman, multiplied a hundredfold step by step, the turning away of speech and mind from that (Brahman) on account of the absence itself of any limitation for that (bliss), is stated in (the passage)

'From whom words turn back' (Tait 2 9)

And thus it is stated that one knowing the bliss of Brahman, without any limitation, fears not from anything whatsoever And further, that this wise one described in the words of the *Mantra* (who) is possessed of the nature of being the inmost Ātman of the world with the origination and sustenance of the world taking place owing to his own reflecting being described in the passage beginning with

'He desired' (Tait 2 6)

is different from the nature of the released one, is surely quite evident. ‖ 17 ‖

[140] इतश्च, उभयावस्थात् प्रत्यगात्मनोऽन्य 'आनन्दमयः'।

भेदव्यपदेशाच्च ॥ १८ ॥

'तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाश' (तै २।१)

इत्यारभ्य, मान्त्रवर्णिकं ब्रह्म व्यञ्जयद्वाक्यम्, 'अन्नप्राणमनोभ्यः' इव जीवादपि तस्य भेदं व्यपदिशति

'तस्माद्वा एतस्माद्विज्ञानमयात् । अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमय' (तै २।५)

इति। अत, जीवात्, भेदव्यपदेशाच्च, अयं मान्त्रवर्णिक आनन्दमयोऽन्य एव, इति विज्ञायते ॥ १८ ॥

[141] इतश्च जीवात्, अन्यः—

कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा ॥ १९ ॥

जीवस्य, अविद्यापरवशस्य जगत्कारणत्वे हि, अवर्जनीय-आनुमानिकप्रधानशब्दाभिधेयाचिद्वस्तुसंसर्गापेक्षा। तथैव हि चतुर्मुखादीनां कारणत्वम्। इह च

'सोऽकामयत । बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' (तै २।६)

इति, अचित्संसर्गरहितस्य स्वकामादेव विचित्रचिदचिद्वस्तुन सृष्टि

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[140] —And for this reason also, the 'Ānandamaya' is other than the inmost Atman in both states

And on account of the reference to distinction ॥ 18 ॥

The passage beginning with

'From that, verily from this Ātman Ākāsa originated

(Tait 2 1)

pointing out the Brahman described in the words of the *Mantra* points out the distinction of that (Brahman) from the Jīva also as from 'food, vital air (and) mind' in the passage

From that verily, from this one constituted of Vijñana, there is another inmost Ātman constituted of bliss (Tait 2 5)

Therefore, on account of the reference to distinction also from the Jiva it is definitely known that this Anandamaya described in the words of the *Mantra* is certainly different ॥ 18 ॥

[141] —And for this reason (also), (he is) different from Jiva

On account of Kāma (desire), (there is) no need for Anumana (i e Pradhāna) ॥ 19 ॥

If Jiva (completely) under the control of Avidya were the cause of the world the need for contact with a non sentient thing expressed by the words Pradhana, Ānumānika is indeed unavoidable In the same way, is (to-be explained) being the cause (of the world) (in the case) of the four faced (Brahmadeva) and others But here the creation of variegated objects—sentient and non sentient—from his own volition alone on the part of one bereft of contact with the non-sentient in (the passage)

'He desired—Let me be many may I procreate (Tait 2 6)

—(the creation) is described in the Śruti (passage) viz

'इदं सर्वमसृजत । यदिदं किं च' (तै. ३।६)

इत्याम्नायते । अतः, अस्य, आनन्दमयस्य जगत्सृजतः, न, आनुमानिकाचिद्वस्तुसंसर्गापेक्षा प्रतीयते । ततश्च, जीवात्, अन्य आनन्दमयः ॥ १९ ॥

[142] इतश्च जीवात्, अन्यः—

अस्मिन्नस्य च तद्योगं शास्ति ॥ २० ॥

अस्मिन्, आनन्दमये, अस्य जीवस्य, तद्योगं शास्ति, आनन्दयोगं शास्ति शास्त्रं

'रसो वै स । रस ह्येवाय लब्ध्वानन्दी भवति' (तै ३।७)

इति । रसशब्दाभिधेयानन्दमयलाभात्, अयं जीवशब्दाभिलपनीयः, आनन्दी भवति, इत्युच्यमाने, यल्लाभात्, य आनन्दी भवति, स स एव, इत्यनुन्मत्तः को ब्रवीति ?—इत्यर्थः ।

एवम्, आनन्दमयः परं ब्रह्म, इति निश्चिते सति,

'यदेष आकाश आनन्दो न स्यात्' (तै ३।७)

'विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म' (बृ. ३।९।२८)

इत्यादिषु, आनन्दशब्देन, आनन्दमय एव परामृश्यते । यथा, विज्ञानशब्देन विज्ञानमयः । अत एव

'आनन्द ब्रह्मणो विद्वान्' ((तै. ३।४, ३।९)

इति व्यतिरेकनिर्देशः । अत एव

'(*He*) *created all this, whatever all is this.*' (Tait 2 6)

Therefore, in the case of this Ānandamaya while creating the world, there is not apprehended the need for a contact with a non-sentient thing, Ānumānika. And thus the Ānandamaya is other than the Jiva ॥ 19 ।

[142] —And for this reason (also), (he is) different from the Jiva.

And (the Śruti) declares the association with that (bliss) of this (Jiva) in this (Ānandamaya) ॥ 20 ॥

In this—in the one constituted of bliss, of this,—of Jiva, declares the association of that,—declares the Sāstra the association of bliss, in

'*He is verily, the flavour, having secured the flavour indeed this one becomes blissful.*' (Tait 2 7)

When it is stated that this one designated by the word Jiva becomes blissful on the acquisition of the Ānandamaya expressed by the word Rasa, what unintoxicated person would speak out that he (Jiva) who becomes blissful on the acquisition of whom (Ānandamaya) is the same as he (i e. the Highest Atman in the Ānandamaya)?—This is the sense

Thus, when it has been ascertained that the Ānandamaya is the Highest Brahman, the Anandamaya himself is referred to by the word Ānanda in (the passages)

'*If this Ākāśa were not Ānanda (bliss)*' (Tait 2 7)

'*Special knowledge, bliss (is) Brahman*' (Br 3 9 28)

etc, just as by the word Vijñāna (is to be understood) the one constituted of Vijñāna For this very reason, there is the reference to difference (from the Brahman) in (the passage)

'*The knower of the bliss of Brahman*' (Tait 2 4, 2 9)

For this very reason, there is also a reference to the fruit in (the passage)

'एतमानन्दमयमात्मानमुपसंक्रामति' (तै. २।८)

इति फलनिर्देशश्च। उत्तरे च, अनुवाके पूर्वानुवाकोक्तानाम्, अन्नमयादीनां

'अन्नं ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्' (तै. ३।२)

'प्राणो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्' (तै. ३।३)

'मनो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्' (तै. ३।४)

'विज्ञानं ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्' (तै. ३।५)

इति प्रतिपादनात्,

'आनन्दो ब्रह्म' (तै. ३।६)

इत्यपि, आनन्दमयस्यैव प्रतिपादनम्, इति विज्ञायते। तत एव च, तत्रापि

'आनन्दमयमात्मानमुपसंक्रम्य' (तै. ३।१०।५)

इत्युपसंहृतम्। अतः प्रधानशब्दाभिलप्यात्, अर्थान्तरभूतस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणो जीवशब्दाभिलपनीयात्, अपि वस्तुतः, अर्थान्तरत्वं सिद्धम् ॥ २० ॥

आनन्दमयाधिकरणं समाप्तम् (६)

यद्यपि मन्दपुण्यानां जीवानां कामात्, जगत्सृष्टिः, अतिशयितानन्दयोगः, भयाभयहेतुत्वम्, इत्यादि न संभवति, तथापि, विलक्षणपुण्यानाम्, आदित्येन्द्रप्रजापतिप्रभृतीनां संभवति, एव, इति, इमाम्, आशङ्कां निराकरोति—

[143] अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशात् ॥ २१ ॥ (अधिकरण ७, सूत्राणि २१–२२)

इदम्, आम्नायते छान्दोग्ये—

'*He goes over to this Ānandamaya Ātman,*' (Tait. 2·8)

And on account of the propounding of Annamaya and others spoken of in the previous Anuvāka (chapter) (in passages)

'*One should know Anna (food) as Brahman.*' (Tait. 3·2)

'*One should know Prāna (breath) as Brahman*' (Tait. 3·3)

'*One should know Manas (mind) as Brahman.*' (Tait. 3·4)

'*One should know Vijñāna as Brahman*' (Tait. 3·5)

—it is known that in the next Anuvāka (chapter), there is the propounding of the Anandamaya himself in

'*Bliss (as) Brahman*' (Tait 3·6)

also. And for that very reason, it is concluded there also in

'*Having gone over to the Anandamaya Atman*' (Tait. 3·10·5)

Hence, in the case of the Highest Brahman, which is a different entity from that designated by the word Pradhāna, being a different object also from the entity designated by the word Jiva, is proved. ॥ 20 ॥

Here ends the Ānandamayādhikarana (6)

Although in the case of the Jīvas with scanty merit, are not possible the creation of the world through (mere) thought, the association with excessive bliss, being the cause of fear and non-fear etc., still (these) are definitely possible in the case of Āditya, Indra, Prajāpati and others of extraordinary merit—(the Sūtrakāra) removes this doubt (by the following Sūtra)—

[143] (The Paramātman is) the inmost, on account of the mention of His attributes. ॥ 21 ॥ (Adhikaraṇa 7, Sūtras 21–22).

This has been declared by the Sruti in the *Chāndogya*—

'य एषोऽन्तरादित्ये हिरण्मयः पुरुषो दृश्यते हिरण्यश्मश्रुर्हिरण्यकेश आप्रणखात् सर्व एव सुवर्णः। तस्य यथा कप्यासं पुण्डरीकमेवमक्षिणी। तस्योदिति नाम। स एष सर्वेभ्यः पाप्मभ्य उदितः। उदेति ह वै सर्वेभ्यः पाप्मभ्यो य एवं वेद। तस्यर्क्च साम च गेष्णौ। ...इत्यधिदैवतम्' (छा. १।६।६-७-८)

अथ, अध्यात्ममपि—

'अथ य एषोऽन्तरक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते सैवर्क्तत्साम तदुक्थं तद्यजुस्तद्ब्रह्म। तस्यैतस्य तदेव रूपं यदमुष्य रूपं यावमुष्य गेष्णौ तौ गेष्णौ यन्नाम तन्नाम' (छा. १।७।५)

इति। तत्र संदिह्यते—किम्, अयम्, अक्ष्यादित्यमण्डलान्तर्वर्ती पुरुषः पुण्योपचयनिमित्तैश्वर्यः, आदित्यादिशब्दाभिलप्यः, जीवः, एव; आहोस्वित् तदतिरिक्तः परमात्मा, इति? —किं युक्तम्? उपचितपुण्यो जीव एव, इति। कुतः? सशरीरत्वश्रवणात्। शरीरसंबन्धो हि जीवानामेव संभवति। कर्मानुगुणप्रियाप्रिययोगाय हि शरीरसंबन्धः। अत एव हि, कर्मसंबन्धरहितस्य मोक्षस्य प्राप्यत्वम्, अशरीरत्वेन, उच्यते

'Who this one is seen, the person within the Sun, constituted of gold, gold-bearded, gold-haired, gold all over right upto the tips of the nails,—of Him are the two eyes like the lotus opened by the Sun. Of Him 'Ud' (High) (is) the name. He, this one, has risen up from all sins. Rises up, indeed, he from all sins, who knows thus. Of him the Ṛk and the Sāman are the two singers.—This concerning (His being) the Deity.' (Chā. 1·6 6, 7, 8)

Further, concerning the body also—

'Now, who this one is seen within the eye, the person (He is) the self-same Ṛk, the same Sāman, and the same Sāman-song, the same Yajus, that Brahman. Of Him, is the same form which is the form of this one; what are the two singers of that are (His) singers; what name (Ud He has), the same name (for the other)'. (Chā. 1·7 5)

—There arises the doubt—Is this Person staying within the eye and the orb of the Sun, with (his) pre-eminent glory due to accumulation of merit, designated by the word Aditya etc, the Jīva; or the Highest Atman over and above that?—What (is) proper (here)? Assuredly, the Jīva with accumulated merit. Whence? On account of the statement in the Sruti of his being possessed of a body. Association with a body is indeed, possible only in the case of the Jivas. For, association with a body is for the sake of association with the agreeable and the disagreeable in conformity with the Karman. For this very reason, is indeed spoken of, the attainment of the release void of (any) association with Karman, as not being possessed of the body, in

> *'न ह वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति । अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः'* (छा. ८।१२।१)

इति । संभवति च पुण्यातिशयात्, ज्ञानाधिक्यं शक्त्याधिक्यं च । अत एव, लोककामेशत्वादि तस्यैव, उपपद्यते । तत एव च, उपास्यत्वम्, फलदायित्वम्, पापक्षपणकरत्वेन मोक्षोपयोगित्वं च । मनुष्येष्वपि, उपचितपुण्याः केचित् ज्ञानशक्त्यादिभिः, अधिकतरा दृश्यन्ते । ततश्च सिद्धगन्धर्वादयः, ततश्च देवाः, ततश्च, इन्द्रादयः । अतः, ब्रह्मादिषु, अन्यतम एव, एकैकस्मिन्कल्पे पुण्यविशेषेणैव प्रभूतमैश्वर्यं प्राप्तः, जगत्सृष्ट्यादि करोति, इति जगत्कारणत्वजगदन्तरात्मत्वादिवाक्यम्, अस्मिन्नेवोपचितपुण्यविशेषे सर्वज्ञे सर्वशक्तौ वर्तते । अतः, न जीवातिरिक्तः परमात्मा नाम कश्चिदस्ति । एवं च सति

> *'अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वम्'* (बृ. ३।८।८)

इत्यादयो जीवात्मनः स्वरूपाभिप्राया भवन्ति । मोक्षशास्त्राण्यपि तत्स्वरूपप्राप्त्युपायोपदेशपराणि, इति—

[144] एवं प्राप्ते, अभिधीयते — अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशात् — अन्तरादित्ये, अन्तरक्षिणि च यः पुरुषः प्रतीयते स जीवादन्यः परमात्मा, एव । कुतः ? तद्धर्मोपदेशात् ।

> *'Not indeed, is there the destruction of the agreeable and the disagreeable in the case of one with a body; Him indeed not having a body, touch not the agreeable and the disagreeable.'* (Chā. 8·12 1)

And excess of knowledge and excess of powers are, indeed, possible owing to the excess of merit. For this very reason, being the Lord of worlds and desires is appropriate just in his case. And surely as a consequence, (follow)—being the object of worship, being the bestower of fruit, and being useful for (securing) salvation by being the destroyer of sin. Amongst human beings also there are seen some to be greater by knowledge, power etc.—(greater) again than they are the Siddhas, the Gandharvas and others, (greater) than these again are gods, (greater) again than these are Indra and others. Therefore, only some one from among Brhmadeva and others attained to a very great glory by distinctive merit itself in each one particular Kalpa, effects even the creation etc. of the world—and so, the passage referring to his being the cause of the world and being the inmost Ātman of the world, applies to him alone who is with distinct merit accumulated, omni-scient (and) omnipotent. Therefore, there is no Paramātman for the matter of that, over and above the Jīva. And this being the case,

> *'Not big, not atomic, not short'* (Br. 3·8 8)

etc. would pertain to his own nature of the Jīvātman (Individual Soul). The scriptural passages dealing with salvation are also intent upon describing the means of attaining to that own nature.

[**144**] This (prima-facie view) being reached, (this) is stated (in reply)— (The Paramātman is) the inmost, on account of the mention of His attributes. That Person who is apprehended as being within the Sun and within the eye, is the Paramātman alone, other than the Jīva. Whence?

जीवेषु, असंभवँस्तदतिरिक्तस्यैव परमात्मनो धर्मः, अयम्, अपहतपाप्मत्वादिः

'स एष सर्वेभ्यः पाप्मभ्य उदितः' (छा. १।६।७)

इत्यादिना, उपदिश्यते। अपहतपाप्मत्वं हि, अपहतकर्मत्वम्, कर्मवश्यतागन्धरहितत्वम्, इत्यर्थः। कर्माधीनसुखदुःखभागित्वेन कर्मवश्या हि जीवाः। अतः, अपहतपाप्मत्वं जीवादन्यस्य परमात्मन एव धर्मः। तत्पूर्वकं स्वरूपोपाधिकं लोककामेशत्वम्, सत्यसंकल्पत्वादिकम्, सर्वभूतान्तरात्मत्वं च तस्यैव धर्मः। यथा, आह—

'एष आत्मापहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोकोऽविजिघत्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः' (छा. ८।१।५)

इति। तथा—

'एष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मापहतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायणः' (सुबालोपनिषत्)

इति।

'सोऽकामयत। बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' (तै. २।६)

इत्यादिसत्यसंकल्पत्वपूर्वकसमस्तचिदचिद्वस्तुसृष्टियोगः, निरुपाधिकभयाभयहेतुत्वम्, वाङ्मनसपरिमितिकृतपरिच्छेदरहितानवधिकातिशयानन्दयोगः, इत्यादयः, अकर्मसंपाद्याः स्वाभाविकाः, धर्माः, जीवस्य न संभवन्ति।

On account of the mention of His attributes. This characteristic which is impossible in the case of the Jīva, belonging only to the Paramātman over and above that, viz. to be with sins destroyed etc, is mentioned by

'He, this one has risen up from all sins' (Chā 1·6·7)

etc To be with sins destroyed is, indeed to be with Karman destroyed, that is, to be void of even the tinge of being subject to Karman, for, the Jīvas are subject to Karman, owing to their sharing in happiness and misery dependent upon Karman Therefore, *being with sins destroyed is a characteristic of* Paramātman alone other than the Jīva And of Him alone (are) the characteristics—being the Lord of worlds and desires, having thoughts fulfilled etc, being the inmost Ātman of all beings—(all these) being preceded by that (*Apahatapāpmatva*) and conditioned by His own nature, as says (the Sruti)—

'This Ātman with sins destroyed, bereft of old age, bereft of death, bereft of grief, without hunger, without thirst, with desires fulfilled, with thoughts fulfilled' (Chā 8 1 5)

Likewise,

'This one, the inmost Ātman of all beings, with sins destroyed, divine, refulgent, the one Nārāyana' (Subālopanisat)

'He desired, Let me be many, may I procreate' (Tait 2 6)

—(described) here etc the effecting of the creation of all the sentient and the non-sentient objects preceded by having thoughts fulfilled being the cause of fear and non-fear without any limiting adjuncts, the association with unlimited and excessive bliss, bereft of restrictions caused by limitations of speech and mind —etc, these natural characteristics not to be secured by Karman are not possible in Jīva.

[145] यत्तु, शरीरसंबन्धात्, न जीवातिरिक्त, इत्युक्तम्, तदयुक्तम्। न हि सशरीरत्वं कर्मवश्यतां साधयति। सत्यसंकल्पस्य, इच्छयापि शरीरसंबन्धसंभवात्। अथ, उच्येत—शरीरं नाम त्रिगुणात्मकप्रकृतिपरिणामरूपभूतसंघात, तत्संबन्धश्च, अपहतपाप्मनः सत्यसंकल्पस्य पुरुषस्येच्छया न संभवति, अपुरुषार्थत्वात्। कर्मवश्यस्य तु, स्वस्वरूपानभिज्ञस्य कर्मानुगुणफलोपभोगाय, अनिच्छतोऽपि तत्संबन्धोऽवर्जनीय', इति। स्यात्, एतदेवम्, यदि त्रिगुणमय' प्राकृतोऽस्य देह· स्यात्। स तु स्वाभिमत' स्वानुरूपोऽप्राकृत एव, इति सर्वमुपपन्नम्।

एतदुक्तं भवति—परस्यैव ब्रह्मण, निखिलहेयप्रत्यनीकानन्तज्ञानानन्दैकस्वरूपतया सकलेतरविलक्षणस्य, स्वाभाविकानवधिकातिशयासङ्ख्येयकल्याणगुणगणाश्च सन्ति। तद्वदेव, स्वाभिमतानुरूपैकरूपाचिन्त्यदिव्याद्भुतनित्यनिरवद्यनिरतिशयौज्ज्वल्यसौन्दर्यसौगन्ध्यसौकुमार्यलावण्ययौवनाद्यनन्तकल्याणगुणगणनिधिदिव्यरूपम्,अपि,स्वाभाविकम्, अस्ति। तदेव, उपासकानुग्रहेण तत्तत्प्रतिपत्त्यनुरूपसंस्थान करोति। अपारकारुण्यसौशील्य-

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[145] As to what has been said—that (the Purusa) is not over and above the Jiva on account of the connection with the body —that is improper Not indeed, does being possessed of a body prove being dependent upon Karman on account of the possibility of the connection with the body of one with thoughts fulfilled even with the (mere) volition If it is argued—That the body is indeed, the aggregate of elements having the form of the modification of the Prakrti constituted of the three Gunas And a connection with that is not possible by the volition of the person with sins destroyed and having thoughts fulfilled on account of the absence of human purpose of life (in him) In the case of one however who is subject to Karman and ignorant of his own (real) nature a connection with that, for the enjoyment of the fruit in conformity with the Karman is unavoidable although not desired—(The reply is)—This would be so if his body has been constituted of the three Gunas and has risen out of Prakrti But that (body) is definitely a self desired one befitting him and not arising out of Prakrti—thus everything stands to reason

This is what is intended to be said—In the case of the Highest Brahman itself that is quite different from everything else owing to its uniform nature of endless knowledge and bliss and the rival of everything to be abandoned there are hosts of natural unlimited excessive (and) innumerable auspicious qualities In the same manner the refulgent form the store of endless hosts of auspicious qualities unthinkable refulgent wonderful eternal blameless unsurpassed brilliance beauty excellent fragrance delicate nature loveliness, youth etc the unique form self desired and befitting him —(the refulgent form) *is also natural* And that same by way of favouring the worshipper creates configuration in conformity with the various apprehensions—The endless ocean of mercy, good nature affection magnanimity, overlordship

वात्सल्यौदार्यैश्वर्यजलनिधिः, निरस्तनिखिलहेयगन्धः, अपहतपाप्मा परमात्मा परं ब्रह्म पुरुषोत्तमो नारायणः, इति

'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते' (तै ३।१।१)

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' (छा ६।२।१)

'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्' (ऐ १।१)

'एको ह वै नारायण आसीत् । न ब्रह्मा नेशानः' (म १)

इत्यादिषु, निखिलजगदेककारणतया, अवगतस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणः

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै २।१)

'विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म' (बृ ३।९।२८)

इत्यादिषु, एवंभूतं स्वरूपम्, इत्यवगम्यते।

'निर्गुणम्' (चू ७।२)

'निरञ्जनम्' (श्वे. ६।१९)

'अपहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोकोऽविजिघत्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः' (छा ८।१।५)

'न तस्य कार्यं करणं च विद्यते न तत्समश्चाप्यधिकश्च दृश्यते ।
परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च ॥' (श्वे ६।८)

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with (even) the tinge of everything to be abandoned removed, with sins destroyed, the highest Ātman, the Highest Brahman is Nārāyana, the excellent Man—of the Highest Brahman as such, apprehended as the only cause of the entire world in

'From whom again, these beings are produced' (Tait 3 1 1)

'Existence alone, (my) dear, was all this in the beginning' (Cha 6 2 1)

'Ātman alone was all this in the beginning' (Ait 1·1)

'Nārāyana alone was, verily (there), neither Brahman, nor Siva' (M 1)

etc, the nature is apprehended as being such in

'Existence, knowledge, Infinite Brahman' (Tait 2 1)

'Special knowledge, bliss (is) Brahman' (Br 3 9 28)

etc In

'Qualitiless' (Cu 7 2)

'Blotless' (Śve 6 19)

'With sins destroyed, bereft of old age, bereft of death, bereft of grief, without hunger, without thirst with desires fulfilled, with thoughts fulfilled' (Cha 8 1·5)

'In his case, there is no effect (body), the sense-organs, there is not seen any one equal or superior to him, his supreme power is heard to be definitely multifarious, and knowledge, strength, activity (are all) natural (in him)' (Śve 6 8)

'तमीश्वराणां परमं महेश्वरं तं दैवतानां परमं च दैवतम् ।' (श्वे. ६।७)
'स कारणं करणाधिपाधिपो न चास्य कश्चिज्जनिता न चाधिपः ।' (श्वे. ६।९)
'सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचित्य धीरो नामानि कृत्वाभिवदन्यदास्ते ।।'
(तै. आ. ३।११)
'वेदाहमेतं पुरुषं महान्तमादित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्तात्' (श्वे. ३।८)
'सर्वे निमेषा जज्ञिरे विद्युतः पुरुषादधि' (म. ना. १।८)

इत्यादिषु, परस्य ब्रह्मणः प्राकृतहेयगुणान्, प्राकृतहेयदेहसंबन्धम्, तन्मूलकर्मवश्यतासंबन्धं च प्रतिषिध्य, कल्याणगुणान्, कल्याणरूपं च वदति । तदिदं स्वाभाविकम्, एव रूपम्, उपासकानुग्रहेण तत्प्रतिपत्त्यनुगुणाकारं देवमनुष्यादिसंस्थानं करोति स्वेच्छयैव परमकारुणिको भगवान् । तदिदमाह श्रुतिः—

'अजायमानो बहुधा विजायते' (तै. आ. ३।१२)

इति । स्मृतिश्च—

'अजोऽपि सन्नव्ययात्मा भूतानामीश्वरोऽपि सन् ।
प्रकृतिं स्वामधिष्ठाय संभवाम्यात्ममायया ॥' (गी. ४।६)

'*Him the highest great Lord of Lords, (and) him, the highest Deity of deities*'. (Śve. 6·7)

'*He is the cause, the Lord of the lord of the sense-organs, and there is no one progenitor for him, nor a Lord*'. (Śve 6 9)

'*Having collected together all forms, the wise one, having assigned names, stays on speaking of*'. (Tait. Ā. 3·11)

'*I know this great Puruṣa, Āditya-coloured, and beyond darkness*'. (Śve 3·8)

'*All moments arose out of the Lightning-Puruṣa*'. (M N 1·8)

etc,—having repudiated in the case of the Highest Brahman the qualities arising from the Prakṛti (and) fit to be abandoned, the connection with the body fit to be abandoned, (and) arising from Prakṛti, (and) the connection with the nature of being subject to Karman rooted in that (connection with a body), (the Śruti) speaks of the auspicious qualities and auspicious form. The highly merciful Lord by his will itself creates, verily, this same natural form, the configuration of gods, men etc, having a form conforming to the various apprehensions, by way of favouring the worshippers—this same, says the Śruti viz —

'*Not taking birth, he is born in various ways*'. (Tait Ā 3·12)

and also the Smṛti—

'*Although unborn, of immutable self, although the Lord of creatures, I come into being by my own Māyā, resorting to my own Prakṛti*'. (Gītā 4·6)

' परित्राणाय साधूनां विनाशाय च दुष्कृताम् ' (गी. ४।८)

इति।

साधवो हि, उपासकाः, तत्परित्राणम्, एवोद्देश्यम्। आनुषङ्गिको दुष्कृतां विनाशः। संकल्पमात्रेणापि तदुपपत्तेः। 'प्रकृतिं स्वाम्' इति—प्रकृतिः स्वभावः। स्वमेव स्वभावमास्थाय, न संसारिणां स्वभावम्, इत्यर्थः। 'आत्ममायया' इति—स्वसंकल्पमात्ररूपेण ज्ञानेन, इत्यर्थः। माया वयुनं ज्ञानम्, इति ज्ञानपर्यायम्, अपि मायाशब्दं नैघण्टुका अधीयते। आह च भगवान्पराशरः—

' समस्ताः शक्तयश्चैता नृप यत्र प्रतिष्ठिताः।
तद्विश्वरूपवैरूप्यं रूपमन्यद्धरेर्महत् ॥ ६९ ॥
समस्तशक्तिरूपाणि तत्करोति जनेश्वर।
देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्याख्यचेष्टावन्ति स्वलीलया ॥ ७० ॥
जगतामुपकाराय न सा कर्मनिमित्तजा।' (वि. पु. ६।७।६९–७१)

महाभारते च, अर्चावताररूपस्य, अपि, अप्राकृतत्वमुच्यते।

' न भूतसंघसंस्थानो देहोऽस्य परमात्मनः।'

इति। अतः परस्यैव ब्रह्मण एवंरूपवत्त्वात्, अयमपि तस्यैव धर्मः। अतः, आदित्यमण्डलाक्ष्यधिकरण आदित्यादिजीवातिरिक्तः परमात्मा, एव ॥ २१ ॥

' For the protection of the good, and for the annihilation of the evil-doers '. (Gītā 4·8)

The good are, indeed, the worshippers, and the object aimed at is, verily, their protection. The annihilation of the evil-doers is just tagged on (i. e., auxiliary), as it can result merely by thought, 'Prakṛtim svām'—Prakṛti (means) nature; having resorted to his own nature, and not to the nature of those in worldly existence—This is the sense. 'Ātmamāyayā' (means) by means of the knowledge merely in the form of his own thought—This is the sense. The etymologists read the word Māyā as the synonym of knowledge, as *Māyā*, *Vayunam*, *Jñānam*. And says the Revered Parāśara—

' Where (O) King, are established all these powers, that is Hari's another great form, with muliplicity of a universal nature ॥ 69 ॥

(O) Lord of people, that (Hari) creates in his sport, the forms of all powers, endowed with the activities of gods, lower animals, human beings socalled, ' ॥ 70 ॥

—(Activity) is for obliging the worlds (and) that is not the outcome as a result of Karman '. (V. P. 6·7·69-71)

And in the *Mahābhārata* is also spoken of, the form of incarnation for worship, as not arising out of Prakṛti in

' Of this highest Ātman, the body is not the configuration of the aggregate of elements '.

Therefore, on account of the Highest Brahman itself, being possessed of such a form, this also is a characteristic of it (Brahman) alone. Thus, the one having his abode in the eye and in the orb of the sun, is the Paramātman himself over and above the Jīvas (individual Souls), Āditya and others. ॥ 21 ॥

[144] भेदव्यपदेशाच्चान्यः ॥ २२ ॥

आदित्यादिजीवेभ्यो भेदो व्यपदिश्यतेऽस्य परमात्मन ।

'य आदित्ये तिष्ठन्नादित्यादन्तरो यमादित्यो न वेद यस्यादित्य शरीर य आदित्यमन्तरो यमयति' (बृ ३।७।९)

'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरो यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा शरीर य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति' (बृ ३।७।२२)

'यस्याक्षर शरीर यमक्षर न वेद । यो मृत्युमन्तरे सचरन् यस्य मृत्यु शरीर य मृत्युर्न वेद । एष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मापहतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायण' (सुबालो)

इति च, अस्य, अपहतपाप्मन परमात्मन सर्वान् जीवान् शरीरत्वेन व्यपदिश्य तेषाम्, अन्तरात्मत्वेनैन व्यपदिशति । अत, सर्वेभ्य एव आदित्यादिजीवेभ्योऽन्य एव परमात्मा, इति सिद्धम् ॥ २२ ॥

अन्तराधिकरण समाप्तम् (७)

[145] *'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते'* (तै ३।१।१)
इति जगत्कारणं ब्रह्म, इत्यवगम्यते । किं तत्, जगत्कारणम्, इत्यपेक्षाया

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[144] And on account of the reference to difference another ॥ 22 ॥

Difference from the Jivas Aditya and others of this Paramatman is referred to—

'Who residing in Aditya is different from Aditya whom Aditya knows not whose body is Aditya who controls Aditya inside (Br 3 7 9)

Who residing in the Atman is different from the Atman whom the Atman knows not whose body is the Atman who controls the Atman within (Br 3 7 22)

'Whose body is the Imperishable whom the Imperishable knows not who moving about within Death whose body is Death, whom Death knows not—This one the inmost Atman of all beings with sins destroyed divine refulgent the one Narayana (Subalo)

—And having in these passages referred to all Jivas as being 'the body of the Highest Atman with sins destroyed (the Sruti) refers to him (Paramatman) as being their inmost Atman Therefore it is established that the Paramātman is verily different from all Jivas Aditya and others without exception ॥ 22 ॥

Here ends the Antaradhikarana (7)

[145] In (the passage)

From whom again these beings are produced (Tait 3 1 1)

it is known that the cause of the world is Brahman There being the expectancy to know what is that which is the cause of the world when the cause of the world is mentioned in general terms—

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् ।...तत्तेजोऽसृजत' (छा. ६।२।२–३)

'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्...स इमाँल्लोकानसृजत' (ऐ. १।१–२)

'तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः' (तै. २।१)

इति साधारणैः शब्दैः, जगत्कारणे निर्दिष्टे, ईक्षणविशेषानन्दविशेषरूपविशेषार्थस्वभावात्, प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञादिव्यतिरिक्तं ब्रह्म, इत्युक्तम् । इदानीम्, आकाशादिविशेषशब्दैः, निर्दिश्य, जगत्कारणत्वजगदैश्वर्यादिवादेऽपि, आकाशादिशब्दाभिधेयतया प्रसिद्धचिदचिद्वस्तुनोऽर्थान्तरम्, उक्तलक्षणमेव ब्रह्म, इति प्रतिपाद्यते, 'आकाशस्तल्लिङ्गात्' इत्यादिना पादशेषेण ।

[146] आकाशस्तल्लिङ्गात् ॥ २३ ॥ (अधिकरण ८, सूत्र–२१)

इदमाम्नायते छान्दोग्ये—

'अस्य लोकस्य का गतिरित्याकाश इति होवाच । सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतान्याकाशादेव समुत्पद्यन्ते आकाशं प्रत्यस्तं यान्ति । आकाशो ह्येवैभ्यो ज्यायान् । आकाशः परायणम्' (छा. १।९।१)

इति । तत्र संदेहः—किं प्रसिद्धाकाशम्, एव, अत्र, आकाशशब्देन, अभिधीयते—उत,

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'Existence alone, (my) dear, was all this in the beginning... It created Light'. (Chā. 6·2·2–3)

'Ātman alone was all this in the beginning...He created these worlds'. (Ait. 1·1–2)

'From that, verily, from this Ātman, Ākāśa originated'. (Tait. 2·1)

it is stated that Brahman is different from the Kṣetrajñas and the Pradhāna on account of its nature of a special entity, having the speciality of reflection, speciality of bliss and speciality of form. Now, having pointed out by special words like Ākāśa and others, it is propounded by the remaining part of the quarter beginning with (the Sūtra) 'Ākāśa (is Brahman) on account of the characteristics of that' etc., that the same Brahman already defined, is an entity different from the well-known sentient and non-sentient entities, owing to its being denoted by the word Ākāśa and others, even during discussions in respect of (its) being the cause of the world, (and) being possessed of overlordship.

[146] Ākāśa (is Brahman) on account of the characteristics of that ॥ 23 ॥

This is declared in the *Chāndogya* by the Sruti—

'Of these people what is the destination? He said, verily, Ākāśa All these beings, indeed, come out of the Ākāśa alone, go to set in the Ākāśa. Ākāśa alone is indeed, greater than these, Ākāśa is (their) highest destination'. (Chā. 1·9·1)

There (arises) the doubt—Is the well-known Ākāśa itself denoted here by

उक्तलक्षणमेव ब्रह्म ? इति । किं प्राप्तम् ? प्रसिद्धाकाशः, इति । कुतः ? शब्दैकसमधिगम्ये वस्तुनि, य एवार्थो व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धः शब्देन प्रतीयते, स एव ग्रहीतव्यः । अतः, प्रसिद्धाकाश एव चराचरात्मकभूतजातस्य कृत्स्नस्य कारणम् । अतः, तस्मात्, अनतिरिक्तं ब्रह्म ।

ननु—ईक्षापूर्वकसृष्ट्यादिभिः, अचेतनात्, जीवाच्च व्यतिरिक्तं ब्रह्म, इत्युक्तम् । सत्यम्, उक्तम् । दुरुक्तं तु तत् । तथाहि—

'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते...तद्ब्रह्म ।'　　　　(तै. ३।१)

इत्युक्ते, कुत इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, इत्यादिविशेषापेक्षायां

'सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतान्याकाशादेव समुत्पद्यन्ते'　　　　(छा १।९।१)

इत्यादिना विशेषप्रतीतेः जगज्जन्मादिकारणम्, आकाश एव, इति निश्चीयते ।

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्'　　　　(छा ६।२।१)

इत्यादिष्वपि, सदादिशब्दाः साधारणाकाराः, तमेव विशेषम्, आकाशम्, अभिदधति ।

'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्'　　　　(ऐ १।१)

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the word Ākāśa or the already defined Brahman itself? What (is the prima-facie view) reached? The well-known Ākāśa Whence? In the case of an entity that can be known only from the word (denoting it), whatever sense established by etymology is apprehended from a word, that alone should be accepted Therefore, the well known Ākāśa itself is the cause of the entire aggregate of entities, movable and immovable Therefore, Brahman is not different from that

I say (says the objector)—It has been stated that Brahman is different from the Jīva and the non-sentient by (Sruti passages about) the creation etc, preceded by reflecting,—(our reply is)—True, it has been so said, but that is (just) wrongly stated—To explain the same—In the statement viz

'From whom again, these beings are produced that is Brahman'.
(Tait 3 1)

there being the expectancy about the details (as envisaged) in (the query) viz —Whence are produced these beings?—it is ascertained that Ākāśa alone is the cause of the origination etc. of the world, on account of the particular apprehension by

'All these beings, indeed come out of the Ākāsa alone'.
(Chā 1 9 1)

Even in passages such as—

'Existence alone, (my) dear, was all this in the beginning'
(Cha 6 2 1)

the words like Sat etc having the general import denote the same particular (entity) viz Ākāsa

Also in (the passage)—

'Ātman alone was verily, all this in the beginning'
(Ait 1 1)

इत्यादिष्वपि, आत्मशब्दः, तत्रैव वर्तते। तस्यापि हि चेतनैकान्तत्वं न संभवति यथा मृदात्मको घट इति। आप्नोति, इति, आत्मा—इति व्युत्पत्त्या सुतराम्, आकाशेऽपि, आत्मशब्दो वर्तते। अत एव, आकाश एव कारणं ब्रह्म, इति निश्चिते सति, ईक्षणादयस्तदनुगुणा गौणा वर्णनीयाः। यदि हि साधारणशब्दैः, एव सदादिभिः कारणम्, अभ्यधास्यत, ईक्षणाद्यर्थानुरोधेन चेतनविशेष, एव कारणम्, इति निरचेष्यत। आकाशशब्देन तु विशेष एव निश्चितः, इति न अर्थस्वाभाव्यात्, निर्णेतव्यमस्ति।

ननु—

'आत्मन आकाश संभूत' (तै २।१)

इति, आकाशस्यापि कार्यत्वं प्रतीयते। सत्यम्। सर्वेषामेव, आकाशवाय्वादिना सूक्ष्मावस्था स्थूलावस्था च—इत्यवस्थाद्वयमस्ति। तत्र, आकाशस्य सूक्ष्मावस्था कारणम्, स्थूलावस्था तु कार्यम्।

'आत्मन आकाश संभूत' (तै २।१)

इति स्वस्मादेव सूक्ष्मरूपात्, स्वयं स्थूलरूपः संभूतः—इत्यर्थः।

'सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतान्याकाशादेव समुत्पद्यन्ते' (छा. १।९।१)

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etc, the word Atman is (used to denote) the same (entity) In the case of that (Atman) too, its being invariably the sentient is not possible, as in—The jar, with the clay for its Atman (clay which is non-sentient) In accordance with the derivation viz Ātman is that which secures (*Āpnoti*) the word Ātman fits in well, all the more even in the case of Ākāśa Therefore, verily, when it is ascertained in this way that Ākāśa is the cause, Brahman, reflection etc in conformity with that are to be considered as secondary, for if merely by Sat and others,— words of general import— was intended to be denoted the cause, it would have to be ascertained that a particular sentient (entity) alone is the cause in accordance with the sense, reflecting etc By the word Ākāśa however, has been ascertained the particular (entity)—and so, nothing is to be ascertained in accordance with the natural process of interpretation

I say (says the objector) in (the passage)

From Ātman Ākāsa originated' (Tait 2 1)

being a product in the case of Ākaśa also is apprehended—True (what you say) In the case of all without exception, the Akāśa, the wind and others there are two conditions viz the gross condition and the subtle condition There the subtle condition of Ākāśa is the cause, while the gross condition is the product

Of the passage

'From Ātman, Ākāśa originated' (Tait 2 1)

the sense is that (Akaśa) *itself in its gross* form is originated from its own subtle form On account of the statement of the Sruti that the origination dissolution etc of the entire world are from Ākāśa alone in

'All these beings, indeed, come out of Ākāśa alone'

(Chā 1 9 1)

इति सर्वस्य जगत आकाशात्, एव, प्रभवाप्ययदिश्रवणात्, तदेव हि जगत्कारणं ब्रह्म, इति निश्चितम् । यतः, एवं प्रसिद्धाकाशात्, अनतिरिक्तं ब्रह्म, अत एव

'यदेष आकाश आनन्दो न स्यात्' (तै २।७)
'आकाशो ह वै नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता' (छा ८।१४।१)

इत्येवमादिनिर्देशोऽप्युपपन्नतरः । अतः, प्रसिद्धाकाशात्, अनतिरिक्तं ब्रह्म — इत्येवं प्राप्ते, ब्रूमः — 'आकाशस्तल्लिङ्गात् ।' आकाशशब्दाभिधेयः, प्रसिद्धाकाशात्, अचेतनात्, अर्थान्तरभूतो यथोक्तलक्षणः परमात्मा, एव। कुतः ? तल्लिङ्गात्। निखिलजगदेककारणत्वम्, सर्वस्माज्ज्यायस्त्वम्, परायणत्वम्,—इत्यादीनि परमात्मलिङ्गानि, उपलभ्यन्ते। निखिलजगदेककारणत्वं हि, अचिद्वस्तुनः प्रसिद्धाकाशशब्दाभिधेयस्य नोपपद्यते, चेतनवस्तुनः, तत्कार्यत्वासंभवात्। परायणत्वं च चेतनानां परमप्राप्यत्वम्। तच्च, अचेतनस्य हेयस्य सकलपुरुषार्थविरोधिनो न संभवति। सर्वस्माज्ज्यायस्त्वं च निरुपाधिकं सर्वैः कल्याणगुणैः सर्वेभ्यो निरतिशयोत्कर्षः। तदपि, अचितो नोपपद्यते।

यदुक्तम्—जगत्कारणविशेषाकाङ्क्षायाम्, आकाशशब्देन विशेषसमर्पणात्, अन्यत्सर्वं तदनुरूपमेव वर्णनीयम्, इति। तदयुक्तम्

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it has been ascertained that that same Brahman is, indeed, the cause of the world. Inasmuch as, Brahman is not different from the well-known Ākāśa,—for this very reason, this reference and such others also in

'If this Ākāśa were not the bliss'. (Tait 2 7)
'Ākāśa, indeed, verily, is the manifester of name and form' (Chā 8 14 1)

becomes all the more reasonable Therefore, Brahman is not different from the well-known Akāśa—This (prima-facie view) being reached, we say (in reply)—'(He is) the Akāśa, on account of the characteristics of that' The entity denoted by the word Ākāśa is no one but the Paramātman as already defined who is a different entity from the well known non-sentient Ākāśa Whence ?— On account of the characteristics of that There are met with characteristics of the Paramatman, such as being the only cause of the entire world, being the most extensive (pre-eminent) of all, being the highest destination for, being the only cause of the entire world is not reasonable in the case of the non-sentient entity denoted by the well-known word Ākāśa on account of the impossibility of the sentient entity being its product And being the highest destination is being the highest thing fit to be reached And that is not possible in the case of the non-sentient entity fit to be abandoned and opposed to all human purpose in life And being the most extensive (pre-eminent) is the unsurpassed pre-eminence over all without any limiting adjunct owing to all the auspicious qualities That, too, is not reasonable in the case of the non-sentient

As to what has been stated—That when there is the expectancy for a particular cause of the world, by the word Ākāśa is to be described

'*सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतान्याकाशादेव समुत्पद्यन्ते*' (छा. १।९।१)

इति प्रसिद्धवन्निर्देशात्। प्रसिद्धवन्निर्देशो हि प्रमाणान्तरप्राप्तिमपेक्षते। प्रमाणान्तराणि च—

'*सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्*' (छा. ६।२।१)

इत्येवमादीनि, एव वाक्यानि। तानि च यथोदितप्रकारेणैव ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयन्ति, इति तत्प्रतिपादितं ब्रह्म, आकाशशब्देन प्रसिद्धवत्, निर्दिश्यते। संभवति च परस्य ब्रह्मणः प्रकाशकत्वात्, आकाशशब्दाभिधेयत्वम्—आकाशते, आकाशयति च, इति। किं च, अनेनाकाशशब्देन विशेषसमर्पणक्षमेण, अपि, चेतनांशं प्रति, असंभावितकारणभावम्, अचेतनविशेषम्, अभिदधानेन

'*तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय*' (छा. ६।२।३)

इति

'*सोऽकामयत। बहु स्यां प्रजायेय*' (तै. २।६)

इत्यादिवाक्यशेषावधारितसार्वज्ञ्यसत्यसंकल्पत्वादिविशिष्टापूर्वार्थप्रतिपादनसमर्थवाक्यार्थान्यथाकरणं न प्रमाणपदवीमाधिरोहति। एवम्, अपूर्वानन्तविशेषणविशिष्टापूर्वार्थप्रतिपादनसमर्थानेकवाक्यगतिसामान्यं च, एकेनानुवादरूपेण, अन्यथाकर्तुं न शक्यते।

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everything else only as befitting that, on account of a reference to a special feature—(our reply is)—That is improper, on account of the well-known reference viz.

'*All these beings, indeed, come out of Ākāśa alone*'. (Chā. 1·9·1)

A reference, as well-known indeed, needs its establishment by other means of proof. The other means of proof are definitely the passages such as—

'*Existence alone, (my) dear, was all this, in the beginning*'. (Chā. 6·2·1)

And because, these propound Brahman in the manner already stated, Brahman propounded by those is pointed out as well-known by the word Ākāśa. And being denoted by the word Akāśa is possible in the case of the Highest Brahman, on account of (its) illumining nature, as (known from the derivation)— illumines itself and illumines others. And further, by this word Ākāśa, although capable of pointing out the particular, denoting the particular non-sentient entity in which there is the impossibility of being the cause for the sentient portion, in

'*It reflected—Let me be many, may I procreate*'. (Chā. 6·2·3)

the interpretation otherwise cannot attain to the status of being the means of proof, of the sense of the passages capable of propounding the unusual entity particularised by being omniscient and with thoughts fulfilled, (which qualities are) ascertained by the concluding passages

'*He desired—Let me be many, may I procreate*'. (Tait. 2·6)

etc. And thus, it is not possible to interpret otherwise by means of one (passage) of the nature of mere repetition, the general import of many a passage capable of propounding an unusual entity particularised by endless uncommon qualifying attributes.

यत्तु—आत्मशब्दः, चेतनैकान्तो न भवति, मृदात्मको घटः, इत्यादिषु दर्शनात्, इत्युक्तम्,—तत्रोच्यते—यद्यपि चेतनात्, अन्यत्रापि क्वचिदात्मशब्दः प्रयुज्यते, तथापि शरीरसंबन्धिनि, आत्मशब्दस्य प्रयोगप्राचुर्यात्,

'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्' (ऐ. १।१)

'आत्मन आकाशः संभूतः' (तै. २।१)

इत्यादिषु शरीरप्रतिसंबन्धिचेतन एव प्रतीयते। यथा गोशब्दस्य, अनेकार्थवाचित्वेऽपि प्रयोगप्राचुर्यात्, सास्नादिमान्, एव स्वतः प्रतीयते, अर्थान्तरप्रतीतिस्तु, तत्तदसाधारणनिर्देशापेक्षा, तथा स्वतः भातं शरीरप्रतिसंबन्धिचेतनाभिधानम्, एव

'स ऐक्षत लोकान्नु सृजै' (ऐ. १।१)

इति—

'सोऽकामयत। बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' (तै. २।६)

इत्यादितत्तद्वाक्यशेषा एव स्थिरीकुर्वन्ति। एवम्, वाक्यशेषावधारितानन्यसाधारणानेकापूर्वार्थविशिष्टं निखिलजगदेककारणं

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' (छा. ६।२।१)

As to what has been said—The word Ātman is not invariably referring to the sentient, on account of that being seen in (expressions like) the jar has the clay for its Ātman,—thereto (this) is said (in reply)—Although the word Ātman is used in some cases (to refer to) other than the sentient, still, on account of the abundant use of the word Ātman in respect of the correlative of the body, the sentient alone, the correlative of the body is apprehended in

'Ātman, alone, verily, was all this in the beginning' (Ait. 1·1)

'From Ātman, Ākāśa originated'. (Tait. 2·1)

etc.,—as for instance, even though the word Go denotes more than one sense, the one possessed of the dew-lap etc. alone is apprehended on account of the abundant use The apprehension of the other meaning, however, stands in need of the various peculiar references. Likewise, the various concluding passages themselves such as

'He reflected,—May, I, indeed, create the worlds'. (Ait. 1·1)

'He desired,—Let me be many, may I procreate.' (Tait. 2·6)

make firm only the denotative sense accrued naturally viz. the sentient, the correlative of the body—Thus it is established that in the passage

'All these beings, indeed'. (Chā. 1·9·1)

etc., that Brahman alone, particularised by many uncommon out-of-the-way entities, ascertained in the concluding sentences, (which is) the only cause of the entire world established by the passage,

'Existence alone, (my) dear, was all this, in the beginning'. (Chā. 6·2·1)

इतिवाक्यसिद्धं ब्रह्म, एव, आकाशशब्देन प्रसिद्धवत्

'सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतानि' (छा० १।९।१)

इत्यादिवाक्येन निर्दिश्यते, इति सिद्धम् ॥ २३ ॥

आकाशाधिकरणं समाप्तम् (८)

[147] अत एव प्राणः ॥ २४ ॥ (अधिकरण ९, सू. २४)

इदमाम्नायते छान्दोग्ये

'प्रस्तोतर्या देवता प्रस्तावमन्वायत्ता' (छा. १।१०।९)

इति प्रस्तुत्य

'कतमा सा देवता इति । प्राण इति होवाच । सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतानि प्राण-मेवाभिसंविशन्ति प्राणमभ्युज्जिहते । सैषा देवता प्रस्तावमन्वायत्ता तां चेदविद्वान्प्रास्तोष्यो मूर्धा ते व्यपतिष्यत्' (छा. १।११।४-५)

इति । अत्र प्राणशब्दोऽपि, आकाशशब्दवत् प्रसिद्धप्राणव्यतिरिक्ते परस्मिन्नेव ब्रह्मणि वर्तते, तदसाधारणनिखिलजगत्प्रवेशनिष्क्रमणादिलिङ्गात् प्रसिद्धवन्निर्दिष्टात् । अधिकाशङ्का तु कृत्स्नभूतजातस्य प्राणाधीनस्थितिप्रवृत्त्यादिदर्शनात्प्रसिद्ध एव प्राणो जगत्कारणतया निर्देशम्, अर्हति, इति । परिहारः, तु, शिलाकाष्ठादिषु चेतनस्वरूपे च तदभावात्,

'सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतानि प्राणमेवाभिसंविशन्ति प्राणमभ्युज्जिहते ।'

(छा. १।११।५)

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is pointed out by the word Ākāśa as well-known. ॥ 23 ॥

Here ends the Ākāśādhikaraṇa (8)

[147] For this very reason, Prāṇa. ॥ 24 ॥ (Adhikaraṇa 9, Sūtra 24)

This is stated by the Sruti in the *Chāndogya*, having begun thus

'(O) Prastotṛ, whatever deity is associated with the introductory rite' (Chā. 1·10·9)

'Who is that deity? He, verily, said, it is Prāṇa. All these beings, verily, enter into Prāṇa alone, and leave off the Prāṇa. This is the same deity that is associated with the introductory rite; if not knowing it, you were to praise that, your head would be falling down'. (Chā. 1·11·4-5)

Here the word Prāṇa also like the word Ākāśa applies to the Highest Brahman alone different from the well-known Prāṇa, on account of the characteristics pointed out as well-known such as (its) entry in and exit from the entire world, peculiar to it. There is, however, a further doubt— The well-known Prāṇa itself deserves mention as being the cause of the world, as it is seen that the entire aggregate of beings has its stability and activity dependent upon Prāṇa —The refutation, however, is on account of its (Prāṇa's) absence in stone, wood etc. and in the nature of the sentient—

'All these beings, verily, enter into Prāṇa alone and leave off the Prāṇa'. (Chā. 1·11·5)

इति नोपपद्यते, इति । अतः, प्राणयति सर्वाणि भूतानि, इति कृत्वा, परं ब्रह्मैव प्राणशब्देनाभिधीयते । अतः, प्रसिद्धाकाशप्राणादेः, अन्यदेव निखिलजगदेककारणम्, अपहतपाप्मत्वसार्वज्ञ्यसत्यसंकल्पत्वाद्यनन्तकल्याणगुणगणं परं ब्रह्मैव, आकाशप्राणशब्दाभिधेयम्, इति सिद्धम् ॥ २४ ॥

प्राणाधिकरण समाप्तम् (९)

[148] अतः परं जगत्कारणत्वव्याप्तेन येन केनापि निरतिशयोत्कृष्टगुणेन जुष्टं ज्योतिरिन्द्रादिशब्दैरर्थान्तरप्रसिद्धैरप्यभिधीयमानं परं ब्रह्मैव, इति प्रतिपाद्यते 'ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात्' इत्यादिना ।

ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात् ॥ २५ ॥ (अधिकरण १०, सूत्राणि २५–२८)

• इदमाम्नायते छान्दोग्ये—

'अथ यदतः परो दिवो ज्योतिर्दीप्यते विश्वतः पृष्ठेषु सर्वतः पृष्ठेष्वनुत्तमेषु लोकेष्विदं वाव तद्यदिदमस्मिन्नन्तःपुरुषे ज्योतिः' (छा. ३।१३।७)

इति । तत्र संशयः—किमयं ज्योतिःशब्दनिर्दिष्टो निरतिशयदीप्तियुक्तोऽर्थः प्रसिद्धम्, आदित्यादिज्योतिरेव कारणभूतब्रह्म, उत समस्तचिदचिद्वस्तुजातविसजातीयः परमकारणभूतः, अमितभाः सर्वज्ञः सत्यसंकल्पः पुरुषोत्तमः ? इति । किं युक्तम् ? प्रसिद्धमेव

—(this idea) does not stand to reason Therefore, the Highest Brahman alone is denoted by the word Prāna, taking into account that it infuses life into all beings Therefore, it is established that the entity to be denoted by the words Akaśa, Prāna is the Highest Brahman alone which is certainly different from the well known Ākāśa and Prana, the only cause of the entire world (and) possessed of hosts of endless auspicious qualities, such as, being with sins destroyed, omni science being with thoughts fulfilled ॥ 24 ॥

Here ends the Prānādhikarana (9)

[148] After this it is propounded that the Jyotis (Luminary) endowed with *some unsurpassed excellent quality or other (quality)* invariably concommitant with being the cause of the world, being denoted by the words Indra *and others, although known to have a different sense, is* the Highest Brahman by 'Jyotiścaranabhidhānat'

Jyotis (is Brahman) on account of the mention of the feet ॥ 25 ॥ (Adhikarana 10, Sūtras 25-28)

This is stated by the Sruti in the *Chāndogya*, viz

'Now what that Luminary shines beyond this heaven, on all sides in the vaults everywhere in the worlds, pre-eminent, this, verily, is that same which this one is the Jyotis in the person within'

(Cha 3·13 7)

There (arises) the doubt—Is this object pointed out by the word *Jyotis* endowed with unsurpassed refulgence the well-known luminary himself, the Sun etc or, Brahman which is the cause, or the highest *Purusa, heterogeneous* with the aggregate of all the sentient and non-sentient objects, the highest *cause, of immeasurable splendour, omniscient, and with thoughts fulfilled?* What (is here) proper? The well-known Luminary alone Whence?

ज्योतिः, इति। कुतः? प्रसिद्धवन्निर्देशेऽपि, आकाशप्राणादिशब्दवत् स्ववाक्योपात्तपरमात्मव्याप्तलिङ्गविशेषादर्शनात् परमपुरुषप्रत्यभिज्ञानासंभवात्, कौक्षेयकज्योतिषा, ऐक्योपदेशाच्च, प्रसिद्धमेव ज्योतिः कारणत्वव्याप्यनिरतिशयदीप्तियोगात्, जगत्कारणं ब्रह्म, इति प्राप्ते, प्रचक्ष्महे—

'ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात्'। द्युसंबन्धितया निर्दिष्टं निरतिशयदीप्तियुक्तं ज्योतिः परमपुरुष एव। कुतः?

'पादोऽस्य सर्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि' (छा. ३।१२।६)

इति, अस्यैव द्युसंबन्धिनश्चरणत्वेन सर्वभूतानामभिधानात्। एतदुक्तं भवति— यद्यपि,

'अथ यदतः परो दिवो ज्योतिर्दीप्यते' (छा. ३।१३।७)

इत्यस्मिन्वाक्ये परमपुरुषासाधारणं लिङ्गं नोपलभ्यते, तथापि पूर्ववाक्ये द्युसंबन्धितया परमपुरुषस्य निर्देशात्, इदमपि द्युसंबन्धज्योतिः स एव, इति प्रत्यभिज्ञायते, इति। कौक्षेयकज्योतिषैक्योपदेशश्च फलाय तदात्मकत्वानुसंधानविधिरिति न कश्चिद्दोषः। कौक्षेयकज्योतिषश्च तदात्मकत्वं भगवता स्वयमेवोक्तम्।

Even though the reference is to something as well-known, as in the case of words Ākāśa, Prāṇa etc., on account of the non-perception of a particular characteristic invariably associated with the Paramātman, mentioned in the passage under reference (and) on account of the impossibility of recognition as the highest Puruṣa, (and) on account of the instruction about the identity with the fire in the belly, the well-known Light itself is the Brahman, the cause of the world, on account of the association with the unsurpassed refulgence invariably concomitant with being the cause—This (prima facie view) being reached, we say (in reply)—

'Jyotis (is Brahman) on account of the mention of the feet'. The Luminary associated with unsurpassed refulgence, mentioned as being connected with heaven, is the highest Puruṣa alone. Whence? On account of the mention of all beings as being the foot of this same connected with heaven, in (the passage)—

'All beings are (his) foot, and his three immortal feet are in heaven'. (Chā. 3·12 6)

This is what is intended to be said—Although in this passage

'Now, what that luminary, shines beyond this heaven' (Chā. 3·13·7)

—there is not found any characteristic peculiar to the highest Purusa, still, on account of the mention of the highest Purusa as connected with heaven in the previous passage, this Jyotis connected with heaven also, is recognized as he himself. And the instruction regarding the identity with the fire in the belly is the injunction for the meditation on its having him as its Atman, for the sake of (the desired) fruit—and so, there is no blemish whatsoever. And having him as the Atman in the case of the fire in the belly is declared by the Lord himself—

'अहं वैश्वानरो भूत्वा प्राणिनां देहमाश्रितः।' (गीता १५।१४)

ति ॥ २५ ॥

[149] छन्दोभिधानान्नेति चेन्न तथा चेतोर्पणनिगमात्तथा हि दर्शनम् ॥२६॥

पूर्वस्मिन्वाक्ये

'गायत्री वा इदं सर्वम्' (छा ३।११।१)

इति गायत्र्याख्यं छन्दोऽभिधाय

'तदेतदृचाभ्युक्तम्' (छा ३।१२।५)

इत्युदाहृतायाः

'तावानस्य महिमा' (छा ३।१२।६)

इत्यस्या ऋचोऽपि छन्दोविषयत्वात्, नात्र परमपुरुषाभिधानम्, इति चेत्—तन्न। तथा चेतोर्पणनिगमात्। न गायत्रीशब्देन छन्दोमात्रम्, इहाभिधीयते। छन्दोमात्रस्य सर्वात्मकत्वानुपपत्तेः, अपि तु ब्रह्मण एव गायत्रीचेतोर्पणम्, इह निगम्यते। ब्रह्मणि गायत्रीसादृश्यानुसंधानं फलायोपदिश्यते, इत्यर्थः। संभवति च

'पादोऽस्य सर्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि' (छा ३।१२।६)

'Having become the Vaiśvānara (fire) I have resorted to the body of the living beings'. (Gītā 15 14)

॥ 25 ॥

[149] If (it is said Jyotis is) not (Brahman) on account of the mention of the metre, (we reply)—No, on account of the Śruti passage (referring) to the contemplation in the mind, accordingly, to the same effect, indeed, is the Śruti. ॥26॥

If it is argued—that on account of its being the subject of the metre, in the case of this Rk also viz.

'That much is his greatness' (Chā 3 12 6)

which is given as an illustration with the remark

'That this is stated by the Rk' (Chā. 3 12 5)

having mentioned the metre named Gāyatrī, in the previous passage

'Gāyatri, verily, is all this'. (Cha. 3 11·1)

there is no mention of the highest Purusa here—(our reply is)—That is not so, because there is the Sruti passage about the contemplation in the mind accordingly Not by the word Gayatri is denoted here the mere metre, on account of the impossibility of mere metre being the Ātman of all But on the other hand, is here stated in the Sruti the contemplation in the mind, of Brahman itself in Gāyatri Meditation on the similarity with Gayatri in (the case of) Brahman, is spoken of for the sake of the fruit—this is the sense And (this) similarity with the four-footed Gayatri of the four-footed Brahman, described in the passage

'All beings are his foot, and his three immortal feet are in heaven'. (Cha 3 12 6)

इति चतुष्पदो ब्रह्मणः, चतुष्पदाया गायत्र्याः सादृश्यम्। चतुष्पदा च गायत्री क्वचिद् दृश्यते। तद्यथा—

'इन्द्रः शचीपतिर्बलेन पीडितः।
दुश्च्यवनो वृषा समित्सु सासहिः॥'

इति। तथा हि, अन्यत्रापि सादृश्यात्, छन्दोभिधायिशब्दोऽर्थान्तरे प्रयुज्यमानो दृश्यते। यथा, संवर्गविद्यायां

'ते वा एते पञ्चान्ये पञ्चान्ये दश संपद्यन्ते' (छा. ४।३।८)

इत्यारभ्य

'सैषा विराडन्नादी' (छां. ४।३।८)

इत्युच्यते॥ २६॥

[150] इतश्च गायत्रीशब्देन ब्रह्मैवाभिधीयते—

भूतादिपादव्यपदेशोपपत्तेश्चैवम्॥ २७॥

भूतपृथिवीशरीरहृदयानि निर्दिश्य

'सैषा चतुष्पदा' (छा. ३।१२।५)

इति व्यपदेशो ब्रह्मण्येव गायत्रीशब्दाभिधेये, उपपद्यते॥ २७॥

उपदेशभेदान्नेति चेन्नोभयस्मिन्नप्यविरोधात्॥ २८॥

पूर्ववाक्ये

'त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि' (छा. ३।१२।६)

And a four-footed Gāyatrī is seen in some places as (in the following instance)

'*Indra the Lord of Śacī (prowess) harassed by Bala—the Bull pushing away far, the victorious one in battles*'.

In the same way, the word denoting a metre is seen being used in another sense, elsewhere too, on account of similarity, as in the Saṁvarga-Vidyā section (dealing with the Saṁvarga, absorbtion) beginning with

'*These, verily, these five, and five others become ten*'. (Chā 4·3·8)

it is said—

'*This is that Virāt metre, the food-eater*'. (Chā 4·3·8)

॥ 26 ॥

[150] For this reason also, by the word Gāyatrī is denoted Brahman alone.

And on account of the logical explanation of the reference to the beings etc., being (his) foot, this is so. ॥ **27** ॥

—The reference viz.

'*This is that four-footed*' (Chā. 3·12·5)

after pointing out to beings, earth, body, heart etc., is appropriate in respect of Brahman alone which is to be denoted by the word Gāyatrī. ॥ 27 ॥

If it is argued, that on account of the difference in the instruction (Jyotis) is not (Brahman), (we reply)—No, on account of the absence of contradiction even between the two. ॥ **28** ॥

If it be argued—that on account of the heaven being referred to as being the abode in the previous passage

'*His three immortal feet are in heaven*'. (Chā. 3·12·6)

इति दिवोऽधिकरणत्वेन निर्देशात्, इह च

'दिवः परः' (छा. ३।१३।७)

इत्यवधित्वेन निर्देशात्, उपदेशस्य भिन्नरूपत्वेन पूर्ववाक्योक्तं ब्रह्म परस्मिन्न प्रत्यभिज्ञायते, इति चेत्—तन्न । उभयस्मिन्नप्युपदेशेऽर्थस्यमाधिक्येन प्रत्यभिज्ञाया अविरोधात् । यथा वृक्षाग्रे श्येनो वृक्षाग्रात्परतः श्येनः, इति । तस्मात्, परमपुरुष एव निरतिशयतेजस्को

'दिवः परो ज्योतिर्दीप्यते' (छा. ३।१३।७)

इति प्रतिपाद्यते ।

'तावानस्य महिमा अतो ज्यायांश्च पूरुषः ।
पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि ।' (छा. ३।१२।६)

इति प्रतिपादितस्य चतुष्पदः परमपुरुषस्य

'वेदाहमेतं पुरुषं महान्तम् ।
आदित्यवर्णं तमसस्तु पारे ॥' (तै. आ. ३।११)

इत्यभिहिताप्राकृतरूपस्य तेजोऽपि, अप्राकृतम्, इति तद्वत्तया स एव ज्योतिःशब्दाभिधेय इति निरवद्यम् ॥ २८ ॥

ज्योतिरधिकरणं समाप्तम् ॥ (१०)

[151] निरतिशयदीप्तियुक्तं ज्योतिःशब्दाभिधेयं प्रसिद्धवन्निर्दिष्टं परमपुरुष एव, इत्युक्तम् । इदानीं कारणत्वव्याप्तामृतत्वप्राप्त्युपायतया, उपास्यत्वेन श्रुत

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and on account of its being referred to here as having a limit in

'Beyond the heaven'. (Chā. 3·13·7)

Brahman mentioned in the previous passage is not recognized in the latter, owing to the instruction being of a different nature—(we reply)—That is not so, on account of the recognition not being contradicted owing to the oneness of the nature of the entity also in both the instructions, as for instance, in the sentence—(There is) on the top of the tree, a hawk; beyond the top of the tree, a hawk. Therefore, the highest Purusa alone, possessed of unsurpassed lustre, is propounded by

'Beyond the heaven, the Light shines.' (Chā. 3·13·7)

Because the lustre of the four-footed highest Purusa propounded in—

'That much is his greatness; greater than this is the Purusa; all the beings are his foot, and his three immortal feet are in heaven'. (Chā. 3·12·6)

is also not derived from Prakṛti, whose uncommon form is denoted in

'I know this great Puruṣa, Āditya-coloured; beyond, however, darkness'. (Tait. Ā. 3·11)

he alone is to be denoted by the word Jyotis owing to his being possessed of that— and so (everything) is blameless. ॥ 28 ॥

Here ends the Jyotiradhikaraṇa (10)

[151] It has (already) been stated that the one endowed with unsurpassed refulgence, denoted by the word Jyotis mentioned as being well-known, is the highest Purusa himself. Now (the Sūtrakāra) says that

इन्द्रप्राणादिशब्दाभिधेयोऽपि परमपुरुष एव, इत्याह—

प्राणस्तथानुगमात् ॥ २९ ॥ (अधिकरण ११—सूत्राणि २९–३२)

कौषीतकिब्राह्मणे प्रतर्दनविद्यायां

'प्रतर्दनो ह वै दैवोदासिरिन्द्रस्य प्रियं धामोपजगाम युद्धेन च पौरुषेण च' (कौ. ३।१)

इत्यारभ्य,

'वरं वृणीष्व' (कौ. ३।१)

इति वक्तारमिन्द्रं प्रति

'त्वमेव मे वरं वृणीष्व यं त्वं मनुष्याय हिततमं मन्यसे' (कौ. ३।१)

इति प्रतर्दनोक्तः

'स होवाच प्राणोऽस्मि प्रज्ञात्मा तं मामायुरमृतमित्युपास्स्व' (कौ. ३।२)

इति श्रूयते। तत्र संशयः—किमयं हिततमोपासनकर्मतया, इन्द्रप्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टो जीव एव, उत तदतिरिक्तः परमात्मा ? इति। किं युक्तम् ? जीव एवेति। कुतः ? इन्द्रशब्दस्य जीवविशेष एव प्रसिद्धेः। तत्समानाधिकरणस्य प्राणशब्दस्यापि तत्रैव वृत्तेः। अयमिन्द्राभिधानो हि जीवः प्रतर्दनेन

'त्वमेव वरं वृणीष्व यं त्वं मनुष्याय हिततमं मन्यसे' (कौ. ३।१)

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the highest Puruṣa alone is one to be denoted even by the words Indra, Prāṇa etc. described in the Śruti as being the object of worship owing to his being the means of securing immortality invariably associated with (his) being the cause—

Prāṇa (is Brahman), on account of the subsequent reference to that effect. ॥ 29 ॥

It is stated by the Śruti, in the *Kauṣītakibrāhmaṇa* in the Pratardana-Vidyā (knowledge taught to Pratardana), beginning with

'Pratardana, verily, the son of Divodāsa, went over to the dear abode of Indra by virtue of fight, manly valour'. (Kau. 3·1)

and addressed by Pratardana

'You yourself choose a boon for me, which you consider most beneficial to mankind' (Kau. 3·1)

(in reply) to Indra who said—

'Choose a boon'. (Kau. 3·1)

'He, verily, said—I am Prāṇa, Prajñātman; worship that me as life and immortality'. (Kau. 3·2)

—There (arises) the doubt—Is this one pointed out by the words Indra Prāṇa as the object of most beneficial worship, the Jiva himself or the Paramātman different from that ? What (is here) proper ? Jiva himself—Whence ? On account of the word Indra being well-known, as referring to a particular Jiva (and) on account of the use of the word Prāṇa in case co-ordination with that, to refer to that same. This Jiva called Indra, spoken to by Pratardana,

'You yourself choose a boon for me, which you think most beneficial to mankind' (Kau. 3·1)

इत्युक्तो

'मामुपास्स्व' (कौ ३।२)

इति स्वात्मोपासनं हिततममुपदिदेश। हिततमञ्च, अमृतत्वप्राप्त्युपाय एव। जगत्कारणोपासनस्यैव, अमृतत्वप्राप्त्युपायता

'तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्येऽथ सपत्स्ये' (छा ६।१४।२)

इत्यवगता, अतः प्रसिद्धजीवभाव इन्द्र एव कारणं ब्रह्म, इत्याशङ्कायाम्, अभिधीयते—'प्राणस्तथानुगमात्' इति। अयम्, इन्द्रप्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टो न जीवमात्रम्, अपि तु जीवादर्थान्तरभूतं परं ब्रह्म।

'स एष प्राण एव प्रज्ञात्मानन्दोऽजरोऽमृत' (कौ ३।८)

इति, इन्द्रप्राणशब्दाभ्यां प्रस्तुतस्य, आनन्दाजरामृतशब्दसामानाधिकरण्येन, अनुगमो हि तथा सति, एवोपपद्यते ॥ २९ ॥

[152] न वक्तुरात्मोपदेशादिति चेदध्यात्मसंबन्धभूमा ह्यस्मिन् ॥ ३० ॥

यदुक्तम्—इन्द्रप्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टस्य, आनन्दाऽजरोऽमृत, इति, अनेनैकार्थ्यात्, अयं परं ब्रह्म, इति—तन्नोपपद्यते।

'मामेव विजानीहि प्राणोऽस्मि प्रज्ञात्मा त मामायुरमृतमित्युपास्स्व' (कौ ३।२)

इति वक्ता हि, इन्द्रः

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gave the most beneficial advice—the worship of his own self, in (the words)—

Worship me' (Kau 3 2)

And the most beneficial is, verily the means of securing immortality The worship of the cause of the world alone, being the means of securing immortality is apprehended from

'For him there is delay only so long as he is not freed (from the body) then he is merged (Cha 6 14 2)

Therefore, there being the doubt—Indra himself having the nature of the Jīva is the cause, Brahman—it is said (in reply)—' Prāna (is Brahman) on account of the subsequent reference to that effect' This one pointed out by the words Indra and Prāna, is not merely the Jīva but the Highest Brahman' an entity different from the Jiva for, in that case alone stands to reason the subsequent reference of the one introduced by the words Indra, Prana, in

This same Prāna himself is the Prajñatman bliss undecaying immortal , (Kau 3 8)

in case co-ordination with the words Ānanda (bliss) Ajara (ageless) (and) Amrta (immortal) ॥ 29 ॥

[152] If (it be said that) on account of the speaker's reference to the Ātman (Indra and others are) not (Brahman) (we reply)—No for here there is the vastness connected with the Self ॥ 30 ॥

As to what has been said—on account of the one mentioned by the words Indra Prana having the same sense as bliss undecaying immortal, this one is the Highest Brahman —(we reply)—That does not stand to reason, for, Indra who is the speaker of the passage—

Know indeed me alone I am Prāna Prajñātman worship that me as life and immortality (Kau 3 2)

'*त्रिशीर्षाणं त्वाष्ट्रमहनम्*' (कौ. ३।१)

इत्येवमादिना त्वाष्ट्रवधादिभिः प्रज्ञातजीवभावस्य स्वात्मन एव, उपास्यतां प्रतर्दनाय, उपदिशति। अतः, उपक्रमे जीवविशेष इत्यवगते सति,

'*आनन्दोऽजरोऽमृतः*' (कौ. ३।८)

इत्यादिभिरुपसंहारः, तदनुगुण एव वर्णनीय इति चेत्, परिहरति—

'अध्यात्मसंबन्धभूमा ह्यस्मिन्'—आत्मनि यः संबन्धः, सः, अध्यात्मसंबन्धः। तस्य भूमा —भूयस्त्वं बहुत्वम्, इत्यर्थः। आत्मनि, आधेयतया संबध्यमानानां बहुत्वेन संबन्धबहुत्वम्। तच्च, अस्मिन्वक्तरि परमात्मन्येव संभवति।

'*तद्यथा रथस्यारेषु नेमिरर्पिता नाभावरा अर्पिता एवमेवैता भूतमात्राः प्रज्ञामात्रास्वर्पिताः प्रज्ञामात्राः प्राणेऽर्पिताः। स एष प्राण एव प्रज्ञात्मानन्दोऽजरोऽमृतः*'

(कौ. ३।८)

इति भूतमात्राशब्देन, अचेतनवस्तुजातमभिधाय, प्रज्ञामात्राशब्देन-तदाधारतया चेतनवर्गं चाभिधाय, तस्याप्याधारतया प्रकृतम्, इन्द्रप्राणशब्दाभिधेयं निर्दिश्य, तमेव, आनन्दो-

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instructs Pratardana about his own Ātman being the object of worship, whose nature as the Jiva is well-known by (acts like) the slaughter of Tvāṣtra and others in the passage—

'*I killed the three-headed Tvāṣtra*'. (Kau. 3·1)

So, it being apprehended in the introductory portion that some particular Jiva (is meant), the winding up by means of the passage

'*Bliss, undecaying, immortal*'. (Kau. 3·8)

etc., is to be described as in conformity with that same.—If it is argued thus, (the Sūtrakāra) refutes (the same as follows)—

'For, here there is the vastness connected with the Self.' The Adhyātmasambandha is, what is in respect of the Ātman. Its Bhūmā, that is, vastness, multitude. Owing to the multitude of the objects connected with the Ātman as abiding in him, there is the multitude of relations. And that is, indeed, possible in the case of the speaker being the Paramātman, as in

'*Just as in the spokes of the chariot, is fixed the wheel-circumference (nave); in the nave are fixed the spokes; exactly in the same way these subtle essences of the elements are fixed in the subtle essences of Prajñā (intelligence), the subtle essences of Prajñā are fixed in the Prāṇa—This same Prāṇa is the Prajñātman, bliss, undecaying and immortal*'. (Kau. 3·8)

—Having denoted by the word Bhūtamātrā the aggregate of non-sentient entities, and having denoted by the word Prajñāmātrā the class of sentient entities as being their support (and) having pointed out the subject under discussion denoted by the words Indra, Prāṇa as being the support even of that, (the Sruti) instructs about that same as bliss, undecaying, immortal,

जरोऽमृतः, इत्युपादृशति । तदेतत्, अचेतनात्मककृत्स्नवस्त्वाधारत्वं जीवादर्थान्तरभूतेऽस्मिन्परमात्मन्येव, उपपद्यते, इत्यर्थः ।

अथवा, अध्यात्मसंबन्धभूमा ह्यस्मिन् — परमात्मासाधारणसंबन्धोऽध्यात्मसंबन्धः । तस्य भूमा बहुत्वं ह्यस्मिन्प्रकरणे विद्यते । तथाहि—प्रथमं

'त्वमेव वरं वृणीष्व यं त्वं मनुष्याय हिततमं मन्यसे' (कौ ३।१)

इति,

'मामुपास्स्व' (कौ ३।२)

इति च परमात्मासाधारणमोक्षसाधनोपासनकर्मत्वं प्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टस्य, इन्द्रस्य प्रतीयते । तथा

'एष एव साधु कर्म कारयति तं यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्निनीषति । एष एवासाधु कर्म कारयति तं यमधो निनीषति' (कौ ३।८)

इति सर्वस्य कर्मणः कारयितृत्वं परमात्मधर्मः । तथा

'तद्यथा रथस्यारेषु नेमिरर्पिता नाभावरा अर्पिता एवमेवैता भूतमात्राः प्रज्ञामात्रास्वर्पिताः प्रज्ञामात्राः प्राणेऽर्पिताः' (कौ ३।८)

इति सर्वाधारत्वं च तस्यैव धर्मः । तथा

'स एष प्राण एव प्रज्ञात्मानन्दोऽजरोऽमृतः' (कौ ३।८)

Therefore this—being the support of all entities, sentient and non-sentient, is appropriate only in respect of the Paramātman, that is an entity different from the Jiva This is the sense

Or (in the Sūtra) 'Adhyātmasambandhabhūmā hyasmin', Adhyātmasambandha (means) the peculiar connection with the Paramātman Its Bhuma (i e) manifold-ness indeed is (found) in this section. To explain the same (in detail)—First is apprehended in the case of Indra pointed out by the word Prana being the object of worship of the Paramātman, the extraordinary means of salvation in

'You yourself choose a boon for me which you think most beneficial to mankind' (Kau 3 1)

and in

'Worship me'. (Kau 3 2)

In the same way, in (the passage)

'This one alone makes him do good deeds, whom (he) desires to lift up from these worlds, this one alone makes him do evil deeds, whom he desires to bring down' (Kau 3 8)

Impelling to do all acts, is this characteristic of the Paramātman Similarly, being the support of all (described in the passage)

'Just as in the spokes of a chariot is fixed the wheel-circumference (nave), in the nave are fixed the spokes, exactly in the same way the subtle essences of the elements are fixed in the subtle essences of Prajña, the subtle essences af Prajña are fixed in the Prāna' (Kau 3 8)

is a characteristic belonging to him alone Similarly, even these (characteristics described in the passage)

'This same Prāna is the Prajñātman, bliss undecaying immortal'. (Kau 3 8)

इत्येते, अपि परमात्मन एव धर्माः ।

'एष लोकाधिपतिरेष सर्वेश्वरः'　　(कौ. ३।८)

इति च परमात्मन्येव संभवति । तदेवम्, अध्यात्मसंबन्धभूम्नोऽत्र विद्यमानत्वात्, परमात्मैव, अत्र, इन्द्रप्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टः ॥ ३० ॥

[153] कथं तर्हि प्रज्ञातजीवभावस्येन्द्रस्य स्वात्मन उपास्यत्वोपदेशः संगच्छते ! तत्राह

शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववत् ॥ ३१ ॥

प्रज्ञातजीवभावेनेन्द्रेण

'मामेव विजानीहि मामुपास्स्व'　　(कौ. ३।२)

इत्युपास्यस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वात्मत्वेन, उपदेशोऽयं न प्रमाणान्तरप्राप्तस्वात्मावलोकनकृतः, अपि तु शास्त्रेणैव स्वात्मदृष्टिकृतः । एतदुक्तं भवति—

'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि'　　(छा. ६।३।२)

'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम्'　　(छा. ६।८।७)

'अन्तः प्रविष्टः शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मा'　　(तै. आ. ३।११।२)

'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरो यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा शरीरं य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति स त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः'　　(बृ. ३।७।२२)

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are the characteristics of him alone. And

'The one is the Lord of the worlds, the Overlord of all'.　　(Kau. 3·8)

is possible in respect of the Paramātman alone. Therefore, in this way, on account of the multitude of connections with the Atman existing here, the Paramātman alone is pointed out by the words Indra, Prāṇa. ॥ 30 ॥

[153] How then does the instruction about himself being the object of worship, go well with Indra with his nature as Jīva being well-known? In this connection says (the Sūtrakāra in reply)—

But the instruction is from the Śāstric point of view; as in the case of Vāmadeva. ॥ 31 ॥

This instruction by Indra whose nature as a Jīva is well-known, about Brahman, the object of worship, as his own Ātman, viz.—

'Know, indeed, me alone; worship me'.　　(Kau. 3·2)

has not been prompted by the comprehension of his own Ātman, arrived at by other means of proof, but has been prompted by the comprehension of his own Ātman, by the Śāstra itself. This is what is intended to be said— Having understood by the following Śāstra passages and such others—

'By this Living Self, having subsequently entered, may I manifest name and form'.　　(Chā. 6·3·2)

'All this has this as the Ātman'.　　(Chā. 6·8·7)

'Entered within, the Controller of the people, the Ātman of all'.　　(Tait. A. 3·11·2)

'Who residing in the Ātman, is different from the Ātman, whom the Ātman knows not, whose body is the Ātman, who controls the Atman inside. He is your Atman, the inner Controller, immortal'.　　(Bṛ. 3·7·22)

'य आत्मनि सचरन्यस्यात्मा शरीर यमात्मा न वेद । एष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा-
पहतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायण '　　(सुबालोप.)

इत्येवमादिना शास्त्रेण जीवात्मशरीरकं परमात्मानम्, अवगम्य, जीवात्मवाचिनाम्, अहंत्व-मादिशब्दानां परमात्मन्येव पर्यवसानं ज्ञात्वा,

'मामेव विजानीहि मामुपास्स्व '　　(कौ. ३।२)

इति स्वात्मशरीरकं परमात्मानमेव, उपास्यत्वेनोपदिदेश, इति । 'वामदेववत्'— यथा वामदेवः परस्य ब्रह्मणः सर्वान्तरात्मत्वम् सर्वस्य तच्छरीरत्वम्, शरीरवाचिनां शब्दानां शरीरिणि पर्यवसानं पश्यन्, 'अहम्' इति स्वात्मशरीरकं परं ब्रह्म निर्दिश्य, तत्सामानाधिकरण्येन मनुसूर्यादीन् व्यपदिशति

'तद्धैतत्पश्यन्नृषिर्वामदेवः प्रतिपेदेऽहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्च '　　(बृ १।४।१०)

'अहं कक्षीवानृषिरस्मि विप्र '　　(बृ १।४।१०)

इत्यादि । यथा च प्रह्लादः

'सर्वगत्वादनन्तस्य स एवाहमवस्थित. ।
मत्त· सर्वमहं सर्वं मयि सर्वं सनातने ॥'　　(वि पु १।१९।८५)

इत्यादि वदति ॥ ३१ ॥

'*Who, moving about the Ātman, whose body is the Ātman, whom the Ātman knows not, this one is the inmost Ātman of all beings, with sins destroyed, divine, refulgent, the one Nārāyana*'
(Subālopa)

the Paramātman as having the Living Self as the body, (and) having known the culmination into the Paramātman alone, of the words Aham, Tvam etc. expressive of the Living Self, (he) instructed about the Paramātman himself, having his Atman as the body, as being the object of worship, in (the passage)

'*Know, indeed, me alone, worship me*'　　(Kau 3 2)

'As in the case of Vāmadeva'— Just as Vāmadeva seeing the Highest Brahman as being the inmost Self of all, everything as being its body, (and) the culmination of words expressive of body into the one with a body, (and) having pointed out the Highest Brahman having his Self as the body, as 'I' refers to Manu, the Sun, etc in case-co-ordination with it in passages—

'*That this, verily, seeing, Seer Vamadeva, came to (understand it in the form)—'I have become Manu, and Surya*'　　(Br. 1 4 10)

'*I (became) the Seer Kaksivat, the Brahmin*'　　(Br 1 4 10)

etc And just as says Pralhāda—

'*On account of the Infinite being all-pervading, that same have I remained, everything out of me, I everything, everything in me, the eternal*'.　　(V P 1 19 85)

etc ॥ 31 ॥

[154] अस्मिन्प्रकरणे जीववाचिभिः शब्दैः, अचिद्विशेषाभिधायिभिश्च, उपास्यभूतस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणः, अभिधाने कारणं चोद्यपूर्वकमाह

जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान्नेति चेन्नोपासात्रैविध्यादाश्रितत्वादिह तद्योगात् ॥३२॥

'न वाचं विजिज्ञासीत । वक्तारं विद्यात्' (कौ. ३।८)

'त्रिशीर्षाणं त्वाष्ट्रमहनमरुन्मुखान्यतीन्छालावृकेभ्यः प्रायच्छम्' (कौ. ३।१)

इत्यादि जीवलिङ्गात्,

'यावद्ध्यस्मिञ्शरीरे प्राणो वसति तावदायुः' (कौ. ३।२)

'अथ खलु प्राण एव प्रज्ञात्मेदं शरीरं परिगृह्योत्थापयति' (कौ. ३।३)

इति मुख्यप्राणलिङ्गाच्च, न, अध्यात्मसंबन्धभूमा, इति चेत्—न । 'उपासात्रैविध्यात्', हेतोः । उपासनात्रैविध्यम्, उपदेष्टुं तत्तच्छब्देनाभिधानम् । निखिलकारणभूतस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपेणानुसंधानम्, भोक्तृवर्गशरीरकत्वानुसंधानम्, भोग्यभोगोपकरणशरीरकत्वानुसंधानं च, इति त्रिविधमनुसंधानमुपदेष्टुमित्यर्थः ।

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[154] In this section (the Sūtrakāra) states the cause for the denotation of the Highest Brahman, the object of worship, preceded by the argument against, by words expressive of the Jīva, and denoting a particular non-sentient thing.—

If (it be argued) that on account of the characteristics of the Jīva and the chief Prāṇa (Prāṇa is not the Paramātman, we reply) No, on account of the three-fold nature of the worship, on account of its being resorted to (and) on account of its association here. ॥ 32 ॥

If it be argued—that there is not the multitude of the connections with the Ātman, on account of the characteristics of the Jīva in (the passages)—

'One should not desire to know the speech; one should know the speaker'. (Kau. 3·8)

'I killed the three-headed Tvāstra, I gave to the wolves the Arunmukha ascetics', (Kau. 3·1)

etc., (and) on account of the characteristics of the chief Prāṇa in (the passagea)

'As long as the Prāna stays in the body, so long there is life'. (Kau. 3·2)

'And indeed, Prāna, himself the Prajñātman, having taken to (or controlled) this body raises it up'. (Kau. 3·3)

etc. (we reply)—No, on account of the reason, 'the three-fold nature of worship.' There is a denotation by the various words to instruct about the three-fold nature of worship; that is, to instruct about the three-fold continued reference to the nature of Brahman, the cause of everything; the continued reference to its having for its body the class of enjoyers, and the continued reference to its having objects of enjoyment, enjoyment, and the means of enjoyment.

तदिदं त्रिविधं ब्रह्मानुसंधानं प्रकरणान्तरेष्वप्याश्रितम् ।

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै २।१)

'आनन्दो ब्रह्म' (तै. ३।६)

इत्यादिषु स्वरूपानुसंधानम् ।

'तत्सृष्ट्वा । तदेवानुप्राविशत् । तदनुप्रविश्य । सच्च त्यच्चाभवत् । निरुक्तं चानिरुक्तं च । सत्यं चानृतं च सत्यमभवत्' (तै. २।६)

इत्यादिषु भोक्तृशरीरतया भोग्यभोगोपकरणशरीरतया चानुसंधानम् । इहापि प्रकरणे त्रिविधमनुसंधानं युज्यते, एवेत्यर्थः । एतदुक्तं भवति—यत्र हिरण्यगर्भादिजीवविशेषाणां प्रकृत्याद्यचेतनविशेषाणां च परमात्मासाधारणधर्मयोगः, तदभिधायिनां शब्दानां परमात्मवाचिशब्दैः सामानाधिकरण्यं वा दृश्यते, तत्र परमात्मनः, तत्तच्चिदचिद्विशेषान्तरात्मत्वानुसंधानं प्रतिपिपादयिषितम्, इति । अतः, अत्र, इन्द्रप्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टो जीवादर्थान्तरभूतः परमात्मैव, इति सिद्धम् ॥ ३२ ॥

इन्द्रप्राणाधिकरणं समाप्तम् (११)

इति श्रीमद्भगवद्रामानुजाचार्यचरणकृतौ शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्ये 'समन्वय'स्य प्रथमस्याध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः समाप्तः ॥

And this three-fold continued reference to Brahman has been accepted in other contexts also—The continued reference to the nature of Brahman in

'Existence, Knowledge, Infinite Brahman'. (Tait. 2 1)

'Bliss (is) Brahman'. (Tait. 3 6)

etc, the continued reference to it as having the enjoyer the body, and also the object of enjoyment, enjoyment and the means of enjoyment as the body, in

'Having created that, entered subsequently that itself, having subsequently entered that, became Sat, and also Tyat, divided and also undivided, truth and also untruth, became the truth'

(Tait 2 6)

etc, In this context also, the three-fold continued reference is certainly appropriate—This is the sense This is what is intended to be said—Where is seen the association with the peculiar characteristics of the Paramātman in the case of the particular Jivas, like Hiranyagarbha and others, and in the case of the particular non sentients like Prakrti and others, or the case-co-ordination of the words expressive of these with the words expressive of the Paramātman there is intended to be propounded the continued reference to the Paramātman being the inner Ātman of the various sentient and non-sentient entities Therefore, it is established that the one mentioned by the words Indra Prana, is the Paramātman alone, an entity different from the Jiva ॥ 32 ॥

Here ends the Indraprānādhikarana (11)

Here ends the first Quarter of the first Chapter (Adhyāya) called 'Samanvaya' in the commentary on the Sārīraka-Mīmāmsā, the composition of the Illustrious Revered preceptor Rāmānuja

प्रथमाध्याये द्वितीयः पादः

[155] प्रथमे पादे, अधीतवेदः पुरुषः कर्ममीमांसाश्रवणाधिगतकर्मयाथात्म्यविज्ञानः, केवलकर्मणाम्, अल्पास्थिरफलत्वमवगम्य, वेदान्तवाक्येषु च, आपातप्रतीतानन्तस्थिरफलब्रह्मस्वरूपतदुपासनसमुपजनितपरमपुरुषार्थलक्षणमोक्षापेक्षः, अवधारितपरिनिष्पन्नवस्तुबोधनशब्दशक्तिः, वेदान्तवाक्यानां परस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि निश्चितप्रमाणभावः, तदितिकर्तव्यतारूपशारीरकमीमांसाश्रवणमारभेत, इत्युक्तं शास्त्रारम्भसिद्धये ।
(अ. १ पा. १ सू. १)

अनन्तविचित्रस्थिरत्रसरूपभोक्तृभोग्यभोगोपकरणभोगस्थानलक्षणनिखिलजगदुदयविभवलयलीलं महानन्दैककारणं परं ब्रह्म,

'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि ।' (तै. २।१।१)

इत्यादि वाक्यं बोधयति, इति च प्रत्यपादि । (अ. १ पा.१ सू २)

जगदेककारणं परं ब्रह्म सकलेतरप्रमाणाविषयतया शास्त्रैकप्रमाणकम् इत्यभ्यधायि । (अ. १ पा. १ सू ३)

शास्त्रैकप्रमाणकत्वं च ब्रह्मणः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यन्वयविरहेऽपि, स्वरूपेणैव परम-

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The Second Quarter of the First Chapter

[155] In the first Quarter, a person who has studied the Vedas, who has secured the right knowledge of Karman from the study (lit. hearing) of the *Karmamīmāṁsā* (of Jaimini), having comprehended mere Karman as having a meagre and impermanent fruit; and desirous of salvation indicating the highest human purpose in life, produced by the nature of Brahman having an endless and permanent fruit apprehended superficially in the Vedānta passages and by its worship; who has ascertained the power of words explaining the entity already established; who has ascertained the status as means of proof of the Vedānta passages in respect of the Highest Brahman, (such a person) should commence the study of the *Śārīrakamīmāṁsā* (of Bādarāyaṇa) pointing out to the procedure thereof—This has been stated for the *elucidation of the commencement (of the study) of the Śāstra.* (I. 1. 1)

Further, it has been propounded that the passage

'From whom again these beings' (Tait. 2·1·1)

etc. enlightens (one) about the Highest Brahman given to sport— the rise, *sustenance (lit. glory) and sublation in respect of the entire world, characterised* by the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment, the means of enjoyment, the places of enjoyment formed of the endless (and) wonderful (objects) movable and immovable. (I. 1. 2)

It has been stated that the only cause of the world, the Highest Brahman has Sāstra alone as the authority owing to its not being within the province of all other means of proof. (I. 1. 3)

And (this) having Sāstra alone as the authority in respect of Brahman, is established from the correlation of the Vedānta passage in respect of the

पुरुषार्थभूते परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि वेदान्तवाक्यानां समन्वयात्, निरुद्यत इत्यवृम ।
(अ. १ पा. १ सू. ४)

निखिलजगदेककारणतया वेदान्तवेद्यं ब्रह्म च, ईक्षणाद्यन्वयात्, आनुमानिकप्रधानादर्थान्तरभूतः, चेतनविशेष एव, इत्युपापीपदाम । (अ. १ पा. १ सू. ५)

स च स्वाभाविकानवधिकातिशयानन्दविपश्चित्त्वनिखिलचेतनभयाभयहेतुत्वसत्यसंकल्पत्वसमस्तचेतनाचेतनान्तरात्मत्वादिभिः, बद्धमुक्तोभयावस्थात्, जीवशब्दाभिलपनीयात्, च, अर्थान्तरभूतः, इति च समादधीमहि । (अ. १ पा. १ सू. १३)

स च, अप्राकृताकर्मनिमित्तस्वासाधारणदिव्यरूपः, इत्युदैरिराम ।
(अ. १ पा. १ सू. २१)

आकाशप्राणाद्यचेतनविशेषाभिधायिभिः, जगत्कारणतया प्रसिद्धवत्, निर्दिश्यमानः, सकलेतरचेतनाचेतनविलक्षणः, स एव, इति समगरिमहि ।
(अ १ पा. १ सू २३)

परतत्त्वासाधारणनिरतिशयदीप्तियुक्तज्योतिःशब्दाभिधेयः, द्युसंबन्धितया प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्स एव, इत्यातिष्ठामहि । (अ. १ पा. १ सू २५)

परमकारणासाधारणामृतत्वप्राप्तिहेतुभूतः परमपुरुष एव शास्त्रदृष्ट्या, इन्द्रादिशब्दैरभिधीयत इति, अब्रूमहि । (अ. १ पा १ सू २९)

Highest Brahman, the highest human purpose in life by its very nature even in the absence of association with activity and passivity—This we have said. (I. 1. 4)

We also have logically proved that Brahman to be known from the Vedānta, as being the only cause of the entire world, is a distinct sentient being, an entity different from the Pradhāna known from inference, on account of (its) association with reflecting etc. (I. 1. 5)

And we came to the conclusion that He, the unique sentient (*Cetanaviśesa*) is an entity different from the one designated by the word Jīva having the two conditions—being bound and released— because of His natural, unlimited excessive bliss and wisdom, being the cause of fear and freedom from fear of all sentients, having thoughts fulfilled, (and) being the inmost Ātman of all the sentients and non-sentients etc. (I. 1. 13)

We proclaimed that He also is possessed of a form—not the product of Prakrti, not resulting from Karman, peculiar to himself (and) refulgent. (I. 1. 21)

We announced that the one indicated by (the words) Akāśa, Prāna etc as denoting particular non-sentients, as well-known, being the cause of the world, different from everything else,—sentient and non-sentient—is He himself. (I. 1. 23)

We stood firmly by the conclusion that the one denoted by the word. Jyotis, endowed with unsurpassed refulgence peculiar to the highest Reality, is He himself on account of his recognition owing to his connection with heaven. (I. 1. 25)

We have stated that by the words Indra and others, from the Sāstric point of view is denoted the highest Purusa alone, the cause of the acquisition of immortality, peculiar to the highest cause. (I. 1. 29)

[156] तदेवम्, अतिपतितसकलेतरप्रमाणसंभावनाभूमिः, सार्वज्ञ्यसत्यसंकल्पत्वाद्यपरिमितोदारगुणसागरतया, स्वेतरसमस्तवस्तुविलक्षण', परं ब्रह्म पुरुषोत्तमो नारायण एव वेदान्तवेद्यः, इत्युक्तम्। अत परं द्वितीय-तृतीय-चतुर्थेषु पादेषु यद्यपि वेदान्तवेद्यं ब्रह्म, एव, तथापि कानिचिद्वेदान्तवाक्यानि प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञान्तर्भूतवस्तुविशेषस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपराणि, एव, इत्याशङ्क्य तन्निरसनमुखेन तत्तद्वाक्योदितकल्याणगुणाकरत्वं ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्यते। तत्र, अस्पष्टजीवलिङ्गकानि वाक्यानि द्वितीयपादे विचार्यन्ते। स्पष्टजीवलिङ्गकानि तृतीये। तत्तत्प्रतिपादनच्छायानुसारीणि चतुर्थे।

सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् ॥ १ ॥ (अधिकरण १, सूत्राणि १–८)

[157] इदमाम्नायते छान्दोग्ये —

'अथ खलु क्रतुमय पुरुषो यथाक्रतुरस्मिँल्लोके पुरुषो भवति तथेत प्रेत्य भवति स क्रतु कुर्वीत मनोमय प्राणशरीरो भारूप।' (छा ३।१४।१-२)

इत्यादि। अत्र,

'स क्रतु कुर्वीत' (छा ३।१४।१ २)

इति प्रतिपादितस्य, उपासनस्य, उपास्यः,

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[156] Thus has it been stated that the highest Purusa, Nārāyana—the possible aspect of knowing whom goes far beyond all other means of proof, who is different from all entities other than himself, owing to his being the ocean of immeasurable noble qualities like omni-science having thoughts fulfilled etc (who is) the Highest Brahman,—is alone to be known from the Vedānta After this, in the second, third and fourth Quarters with the doubt rising, because certain Vedānta passages are calculated to propound the nature of distinct entities included in the Pradhana and the Ksetrajña (the individual Soul), although Brahman alone is to be known from the Vedānta, is propounded through the refutation of that (doubt), Brahman s being the mine of auspicious qualities cited in the various passages There the passages where the characteristics of the Jiva are indistinct are taken for consideration in the second Quarter those where the characteristics (of the Jiva) are distinct in the third (Quarter) those that are in consonance with the semblance of the various expositions in the fourth (Quarter)

On account of the instruction everywhere regarding the well known ॥ 1 ॥
(Adhikarana 1, Sūtras 1–8)

[157] This, states the Sruti in the *Chāndogya*—

'Now, indeed, the Purusa is constituted of will, whatever thought a person entertains in this world, so he becomes, having departed from here He should perform the will, constituted of mind, having Prāna as the body, with a shining form' (Chā 3 14 1-2)

etc Here it is apprehended that the object of worship for the worship propounded in

'He should perform the will' (Chā 3 14 1-2)

is pointed out as

'मनोमयः प्राणशरीरः'　　(छा. ३।१४।२)

इति निर्दिश्यते, इति प्रतीयते। तत्र संशयः—किं मनोमयत्वादिगुणकः क्षेत्रज्ञः, उत परमात्मा? इति। किं युक्तम्? क्षेत्रज्ञः, इति। कुतः? मनःप्राणयोः क्षेत्रज्ञोपकरणत्वात्। परमात्मनस्तु

'अप्राणो ह्यमनाः'　　(मु. २।१।२)

इति तत्प्रतिषेधाच्च। न च

'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म'　　(छा. ३।१४।१)

इति पूर्ववाक्यनिर्दिष्टं ब्रह्म, अत्रोपास्यतया संबन्द्धुं शक्यते।

'शान्त उपासीत'　　(छा. ३।१४।१)

इत्युपासनोपकरणशान्तिनिर्वृत्युपायभूतब्रह्मात्मकत्वोपदेशाय, उपात्तत्वात्। न च

'स क्रतुं कुर्वीत।'　　(छा. ३।१४।१)

इत्युपासनस्योपास्यसाकाङ्क्षत्वात्, वाक्यान्तरस्थमपि ब्रह्म संबध्यते, इति शक्यं वक्तुम्। स्ववाक्योपात्तेन मनोमयत्वादिगुणकेन निराकाङ्क्षत्वात्।

'मनोमयः प्राणशरीर'।'　　(छा. ३।१४।२)

इत्यनन्यार्थतया निर्दिष्टस्य विभक्तिविपरिणाममात्रेण, उभयाकाङ्क्षानिवृत्तिसिद्धेः। एवं

'*Constituted of mind, having Prāna as the body*'.
(Chā. 3·14·2)

—There (arises) the doubt—Is the one having the qualities like being constituted of mind etc the Ksetrajña or the highest Atman? What (is here) proper? The Ksetrajña—Whence? On account of the mind and the Prāna being the instruments for the use of the Ksatrajña, and on account of the repudiation of the same in the case of the Paramātman in

'*Without the Prāna, indeed, without the mind*'. (Mu. 2 1·2)

Further, it is not possible to connect Brahman pointed out in the previous passage—

'*All this indeed is Brahman*'. (Chā. 3 14·1)

as being the object of worship here, on account of that being taken up for instruction about Brahman being the Ātman, the means of perfect satisfaction and tranquillity, the means of worship in

'*Tranquil (in mind), he should worship.*' (Chā. 3·14·1)

Nor again is it possible to say that the Brahman although in another passage is to be connected on account of there being expectancy about the object of worship for the worship in

'*He should perform the will*' (Chā. 3·14·1)

because there is no expectancy owing to (Brahman) having the quality of being constituted of mind, referred to directly in the relevant passages, on account of the cessation of both the kinds of expectancy being established in the case of that mentioned as referring to the same thing in the passage

'*Constituted of mind, having Prāna as the body*'
(Chā. 3·14·2)

merely by the change of the case. The nature of the Jiva having been

निश्चिते जीवत्वे,

'एतद्ब्रह्म' (छा. ३।१४।४)

इत्युपसंहारस्थं ब्रह्मपदमपि जीव एव पूजार्थं प्रयुक्तम्, इत्यध्यवसीयत इति— एवं प्राप्ते, ब्रूमः —

[158] 'सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात्।' मनोमयत्वादिगुणकः परमात्मा, एव। कुतः? सर्वत्र वेदान्तवाक्येषु परस्मिन्नेव ब्रह्मणि प्रसिद्धस्य मनोमयत्वादेरुपदेशात्। प्रसिद्धं हि मनोमयत्वादि ब्रह्मणः। यथा

'मनोमयः प्राणशरीरनेता।' (मु २।२।७)

'स य एषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशः। तस्मिन्नयं पुरुषो मनोमयः। अमृतो हिरण्मयः।' (तै. १।६।१)

'हृदा मनीषा मनसाभिक्लृप्तो य एतं विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति।' (का. ६।९, श्वे. ३।१३, ४।१७)

'न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नापि वाचा।' (मु. ३।१।८)

'मनसा तु विशुद्धेन।' (का. ६·९)

तथा

'प्राणस्य प्राणः।' (के. २)

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ascertained thus, it is concluded that the word Brahman also in the concluding portion in the passage—

'This is Brahman' (Chā. 3·14·4)

is used in the case of Jīva, for the sake of worship. This (prima-facie view) having been reached, we say (in reply) —

[158] 'On account of the instruction everywhere regarding the well-known'. The one having the qualities being constituted of mind etc, is the Paramātman alone. Whence? On account of the instruction about the well-known (qualities) being constituted of mind and others in respect of the Highest Brahman alone. Well-known, indeed, is being constituted of mind etc. in the case of Brahman, as in these (following Vedānta passages) and others —

'Constituted of mind, the leader of the Prāna and the body.' (Mu. 2·2·7)

'This same is the Akāśa in the heart within. In that, this Puruṣa constituted of mind, immortal and golden' (Tait. 1·6·1)

'By the heart, by steadfast desire, by the mind, he is apprehended. Those who know this one, they become immortal.' (Kā. 6·9, Śve. 3. 13; 4·17)

'Not by the eye is grasped, nor again by speech.' (Mu 3·1·8)

'But by the pure mind.' (Kā. 6·9)

Likewise —

'The Prāṇa of the Prāṇas.' (Kena. 2)

'अथ खलु प्राण एव प्रज्ञात्मेदं शरीरं परिगृह्योत्थापयति ।' (कौ ३।३)
'सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतानि प्राणमेवाभिसंविशन्ति प्राणमभ्युज्जिहते ।' (छा. १।११।५)

इत्यादिषु । मनोमयत्वम् — विशुद्धेन मनसा ग्राह्यत्वम् । प्राणशरीरत्वम् — प्राणस्याप्याधारत्वं नियन्तृत्वं च । एवं च सति,

'एष म आत्मान्तर्हृदय एतद्ब्रह्म ।' (छा ३।१४।४)

इति ब्रह्मशब्दोऽपि मुख्य एव भवति ।

'अप्राणो ह्यमना ' (मु २।१।२)

इति मनआयत्तं ज्ञानं प्राणायत्तां स्थितिं च ब्रह्मणो निषेधति ।

अथ वा

'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति शान्त उपासीत ' (छा ३।१४।१)

इति, अत्रैवोपासनं विधीयते । सर्वात्मकं ब्रह्म शान्तः सन्नुपासीत, इति ।

'स क्रतुं कुर्वीत ' (छा ३।१४।१)

इति तस्यैव गुणोपादानार्थोऽनुवादः । उपादेयाश्च गुणाः, मनोमयत्वादयः । अतः सर्वात्मकं ब्रह्म मनोमयत्वादिगुणकमुपासीत, इति वाक्यार्थः ।

'And indeed, Prāna himself, the Prajñātman having taken to (or controlled) this body, raises it up.' (Kau 3 3)

'All these beings, verily, enter into the Prāna alone, leave off Prāna'. (Chā 1 11 5)

etc Being constituted of mind is fitness to be grasped by the pure mind, having Prāna as the body is being the support even of Prana, and being the controller And such being the case, the word Brahman also in

'This one is my Ātman in the heart within, this is Brahman'. (Cha 3 14 4)

is used in its primary sense itself In

'Without the Prāna, indeed, without the mind' (Mu 2 1 2)

(the Sruti) denies in the case of Brahman, knowledge dependent upon mind, and its existence dependent upon the Prāna

Or, the worship is enjoined here also in

'All this, indeed, is Brahman, tranquil in mind one should worship it as Tajjalān' (Chā 3 14 1)

so as to mean—being tranquil in mind, one should worship Brahman, the Ātman of all. In

'He should perform the will' (Chā 3 14·1)

there is the repetition of the same for the sake of referring to the qualities The qualities to be referred to are being constituted of mind etc Therefore, the sense of the passage is—One should worship Brahman, the Atman of all, having the qualities, being constituted of mind etc

[159] तत्र संदेहः—किमिह ब्रह्मशब्देन प्रत्यगात्मा निर्दिश्यते, उत परमात्मा ? इति। किं युक्तम् ? प्रत्यगात्मा, इति। कुतः ? तस्यैव सर्वपदसामानाधिकरण्यनिर्देशोपपत्तेः। सर्वशब्दनिर्दिष्टं हि ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तं कृत्स्नं जगत्। ब्रह्मादिभावश्च प्रत्यगात्मनः, अनाद्यविद्यामूलकर्मविशेषोपाधिको विद्यत एव। परस्य तु ब्रह्मणः सर्वज्ञस्य सर्वशक्तेः, अपहतपाप्मनो निरस्तसमस्ताविद्यादिदोषगन्धस्य, समस्तहेयाकरसर्वभावो नोपपद्यते। प्रत्यगात्मन्यपि क्वचित्क्वचिद्ब्रह्मशब्दः प्रयुज्यते। अत एव

'परमात्मा परं ब्रह्म' (सर्वोप. ४)

इति परमेश्वरस्य क्वचित्सविशेषणो निर्देशः। प्रत्यगात्मनश्च निर्मुक्तोपाधेर्बृहत्त्वं च विद्यते।

'स चानन्त्याय कल्पते' (श्वे. ५।९)

इति श्रुतेः। अविदुषः तस्यैव कर्मनिमित्तत्वात् जन्मस्थितिलयानां

'तज्जलानिति' (छा. ३।१४।१)

हेतुनिर्देशोऽप्युपपद्यते। तदयमर्थः—अयं जीवात्मा स्वतोऽपरिच्छिन्नरूपत्वेन ब्रह्मभूतः सन्, अनाद्यविद्यया देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यस्थावरात्मना, अवतिष्ठते—इति।

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[159] There arises the doubt—Is here pointed out by the word Brahman, the inmost Ātman or the highest Atman ? What (is here) proper ? The inmost Ātman. Whence? On account of the appropriate nature of that same, for being pointed out in case-co-ordination with the word Sarva; for, what is pointed out by the word Sarva is the entire world beginning from Brahman right up to the tuft of grass, and there does exist in the case of the inmost Ātman the nature of Brahman etc., due to the limiting adjunct viz. a distinct Karman rooted in the beginningless Avidyā. In the case of the Highest Brahman, however, which is omniscient, omnipotent, with sins destroyed and with even the tinge of all blemish like Avidyā etc. expelled, does not become appropriate, the nature of everything, the mine of everything fit to be abandoned. In some places, here and there, the word Brahman is used even in respect of the inmost Atman also. For this very reason, there is in some places a particularised mention of the highest Controller in the passage

'The highest Ātman (is) the Highest Brahman.' (Sarvopa. 4)

And in respect of the inmost Ātman released from the limiting adjuncts, greatness also does exist, on account of the Sruti (passage)

'And He is meant for endlessness.' (Śve. 5·9)

And in respect of the same, the ignorant one, the reference as the cause in

'That which produces, in which is merged, and which annihilates' (Chā. 3·14·1)

on account of the birth, sustenance, and dissolution being caused by Karman, is as well proper. So, this is the sense—This Living Ātman being himself Brahman by having an unlimited form, stays on as gods, lower animals, men and immovables owing to the beginning-less Avidyā.

[160] अत्र प्रतिविधीयते—' सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् '। सर्वत्र

' सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म ' (छा ३।१४।१)

इति निर्दिष्टे सर्वस्मिञ्जगति ब्रह्मशब्देन तदात्मतया, अभिधीयमानं परं ब्रह्मैव, न प्रत्यगात्मा कुतः ? प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् ।

' तज्जलानीति ' (छा ३।१४।१)

इति हेतुतः

' सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म ' (छा ३।१४।१)

इति प्रसिद्धवन्निर्देशात् । ब्रह्मणो जातत्वात्, ब्रह्मणि लीनत्वात्, ब्रह्माधीन जीवनत्वाच्च हेतोः, ब्रह्मात्मकं सर्वं खल्विदं जगदित्युक्ते, यस्माज्जगज्जन्मस्थितिलया वेदान्तेषु प्रसिद्धाः, तदेवात्र ब्रह्म, इति प्रतीयते । तच्च परमेव ब्रह्म । तथाहि--

' यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । येन जातानि जीवन्ति । यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति । तद्विजिज्ञासस्व । तद्ब्रह्म । ' (तै ३।१)

इत्युपक्रम्य,

' आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात् । आनन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते ' (तै ३।६)

[1 60] Here, (the position) is controverted (as follows) —

' On account of the well-known instruction everywhere ' Everywhere— When the entire world is pointed out in

' *All this, indeed, is Brahman* (Cha 3 14 1)

whatever is denoted by the word Brahman as being its Ātman is the Highest Brahman alone, and not the inmost Atman Whence ? On account of the well-known instruction on account of the mention as quite well-known

' *All this indeed, is Brahman* (Cha 3 14 1)

owing to the reason

' *Tajjalānīti* (Chā 3 14 1)

When it is stated that this whole world indeed has Brahman for its Atman, on account of the reason — on account of (its) being born of Brahman, on account of (its) being dissolved into Brahman and on account of (its) subsistence depending on Brahman, it is apprehended here, that it is the same Brahman from which the birth, sustenance, (and) dissolution (of the world) are well-known in the Vedānta passages And that is the Highest Brahman itself To explain the same — Beginning with

' *From what again these beings are produced by what (when produced) they live on to what they go (and) enter (within) — Desire to know that definitely that is Brahman* ' (Tait 3 1)

by the passage —

' *One should know bliss as Brahman for, from bliss alone, indeed, are born these beings* ' (Tait 3 6)

इत्यादिना पूर्वानुवाकप्रतिपादितानवधिकातिशयानन्दयोगिनो विपश्चितः परस्माद्ब्रह्मण एव जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिलया निर्दिश्यन्ते । तथा

'स कारणं करणाधिपाधिपो
न चास्य कश्चिज्जनिता न चाधिपः ।' (श्वे. ६।९)

इति करणाधिपस्य जीवस्य, अधिपः परं ब्रह्मैव कारणं व्यपदिश्यते । एवं हि सर्वत्र परस्यैव ब्रह्मणः कारणत्वं प्रसिद्धम् । अतः, परब्रह्मणो जातत्वात्, तस्मिँल्लीनत्वात्, तेन प्राणनात्, तदात्मकतया तादात्म्यमुपपन्नम् । अतः, सर्वप्रकारं सर्वशरीरं सर्वात्मभूतं परं ब्रह्म शान्तो भूत्वा उपासीत, इति, श्रुतिरेव परस्य ब्रह्मणः सर्वात्मकत्वमुपपाद्य तस्योपासनमुपदिशति । परं ब्रह्म हि कारणावस्थं कार्यावस्थं सूक्ष्मस्थूलचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरतया सर्वदा सर्वात्मभूतम् । एवंभूततादात्म्यस्य प्रतिपादने, परस्य ब्रह्मणः सकलहेयप्रत्यनीककल्याणगुणाकरत्वं न विरुध्यते । प्रकारभूतशरीरगतानां दोषाणां प्रकारिणि, आत्मनि, अप्रसङ्गात् । प्रत्युत निरतिशयैश्वर्यापादनेन गुणायैव भवति, इति पूर्वमेवोक्तम् ।

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are mentioned the origination, sustenance (and) dissolution of the world from the Highest Brahman itself, the wise one, associated with unlimited excessive bliss, propounded in the previous section (*Anuvāka*). Similarly in the passage

'He is the cause, the Lord of the lords of the sense-organs; and there is no one progenitor for Him, — nor a Lord!'

(Śve. 6·9)

is pointed out the Highest Brahman alone, the master of the Jiva that is the master of the sense-organs, the cause. In this way, indeed, the Highest Brahman itself being the cause is everywhere well-known. Hence, on account of being born of the Highest Brahman, on account of being merged into that, and on account of (its) living by that, the identity (of that with the world) is appropriate, owing to its having that (Brahman) as the Ātman. And therefore, the Sruti itself having logically proved that the Highest Brahman is the Ātman of all, gives instruction about its worship, that one being tranquil in mind, should worship the Highest Brahman having everything as its modes, having everything for its body, (and) which has become the Ātman of everything. The Highest Brahman, indeed, in the state of cause and in the state of effect, is always the Ātman of all, owing to its having the gross, subtle, sentient and non-sentient entities as its body. In propounding such an identity, is not contradicted the Highest Brahman's being the mine of auspicious qualities, the rival of everything fit to be abandoned, on account of blemishes associated with the bodies, the modes (of the Ātman) not finding scope in the Ātman, the entity possessed of the modes. On the contrary, it becomes positively a good point owing to the attribution of unsurpassed overlordship. — This has already been stated.

[161] यदुक्तम्—जीवस्य सर्वतादात्म्यमुपपद्यते, इति—तदसत् । जीवानां प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नानाम्, अन्योन्यतादात्म्यासंभवात् । मुक्तस्य, अनवच्छिन्नस्वरूपस्यापि जगत्तादात्म्यं जगज्जन्मस्थितिप्रलयकारणत्वं न संभवति, इति

'जगद्व्यापारवर्जम्' (ब्र. सू ४।४।१७)

इत्यत्र वक्ष्यते। जीवकर्मनिमित्तत्वात्, जगज्जन्मस्थितिलयानां स एव कारणम्, इत्यपि न साधीयः । तत्कर्मनिमित्तत्वेऽपीश्वरस्यैव जगत्कारणत्वात् । अतः, परमात्मा, एव, अत्र ब्रह्मशब्दाभिधेयः । इममेव सूत्रार्थम्, अभियुक्ता बहु मन्यन्ते । यदाह वृत्तिकारः—सर्वं खल्विति सर्वात्मा ब्रह्मेशः, इति ॥ १ ॥

विवक्षितगुणोपपत्तेश्च ॥ २ ॥

[162] वक्ष्यमाणाश्च गुणाः परमात्मन्येव, उपपद्यन्ते ।

'मनोमयः प्राणशरीरो भारूपः सत्यसंकल्प आकाशात्मा सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसः सर्वमिदमभ्यात्तोऽवाक्यनादरः' (छा. ३।१४।२)

इति । मनोमयः — परिशुद्धेन मनसैकेन ग्राह्यः । विवेकविमोकादिसाधनसप्तकानुगृहीतपरमात्मोपासननिर्मलीकृतेन हि मनसा गृह्यते । अनेन हेयप्रत्यनीककल्याणैकतानतया सकलेतरविलक्षणस्वरूपता, उच्यते । मलिनमनोभिर्मलिनानामेव ग्राह्यत्वात् ।

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[161] As to what has been said—that the identity with everything of the Jiva is proper,—that is false, on account of the impossibility of mutual identity of the Jivas that are different in different bodies. In the case of the released Soul with his form not circumscribed, as well, identity with the world and being the cause of the birth, sustenance, and dissolution, of the world are not possible. This would be stated by us in (the Sūtra)

'Barring the dealings with the world' (Br. Sū. IV-4-17)

On account of the Karman of the Jiva being the cause, (the proposition) that he alone is the cause of the birth, sustenance, (and) dissolution of the world, is not acceptable, because Īśvara alone is the cause of the world, even though the world has the Karman of that (Jiva) as its cause. Experts think highly of this very sense of the Sūtra, as says the Vrttikāra (Baudhāyana)—Because of all this, indeed, (etc.) Brahman, the Lord, is the Ātman of all.

On account of the possibility of qualities intended to be stated ॥ 2 ॥

[162] The qualities to be stated are possible only in the case of the highest Atman, as in

'Constituted of mind, having Prāna as the body, having a refulgent form, having thoughts fulfilled, the Ātman of Ākāśa, all-doer, having all desires, all-fragrance, all-flavour; He has reached all this, speechless, regardless.' (Chā. 3-14-2)

Manomayah—to be grasped by a completely pure mind for, he is grasped by the mind rendered pure by the worship of the highest Ātman, backed by the seven-fold means—discrimination, non-attachment etc. By this is stated the nature quite different from anything else owing to (his) being uniformly auspicious, the rival of things fit to be abandoned, because only impure (things)

प्राणशरीरः — जगति सर्वेषां प्राणानां धारकः । प्राणो यस्य शरीरमाधेयं विधेयं शेषभूतं च स प्राणशरीरः । आधेयत्वविधेयत्वशेषत्वानि शरीरशब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तानि, इत्युपपादयिष्यते । भारूपः — भास्वररूपः । अप्राकृतसाधारणनिरतिशयकल्याण-दिव्यरूपत्वेन निरतिशयदीप्तियुक्तः, इत्यर्थः । सत्यसंकल्पः — अप्रतिहतसंकल्पः । आकाशात्मा — आकाशवत्सूक्ष्मस्वच्छस्वरूपः । सकलेतरकारणभूतस्याप्याकाशस्य, आत्मभूतः, इति वा, आकाशात्मा । स्वयं च प्रकाशते, अन्यांश्च प्रकाशयति, इति वा, आकाशात्मा । सर्वकर्मा — क्रियत इति कर्म । सर्वं जगद्यस्य कर्म, सर्वा वा क्रिया यस्यासौ सर्वकर्मा । सर्वकामः — काम्यन्त इति कामा भोग्यभोगोपकरणादयः । ते परिशुद्धा सर्वविधास्तस्य सन्ति, इत्यर्थं । सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसः —

'अशब्दमस्पर्शम्' (का ३।१५)

इत्यादिना प्राकृतगन्धरसादिनिषेधात्, अप्राकृताः स्वासाधारणा निरवद्या निरतिशयाः कल्याणाः स्वभोग्यभूताः सर्वविधा गन्धरसाः, तस्य सन्ति, इत्यर्थः । सर्वमिदमभ्यात्तः — उक्तमिदं रसपर्यन्तं सर्वं कल्याणगुणजातं स्वीकृतवान् । अभ्यात्त इति भुक्ता ब्राह्मणा

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are fit to be grasped by impure minds Prānaśarīrah — the holder of all the Prānas in the world Prāna is one who has Śarīra, the thing to be supported, (the world), the thing to be enjoined, and the thing subordinated — he is Prānasarīra Being the thing to be supported, being the thing to be enjoined, being subordinate—are the causes of the use of the word Sarīra — this will be established (later) Bhārūpah — one possessed of a refulgent form, that is to say, endowed with unsurpassed refulgence owing to his having a form not arising out of Prakrti peculiar to himself, unsurpassed, auspicious (and) divine Satyasankalpah—with thoughts not balked Ākāśātmā—with a form subtle and clear like the Ākāsa, or Ākāśatmā (means) the Ātman of Ākāśa, that is even the cause of everything else Or, Ākāśatmā (means) who himself shines and illumines others as well Sarvakarmā—Karman is that which is done (He) whose Karman is the whole world, or to whom belong all actions, he is the Sarvakarmā Sarvakāmah—What are] wished for are Kāmāh, the object of enjoyment the enjoyment, the instruments etc Those, quite pure (and) of all kinds belong to him—This is the sense. Sarvagandhah (and) Sarvarasah—on account of the denial of ordinary fragrance and flavour etc. arising out of Prakrti, in passages like

'*Without sound, without touch*' (Ka 3 15)

— to whom belong the fragrance, flavour not arising out of Prakrti, peculiar to himself, blameless, unsurpassed, auspicious — the objects of enjoyment for himself, (and) of all kinds—This is the sense Sarvamidamabhyāttah— Idam Sarvam—the mentioned group of auspicious qualities right up to flavour, he took for himself—In the expression Abhyāttah there is the termination Kta to be understood in the sense of an agent as in Bhuktāh Brahmanāh (The Brāhmanas have taken food) Avaki—Vāk, — speech,

इतिचत्कर्तरि क्त प्रतिपत्तव्य.। अवाकी—वागुक्ति' सास्य नास्ति, इति, अवाकी। कुत इत्याह, अनादर', इति। अवाप्तसमस्तकामत्वेन, आदर्तव्याभावादादररहित । अत एव, अवाकी, अजल्पाकः, परिपूर्णैश्वर्यत्वात् ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तं निखिल जगत्तृणीकृत्य जोषमासीन , इत्यर्थ । अत एते विवक्षिता गुणाः परमात्मन्येव, उपपद्यन्ते ॥ २ ॥

अनुपपत्तेस्तु न शारीरः ॥ ३ ॥

[163] तमिम गुणसागरं पर्यालोचयतां खद्योतकल्पस्य शरीरसंबन्धनिबन्धनापरिमितदु खसंबन्धयोग्यस्य बद्धमुक्तावस्थस्य जीवस्य, प्रस्तुतगुणलेशसबन्धगन्धोऽपि नोपपद्यते, इति न, अस्मिन्प्रकरणे शारीरपरिग्रहशङ्का जायते, इत्यर्थ. ॥ ३ ॥

कर्मकर्तृव्यपदेशाच्च ॥ ४ ॥

'एतामित प्रेत्याभिसंभवितास्मि ।'　　　　(छा ३।१४।४)

इति प्राप्यतया पर ब्रह्म व्यपदिश्यत। प्राप्तृतया च जीव'। अत' प्राप्ता जीव उपासक, प्राप्यं पर ब्रह्मोपास्यम्, इति प्राप्तुरन्यदेवेदम्, इति विज्ञायते ॥ ४ ॥

शब्दविशेषात् ॥ ५ ॥

'एष म आत्मान्तर्हृदये'　　　　(छा ३।१४।३)

Avākı means *to whom that (speech) does not belong*—(The Srutı) puts in Anadarah to explain whence it is so Void of Adara (regard) on account of the absence of things to be taken up owing to his having secured all his desires *For this very reason—Avakı—not a prattler that is to say*, keeping quiet treating as (a blade of) grass, the whole world beginning with Brahmadeva right up to the tuft of grass on account of his overlordship *being quite complete* Therefore, *these qualities intended to be stated* are proper only in the case of the highest Ātman ॥ 2 ॥

On account of the impropriety again not the embodied Soul ॥ 3 ॥

[163] For those fully considering this same *ocean of qualities*, there is not produced a doubt about reference to the embodied Self in this context, because there is not even the tinge of connection with qualities under reference in the smallest measure, in the case of the Jiva *comparable* (in insignificance) to a glow-worm fit for the connection with immeasurable misery accruing from the connection with the body, (and) in the conditions of being in bondage and being released—This is the sense ॥ 3 ॥

And on account of a reference to the object and the agent ॥ 4 ॥

In the passage

'Having gone away from here I shall be reaching him'　　(Cha 3 14 4)

is referred to the Highest Brahman as being the *destination*, and the Jiva as being the one who reaches Therefore, one who teaches is the Jiva, the worshipper the entity to be reached (is) the Highest Brahman the object of worship—and so, it is known that this Prāpya is quite different from one who reaches ॥ 4 ॥

On account of the distinction in words ॥ 5 ॥

In the passage

'This my Ātman in the heart within'.　　(Chā 3 14 3)

इति शारीरः षष्ठ्या निर्दिष्टः, उपास्यस्तु प्रथमया। एवं समानप्रकरणे वाजिनां च श्रुतौ शब्दविशेषः श्रूयते जीवपरयोः। यथा

'व्रीहिर्वा यवो वा श्यामाको वा श्यामाकतण्डुलो वा एवमयमन्तरात्मन्पुरुषो हिरण्मयो यथा ज्योतिरधूमम्' (श ब्रा १०।६।३।२)

इति। अत्र, अन्तरात्मन्, इति सप्तम्यन्तेन शारीरो निर्दिश्यते। पुरुषो हिरण्मयः, इति प्रथमया, उपास्यः। अतः पर एवोपास्यः ॥ ५ ॥

इतश्च शारीरादन्यः—

स्मृतेश्च ॥ ६ ॥

'सर्वस्य चाहं हृदि संनिविष्टो मत्तः स्मृतिर्ज्ञानमपोहनं च ॥' (गीता १५।१५)
'यो मामेवमसंमूढो जानाति पुरुषोत्तमम्।' (गीता १५।१९)
'ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति।
भ्रामयन्सर्वभूतानि यन्त्रारूढानि मायया ॥' (गीता १८।६१)
'तमेव शरणं गच्छ।' (गीता १८।६२)

इति शारीरकमुपासकम्, परमात्मानं चोपास्यं, स्मृतिर्दर्शयति ॥ ६ ॥

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the embodied (Ātman) is referred to in the genitive, and the object of worship in the nominative In this way, in similar contexts and in the Sruti according to the Vājasaneya recension, distinct words are used regarding the Jiva and the Highest,

'Like a rice grain, or a barley grain or a Śyāmāka (grain), or Syāmaka kernel,—thus this golden Purusa in the Ātman within, like the smokeless light'. (Śata Br 10 6 3 2)

Here by (the expression) Antarātman in the locative, the embodied Soul is indicated By—The golden Purusa—the object of worship (is indicated) in the nominative Therefore, the Highest alone is the object of worship ॥5॥

And for this reason also, (the Highest is) different from the embodied one

And on account of the Smṛti (passages) ॥ 6 ॥

The Smrti indicates the Embodied as the worshipper and the Highest Ātman as the object of worship, in the passages—

'And I am well stationed in the heart of all, from me (arise) remembrance, knowledge and denial' (Gitā 15 15)

'Who, in this way, unruffled, knows me, the highest Purusa' (Gita 15 19)

'Iśvara stays in the heart-region of all beings, (O) Arjuna, revolving all the beings as though placed on a machine by his Māyā'. (Gita 18 61)

'Go for a shelter to him alone' (Gita 18 62)

॥6॥

[164] अर्भकौकस्त्वात्तद्व्यपदेशाच्च नेति चेन्न निचाय्यत्वादेवं व्योमवच्च ॥ ७ ॥

अल्पायतनत्वम्— अर्भकौकस्त्वम्। तद्व्यपदेशः —अल्पत्वव्यपदेशः।

'एष म आत्मान्तर्हृदये' (छा. ३।१४।३)

इति, अणीयसि हृदयायतने स्थितत्वात्,

'अणीयान्व्रीहेर्वा यवाद्वा' (छा. ३।१४।३)

इत्यादिना, अणीयस्त्वस्य स्वरूपेण व्यपदेशाच्च नायं परमात्मा, अपि तु जीव एव।

'सर्वगतं सुसूक्ष्मं यद्भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ति धीराः' (मु. १।१।६)

इत्यादिभिः परमात्मनोऽपरिच्छिन्नत्वावगमात्, जीवस्य च, आराग्रमात्रत्वव्यपदेशात्, इति चेत्—न, एतदेवम्। परमात्मैव हि, अणीयान्, इत्येवं निचाय्यत्वेन व्यपदिश्यते। एवं निचाय्यत्वेन, एवं द्रष्टव्यत्वेन, एवमुपास्यत्वेन, इति यावत्। न पुनरणीयस्त्वम्, एवास्य स्वरूपमिति, व्योमवच्चायं व्यपदिश्यते। स्वाभाविकं महत्त्वं च, अत्रैव व्यपदिश्यते।

'ज्यायान्पृथिव्या ज्यायानन्तरिक्षाज्ज्यायान्दिवो ज्यायानेभ्यो लोकेभ्यः' (छा. ३।१४।३)

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[164] If (it be objected) that this is not (the Paramātman), on account of the abode being small, and on account of that reference, (we say)—No, on account of his being thus to be meditated upon and on account of his being like ether. ॥ 7 ॥

Having a small abode (is) Arbhakaukastvam. Tadvyapadeśah—the *reference to smallness, on account of staying in the minute heart-abode,* (stated) in

'This is my Ātman in the heart within'. (Chā. 3·14·3)

and on account of the reference to his nature as being minute in passages like —

'More minute than the rice grain, than the barley grain' (Chā. 3·14·3)

this is not the highest Ātman but Jiva alone, also on account of the apprehension of the highest Ātman as unlimited in passages like —

'Wise men visualise all round what is all pervading, extremely subtile, the source of beings'. (Mu 1·1·6)

and on account of the reference to Jīva as having the measure of the awl-point—(we reply)—this is not so, because the highest Ātman alone is minute — and so is referred to being thus fit to be meditated upon; that is to say, — by being thus fit to be meditated upon, by thus being fit to be seen, by thus being fit to be worshipped; being only minute is not again his natural form, he is referred to being like ether as well. Here, verily, is referred to his natural greatness (magnitude) in

'Greater than the earth, greater than the mid-region, greater than the heaven, greater than these worlds. (Chā. 3·14·3)

इति । अतः, उपासनार्थमेव, अल्पत्वव्यपदेशः ।

तथाहि—

'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानीति शान्त उपासीत' (छा. ३।१४।१)

इति सर्वोत्पत्तिप्रलयकारणत्वेन सर्वस्यात्मतया, अनुप्रवेशकृतजीवयितृत्वेन च सर्वात्मकं ब्रह्म, उपासीत, इत्युपासनं विधाय,

'अथ खलु क्रतुमयोऽयं पुरुषो यथाक्रतुरस्मिँल्लोके पुरुषो भवति तथेतः प्रेत्य भवति' (छा. ३।१४।१)

इति यथोपासनं प्राप्यसिद्धिमभिधाय,

'स क्रतुं कुर्वीत' (छा. ३।१४।१)

इति गुणविधानार्थमुपासनमनूद्य,

'मनोमयः प्राणशरीरो भारूपः सत्यसंकल्प आकाशात्मा सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसः सर्वमिदमभ्यात्तोऽवाक्यनादरः' (छा. ३।१४।२)

इति जगदैश्वर्यविशिष्टस्य स्वरूपगुणांश्चोपादेयान्प्रतिपाद्य,

Therefore, the reference about his being small, is for the sake of worship alone.

To explain the same (in detail)—Having enjoined the worship that one should worship Brahman, the Ātman of all, owing to its being the cause of origination and dissolution—of all, and owing to its being the life-giving source of all, caused by the subsequent entering as the Atman, in

'All this indeed is Brahman; one should worship (this), tranquil (in mind), as (the world) originates from that, merges into that, and breathes because of that' (Chā. 3·14·1)

—having mentioned the accomplishment of the object to be attained in accordance with the worship in (the passage)

'This Puruṣa is constituted of will. Whatever thought a person entertains in this world, so he becomes, having departed from here' (Chā. 3·14·1)

—having again stated the worship for the purpose of enjoining the accessories (Guṇa) in (the passage)

'He should perform the will' (Chā. 3·14·1)

—having propounded as fit to be accepted, the nature and qualities of the one endowed with the overlordship of the world in (the passage)

'Constituted of mind, having Prāṇa as the body, having a refulgent form, having thoughts fulfilled, the Ātman of Ākāśa, all-doer, having all desired objects, all-fragrance, all-flavour; he has reached all this, speechless, regardless'. (Chā. 3·14·2)

—having mentioned the stay for the sake of worship, of the highest Puruṣa, the object of worship,—in the heart of the worshipper, as being his Ātman, owing to his being minute, in (the passage)

'एष म आत्मा तर्हृदयेऽणीयान्व्रीहेर्वा यवाद्वा सर्षपाद्वा श्यामाकाद्वा श्यामाकतण्डुलाद्वा' (छा ३।१४।३)

इति, उपासकस्य हृदये, अणीयस्त्वेन तदात्मतया, उपास्यस्य परमपुरुषस्योपासनार्थमव स्थानमुक्त्वा,

'एष म आत्मान्तर्हृदये ज्यायान्पृथिव्या ज्यायानन्तरिक्षाज्ज्यायान्दिवो ज्यायानेभ्यो लोकेभ्य सर्वकर्मा सर्वकाम सर्वगन्ध सर्वमिदमभ्यात्तोऽवाक्यनादर' (छा ३।१४।३-४)

इति, अन्तर्हृदये, अवस्थितस्योपास्यमानस्य प्राप्याकार निर्दिश्य,

'एष म आत्मान्तर्हृदय एतद्ब्रह्म' (छा ३।१४।४)

इति, एवभूत पर ब्रह्म परमकारुण्येन, अस्मदुज्जिजीविषया, अस्मद्हृदये सनिहितम्, इति, इदमनुसधान विधाय,

'एतमित प्रेत्याभिसभवितास्मि' (छा ३।१४।४)

इति, यथोपासन प्राप्तिनिश्चयानुसधान च विधाय, इति,

'यस्य स्याद्द्धा न विचिकित्सास्ति' (छा ३।१४।५)

इति, एवविधप्राप्यप्राप्तिनिश्चयोपेतस्योपासकस्य प्राप्तौ, न सशयोऽस्ति, इत्युपसहृतम्। अत, उपासनार्थम्, अर्भकौकस्त्वम्, अणीयस्त्व च ॥ ७ ॥

'This (is) my Ātman in the heart within more minute than the rice grain than the barley grain than the mustard grain than the Syamaka grain than the Syamaka kernel (Cha 3 14 3)
—having pointed out the attainable form of one who is being worshipped (and) staying in the heart within in (the passage)

'This (is) my Ātman in the heart within greater than the earth greater than the mid region greater than the heaven greater than these worlds all doer having all desired objects all fragrance all flavour he has reached all this speechless regardless (Cha 3 14 3-4)
—having shown up the continuous reference viz that this Highest Brahman as (pointed out) in

This is my Ātman in the heart within this is Brahman (Cha 3 14 4)

stays in our heart with a desire to lift us up owing to its extremely merciful nature and having shown up the continuous reference regarding the resolve for attainment in accordance with the worship in the passage

Having gone away from here I shall be reaching him (Cha 3 14 4)

has been concluded that there is no doubt (whatsoever) regarding the attainment by the worshipper who is fortified with a resolve for such an attainment of the object to be attained as in

'For whom this is so there is no doubt (Cha 3 14 5)
—Therefore having a small abode and being minute are for the sake of worship ॥ 7 ॥

संभोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न वैशेष्यात् ॥ ८ ॥

[**165**] जीवस्येव परस्यापि ब्रह्मणः शरीरान्तर्वर्तित्वम्, अभ्युपगतं चेत्, तद्वदेव शरीरसंबन्धप्रयुक्तसुखदुःखोपभोगप्राप्तिः, इति चेत्—न। हेतुवैशेष्यात्। न हि शरीरान्तर्वर्तित्वमेव सुखदुःखोपभोगे हेतुः, अपि तु पुण्यपापरूपकर्मपरवशत्वम्। तत्तु, अपहतपाप्मनः परमात्मनो न संभवति। तथा च श्रुतिः—

'तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्ति
अनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति।' (मु ३।१।१)

इति ॥ ८ ॥

सर्वत्रप्रसिद्ध्यधिकरणं समाप्तम् (१)

[**166**] यदि परमात्मा न भोक्ता, एवं तर्हि सर्वत्र भोक्तृतया प्रतीयमानो जीव एव स्यात्, इत्याशङ्क्याह—

अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात् ॥ ९ ॥ (अधिकरण २, सूत्राणि ९–१२)

कठवल्लीषु, आम्नायते—

'यस्य ब्रह्म च क्षत्रं चोभे भवत ओदनः।
मृत्युर्यस्योपसेचनं क इत्था वेद यत्र सः॥' (का २।२४)

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[165] **If (it is objected) that there would be the attainment of enjoyment, (we say)—No, on account of the distinction. ॥ 8 ॥**

If it is admitted that the Highest Brahman also does reside inside the body, like the Jiva, then there would be likewise also the attainment of the experience of happiness and misery prompted by connection with the body—if it be argued (like this)—(we say)—No on account of the distinction in the cause Not, indeed, is merely residing inside a body, the cause of the experience of happiness and misery, but being subject to the Karman of the nature of merit and sin, that, however, is not possible in the case of the highest Ātman with sins destroyed To the same effect is the Sruti passage—

'One of those two eats the sweet fruit of the Pippala, and not eating, another continues to look on'. (Mu 3 1·1)

॥ 8 ॥

Here ends the Sarvatraprasiddhyadhikarana (1)

[166] If the highest Atman were not the enjoyer, then in that case, Jiva alone would be apprehended as being the enjoyer everywhere—with this doubt being raised, says (the Sūtrakāra) —

The Eater (is the Paramātman) on account of (his) taking up the movable and the immovable ॥ 9 ॥ (Adhikarana 2–Sūtras 9–12)

It is stated in the *Kathavallis* by the Sruti —

'For whom the Brahmins and the Ksatriyas both become the cooked rice, for whom Death is a condiment — but who here, knows where he is?' (Ka 2 24)

इति । अत्र, ओदनोपसेचनसूचितोऽत्ता किं जीव एव, उत परमात्मा ? इति संदिह्यते—किं युक्तम् ? जीव इति । कुतः ? भोक्तृत्वस्य कर्मनिमित्तत्वात् । जीवस्यैव तत्संभवात् । अत्र, उच्यते—

'अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात्'—अत्ता परमात्मा, एव । कुतः ? चराचरग्रहणात् । चराचरस्य कृत्स्नस्यान्नृत्वं हि तस्यैव संभवति । न चेदं कर्मनिमित्तं भोक्तृत्वम् । अपि तु जगज्जन्मस्थितिलयहेतुभूतस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणो विष्णोः संहर्तृत्वम् ।

'सोऽध्वनः पारमाप्नोति तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम् ।' (का. ३।९)

इत्यत्रैव दर्शनात् । तथा च

'मृत्युर्यस्योपसेचनम्' (का. २।२४)

इति वचनात्, ब्रह्म च क्षत्रं चेति कृत्स्नं चराचरं जगत्, इह, अदनीयौदनत्वेन गृह्यते । उपसेचनं हि नाम स्वयमद्यमानं सत्, अन्यस्यादनहेतुः । अतः, उपसेचनत्वेन मृत्योरपि, अद्यमानत्वात्, तदुपसिच्यमानस्य कृत्स्नस्य ब्रह्मक्षत्रपूर्वकस्य जगतः, चराचरस्य, अदनम्, अत्र विवक्षितम्, इत्यवगम्यते । ईदृशं च, अदनं, उपसंहार एव । तस्मात्, ईदृशं जगदुपसंहारित्वरूपं भोक्तृत्वं परमात्मन एव ॥ ९ ॥

Here it is doubted—Is the Eater suggested by the cooked rice and condiment, the Jiva himself, or the highest Atman? What (is here) proper? Jiva. Whence? On account of the status as an enjoyer (eater) being dependent upon Karman, and on account of that being possible in the case of Jiva alone. Here it is stated (in reply) —

'The Eater on account of (his) taking up the movable and the immovable' —The Eater (is) the Paramātman himself Whence? On account of (his) taking up the movable and the immovable, for, being the eater of the entire movable and immovable is possible only in his case. Nor again, is this status of being an enjoyer dependent upon Karman, but on the other hand, it is the status as an absorber, of Visnu, who is the cause of the birth, sustenance and dissolution of the world, the Highest Brahman, on account of *this being seen here itself in*

'He reaches the other end of the path and that is Visnu's highest abode.' (Kā. 3·9)

And likewise, on account of the expression

'Of whom Death is the condiment' (Kā. 2·24)

is understood being fit to be eaten and as being cooked rice, the entire world. movable and immovable viz. the Brāhmanas and the *Ksatriyas. Condiment*, indeed, is something which, itself being eaten, is the cause of (producing the desire for) the eating of another. Therefore, it is apprehended that on account of even Death being eaten up as a condiment, here is intended to be stated the eating of the entire world, movable and immovable, beginning with the Brāhmanas and the Ksatriyas, being helped by that (Death). And such an eating is nothing but absorption. Therefore, such status as an enjoyer in the form of being the absorber of the world belongs to the Paramātman alone. ॥9॥

प्रकरणाच्च ॥ १० ॥

प्रकरणं चेदं परस्यैव ब्रह्मणः।

'महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति' (का. २।२१)

'नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो
न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन।
यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्य-
स्तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनूं स्वाम्॥' (का. २।२२)

इति हि प्रकृतम्।

'क इत्था वेद यत्र सः' (का. २।२४)

इत्यपि हि तत्प्रसादादृते तस्य दुरवबोधत्वमेव, पूर्वप्रस्तुतं प्रत्यभिज्ञायते॥ १०॥

अथ स्यात्, नायं ब्रह्मक्षत्रौदनसूचितः पुरुषोत्तमः, अपहतपाप्मा परमात्मा। अनन्तरम्

'ऋतं पिबन्तौ सुकृतस्य लोके
गुहां प्रविष्टौ परमे परार्द्धे।
छायातपौ ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति
पञ्चाग्नयो ये च त्रिणाचिकेताः॥' (का. ३।१)

इति कर्मफलभोक्तुरेव सद्वितीयस्याभिधानात्। द्वितीयश्च, प्राणो बुद्धिर्वा स्यात्। ऋतपानं

And on account of the context ॥ 10 ॥

Further, this Section refers to the Highest Brahman alone—

'Great, all-pervading—thinking of (this) Ātman, the wise one grieves not'. (Kā. 2·21)

'Not is this Ātman to be secured by exposition, not by intellect, not by profound learning, that one whom this (Ātman) chooses, by him (he) is to be secured, and for him this Ātman lays bare this form' (Kā. 2·22)

—This is indeed the matter under discussion—

'(But) who, here, knows, where he is?' (Kā. 2·24)

—By this (passage) also is recognized the previously stated difficulty in understanding him without his grace. ॥ 10 ॥

Now it may be argued—This Superman suggested by cooked rice, Brāhmaṇas and Kṣatriyas, is not the highest Ātman with sins destroyed, on account of the mention of the enjoyer (Jīva) himself of the fruit of Karman along with a second, in the passage coming after—

'There are the two who have entered the cave, drinking the fruit of (their) good deed in the highest topmost place—(like) shadow and light—so speak the Brahman-knowers,—those tending five-fires, and those tending the three-fold Nāciketa fire.' (Kā. 3·1)

The second one may be either Prāṇa or Buddhi (intelligence)—Drinking the fruit is nothing but the enjoyment of the fruit of Karmaṇ, and

दि कर्मफलभोग एव। स च परमात्मनो न संभवति। बुद्धिप्राणयोस्तु भोक्तुर्जीवस्य, उपकरणभूतयो', यथाकथंचित्पाने, अन्वयः संभवति, इति तयोरन्यतरेण सद्वितीयो जीव एव प्रतिपाद्यते। तत्, एकप्रकरणत्वात्पूर्वप्रस्तुतोऽत्तापि स एव भवितुमर्हति, इति।

[167] अत्रोच्यते--

गुहां प्रविष्टावात्मानौ हि तद्दर्शनात् ॥ ११ ॥

न प्राणजीवौ बुद्धिजीवौ वा गुहां प्रविष्टौ, ऋतं पिबन्तौ, इत्युच्येते। अपि तु जीवात्मपरमात्मानौ हि तथा व्यपदिश्येते। कुत. ? ' तद्दर्शनात् '। अस्मिन्प्रकरणे जीवपरयोरेव गुहाप्रवेशव्यपदेशो दृश्यते। परमात्मनस्तावत्

' तं दुर्दर्शं गूढमनुप्रविष्टं
गुहाहितं गह्वरेष्ठं पुराणम् ।
अध्यात्मयोगाधिगमेन देवं
मत्वा धीरो हर्षशोकौ जहाति ॥' (का २।१२)

जीवस्यापि

' या प्राणेन संभवत्यदितिर्देवतामयी ।
गुहां प्रविश्य तिष्ठन्ती या भूतेभिर्व्यजायत ॥' (का. ४।७)

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that is not possible in the case of the Paramatman But because somehow or other the connection of Buddhi and Prāna that are the means (of enjoyment) for the Jiva, the enjoyer, with drinking, is possible Jiva alone is propounded as being with a second being either of (these) two. Therefore, on account of there being the same Section, he (Jiva alone) introduced before deserves to be the eater also —

[167] Here it is stated (in reply)—

The two who have entered the cave are indeed the two Ātmans, on account of that being seen ॥ 11 ॥

Neither Prana and Jiva nor Buddhi and Jīva could be described as having entered the cave (and) as drinking the fruit but on the other hand, the Jivātman and the Paramātman are referred to in that way Whence? 'On account of that being seen In this Section is seen reference to the entering the cave on the part of the Jiva and the Highest alone—In respect of the Paramatman for the matter of that—

' Him difficult to be seen, concealed entering subsequently, placed in the cave staying in the cavern the ancient one — having known the Refulgent one by having recourse to the Yoga-meditation of the Ātman within the wise one abandons joy and sorrow'
(Ka 2 12)

and in respect of the Jiva also

' Who Aditi, having the form of the deity, who exists with Prāna, staying after having entered the cave who was born variously along with the elements
(Ka 4 7)

इति कर्मफलानि, अत्ति, इति—अदितिर्जीव उच्यते। प्राणेन संभवति, इति प्राणेन सह वर्तते। देवतामयी, इन्द्रियाधीनभोगा गुहां प्रविश्य तिष्ठन्ती, हृदयपुण्डरीकोदरवर्तिनी, या भूतेभिर्व्यजायत—पृथिव्यादिभिर्भूतैः सहिता, देवादिरूपेण विविधा जायते। एवं च सति,

'ऋतं पिबन्तौ' (का.३।१)

इति व्यपदेशः, छत्रिणो गच्छन्ति, इतिवत्प्रतिपत्तव्यः। यद्वा प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकरूपेण पाने कर्तृत्वं जीवपरयोरुपपद्यते ॥ ११ ॥

विशेषणाच्च ॥ १२ ॥

अस्मिन्प्रकरणे जीवपरमात्मानौ, एव, उपास्यत्वोपासकत्वप्राप्यत्वप्राप्तृत्वविशिष्टौ सर्वत्र प्रतिपाद्येते।

'ब्रह्मजज्ञं देवमीड्यं विदित्वा
निचाय्येमां शान्तिमत्यन्तमेति।' (का. १।१७)

ब्रह्मजज्ञो जीवः, ब्रह्मणो जातत्वाज्ज्ञत्वाच्च। तं देवमीड्यं विदित्वा—जीवात्मानमुपासकं ब्रह्मात्मकत्वेन, अवगम्य, इत्यर्थः। तथा

Aditi is called Jīva, because she eats the fruit of the Karman. Prāṇena sambhavati—exists with the Prāṇa, Devatāmayī—with the enjoyments dependent upon the sense-organs; Guhām praviśya tiṣṭhantī—staying in the interior of the heart-lotus. Yā bhūtebhir vyajāyata —along with the earth and other elements, is she variously born in the form of gods and others. This being the case, the reference

'*The two drinking the fruit*' (Kā. 3·1)

should be understood like—the holders of umbrella are going. Or, being the agent for drinking is appropriate in the case of the Jīva and the Highest, through the relation of the impelled and the impeller. ॥ 11 ॥

And on account of the distinctive attributes ॥ 12 ॥

In this Section, the Jīva and the Paramātman alone are propounded everywhere as characterised by the relation of the object of worship and the worshipper, and of the destination and the one to reach it.

'*Having known and meditated upon the god, born of and knower of Brahman, fit to be worshipped, attains to this everlasting tranquillity.*' (Kā. 1·17)

Brahmajajñaḥ—the Jīva, on account of his being born of Brahman, and on account of his being its knower. Knowing him, the god deserving worship—that is to say, having apprehended the Jīvātman, the worshipper, as having Brahman for his Atman. Likewise is described the Paramātman, the object of worship, in (the passage)—

'यः सेतुरीजानानामक्षरं ब्रह्म यत्परम् ।
अभयं तितीर्षतां पारं नाचिकेतं शकेमहि ॥' (का. ३।२)

इति, उपास्यः परमात्मा, उच्यते। नाचिकेतं—नाचिकेतस्य कर्मणः प्राप्यम्, इत्यर्थः ।

'आत्मानं रथिनं विद्धि शरीरं रथमेव च ।' (का ३।३)

इत्यादिना, उपासको जीव उच्यते। तथा

'विज्ञानसारथिर्यस्तु मनःप्रग्रहवान्नरः ।
सोऽध्वनः पारमाप्नोति तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम् ॥' (का ३।९)

इति, प्राप्यप्राप्तारौ, अभिधीयेते जीवपरमात्मानौ। इहापि छायातपौ, इति, अज्ञत्वसर्वज्ञत्वाभ्यां तावेव विशिष्य व्यपदिश्येते।

[168] अथ स्यात्—

'येयं प्रेते विचिकित्सा मनुष्येऽस्तीत्येके नायमस्तीति चैके ।' (का १।२०)

इति, जीवस्वरूपयाथात्म्यप्रश्नोपक्रमत्वात्सर्वमिदं प्रकरणं जीवपरमिति प्रतीयते, इति। नैतदेवम्। न हि जीवस्य देहातिरिक्तस्य, अस्तित्वनास्तित्वशङ्कया, अयं प्रश्नः। तथा सति, पूर्ववरद्वयवरणानुपपत्तेः। तथाहि—

What is the bridge for the sacrificers which is the highest imperishable Brahman, which is the other end free from danger, for those who wish to cross (the Samsāra)—may we be able (to reach) the Naciketa (fire)! (Ka 3 2)

Naciketam—that is to say the destination by sacrificial rite connected with the Naciketa fire

'*Know the Ātman to be the master of the chariot, and the body the chariot itself* (Ka 3 3)

—by this etc is described the Jiva the worshipper Likewise in

The person who has Vijñāna as the charioteer, holding the reins in the form of the mind—he reaches the other end of the path that is Visnu's highest abode (Ka 3 9)

are denoted Jiva and Paramatman as the one to reach and the destination (respectively) Here also the same two are indicated by (the expression) shadow and light, as characterised by being ignorant and being omniscient

[168] Now, it may be objected that—it is apprehended that this entire Section deals with Jiva because there is the introduction of the question about the real nature of Jiva as in (the passage)

'*What this doubt (is) when a person has departed this world—some (say)—This one is, and some (say)—This one is not* (Ka 1 20)

—This is not so Not indeed is this question (raised) with the doubt about the existence and non-existence of Jiva separated from the body, on account of the impropriety of the previous choosing of two boons in the circumstances To explain the same in detail—

पितुः सर्ववेदसदाक्षिणक्रतुसमाप्तिवेलायां दीयमानदक्षिणावैगुण्येन क्रतुवैगुण्यं मन्यमानेन कुमारेण नाचिकेतसास्तिकाग्रेसरेण स्वात्मदानेनापि, पितुःक्रतुसाद्गुण्यमिच्छता, 'कस्मै मां दास्यसि', इति, असकृत्पितरं पृष्टवता स्वनिर्बन्धरुष्टपितुर्वचनान्मृत्युसदनं प्रविष्टेन, स्वसदनात्प्रोषुषि यमे तददर्शनात्, तत्र तिस्रो रात्रीरुपोषुषा, स्वोपवासभीततत्प्रतिविधानप्रवृत्तमृत्युप्रत्ते वरत्रये, आस्तिक्यातिरेकात्प्रथमेन वरेण स्वात्मानं प्रति पितुः प्रसादो वृतः। एतच्च सर्वं देहातिरिक्तमात्मानमजानतो नोपपद्यते। द्वितीयेन च वरेण, उत्तीर्णदेहात्मानुभाव्यफलसाधनभूता, अग्निविद्या वृता। तदपि देहातिरिक्तात्मानमिज्ञस्य न संभवति। अतः, तृतीयेन वरेण यदिदं व्रियते

'येयं प्रेते विचिकित्सा मनुष्येऽस्तीत्येके नायमस्तीति चैके।
एतद्विद्यामनुशिष्टस्त्वयाहं वराणामेष वरस्तृतीयः॥' (का. १।२०)

इति। अत्र, परमपुरुषार्थरूपब्रह्मप्राप्तिलक्षणमोक्षयाथात्म्यविज्ञानाय, तदुपायभूतपरमात्मोपासनपरावरात्मतत्त्वजिज्ञासया, अयं प्रश्नः क्रियते। एवं च

'येयं प्रेते' (का. १।२०)

At the time of the completion of the sacrifice where the Dakṣiṇā is all the possessions, thinking there would deficiency in the sacrifice owing to the deficiency of the Dakṣiṇā being given—by the boy Naciketas, the prince of the religious-minded, wishing for the efficiency of his father's sacrifice even at the cost of himself, repeatedly asking his father—To whom would you give me ?—entering the abode of Death, respecting the words of his father angry on account of his own importunity; fasting there for three nights, not seeing him (Yama), as Yama had gone out of his house,—was chosen the favour of (clemency by) the farther for himself, by the first boon, on account of the exuberence of religious fervour, out of three boons offered by Death, frightened at his fast and ready to compensate (him) for the same—And all this cannot be appropriate in the case of one not knowing the Ātman as separate from the body. And by the second boon, was chosen the fire-lore (i. e. Agnividyā), the means of the fruit to be experienced by the Ātman gone out of the body. That, too, is not possible in the case of one ignorant o the Ātman as separate from the body. Therefore, what this being chosen by the third boon—

'What this doubt when a person has departed this world—some (say)—This one is, some (say) This one is not—This may I realise, instructed by you;—this is the third boon of the boons (for me).' (Kā. 1·20)

Here, this question is put in for the right knowledge of salvation characterised by the attainment to Brahman, constituting the highest human purpose in life, with a desire to know the real nature of Ātman, high and low, and the worship of the highest Ātman, which is the means of that. Thus again the passage

'What this—when departed' (Kā 1·20)

इति न शरीरवियोगमात्राभिप्रायम्, अपि तु सर्वबन्धविनिर्मोक्षाभिप्रायम्। यथा

'न प्रेत्य सञ्ज्ञास्ति।' (बृ. २।४।१२)

इति। अयमर्थः — मोक्षाधिकृते मनुष्ये प्रेते सर्वबन्धविनिर्मुक्ते, तत्स्वरूपविषयवादिविप्रतिपत्तिनिमित्तास्तिनास्त्यात्मिका येयं विचिकित्सा, तदपनोदनाय तत्स्वरूपयाथात्म्यं त्वयानुशिष्टोऽहं विद्यां जानीयाम्, इति।

[169] तथाहि — बहुधा विप्रतिपद्यन्ते। केचित्, वित्तिमात्रस्यात्मनः स्वरूपोच्छित्तिलक्षणं मोक्षमाचक्षते। अन्ये. वित्तिमात्रस्यैव सतोऽविद्यास्तमयम्। अपरे, पाषाणकल्पस्यात्मनो ज्ञानाद्यशेषवैशेषिकगुणोच्छेदलक्षणं कैवल्यरूपम्। अपरे, अपहतपाप्मानं परमात्मानमभ्युपगच्छन्तः, तस्यैवोपाधिसंसर्गनिमित्तजीवभावस्य, उपाध्यपगमेन तद्भावलक्षणमोक्षम्, आतिष्ठन्ते।

त्रय्यन्तनिष्णातास्तु,निखिलजगदेककारणस्य,अशेषहेयप्रत्यनीकानन्तज्ञानानन्दैकस्वरूपस्य, स्वाभाविकानवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणाकरस्य, सकलेतरविलक्षणस्य, सर्वात्मभूतस्य, परस्य ब्रह्मणः, शरीरतया प्रकारभूतस्य, अनुकूलापरिच्छिन्नज्ञानस्वरूपस्य,

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cannot have the purport of a mere separation from the body, but conveys the idea of complete release from all bondage, as in

'There is no consciousness (left) after departing.' (Br. 2 4 12)

This is the sense—When a person eligible for salvation, completely released from all bondage has departed, what this doubt of the nature—is, is not—caused by disagreement among the disputants regarding its nature, is—in order to drive away that, I may realise its true nature, instructed by you

[169] To explain the same—Variously do people disagree, some speak of salvation characterised by the extinction of the nature of the Atman who is mere consciousness, others, as the disappearance of Avidyā in the case of the Ātman existing only as consciousness others, as the form of mere oneness characterised by the extinction of all the qualities admitted by the Vaiśesika philosophy in the case of the Ātman resembling a stone, others admitting the highest Atman as having all sins destroyed, stand by (the idea of) salvation characterised by his nature in the case of the nature of Jīva caused by the contact with the limiting adjuncts of himself, on the passing away of the limiting adjuncts

Those well-versed in the doctrines of the three Vedas on the other hand, speak of salvation as the natural realisation of the Paramātman, preceded by the uprooting of the Avidyā in the case of Jiva, who is the mode, by being the body of the Highest Brahman, the only cause of the entire world, having a uniform nature of infinite knowledge and bliss, the opposite (or rival) of everything fit to be abandoned, the mine of natural, unlimited, excessive, innumerable auspicious qualities, quite different from everything else, (and) the Ātman of everything,—(of Jiva) having the nature of favourable and

परमात्मानुभवैकरसस्य, जीवस्य, अनादिकर्मरूपाविद्यातिरोहितस्वरूपस्य, अविद्योच्छेदपूर्वकस्वाभाविकपरमात्मानुभवमेव मोक्षमाचक्षते।

तत्र मोक्षस्वरूपं तत्साधनं च, त्वत्प्रसादाद्विद्याम्, इति नचिकेतसा पृष्टो मृत्युः, तस्यार्थस्य दुरवबोधत्वप्रदर्शनेन विविधभोगावितरणप्रलोभनेन चैनं परीक्ष्य, योग्यतामभिज्ञाय, परावरात्मतत्त्वविज्ञानं परमात्मोपासनं तत्पदप्राप्तिलक्षणं मोक्षं च,

'तं दुर्दर्शं गूढमनुप्रविष्टम्।' (का. २।१२)

इत्यारभ्य,

'सोऽध्वनः पारमाप्नोति तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम्' (का. ३।९)

इत्यन्तेनोपदिश्य, तदपेक्षितांश्च विशेषानुपदिदेश, इति सर्वं समञ्जसम्। अतः, परमात्मैव, अत्ता, इति सिद्धम् ॥ १२ ॥

अत्त्रधिकरणं समाप्तम्। (२)

[170] अन्तर उपपत्तेः ॥ १३ ॥ (अधिकरण ३, सूत्राणि १३–१८)

इदं समामनन्ति छन्दोगाः।

'य एषोऽक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यत एष आत्मेति होवाचैतदमृतमभयमेतद्ब्रह्म' (छा. ४।१५।१)

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unlimited knowledge, with uniform realisation of the highest Atman, (and) with his nature screened by Avidyā constituted of beginningless Karman.

There, Death asked by Naciketas,— May I know through your grace the nature of salvation and its means?—having tested him by pointing out to the difficulty of understanding that matter and by the allurement of the bestowing of various kinds of enjoyments, having realised (his) fitness; (and then) having instructed (him) in the passage beginning with

'Him, difficult to be seen, concealed, entering subsequently' (Kā. 2·12)

up to—

'He reaches the other end of the path, that is Visnu's highest abode' (Kā. 3·9)

about the knowledge of the nature of Ātman, high and low, the worship of the Paramātman, and salvation in the form of the attainment to his abode, further let him know the details required in that connection—and so, everything is quite in order. Therefore, it is established that the Paramātman alone is the Eater. ॥ 12 ॥

Here ends the Attradhikarana (2)

[170] (The Person) within, on account of propriety. ॥ 13 ॥ (Antarādhikarana 3—Sūtras 13–18)

This is what the Chandogas declare in the Śruti—

'Who this Person is seen within the eye: this is the Ātman —Thus he said,—This (is) immortal, free from fear, this (is) Brahman' (Chā. 4·15·1)

इति। तत्र संदेहः— किमयमक्ष्याधारतया निर्दिश्यमानः पुरुषः प्रतिबिम्बात्मा, उत चक्षुरिन्द्रियाधिष्ठाता देवताविशेषः, उत जीवात्मा, अथ परमात्मा? इति। किं युक्तम्? प्रतिबिम्बात्मा, इति। कुतः? प्रसिद्धवन्निर्देशात्, दृश्यते, इत्यपरोक्षाभिधानाच्च। जीवात्मा वा, तस्यापि हि चक्षुषि विशेषेण संनिधानात्, प्रसिद्धिरुपपद्यते, उन्मीलितं हि चक्षुरुद्वीक्ष्य जीवात्मनः शरीरे स्थितिगती निश्चिन्वन्ति।

'रश्मिभिरेषोऽस्मिन्प्रतिष्ठित' (बृ. ५।५।२)

इति श्रुतिप्रसिद्ध्या चक्षुःप्रतिष्ठो देवताविशेषो वा। एष्वेव प्रसिद्धवन्निर्देशोपपत्तेः, एषामन्यतम इति प्राप्ते, प्रचक्ष्महे—' अन्तर उपपत्तेः '—अक्ष्यन्तरः परमात्मा। कुतः?

'एष आत्मेति होवाचैतदमृतमभयमेतद्ब्रह्म। एतं संयद्वाम इत्याचक्षते। एतं हि सर्वाणि वामान्यभिसंयन्ति।...एष उ एव वामनीरेष हि सर्वाणि वामानि नयति। एष उ एव भामनीरेष हि सर्वेषु लोकेषु भाति' (छा ४।१५।१-२-३-४)

इति। एषां गुणानां परमात्मन्येवोपपत्तेः॥ १३॥

There arises the doubt—Is this Person indicated as having the eye for his support the Atman in reflection or a specific Deity presiding over the sense-organ the eye, or the Jivātman, or the Paramātman? What (is here) proper? —The Ātman in reflection Whence? On account of the reference as being quite well known and on account of the direct statement—(He) is seen Or, the Jivātman In his case also, being well-known is indeed proper on account of his residing particularly in the eye. for, people conclude about the stay or departure of the Jivatman in the body by looking into the opened eye Or a specific Deity established in the eye owing to that being widely known in the Sruti in

'By the rays, is this one established within this'

(Br 5 5 2)

On account of the propriety of the well-known reference in respect of these (three) alone one of these (is the Person in the eye)—This (prima-facie view) being reached, we say (in reply)— (The Person) within on account of propriety' The one within the eye is the Paramātman Whence? On account of the propriety of these qualities existing only in the Paramātman, (the qualities) mentioned in—

'This is the Ātman—thus he said — This (is) immortal, free from fear, this (is) Brahman They call this Samyadvāma (having all riches flocking up to him) all riches verily, flock up to him This one (is) verily, Vāmani (carrying riches), this one verily, carries all riches, this one (is), verily, Bhāmani (the shining one), this one, verily shines in all the worlds' (Chā 4 15 1,2,3,4)

|| *13* ||

स्थानादिव्यपदेशाच्च ॥ १४ ॥

चक्षुषि स्थितिनियमनादयः परमात्मन एव,

'यश्चक्षुषि तिष्ठन्' (बृ. ३।७।१८)

इत्यादिना व्यपदिश्यन्ते । अतश्च,

'य एषोऽक्षिणि पुरुषः' (छा. ४।१५।१)

इति स एव प्रतीयते । अतः, प्रसिद्धवन्निर्देशश्च परमात्मन्युपपद्यते । तत एव

'दृश्यते' (छा. ४।१५।१)

इति साक्षात्कारव्यपदेशोऽपि योगिभिर्दृश्यमानत्वादुपपद्यते ॥ १४॥

सुखविशिष्टाभिधानादेव च ॥ १५ ॥

इतश्च, अक्ष्याधारः पुरुषोत्तमः ।

'कं ब्रह्म खं ब्रह्म' (छा. ४।१०।५)

इति प्रकृतस्य सुखविशिष्टस्य ब्रह्मण उपासनस्थानविधानार्थं संयद्वामत्वादिगुणविधानार्थं च,

'य एषोऽक्षिणि पुरुषः' (छा. ४।१५।१)

इत्यभिधानात् । एवकारात्, नैरपेक्ष्यं हेतोर्द्योतयति ।

ननु—अग्निविद्याव्यवधानात्,

And *on account of the reference to the abode etc.* ॥ 14 ॥

Staying in, controlling the eye etc. are mentioned as belonging only to the Paramātman in (the passage)

'Who residing in the eye' (Br. 3·7·18)

and others—And therefore, he alone is apprehended in (the passage)

'Who this Person within the eye'. (Chā. 4·15·1)

Hence, the reference as well-known is appropriate in the case of the Paramātman. And for the same reason, the reference to the direct perception in (the passage)

'(He) is seen' (Chā. 4·15·1)

is appropriate on account of him being seen by the Yogins. ॥ 14 ॥

And, verily, on account of the *description as being characterised by* happiness. ॥ 15 ॥

And for this reason, the one having the eye as the abode is the Purusottama, on account of the description as

'Who this Person in the eye' (Chā. 4·15·1)

for the sake of enjoining (pointing out) the place of (the object of) worship of Brahman characterised by happiness, the matter in hand, in

'Happiness (ka) (is) Brahman; Sky (is) Brahman' (Chā. 4·10·5)

and for pointing out the qualities, having all riches etc. (The Sūtrakāra) definitely points out complete independence of the cause, on account of the use of Eva (verily).

I say (says the objector)—On account of the intervening of the

'क ब्रह्म ख ब्रह्म' (छा ४।१०।५)

इति प्रकृत ब्रह्म नेह संनिधत्ते। तथाहि—अग्नय.

'प्राणो ब्रह्म क ब्रह्म ख ब्रह्म' (छा ४।१०।५)

इति ब्रह्मविद्यामुपदिश्य,

'अथ हैन गार्हपत्योऽनुशशास' (छा ४।११।१)

इत्यारभ्य, अग्नीनामुपासनमुपदिदिशु। न च, अग्निविद्या ब्रह्मविद्याङ्गम् इति वक्तुं शक्यम्, ब्रह्मविद्याफलानन्तर्गततद्विरोधिसर्वायु प्रातिसतत्यविच्छेदादिफलश्रवणात्—उच्यते—

'प्राणो ब्रह्म' (छा ४।१०।५)

'एतदमृतमभयमेतद्ब्रह्म' (छा ४।१५।१)

इत्युभयत्र ब्रह्मसशब्दनात्।

'आचार्यस्तु ते गतिं वक्ता' (छा ४।१४।१)

इत्यग्निवचनाच्च, गत्युपदेशात्पूर्वं ब्रह्मविद्याया असमाप्ते, तन्मध्यगताग्निविद्या ब्रह्मविद्याङ्गम्, इति निश्चीयते,

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Agnividya Brahman introduced by the passage

Happiness (ka) (is) Brahman Sky (is) Brahman' (Cha 4 10 5)

cannot here be associated To explain the same in detail—The Fires having given instruction about Brahmavidya in

Prāna (is) Brahman Happiness (ka) (is) Brahman Sky (is) Brahman (Cha 4 10 5)

instructed the worship of Fires beginning with

'Now verily him instructed the Garhapatya (Fire) (Cha 4 11 1)

Nor again is it possible to speak of Agnividya as a part of Brahmavidyā on account of the mention in the Sruti of the fruit viz acquisition of a full long life and the continuity of the progeny etc, not included in the fruit of the Brahmavidya and opposed to that—This is said (in reply)—Because on account of the direct occurrence of the word Brahman in the two passages

Prana (is) Brahman (Cha 4 10 5)

This one (is) immortal free from fear This (is) Brahman (Cha 4 15 1)

and on account of the utterance of Agni

'The preceptor would speak to you of the destination (course) (Cha 4 14 1)

there is the non-completion of the Brahmavidya prior to the instruction about the destination it is ascertained that Agnividya included in that is the part of the Brahmavidya also and because of the instruction about the Agnividya for only one eligible for the Brahmavidya as in

'अथ हैनं गार्हपत्योऽनुशशास' (छा. ४।११।१)

इति ब्रह्मविद्याधिकृतस्यैव, अग्निविद्योपदेशाच्च। किं च,

'व्याधिभिः प्रतिपूर्णोऽस्मि' (छा. ४।१०।३)

इति ब्रह्मप्राप्तिव्यतिरिक्तनानाविधकामोपहतिपूर्वकगर्भजन्मजरामरणादिभवामयाभितप्ताय, उपकोसलाय,

'एषा सोम्य तेऽस्मद्विद्यात्मविद्या च' (छा. ४।१४।१)

इति समुच्चित्योपदेशात्, मोक्षैकफलात्मविद्याङ्गत्वम्, अग्निविद्यायाः प्रतीयते। एवं च अङ्गत्वेऽवगते सति फलानुकीर्तनम्, अर्थवाद इति गम्यते। न च, अत्र मोक्षविरोधि फलं किञ्चिच्छ्रूयते।

'अपहते पापकृत्यां लोकीभवति सर्वमायुरेति ज्योग्जीवति नास्यावरपुरुषाः क्षीयन्ते। उप वयं तं भुञ्जामोऽस्मिंश्च लोकेऽमुष्मिंश्च' (छा. ४।११।२)

इति, अमीषां फलानां मोक्षाधिकृतस्यानुगुणत्वात्। अपहते पापकृत्यां—ब्रह्मप्राप्तिविरोधि पापं कर्मापहन्ति। लोकीभवति—तद्विरोधिनि पापे निरस्ते ब्रह्मलोकं प्राप्नोति। सर्वमायुरेति—ब्रह्मोपासनसमाप्तेर्यावदायुरपेक्षितं तत्सर्वमेति। ज्योग्जीवति—व्याधि-

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'Now, verily, him instructed the Gārhapatya (Fire)' (Chā. 4·11·1)

and further

Here is, (O) gentle one, for you, the Atma-vidyā, our (Agni-) Vidyā' (Chā. 4·14·1)

—from this combined instruction, to Upakosala tormented by discomfort due to stay in the embryo, birth, old age and death, preceded by the obsession of different kinds of desire, apart from the acquisition of Brahman, feeling

'I have been fed up with disease' (Chā. 4·10 3)

it is apprehended that the Agnividyā is a part of the Ātmavidyā having the only fruit viz. Mokṣa. And when in this way, being a part (in the case of Agnividyā) is apprehended, the subsequent description of the fruit is understood merely to be a glorificatory statement. Nor again, is mentioned (in the Sruti) here any fruit opposed to salvation, on account of those fruits (mentioned) in (the passage)

'He destroys sinful actions, becomes possessed of (Brahman-) world, secures all (full) life, lives for a long time; neither his descendants come down in the scale We would be standing by him in this world, as well as in the hereafter'. (Chā. 4·11·2)

being suitable for one qualified for salvation. Apahate pāpakṛtyām—destroys the sinful act opposed to the attainment to Brahman. Lokībhavati—with the sin opposed to that driven out, attains to the Brahman-world. Sarvamāyureti—whatever life is expected up to the completion of the worship of Brahman, that full life he comes to. Jyogjīvati—not struck

भिरनुपहतो यावद्ब्रह्मप्राप्ति जीवति । नास्यापरपुरुषाः क्षीयन्ते—अस्य शिष्यप्रशिष्यादयः पुत्रपौत्रादयोऽपि ब्रह्मविद एव भवन्ति ।

'नास्याब्रह्मवित्कुले भवति' (मु. ३।२।९; मा. १०)

इति श्रुत्यन्तरे ब्रह्मविद्याफलत्वेन श्रूयते। उप वयं तं भुञ्जामोऽस्मिँल्लोकेऽमुष्मिंश्च—वयम्—अग्नयः, तम्—एनमुपभुञ्जामो यावद्ब्रह्मप्राप्ति विघ्नेभ्यः परिपालयामः, इति । अतः, अग्निविद्याया ब्रह्मविद्याङ्गत्वेन तत्संनिधानाविरोधात, सुखविशिष्टं प्रकृतमेव ब्रह्म, इहोपासनस्थानविधानार्थं गुणविधानार्थं च, उच्यते ।

[171] ननु—

'आचार्यस्तु ते गतिं वक्ता' (छा. ४।१४।१)

इति गतिमात्रपरिशेषणात्, आचार्येण गतिरेवोपदिश्यते, इति गम्यते । तत्कथं स्थानगुणविध्यर्थता, उच्यते ? तदभिधीयते—

'आचार्यस्तु ते गतिं वक्ता' (छा. ४।१४।१)

इत्यस्य, अयमभिप्रायः । ब्रह्मविद्यामनुपदिश्य, प्रोषुषि गुरौ तदलाभात्, अनाश्वासमुपकोसलमुज्जीवयितुं, स्वपरिचरणप्रीता गार्हपत्यादयो गुरोरग्नयः, तस्मै ब्रह्मस्वरूपमात्रं

down by diseases, lives up to the attainment to Brahman.—Nāsyāparapuruṣāḥ kṣīyante—even his pupils, grand-pupils etc., sons and grand-sons etc., become indeed, Brahman-knowers. It is mentioned in another Śruti passage—

'Not in his family is born a person not knowing Brahman' (Mu. 3·2·9; Mā. 10)

as having the fruit of Brahma-vidyā. Upa vayam tam bhuñjāmosmin loke amuṣmiṅśca— *we—Fires; him, this one, we stand by for enjoyment; we* would be protecting (him) from obstacles till (his) attainment to Brahman. Therefore, owing to Agnividyā being a portion of Brahmavidyā, there is no contradiction about its proximity—and so Brahman itself, the matter in hand, characterised by happiness, is here mentioned for the sake of pointing out the place (object) of worship and for the declaration (enjoining) of qualities.

[171] *I say (says the objector)—By (the passage)*

'The preceptor, however, would be speaking to you of the course' (Chā. 4·14·1)

is understood that only the instruction about the course is given by the preceptor on account of the course only, remaining (to be explained). So, how is the enjoining of the place and the qualities be spoken of ?—This is stated (in reply)—This is the purport of the passage—

'The preceptor, however, would be speaking to you of the course' (Chā. 4·14·1)

—when the teacher proceeded on the journey, without instructing about Brahmavidyā, in order to infuse spirit in Upakosala who was absolutely uncomfortable on account of his not securing that (instruction), the Fires of (kept by) the preceptor, Gārhapatya (the householder's fire) and others

तदङ्गभूतां च, अग्निविद्यामुपदिश्य,

'आचार्याद्धैव विद्या विदिता साधिष्ठं प्रापयति' (छा. ४।९।३)

इति श्रुत्यर्थमालोच्य, साधुतमत्वप्राप्त्यर्थम्, आचार्य एवास्य संयद्वामत्वादिगुणकं परं ब्रह्म तदुपासनस्थानमर्चिरादिकां च गतिमुपदिशतु, इति मत्वा,

'आचार्यस्तु ते गतिं वक्ता' (छा. ४।१४।१)

इत्यवोचन् । गतिग्रहणम्, उपदेश्यविद्याशेषप्रदर्शनार्थम् । अत एव, आचार्योऽपि

'अहं तु ते तद्वक्ष्यामि' (छा. ४।१४।३)

इत्यभिधाय,

'यथा पुष्करपलाश आपो न श्लिष्यन्त एवमेवंविदि पापं कर्म न श्लिष्यते' (छा. ४।१४।३)

इत्युपक्रम्य, संयद्वामत्वादिकल्याणगुणविशिष्टं ब्रह्म, अक्षिस्थानोपास्यम्, अर्चिरादिकां च गतिमुपदिदेश । अतः,

'कं ब्रह्म खं ब्रह्म' (छा. ४।१०।५)

इति सुखविशिष्टस्य प्रकृतस्यैव ब्रह्मणोऽत्राभिधानात्, अयमक्ष्याधारः परमात्मा ॥ १५ ॥

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pleased with service done unto them, having instructed him about only the nature of Brahman and the Agnividyā, a part of the same; having pondered the purport of the Śruti viz.

'The Vidyā known from the Ācarya himself, takes, verily, one to the best' (Chā. 4·9·3)

and having cogitated—Let the preceptor himself instruct him about the Highest Brahman possessing the qualities like, leading to controlling (all) riches, the place of its worship and the course beginning with Arcis etc. for the sake of reaching the best, said (thus)—

'The preceptor, however, would be speaking to you of the course.' (Chā 4·14·1)

—The reference to the course is for the sake of pointing out the subordinate details of the Vidyā to be instructed about. For this very reason, the preceptor also having said

'I, indeed, would tell you that' (Chā. 4·14·3)

—having begun with,

'As the waters on the leaf of a lotus do not stick on (to it), similarly a sinful act does not stick on to one who knows thus' (Chā. 4·14·3)

imparted instruction in Brahman characterised by auspicious qualities like, leading to controlling (all) riches, as the object of worship in the eye-abode, and the course beginning with Arcis etc. Therefore, on account of the mention here of the Brahman introduced in (the passage)

'Happiness (ka) (is) Brahman, Sky (is) Brahman'. (Chā. 4·10·5)

as characterised by happiness, this one having the eye as the abode is the highest Ātman. ॥ 15 ॥

[172] ननु च—

'*कं ब्रह्म खं ब्रह्म*' (छा ४।१०।५)

इति परं ब्रह्म, अभिहितम्, इति कथमवगम्यते यस्येहाक्ष्याधारतयाभिधानं ब्रूषे ? यावता,

'*कं ब्रह्म खं ब्रह्म*' (छा. ४।१०।५)

इति प्रसिद्धाकाशलौकिकसुखयोरेव ब्रह्मदृष्टिर्विधीयते, इति प्रतिभाति।

'*नाम ब्रह्म*' (छा. ७।१।५)

'*मनो ब्रह्म*' (छा. ७।३।२)

इत्यादिवचनसारूप्यात्—तत्राह—

अत एव च स ब्रह्म ॥ १६ ॥

यतस्तत्र,

'*यदेव कं तदेव खम्*' (छा. ४।१०।५)

इति सुखविशिष्टस्याकाशस्य अभिधानम्, अत एव खशब्दाभिधेयः स आकाशः परं ब्रह्म। एतदुक्तं भवति—अग्निभिः

'*प्राणो ब्रह्म कं ब्रह्म खं ब्रह्म*' (छा. ४।१०।५)

इत्युक्ते, उपकोसल उवाच—

'*विजानाम्यहं यत्प्राणो ब्रह्म कं च तु खं च न विजानामि*' (छा. ४।१०।५)

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[172] I say (says the objector)—How is it apprehended that in

'*Happiness (ka) (is) Brahman ; Sky (is) Brahman*' (Chā. 4·10 5)

in denoted the Highest Brahman of which the denotation is as having the eye as the abode ? Inasmuch as it appears that meditation as Brahman of the two, the well-known Ākāśa and popular happiness—is enjoined in

'*Happiness (ka) (is) Brahman ; Sky (is) Brahman*' (Chā. 4·10·5)

on account of its having the same form as

'*Name (is) Brahman*'. (Chā. 7·1·5)

'*Mind (is) Brahman*'. (Chā. 7 3·2)

etc.—There (the Sūtrakāra) says (in reply)—

For this very reason also, that (Ākāśa) is Brahman ॥ 16 ॥

Inasmuch as there is the denotation of the Ākāśa particularised by happiness, in the passage,

'*Whatever is happiness, that is Sky*' (Chā. 4·10 5)

—for this very reason, that Akāśa denoted by the word Kha is the Highest Brahman. This is what is intended to be said—When it was said by the Fires

'*Prāna (is) Brahman, Happiness (is) Brahman, Sky (is) Brahman*' (Chā. 4·10 5)

Upakosala said —

'*I understand that Prāna is Brahman, but I do not know about Ka (happiness) Kha (sky)*'. (Chā. 4·10·5)

इति। अस्य, अयमभिप्रायः—न तावत्प्राणादिप्रतीकोपासनम्, अग्निभिरभिहितम्, जन्मजरामरणादिभवभयभीतस्य, मुमुक्षोर्ब्रह्मोपदेशाय प्रवृत्तत्वात्। अतः, ब्रह्मैव, उपास्यमुपादिष्टम्। तत्र प्रसिद्धैः प्राणादिभिः समानाधिकरणं ब्रह्म निर्दिष्टम्। तेषु च प्राणविशिष्टत्वं, जगद्विधरणयोगेन वा प्राणशरीरतया प्राणस्य नियन्तृत्वेन वा ब्रह्मण उपपद्यते, इति

'विजानाम्यहं यत्प्राणो ब्रह्म' (छा. ४।१०।५)

इत्युक्तवान्। तथा सुखाकाशयोरपि ब्रह्मणः शरीरतया तन्नियाम्यत्वेन विशेषणत्वम्, उत, अन्योन्यव्यवच्छेदकतया निरतिशयानन्दरूपब्रह्मस्वरूपसमर्पणपरत्वेन वा। तत्र पृथग्भूतयोः शरीरतया विशेषणत्वे, वैषयिकसुखभूताकाशयोर्नियामकत्वं ब्रह्मणः स्यात्, इति स्वरूपावगतिर्न स्यात्। अन्योन्यव्यवच्छेदकत्वे, अपरिच्छिन्नानन्दस्वरूपत्वं ब्रह्मणः स्यात्, इति, अन्यतरप्रकारनिर्दिधारयिषया,

'कं च तु खं च न विजानामि' (छा. ४।१०।५)

इत्युक्तवान्। उपकोसलस्येममाशयं जानन्तोऽग्नयः

'यद्वाव कं तदेव खं यदेव खं तदेव कम्' (छा. ४।१०।५)

इत्यूचिरे। ब्रह्मणः सुखरूपत्वमेव, अपरिच्छिन्नम्, इत्यर्थः। अतः, प्राणशरीरतया

This is the purport of this (his remark). Not for the matter of that, is mentioned by the Fires the symbol-worship of Prāṇa and others, on account of a person desirous of salvation, frightened by the fear arising from birth, old age, death etc., getting active for the instruction about Brahman; for this reason, Brahman itself as the object of worship has been taught. There Brahman having case-co-ordination with the well-known Prāṇa and others is mentioned. And in those, it is appropriate that Brahman is characterised by Prāṇa owing to its association with supporting the world, or owing to its having Prāṇa as the body, or owing to its being the controller of Prāṇa — and so, he said

'I understand that Prāṇa is Brahman'. (Chā. 4·10·5)

Likewise, in the case of happiness and Akāśa also, whether these are the characteristics of Brahman, because of their being fit to be controlled by it as being the body of Brahman; or, owing to their being calculated to appropriate the nature of Brahman constituted of unsurpassed bliss, owing to their being mutually exclusive. — There, if the two, quite distinct, are attributes owing to their being the body of Brahman, that would result in Brahman being the controller of sensual pleasure and the element Akāśa—and so, there would be no apprehension of its (real) nature. If they are mutually exclusive, there would be the nature of Brahman as unlimited pleasure —and so he said—

'But I do not know about Ka and Kha' (Chā 4·10·5)

with a desire to ascertain definitely, one of the two alternatives. The Fires, knowing this intention of Upakosala said —

'Whatever, indeed, is Ka, that same is Kha, and whatever is Kha, that same is Ka.' (Chā. 4·10·5).

Brahman's form as happiness itself is unlimited—This is the sense. Therefore, what nature Brahman is, characterised by Prāṇa owing to its-

ाविशिष्टं यद्ब्रह्म तदेव, अपरिच्छिन्नसुखरूपं च, इति निगमितम्,

'प्राण च हास्मै तद्वाकाशं चोचु' (छा ४।१०।५)

। अतः,

'क ब्रह्म ख ब्रह्म' (छा ४।१०।५)

त्र, अपरिच्छिन्नसुखं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादितम्, इति परं ब्रह्मैव तत्र प्रकृतम्। तदेव च, अत्र, ्याधारतया, अभिधीयते, इत्यक्ष्याधारः परमात्मा ॥ १६ ॥

श्रुतोपनिषत्कगत्यभिधानाच्च ॥ १७ ॥

श्रुतोपनिषत्कस्य, अधिगतपरमपुरुषयाथात्म्यस्य, अनुसंधेयतया श्रुत्यन्तरप्रति-प्रमानार्चिरादिका गतिर्या, ताम्, अपुनरावृत्तिलक्षणपरमपुरुषप्राप्तिकरीम्, उपकोसलाय, क्षिपुरुषं श्रुतवते,

'तेऽर्चिषमेवाभिसंभवन्त्यर्चिषोऽहरह्न आपूर्यमाणपक्षम्' (छा ४।१५।५)

यारभ्य

'चन्द्रमसो विद्युत तत्पुरुषोऽमानव स एनान्ब्रह्म गमयत्येष देवपथो ब्रह्मपथ एतेन प्रतिपद्यमाना इमं मानवमावर्तं नावर्तन्ते' (छा ४।१५।५-६)

यन्तेन, उपदिशति, इत्यतोऽपि, अयमक्षिपुरुषः परमात्मा ॥ १७ ॥

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ving Prāna as its body that same is the form viz unlimited happiness—and , there is the Sruti passage (*Nigamitam*)

'They spoke to him verily, of Prāna and that Ākāsa' (Cha 4 10 5)

Brahman is propounded as unlimited happiness here in

'Happiness (is) Brahman Sky (is) Brahman' (Cha 4 10 5)

and so the Highest Brahman itself *is the subject-matter there* And *that* me is mentioned here as having the eye as the abode,—and so the one ving the eye as the abode is the highest Ātman ॥ 16 ॥

And on account of mention of the course of the one who has studied ie Upanisads ॥ 17 ॥

What course is there beginning with Arcis etc for one who has studied ie Upanisads, (and) who has apprehended the real nature of the highest urusa as being the object of meditation propounded in other Srutis,— e imparts instruction about that leading to the attainment of the highest urusa characterised by non return (to this Samsāra) to Upakosala who had eard (the description of) the person in the eye in the passage beginning ith

They, indeed go over to the Arcis etc from Arcis to the day from the day to the waxing fortnight' (Cha 4 15 5)

nd ending with—

'From the moon to the lightning there a non human Person—he takes them over to Brahman This (is) the path of the gods the path of Brahman those that are being carried by this do not return to this human whirl-pool (Cha 4 15 5-6)

And so for this reason also this Person in the eye is the Paramātman ॥ 17 ॥

अनवस्थितेरसंभवाच्च नेतरः ॥ १८ ॥

प्रतिबिम्बादीनामक्षिणि नियमेनानवस्थानात्, अमृतत्वादीनां च निरुपाधिकानां तेष्वसंभवात्, न परमात्मन इतरश्छायादिरक्षिपुरुषो भवितुमर्हति। प्रतिबिम्बस्य तावत्पुरुषान्तरसंनिधानायत्तत्वात्, न नियमेनावस्थानसंभवः। जीवस्यापि सर्वेन्द्रियव्यापारानुगुणत्वाय सर्वेन्द्रियकन्दभूते स्थानविशेषे वृत्तिः, इति चक्षुषि नावस्थानम्। देवतायाश्च,

'रश्मिभिरेषोऽस्मिन्प्रतिष्ठितः' (बृ. ५।५।२)

इति रश्मिद्वारेणावस्थितिवचनात्, देशान्तरावस्थितस्यापि, इन्द्रियाधिष्ठानोपपत्तेः, न चक्षुष्यवस्थानम्। सर्वेषामेवैषां निरुपाधिकामृतत्वादयः, न संभवन्त्येव। तस्मात्, अक्षिपुरुषः परमात्मा ॥ १८ ॥

अन्तराधिकरणं समाप्तम् (३)

[173] *'स्थानादिव्यपदेशाच्च'* (ब्र. सू. १।२।१४)

इत्यत्र

'यश्चक्षुषि तिष्ठन्' (बृ. ३।७।१८)

इत्यादिना प्रतिपाद्यमानं चक्षुषि स्थितिनियमनादिकं परमात्मन एव, इति सिद्धं कृत्वा,

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And on account of non-staying, and on account of the impossibility, not another. ॥ 18 ॥

On account of the reflection etc. not as a rule staying in the eye, and on account of the impossibility of immortality etc. having no limiting adjuncts, in the case of those, the Person in the eye,—reflection etc.—does not deserve to be any one else than the Paramātman. In the case of reflection for the matter of that, there is no possibility of its stay as a rule, on account of that being dependent upon the presence of another person. In the case of the Jiva also, there cannot be the stay in the eye, because there is his existence in a distinct place (heart), the nucleus of all sense-organs, in order to regulate the functions of all sense-organs. In the case of the (supervising) deity also, there cannot be the stay in the eye on account of the possibility of its stay (here in the eye), although staying in another place, on account of the statement about the stay through the rays, and thus accounting for the supervision of the sense-organs—in

'By the rays, he is established in the eye'. (Br. 5·5·2)

Surely in the case of all these, immortality etc. being without limiting adjuncts cannot exist. Therefore, the Person in the eye is the highest Atman. ॥ 18 ॥

Here ends the Antarādhikaraṇa (3)

[173] In (the Sūtra) here

'And on account of the reference to the abode etc.'. (B.S. 1·2·14)

after having first proven that the staying in and the controlling etc, of the eye, being propounded in (the passage)

"Who staying in the eye' (Br. 3·7·18)

etc., belong only to the Paramātman, it has been established (by us) that the

अक्षिपुरुषस्य परमात्मत्वं साधितम् । इदानीं तदेव समर्थयते—

अन्तर्याम्यधिदैवाधिलोकादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात् ॥ १९ ॥ (अधि.४, सूत्राणि १९–२१)

काण्वा माध्यंदिनाश्च वाजसनेयिनः समामनन्ति—

'य पृथिव्या तिष्ठन्पृथिव्या अन्तरो य पृथिवी न वेद यस्य पृथिवी शरीर य पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयत्येष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृत' (बृ ३।७।३)

इति । एवम्, अब्वग्न्यन्तरिक्षवाय्वादित्यदिक्चन्द्रतारकाकाशतमस्तेजःसु दैवतेषु च सर्वेषु च भूतेषु प्राणवाक्चक्षु-श्रोत्रमनस्त्वग्विज्ञानरेतःस्वात्मात्मीयेषु तिष्ठन्तं तत्तदन्तरभूतं तत्तदवेद्यं तत्तच्छरीरकं तत्तद्यमयन्तं कंचिन्निर्दिश्य,

'एष त आत्मा अन्तर्याम्यमृत' (बृ. ३।७।२३)

इत्युपदिश्यते । माध्यंदिनपाठे तु—

'य सर्वेषु लोकेषु तिष्ठन्सर्वेषु वेदेषु य सर्वेषु यज्ञेषु'

इति च पर्यायाः ।

'यो विज्ञाने तिष्ठन्' (बृ ३।७।२२)

इत्यस्य पर्यायस्य स्थाने,

Person in the eye has the nature of the highest Ātman Now he (the Sūtrakāra) corroborates the same (in the Sūtra)—

The inner Controller in respect of the deities, in respect of the worlds etc (is the Paramātman) on account of the mention of the attributes of the same ॥ 19 ॥ (Antaryāmyadhikaraṇa 4, Sūtras 19-21)

The Vajasaneyins—The Kāṇvas and the Mādhyandinas read—

'Who staying in the earth, is within the earth, whom the earth knows not, whose body is the earth, who inwardly controls the earth, this (is) your Ātman, the inner Controller, immortal'. (Br 3 7 3)

In this way, having pointed out some one staying in the divinities—water, fire, mid-region, wind, the Sun, quarters, the moon, the stars, the sky, darkness and light, and in material substances belonging to himself—Prāṇa, speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, consciousness, seed, being within the various objects, not known by the various objects, having the various objects as his body, (and) controlling the various objects, it is taught—

'This is your Ātman the inner Controller, immortal'. (Br. 3 7 23)

In the Mādhyandina recension however, there are alternatives, viz

'Who residing in all the worlds, in all the Vedas, who in all the sacrifices.'

In place of the alternative (reading)

'Who staying in Vijñāna' (Br. 3 7 22)

there is the alternative

'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्'

इति पर्यायः।

'स त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः' (बृ. ३।७।३)

इति च विशेषः। तत्र संशय्यते—किमयमन्तर्यामी प्रत्यगात्मा, उत परमात्मा ? इति। किं युक्तम् ? प्रत्यगात्मा, इति। कुतः ? वाक्यशेषे,

'द्रष्टा श्रोता' (बृ. ३।७।२३)

इति करणायत्तज्ञानताश्रुतेः। एवं द्रष्टुरेवान्तर्यामित्वोपदेशात्,

'नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा' (बृ. ३।७।२३)

इति द्रष्ट्रन्तरनिषेधाच्च, इत्येवं प्राप्ते, अभिधीयते—

'अन्तर्याम्यधिदैवाधिलोकादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात्'। अधिदैवाधिलोकादिपदचिह्नितेषु वाक्येषु श्रूयमाणोऽन्तर्याम्यपहतपाप्मा परमात्मा नारायणः। काण्वपाठसिद्धेभ्योऽधिदैवादिमन्त्रेभ्यो वाक्येभ्योऽधिकान्यधिलोकादिमन्ति वाक्यानि माध्यंदिनपाठे सन्ति, इति ज्ञापनार्थम्, अधिदैवाधिलोकादिषु, इति, उभयोरुपादानम्। तदेवम्, उभयेष्वपि वाक्येषु, अन्तर्यामी परमात्मा, इत्यर्थः। कुतः ? तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात्। परमात्मधर्मो ह्ययम्, यदेक एव सन्त्सर्वलोकसर्वभूतसर्वदेवादीन्नियमयति, इति। तथा हि उद्दालकप्रश्नः—

'*Who staying in the Ātman*'

—and the difference is

'*He is your Ātman, the inner Controller, immortal.*' (Br 3·7·3)

—There arises a doubt—Is this inner Controller, the inmost Atman or the Paramātman? What (is here) proper? The inmost Atman. Whence? On account of the declaration in the Sruti about his knowledge being dependent upon the sense-organs in the supplementary passage,

'*The Seer, the Hearer*' (Br 3·7·23)

on account of the instruction about the Seer alone being the inner Controller in this way, and on account of the denial of another Seer in the passage

'*Not other than this is (any) Seer.*' (Br. 3·7·23)

—This (prima-facie view) being reached, (this) is stated (in reply)—

'The inner Controller in respect of the deities and in respect of the worlds, etc., on account of the mention of the attributes of the same.' The inner Controller being mentioned in the Śruti passages marked with the words Adhidaiva (in respect of the deities) and Adhiloka (in respect of the worlds) etc. is Nārāyaṇa, the Paramātman with sins destroyed. In the Mādhyandina recension, there are passages referring to the Adhiloka etc., in addition to the passages referring to the Adhidaiva etc, found in the Kānva recension—in order to make this known, there is the acceptance of both—in respect of the Adhidaiva and the Adhiloka etc, Thus then, there is in both the passages the inner Controller, the Paramātman—This is the sense. Whence? On account of the mention of the attributes of the same. This is, indeed, the attribute of the Paramātman that he, although being one, controls all worlds, all beings, all gods etc. To the same effect is the query of Uddālaka—beginning with

'य इमं च लोकं परं च लोकं सर्वाणि भूतानि योऽन्तरो यमयति' (बृ ३।७।१)

इत्युपक्रम्य,

'तमन्तर्यामिणं ब्रूहि' (बृ ३।७।२)

इति। तस्य चोत्तरम्—

'यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन्' (बृ ३।७।३)

इत्यारभ्य, उक्तम्। तदेतत्, सर्वाँल्लोकान्सर्वाणि भूतानि सर्वाणि च दैवतानि सर्वान्वेदान्सर्वांश्च यज्ञानन्तःप्रविश्य, सर्वप्रकारनियमनं सर्वशरीरतया सर्वस्यात्मत्वं च, सर्वज्ञात्सत्यसंकल्पात्पुरुषोत्तमादन्यस्य न संभवति। तथाहि—

'अन्तःप्रविष्टः शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मा' (तै आ ३।११।२)

'तत्सृष्ट्वा। तदेवानुप्राविशत्। तदनुप्रविश्य। सच्च त्यच्चाभवत्।' (तै २।६)

इत्यादीनि, औपनिषदानि वाक्यानि परमात्मन एव सर्वस्य प्रशासितृत्वं सर्वस्यात्मत्वम्, इत्यादीनि वदन्ति। तथा सुबालोपनिषदि,

'नैवेह किंचनाग्र आसीत्। अमूलमनाधारा इमाः प्रजाः प्रजायन्ते। दिव्यो देव एको नारायणः। चक्षुश्च द्रष्टव्यं च नारायणः। श्रोत्रं च श्रोतव्यं च नारायणः' (सुबा)

इत्यारभ्य,

'*He who being inside controls this world as well as the other world, (and) all beings.*' (Br. 3·7·1)

'*Tell me that inner Controller*' (Br 3 7·2)

And the answer to that has been stated, beginning with

'*Who staying in the Earth*' (Br 3·7 3)

Thus, this controlling of all modes, being the Atman of all owing to having all as his body, after having entered within all worlds, all beings, and all deities, all Vedas, and all sacrifices, is not possible in the case of any one other than the highest Purusa who is omniscient and with thoughts fulfilled To explain the same in detail —

'*Entered within the controller of people, the Ātman of all*' (Tait. Ā 3 11 2)

'*Having created that, (it) entered subsequently that same, having entered that subsequently, became Sat and Tyat*' (Tait 2 6)

—these and other passages from the Upanisads speak of the Paramatman alone being the high ruler of all, being the Ātman of all etc Similarly in the *Subālopanisad*, beginning with

'*Not at all was anything there in the beginning These creatures are born without any root, supportless There is (only) one refulgent god Nārāyana Nārāyana is the eye and the thing to be seen, Nārāyana is the ear and the thing to be heard*' (Subā.)

it is propounded that being the Atman of all, having everything as its body, and being the controller of all, belong to the Highest Brahman alone, In the passage

'यं पृथिवी न वेद', (बृ. ३।७।३)
'यमात्मा न वेद' (बृ माध्यं. ३।७।२२)

इत्येवमादिभिर्वाक्यैः पृथिव्यात्मादिनियाम्यैः, अनुपलभ्यमान एव नियमयति, इति यत्पूर्वमुक्तम्, तदेव,

'अदृष्टो द्रष्टाश्रुतः श्रोता' (बृ ३।७।२३)

इति निगमय्य,

'नान्योऽतोऽस्ति' (बृ ३।७।२३)

इत्यादिना तस्य नियन्तुर्नियन्त्रन्तरं निषिध्यते।

'एष त आत्मा' (बृ. ३।७।२३)
'स त आत्मा' (बृ. माध्यं. ३।७।२३)

इति च, ते, इति व्यतिरेकविभक्तिनिर्दिष्टस्य जीवस्यात्मतयोपदिश्यमानोऽन्तर्यामी न प्रत्यगात्मा भवितुमर्हति ॥ १९ ॥

[174] न च स्मार्तमतद्धर्माभिलापाच्छारीरश्च ॥ २० ॥

स्मार्तम्—प्रधानम्, शारीरो जीवः। स्मार्तं च, शारीरश्च नान्तर्यामी। अतद्धर्माभिलापात्—तयोरसंभावितधर्माभिलापात्। स्वभावत एव सर्वस्य द्रष्टृत्वम्, सर्वस्य नियन्तृत्वम्, सर्वस्यात्मत्वम्, स्वत एवामृतत्वं च तयोर्न संभावनागन्धमर्हति। एतदुक्तं भवति—यथा स्मार्तमचेतनं सर्वज्ञत्वनियन्तृत्वसर्वात्मत्वादिकं नार्हति, तथा

'Whom the earth knows not'. (Br. 3·7·3)
'Whom the Ātman knows not', (Br. Mā. 3·7·22)

—having conveyed the same by

'Unseen, Seer; unheard, Hearer' (Br. 3·7·23)

another controller for him, the controller, is denied in

'Not other than this (is)' (Br 3·7·23)

etc. And in (the passages)

'This is your Ātman' (Br. 3·7·23)
'He is your Ātman' (Br Mā. 3·7·23)

the inner Controller being declared as the Ātman of the Jīva pointed out by the excluding (Genitive) case in Te, does not deserve to be the inmost Ātman. ॥ 19 ॥

Nor again (Pradhāna) mentioned in the Smṛti, on account of the non-mention of those qualities in it and also (not) the Embodied one ॥ 20 ॥

Smārtam (is the) Pradhāna, Sārīra (is the) Jīva. The Smārta and the Sārīra are not the inner Controller. Ataddharmābhilāpāt—on account of the non-mention of those qualities impossible (not existing) in the two. In the case of the two, there cannot be the slightest possibility of their being by nature itself, the seer of all, the Controller of all the Ātman of all and being naturally immortal. This is what is intended to be stated—Just as the non-sentient Pradhāna does not deserve to be omniscient, the Controller and the Ātman of all; similarly the Jīva also, on account of not being

जीवोऽपि, अतद्धर्मत्वात्, इति। अमीषां गुणानां परमात्मन्यन्वयः प्रत्यगात्मनि व्यतिरेकश्च सूत्रद्वयेन दर्शितः ॥ २० ॥

निरपेक्षं च हेत्वन्तरमाह—

उभयेऽपि हि भेदेनैनमधीयते ॥ २१ ॥

उभये—माध्यंदिनाः काण्वाश्च, अन्तर्यामिणो नियाम्यत्वेन वागादिभिरचेतनैः सममेनं शारीरमपि विभज्य, अधीयते—

'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरो यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा शरीरं य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति स त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः' (बृ. ३।७।२२)

इति माध्यंदिनाः,

'यो विज्ञाने तिष्ठन्' (बृ. ३।७।२२)

इत्यादि च काण्वाः परमात्मनियाम्यतया तस्माद्विलक्षणत्वेनैनमधीयते, इत्यर्थः। अतोऽन्तर्यामी प्रत्यगात्मनो विलक्षणोऽपहतपाप्मा परमात्मा नारायणः, इति सिद्धम् ॥ २१ ॥

अन्तर्याम्यधिकरणं समाप्तम् । (४)

अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः ॥ २२ ॥ (अधिकरण ५, सूत्राणि २२–२४)

आथर्वणिका अधीयते—

'अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते। यत्तदद्रेश्यमग्राह्यमगोत्रमवर्णमचक्षुःश्रोत्रं

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possessed of those characteristics. By the two Sūtras is pointed out the presence (association) of these qualities in the case of the highest Atman and their absence in the case of the inmost Atman. ॥ 20 ॥

The Sūtrakāra mentions another independent reason—

Both of them, indeed, read this one as distinct. ॥ 21 ॥

Ubhaye—the Kānvas and the Mādhyandinas read this one, the embodied Ātman also separately as being on the same level as the non-sentient speech etc. owing to his being the object to be controlled by the inner Controller. In (the passage)

'Who staying in the Ātman, is within the Ātman, whom the Ātman knows not, whose body is the Ātman, who inwardly controls the Ātman,—this is your Ātman, the inner Controller, immortal.' (Br. 3·7·22)

the Mādhyandinas, and the Kānvas in (the passage)

'Who staying in the Vijñāna' (Br. 3·7·22)

etc., read this one as being quite different from that (*antaryāmin*), owing to his being the object to be controlled by the Paramātman—This is the sense. Therefore, it is established that the inner Controller is the highest Atman, Nārāyana different from the inmost Atman with sins destroyed. ॥ 21 ॥

Here ends the Antaryāmyadhikarana (4)

The one possessed of qualities, invisibility etc., on account of the statement of the characteristics ॥ 22 ॥

(Adhikarana 5— Sūtras 22-24)

The followers of the Atharvana school read—

'And now the higher (Vidyā) by which the Imperishable is cognised; and what that is not fit to be seen, not fit to be

तदपाणिपादम् । नित्यं विभुं सर्वगतं सुसूक्ष्मं तदव्ययं यद्भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ति धीराः'
(मु. १।१।५-६)

इति । तथोत्तरत्र,

'अक्षरात्परतः परः' (मु २।१।२)

इति । तत्र संदिह्यते—किमिह, अदृश्यत्वादिगुणकमक्षरम्, अक्षरात्परतः परश्च प्रकृतिपुरुषौ, अथ, उभयत्र परमात्मैव ? इति । किं तावत्प्राप्तम् ? प्रकृतिपुरुषौ, इति । कुतः ? अस्याक्षरस्य

'अदृष्टो द्रष्टा' (बृ. ३।७।२३)

इत्यादाविव, न द्रष्टृत्वादिचेतनधर्मविशेष इह श्रूयते ।

'अक्षरात्परतः परः' (मु. २।१।२)

इति च सर्वस्माद्विकारात्परभूतादक्षरादस्मात्परः क्षेत्रज्ञः समष्टिपुरुषः प्रतिपाद्यते । एतदुक्तं भवति — रूपादिमत्स्थूलरूपाचेतनपृथिव्यादिभूताश्रयं दृश्यत्वादिकं प्रतिषिध्यमानं पृथिव्यादिसजातीयसूक्ष्मरूपाचेतनमेवोपस्थापयति । तच्च प्रधानमेव । तस्मात्परत्वं च समष्टिपुरुषस्यैव प्रसिद्धम् । तदधिष्ठितं च प्रधानं महदादिविशेषपर्यन्तं विकारजातं प्रसूते, इति । तत्र दृष्टान्ता उपन्यस्यन्ते—

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grasped, without a family (source), without colour, without eyes and ears, without hands and feet, eternal, all-pervading, all-encompassing, extremely subtile, that without decrease, that which is the source of beings—the wise see fully'. (Mu 1·1 5–6)

Likewise, further on

'The Highest is beyond the Imperishable' (Mu 2 1·2)

—There is raised the doubt—Is it (meant) here that the Imperishable possessed of the qualities invisibility etc, and the Highest beyond the Imperishable, the Prakrti and Purusa, or the Paramātman in both the cases? What for the matter of that, is (the prima-facie view) reached? Prakrti and Purusa. Whence? In the case of the Imperishable, no distinct attribute of the sentient, being the Seer etc is here declared, as in

'Unseen, the Seer' (Br 3 7 23)

etc And by (the passage)

'The Highest (is) beyond the Imperishable' (Mu 2 1 2)

is propounded the cosmos-Purusa, the Ksetra-knower beyond this Imperishable which is beyond all modifications This is what is intended to be stated—(The qualities) visibility etc belonging to the elements, the earth etc possessed of colour etc., of gross form, and non-sentient, being repudiated, establish only a non-sentient—the earth and other homogeneous elements in a subtle form And that is Pradhāna itself. And being beyond that, is well-known in the case of the cosmos-Purusa alone And Pradhāna supervised over by him produces the aggregate of modifications, beginning with Mahat and ending with individuality. In this connection, illustrative instances have been put forward—

'यथोर्णनाभिः सृजते गृह्णते च यथा पृथिव्यामोषधयः संभवन्ति ।
यथा सतः पुरुषात्केशलोमानि तथाक्षरात्संभवतीह विश्वम् ॥' (मु. १।१।७)

इति। अतोऽस्मिन्प्रकरणे प्रधानपुरुषावेव प्रतिपाद्येते, इत्येवं प्राप्ते, अभिधीयते—

'अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः'—अदृश्यत्वादिगुणकः, अक्षरात्परतः परश्च परमपुरुष एव। कुतः? तद्धर्मोक्तेः।

'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्' (मु. १।१।९)

इत्यादिना सर्वज्ञत्वादिकास्तस्यैव धर्मा उच्यन्ते। तथाहि—

'यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते' (मु. १।१।५)

इत्यादिना, अदृश्यत्वादिगुणकमक्षरमभिधाय,

'तथाक्षरात्संभवतीह विश्वम्' (मु. १।१।७)

इति तस्माद्विश्वसंभवं चाभिधाय

'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद्यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः ।
तस्मादेतद्ब्रह्म नामरूपमन्नं च जायते ॥' (मु. १।१।९)

इति भूतयोनेरक्षरस्य सर्वज्ञत्वादि प्रतिपाद्यते। पश्चात्

'As the spider produces and withdraws; as herbs originate on the earth, as from the existing Puruṣa (originate) the hair on the head and body (long and soft hair), in the same way from the Imperishable emanates here, the Universe'. (Mu. 1·1·7)

Therefore, in this Section are propounded the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa alone This (prima-facie view) being reached, this is stated (in reply)—

'The one possessed of the qualities, invisibility etc., on account of the mention of the characteristics'. The one possessed of the qualities, invisibility etc., (and) the Highest beyond the Imperishable is the highest Puruṣa himself. Whence? On account of the mention of his characteristics. By the passage

'Who, the omniscient, all-knower' (Mu. 1·1·9)

etc. are stated the qualities, omniscience etc., as belonging to him alone. To explain the same in detail—Having declared by the passage

'By which the Imperishable is cognised' (Mu. 1·1·5)

etc., the Imperishable having the qualities, invisibility etc. and having declared the emanating of the universe from the same in

'In the same way, from the Imperishable, emanates here the universe' (Mu 1·1·7)

is propounded the omniscience etc. of the Imperishable, the source of beings in (the passage)

'Who, omniscient, all-knower, of whom the penance is constituted of knowledge; from that is born this Brahman, name and form and food'. (Mu. 1·1·9)

And further is referred to as the Highest, the source of beings, the Imperishable, the matter under discussion, possessed of qualities, invisibility etc. the

'अक्षरात्परतः परः'　　　(मु. २।१।२)

इति च प्रकृतम्, अदृश्यत्वादिगुणकं भूतयोन्यक्षरं सर्वज्ञमेव परत्वेन व्यपदिश्यते। अतः,

'अक्षरात्परतः परः'　　　(मु. २।१।२)

इत्यक्षरशब्दः पञ्चम्यन्तः प्रकृतम्, अदृश्यत्वादिगुणकमक्षरं नाभिधत्ते। तस्य सर्वज्ञस्य विश्वयोनेः सर्वस्मात्परत्वेन तस्मादन्यस्य परत्वासंभवात्। अतः, अत्र, अक्षरशब्दो भूतसूक्ष्ममचेतनं ब्रूते ॥ २२ ॥

विशेषणभेदव्यपदेशाभ्यां च नेतरौ ॥ २३ ॥

इतश्च न प्रधानपुरुषौ। विशिनष्टि हि प्रकरणं प्रधानाच्च पुरुषाच्च भूतयोन्यक्षरं व्यावर्तयति, इत्यर्थः, एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानोपपादनादिभिः। तथा ताभ्यामस्याक्षरस्य भेदश्च व्यपदिश्यते

'अक्षरात्परतः परः'　　　(मु. २।१।२)

इत्यादिना। तथाहि

'स ब्रह्मविद्यां सर्वविद्याप्रतिष्ठामथर्वाय ज्येष्ठपुत्राय प्राह।'　(मु. १।१।१)

इति सर्वविद्याप्रतिष्ठाभूता ब्रह्मविद्या प्रक्रान्ता। परविद्यैव च सर्वविद्याप्रतिष्ठा। तामिमां सर्वविद्याप्रतिष्ठां विद्यां चतुर्मुखाथर्वादिगुरुपरम्परयाङ्गिरसा प्राप्तां जिज्ञासुः

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omniscient himself, in

'*The Highest (is) beyond the Imperishable*'.　　　(Mu. 2·1·2)

Therefore, the word Akṣara (in the passage)

'*The Highest (is) beyond the Imperishable*'　　　(Mu 2 1 2)

which is in the ablative, does not express the Imperishable possessed of *qualities, invisibility etc the matter in hand*; because, that source of universe, the omniscient, being beyond all, there is the impossibility of anything else than that, being beyond　Therefore, here the word Aksara speaks of a non-sentient, the subtle element. ॥ 22 ॥

And on account of the reference to particularity and difference, not the other two. ॥ 23 ॥

And for this reason also, are not (referred to) Pradhāna and Puruṣa. The Section, indeed, particularises (distinguishes) the source of beings, the Imperishable, from the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa, that is to say — excludes, by the argumentation etc to prove the knowledge of all by the knowledge of one. Likewise, by the passage.

'*The Highest (is) beyond the Imperishable*'　　(Mu. 2·1·2)

etc., is pointed out the difference of the Imperishable from the two　To explain the same in detail—In (the passage)

'*He told his eldest son Atharvan, the Brahmavidyā, the support of all Vidyās*'　　　(Mu. 1 1·1)

is introduced the Brahmavidyā, the support of all Vidyās. And the highest Vidyā alone is the support of all Vidyās. Desirous of knowing this same Vidyā, the support of all Vidyās, acquired by Angiras, in teacher-succession,—Brahmadeva, Atharvan and others—in the passage—

'शौनको ह वै महाशालोऽङ्गिरसं विधिवदुपसन्नः पप्रच्छ । कस्मिन्नु भगवो विज्ञाते सर्वमिदं विज्ञातं भवति' (मु. १।१।३)

इति । ब्रह्मविद्यायाः सर्वविद्याश्रयत्वाद्ब्रह्मविज्ञानेन सर्वं विज्ञातं भवति, इति कृत्वा ब्रह्मस्वरूपमनेन पृष्टम्—

'तस्मै स होवाच द्वे विद्ये वेदितव्ये इति ह स्म यद्ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति परा चैवापरा च' (मु. १।१।४)

इति । ब्रह्म प्रेप्सुना द्वे विद्ये वेदितव्ये—ब्रह्मविषये परोक्षापरोक्षरूपे द्वे विज्ञाने उपादेये, इत्यर्थः । अत्र परोक्षं शास्त्रजन्यं ज्ञानम्, अपरोक्षं योगजन्यं ज्ञानम् । तयोर्ब्रह्मप्राप्त्युपायभूतमपरोक्षज्ञानम् । तच्च भक्तिरूपापन्नम्—

'यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यः' (मु. ३।२।३)

इत्यत्रैव विशेष्यमाणत्वात् । तदुपायश्च, आगमजन्यं विवेकादिसाधनसप्तकानुगृहीतं ज्ञानम् ।

'तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसाऽनाशकेन' (बृ. ४।४।२२)

इति श्रुतेः । आह च भगवान् पराशरः—

'Śaunaka, indeed, a wealthy householder, approaching humbly, according to the rites, Angiras, asked—What being known, Your Reverence, all this becomes known?' (Mu. 1·1·3)

Having thought out that, by the knowledge of Brahman everything becomes known, on account of the Brahmavidyā being the resort of all Vidyās, by him has been asked (here) the nature of Brahman—

'He, verily, said to him,—Two Vidyās are fit to be known—thus, verily, say the Brahman-knowers—the Parā and the Aparā (the higher and the lower)'. (Mu. 1·1·4)

Two Vidyās are fit to be known by one desirous of attaining to Brahman—in the case of Brahman, two Vijñānas, direct and indirect, have to be resorted to—This is the sense. Here Parokṣa (indirect)—the knowledge derived from the Śāstra; Aparokṣa (direct)—the knowledge derived from mystic communion. Of the two, direct knowledge is the means of attaining to Brahman, and that takes the form of devotion, on account of this being particularised here itself in (the passage)

'That one whom this (Ātman) chooses, by him (the Ātman) is secured'. (Mu. 3·2·3)

And the means for that is the knowledge derived from Scripture and favoured by the seven-fold means, Viveka etc., on account of the Śruti passage—

'Him, this one, the Brāhmaṇas desire to know, by means of the recitation of the Vedas, by sacrifice, by charity, (and) by imperishable penance.' (Br. 4·4·22)

The Revered Parāśara also says—

'तत्प्राप्तिहेतुर्ज्ञानं च कर्म चोक्तं महामुने ।
आगमोत्थं विवेकाच्च द्विधा ज्ञानं तथोच्यते ॥'

इति ।

'तत्रापरा, ऋग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः'　　　　　(मु १।१।५)

इत्यादिना धर्मशास्त्राणीत्यन्तेन, आगमोत्थं ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारहेतुभूतं परोक्षज्ञानमुक्तम्। साङ्गस्य सेतिहासपुराणस्य सधर्मशास्त्रस्य समीमांसस्य वेदस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुभूतत्वात् ।

'अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते'　　　　　(मु १।१।५)

इति, उपासनाख्यं ब्रह्मसाक्षात्काररलक्षणं भक्तिरूपापन्नं ज्ञानमुच्यते ।

'यत्तदद्रेश्यम्'　　　　　(मु १।१।६)

इत्यादिना परोक्षापरोक्षरूपज्ञानद्वयविषयस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपमुच्यते ।

'यथोर्णनाभिः सृजते गृह्णते च'　　　　　(मु १।१।७)

इत्यादिना यथोक्तस्वरूपात्परस्माद्ब्रह्मणोऽक्षरात्कृत्स्नस्य चेतनाचेतनात्मकप्रपञ्चस्योत्पत्तिरुक्ता। विश्वमिति वचनात्, नाचेतनमात्रस्य ।

'तपसा चीयते ब्रह्म ततोऽन्नमभिजायते ।
अन्नात्प्राणो मनः सत्यं लोकाः कर्मसु चामृतम् ॥'　　　　　(मु १।१।८)

'Jñana and Karman—the cause of its attainment, have been stated, (O) great sage, knowledge is likewise spoken of as twofold—emanating from the Āgama, and from Viveka'

In

'There the Aparā (the lower Vidyā) Rgveda, Yajurveda' (Mu 1·1 5)

etc, ending with the Dharmaśāstras—by this has been mentioned the indirect knowledge emanating from the Scriptures, and the cause of realisation of Brahman on account of the Veda along with its limbs (the six Vedaṅgas), with Itihāsa and Purāna, with the Dharmaśāstra with the Mīmāmsā, being the cause of the origination of the knowledge of Brahman By (the passage)

'Now the higher (Vidyā) by which that Imperishable is cognised' (Mu 1·1 5)

is declared the knowledge called worship, being the direct perception of Brahman, (and) taking the form of devotion By (the passage)

'What that is not fit to be seen' (Mu 1 1 6)

etc, is described the nature of the Highest Brahman the object of two knowledges, having the form, direct and indirect By (the passage) beginning with

'Just as the spider produces and withdraws' (Mu 1·1 7)

etc, is spoken of, the origination of the entire worldly existence constituted of the sentient and the non-sentient, from the Imperishable-the Highest Brahman with its nature already described, and not merely of the non sentient, on account of the expression Viśvam (universe) In (the passage)

'Brahman is augmented by knowledge From that, food is produced along from food, Prāna, mind, truth worlds and in the sacrificial rites, immortality' (Mu 1 1 8)

इति ब्रह्मणो विश्वोत्पत्तिप्रकार उच्यते। तपसा—ज्ञानेन

'यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः' (मु १।१।९)

इति वक्ष्यमाणत्वात्। चीयते—उपचीयते। 'बहु स्याम्' इति संकल्परूपेण ज्ञानेन ब्रह्म सृष्ट्युन्मुखं भवति, इत्यर्थः। ततोऽन्नमभिजायते— अद्यत इति, अन्नम्। विश्वस्य भोक्तृवर्गस्य भोग्यभूतं भूतसूक्ष्ममव्याकृतं परस्माद्ब्रह्मणो जायते, इत्यर्थः। प्राणमनःप्रभृति च स्वर्गापवर्गरूपफलसाधनभूतकर्मपर्यन्तं सर्वं विकारजातं तस्मादेव जायते।

'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्' (मु १।१।९)

इत्यादिना सृष्ट्युपकरणभूतं सार्वज्ञ्यसत्यसंकल्पत्वादिकमुक्तम्। सर्वज्ञात्सत्यसंकल्पात्परस्माद्ब्रह्मणोऽक्षरादेतत्कार्याकारं ब्रह्म नामरूपविभक्तं भोक्तृभोग्यरूपं च जायते।

'तदेतत्सत्यम्' (मु १।२।१)

इति परस्य ब्रह्मणो निरुपाधिकसत्यत्वमुच्यते।

'मन्त्रेषु कर्माणि कवयो यान्यपश्यन्
तानि त्रेतायां बहुधा सततानि।
तान्याचरत नियतं सत्यकामाः' (मु १।२।१)

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are spoken of, the details of the origination of the universe from Brahman. Tapasā — by knowledge, on account of

'Of whom the penance is constituted of knowledge' (Mu 1 1 9)

that is going to be mentioned down below. Ciyate — is augmented The sense is — Brahman becomes eager for creation by the knowledge in the form of thought 'Let me be many' Tatah annam abhijayate — what is eaten is Anna The meaning is that from the Highest Brahman is produced the unmodified subtle element, the object of enjoyment for the entire aggregate of enjoyers And from that alone is produced the entire aggregate of modifications beginning with Prāna and mind, right up to the Karman which is the means of the fruit in the form of heaven (and) salvation By (the passage)

'Who, the omniscient, all-knower' (Mu 1 1 9)

etc, is spoken of, omniscience, being with thoughts fulfilled, etc, the means of creation And this Brahman having the form of a product differentiated by name and form and constituted of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is produced from the Imperishable, the Highest Brahman, omniscient and with thoughts fulfilled By (the passage)

'That this is the Reality' (Mu 1 2 1)

is declared the nature of adjunctless Reality belonging to the Highest Brahman. In (the passage)

'Those rites which the wise saw in the (Vedic) Mantras, those were continued variously in the Tretā fires, (O) you with thoughts fulfilled, observe them always' (Mu 1 2 1)

इति सार्वज्ञ्यसत्यसंकल्पत्वादिकल्याणगुणाकरमक्षरं पुरुषं स्वतः सत्यं कामयमानाः तत्प्राप्तये फलान्तरेभ्यो विरक्ता', ऋग्यजुःसामाथर्वसु कविभिर्दृष्टानि वर्णाश्रमोचितानि त्रेताग्निषु बहुधा संततानि कर्माण्याचरत, इति ।

'एष व पन्था '　　(मु १।२।१)

इत्यारभ्य,

'एष व पुण्य सुकृतो ब्रह्मलोक '　　(मु १।२।६)

इत्यन्तेन, कर्मानुष्ठानप्रकारं श्रुतिस्मृतिचोदितेषु कर्मस्वेकतरकर्मवैधुर्येऽपि, इतरेषामनुष्ठितानामपि निष्फलत्वमयथानुष्ठितस्य चाननुष्ठितसमत्वमभिधाय

'प्लवा ह्येते अदृढा यज्ञरूपा
अष्टादशोक्तमवरं येषु कर्म ।
एतच्छ्रेयो येऽभिनन्दन्ति मूढा
जरामृत्यु ते पुनरेवापियन्ति ॥ '　　(मु १।२।७)

इत्यादिना फलाभिसंधिपूर्वकत्वेन ज्ञानविधुरतया चावरं कर्माचरता पुनरावृत्तिमुक्त्वा

'तप श्रद्धे ये ह्युपवसन्ति'　　(मु १।२।११)

(the idea is)—Observe ye, (O) you who are disgusted with other fruits, longing for that Imperishable Purusa, the mine of all auspicious qualities, omniscience, being with thoughts fulfilled, etc , the Reality himself , for the sake of attaining to that,—*the rites variously linked up with the Tretā fires,—the* rites seen by the wise men in the Rk, Yajus, Sāman and Atharva (Vedas), (and) suitable for (different) castes and stages of life Having mentioned in *the passage beginning with*

'*This your path*　　(Mu 1 2 1)

and ending with

'*This your holy world of Brahman, well-formed*　　(Mu 1 2 6)

the details about the performance of rites —the fruitlessness of the performance of other rites even when divested of a single (necessary) rite, and the performance of a rite *not according to the rules, being equivalent to the non-*performance of the same in the case of the rites enjoined in the Sruti and the Smrti , having declared the return of those performing the Karman, inferior on account of being divested of knowledge, preceeded by the attachment to the fruit, in (the passage)

'*These boats in the form of sacrifices are, indeed, not firm, where the Karman mentioned for the eighteen (16 priests, the sacrificer and his wife) is inferior Those fools who commend this as the highest desired good they once again get merged into old age and death*'　　(Mu 1 2 7)

and others , having again praised in (the passage)

'*Those who, indeed practise penance and faith*' (Mu 1 2 11)

इत्यादिना पुनरपि फलाभिसंधिरहितं ज्ञानिनानुष्ठितं कर्म ब्रह्मप्राप्तये भवतीति प्रशस्य,

'परीक्ष्य लोकान्' (मु. १।२।१२)

इत्यादिना केवलकर्मफलेषु विरक्तस्य यथोदितकर्मानुगृहीतं ब्रह्मप्राप्त्युपायभूतं ज्ञानं जिज्ञासमानस्य च, आचार्योपसदनं विधाय,

'तदेतत्सत्यं यथा सुदीप्तात्' (मु. २।१।१)

इत्यादिना

'सोऽविद्याग्रन्थिं विकिरतीह सोम्य' (मु. २।१।१०)

इत्यन्तेन पूर्वोक्तस्याक्षरस्य भूतयोनेः परस्य ब्रह्मणः परमपुरुषस्यानुक्तैः स्वरूपगुणैः सह सर्वभूतान्तरात्मतया विश्वशरीरत्वेन विश्वरूपत्वं तस्माद्विश्वसृष्टिं च विस्पष्टमभिधाय

'आविः संनिहितम्' (मु. २।२।१)

इत्यादिना, तस्यैवाक्षरस्याव्याकृतात्परतोऽपि पुरुषात्परभूतस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणः परमव्योम्नि प्रतिष्ठितस्यानवधिकातिशयानन्दस्वरूपस्य हृदयगुहायामुपासनप्रकारम्, उपासनस्य च परभक्तिरूपत्वम्, उपासीनस्याविद्याविमोकपूर्वकं ब्रह्मसमं ब्रह्मानुभवं फलं चोपदिश्य, उपसंहृतम्। अतः, एवं विशेषणाद्भेदव्यपदेशाच्च नास्मिन्प्रकरणे प्रधानपुरुषौ प्रतिपाद्येते।

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that the Karman void of attachment to the fruit, performed by the wise one, is for the attainment to Brahman; having enjoined in (the passage)

'Having examined the worlds' (Mu. 1·2·12)

and others, going to the Ācārya, upon one disgusted with the fruits of mere rites, desirous of knowing the knowledge, the means of attaining to Brahman, and favoured by the Karman as mentioned; having mentioned quite clearly in (the passage) beginning with

'Then this is the Reality, as from well-lighted (fire)' (Mu. 2·1·1)

etc., and ending with

'(O) gentle one, he loosens up here the knot of Avidyā' (Mu. 2·1·10)

in the case of the imperishable source of beings, the Highest Brahman, the highest Puruṣa already described, the universal form along with the unmentioned nature and qualities, on account of having the universe as the body owing to that being the inmost Atman of all, and from that the creation of the universe; and having given instruction in (the passage)

'Manifest, near by' (Mu. 2·2·1)

etc., about the mode of worship in the heart-cavern, of that same Imperishable which is beyond, even over and above the Puruṣa beyond the unmodified, the Highest Brahman, established in the highest sky, having the nature of unlimited and unsurpassed bliss; worship as having the form of the highest devotion and the fruit, realisation of Brahman equal to Brahman, preceded by the getting away from Avidyā in the case of the worshipper,—the whole thing has been wound up (thus)—Therefore, on account of this particularisation and on account of the mention of the difference, Pradhāna and Puruṣa are not

भेदव्यपदेशोऽपि हि ताभ्यां परस्य ब्रह्मणोऽत्र विद्यते ।

'*दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः सबाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः ।*
अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रो ह्यक्षरात्परतः परः ॥' (मु. २।१।२)

इत्यादिभिः, अक्षरादव्याकृतात्परो यः समष्टिपुरुषः, तस्मादपि परभूतोऽदृश्यत्वादिगुणकोऽक्षरशब्दाभिहितः परमात्मा, इत्यर्थः । अश्नुत इति वा, न क्षरतीति वा, अक्षरम् । तद्, अव्याकृतेऽपि स्वविकारव्याप्त्या वा, महदादिवन्नामान्तराभिलापयोग्यक्षरणाभावाद्वा, अक्षरत्वं कथंचिदुपपद्यते ॥ २३ ॥

रूपोपन्यासाच्च ॥ २४ ॥

'*अग्निर्मूर्धा चक्षुषी चन्द्रसूर्यौ*
दिशः श्रोत्रे वाग्विवृताश्च वेदाः ।
वायुः प्राणो हृदयं विश्वमस्य
पद्भ्यां पृथिवी ह्येष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ॥' (मु २।१।४)

इति, ईदृशं रूपं सर्वभूतान्तरात्मनः परमात्मन एव संभवति । अतश्च परमात्मा ॥ २४ ॥

अदृश्यत्वादिगुणकाधिकरणं समाप्तम् (५)

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propounded in this Section. The mention of the difference also of the Highest Brahman, from the two, indeed, occurs here—

'*Refulgent, formless, indeed, the Purusa, with the outward and the inward, verily, the unborn*
Without Prāna, without mind, white, indeed, the Highest beyond the Imperishable'. (Mu 2·1·2)

— *In such passages*, that what (is) this Cosmos-Purusa beyond the unmodified Imperishable, beyond even that, is the Paramātman denoted by the word Aksara, having the qualities, invisibility etc. — This is the sense Aksara is (what) pervades, or what does not perish, or, the nature of being Aksara would be somehow appropriate owing to its pervading by its modifications, although itself unmodified, or on account of the absence of suitable decay in being mentioned by other names Mahat etc ॥ 23 ॥

And on account of the description of form ॥ 24 ॥

'*Of Him Fire (is) the head; the two eyes (are) the Sun and the moon, the directions (are) the two ears; and the speech, the Vedas revealed, the wind, Prāna, the heart, the universe; from (His) feet, the earth:—This one, indeed, the inmost Ātman of all beings*' (Mu 2·1·4)

—Such form (as mentioned) is possible only in the case of the Paramātman, the inmost Ātman of all beings. And therefore, (he is) the Paramātman (described here) ॥ 24 ॥

Here ends the Adrśyatvādigunakādhikarana (5)

[175] वैश्वानरः साधारणशब्दविशेषात् ॥ २५ ॥

(अधिकरण ६, सूत्राणि २५–३३)

इदमामनन्ति छन्दोगाः—

'आत्मानमेवेमं वैश्वानरं संप्रत्यध्येषि तमेव नो ब्रूहि' (छा. ५।११।६)

इति प्रक्रम्य,

'यस्त्वेतमेवं प्रादेशमात्रमभिविमानमात्मानं वैश्वानरमुपास्ते' (छा. ५।१८।१)

इति। तत्र संदेहः— किमयं वैश्वानर आत्मा परमात्मेति शक्यनिर्णयः, उत न ? इति। किं प्राप्तम् ? अशक्यनिर्णयः, इति। कुतः ? वैश्वानरशब्दस्य चतुर्ष्वर्थेषु प्रयोगदर्शनात्। जाठराग्नौ तावत्—

'अयमग्निर्वैश्वानरो येनेदमन्नं पच्यते यदिदमद्यते। तस्यैष घोषो भवति यमेतत्कर्णावपिधाय शृणोति। स यदोत्क्रमिष्यन्भवति नैनं घोषं शृणोति' (बृ. ५।९।१)

इति। महाभूततृतीये च—

'विश्वस्मा अग्निं भुवनाय देवा वैश्वानरं केतुमह्नामकृण्वन्।' (ऋ. सं. १०।८८।१२)

इति। देवतायां च—

'वैश्वानरस्य सुमतौ स्याम राजा हि कं भुवनानामभिश्रीः।' (ऋ सं.१।९८।१)

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[175] Vaiśvānara (is the highest Ātman) on account of the distinction referring to a common expression. ॥ 25 ॥

(Adhikarana 6, Sūtras 25–33)

This is what say the Chandogas — Beginning with

'You are now studying this Vaiśvānara, the Ātman himself, speak of this one himself to us.' (Chā. 5·11·6)

'Who again worships thus, this one alone, the Ātman Vaiśvānara merely a span-long in measure.' (Chā. 5·18·1)

— There arises the doubt — Is the ascertainment possible about this Vaiśvānara Ātman, whether he is the Paramātman or not? What is (here) reached? The ascertainment is impossible. Whence? On account of the word Vaiśvānara being seen used in four senses. — To begin with, in (the sense of) the digestive fire, in (the passage)

'This fire Vaiśvānara by whom this food what is eaten, is digested. Of him, there is this noise which one hears on closing one's ears. When he (the Ātman) is about to depart, one does not hear this noise.' (Br. 5·9·1)

And in (the sense of) the third great element—

'The gods made Vaiśvānara Agni, the sign of the days, for the sake of the entire universe' (Rg Sam. X·88 12)

And in (the sense of) the Deity—

'May we be in the good opinion (grace) of Vaiśvānara; he is indeed, the king, happiness, splendour of the universe' (Rg. Sam. I·98·1)

इति । परमात्मनि च—

'तदात्मन्येव हृदयेऽग्नौ वैश्वानरे प्रास्यत् ।' (तै. ब्रा ३।११।८)
'स एष वैश्वानरो विश्वरूप प्राणोऽग्निरुदयते' (प्र १।७)

इति च । वाक्योपक्रमादिषु च, उपलभ्यमानान्यपि लिङ्गानि सर्वानुगुणतया नेतुं शक्यानि इति । एवं प्राप्ते, अभिधीयते—

'वैश्वानरः साधारणशब्दविशेषात्'। वैश्वानरः—परमात्मा । कुतः ? साधारण शब्दविशेषात् । विशेष्यते, इति विशेषः । साधारणस्य वैश्वानरशब्दस्य परमात्मासाधारणै श्वर्यैर्विशेष्यमाणत्वात्, इत्यर्थः । तथाहि—औपमन्यवादयः पञ्चेमे महर्षयः समेत्य

'को न आत्मा किं ब्रह्म'

(छा. ५।११।१)

इति विचार्य,

'उद्दालको वै भगवन्तोऽयमारुणि सम्प्रतीममात्मानं वैश्वानरमध्येति तं हन्ताभ्यागच्छाम' (छा ५।११।२)

इति, उद्दालकस्य वैश्वानरात्मविज्ञानमवगम्य, तमभ्याजग्मुः ।

And in (the sense of) the Paramātman—in

'*He threw it into the Ātman himself, in the heart, in the Agni Vaiśvanara*'. (Tait Br 3 11 8)

'*He, this one, Vaisvānara, with the universe as his form, Prāna, Agni, rises*'. (Pra 1 7)

And the various characteristics that are found even in the introductory passages etc. are possible to be construed as being in conformity with all (the four entities)—This (prima-facie view) being reached, this is stated (in reply)—

'Vaiśvānara, on account of the distinction referring to a common expression.' Vaiśvānara (is) the Paramātman Whence? On account of the distinction referring to a common expression. Viśesa is that which is particularised The sense is—on account of the common expression Vaiśvanara being particularised by the extraordinary glories of the Paramātman To explain the same—These five great sages—the descendant of Upamanyu and others—, having foregathered, having thought about (the problem)

'*Who (is) our Ātman and what (is) Brahman?*'

(Chā 5·11·1)

went over to him (Uddālaka), having come to know about the special knowledge in respect of Vaiśvānara Ātman, on the part of Uddalaka, saying

'*Your Reverences! This one Uddālaka the descendant of Aruna, at present is studying this Ātman Vaiśvānara Right ho! let us wend our way unto him*'. (Chā 5 11-2)

स चोद्दालक एतान्वैश्वानरात्मजिज्ञासूनभिलक्ष्य, आत्मनश्च तत्राकृत्स्नवेदित्वं मत्वा, तान्होवाच—

'अश्वपतिर्वै भगवन्तोऽयं कैकेयः संप्रतीममात्मानं वैश्वानरमध्येति तं हन्ताभ्यागच्छाम' (छा. ५।११।४)

इति। ते चोद्दालकषष्ठास्तमश्वपतिमभ्याजग्मुः। स च तान्महर्षीन्यथार्हं पृथगभ्यर्च्य,

'न मे स्तेनः' (छा. ५।११।५)

इत्यादिना,

'यक्ष्यमाणो ह वै भगवन्तोऽहमस्मि' (छा. ५।११।५)

इत्यन्तेन, आत्मनो व्रतस्थतया प्रतिग्रहयोग्यतां ज्ञापयन्नेव, ब्रह्मविद्भिरपि प्रतिषिद्धस्य परिहरणीयतां विहितकर्मकर्तव्यतां च प्रज्ञाप्य,

'यावदेकैकस्मा ऋत्विजे धनं दास्यामि तावद्भगवद्भ्यो दास्यामि वसन्तु भगवन्तः' (छा. ५।११।५)

इत्यवोचत्। ते च मुमुक्षवो वैश्वानरमात्मानं जिज्ञासमानाः, तमेवात्मानमस्माकं ब्रूहि, इत्यवोचन्। तदेवं

'को न आत्मा किं ब्रह्म' (छा. ५।११।१)

And that Uddālaka having noticed them to be desirous of knowing the Vaiśvānara Atman, knowing that his knowledge in respect of that was incomplete, verily, said he unto them—

'Your Reverences! Aśvapati, king of the Kekayas, verily, at present is studying the Vaiśvānara Ātman Right ho! let us wend our way unto him'. (Chā. 5·11·4)

and they, the six including Uddālaka, went over to that Aśvapati. And he, having worshipped these great sages individually as befitted them, beginning with

'There is no thief for me' (Chā. 5·11·5)

and ending with

'Your Reverences! I am engaged in sacrifices' (Chā. 5·11·5)

—having made them indeed know that he was one worthy to receive presents from, owing to his being engaged in the observance of vows; and having made them aware of the obligation on the part of even the Brahman-knowers, not to take up what is prohibited, and the duty of performing the prescribed Karman, he said (to them)—

'What wealth shall I be giving to each one of the Ṛtviks, that shall I be giving to Your Reverences. Abide here, your Reverences.' (Chā. 5·11·5)

And they, the Release-seekers, desirous of knowing the Vaiśvānara Atman said—Speak of that same Ātman to us—

'Who, (is) our Ātman, what (is) Brahman?' (Chā. 5·11·1)

इति जीवात्मनामात्मभूतं ब्रह्म जिज्ञासमानैस्तज्ज्ञमन्विच्छद्भिर्वैश्वानरात्मज्ञसकाशमागम्य पृच्छ्यमानो वैश्वानरात्मा परमात्मा, इति विज्ञायते। आत्मब्रह्मशब्दाभ्यामुपक्रम्य पश्चात्सर्वत्रात्मवैश्वानरशब्दाभ्यां व्यवहाराच्च, ब्रह्मशब्दस्थाने निर्दिश्यमानो वैश्वानरशब्दो ब्रह्मैवाभिधत्ते, इति विज्ञायते। किं च,

'स सर्वेषु लोकेषु सर्वेषु भूतेषु सर्वेष्वात्मस्वन्नमत्ति' (छा० ५।१८।१)

'तद्यथेषीकतूलमग्नौ प्रोतं प्रदूयेतैवं हास्य सर्वे पाप्मानः प्रदूयन्ते' (छा. ५।२४।३)

ति च वक्ष्यमाणं वैश्वानरात्मविज्ञानफलं वैश्वानरात्मानं परं ब्रह्म, इति ज्ञापयति ॥ २५ ॥

[176] इतश्च वैश्वानरः परमात्मा—

स्मर्यमाणमनुमानं स्यादिति ॥ २६ ॥

द्युप्रभृतिपृथिव्यन्तम्, अवयवविभागेन वैश्वानरस्य रूपमिहोपदिश्यते। तच्च श्रुतिस्मृतिषु परमपुरुषरूपतया प्रसिद्धम्। तदिह तदेवेदमिति स्मर्यमाणं प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानं वैश्वानरस्य परमपुरुषत्वे, अनुमानं लिङ्गमित्यर्थः। इतिशब्दः प्रकारवचनः। इत्थंभूतं रूपं प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानं वैश्वानरस्य परमात्मत्वेऽनुमानं स्यात्।

—And thus, it is known that the Vaiśvānara-Ātman is the Paramātman who was being asked about by those desirous of knowing Brahman which is the Atman of the Jīvātmans, and seeking for one knowing that, after having come to the knower of the Vaiśvānara-Ātman. And further, it is known that the word Vaiśvānara denotes Brahman itself, which is being used in place of the word Brahman, on account of the use of the words Atman and Vaiśvānara everywhere later on, after having begun with the use of the words Atman and Brahman. And further, in (the passages),

'He eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Ātmans' (Chā. 5·18·1)

'It is as under—, as the Isīka-reed cotton, scattered over in the fire is completely wiped out, so, all his sins are, verily, wiped out'. (Chā. 5·24·3)

—the fruit of the knowledge of the Vaiśvānara-Ātman, being mentioned (here) makes one know that the Vaiśvānara-Ātman (is) the Highest Brahman. ॥ 25 ॥

[176] And for this reason also, Vaiśvānara is the Paramātman.

The thing referred to may be the inferential mark—thus ॥ 26 ॥

Here is described the form of Vaiśvānara involving different limbs beginning with the heaven, and ending with the earth. And that is well-known in the Śrutis and the Smṛtis, as being the form of the highest Puruṣa. That (form) here, smaryamāna (referred to in the Śrutis and the Smṛtis) being recognised in (the expression)—That same (is) this, is the Anumāna —that is to say, the inferential mark in (proving) the Vaiśvānara being the highest Puruṣa. The word Iti expresses manner. Such a form being recognised may be the inferential mark in (proving) Vaiśvānara being the Paramātman.

श्रुतिस्मृतिषु हि परमपुरुषस्येत्थं रूपं प्रसिद्धम् । यथा आथर्वणे

> 'अग्निर्मूर्धा चक्षुषी चन्द्रसूर्यौ
> दिशः श्रोत्रे वाग्विवृताश्च वेदाः ।
> वायुः प्राणो हृदयं विश्वमस्य
> पद्भ्यां पृथिवी ह्येष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ॥' (मु. २।१।४)

इति । अग्निरिह द्युलोकः

> 'असौ वै लोकोऽग्निः' (छा. ५।४।१)

इति श्रुतेः । स्मरन्ति च मुनयः—

> 'द्यां मूर्धानं यस्य विप्रा वदन्ति
> खं वै नाभिं चन्द्रसूर्यौ च नेत्रे ।
> दिशः श्रोत्रे विद्धि पादौ क्षितिं च
> सोऽचिन्त्यात्मा सर्वभूतप्रणेता ॥'

इति ।

> 'यस्याग्निरास्यं द्यौर्मूर्धा खं नाभिश्चरणौ क्षितिः ।
> सूर्यश्चक्षुर्दिशः श्रोत्रं तस्मै लोकात्मने नमः ॥' (म. भा. शान्ति. रा. ४७।६८)

इति च । इह च द्युप्रभृतयो वैश्वानरस्य मूर्धाद्यवयवत्वेनोच्यन्ते । तथाहि— तैः, औपमन्यवप्रभृतिभिर्महर्षिभिः

Such a form of the highest Puruṣa is indeed well-known in the Srutis and the Smṛtis. As in the Atharvan-text—

> '*Of him Fire (is) the head, the two eyes (are) the Sun and the moon; the directions (are) the two ears; and the speech, the Vedas revealed; the wind, the Prāṇa; the heart, the universe; from His feet the earth; this one, indeed, the inmost Ātman of all beings.*' (Mu. 2·1·4)

Here Agni (means) the heavenly world, according to the Sruti—

> '*That world, verily, is Agni.*' (Chā. 5·4·1)

And the sages also declare in the Smṛti—

> '*Of whom the learned Brāhmanas declare the heaven as the head; the sky, verily, as the navel; and the Sun and the moon as the two eyes; quarters as the two ears; and the earth as the two feet,—know that he is the unthinkable Ātman and the promulgator of all beings.*'

And—

> '*A bow to that Lokātman of whom Agni is the mouth; the heaven, the head; the sky, the navel; the feet, the earth; the Sun, the eye; the quarters, the ear*'. (MBh. Śānti. 47·68)

And here, heaven etc. are spoken of as the limbs—the head etc. of the Vaiśvānara. To explain the same in detail—Kekaya, questioned by those great sages, Aupamanyava and others, saying

'आत्मानमेवेमं वैश्वानरं संप्रत्यध्येषि तमेव नो ब्रूहि' (छा. ५।११।६)

इति पृष्टः केकयस्तेभ्यो वैश्वानरात्मानमुपदिदिक्षुः, विशेषप्रश्नान्यथानुपपत्त्या वैश्वानरात्मन्येतैः किंचिज्ज्ञातं किंचिच्चाज्ञातमिति विज्ञाय, ज्ञाताज्ञातांशबुभुत्सया तानेकैकं पप्रच्छ। तत्र

'औपमन्यव कं त्वमात्मानमुपास्से' (छा. ५।१२।१)

इति पृष्टे

'दिवमेव भगवो राजन्' (छा. ५।१२।१)

इति तेन चोक्ते, दिवि तस्य पूर्णवैश्वानरात्मबुद्धिं निवर्तयन्, वैश्वानरस्य द्यौर्मूर्धा, इति चोपदिशन्, तस्या वैश्वानरांशभूताया दिवः सुतेजा इति गुणनामधेयं प्राचिख्यपत्। एवं सत्ययज्ञादिभिरादित्यवाय्वाकाशाप्पृथिवीनामेकैकेनैकैकमुपास्यमानतया कथितानाम्, विश्वरूपः पृथग्वर्त्मा बहुलो रयिः प्रतिष्ठा, इत्येकैकगुणनामधेयानि वैश्वानरात्मनश्चक्षुः-प्राणसंदेहबस्तिपादावयवत्वं चोपदिष्टम्। संदेहो मध्यकाय उच्यते। अतः, एवंभूतद्युमूर्धत्वादि-विशिष्टं परमपुरुषस्यैव रूपमिति वैश्वानरः परमपुरुष एव ॥ २६ ॥

पुनरपि, अनिर्णयमेवाशङ्क्य परिहरति—

'You are now studying this Vaiśvānara, the Ātman himself; speak of this one to us' (Chā. 5·11·6)

—desirous of giving them instruction about the Vaiśvānarātman asked each one of them, after having known that these have understood something and not understood something in respect of the Vaiśvānara, with a desire to know the known and unknown portions (items); as otherwise the specific questions could not be proper. There when asked

'O Aupamanyava, what Ātman do you worship'? (Chā. 5·12·1)

and when he said—

'Your Reverence, (O) king, heaven itself' (Chā. 5·12·1)

—refuting his idea about heaven being the complete Vaiśvānarātman, and instructing him that of Vaiśvānara heaven (is) the head, informed him about that heaven which is a portion of the Vaiśvānara, the quality-appellation Sutejāh *(possessed of rich splendour)—Thus in the case of the Sun, the Wind,* the Ākāśa, the Earth (pointed out) by Satyayajña and others, each one of these as being worshipped by some one of them, quality-appellations for each one of these, viz. Viśvarūpa (omniform), Pṛthagvartman (*variously moving*), Bahula (pervading), Rayi (wealth) [illegible] Vaiśvānara Atman being possessed of the limb[illegible] and feet—have been described. Sandeha is s[illegible] f the body. Hence such a form particularised by heaven being the head etc. belongs to the highest Purusa alone—and so, Vaiśvānara (is) the highest Puruṣa himself. ॥ 26 ॥

Once again, sensing a doubt about the ascertainment, (the Sūtrakāra) refutes (it)—

शब्दादिभ्योन्तःप्रतिष्ठानाच्च नेति चेन्न तथा दृष्ट्युपदेशादसंभवात्पुरुषमपि चैनमधीयते ॥ २७ ॥

यदुक्तम्—वैश्वानरः परमात्मेति निश्चीयते, इति— तन्न । 'शब्दादिभ्योन्तःप्रतिष्ठानाच्च' जाठरस्याग्नेरिह प्रतीयमानत्वात् । शब्दस्तावत्, वाजिनां वैश्वानरविद्याप्रकरणे

'स एषोऽग्निर्वैश्वानरः' (श. ब्रा. १०।६।१।११)

इति वैश्वानरसमानाधिकरणतयाग्निरिति श्रूयते । अस्मिन्प्रकरणे च

'हृदयं गार्हपत्यो मनोऽन्वाहार्यपचन आस्यमाहवनीयः' (छा. ५।१८।२)

इति वैश्वानरस्य हृदयादिस्थस्य, अग्नित्रयकल्पनं क्रियते ।

'तद्यद्भक्तं प्रथममागच्छेत्तद्धोमीयं स यां प्रथमामाहुतिं जुहुयात्तां जुहुयात्प्राणाय स्वाहा' (छा. ५।१९।१)

इत्यादिना, प्राणाहुत्याधारत्वं च वैश्वानरस्यावगम्यते । तथा वैश्वानरस्य, अस्मिन्पुरुषेऽन्तःप्रतिष्ठानं वाजसनेयिनः समामनन्ति—

If it be argued that (Vaiśvānara is) not (the Paramātman) on account of the Scriptural passages etc., and on account of the firm stay within, (we reply)—No, on account of the instruction about meditation in that way, on account of the impossibility and because they read about this one even as the Puruṣa. ॥ 27 ॥

As to what has been stated—that it is ascertained viz. Vaiśvānara is the Paramātman,—that is not so, on account of the digestive fire being apprehended here, 'on account of the Scriptural passages etc. and on account of the firm stay within'. As regards the Scriptural passage—Agni is mentioned as being in case-co-ordination with Vaiśvānara in the Sruti passage in the Section dealing with the Vaiśvānara-vidyā according to the Vājins (followers of the Yajurveda)—

'That this one (is) the Agni Vaiśvānara'. (Ś. Brā. 13 6·1·11)

And in this Section, the Vaiśvānara stationed in the heart etc. is fancied to be three fires—

'The heart (is) the Gārhapatya (the house-holder's fire); the mind, the Anvāhārya-pacana (what digests what is eaten); the mouth, the Āhavanīya (where oblations are offered).' (Chā. 5·18·2)

And by this (passage) and others,

'Whatever cooked rice comes first, that belongs to the sacrifice; what first offering he may offer, that he should offer, to Prāṇa—Hail!' (Chā. 5·19·1)

it is known that Vaiśvānara is also the abode of the offering to Prāṇa. Likewise, the Vājasaneyins speak of the Vaiśvānara as being stationed within, in this Puruṣa—

'स यो हैतमेवमग्निं वैश्वानरं पुरुषविधं पुरुषेऽन्तः प्रतिष्ठितं वेद'

(श. ब्रा. १०।६।१।११)

इति । अतः, अग्निशब्दसामानाधिकरण्यादग्नित्रेतापरिकल्पनात्प्राणाहुत्याधारभावात्, अन्तः-प्रतिष्ठानाच्च, वैश्वानरस्य जाठरत्वमपि प्रतीयते, इति नैकान्ततः परमात्मत्वम्, इति चेत् — तन्न । 'तथा दृष्ट्युपदेशात्' । पूर्वोक्तस्य त्रैलोक्यशरीरस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणो वैश्वानरस्य जाठराग्निशरीरतया तद्विशिष्टस्योपासनोपदेशात् । अग्निशब्दादिभिर्हि न केवलो जाठरः प्रतिपाद्यते, अपि तु जाठराग्निविशिष्टः परमात्मा । कथमिदमवगम्यते ? इति चेत्— असंभवात् । जाठरस्य केवलस्य त्रैलोक्यशरीरत्वासंभवात् । त्रैलोक्यशरीरतया प्रतिपन्नवैश्वानरसमानाधिकरणो जाठरविषयतया प्रतीयमानोऽग्निशब्दो जाठरशरीरतया तद्विशिष्टं परमात्मानमेवाभिदधाति, इत्यर्थः । यथोक्तं भगवता

'अहं वैश्वानरो भूत्वा प्राणिनां देहमाश्रितः ।
प्राणापानसमायुक्तः पचाम्यन्नं चतुर्विधम् ॥' (गी. १५।१४)

इति । जाठरानलशरीरो भूत्वा, इत्यर्थः । अतः, तद्विशिष्टस्योपासनमत्रोपदिश्यते । किं च

'He who thus, verily, knows this very Vaisvānara Agni in the form of a Puruṣa as stationed within in the Puruṣa.'

(Śa Brā 10 6 1 11)

Therefore, if it be argued that Vaisvānara is not the Paramātman exclusively, because his nature as the digestive fire also is apprehended, on account of his being in case-co-ordination with the word Agni on account of his being fancied as three fires on account of his being the abode of the offering to Prana and on account of his being firmly stationed within—(We reply)—That (is) not (so), 'on account of the instruction about meditation in that way'—on account of the instruction about the worship of the Highest Brahman with the three worlds as its body, already described as particularised by that (Vaiśvānara) owing to Vaiśvānara having the digestive fire as his body By the words Agni etc, indeed is propounded not merely the digestive, but the highest Ātman particularised by the digestive fire If (it be asked)—How is this known? (We reply)—On account of the impossibility—on account of the impossibility of merely the digestive (fire) having as a body the three worlds The word Agni with its case-co-ordination with Vaiśvānara being admitted owing to his having the three worlds as the body, being apprehended as associated with the digestive fire denotes the Paramātman alone, particularised by that (digestive fire) owing to his having the digestive fire as his body —This is the sense As has been said by the Lord—

'I having become the Vaiśvānara (fire) have resorted to the body of living beings, helped by Prāna and Apāna (vital breaths) I digest the four-fold food' (Gita 15 14)

The sense is—Having become one with the digestive fire as the body Therefore, is taught here the worship of the one particularised by it And

पुरुषमपि चैनमधीयते वाजसनेयिनः—

'स एषोऽग्निर्वैश्वानरो यत्पुरुषः' (श. ब्रा. १०।६।१।११)

इति। न हि जाठरस्य केवलस्य पुरुषत्वम्। परमात्मन एव हि निरुपाधिकं पुरुषत्वम्। यथा

'सहस्रशीर्षा पुरुषः।' (श्वे. ३।१४)

'पुरुष एवेदं सर्वम्' (श्वे. ३।१५)

इत्यादौ ॥ २७ ॥

अत एव न देवता भूतं च ॥ २८ ॥

उक्तेभ्य एव हेतुभ्यो देवतायाश्च तृतीयस्य महाभूतस्यापि न वैश्वानरत्वप्रसङ्गः ॥ २८ ॥

[177] साक्षादप्यविरोधं जैमिनिः ॥ २९ ॥

वैश्वानरसमानाधिकरणस्याग्निशब्दस्य जाठराग्निशरीरतया तद्विशिष्टस्य परमात्मनो वाचकत्वम्, तथैव परमात्मन उपास्यत्वं चोक्तम्। जैमिनिस्त्वाचार्यो वैश्वानरशब्दवदग्निशब्दस्यापि परमात्मन एव साक्षादव्यवधानेन वाचकत्वे न कश्चिद्विरोधः, इति मन्यते। एतदुक्तं भवति — यथा वैश्वानरशब्दः साधारणोऽपि परमात्मासाधारणधर्मविशेषितो विश्वेषां नराणां नेतृत्वादिना गुणेन परमात्मानमेवाभिदधाति, इति निश्चीयते, एवमग्निशब्दोऽपि, अग्रनयनादिना येनैव गुणेन योगाज्ज्वलने वर्तते तस्यैव गुणस्य निरुपा-

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further, the Vājasaneyins read of him as even a Puruṣa—

'*That this one, Agni Vaiśvānara (is) what Puruṣa (is).*' (Śa. Brā. 10·6·1·11)

Not, indeed, is the nature of the Puruṣa belonging to merely the digestive fire. The nature of the Puruṣa without any limiting adjuncts, belongs to the Paramātman alone, as in

'*The thousand-headed Puruṣa*' (Śve. 3·14)

'*Puruṣa alone (is) all this*' (Śve. 3·15)

॥ 27 ॥

For this reason also, neither the Deity, nor the element. ॥ 28 ॥

For the reasons mentioned already, there can be no undesirable contingency of the Deity or even the third element being the Vaiśvānara. ॥ 28 ॥

[177] There is no contradiction even directly—says Jaimini ॥ 29 ॥

It has already been mentioned that the word Agni in case-co-ordination with Vaiśvānara is expressive of the Paramātman particularised by it, owing to his having the digestive fire as his body, and likewise in the same way, that the Paramātman is the object of worship. The preceptor Jaimini, however, is of opinion that the word Agni also, like the word Vaiśvānara, being directly—without anything intervening—expressive of the Paramātman alone, there is no contradiction whatsoever. This is what is intended to be stated—Just as it is ascertained that the word Vaiśvānara, although a common term, being characterised by the attributes peculiar to the Paramātman, denotes the Paramātman alone, owing to the qualities such as being the leader of all men; in the same way, the word Agni *also denotes in this Section*,

धिकस्य काष्ठागतस्य परमात्मनि संभवात्, अस्मिन्प्रकरणे परमात्मासाधारणधर्मविशेषितः परमात्मानमेवाभिधत्ते, इति ॥ २९ ॥

'यस्त्वेतमेवं प्रादेशमात्रमभिविमानम्'　　　　(छा. ५।१८।१)

इत्यपरिच्छिन्नस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणो द्युप्रभृतिपृथिव्यन्तावयवस्य प्रादेशसंबन्धिन्या मात्रया परिच्छिन्नत्वं कथमुपपद्यते ? तत्राह—

अभिव्यक्तेरित्याश्मरथ्यः ॥ ३० ॥

उपासकाभिव्यक्त्यर्थं प्रादेशमात्रत्वं परमात्मनः, इति, आश्मरथ्य आचार्यो मन्यते। द्यौर्मूर्धादित्यश्चक्षुर्वायुः प्राण आकाशो मध्यकाय आपो बस्तिः पृथिवी पादौ, इति द्युप्रभृतिप्रदेशसंबन्धिन्या मात्रया परिच्छिन्नत्वं कृत्स्नमभिव्याप्तवतो विगतमानस्य हि, अभिव्यक्तेरेव हेतोर्भवति ॥ ३० ॥

मूर्धप्रभृत्यवयवविशेषैः पुरुषधर्मविधत्वं परस्य ब्रह्मणः किमर्थम् ? इति चेत्— तत्राह—

अनुस्मृतेर्बादरिः ॥ ३१ ॥

तथा, उपासनार्थमिति बादरिराचार्यो मन्यते—

Paramātman alone, being characterised by the attributes peculiar to Paramātman, on account of the possibility in Paramātman of the same quality without any adjuncts and carried to its farthest limit—the quality viz. carrying in front etc; used in the case of fire on account of etymology. ॥29॥

How is it reasonable that the unlimited Highest Brahman having limbs beginning with the heaven and ending with the earth, should be limited by the measure connected with the span-region, in (the passage)

'Who again (worships) thus, this one (Ātman Vaiśvānara), merely a span long in measure.'　　　　(Chā. 5·18·1)

—There the Sūtrakāra says—

(Brahman is said to be Prādeśamātra) on account of manifestation— So (says) Āśmarathya ॥ 30 ॥

The preceptor Āśmarathya is of opinion that the Paramātman is of the measure of the span for manifestation for the worshipper. The heaven (is) the head, the Sun, the eye, the wind, the Prāṇa; Ākāśa, the trunk; waters, the bladder; the Earth, the feet—Here (in the case of the Paramātman) pervading everything beyond all measure, the limited nature by the measure associated with the regions, heaven etc., is indeed, on account of manifestation itself. ॥30॥

If it be objected—For what purpose is, in the case of the Highest Brahman, the possession of human attributes by means of particular limbs beginning with the head?—There (the Sūtrakāra) says—

On account of meditation—(says) Bādari. ॥ 31 ॥

For the worship in that manner,—opines the preceptor Bādari—for, in (the passage)

'यस्त्वेतमेवं प्रादेशमात्रमभिविमानमात्मानं वैश्वानरमुपास्ते स सर्वेषु लोकेषु सर्वेषु भूतेषु सर्वेष्वात्मस्वन्नमत्ति' (छा. ५।१८।१)

इति ब्रह्मप्राप्तये ह्युपासनमुपदिश्यते। एतमेवमिति—उक्तप्रकारेण पुरुषाकारमित्यर्थः। स सर्वेषु लोकेषु सर्वेषु भूतेषु सर्वेष्वात्मसु वर्तमानं यदन्नं भोग्यं तदत्ति। सर्वत्र वर्तमानं स्वत एवानवधिकातिशयानन्दं ब्रह्मानुभवति। यत्तु सर्वैः कर्मवश्यैरात्मभिः प्रत्येकमनन्यसाधारणमन्नं भुज्यते तन्मुमुक्षुभिस्त्याज्यत्वादिह न गृह्यते ॥ ३१ ॥

यदि परमात्मा वैश्वानरः, कथं तर्हुरःप्रभृतीनां वेद्यादित्वोपदेशः, यावता जाठराग्निपरिग्रह एवैतदुपपद्यते ? इति, अत्राह—

संपत्तेरिति जैमिनिस्तथा हि दर्शयति ॥ ३२ ॥

अस्य परमात्मन एव वैश्वानरस्य द्युप्रभृतिपृथिव्यन्तशरीरस्य समाराधनभूताया उपासकैरहरहः क्रियमाणायाः प्राणाहुतेः, अग्निहोत्रत्वसंपादनाय, अयमुरःप्रभृतीनां वेदित्वाद्युपदेशः, इति जैमिनिराचार्यो मन्यते। तथाहि—परमात्मोपासनोचितमेव फलं प्राणाहुत्याग्निहोत्रसंपत्तिं च दर्शयति, इयं श्रुतिः—

'Who again worships thus this Ātman Vaiśvānara, merely a span long in measure; he eats food in all the worlds, in all the beings and in all the Ātmans.' (Chā. 5·18·1)

is indeed taught the worship for the sake of attainment to Brahman. Etamevam —that is to say, of the human form in the manner described before. What food—object of enjoyment—is existing in all the worlds, in all the beings, in all the Ātmans, that he eats.—Of his own accord he experiences Brahman existing everywhere and with unsurpassed excessive bliss. Whatever food singly—not shared by others—is eaten by all Ātmans subject to Karman, that is not taken up (referred to) here as it is fit to be abandoned by those desirous of salvation. ॥ 31 ॥

If the Paramātman (is) the Vaiśvānara, how can there be the teaching about the chest etc., being the altar etc.?—Because this becomes reasonable by the acceptance of only the digestive fire—Here says (the Sūtrakāra)—

On account of the completion, says Jaimini; to the same effect, shows the Śruti. ॥ 32 ॥

The preceptor Jaimini opines that this teaching about the chest etc. being the altar etc. (is) for establishing the nature of fire-sacrifice in the case of the Prāṇa-oblation, which is the means of worship of this Vaiśvānara, who is no other than the Paramātman, having a body beginning with the heaven and ending with the earth—which is gone through by the worshippers day after day. To the same effect, shows this Śruti the fruit appropriate for the worship of the Paramātman himself and by the Prāṇa-oblation the completion of the fire-sacrifice—

'स य इदमविद्वानग्निहोत्रं जुहोति यथाङ्गारानपोह्य भस्मनि जुहुयात्तादृक्तत्स्यात् । अथ य एतदेवं विद्वानग्निहोत्रं जुहोति तस्य सर्वेषु लोकेषु सर्वेषु भूतेषु सर्वेष्वात्मसु हुतं भवति । तद्यथेषीकातूलमग्नौ प्रोतं प्रदूयेतैवं हास्य सर्वे पाप्मानः प्रदूयन्ते'
(छा. ५।२४।१-२-३)

इति ॥ ३२ ॥

आमनन्ति चैनमस्मिन् ॥ ३३ ॥

एनं परमपुरुषं द्युमूर्धत्वादिविशिष्टं वैश्वानरमस्मिन्नुपासकशरीरे प्राणाहुत्याधारत्वायामनन्ति च ।

'तस्य ह वा एतस्यात्मनो वैश्वानरस्य मूर्धैव सुतेजाः' (छा. ५।१८।२)

इत्यादिना । अयमर्थः—

'यस्त्वेतमेवं प्रादेशमात्रमभिविमानमात्मानं वैश्वानरमुपास्ते' (छा. ५।१८।१)

इति त्रैलोक्यशरीरस्य परमात्मनो वैश्वानरस्योपासनं विधाय,

'सर्वेषु लोकेषु' (छा. ५।१८।१)

इत्यादिना ब्रह्मप्राप्तिं च फलमुपदिश्य, अस्यैवोपासनस्याङ्गभूतं प्राणाग्निहोत्रम्

'तस्य ह वा एतस्य' (छा. ५।१८।२)

'He who, an ignorant one, performs this fire-sacrifice,—that would be as one having left off the live coal were to offer oblations in the ashes. On the other hand, he who, one knowing thus performs the fire-sacrifice, in his case the offering is for all the worlds, for all the beings and for all the Ātmans. It is like this—As the Isīkā-cotton scattered over the fire, is completely burnt away; so are burnt away all his sins.' ॥ 32॥ (Chā. 5·24·1–2–3)

And they speak of him in this ॥ 33 ॥

And they speak of this—the highest Puruṣa, Vaiśvānara, characterised by having the heaven as the head etc , as being the resort of the Prāṇa-oblation in this,—the body of the worshipper,—by (the passage) beginning with

'Of this, indeed, that same Ātman Vaiśvānara, the head itself is (heaven) of great lustre.' (Chā. 5·18·2)

etc. This is the sense—Having (first) enjoined the worship of the Vaiśvānara, the Paramātman having the three worlds as his body in (the passage)

'Who again worships thus this Ātman Vaiśvānara, merely a span long in measure'. (Chā. 5·18·1)

and having taught the fruit, the attainment to Brahman by the passage beginning with

'In all the worlds' (Chā. 5·18·1)

the Sruti teaches the Prāna fire-sacrifice, a part of this worship itself, by the passage beginning with

'Of him, verily, of this one' (Chā. 5 18·2)

इत्यादिनोपदिशति । यः पूर्वमुपास्यतयोपदिष्टो वैश्वानरः, तस्यावयवभूतानग्न्यादित्यादीन्, सुतेजोविश्वरूपादिनामधेयान्, उपासकशरीरे मूर्धादिपादान्तेषु संपादयति, इति मूर्धैव सुतेजाः, उपासकस्य मूर्धैव परमात्ममूर्धभूता द्यौः, इत्यर्थः । चक्षुर्विश्वरूपः, आदित्य इत्यर्थः । प्राणः पृथग्वर्त्मा, वायुरित्यर्थः । संदेहो बहुलः, उपासकस्य मध्यकाय एव परमात्ममध्यकायभूत आकाश इत्यर्थः । बस्तिरेव रयिः, अस्य बस्तिरेव तदवयवभूता आप इत्यर्थः । पृथिव्येव पादौ, अस्य पादावेव तत्पादभूता पृथिवी, इत्यर्थः । एवमुपासकः स्वशरीरे परमात्मानं त्रैलोक्यशरीरं वैश्वानरं संनिहितमनुसंधाय, स्वकीयान्, उरोलोमहृदयमनआस्यानि प्राणाहुत्याधारस्य परमात्मनो वैश्वानरस्य वेदिबर्हिर्गार्हपत्यान्वाहार्यपचनाहवनीयान्, अग्निहोत्रोपकरणभूतान्परिकल्प्य, प्राणाहुतेश्चाग्निहोत्रत्वं परिकल्प्य, एवंविधेन प्राणाग्निहोत्रेण परमात्मानं वैश्वानरमाराधयेत्, इति

'उर एव वेदिर्लोमानि बर्हिर्हृदयं गार्हपत्यः' (छा. ५।१८।२)

इत्यादिनोपदिश्यते । अतः, परमात्मा पुरुषोत्तम एव वैश्वानर इति सिद्धम् ॥ ३३ ॥

वैश्वानराधिकरणं समाप्तम् । (६)

इति श्रीभगवद्रामानुजविरचिते शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्ये प्रथमस्याध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः ॥ २ ॥

—what Vaiśvānara was taught as being the object of worship before, the Śruti equates with Agni, the Sun etc., that are the limbs of that same, having the appellation Sutejas, Viśvarūpa etc., with the (limbs) beginning with the head and ending with the feet belonging to the body of the worshipper—thus—the head itself (is) the Sutejas,—the head itself of the worshipper is the heaven which is the head of the Paramātman; the eye—Viśvarūpa,—that is to say, the Sun; Prāṇa—the Pṛthagvartman, that is to say, the wind. Sandeho Bahulah—the sense is that the trunk itself of the worshipper is the Ākāśa, forming the trunk of the Paramātman Bastireva rayih—his bladder itself is the waters that are his parts. Pṛthivyeva Pādau means his feet themselves are the earth which is his feet. Thus, the worshipper having referred to the Paramātman, the Vaiśvānara with the three worlds as his body present in his body; having (respectively) equated his own chest, hair, heart, mind and mouth, with altar, sacrificial grass, Gārhapatya, Anvāhāryapacana, and Ahavanīya, the means for the fire-sacrifice for the Paramātman Vaiśvānara, the abode of the fire-oblation, and having equated the Prāṇa-oblation with the fire-sacrifice, should be worshipping the Paramātman Vaiśvānara by such kind of Prāṇa-fire-sacrifice—this is taught by (the equations or superimpositions) in

'The chest itself (is) the altar; the hair, the sacrificial grass; the heart, the Gārhapatya' (Chā. 5·18·2)

etc. Therefore, it is established that the Paramātman, the highest Puruṣa, himself is the Vaiśvānara ॥ 33 ॥

Here ends the Vaiśvānarādhikaraṇa (6)

Here ends the second Quarter of the first Chapter (Adhyāya) in the commentary on the Śārīrakamīmāṁsā, composed by the Illustrious Revered Rāmānuja.

[178] प्रथमाध्याये तृतीयः पादः

द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं स्वशब्दात् ॥ १ ॥ (अधिकरण १ — सूत्राणि १—७)

आथर्वणिका अधीयते—

'यस्मिन्द्यौः पृथिवी चान्तरिक्षमोतं मनः सह प्राणैश्च सर्वैः ।
तमेवैकं जानथात्मानमन्या वाचो विमुञ्चथामृतस्यैष सेतुः ॥' (मु २।२।५)

इति । तत्र संशयः—किमयं द्युपृथिव्यादीनामायतनत्वेन श्रूयमाणो जीवः, उत परमात्मा ? इति । किं युक्तम् ? जीव इति । कुतः ?

'अरा इव रथनाभौ संहता यत्र नाड्यः ।
स एषोऽन्तश्चरते बहुधा जायमानः ॥' (मु २।२।६)

इति परस्मिञ्छ्लोके पूर्ववाक्यप्रस्तुतं द्युपृथिव्याद्यायतनं यत्रेति सप्तम्यन्तेन परामृश्य, तस्य नाड्याधारत्वमुक्त्वा, पुनरपि

'स एषोऽन्तश्चरते बहुधा जायमानः' (मु २।२।६)

इति तस्य बहुधा जायमानत्वं चोच्यते । नाडीसंबन्धो देवादिरूपेण बहुधा जायमानत्वं च जीवस्यैव धर्मः । अस्मिन्नपि श्लोके

'ओतं मनः सह प्राणैश्च सर्वैः' (मु २।२।५)

The Third Quarter of the First Chapter

[178] The Paramātman is the abode of heaven, earth etc, on account of (the use of) the particular words themselves ॥ 1 ॥
(Adhikarana 1 Sūtras 1-7)

The followers of the Atharvan read—

'In whom heaven earth, likewise the mid region, and mind along with all vital breaths are woven — know him alone to be the one Ātman, give up other words, this one is the dam for immortality' (Mu 2 2 5)

There arises a doubt — Is this one mentioned in the Sruti as being the abode of heaven earth etc the Jīva or the Paramātman? What (is) proper? Jīva Whence? In the next verse—

'Like the spokes in the nave of the chariot, where the arteries are gathered together this one moves about inside, being born in various ways (Mu 2 2 6)

—having referred again by (the word) Yatra in the locative case to the abode of heaven earth etc introduced in the previous passage (and) having spoken of his being the support of the arteries once again by (the passage)

This one moves within being variously born' (Mu 2 2 6)

, is mentioned his being variously born The connection with the arteries and being born in various ways in the form of gods etc., are the characteristics of the Jīva alone In this verse also

'And the mind along with all vital breaths is woven' (Mu. 2 2 5)

—what is being mentioned viz being the resort of the five Prānas and mind—

इति प्राणपञ्चकस्य मनसश्च, आश्रयत्वमुच्यमानं जीवधर्म एव। एवं जीवत्वे निश्चिते सति, द्युपृथिव्याद्यायतनत्वादिकं यथाकथंचित् संगमयितव्यम्, इति। एवं प्राप्ते, प्रचक्ष्महे—

[179] 'द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं स्वशब्दात्'—द्युपृथिव्यादीनामायतनं परं ब्रह्म। कुतः? स्वशब्दात्—परब्रह्मासाधारणशब्दात्।

'अमृतस्यैष सेतुः' (मु. २।२।५)

इति परस्य ब्रह्मणोऽसाधारणः शब्दः।

'तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति नान्यः पन्था अयनाय विद्यते' (श्वे. ३।८)

इति सर्वत्रोपनिषत्सु स एव, अमृतत्वप्राप्तिहेतुः श्रूयते। सिनोतेश्च बन्धनार्थत्वात् सेतुः, अमृतस्य प्रापकः, इत्यर्थः। सेतुरिव वा सेतुः। नद्यादिषु सेतुर्हि कूलस्य प्रतिलम्भकः। संसारार्णवपारभूतस्य, अमृतस्य, एष प्रतिलम्भकः, इत्यर्थः। आत्मशब्दश्च निरुपाधिकः परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि मुख्यवृत्तः। आप्नोति, इति हि, आत्मा। स्वेतरसमस्तस्य नियन्तृत्वेन व्याप्तिः, तस्यैव संभवति। अतः सोऽपि तस्यैव शब्दः।

'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्' (मु. १।१।९)

इत्यादयश्च, उपरितनाः परस्यैव ब्रह्मणः शब्दाः। नाड्याधारत्वं तस्यापि संभवति।

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is a characteristic of the Jiva alone. Thus its having the nature of Jiva being determined, being the abode etc. of heaven earth etc. has got to be construed somehow or other— This (prima-facie. view) being reached, we say (in reply)—

[179] 'The abode of heaven, earth etc., on account of (the use of) the particular words themselves'— The highest Brahman is the abode of heaven, earth etc.—Whence? 'On account of (the use of) particular words themselves, on account of the use of words peculiar to the Highest Brahman.

'This one is the dam of immortality,' (Mu. 2·2·5)

this is the expression peculiar to the Highest Brahman. In (the passage)

'Knowing him thus, he becomes immortal here. There is no other way for salvation.' (S've 3·8)

and everywhere in the *Upaniṣads* the same one (the Paramātman) is described as the cause of the attainment of immortality. On account of the root Si conveying the meaning of binding, (the word) Setu means —one who takes to immortality. Or, Setu means— like a Setu. In the case of rivers etc. Setu (dam) is a barrier for the bank ; that is to say, this one is the barrier for immortality which is on the other side of the ocean of worldly existence. The word Ātman without any limiting adjuncts, has its primary sense denoting the Highest Brahman. Ātman is, indeed, one who secures. In his case alone, is possible the pervading nature, by being the controller of everything else other than himself. Therefore, that also is the expression referring to him alone.

'Who omniscient, all-knower' (Mu. 1·1·9)

and others—such subsequent words refer to the Highest Brahman alone. Being

'संतत शिराभिस्तु लम्बत्याकाशसन्निभम्'　　(ना १३।२)

इत्यारभ्य,

'तस्याः शिखाया मध्ये परमात्मा व्यवस्थितः'　　(ना १३।२)

इति श्रवणात्।

'बहुधा जायमानः'　　(मु २।२।६)

इत्यपि परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि संगच्छते।

'अजायमानो बहुधा विजायते।
तस्य धीराः परिजानन्ति योनिम्॥'　　(तै आ ३।१३)

इति देवादीनां समाश्रयणीयत्वाय तत्तज्जातीयरूपसंस्थानगुणधर्मसमन्वितः स्वकीयं स्वभावम्, अजहदेव स्वेच्छया बहुधा विजायते परः पुरुषः, इत्यभिधानात्। स्मृतिरपि

'अजोऽपि सन्नव्ययात्मा भूतानामीश्वरोऽपि सन्।
प्रकृतिं स्वामधिष्ठाय संभवाम्यात्ममायया॥'　　(गीता ४।६)

इति। मनःप्रभृतिजीवोपकरणाधारत्वं च सर्वाधारस्य परस्यैवोपपद्यते॥ १॥

[180] इतश्च परमपुरुषः—

मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशाच्च॥ २॥

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the support of the arteries is possible also in its case, on account of the description in the Sruti—

'The Paramātman is well established in the midst of that flame'　　(Na 13 2)

beginning with

'Ceaselessly, by the arteries, however, he hangs lustrous like the sky　　(Na 13 2)

'Born in various ways'　　(Mu 2 2 6)

also can be properly construed with the Highest Brahman, on account of the description in the (Sruti) passage

'Not being born he is born in various ways, the wise men know well his birth'　　(Tait Ā 3 13)

that the highest Purusa is born at will, endowed with the form configuration qualities and characteristics belonging to the various species without even abandoning his own nature for being fit to be resorted to by the gods etc. The Smrti also (declares) to the same effect —

'Although being unborn (though) of an imperishable nature, though being the overlord of creatures presiding over my own Prakrti I am born by my own wonderful power　　(Gita 4 6)

Being the abode of the means (for the use) of the Jiva mind etc, is appropriate in the case of the Highest alone, the support of all ॥ 1 ॥

[180] And for this reason also the highest Purusa (is the abode)—

And on account of the reference to his being approached by the Released ॥ 2 ॥

अयं द्युपृथिव्याद्यायतनभूतः पुरुषः संसारबन्धनान्मुक्तैरपि प्राप्यतया व्यपदिश्यते—

'यदा पश्यः पश्यते रुक्मवर्णं कर्तारमीशं पुरुषं ब्रह्मयोनिम् ।
तदा विद्वान्पुण्यपापे विधूय निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति ॥' (मु. ३।१।३)

'यथा नद्यः स्यन्दमानाः समुद्रेऽस्तं गच्छन्ति नामरूपे विहाय ।
तथा विद्वान्नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम् ॥' (मु. ३।२।८)

इति । संसारबन्धाद्विमुक्ता एव हि विधूतपुण्यपापाः, निरञ्जना नामरूपाभ्यां विमुक्ताश्च । पुण्यपापनिबन्धनाचित्संसर्गप्रयुक्तनामरूपभाक्त्वमेव हि संसारः । अतो विधूतपुण्यपापैर्निरञ्जनैः प्रकृतिसंसर्गरहितैः परेण ब्रह्मणा परमसाम्यमापन्नैः प्राप्यतया निर्दिष्टो द्युपृथिव्याद्यायतनभूतः पुरुषः परं ब्रह्मैव ॥ २ ॥

एवं परब्रह्मासाधारणशब्दादिभिः परमेव ब्रह्म, इति प्रसाध्य, प्रत्यगात्मासाधारणशब्दाभावाच्च, अयं परः, एव, इत्याह—

नानुमानमतच्छब्दात्प्राणभृच्च ॥ ३ ॥

This Purusa who is the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc. is referred to as fit to be approached even by those released from the bondage of worldly existence, in

'When the Seer sees the Purusa golden-coloured, the agent, the Controller, born of Brahman, then the wise one, having shaken off merit and demerit (and thus becoming) blotless, attains to the maximum equality (resemblance)' (Mu. 3 1 3)

'As rivers trickling down, disappear into the sea, giving up (their individual) names and forms; so, the wise one completely freed from name and form goes unto the shining Purusa higher than the high.' (Mu. 3 2·8)

Those free from the bondage of the worldly existence alone are those with merits and sins shaken off, blotless, and freed from name and form. Worldly existence is, indeed, the sharing of name and form prompted by the contact with the non-sentient dependent upon merits and sins. Therefore, the Purusa, the abode of heaven, earth etc., (and) pointed out as being fit to be reached by those with merits and sins shaken off, those that are blotless, bereft of the contact with the Prakrti, (and) who have attained to the maximum resemblance with the Highest Brahman, is the Highest Brahman alone ॥ 2 ॥

Thus having proved that it is the Highest Brahman by the words peculiar to the Highest Brahman, (the Sūtrākara) says, —even on account of the absence of the words peculiar to the inmost Self, this one is the Highest alone

(The abode is) not the (Pradhāna to be inferred by) inference, on account of the absence of the word (denoting) that and (not) the Prāna-bearer (the Jīva) ॥ 3 ॥

यथा, अस्मिन्प्रकरणे प्रधानप्रतिपादकशब्दाभावात्, प्रधानं न प्रतिपाद्यम्, एवं प्राणभृत्, अपि, इत्यर्थः। अनुमीयते, इति, अनुमानं परोक्तं प्रधानमुच्यते। अनुमानप्रमितत्वात्, आनुमानम्, इति वा। अतच्छब्दात्—तद्वाचिशब्दाभावात्, इत्यर्थः अर्थाभावे यत्, अव्ययम्, इति, अव्ययीभावः ॥ ३ ॥

[181] इतश्चायं न प्रत्यगात्मा—

भेदव्यपदेशात् ॥ ४ ॥

'समाने वृक्षे पुरुषो निमग्नोऽनीशया शोचति मुह्यमानः ।
जुष्टं यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीशमस्य महिमानमिति वीतशोकः ॥' (मु. ३।१।२; श्वे ४।७)

इत्यादिभिर्जीवाद्विलक्षणत्वेन, अयं व्यपदिश्यते। अनीशया—भोग्यभूतया प्रकृत्या—मुह्यमानः शोचति जीवः। अयं यदा स्वस्मादन्यं सर्वस्येशं प्रीयमाणमस्येश्वरस्य महिमानं च निखिलजगन्नियमनरूपं पश्यति तदा वीतशोको भवति ॥ ४ ॥

प्रकरणात् ॥ ५ ॥

प्रकरणं चेदं परस्य ब्रह्मणः, इति,
'अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः' (ब्र सू १।२।२२)
इत्यत्रैव प्रतिपादनात्। नाडीसंबन्धबहुधाजायमानत्वमनःप्राणाधारत्वैश्च प्रकरणविच्छेदा-

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Just as in this Section, Pradhāna is not the thing propounded on account of the absence of the words propounding Pradhāna, similarly, the Prāna-bearer also —this is the sense. Anumāna is what is inferred,—the Pradhāna mentioned by others, is spoken of; or Anumāna (so called) on account of its being understood by inference. Atacchabdāt, that is to say, on account of the absence of the word denoting that. (Atat—*na tat* is) an Avyayībhāva (adverbial compound), indeclinable, there being the negation of an entity. ॥3॥

[181] And for this reason also, not the inmost Atman—

On account of the reference to difference ॥ 4 ॥

By such passages as—

'On the same tree, the Purusa sunk deep, being infatuated owing to helplessness, feels aggrieved; when he perceives another, the acceptable Lord, his greatness, then, he has his grief removed.' (Mu.3·1·7; Śve. 4·7)

this one is referred to as being different from the Jiva. Being infatuated, Anīśayā—by the Prakrti that has become the object of enjoyment, the Jiva grieves. When this one sees the Controller of all, other than himself, satisfied, and the greatness of this Lord, in the form of the regulating of the entire world, then he becomes free from grief. ॥ 4 ॥

On account of the context ॥ 5 ॥

That this is the context about the Highest Brahman is propounded just in (the Sūtra)

'The one possessed of invisibility etc., on account of the statement of the characteristics.' (Br. Sū. I. 2. 22)

We have removed here merely the doubt about the abrupt breaking of the

शङ्कामात्रम्, अत्र पर्यहार्म्म ॥ ५ ॥

स्थित्यदनाभ्यां च ॥ ६ ॥

'द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते ।
तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति ॥' (मु. ३।१।१)

इत्येकस्य कर्मफलादनम्, अन्यस्य च कर्मफलमनश्नत एव दीप्यमानतया शरीरान्तःस्थितिमात्रं प्रतिपाद्यते। तत्र कर्मफलमनश्नन् दीप्यमान एव सर्वज्ञोऽमृतसेतुः सर्वात्मा द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं भवितुमर्हति, न पुनः कर्मफलमदन्, शोचन् प्रत्यगात्मा। अतो द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं परमात्मेति सिद्धम् ॥ ६ ॥

द्युभ्वाद्यधिकरणं समाप्तम् (१)

[182] भूमा संप्रसादादध्युपदेशात् ॥ ७ ॥ (अधिकरण २, सू. ७–८)

इदमामनन्ति छन्दोगाः—

'यत्र नान्यत्पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति नान्यद्विजानाति स भूमा ।
अथ यत्रान्यत्पश्यत्यन्यच्छृणोत्यन्यद्विजानाति तदल्पम् ॥' (छा. ७।२४।१)

इति। तत्र, अयं भूमशब्दो भावप्रत्ययान्तो व्युत्पाद्यते। तथाहि — पृथ्व्यादिषु बहुशब्दः पठ्यते। ततः

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context, owing to the connection with the arteries, being born in various ways, and being the support of the mind and the Prāṇa. ॥ 5 ॥

And on account of abiding and eating. ॥ 6 ॥

In (the passage)

'Two birds (with good feathers) being together, friends, cling on to the same tree; one of the two eats the sweet fruit of the Pippala; and not eating, another continues to look on' (Mu. 3·1·1)

is propounded eating (enjoying) the fruit of Karman on the part of one, and merely abiding in the body owing to being refulgent even though not eating (enjoying) the fruit of Karman, on the part of the other. There the one alone, not eating (enjoying) the fruit of Karman (and) refulgent, omniscient, the bridge (dam) for immortality, the Atman of all,— deserves to be the abode of heaven, earth etc, (and) not again the inmost Atman, eating (enjoying) the fruit of Karman (and) grieving. Therefore, it is established that the Paramātman (is) the abode of the heaven, the earth etc. ॥ 6 ॥

Here ends the Dyubhvādyadhikaraṇa (1)

[182] The Bhūman (is the Paramātman) on account of the teaching in addition to the deep-sleep-calm ॥ 7 ॥ (Adhikaraṇa 2—Sūtras 7–8)

The followers of the Chandoga, ordain as under—

'Where one sees not anything else, one hears not anything else, one knows not anything else,—that (is) the Bhūman (Big): but where one sees anything else, one hears anything else, knows anything else,—that is Little.' (Chā. 7·24·1)

There this word Bhūman ending with a termination indicating a state (of being) is dilated upon etymologically. To explain the same in detail—

'पृथ्वादिभ्य इमनिज्वा' (पा. सू. ५।१।१२२)

इति, इमनिच्प्रत्यये कृते

'बहोर्लोपो भू च बहोः' (पा. सू. ६।४।१५८)

इति प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोर्विकारे 'भूम' इति भवति। भूमा-बहुत्वम्, इत्यर्थः। अत्र च, अयं बहुशब्दो वैपुल्यवाची न संख्यावाची।

यत्रान्यत्पश्यति 'तदल्पम्' (छा. ७·२४·१)

इति, अल्पप्रतियोगित्वश्रवणात्। अल्पशब्दनिर्दिष्टधर्मिप्रतियोगिप्रतिपादनपरत्वादेव धर्मिपरश्च निश्चीयते. न धर्ममात्रपरः। तदेवं भूमेति विपुलः, इत्यर्थः। वैपुल्यविशेषश्च, इह, आत्मा, इत्यवगतः।

'तरति शोकमात्मवित्' (छा ७।१।३)

इति प्रक्रम्य भूमविज्ञानमुपदिश्य,

'आत्मैवेदं सर्वम्' (छा. ७।२५।२)

इति तस्यैवोपसंहारात्।

[183] अत्र संशय्यते — किमयं भूमगुणविशिष्टः प्रत्यगात्मा, उत परमात्मा ? इति। किं युक्तम्? प्रत्यगात्मा, इति। कुतः?

The word Bahu is mentioned among (the words) Pṛthu etc. Then, when the termination *man*, is applied in accordance with the Sūtra—

'To Pṛthu etc. (the termination) I or man' (Pā. Sū. 5·1·122)

and according to the Sūtra—

'There is the elision of Bahu, and there is Bhū (in place) of Bahu' (Pā. Sū. 6·4·158)

when there is the modification in the stem and termination, (the word) Bhūman is formed. Bhūman, that is to say Bahutvam (bigness). Here, again, the word Bahu denotes bigness, and not number, on account of the mention in the Sruti of its being the counter-entiny of Alpa (little), in (the passage)

'Where one sees anything else ..., ... that is Little.' (Chā. 7·24·1)

—And definitely on account of its being meant for propounding the counter-entiny, viz. the object possessed of characteristics pointed out by the word Alpa, it is ascertained that (this word) points out to the object possessed of characteristics, (and) not merely the characteristics. Thus, therefore, Bhūman, that is to say, big—This is the sense. And here the Ātman is apprehended as having the distinction of bigness, on account of the winding up of the same (Ātman) in

'Ātman alone is all this' (Chā. 7·25·2)

after having taught the knowledge about Bhūman, beginning with

'The Ātman-knower crosses over grief.' (Chā. 7·1·3)

[183] Here it is doubted—Is this one characterised by the quality of bigness, the inmost Ātman, or the Highest Ātman? What (is) proper? The inmost Ātman. Whence? In respect of objects beginning with Name

'श्रुतं ह्येवमेव भगवद्दृशेभ्यस्तरति शोकमात्मविद्' (छा. ७।१।३)

इति, आत्मजिज्ञासया, उपसेदुषे नारदाय नामादिप्राणपर्यन्तेषु, उपास्यतयोपदिष्टेषु

'अस्ति भगवो नाम्नो भूयः' (छा. ७।१।५)

'अस्ति भगवो वाचो भूय.' (छा. ७।२।२)

इत्यादयः प्रश्नाः,

'वाग्वाव नाम्नो भूयसी' (छा ७।२।१)

'मनो वाव वाचो भूयः' (छा. ७।३।१)

इत्यादीनि च प्रतिवचनानि प्राणात्प्राचीनेषु दृश्यन्ते। प्राणे तु न पश्यामः। अतः, प्राणपर्यन्त एवायम्, आत्मोपदेशः, इति प्रतीयते। तेन, इह प्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टः प्राणसहचारी प्रत्यगात्मैव, न वायुविशेषमात्रम्।

'प्राणो ह पिता प्राणो ह माता' (छा. ७।१५।१)

इत्यादयश्च प्राणस्य चेतनतामवगमयन्ति।

'पितृहा...मातृहा' (छा. ७।१५।२)

इत्यादिना सप्राणेषु पितृप्रभृतिषु, उपमर्दकारिणि हिंसकत्वनिमित्तोपक्रोशवचनात्। तेष्वेव

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and up to Prāna, taught as being the objects of worship, to Nārada, who had approached as an humble pupil with a desire to know Ātman, (saying)

'This very thing has, indeed, been heard by me, from people like Your Reverence, that the Ātman knower crosses over grief.' (Chā. 7·1 3)

—There are seen questions in respect of (entities) prior to Prāna such as

'Is there, Your Reverence, something bigger than name?' (Chā. 7 1·5)

'Is there, Your Reverence, something bigger than speech?' (Chā. 7·2·2)

and the answers as

'Speech, verily, (is) bigger than name'. (Chā 7·2 1)

'Mind, verily, (is) bigger than speech'. (Chā. 7 3·1)

But (this) we do not notice in the case of Prāna Therefore, it is apprehended that this instruction about Ātman ends only up to Prāna, so that here the one pointed out by the word Prāna, is the inmost Ātman, the companion of Prāna and not merely a particular wind. The Sruti passages like

'Prāna, verily, (is) the father, Prāna, verily, (is) the mother' (Chā. 7·15 1)

make one comprehend the sentient nature of Prāna, on account of the words of reproach consequent on being the slayer in respect of one insulting the father etc, while living, by (words)

'The slayer of the father .. the slayer of the mother' (Chā 7·15·2)

and on account of the absence of the words of reproach in respect of even one

विगतप्राणेषु, अत्यन्तोपमर्दकारिण्यपि, उपक्रोशाभाववचनाच्च, हिंसायोग्यश्चेतन एव प्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टः । अप्राणेषु स्थावरेष्वपि चेतनेषु, उपमर्दभावाभावयोर्हिंसातदभावदर्शनात्, अयं हिंसायोग्यतया निर्दिष्टः प्राणः प्रत्यगात्मैव, इति निश्चीयते । अत एव च, अरनाभिदृष्टान्ताद्युपासनेन प्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टः परः, इति न भ्रमयितव्यम् । परस्य हिंसाप्रसङ्गाभावात् । जीवात्, इतरस्य तद्भोग्यभोगोपकरणभूतस्य कृत्स्नस्य, अचिद्वस्तुनो जीवायत्तस्थितित्वेन प्रत्यगात्मन्येव, अरनाभिदृष्टान्तोपपत्तेश्च । अयमेव च प्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टो भूमा । अस्ति भगवः प्राणाद्भूयः ? इति प्रश्नस्य, अदो वाव प्राणाद्भूयः, इति प्रतिवचनस्य च, अभावात्, भूमसंशब्दनात्प्राक्प्राणप्रकरणस्याविच्छेदात् ।

किं च, प्राणवेदिनोऽतिवादित्वमुक्त्वा

'तमेवेष तु वा अतिवदति' (छा. ७।१६।१)

इति प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्य

'यः सत्येनातिवदति' (छा. ७।१६।१)

इति तस्य सत्यवदनं प्राणोपासनाङ्गतया, उपदिश्य, उपादेयस्य सत्यवदनस्य शेषतया पूर्वनिर्दिष्टप्राणयाथात्म्यविज्ञानं

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insulting bitterly the same, when without life, one fit for being slain is the sentient alone, pointed out by the word Prāna It is ascertained that this Prāṇa pointed out as fit for being slain is the inmost Ātman on account of the perception of destruction and non-destruction, referring to the presence and absence of insult in respect of non-sentient beings and sentient beings without any vital breath. And for this very reason, it should not be wrongly considered that the one pointed out by the word Prāṇa is not the Highest owing to the introduction of the illustration of the spokes and the nave etc., on account of the absence of any contingency of injury (or, killing) regarding the Highest, and on account of the appropriate nature of the illustration of the spokes and the nave in respect of the inmost Ātman alone, because the entire non-sentient other than the Jiva, which *is* the means of the enjoyment of what is to be enjoyed by that (Jiva), has its *existence dependent upon Jiva. And this same one is the Bhūman pointed* by the word Prāna; on account of the Section about Prāna not being cut off before the direct mention of the word Bhūman, because there is the absence of the question (like)— Is there, Your Reverence, anything bigger than Prāna? —and of an answer (like)—This one, verily, is bigger than Prāna—

And further, having spoken of the over-bold statement of the Prāna-knower, having made one recognise the same in (the passage)

'Him alone, this one, verily again, speaks over-boldly'

(Chā. 7·16·1)

—having taught speaking the truth in the case of him

'Who speaks in an over-bold manner by truth'

(Chā. 7·16·1)

as being the part of the worship of Prāṇa; having taught in (the passage)

'यदा वै विजानात्यथ सत्यं वदति' (छा. ७।१७।१)

इत्युपदिश्य, तत्सिद्ध्यर्थं च मननश्रद्धानिष्ठाप्रयत्नानुपदिश्य, तदारम्भाय च प्राप्यभूत-प्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टप्रत्यगात्मस्वरूपस्य सुखरूपताज्ञानमुपदिश्य, तस्य च सुखस्य विपुलता

'भूमा त्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्यः' (छा. ७।२३।१)

इत्युपदिश्यते। तदेवं प्रत्यगात्मन एव, अविद्याविमुक्तं रूपं विपुलसुखमित्युपदिष्टम्, इति

'तरति शोकमात्मवित्' (छा. ७।१।३)

इत्युपक्रमाविरोधश्च। अतो भूमगुणविशिष्टः प्रत्यगात्मा। यत एवं भूमगुणविशिष्टः प्रत्यगात्मा, अत एव, अहमर्थे प्रत्यगात्मनि

'अहमेवाधस्तादहमुपरिष्टात्' (छा. ७।२५।१)

इत्यारभ्य,

'अहमेवेदं सर्वम्' (छा. ७।२५।१)

इति प्रत्यगात्मनो वैभवमुपदिशति। एवं प्रत्यगात्मत्वे निश्चिते सति, तदनुगुणतया वाक्यशेषो नेतव्य इति। एवं प्राप्ते, अभिधीयते—

'When, verily, he knows well, then he speaks the truth' (Chā. 7·17·1)

the right knowledge of Prāṇa as Prāṇa is, pointed out before, as being subordinate to the truthful speaking fit for being resorted to; having taught also, for its accomplishment thinking, faith, devotion, effort; and having taught the knowledge of the form of happiness pertaining to the nature of the inmost Ātman referred to by the word Prāna, which is the destination to begin with, the fulness of that happiness is taught in (the passage)

'Bhūman alone, (is) again, fit to be desired to be known.' (Chā. 7·23·1)

And in this way, there would be non-contradiction with the introduction as well,—in

'The Ātman-knower crosses over grief' (Chā. 7·1·3)

because, it is taught that the form divested of Avidyā of the inmost Ātman alone is fulness (abundance) of happiness. Therefore, the one particularised by the quality of Bhūman (is) the inmost Ātman. Because in this way the one particularised by the quality Bhūman (is) the inmost Atman,—for this very reason, having begun with

'I alone below; I above;' (Chā. 7·25·1)

in respect of the inmost Atman, the I-entity, (the Sruti) teaches the glory of the inmost Ātman in (the passage)

'I, alone, (am) all this,' (Chā. 7·25·1)

In this way when the nature of the inmost Ātman is ascertained, the remaining part of the passage has to be construed in conformity with that—This (prima-facie view) being reached, (this) is stated in reply—

[184] 'भूमा संप्रसादादध्युपदेशात्'। भूमगुणविशिष्टो न प्रत्यगात्मा, अपि तु परमात्मा। कुतः? संप्रसादादध्युपदेशात्। संप्रसादः प्रत्यगात्मा

> *'एष संप्रसादोऽस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते'* (छा. ८।३।४)

इति, उपनिषत्प्रसिद्धेः। संप्रसादात्प्रत्यगात्मनोऽधिकतया भूमगुणविशिष्टस्य सत्यशब्दाभिधेयस्योपदेशात्, इत्यर्थः। सत्यशब्दाभिधेयं च परं ब्रह्म। एतदुक्तं भवति—

यथा नामादिषु प्राणपर्यन्तेषु पूर्वपूर्वाधिकतयोत्तरोत्तराभिधानात् पूर्वेभ्य उत्तरेषामर्थान्तरत्वम्, एवं प्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टात्प्रत्यगात्मनोऽधिकतया भूमगुणविशिष्टो निर्दिष्टः सत्यशब्दाभिधेयः, तस्मादर्थान्तरभूत एव। अतः, सत्यशब्दनिर्दिष्ट एव भूमा, इति सत्याख्यं परं ब्रह्मैव भूमा, इत्युपदिश्यते, इति। तदाह वृत्तिकारः — भूमा त्वेवेति भूमा परं ब्रह्म। नामादिपरंपरया, आत्मन ऊर्ध्वमस्योपदेशात्, इति।

प्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टात्, अधिकतया सत्यस्योपदेशः कथमवगम्यते? इति चेत्—

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[184] 'On account of the teaching in addition to the deep-sleep-calm' the one particularised by the quality Bhūman is not the inmost Ātman, but on the other hand, the Paramātman. Whence? On account of the teaching in addition to the deep-sleep-calm. Samprasāda—the inmost Ātman, on account being well-known as such in the Upanisads—

> *'This Samprasāda rising up from this body, having attained to the highest light, emerges in his own form.'* (Chā. 8 3-4)

The sense is— On account of the instruction about the one particularised by the quality of bigness denoted by the word Satya, being more than the Samprasāda, the inmost Ātman. And the one denoted by the word Satya is the Highest Brahman. This is what is (intended to be) said—

Just as in respect of (entities) beginning with name and ending with Prāna,—each succeeding (thing) being spoken of as being superior to each preceding (thing), the succeeding (things) are separate (things) from the preceding, so, the one denoted by the word Satya pointed out as being particularised by the quality of Bhūman, as being superior to the inmost Ātman pointed out by the word Prāna, is definitely another entity from that. For this reason, the Highest Brahman, called by (the name) Satya is taught as being Bhūman, because the one pointed out by the word Satya is Bhūman. To the same effect says the Vrttikāra—Bhūman alone, again—Bhūman (means) the Highest Brahman, on account of the teaching about this as beyond the Ātman in gradual succession, beginning with name etc.

If it be objected—How is the teaching about Satya as being over and above the one pointed out by the word Prāna, known?—(We reply)—Having mentioned the Prāna-knower as talking big in

'स वा एष एवं पश्यन्नेवं मन्वान एवं विजानन्नतिवादी भवति'
(छा. ७।१५।४)

इति प्राणविदोऽतिवादित्वमुक्त्वा,

'एष तु वा अतिवदति यः सत्येनातिवदति' (छा. ७।१६।१)

इति सत्यवेदित्वेन, अतिवादिनं तुशब्देन पूर्वस्मादतिवादिनो व्यावर्तयति। अत एव

'एष तु वा अतिवदति' (छा. ७।१६।१)

इत्यत्र प्राणातिवादिनो न प्रत्यभिज्ञा। अतः, अस्यातिवादित्वनिमित्तं सत्यं पूर्वातिवादित्वनिमित्तात्प्राणादधिकम्, इति विज्ञायते।

ननु च — प्राणवेदिन एव सत्यवदनम्, अङ्गत्वेनोपदिष्टम्। अतः प्राणप्रकरणाविच्छेदः, इत्युक्तम् — नैतद्युक्तम्। तुशब्देन हि, अतिवाद्येवान्यः प्रतीयते, न तु तस्यैवातिवादिनः सत्यवदनाङ्गविशिष्टतामात्रम्। एष तु वा अग्निहोत्री यः सत्यं वदति, इत्यादिषु, अग्निहोत्र्यन्तराप्रतीतेः प्रतीतस्यैवाग्निहोत्रिणः सत्यविधानाङ्गविधानम्, इति क्लिष्टा गतिराश्रीयते। अत्र तु, अतिवाद्यन्तरत्वनिमित्तं सत्यशब्दाभिधेयं परं ब्रह्म प्रतीयते। सत्यशब्दश्च

'But he, this one, verily, seeing thus, thinking thus, knowing thus, becomes one talking big.' (Chā. 7·15·4)

(the passage)

'Who speaks in an over-bold manner by truth' (Chā. 7·16·1)

excludes by the word Tu the one talking big, owing to his knowing the Satya (truth) from the previous big-talker. For this very reason, there is no recognition of the one talking big about the Prāna in (the passage)

'But this one, verily, speaks boldly.' (Chā. 7·16·1)

Therefore, it is known that the Satya, the cause of his talking big, is superior to Prāṇa, the cause of the previous big-talking.

I say (says the objector)— Talking about Satya on the part of the Prāṇa-knower, is taught as being an auxiliary (part). And so, it is stated there is no abrupt break of the context— (Our reply is)— This is not proper. By the word Tu (but) is apprehended the big talker himself as different, and not again, only something particularised by being a part of Satyavadana (talking about the truth) in the case of that same big-talker. In (passages) like—But this, verily, the Fire-worshipper, who speaks Satya-on account of the non-apprehension of another fire-worshipper, there is the statement about the Satyavidhāna being subordinate, in the case of the Fire-worshipper already apprehended— this cumbrous course has to be resorted to (in explaining the passage). Here, however, the Highest Brahman denoted by the word Satya is apprehended as the cause of another big-talker being there. The word Satya again is used to denote the Highest Brahman in passages like—

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. २।१।१)

इत्यादिषु परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि प्रयुक्तः। अतः, तन्निष्ठस्यातिवादिनः पूर्वस्मादाधिकत्वं संभवति, इति वाक्यस्वरससिद्धम्, अन्यत्वं न बाधितव्यम्। अतिवादित्वं हि वस्त्वन्तरात्पुरुषार्थतया, अतिक्रान्तस्वोपास्यवस्तुवादित्वम्। नामाद्याशापर्यन्तोपास्यवस्त्वतिक्रान्तस्वोपास्यप्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टप्रत्यगात्मवादित्वात्, प्राणविदोऽतिवादित्वम्। तस्यापि सातिशयपुरुषार्थत्वात्, निरतिशयपुरुषार्थतया, उपास्यपरब्रह्मवादिन एव साक्षात्, अतिवादित्वम्, इति।

'एष तु वा अतिवदति यः सत्येनातिवदति' (छा. ७।१६।१)

इत्युक्तम्। सत्येन, इति, इत्थंभूतलक्षणा तृतीया। सत्येन परेण ब्रह्मणा, उपास्येनोपलक्षितो योऽतिवदति, इत्यर्थः। अत एवैवं शिष्यः प्रार्थयते

'सोऽहं भगवः सत्येनातिवदानि' (छा. ७।१६।१)

इति। आचार्यश्च

'सत्यं त्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्यम्' (छा. ७।१६।१)

इत्याह।

'आत्मतः प्राणः' (छा. ७।२६।१)

'Existence (Satya) Knowledge, Infinite Brahman' (Tait. 2·1·1)

Therefore, because being superior to the preceding one is possible in the case of the big-talker devoted to that, his being different, rightly established in the passages themselves, should not be taken exception to. Being a big-talker is, indeed, talking about an entity, one's object of worship, transcending anything else owing to its being the goal of human life. Talking big on the part of the Prāṇa-knower is there on account of his speaking about the inmost Ātman pointed out by the word Prāna, his object of worship, transcending the objects of worship, beginning with name and ending with quarters. And because on account of the human purpose being subject to excess (capable of being surpassed), in his case also, there is the direct talking big on the part of one speaking of the Highest Brahman, the object of worship, owing to its being the unsurpassed human purpose in life, it is stated

'But this one, verily, speaks boldly, who speaks boldly by Satya.' (Chā 7·16·1)

Satyena—There is the instrumental case showing being characterised by one who talks big—being characterised by Satya, the Highest Brahman, the object of worship—This is the sense. And for this very reason, thus the pupil prays—

'That I, Your Reverence, I may talk big, characterised by Satya.' (Chā. 7·16·1)

And the preceptor says—

'Satya alone has to be desired to be known.' (Chā. 7·16·1)

And there is stated the origination of the one pointed out by the word Prāṇa, from the Ātman in the passage—

इति च प्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टस्यात्मन उत्पत्तिरुच्यते । अतः,

'तरति शोकमात्मवित्' (छा. ७।१।३)

इति प्रकान्त आत्मा प्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टादन्यः, इति गम्यते ।

यत्तूक्तम् — अस्ति भगवः प्राणाद्भूयः ? इति प्रश्नस्य, अदो वाव प्राणाद्भूयः, इति प्रतिवचनस्य चादर्शनात्, प्रकान्त आत्मोपदेशः प्राणोपदेशपर्यवसानो गम्यते, इति — तदयुक्तम् । न हि प्रश्नप्रतिवचनाभ्यामेव, अर्थान्तरत्वं गम्यते, प्रमाणान्तरेणापि तत्संभवात् । उक्तं च प्रमाणान्तरम् । अस्ति भगवः प्राणाद्भूयः ? इत्यपृच्छतोऽयमभिप्रायः — नामादिष्वाशापर्यन्तेष्वचेतनेषु पुरुषार्थभूयस्तया पूर्वपूर्वमतिक्रान्तेष्वप्युत्तरोत्तरेषूपदिष्टेषु तत्तद्वेदिन आचार्येणातिवादित्वं नोक्तम् । प्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टप्रत्यगात्मयाथात्म्यवेदिनस्तु पुरुषार्थभूयस्त्वातिशयं मन्वानेन

'स वा एष एवं पश्यन्नेवं मन्वान एवं विजानन्नतिवादी भवति'

(छा ७।१५।४)

इत्यतिक्रान्तवस्तुवादित्वमुक्तम् । अतः, अत्रैव, आत्मोपदेशः समाप्तः, इति मत्वा शिष्यो भूयो न पप्रच्छ । आचार्यस्तु, इदमपि सातिशयं मत्वा, निरतिशयपुरुषार्थभूतं सत्यशब्दाभिधेयं परं ब्रह्म

Therefore, it is known that the Ātman introduced in

'The Ātman-knower crosses over grief' (Chā 7·1·3)

is different from the one pointed out by the word Prāna

As to what has been stated — That on account of the absence of the question — Is there something, Your Reverence, bigger than Prāna ? — and the reply (there to) — This one is bigger than Prāna — it is understood that the teaching about the Ātman, introduced here, culminates into the teaching about Prāna — (We reply) — that is improper Not, indeed, is to be understood merely by question and answer, being a different thing; because that is possible, even by another means of proof. And another means of proof has been stated This is the intention in not asking the question — Is, Your Reverence, anything bigger than Prāna ? In respect of non-sentient things beginning with name and ending with quarters being taught as going successively beyond and beyond in consideration of the purpose in human life being higher and higher, the preceptor has not declared talking big in the case of those knowing those various entities By him, however, thinking that there is the maximum bigness of the purpose in human life in the case of one knowing the right nature of the inmost Ātman pointed out by the word Prāna, has been spoken of, the talking about the thing beyond, in

'He, this one, verily, seeing thus, thinking thus, knowing thus, becomes one talking big' (Chā 7 15 4)

Therefore, thinking that the instruction about the Ātman has come to an end just there, the disciple did not ask further , the preceptor, however, thinking that this too admitted of excess, of his own accord introduced the Highest Brahman denoted by the word Satya, which is the human purpose in life admitting of no excess, in

'एष तु वा अतिवदति यः सत्येनातिवदति' (छा ७।१६।१)

इति स्वयमेवोपचिक्षेप। शिष्योऽपि परमपुरुषार्थरूपे परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि, उपक्षिप्ते, तत्स्वरूपतदुपासनयाथात्म्यबुभुत्सया

'सोऽहं भगवः सत्येनातिवदानि' (छा ७।१६।१)

इति प्रार्थयामास। ततो ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारनिमित्तातिवादित्वसिद्धये ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारोपायभूतं ब्रह्मोपासनं

'सत्यं त्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्यम्' (छा ७।१६।१)

इत्युपदिश्य, तदुपायभूतं ब्रह्ममननं

'मतिस्त्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्या' (छा ७।१८।१)

इत्युपदिश्य, श्रवणप्रतिष्ठार्थत्वान्मननस्य, मननोपदेशेन श्रवणमप्यर्थसिद्धं मत्वा, श्रवणोपायभूतां ब्रह्मणि श्रद्धां

'श्रद्धा त्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्या' (छा ७।१९।१)

इत्युपदिश्य, तदुपायभूतां तन्निष्ठां

'निष्ठा त्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्या' (छा ७।२०।१)

इत्युपदिश्य, तदुपायभूतां तदुद्योगप्रयत्नरूपां कृतिमपि

'कृतिस्त्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्या' (छा ७।२१।१)

'But he verily, talks big who speaks in an over bold manner by Truth (Chā 7 16 1)

The pupil on his part also on the introduction of the Highest Brahman, the highest purpose in human life implored (thus)—

'That I, Your Reverence I may talk big (Chā 7 16 1)

with a desire to know its nature and the proper mode of its worship Then having taught for the sake of proving talking big, the cause of the realisation of Brahman the worship of Brahman, as the means of realisation of Brahman in

'Truth (Satya) alone, however is to be desired to be known' (Chā 7 16 1)

—having taught the meditation on Brahman the means for that in

Meditation alone is however, to be desired to be known' (Cha 7 18 1)

—having taught Faith in Brahman, the means for hearing in

'Faith alone however, is to be desired to be known' (Cha 7 19 1)

—holding that hearing is already implied by the instruction about meditation because meditation is calculated to stabilise hearing having taught devotion to it, the means of (securing) it, in

'Devotion alone, however, is to be desired to be known' (Cha 7 20·1)

—having taught mental effort also being of the nature of effort for securing that (and) the means thereof in

'Mental effort alone, however, is to be desired to be known (Cha 7 21 1)

इत्युपदिश्य, श्रवणाद्युपक्रमरूपकृतिसिद्धये प्राप्यभूतस्य सत्यशब्दाभिहितस्य ब्रह्मणः सुखरूपता ज्ञातव्या, इति

'सुखं त्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्यम्' (छा. ७।२२।१)

इत्युपदिश्य, निरतिशयविपुलमेव सुखं परमपुरुषार्थरूपं भवति, इति तस्यैव ब्रह्मणः सुखरूपस्य निरतिशयता ज्ञातव्या, इति

'भूमा त्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्यः' (छा. ७।२३।१)

इत्युपदिश्य, निरतिशयविपुलसुखरूपस्य ब्रह्मणो लक्षणमिदमुच्यते

'यत्र नान्यच्छृणोति नान्यद्विजानाति स भूमा' (छा. ७।२४।१)

इति । अयमर्थः— अनवधिकातिशयसुखरूपे ब्रह्मणि, अनुभूयमाने, ततोऽन्यत्किमपि न पश्यति, अनुभविता, ब्रह्मस्वरूपतद्विभूत्यन्तर्गतत्वाच्च कृत्स्नस्य वस्तुजातस्य । अतः, ऐश्वर्यापरपर्यायविभूतिगुणविशिष्टं निरतिशयसुखरूपं ब्रह्म, अनुभवन्, तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य वस्तुनोऽभावादेव किमप्यन्यन्न पश्यति । अनुभाव्यस्य सर्वस्य सुखरूपत्वादेव दुःखं न पश्यति । तदेव हि सुखं यदनुभूयमानं पुरुषानुकूलं भवति ।

—having taught

'Happiness, alone, however, is to be desired to be known' (Chā. 7·22·1)

because Brahman is to be known as having the nature of happiness, which is denoted by the word Satya, which is the destination, for the sake of perfecting the action of the nature of the introduction of hearing etc.; —having taught

'Bhūman alone, however, is to be desired to be known' (Chā. 7·23·1)

on the ground that the same Brahman of the nature of happiness, is to be known as having abundance admitting of no excess, because abundant happiness admitting of no excess is alone the highest human purpose in life,—now is stated the characteristic of Brahman constituted of happiness admitting of no excess, in

'Where one sees not anything else, one hears not anything else, one knows not anything else; that is the Bhūman (Big).' (Chā. 7·24·1)

This is the sense— When Brahman constituted of happiness, admitting of no excess is being realised, the experiencer does not see anything else than that, on account of the entire aggregate of things being included in the nature of Brahman and its manifestations. So, one experiencing Brahman characterised by the quality of manifestations (glory), a synonym for overlordship, (and) of the nature of bliss admitting of no excess, does not see anything else on account of the absence of any entity other than that. And everything fit to be experienced being of the nature of happiness alone, he does not see misery. That alone, indeed, is happiness which, being experienced, becomes agreeable to a person.

[185] ननु च — इदमेव जगत्, ब्रह्मणोऽन्यतयानुभूयमानं दुःखरूपं परिमितसुखरूपं च भवत्, कथमिव ब्रह्मविभूतित्वेन तदात्मकतयानुभूयमानं सुखरूपमेव भवेत् ? उच्यते —

कर्मवश्यानां क्षेत्रज्ञानां ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत्वेनानुभूयमानं कृत्स्नं जगत्, तत्तत्कर्मानुरूपं दुःखं च परिमितसुखं च भवति। अत, ब्रह्मणोऽन्यतया, अनुभूयमानम्, अन्यतया परिमितसुखत्वेन दुःखत्वेन च जगदनुभवस्य कर्मनिमित्तत्वात्, कर्मरूपाविद्याविमुक्तस्य तदेव जगद्विभूतिगुणविशिष्टब्रह्मानुभवान्तर्गतं सुखमेव भवति। यथा पित्तोपहतेन पीयमानं पय. पित्ततारतम्येन, अल्पसुखं विपरीतं च भवति। तदेव पय पित्तानुपहतस्य सुखायैव भवति। यथैव राजपुत्रस्य पितुर्लीलोपकरणम्, अतथात्वेनानुसंधीयमानं प्रियत्वमनुपगतं तथात्वेनानुसंधीयमानं प्रियतमं भवति, तथा निरतिशयानन्दस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणोऽनवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणाकरस्य लीलोपकरणं तदात्मकं चानुसंधीयमानं जगत्, निरतिशयप्रीतये भवत्येव। अत', जगदैश्वर्यविशिष्टम्, अनवधिकातिशयसुखरूपं ब्रह्म, अनुभवंस्ततोऽन्यत्किमपि न पश्यति, दुःखं च न पश्यति। एतदेवोपपादयति वाक्यशेषः—

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[185] I say (says the objector) —This same world being experienced as different from Brahman and being constituted of misery (and) constituted of limited happiness— how can it be constituted of happiness alone when being experienced as the manifestation of Brahman, and as having that as the Ātman ? —(To this objection) is stated (in reply)—

The entire world being experienced as different from Brahman becomes misery or limited happiness in conformity with the various Karmans, for the Ksetra-knowers (individual Souls) subject to Karman Therefore, on account of the experience of the world being experienced as different from Brahman, and as being characterised by limited happiness and misery, owing to its being different being caused by Karman, that same world becomes happiness alone, included in the realisation of Brahman, particularised by the quality of manifestation for one freed from Avidya of the nature of Karman Just as the milk being drunk by one affected by bile, becomes conducive to little happiness or to producing a contrary effect, in accordance with the degree of the intensity of the bile that same milk is for happiness alone, in the case of one not affected by bile Just as a plaything given by the father not conducive to agreeableness, when not looked upon in that light in the case of a prince becomes exceedingly agreeable when looked upon in that light in the same way the world does become conducive to happiness admitting of no excess alone the world being looked upon as having that (Brahman) as the Ātman (and) as a recreation— means for Brahman having the nature of bliss admitting of no excess, the mine of unlimited excessive (and) innumerable auspicious qualities Therefore, one experiencing Brahman particularised by the overlordship of the world, constituted of unlimited happiness, admitting of no excess, does not behold anything else beyond that and beholds not misery —This same, the remaining passage propounds—

'स वा एष एवं पश्यन्नेवं मन्वान एवं विजानन्नात्मरतिरात्मक्रीड आत्ममिथुन आत्मानन्दः स स्वराड्भवति तस्य सर्वेषु लोकेषु कामचारो भवति। अथ येऽन्यथातो विदुरन्यराजानस्ते क्षय्यलोका भवन्ति तेषां सर्वेषु लोकेष्वकामचारो भवति'

(छा. ७।२५।२)

इति। स्वराट् — अकर्मवश्यः। अन्यराजानः — कर्मवश्याः। तथा

'न पश्यो मृत्युं पश्यति न रोगं नोत दुःखताम्।
सर्वं ह पश्यः पश्यति सर्वमाप्नोति सर्वशः॥' (छा. ७।२६।२)

इति च। निरतिशयसुखरूपत्वं च ब्रह्मणः

'आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात्' (ब्र. सू. १।१।१३)

इत्यत्र प्रपञ्चितम्। अतः, प्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टात् प्रत्यगात्मनोऽर्थान्तरभूतस्य सत्यशब्दाभिधेयस्य ब्रह्मणो भूमेत्युपदेशात्, भूमा परं ब्रह्म॥७॥

धर्मोपपत्तेश्च ॥ ८ ॥

[186] अस्य भूम्नो ये धर्मा आम्नायन्ते तेऽपि परस्मिन्नेवोपपद्यन्ते।

'एतदमृतम्' (छा. ७।२४।१)

इति स्वाभाविकम्, अमृतत्वं

'He, verily, this one, seeing thus, thinking thus, knowing thus, he becomes self-loving, self-sporting, self-uniting, self-rejoicing, self-ruler; of him there is movement at will in all the worlds; but those who know otherwise, than this loyal to another king,— they have perishable worlds; of them there is no movement at will in all the worlds'. (Chā. 7·25·2)

Svarāṭ—not subject to Karman, Anyarājānah—subject to Karman. And likewise (the following passage).

'The Seer sees not death, neither disease, nor misery; the Seer, verily, sees all, secures everything from everywhere.'

(Cha. 7 26·2)

And the nature of Brahman as bliss admitting of no excess, is fully expounded here in

'Constituted of bliss on account of repetition.'

(Br. Sū. I. 1·13)

Therefore, Bhūman is the Highest Brahman on account of the teaching that Brahman, an entity different from the inmost Ātman pointed out by the word Prāna (and) denoted by the word Satya, is Bhūman ॥ 7 ॥

And on account of the propriety of the attributes ॥ 8 ॥

[186] Whatever attributes are ordained in the Śruti in the case of this Bhūman, they also are proper in the case of the Highest alone. Indeed the attributes such as, natural immortality in

'This is immortality' (Chā. 7·24·1)

'स्वे महिम्नि'　　　　(छा ७।२४।१)

इति, अनन्याधारत्वं

'स एवाधस्तात्'　　　　(छा ७।२५।१)

इत्यादिना

'स एवेद सर्वम्'　　　　(छा ७।२५।१)

इति, सर्वात्मत्वं

'आत्मत प्राण'　　　　(छा ७।२६।१)

इत्यादि प्राणप्रभृते सर्वस्योत्पादकत्वम्, इत्यादयो धर्मा परमात्मन एव ।

यत्तु—

'अहमेवाधस्तात्'　　　　(छा ७।२५।१)

इत्यादिना सर्वात्मत्वमुपदिष्टम्, तद्भूमगुणविशिष्टस्य ब्रह्मणोऽहंग्रहेणोपासनमुपदिश्यते

'अथातोऽहङ्कारादेश'　　　　(छा ७।२५।१)

इत्यहंग्रहोपदेशोपक्रमात् । अहमर्थस्य प्रत्यगात्मनोऽपि ह्यात्मा परमात्मा, इत्यन्तर्यामिब्राह्मणादिपूक्तम् । अत, प्रत्यगर्थस्य परमात्मपर्यवसानात्, अहंशब्दोऽपि परमात्मपर्यवसायी, इति प्रत्यगात्मशरीरकत्वेन परमात्मानुसंधानार्थोऽयमहंग्रहोपदेशः । परमात्मनः सर्वशरीरतया सर्वात्मत्वात् प्रत्यगात्मनोऽप्यात्मा परमात्मा । तदेव

—not having any other support, in

'In one s own greatness'　　　　(Chā 7 24 1)

—being the Ātman of all, in

'He alone is all this'　　　　(Chā 7 25 1)

beginning with

'He alone down below　　　　(Cha 7 25 1)

—being the producer of everything Prāna etc in

'From Ātman, Prana　　　　(Cha 7 26 1)

belong to the Paramatman alone

As to being the Ātman of all being taught (in passages) beginning with

'I alone, down below　　　　(Chā 7 25 1)

that is the worship taught of Brahman particularised by the qualities of that Bhūman, in the form 'I, on account of the introduction of the instruction in the form 'I' in (the passage)—

'And, now the instruction of Ahamkāra

(Cha 7 25 1)

It has been declared in the Brāhmana passage dealing with the inner Controller, that the Paramātman is indeed the Ātman even of the inmost Ātman the 'I' entity Therefore, because on account of the culmination of the inmost entity in the Paramātman the word 'I' also culminates into the Paramātman, there is this instruction in the form 'I for the purpose of meditation upon the Paramātman as having the inmost Ātman as the body On account of the Paramātman being the Ātman of all owing to his having everything as his body the Paramātman is the Ātman also of the inmost Ātman And that same is mentioned —beginning with

'अथात आत्मादेशः' (छा. ७।२५।२)

इत्यादिना

'आत्मैवेदं सर्वम्' (छा. ७।२५।२)

इत्यन्तेनोच्यते । एतदेवोपपादयितुं प्रत्यगात्मनोऽप्यात्मभूतात्परमात्मनः सर्वस्योत्पत्तिरुच्यते

'तस्य ह वा एतस्यैवं पश्यत एवं मन्वानस्यैवं विजानत आत्मतः प्राणः... आत्मत आकाशः' (छा. ७।२६।१)

इत्यादिना। उपासकस्यान्तर्यामितयावस्थितात् परमात्मनः सर्वस्योत्पत्तिः, इत्यर्थः। अतः, परमात्मनः प्रत्यगात्मशरीरकत्वज्ञानप्रतिष्ठार्थम्, अहंग्रहोपासनं कर्तव्यम्। तस्मात्, भूमविशिष्टः परमात्मा, इति सिद्धम् ॥ ८ ॥

भूमाधिकरणं समाप्तम् (२)

[187] अक्षरमम्बरान्तधृतेः ॥ ९ ॥ (अधिकरण ३, सूत्राणि ९–११)

वाजसनेयिनो गार्गिप्रश्ने समामनन्ति—

'स होवाचैतद्वै तदक्षरं गार्गि ब्राह्मणा अभिवदन्त्यस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वमदीर्घमलोहितमस्नेहमच्छायम्' (बृ. ३।८।८)

'*And now, therefore, the instruction about the Ātman*' (Chā. 7·25·2)

and ending with

'*Ātman alone is all this.*' (Chā 7·25·2)

In order to expound this same, the origination of everything is spoken of as from the Paramātman, who is the Ātman even of the inmost Ātman, in the passage beginning with—

'*Indeed for him, this one again, seeing thus, thinking thus, knowing thus, — from Ātman, Prāṇa; from Ātman, Ākāśa*'. (Chā. 7·26·1)

There is the origination of everything from the Paramātman, stationed as the inner Controller of the worshipper,— this is the sense. Therefore, the worship of the I-form should be gone through for the purpose of the firm establishment of the knowledge of the Paramātman as having the inmost Ātman as his body. Therefore, it is established that the one particularised by Bhūman is the Paramātman. ॥ 8 ॥

Here ends the Bhūmādhikaraṇa (2)

[187] The Imperishable (is the Paramātman) on account of its supporting the end of the sky. ॥ 9 ॥ (Adhikaraṇa 3, Sūtras 9–11)

The followers of the Vājasaneyi (school) ordain in the Section dealing with the questions of Gārgī,

'*He, verily, said— This, verily, is (O) Gārgī, that Imperishable which the Brāhmaṇas speak about as not gross, not atomic, not short, not long, not red, not oily, not having a shadow*'.

(Bṛ. 3·8·8)

इत्यादि। तत्र संशयः— किमेतदक्षरम्, प्रधानं, जीवो वा, उत परमात्मा? इति। किं युक्तम्? प्रधानम्, इति। कुतः?

'अक्षरात्परत: परः' (मु २।१।२)

इत्यादिषु, अक्षरशब्दस्य प्रधाने प्रयोगदर्शनात्। अस्थूलत्वादीनां च तत्रैव समन्वयात्।

'यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते' (मु १।१।५)

इत्यादिषु परस्मिन्नप्यक्षरशब्दो दृश्यते इति चेत्—न। प्रमाणान्तरप्रसिद्धश्रुतिप्रसिद्धयोः प्रमाणान्तरप्रसिद्धस्य प्रथमप्रतीतेः, प्रतीतपरिग्रहे विरोधाभावात्। किं च,

'यदूर्ध्वं गार्गि दिवो यदर्वाक्पृथिव्या' (बृ ३।८।७)

इत्यारभ्य सर्वस्य कालत्रयवर्तिनः कारणभूताकाशाधारत्वे प्रतिपादिते,

'कस्मिन्नु खल्वाकाश ओतश्च प्रोतश्च' (बृ ३।८।७)

इति, आकाशस्यापि कारणं तदाधारभूतं किम्, इति पृष्टे, प्रत्युच्यमानम्, अक्षरं सर्वविकारकारणतया तदाधारभूतं प्रमाणान्तरप्रसिद्धं प्रधानम्, इति प्रतीयते। अतः, अक्षरं प्रधानम्, इति प्राप्ते, उच्यते—

'अक्षरमम्बरान्तधृतेः'— अक्षरं — परं ब्रह्म। कुतः? अम्बरान्तधृतेः। अम्बरस्य,

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etc There (arises) the doubt—Is this Aksara, Pradhāna or Jiva or the Paramātman? What is proper (here)? Pradhāna Whence? On account of the word Aksara being found used (in the sense) of Pradhāna, in

'The Highest is beyond the Aksara' (Mu 2 1 2)

etc. and because there is the proper co-ordination of being not gross etc, there (in Pradhāna) alone If it is objected to, that the word Aksara is used to point to the Highest also in

'By which that Aksara is known' (Mu 1 1 5)

etc. (the Pūrvapaksin says)—No, because of the two—something well-established by other means of proof and something well-established by Śruti,— what is well-established by other means of proof, comes to be apprehended first, on account of the absence of any contradiction with the acceptance of what is apprehended And further, when it is propounded that everything existing in the three times has for its support the Ākāsa the cause in (the passage) beginning with

'What is, (O) Gārgi, above the heaven, and what is on this side of the earth?' (Br 3 8 7)

and when it was asked — what is the cause of even the Ākāśa, and what is its support? — in (the passage)

'In what, indeed, is the Ākāśa woven warp and woof?' (Br 3 8 7)

the answer given viz — Aksara is apprehended as Pradhāna, well-established by other means of proof, (and) being the support of that, owing to its being the support of all modifications Hence Aksara is Pradhāna —This (prima-facie view) being reached, (this) is stated (in reply)—

'The Imperishable (is the Paramātman) on account of its supporting the end of the sky' The Imperishable — the Highest Brahman Whence?

आकाशस्य, अन्तः पारभूतम्, अव्याकृतम् — अम्बरान्तः, तस्य धृतेः। तदाधारतया, अस्य, अक्षरस्य, उपदेशादिति यावत्। अयमर्थः —

'*कस्मिन्नु खल्वाकाश ओतश्च प्रोतश्च*' (बृ. ३।८।७)

इत्यत्र, आकाशशब्दनिर्दिष्टं न वायुमत्, अम्बरम्, अपि तु तत्पारभूतमव्याकृतम्। अतः, तस्याव्याकृतस्याप्याधारत्वेनोच्यमानम्, अक्षरं न, अव्याकृतं भवितुमर्हति, इति।

[188] ननु — आकाशशब्दनिर्दिष्टो न वायुमान्, इति कथमवगम्यते? उच्यते —

'*यदूर्ध्वं गार्गि दिवो यदर्वाक्पृथिव्या यदन्तरा द्यावापृथिवी इमे यद्भूतं च भवच्च भविष्यच्चेत्याचक्षत आकाश एव तदोतं च प्रोतं च*' (बृ. ३।८।४)

इत्युक्ते, त्रैलोक्यवर्तिनो विकारजातस्याधारतया निर्दिष्ट आकाशो न वायुमदाकाशो भवितुमर्हति। तस्यापि विकारान्तर्गतत्वात्। अतः, अत्र, आकाशशब्दनिर्दिष्टं भूतसूक्ष्मम्, इति प्रतीयते। ततस्तस्यापि भूतसूक्ष्मस्याधारभूतं किम्, इति पृच्छ्यते

'*कस्मिन्नु खल्वाकाश ओतश्च प्रोतश्च*' (बृ. ३।८।७)

On account of its supporting the end of the sky. Ambarasya, —of Ākāśa; antaḥ,—the unmanifest, being the end; that is the Ambarāntaḥ, on account of the support of that—that is to say (*iti yāvat*), —on account of the teaching of this Akṣara as being the support of that. This is the sense—Here in (the passage)

'*In what, indeed, is the Ākāśa woven warp and woof?*' (Br. 3·8·7)

what is pointed out by the word Ākāśa is not the sky with the wind, but the unmanifest, the end of that. Therefore, the Akṣara being spoken of as the support of even that unmanifest, does not deserve to be the unmanifest.

[188] I say (says the objector)—How is it known that the one pointed out by the word Akāśa is not the one with the wind? It is stated (in reply)—When it is stated

'*What is, (O) Gārgī, above the heaven, and what is on this side of the earth, what is in between, these heaven and earth; and what is said as past, present and future,—all that is the Ākāśa alone woven warp and woof*' (Bṛ 3·8·4)

the Ākāśa pointed out as the support of the aggregate of modifications existing in the three worlds, does not deserve to be the Ākāśa with the wind; because that also is included within the modifications. Therefore, here it is apprehended that the one pointed out by the word Ākāśa is the subtle element (of that name). Therefore, it is asked—what is the support of even that subtle element?—in (the passage)

'*In what, indeed, is the Ākāśa woven warp and woof?*' (Br. 3·8·7)

इति । अतस्तदाधारतया निर्दिश्यमानम्, अक्षरं न प्रधानं भवितुमर्हति ।

यत्तु-श्रुतिप्रसिद्धात्प्रमाणान्तरप्रसिद्धं प्रथमं प्रतीयते, इति, तन्न । अक्षरशब्दस्य, अवयवशक्त्या स्वार्थप्रतिपादने प्रमाणान्तरानपेक्षणात् । संबन्धग्रहणदशायाम्, अर्थस्वरूपं येन प्रमाणेनावगम्यते न तत्प्रतिपादनदशायामपेक्षणीयम् ॥ ९ ॥

एवं तर्हि, अक्षरशब्दनिर्दिष्टो जीवोऽस्तु । तस्य भूतसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तस्य कृत्स्नस्य, अचिद्वस्तुन आधारत्वोपपत्तेः । अस्थूलत्वाद्युच्यमानविशेषणोपपत्तेश्च ।

'अव्यक्तमक्षरे लीयते । यस्याव्यक्तं शरीरम् । यस्याक्षरं शरीरम्' (सुबालो०)

'क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते' (गी १५।१६)

इत्यादिषु प्रत्यगात्मन्यपि, अक्षरशब्दप्रयोगदर्शनात् । अत्र, उत्तरम्—

सा च प्रशासनात् ॥ १० ॥

सा च, अम्बरान्तधृतिः, अस्याक्षरस्य प्रशासनादेव भवति, इति उपदिश्यते

'एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठत । एतस्य

Therefore, the Aksara being pointed out as its support does not deserve to be the Pradhāna

As to what is stated viz.— what is well-established by other means of proof is apprehended prior to that well-established by the Śruti,—it is not so, because the word Aksara does not stand in need of any other means of proof in giving its own sense by the power of its component parts By what means of proof the nature of the meaning is apprehended at the stage of cognising the correlation, that is not necessary at the stage of understanding it. ॥ 9 ॥

(The Pūrvapaksin says) —(Well then) if so, let Jīva be the one pointed out by the word Aksara, on account of the propriety of his being the support of all the non-sentient objects, right up to the subtle element, and on account of the propriety of the qualifying attributes not-gross etc that are being mentioned And because the use of the word Aksara is seen to point out also to the inmost Atman in

'The unmanifest is merged into the Imperishable, whose body is the unmanifest, whose body is the imperishable' (Subalopanisad)

'All the beings are the perishable, the Immutable is called the imperishable.' (Gita 15 16)

etc. Here the answer (is)—

And that (support) due to (his) command ॥ 10 ॥

And that—support of the end of the sky—is due to the command alone of this Imperishable,— This is taught (by the passage) beginning with —

'By the command of this Imperishable, verily, (O) Gārgi, the Sun and the Moon stay on, supported By the command of

या अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि द्यावापृथिव्यौ विधृते तिष्ठतः । एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि निमेषा मुहूर्ता अहोरात्राण्यर्धमासा मासा ऋतवः संवत्सरा इति विधृतास्तिष्ठन्ति ।' (बृ. ३।८।९)

इत्यादिना । प्रशासनं — प्रकृष्टं शासनम् । न च, ईदृशं स्वशासनाधीनसर्ववस्तुविधरणं बद्धमुक्तोभयावस्थस्यापि प्रत्यगात्मनः संभवति । अतः, पुरुषोत्तम एव प्रशासित्रक्षरम् ॥ १० ॥

अन्यभावव्यावृत्तेश्च ॥ ११ ॥

अन्यभावः — अन्यत्वं प्रधानादिभावः । अस्याक्षरस्य परमपुरुषादन्यत्वं वाक्यशेषे व्यावर्त्यते—

'तद्वा एतदक्षरं गार्ग्यदृष्टं द्रष्टृश्रुतं श्रोत्रमतं मन्त्रविज्ञातं विज्ञातृ नान्यदतोऽस्ति द्रष्टृ नान्यदतोऽस्ति श्रोतृ नान्यदतोऽस्ति मन्तृ नान्यदतोऽस्ति विज्ञात्रेतस्मिन्नु खल्वक्षरे, गार्ग्याकाश ओतश्च प्रोतश्च ।' (बृ. ३।८।११)

इति । अत्र द्रष्टृत्वश्रोतृत्वाद्युपदेशात्, अस्याक्षरस्याचेतनभूतप्रधानभावो व्यावर्त्यते । सर्वैरदृष्टस्यैव सतः सर्वस्य द्रष्टृत्वाद्युपदेशाच्च प्रत्यगात्मभावो व्यावर्त्यते । अतः, इयम्, अन्यभावव्यावृत्तिः, अस्याक्षरस्य परमपुरुषतां द्रढयति ।

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this Imperishable, verily, (O) Gārgi, the heaven and the earth stay on, supported, By the command of this Imperishable, verily, (O) Gārgi, twinklings, Muhūrtas, days and nights, fortnights, months seasons, years,—(all) these stay on supported.' (Br. 3·8·9)

Praśāsana—the forceful command. And nor is such being the support of all entities, dependent upon one's own command, possible in the case of the inmost Ātman, even in both the states, —the bound as well as the free. Hence, the Puruṣottama alone is the commanding Imperishable ॥ 10 ॥

And on account of the exclusion from the state of another ॥ 11 ॥

Anyabhāva—the state of being another, the state of Pradhāna etc. Being different from the highest Puruṣa, on the part of this Imperishable is repudiated in the remaining passage—

'That, verily, this Imperishable, (O) Gārgi, being (itself) unseen, is the Seer; unheard, the Hearer; unthought of, the Thinker; unknown, the Knower. No one other than this, is the Seer; no one other than this, is the Hearer; no one other than this, is the Thinker; no one other than this, is the Knower. In this very Imperishable, indeed, (O) Gārgi, is the Ākāśa woven, warp and woof.' (Br. 3·8·11)

Here, on account of the teaching about (this) being the Seer, Hearer etc., being the non-sentient element and Pradhāna, of this Imperishable is repudiated, and being the inmost Atman is repudiated on account of the teaching about (Akṣara's) being the seer of all, although itself being unseen by all. Therefore, this exclusion from the state of another, confirms the Imperishable being the highest Puruṣa.

एवं वा, अन्यभावव्यावृत्तिः। अन्यस्य सद्भावव्यावृत्तिः – अन्यभावव्यावृत्तिः। यथैतदक्षरमन्यैरदृष्टं सदन्येषां द्रष्टृ च सत्, स्वव्यतिरिक्तस्य समस्तस्याधारभूतम्, एवमन्येनादृष्टमेतस्य द्रष्टृ च सत्, एतस्याधारभूतम्, अन्यन्नास्तीति वदन्

'नान्यतोऽस्ति द्रष्टृ' (बृ ३।८।११)

इत्यादिवाक्यशेषः, अन्यस्य सद्भावं व्यावर्तयन्, अस्याक्षरस्य प्रधानभावं प्रत्यगात्मभावं च प्रतिषेधति।

किं च,

'एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि ददतो मनुष्याः प्रशंसन्ति यजमानं देवा दर्वी पितरोऽन्वायत्ताः' (बृ ३।८।९)

इति श्रौतं स्मार्तं च यागदानहोमादिकं सर्वं कर्म, यस्य, आज्ञया प्रवर्तत तदक्षरं परब्रह्मभूतः पुरुषोत्तम एव, इति विज्ञायते। अपि च

'यो वा एतदक्षरं गार्ग्यविदित्वास्मिँल्लोके जुहोति यजते तपस्तप्यते बहूनि वर्षसहस्राण्यन्तवदेवास्य तद्भवति यो वा एतदक्षरं गार्ग्यविदित्वास्माल्लोकात्प्रैति स कृपणोऽथ य एतदक्षरं गार्गि विदित्वास्माल्लोकात्प्रैति स ब्राह्मण' (बृ. ३।८।१०)

Or, thus the repudiation from the state of another (can be explained)—Anyabhāvavyāvṛtti—the repudiation of the existence of another. Just as this Imperishable, being unseen by others, and being also the Seer of others, is the support of everything other than itself, similarly there is nothing else, unseen by others, and being the Seer of this, which is the support of this—thus declaring, the remaining passage

'*No one other than this, the Seer.*' (Bṛ. 3·8·11)

etc. denying the existence of another, repudiates this Imperishable being the Pradhāna or being the inmost Ātman.

And further, by (the passage)

'*By the command of this Imperishable, verily, (O) Gārgi, men praise those who give (gifts), the gods, the sacrificer, and the fathers associated with them the Darvi offering*' (Br. 3·8 9)

it is known that the one at whose behest all rites according to the Scriptures, and the Smṛtis, such as sacrifice, charitable gifts, oblations, proceed.— that Imperishable is the Puruṣottama alone, the Highest Brahman Moreover,

'*Who verily, (O) Gārgi, not knowing, in this world offers oblations, sacrifices, practises penance for many thousands of years,— that (all) becomes for him, having an end, Who, verily, not knowing this Imperishable, (O) Gārgi, departs this world, he is mean On the other hand, who knowing this Imperishable, (O) Gārgi, departs this world, he is the Brahman-knower.*' (Br. 3 8 10)

इति यदज्ञानात्, संसारप्राप्तिः, यज्ज्ञानाच्च, अमृतत्वप्राप्तिः,—तदक्षरं परं ब्रह्मैव, इति सिद्धम् ॥ ११ ॥

अक्षराधिकरणं समाप्तम् (३)

[189] ईक्षतिकर्म व्यपदेशात्सः ॥ १२ ॥ (अधिकरण ४, सू. १२)

आथर्वणिकाः सत्यकामप्रश्नेऽधीयते—

'यः पुनरेतं त्रिमात्रेणोमित्येतेनैवाक्षरेण परं पुरुषमभिध्यायीत स तेजसि सूर्ये संपन्नो यथा पादोदरस्त्वचा विनिर्मुच्यत एवं ह वै स पाप्मना विनिर्मुक्तः स सामभिरुन्नीयते ब्रह्मलोकं स एतस्माज्जीवघनात्परात्परं पुरिशयं पुरुषमीक्षते' (प्र. ५।५)

इति। अत्र ध्यायति-ईक्षतिशब्दौ, एकविषयौ, ध्यानफलत्वादीक्षणस्य।

'यथाक्रतुरस्मिँल्लोके पुरुषः' (छा. ३।१४।१)

इति न्यायेन ध्यानविषयस्यैव प्राप्यत्वात्। परं पुरुषम्—इत्युभयत्र कर्मभूतस्यार्थस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानाच्च।

तत्र संशय्यते—किमिह, अयं—परं पुरुषम्, इति निर्दिष्टो जीवसमष्टिरूपोऽण्डाधिपतिश्चतुर्मुखः, उत सर्वेश्वरः पुरुषोत्तमः? इति। किं युक्तम्? समष्टिक्षेत्रज्ञः, इति। कुतः?

—Thus it is established—By the ignorance of which there is the attainment to worldly existence, and by the knowledge of which there is the attainment to immortality, that Imperishable is the Highest Brahman itself. ॥ 11 ॥

Here ends the Akṣarādhikaraṇa (3)

[189] On account of the reference, the object of reflection, he (is the Paramātman) ॥ 12 ॥ (Adhikaraṇa 4, Sūtra 12)

The followers of the Atharvaṇa (Veda) read in (the Section dealing with) the questions of Satyakāma—

'Who, again, would be contemplating upon this highest Puruṣa by means of this same Om with its three measures (mātrā), he, merged in the light, the Sun, as the serpent is freed from the slough, he, indeed, freed from sins, verily, thus, he is lifted up to the Brahmaloka by the Sāmans; he reflects upon the Puruṣa residing in the body (city), beyond this high— this cosmic Jīva.' (Pra. 5·5)

Here, the words Dhyāyati, and Īkṣati refer to the same thing, on account of Īkṣaṇa resulting in Dhyāna, on account of the object of contemplation being the destination, after the maxim

'Whatever thought a man entertains in this world' (Chā. 3·14·1)

and on account of the recognition of the entity as being the object in both the cases as the highest Puruṣa.

There it is doubted— Is this one pointed out as the highest Puruṣa (in the accusative case) the four-faced one (Brahmadeva), the cosmic Jīva, the Lord of the Egg, or the Puruṣottama, the all-controller? What is proper (here)? The cosmic individual Soul. Whence? Beginning with

'स यो ह वै तद्भगवन्मनुष्येषु प्रायणान्तमोङ्कारमभिध्यायीत कतमं वाव स तेन लोकं जयति' (प्र ५।१)

इति प्रक्रम्य, एकमात्रं प्रणवमुपासीनस्य मनुष्यलोकप्राप्तिमभिधाय, द्विमात्रमुपासीनस्य, अन्तरिक्षलोकप्राप्तिमभिधाय, त्रिमात्रमुपासीनस्य प्राप्यतयाभिधीयमानो ब्रह्मलोकः, अन्तरिक्षात्परो जीवसमष्टिरूपस्य चतुर्मुखस्य लोकः, इति विज्ञायते। तद्गतेन च, ईक्ष्यमाणस्तल्लोकाधिपतिश्चतुर्मुख एव।

'एतस्माज्जीवघनात्परात्परम्' (प्र ५।५)

इति च, देहेन्द्रियादिभ्यः परात्, देहेन्द्रियादिभिः सह घनीभूतात्, जीवव्यष्टिपुरुषात्, ब्रह्मलोकवासिनः समष्टिपुरुषस्य चतुर्मुखस्य परत्वेनोपपद्यते। अतः, अत्र निर्दिश्यमानः परमपुरुषः समष्टिपुरुषश्चतुर्मुख एव। एवं चतुर्मुखत्वे निश्चिते, अजरत्वादयो यथाकथंचिन्नेयाः, इति प्राप्ते, प्रचक्ष्महे —

'ईक्षतिकर्म व्यपदेशात्सः' ईक्षतिकर्म-स परमात्मा। कुतः? व्यपदेशात्। व्यपदिश्यते हि, ईक्षतिकर्म परमात्मत्वेन। तथाहि — ईक्षतिकर्मविषयतयोदाहृते श्लोके

'तमोङ्कारेणैवायतनेनान्वेति विद्वान्यत्तच्छान्तमजरममृतमभयं परं च' (प्र ५।७)

'He who, verily, indeed amongst men contemplates, Your Reverence, upon that Om up to death—which world, verily, does he conquer by that?' (Pra 51)

—having declared the acquisition of the human world by one worshipping the one-measure Om, having announced the acquisition of the mid-region by one worshipping the two-measure (Om)—it is known that the world of Brahmā being announced as the destination for one worshipping the three-measure (Om), beyond the mid-region, is the world of the four-faced (Brahmadeva) having the form of the cosmic Jiva. And the Lord of that, being seen by one who has reached that, is the Four-faced (Brahmadeva) himself And

'Beyond this high, this cosmic-Jiva.' (Pra 55)

is appropriate only when the Four-faced, cosmic Purusa, residing in the Brahmaloka, (is regarded) as higher than the Purusa, the individual Soul, tangible with the body, sense-organs etc, beyond the body, sense-organs etc Therefore, the highest Purusa being pointed out here, is the Four-faced (Brahmadeva), the cosmic Purusa. When it has been thus ascertained the nature of the Four-faced one, qualities like being bereft of old age, are to be somehow construed--This (prima-facie view) being reached, we say (in reply)—

'On account of the reference, the object of reflection, he (is the Paramātman)' The object of reflection, he, the Paramātman Whence? On account of (such a) reference. The object of reflection is, indeed, referred to as being the Paramātman To explain the same in detail—In the verse cited, referring to the object of reflection,

'The wise one reaches by the support, the Om alone, whatever is tranquil, ageless, immortal, fearless, and highest' (Pra. 57)

इति परं शान्तम्, अजरम्, अभयम्, अमृतम्, इति हि परमात्मन एवैतद्रूपम् ।

'एतदमृतमभयमेतद्ब्रह्म' (छा ४।१५।१)

इत्येवमादिश्रुतिभ्यः,

'एतस्माज्जीवघनात्परात्परम्' (प्र ५।५)

इति च परमात्मन एव व्यपदेशो न चतुर्मुखस्य । तस्यापि जीवघनशब्दगृहीतत्वात् । यस्य हि कर्मनिमित्तं देहित्वं स जीवघन इत्युच्यते । चतुर्मुखस्यापि तच्छ्रूयते

'यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वम्' (श्वे ६।१८)

इत्यादौ ।

यत्पुनरुक्तम् — अन्तरिक्षलोकस्योपरि निर्दिश्यमानो ब्रह्मलोकश्चतुर्मुखलोक इति प्रतीयते, तत्रस्थश्चतुर्मुखः, इति — तदयुक्तम् ।

'यत्तच्छान्तमजरममृतमभयम्' (प्र. ५।७)

इत्यादिना, ईक्षतिकर्मणः परमात्मत्वे निश्चिते सति, ईक्षितुः स्थानतया निर्दिष्टो ब्रह्मलोको न क्षयिष्णुः, चतुर्मुखलोको भवितुमर्हति । किं च,

'यथा पादोदरस्त्वचा विनिर्मुच्यत एवं ह वै स पाप्मना विनिर्मुक्तः स सामभिरुन्नीयते ब्रह्मलोकम्' (प्र ५।५)

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being the highest, tranquil, ageless, fearless, immortal is, indeed, the nature of the Paramātman alone, from the Sruti passages such as

'*This is immortal, fearless, this is Brahman*' (Chā 4 15 1)

and in

'*Beyond this high, this cosmic-Jiva* (Pra 5 5)

the reference is of the Paramatman alone and not of the four-faced Brahmadeva, on account of him (Caturmukha) also being comprehended by the word Jivaghana for he is called Jivaghana who is possessed of a body due to Karman, and that is described in the case of the Four-faced (Brahma) also in

'*Who fashions up Brahmā before* (Śve 6 18)

etc, As to what has been stated—It is undrstood that the Brahmaloka pointed out as being above the mid region world is the world of Brahmadeva, (and hence) residing there is the Four faced (Brahmadeva)—(we say)— That is not proper When it has been ascertained that the object of reflection is the Paramātman in (the passage)

'*Whatever is tranquil (quiet), ageless, immortal fearless*' (Pra 5 7)

etc, the Brahmaloka pointed out as the place of one reflecting cannot be the decaying world of the Four-faced (Brahmā) And further, what is being spoken of as the destination for one freed from all sins, in (the passage)

'*As the serpent is freed from the slough, he freed from all sins—he indeed is lifted up to the Brahma-world by the Sāmans*' (Pra 5 5)

इति सर्वपापविनिर्मुक्तस्य प्राप्यतयोच्यमानं न चतुर्मुखस्थानम् । अत एव च, उदाहरण-श्लोके, इममेव ब्रह्मलोकमधिकृत्य श्रूयते

'यत्तत्कवयो वेदयन्ते' (प्र ५।७)

इति । कवयः—सूरयः । सूरिभिर्द्रष्टव्यं च वैष्णवं पदमेव

— *'तद्विष्णो परमं पदं सदा पश्यन्ति सूरयः'* (नृ पू ता ८।३)

इत्येवमादिभ्यः। न च, अन्तरिक्षात्परश्चतुर्मुखलोकः, मध्ये स्वर्गलोकादीनां बहूनां सद्भावात् । अत एव

'एतद्वै सत्यकाम परं चापरं च ब्रह्म यदोंकारस्तस्माद्विद्वानेतेनैवायतनेनैकतरम-न्वेति' (प्र ५।२)

इति प्रतिवचने, यदपरं कार्यं ब्रह्म निर्दिष्टं तदैहिकामुष्मिकत्वेन द्विधा विभज्य, एकमात्र-प्रणवमुपासीनानाम्, ऐहिकं मनुष्यलोकावाप्तिरूपं फलमभिधाय, द्विमात्रमुपासीनानाम्, आमुष्मिकम्, अन्तरिक्षशब्दोपलक्षितं फलं चाभिधाय, त्रिमात्रेण परब्रह्मवाचिना प्रणवेन परमपुरुषं ध्यायतां परमेव ब्रह्म प्राप्यतयोपदिशति, इति-सर्वं समञ्जसम् । अतः, ईक्षतिकर्म परमात्मा ॥ १२ ॥

ईक्षतिकर्माधिकरणं समाप्तम् । (४)

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is not the place of the Four-faced (Brahmadeva) And therefore, in the verse cited, it is mentioned in the Sruti referring to this very Brahmaloka,

'What the wise men come to know' (*Pra 5 7*)

Kavayah —the wise men And the thing fit to be seen by the wise men is Visnu's place alone, from the Sruti passages like

'The wise men always see that famous highest place of Visnu' (Nr Pu. Tā 8 3)

And again the world of Brahmā is not beyond the mid-region on account of of the existence of many worlds, heaven etc in between For this very reason, in the reply-statement

'This, verily, (O) Satyakāma the Higher and the Lower Brahman, what is the Om Therefore, the wise one, through this very abode reaches either of these (Pra 5 2)

what is the lower—effect—Brahman pointed out,—having divided that into two —belonging to this world and belonging to the hereafter, having declared the fruit belonging to this world viz, the acquisition of the world of mortals, for those worshipping the one-measure Om, and having declared the fruit belonging to the hereafter, indicated by the word Antariksa, for those worshipping the two-measure Brahman—the Sruti teaches the Highest Brahman alone as the destination for those contemplating the highest Purusa by the three-measure Om denoting the Highest Brahman,—and so everything is reasonable Therefore, the object of reflection is the Paramātman ॥ 12 ॥

Here ends the Īksatikarmādhikarana (4)

[190] दहर उत्तरेभ्यः ॥ १३ ॥ (अधिकरण ५, सूत्राणि १३–२२)

इदमामनन्ति च्छन्दोगाः—

'अथ यदिदमस्मिन्ब्रह्मपुरे दहरं पुण्डरीकं वेश्म दहरोऽस्मिन्नन्तर आकाशस्तस्मिन्यदन्तस्तदन्वेष्टव्यं तद्वाव विजिज्ञासितव्यम्' (छा. ८।१।१)

इति। तत्र संदेहः— किमसौ हृदयपुण्डरीकमध्यवर्तिदहराकाशो महाभूतविशेषः, उत प्रत्यगात्मा, अथ परमात्मा ? इति। किं तावद्युक्तम् ? महाभूतविशेषः, इति। कुतः ? आकाशशब्दस्य महाभूताकाशे ब्रह्मणि च प्रसिद्धत्वेऽपि, भूताकाशे प्रसिद्धिप्रकर्षात्।

'तस्मिन् यदन्तस्तदन्वेष्टव्यम्' (छा. ८।१।१)

इति, अन्वेष्टव्यान्तरस्याधारतया प्रतीतेश्च, इति। एवं प्राप्ते, अभिधीयते—

'दहर उत्तरेभ्यः'। दहराकाशः— परं ब्रह्म। कुतः ? उत्तरेभ्यो वाक्यगतेभ्यो हेतुभ्यः।

'एष आत्मापहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोकोऽविजिघत्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः' (छा. ८।१।५)

इति निरुपाधिकात्मत्वम्, अपहतपाप्मत्वादिकम्, सत्यकामत्वं सत्यसंकल्पत्वं च, इति दहराकाशे श्रूयमाणा गुणा दहराकाशं परं ब्रह्मेति ज्ञापयन्ति।

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[190] Dahara (small) (is the Paramātman) on account of the later (passages) ॥ 13 ॥ (Adhikaraṇa 5, Sūtras 13-22)

The Chandogas ordain thus—

'Now whatever is this small lotus-abode in the Brahma-city, there in this, the small sky; what is inside that, that is to be searched after; that is to be desired to be known.' (Chā. 8·1·1)

There (arises) the doubt— Is this small Ākāśa (space) in the interior of the heart-lotus, the particular great element, or the inmost Atman, or the Paramātman? What, for the matter of that, is proper (here)? The particular great element. Whence? On account of the word Ākāśa being more prominently well-known as denoting the great element, although it is mentioned to mean the great element and Brahman,— and on account of the apprehension of that as the support of the other thing to be searched. in (the passage)

'What is inside that, that has to be searched after.' (Chā. 8·1·1)

—This (prima-facie view) being reached, (this) is stated (in reply)—

'The small (is the Paramātman) on account of the later (passages).' The Daharākāśa is the Highest Brahman. Whence? — From the later logical reasonings found in the passages. The qualities being mentioned in the Śruti in respect of the Daharākāśa, viz., being the Ātman without any limiting adjuncts, being with sins destroyed, being with all desires fulfilled, being with all thoughts fulfilled,—in

'This Ātman with sins destroyed, bereft of old age, bereft of death, bereft of grief, without hunger, without thirst, with desires fulfilled, with thoughts fulfilled' (Chā. 8·1·5)

'अथ य इहात्मानमनुविद्य व्रजन्त्येतांश्च सत्यान्कामांस्तेषां सर्वेषु लोकेषु कामचारो भवति' (छा. ८।१।६)

इत्यादिना

'य कामं कामयते सोऽस्य संकल्पादेव समुत्तिष्ठति । तेन संपन्नो महीयते' (छा ८।२।१०)

इत्यन्तेन, दहराकाशवेदिनः सत्यसंकल्पत्वप्राप्तिश्चोच्यमाना दहराकाशं परं ब्रह्म, इत्यवगमयति ।

'यावान्वा अयमाकाशस्तावानेषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाश' (छा ८।१।३)

इति, उपमानोपमेयभावश्च दहराकाशस्य भूताकाशत्वे नोपपद्यते । हृदयावच्छेदनिबन्धन उपमानोपमेयभाव इति चेत्, तथा सति हृदयावच्छिन्नस्य द्यावापृथिव्यादिसर्वाश्रयत्वं नोपपद्यते । ननु च, दहराकाशस्य परमात्मत्वेऽपि, बाह्याकाशोपमेयत्वं न संभवति

'ज्यायान्पृथिव्या ज्यायानन्तरिक्षात्' (छा ३।१४।३)

इत्यादौ सर्वस्माज्ज्यायस्त्वश्रवणात् । नैवम् । दहराकाशस्य हृदयपुण्डरीकमध्यवर्तित्व-

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make one understand that the Daharākāśa is the Highest Brahman And the acquisition of being with desires fulfilled, spoken of in the case of the knower of the Daharākāsa, being mentioned in the passage beginning with—

'Now, those who having known the Ātman here, and these fulfilled desires, go away,—of them there is movement at will in all the worlds' (Chā 8 1 6)

and ending with

'What desire he wishes for, that rises up for him through his will Endowed with that he becomes great' (Chā 8 2 10)

makes one apprehend that the Daharakāśa is the Highest Brahman

'What size, verily, this Ākasa that same is this Ākāsa in the heart within' (Chā 8 1 3)

—and this relation of the standard of comparison and the object of comparison could not be accounted for well with the Daharakāśa being the element Ākāśa If it be argued that the relation of the standard of comparison and the object to be compared, is circumscribed by the limit of the heart— in that case, being the resort of all —heaven earth etc, would not be appropriate in one circumscribed by the heart But (I say, says the objector)— Even if Daharakāśa were to be the Paramātman its being the object to be compared with the Akāśa outside would not be appropriate, on account of the mention in the Śruti about its being bigger than everything in

'Bigger than the earth bigger than the mid region' (Chā 3 14 3)

etc —Not so (we reply) because this passage is intended to repudiate the smallness resulting from its being in the interior of the heart-lotus, just as

प्राशाल्पत्वनिवृत्तिपरत्वात्, अस्य वाक्यस्य। यथा, अधिकजवेऽपि सवितरि, इषुवद्गच्छति सविता, इति वचनं गतिमान्द्यनिवृत्तिपरम्।

अथ स्यात् —

'एष आत्मापहतपाप्मा' (छा. ८।१।५)

इत्यादिना दहराकाशो न निर्दिश्यते।

'दहरोऽस्मिन्नन्तराकाशस्तस्मिन्यदन्तस्तदन्वेष्टव्यम्' (छा. ८।१।१)

इति दहराकाशान्तर्वर्तिनः, ततोऽन्यस्यान्वेष्टव्यत्वेन प्रकृतत्वात्, इह

'एष आत्मापहतपाप्मा' (छा. ८।१।५)

इति तस्यैवान्वेष्टव्यस्य निर्देष्टुं युक्तत्वात्।

स्यादेतदेवं यदि श्रुतिरेव दहराकाशं तदन्तर्वर्तिनं च न व्यभाङ्क्ष्यत्। व्यभाङ्क्षीत्तु सा। तथाहि —

'यदिदमस्मिन्ब्रह्मपुरे दहरं पुण्डरीकं वेश्म दहरोऽस्मिन्नन्तराकाशस्तस्मिन्यदन्तस्तदन्वेष्टव्यम्' (छा. ८।१।१)

इति ब्रह्मपुरशब्देन, उपास्यतया संनिहितपरब्रह्मणः पुरत्वेन, उपासकशरीरं निर्दिश्य, तन्मध्यवर्ति च तदवयवभूतं पुण्डरीकाकारम्, अल्पपरिमाणं हृदयं परस्य ब्रह्मणो वेश्मतयाभिधाय, सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिम्, आश्रितवात्सल्यैकजलधिम्, उपासकानुग्रहाय तस्मि-

the statement 'The Sun moves like an arrow' in respect of the Sun even though possessed of a great speed, is intended to repudiate the slowness of the speed.

Now, it may be (argued)— The Daharākāśa is not pointed by passages like

'This Ātman, with sins destroyed' (Chā. 8·1·5)

on account of the one residing within the Daharākāśa being the subject-matter in hand and being different from that as being fit to be searched after; in (the passage)

'There is in this, the small sky, what is inside it is to be searched after' (Chā. 8·1·1)

here in

'This Ātman with sins destroyed' (Chā. 8 1·5)

it is proper to point out that same one fit for being searched after—

(The reply is) —It would be so, if the Śruti itself were not splitting the Daharākās'a and the one residing within that, but it did so split up. To explain the same in detail—In the passage

'Now whatever is this small lotus-abode in the Brahma-city, there is in this, the small sky; what is inside it is to be searched after' (Chā. 8 1·1)

—having pointed out to the body of the worshipper, as being the city of the Highest Brahman near by, for being worshipped, by the word Brahmapura—having mentioned as the abode of the Highest Brahman, the heart existing in the interior of that, and which is the part thereof, having the form of a lotus, (and) of a small measure, — having pointed out by the word

न्वेश्मनि संनिहितं सूक्ष्मतया ध्येयं दहराकाशशब्देन निर्दिश्य, तदन्तर्वर्ति च, अपहतपाप्मत्वादि स्वभावतो निरस्तनिखिलहेयत्वसत्यकामत्वादि स्वाभाविकानवधिकातिशयकल्याणगुणजातं च ध्येयं तदन्वेष्टव्यमित्युपदिश्यते । अत्र, तदन्वेष्टव्यम्, इति तच्छब्देन दहराकाशं तदन्तर्वर्तिगुणजातं च परामृश्य, तदुभयमन्वेष्टव्यमित्युपदिश्यते ।

'यदिदमस्मिन्ब्रह्मपुरे दहरं पुण्डरीकं वेश्म'　　　　(छा ८।१।१)

इत्यनूद्य, तस्मिन्दहरपुण्डरीकवेश्मनि यो दहराकाशो यच्च तदन्तर्गतं गुणजातं तदुभयमन्वेष्टव्यम्, इति विधीयते, इत्यर्थः ।

दहराकाशशब्दनिर्दिष्टस्य परब्रह्मत्वं, तस्मिन् यदन्तः, इति निर्दिष्टस्य च तद्गुणत्वं तच्छब्देनोभयं परामृश्य, उभयस्याप्यन्वेष्टव्यतया विधानं च कथमवगम्यते ? इति चेत्—तदवहितमना शृणु—

'यावान्वा अयमाकाशस्तावानेषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाश'　　　　(छा ८।१।३)

Daharākasa the object of contemplation in a subtle form, stationed in that abode for the benefit of the worshipper, the Dhyeya (what is fit to be meditated upon) — which is omniscient, omnipotent, the one ocean of affection for those resorting to it, it is taught (by the Sruti) that the object of contemplation, with all sins destroyed etc naturally being with everything fit to be abandoned driven away, being with desires fulfilled, (and) the aggregate of auspicious qualities, natural endless, and excessive, existing in the interior of that—that is to be searched for Here, having referred to the Daharākāsa, and the aggregate of qualities residing within that, by the word Tat in Tadanvestavyam, it is taught that both of these are to be searched after The sense is — Having repeated

'Now whatever is this small lotus-abode in the Brahman-city'　　　　(Chā 8 1 1)

it is enjoined that what that Dahārākasa is in the small lotus-abode, and what the aggregate of qualities is residing in it,—both these should be searched for.

If it be argued— How can the injunction be about *both these as objects* to be searched for, after having referred to both by the word Tat — the nature as the Highest Brahman in the case of one pointed out by the word Daharākās'a, and being the qualities in the case of one pointed out by (the expression) What is within that ?— Listen to (what we say in reply) with an attentive mind—

Having mentioned the very great expanse of the Daharākāsa in (the passage)—

'What size, verily, this Ākāsa, that same is this Ākāsa in the heart within'　　　　(Chā 8 1 3)

इति दहराकाशस्यातिमहत्तामभिधाय,

'उभे अस्मिन्द्यावापृथिवी अन्तरेव समाहिते । उभावग्निश्च वायुश्च सूर्या-चन्द्रमसावुभौ विद्युन्नक्षत्राणि' (छा. ८।१।३)

इति प्रकृतमेव दहराकाशं 'अस्मिन्' इति निर्दिश्य, तस्य सर्वजगदाधारत्वमभिधाय,

'यच्चास्येहास्ति यच्च नास्ति सर्वं तदस्मिन्समाहितम्' (छा ८।१।३)

इति पुनरपि 'अस्मिन्' इति तमेव दहराकाशं परामृश्य, तस्मिन्नस्योपासकस्य, इह लोके यद्भोग्यजातमस्ति, यच्च मनोरथमात्रगोचरमिह नास्ति, सर्वं तद्भोग्यजातमस्मिन्दहराकाशे समाहितमिति निरतिशयभोग्यत्वं दहराकाशस्य, अभिधाय, तस्य दहराकाशस्य देहावयवभूतहृदयान्तर्वर्तित्वेऽपि, देहस्य जराप्रध्वंसादौ सत्यपि, परमकारणतयातिसूक्ष्मत्वेन निर्विकारत्वमुक्त्वा, तत एव

'एतत्सत्यं ब्रह्मपुरम्' (छा ८।१।५)

इति तमेव दहराकाशं सत्यकारणतया सत्यभूतं ब्रह्माख्यं पुरं निखिलजगदावासभूतम्, इत्युपपाद्य

'अस्मिन्कामाः समाहिताः' (छा ८।१।५)

—having pointed out by 'Asmin', the Daharākāśa, the matter in hand itself in (the passage)

'Both the heaven and the earth have been placed together, verily, within, both fire and wind, both the Sun and the Moon, lightning and asterisms' (Chā 8 1·3)

—having mentioned its being the support of the entire world and having again referred to the same Daharākaśa by 'Asmin' in (the passage)—

'Whatever of this is here, and whatever is not, all that has been placed together in this' (Cha 8 1·3)

—having mentioned the unsurpassed state of being enjoyed, of this Daharakāśa by (saying)—whatever aggregate of the objects of enjoyment there in this world of this worshipper, and whatever is not here being only within the province of thought—all that aggregate of objects of enjoyment, is placed together in this Daharākāsa, —having spoken of that Daharākāsa not being subject to modification owing to its being extremely subtile, because it is the highest cause, even though it resides within the heart which is a part of the body, (and) though there exist in the case of the body, old age, destruction etc, —having propounded therefrom that the same Daharākāsa, eternal owing to its being the eternal cause, the city called Brahman, is the abode of the entire world in (the passage)

'This eternal city of Brahman' (Chā 8 1·5)

—having pointed out by 'Asmin' the Daharākāsa, and having pointed out by 'Kāmāh' the attributes longed for in (the passage)

'In this, desires are placed together' (Chā 8 1 5)

इति दहराकाशं 'अस्मिन्' इति निर्दिश्य, काम्यभूतांश्च गुणान् 'कामाः' इति निर्दिश्य, तेषां दहराकाशान्तर्वर्तित्वमुक्त्वा, तदेव दहराकाशस्य काम्यभूतकल्याणगुणविशिष्टत्वं तस्यात्मत्वं च

'एष आत्मापहतपाप्मा' (छा ८।१।५)

इत्यादिना

'सत्यसंकल्पः' (छा ८।१।५)

इत्यन्तेन स्फुटीकृत्य,

'यथा ह्येवेह प्रजा अन्वाविशन्ति' (छा ८।१।५)

इत्यारभ्य,

'तेषां सर्वेषु लोकेष्वकामचारो भवति' (छा ८।१।६)

इत्यन्तेन, तदिदं गुणाष्टकं तद्विशिष्टं दहराकाशशब्दनिर्दिष्टमात्मानं च, अविदुषामेतद्व्यतिरिक्तभोग्यसिद्ध्यै च कर्म कुर्वताम्, अन्तवत्फलावाप्तिम्, असत्यसंकल्पत्वं च, अभिधाय,

'अथ य इहात्मानमनुविद्य व्रजन्त्येतांश्च सत्यान्कामांस्तेषां सर्वेषु लोकेषु कामचारो भवति' (छा ८।१।६)

इत्यादिना, दहराकाशशब्दनिर्दिष्टमात्मानं तदन्तर्वर्तिनश्च काम्यभूतान्, अपहतपाप्मत्वादिकान्गुणान् विजानताम्, उदारगुणसागरस्य तस्य परमपुरुषस्य प्रसादादेव सर्वकामावाप्ति

—having spoken of their residing within the Dabarākāśa —having made clear by (the passage) beginning with—

'This Ātman with sins destroyed' (Cha 8 1-5)

and ending with—

'With thoughts fulfilled' (Cha 8 1 5)

that the same Daharākaśa is characterised by auspicious qualities longed for and that it is the Ātman—and having mentioned in the passage beginning with

'Just as indeed here these subjects enter along' (Cha 8 1 5)

and ending with

Of them in all the worlds there is no movement at will (Cha 8 1 6)

this, the aggregate of eight attributes, and the Ātman pointed out by the word Daharākāśa as characterised by those (qualities), and the acquisition of the fruit having an end and not being with thoughts fulfilled, in the case of the non knowers, engaged in action, for the accomplishment of the object of enjoyment other than this,—it is stated there is the acquisition of all desires, and having one's thoughts fulfilled through the grace alone of that highest Puruṣa the ocean of noble qualities in the case of those knowing the Ātman pointed out by the word Daharākāśa, and the attributes such as being with sins destroyed residing within that and fit to be longed for in (the passage)

'For those who here, having known the Ātman and these desires fulfilled, depart there is movement at will in all the worlds' (Cha 8 1 6)

सत्यसंकल्पता चोच्यते । अतः, दहराकाशः परं ब्रह्म, तदन्तर्वर्ति च, अपहतपाप्मत्वादि-काम्यगुणजातं तदुभयमन्वेष्टव्यं विजिज्ञासितव्यम्, इति चोच्यते, इति निश्चीयते । तदेतत्, वाक्यकारोऽपि स्पष्टयति—तस्मिन्यदन्तरिति काम्यव्यपदेशः—इत्यादिना । अतः, एतेभ्यो हेतुभ्यो दहराकाशः परमेव ब्रह्म ॥ १३ ॥

गतिशब्दाभ्यां तथा हि दृष्टं लिङ्गं च ॥ १४ ॥

[191] इतश्च दहराकाशः परं ब्रह्म—

'तद्यथा हिरण्यनिधिं निहितमक्षेत्रज्ञा उपर्युपरि संचरन्तो न विन्देयुरेवमेवेमाः सर्वाः प्रजा अहरहर्गच्छन्त्य एतं ब्रह्मलोकं न विन्दन्त्यनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः'

(छा. ८।३।२)

इति, 'एतम्' इति प्रकृतं दहराकाशं निर्दिश्य तत्र, अहरहः सर्वेषां क्षेत्रज्ञानां गमनम्, गन्तव्यस्य तस्य दहराकाशस्य ब्रह्मलोकशब्दनिर्देशश्च दहराकाशस्य परब्रह्मतां गमयतः ।

कथमनयोरस्य परब्रह्मत्वसाधकत्वम् ? इत्यत्राह—'तथाहि दृष्टम्' इति । परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि सर्वेषां क्षेत्रज्ञानामहरहः सुषुप्तिकाले गमनमन्यत्राभिधीयमानं दृष्टम् ।

'एवमेव खलु सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सति संपद्य न विदुः सति संपद्यामहे'

(छा. ६।९।२)

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etc. Therefore, it is ascertained that it is mentioned (in the Sruti) the Daharākāśa, the Highest Brahman; the aggregate of qualities fit to be longed for, such as being with sins destroyed, residing within it,—both of them are to be searched for, (and) to be desired to be known. This same, the Vākyakāra also clarifies by (the passage)— In—what is in that—there is a reference to the (qualities) longed for Therefore, for these reasons, the Daharākāśa is the Highest Brahman alone. ॥ 13 ॥

On account of the movement and the Śruti expression, to the same effect it is seen, and also there is an inferential mark ॥ 14 ॥

[191] And for this reason also, Daharākāśa is the Highest Brahman—

'It is as follows — Those who do not know the (geological value of the) fields, moving about again and again above, do not secure the gold treasure placed (underground), in the same way all these beings, moving about day after day, do not secure this Brahmaloka; for, they are overwhelmed with untruth,' (Chā. 8·3·2)

—Here, having pointed out to the Daharākāśa, the subject-matter, by (the expression) 'Etam', the movement of all the Kṣetrajñas there day after day, and the reference to that Daharākāśa by the word Brahmaloka as the destination— (both these) indicate Daharākāśa as being Brahmaloka.

How can there be in the case of these two, the capacity of proving that this is possessed of the nature of the Highest Brahman? — (In answer) to this (question, the Sūtrakāra) says—'To the same effect it is seen.'— The movement at the time of deep sleep day after day, towards the Highest Brahman in the case of all Kṣetra-knowers is seen to have been mentioned elsewhere, viz.

'In this same way, (O) gentle one, all these beings, merging into the Sat, do not know— We have merged into the Sat'

(Chā. 6·9·2)

इति,

'सत आगम्य न विदुः सत आगच्छामहे' (छा ६।१०।२)

इति च। तथा ब्रह्मलोकशब्दश्च परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि दृष्टः।

'एष ब्रह्मलोक सम्राडिति होवाच' (बृ. ४।३।३२)

इति। मा भूत्, अन्यत्र ब्रह्मणि गमनदर्शनम्। एतदेव तु दहराकाशे सर्वेषां क्षेत्रज्ञानां प्रलयकाल इव निरस्तनिखिलदुःखानां सुषुप्तिकालेऽवस्थानं श्रूयमाणमस्य परब्रह्मत्वे पर्याप्तं लिङ्गम्। तथा ब्रह्मलोकशब्दश्च समानाधिकरणवृत्त्या, अस्मिन्दहराकाशे प्रयुज्यमानोऽस्य ब्रह्मत्वे प्रयोगान्तरनिरपेक्षं पर्याप्तं लिङ्गमित्याह 'लिङ्गं च' इति। निषादस्थपतिन्यायाच्च षष्ठीसमासात् समानाधिकरणसमासो न्याय्यः।

अथवा,

'अहरहर्गच्छन्त्य' (छा ८।३।२)

इति न सुषुप्तिविषयं गमनमुच्यते, अपि तु, अन्तरात्मत्वेन सर्वदा वर्तमानस्य दहराकाशस्य परमपुरुषार्थभूतस्य, उपर्युपर्यहरहर्गच्छन्त्यः सर्वस्मिन्काले वर्तमानाः, तमजानन्त्यः, तं न विन्दन्ति न लभन्ते।

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and further,

'having come from the Sat do not know—We have come from the Sat' (Cha 6 10 2)

Likewise, the word Brahmaloka is also seen as referring to the Highest Brahman—

'This is Brahmaloka, the Emperor—thus, verily, he said' (Br 4 3 32)

There may not be elsewhere the description of going to the Brahman But this same is the sufficient logical reason viz the residing in the deep-sleep-state of all Ksetra-knowers with all miseries driven away as at the time of the dissolution of the world in the Daharākaśa, described in the Sruti (The Sūtrakāra also) says 'and (also) the inferential mark because the word Brahmaloka used to refer to this Daharakaśa by being put in case co-ordination, is likewise a sufficient inferential mark not requiring any other syllogism for this being Brahman And further, after the maxim of the Nisāda-Chief, (to take) the compound expression as in case co ordination (as a Karmadharaya compound) is more resonable (or grammatically correct) than (to take it as) a genitive compound

Or

'going day after day' (Chā 8 3 2)

—by this is not mentioned the going as referring to the state of deep sleep but on the other hand, these, going day after day over and above the Daharākaśa, existing at all times, always existing as the inmost Ātman which is the highest human purpose in life not knowing that—Na vindanti—do not secure (that)

यथा हिरण्यनिधिं निहितं तत्स्थानमजानानास्तदुपरि सर्वदा वर्तमाना अपि न लभन्ते तद्वदित्यर्थः। सेयमेव, अन्तरात्मत्वेनावस्थितस्य दहराकाशस्योपरि तन्नियमितानां सर्वासां प्रजानामजानतीनां सर्वदा गतिरस्य दहराकाशस्य परब्रह्मतां गमयति। तथा ह्यन्यत्र परस्य ब्रह्मणोऽन्तरात्मतयावस्थितस्य स्वनियम्याभिः स्वस्मिन्वर्तमानाभिः प्रजाभिरवेदनं दृष्टम्। यथा, अन्तर्यामिब्राह्मणे

'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरो यमात्मा वेद न यस्यात्मा शरीरं य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति' (बृ (मा.) ३।७।२२)

'अदृष्टो द्रष्टाश्रुतः श्रोता' (बृ. ३।७।२३)

इति च। मा भूदन्यत्रदर्शनम्, स्वयमेव तु, इयं निधिदृष्टान्तावगतपरमपुरुषार्थभावस्यास्य हृदयस्थस्योपरि तदाधारतयाहरहः सर्वदा सर्वासां प्रजानामजानतीनां गतिः, अस्य परब्रह्मत्वे पर्याप्तं लिङ्गम् ॥ १४॥

[192] इतश्च दहराकाशः परं ब्रह्म—

धृतेश्च महिम्नोऽस्यास्मिन्नुपलब्धेः ॥ १५ ॥

'अथ य आत्मा' (छा. ८।४।१)

इति प्रकृतं दहराकाशं निर्दिश्य

As those not knowing the gold treasure placed (underground) (and) its (particular) place, *although always remaining over that, do not get it,—like* that — this (is) the sense And the same movement at all time above the Daharākāśa staying as the inmost Ātman, of all people, controlled by that (and) not aware of this, *indicates* this Daharākāśa *as* being the *Highest* Brahman. To the same effect, elsewhere is seen the non-cognition of the Highest Brahman staying as the inmost Ātman, by the people controlled by *itself (and) residing within itself, as in the Brāhmaṇa passage dealing with the* inner Controller viz.

'Who, residing in the Ātman, is different from the Ātman; whom the Ātman knows not, whose body is the Ātman; who controls the Ātman inside' (Br. (M)3·7·22)

and also in

'The unseen, the Seer; the unheard, the Hearer.' (Br. 3·7·23)

There may not be any (actual) reference elsewhere; this movement of its own accord, however, at all time, of all ignorant people day after day, having that as the support, above *this one stationed in the heart (and)* whose nature as the highest human purpose in life is known by the illustrative instance of the treasure, is a sufficient inferential mark in (proving this one, as being) the Highest Brahman ॥ 14 ॥

[192] And for this reason, Daharākāśa is the Highest Brahman.—

And on account of the greatness of the support, being found, in this ॥15॥

Having pointed out to the matter in hand, the Daharākāśa, in (the passage)

'Now, who, the Ātman' (Chā. 8·4·1)

the statement in the Sruti about the supporting of the world here in

'स सेतुर्विधृतिरेषा लोकानामसंभेदाय' (छा ८।४।१)

इत्यस्मिन्नगद्विधरणं श्रूयमाणं दहराकाशस्य परब्रह्मतां गमयति। जगद्विधरणं हि परस्य ब्रह्मणो महिमा—

'एष सर्वेश्वर एष सर्वभूताधिपतिरेष भूतपाल एष सेतुर्विधरण एषां लोकानामसंभेदाय' (बृ ४।४।२२)

इति,

'एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठत' (बृ ३।८।९)

इत्यादिभ्यः। स चायं परस्य ब्रह्मणो धृत्याख्यो महिमा, अस्मिन्दहराकाशे लभ्यते। अतः, दहराकाशः परं ब्रह्म ॥ १५ ॥

प्रसिद्धेश्च ॥ १६ ॥

आकाशशब्दश्च परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि प्रसिद्धः

'को ह्येवान्यात्कः प्राण्यात्। यदेष आकाश आनन्दो न स्यात्' (तै ०।७)

'सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतान्याकाशादेव समुत्पद्यन्त आकाशं प्रत्यस्तं यान्ति' (छा १।९।१)

इत्यादिषु। अपहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणसनाथा प्रसिद्धिः, भूताकाशप्रसिद्धेर्बलीयसी, इत्यभिप्रायः ॥ १६ ॥

'That is the bridge (dam) the support for the non disintegration of these peoples' (Cha 8 4 1)

indicates the Daharakāśa as being the Highest Brahman Supporting the world is indeed, the greatness of the Highest Brahman (as is seen) in

'This, the Controller of all this, the supreme Lord of all beings, this the protector of beings, this, the bridge this, the support for the non disintegration of beings' (Br 4 4 22)

'By the command of this Imperishable, verily, (O) Gargi, the Sun and the Moon stay on supported (Br 3 8 9)

etc — And this greatness of the Highest Brahman, known as support, is found in this Daharākaśa Therefore, the Daharakaśa is the Highest Brahman ॥ 15 ॥

And on account of being well known ॥ 16 ॥

And the word Ākasa is well-known to refer to the Highest Brahman in (passages) like

'Who indeed, would be breathing, who would live, if this Ākāśa were not the bliss?' (Tait 2 7)

'All these beings, indeed, come out from the Ākasa alone go to set in the Ākaśa' (Chā 1 9 1)

Being well-known owing to association with qualities like being with sins destroyed etc is stronger than being well-known as the element Ākāsa —This is the purport. ॥ 16 ॥

एवं तावद्दहराकाशस्य भूताकाशत्वं प्रतिक्षिप्तम्। अथ, इदानीं दहराकाशस्य प्रत्यगात्मत्वमाशङ्क्य निराकर्तुमुपक्रमते—

इतरपरामर्शात्स इति चेन्नासंभवात् ॥ १७ ॥

यदुक्तम्—वाक्यशेषवशात्, दहराकाशः परं ब्रह्म, इति—तदयुक्तम्। वाक्यशेषे परस्मात्, इतरस्य जीवस्यैव साक्षात्परामर्शात्।

'अथ य एष संप्रसादोऽस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यत एष आत्मेति होवाचैतदमृतमभयमेतद्ब्रह्म' (छा. ८।३।४)

इति। यद्यपि

'दहरोऽस्मिन्नन्तराकाशः' (छा. ८।१।१)

इति हृदयपुण्डरीकमध्यवर्तितया, उपदिष्टस्याकाशस्य, उपमानोपमेयभावाद्यसंभवात्, भूताकाशत्वं न संभवति, तथापि वाक्यशेषात् प्रत्यगात्मत्वं युक्तमाश्रयितुम्। आकाशशब्दोऽपि प्रकाशादियोगात्, जीव एव वर्तिष्यते, इति चेत्,—अत्रोत्तरं 'नासंभवात्' इति। नायं जीवः। न ह्यपहतपाप्मत्वादयो गुणा जीवे संभवन्ति ॥ १७ ॥

In this manner, so far has been counter-acted (the proposition that) the Daharākāśa is the element Ākāśa. Now, here, sensing some doubt as regards the Daharākāśa being the inmost Ātman, (the Sūtrakāra) takes in hand its repudiation.

If it is argued that owing to the reference to the other one, he (the Jīva, is referred to,)—(we reply)— No, on account of the impossibility. ॥ 17 ॥

As to what has been said that on account of the remaining passage, Daharākāśa is the Highest Brahman—(we say)—It is improper, because in the complementary (remaining) passage, there is a direct reference to the Jīva alone, who is other than the Highest—

' Now this Samprasāda rising up from this body, having attained to the highest Light, emerges in his own form, this, the Ātman—he, verily, said; — this (is) immortal, without fear, — this Brahman.' (Chā. 8·3·4)

Although in

'There (is) in this, the small sky' (Chā 8·1·1)

on account of the impossibility of the relation of the standard of comparison and the object of comparison etc , regarding the Ākāśa mentioned as being in the interior of the heart-lotus, there is not the possibility of its being the element Ākāśa, still through the force of the complementary passage it is proper to resort to (the idea of) that being the inmost Atman.— The word Ākāśa also would be referring to Jīva himself on account of its association with light etc. — If it be argued like that here is the answer— 'No, on account of the impossibility'. This one (is) not the Jīva. Not, indeed, are the qualities like being with sins destroyed, possible in the case of the Jīva. ॥ 17 ॥

उत्तराच्चेदाविर्भूतस्वरूपस्तु ॥ १८ ॥

उत्तरात्प्रजापतिवाक्यात्, जीवस्यैव, अपहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणयोगो निर्धार्यते, इति चेत्—एतदुक्तं भवति—प्रजापतिवाक्यं जीवपरमेव । तथाहि—

> *'य आत्मापहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोको विजिघत्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसङ्कल्पः सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः । स सर्वांश्च लोकानाप्नोति सर्वांश्च कामान्यस्तमात्मानमनुविद्य विजानाति'* (छा ८।७।१)

इति प्रजापतिवचनम्, ऐतिह्यरूपेण, उपश्रुत्य, अन्वेष्टव्यात्मस्वरूपजिज्ञासया प्रजापतिमुपसेदुषे मघवते प्रजापतिः, जागरितस्वप्नसुषुप्त्यवस्थं जीवात्मानं सशरीरं क्रमेण शुश्रूषुयोग्यतापरिचिक्षिषया, उपदिश्य, तत्र भोग्यमपश्यते परिशुद्धात्मस्वरूपोपदेशयोग्याय तस्मै मघवते

> *'मघवन्मर्त्यं वा इदं शरीरमात्तं मृत्युना । तदस्यामृतस्याशरीरस्यात्मनोऽधिष्ठानम्'* (छा ८।१२।१)

इति शरीरस्याधिष्ठानतामात्मनश्चाधिष्ठातृताम्, अशरीरस्य च तस्यामृतत्वस्वरूपतां चोक्त्वा,

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If it is argued from the later passage, (the soul) has his nature displayed for the matter of that ॥ 18 ॥

If it be argued that it is ascertained that there is the association of the Jiva himself with qualities like being with sins destroyed, from the later speech of Prajāpati— this is what is intended to be said—The speech of Prajāpati does refer to Jiva To explain the same (in detail)—

> *'What Ātman, with sins destroyed, ageless, bereft of death breft of grief, without hunger, without thirst, with wishes fulfilled with thoughts fulfilled— he should be searched for, should be desired to be known, and he secures all the worlds and all desires, who knows, having duly comprehended that Ātman* (Cha 8 7 1)

—having heard the speech of Prajāpati as a traditional statement—Prajāpati having taught to Indra who had approached Prajapati with a desire to know the nature of Ātman to be searched for, with a desire to test the fitness of him desirous of learning about the embodied Jīvātman in the three states— waking, dream and deep sleep—in due order,—and having mentioned to that Indra not seeing there any object of enjoyment, (and who was thus) fit for the instruction about the nature of the all-pure Ātman, the body being the substratum, and the Ātman being the presiding authority and the nature as immortality of him having no body, in (the passage)—

> *(O) Indra, this body, verily, is mortal grasped by Death That is the substratum of this Ātman, immortal and bodiless'* (Cha 8 12 1)

'न ह वै सशरीरस्य सत प्रियाप्रियपोरपहतिरस्ति । अशरीर वाव सन्त न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशत' (छा ८।१२।१)

इति कर्मारब्धशरीरयोगिनस्तदनुगुणसुखदुःखभागित्वरूपानर्थं तद्विमोक्षे च तदभावमभिधाय,

'एवमेवैष सम्प्रसादोऽस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय पर ज्योतिरुपसपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते' (छा ८।१२।३)

इति जीवात्मन· स्वरूपमेव शरीरवियुक्तमुपदिदेश ।

'स उत्तम पुरुष स तत्र पर्येति जक्षत्क्रीडन्रममाण स्त्रीभिर्वा यानैर्वा ज्ञातिभिर्वा नोपजन स्मरन्निद शरीरम्' (छा ८।१२।३)

इति प्राप्यस्य परस्य ज्योतिषः पुरुषोत्तमत्वं निवृत्ततिरोधानस्य परं ज्योतिरुपसंपन्नस्य प्रत्यगात्मनो ब्रह्मलोके यथेष्टभोगावाप्तिं प्रियाप्रियादियुक्तकर्मनिमित्तशरीराद्यपुरुषार्थाननुसंधानं चाभिधाय,

'स यथा प्रयोग्य आचरणे युक्त एवमेवायमस्मिञ्छरीरे प्राणो युक्त' (छा ८।१२।३)

इति यथोक्तस्वरूपस्यैव संसारदशायां कर्मतन्त्रं शरीरयोगं युग्यशकटयोगदृष्टान्तेना-

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and having mentioned in

'Not, indeed, is there the destruction of the agreeable and the disagreeable in the case of one having a body him not having a body, verily, touch not the agreeable and the disagreeable' (Cha 8 12 1)

the disaster in the form of sharing in happiness and grief in conformity with (the body) for one associated with the body produced by the Karman, (and) the absence of the same when freed from it (Prajapati) taught the nature itself of the Jivātman when separated from the body, in (the passage)

'This Samprasāda, verily thus rising up from this body having attained to the highest Light, emerges in his own form (Cha 8 12 3)

Having mentioned in (the passage)

'That (is) the highest Purusa he moves about there eating playing, sporting with women or with conveyances, or with relatives, not remembering this body generated (or birth)' (Cha 8 12 3)

that the highest Light the destination is the highest Purusa that the inmost Atman with the veil removed, (and) attaining to the highest Light, secures the fruit as desired in the Brahmaloka, (and) that there is the continuing non-association with what is not the human purpose in life, such as the body etc resulting from Karman (and) endowed with the agreeable and the disagreeable —having mentioned in (the passage)

'As he (a horse) fit to be yoked to the cart (or, for movement) is yoked in the same way the Prāna is yoked to this body' (Cha 8 12 3)

the association with the body depending upon the Karman, in the state of

भिधाय,

'अथ यत्रैतदाकाशमनुविषण्णं चक्षु स चाक्षुष पुरुषो दर्शनाय चक्षुरथ यो वेदेदं जिघ्राणीति स आत्मा गन्धाय घ्राणमथ यो वेदेदमभिव्याहराणीति स आत्माभिव्याहाराय वागथ यो वेदेदं शृणवानीति स आत्मा श्रवणाय श्रोत्रमथ यो वेदेदं मन्वानीति स आत्मा मनोऽस्य दैवं चक्षु ।' (छा. ८।१२।४-५)

इति चक्षुरादीनां करणत्वं रूपादीनां ज्ञेयत्वम्, अस्य च ज्ञातृत्वं प्रदर्श्य, तत एव शरीरेन्द्रियेभ्योऽस्य व्यतिरेकमुपपाद्य

'स वा एष एतेन दिव्येन चक्षुषा मनसैतान्कामान्पश्यन्रमते य एते ब्रह्मलोके ।' (छा ८।१२।५)

इति तस्यैव विधूतकर्मनिमित्तशरीरेन्द्रियस्य मनःशब्दाभिहितेन दिव्येन स्वाभाविकेन ज्ञानेन सर्वकामानुभवमुक्त्वा,

'तं वा एतं देवा आत्मानमुपासते । तस्मात्तेषां सर्वे च लोका आत्ता सर्वे च कामा' (छा ८।१२।६)

इत्येवंविधमात्मानं ज्ञानिनो जानन्ति, इत्यभिधाय,

'स सर्वांश्च लोकानाप्नोति सर्वांश्च कामान्यस्तमात्मानमनुविद्य विजानातीति ह प्रजापतिरुवाच ।' (छा ८।१२।६)

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worldly existence, in the case of him alone with his form already described by the illustration of the association of the cart and the fit-to-be-yoked (animal) —having pointed out in (the passage)—

'Now, where into this Ākāśa, this eye has entered, that is the Person in the eye, the eye is for the sight, now who knows (thinks)—May I smell this—he is the Ātman, the nose is for smell, now who knows —May I speak this— he is the Ātman, the tongue is for speaking out, now who knows— May I hear this—he is the Ātman the ear is for hearing, now who knows—May I think this—he is the Ātman the mind is his divine eye (Cha. 8 12 4-5)

that the eye etc are the instruments, colour etc are the objects of knowledge and that he is the knower, having reasoned from this very fact, that he is different from the body and the sense-organs, having told in (the passage)—

'He, this one, verily, enjoys seeing with this divine eye, the mind, these desires which are in the Brahmaloka' (Cha 8 12 5)

that he himself, with the body and the sense-organs resulting from Karman shaken off, experiences all desires by the divine natural knowledge denoted by the word Manas (mind), —having mentioned in (the passage)

'Him verily,— this Ātman- the gods worship, therefore, for them all the worlds are secured, and all the desires' (Cha 8 12 6)

that the knowers know such an Ātman, (and) having mentioned in (the passage)

'And he secures all the worlds and all desires, who knows, having duly comprehended that Ātman —thus, verily, Prajāpati said' (Cha 8 12 6)

इत्येवंविधमात्मानं विदुषः सर्वलोकसर्वकामावाप्त्युपलक्षितं ब्रह्मानुभवं फलमभिधायोपसंहृतम्। अतः, तत्र, अपहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणको ज्ञातव्यतया प्रक्रान्तो जीव एवेत्यवगतम्। अतः, जीवस्यापहतपाप्मत्वादय संभवन्ति। अतः, दहरवाक्यशेषे श्रूयमाणस्य जीवस्यापहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणसम्भवात् स एव दहराकाशः, इति निर्णीयते, इति चेत्-इति।

तत्राह— 'आविर्भूतस्वरूपस्तु' इति। पूर्वम्, अनृततिरोहितापहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणकः स्वस्वरूप', पश्चात्, विमुक्तकर्मबन्धः शरीरात्समुत्थितः परं ज्योतिरुपसंपन्न आविर्भूतस्वरूपः सन्, अपहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणविशिष्टः, तत्र प्रजापतिवाक्येऽभिधीयते। दहरवाक्ये तु, अतिरोहितस्वभावापहतपाप्त्वमादिविशिष्ट एव दहराकाशः प्रतीयते। आविर्भूतस्वरूपस्यापि जीवस्य, असंभावनीयाः सेतुवत्सर्वलोकविधरणत्वादयः सत्यशब्दनिर्वचनावगतं चेतनाचेतनयोर्नियन्तृत्वं दहराकाशस्य परब्रह्मतां साधयन्ति। सेतुवत्सर्वलोकविधरणत्वादय आविर्भूतस्वरूपस्यापि न संभवन्ति, इति

'जगद्व्यापारवर्जम्'　　　　　　　(ब्र सू ४।४।१७)

इत्यत्रोपपादयिष्यामः ॥ १८ ॥

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the fruit, the realisation of Brahman, characterised by the acquisition of all worlds and all desires, for the one knowing such an Ātman—it (the teaching) has been wound up Therefore, it is apprehended that the Jīva alone is the one introduced there as being fit to be known with qualities such as being with sins destroyed Therefore, (attributes) such as being with sins destroyed are possible in the case of the Jīva, and so, on account of the possibility of the qualities such as being with sins destroyed, in the case of the Jīva mentioned in the Sruti passage— in the complementary passage dealing with the Dahara, it is ascertained that he himself is the Daharākāsa — If it is argued like this—

In that connection says (the Sūtrakāra in reply)—' (the Soul) has his nature displayed for the matter of that'—Originally possessed of the qualities like being with sins destroyed etc screened by falsehood, with his *own nature later on, with the tie of Karman loosened, rising up from the* body, attaining to the highest Light with his own nature being manifested, particularised by the qualities like being with sins destroyed,—(in this way Jīva) is described there in the Prajapati-passage In the Dahara-passage, however, Daharākāśa alone is apprehended as being particularised by unscreened nature (and) the qualities such as being with sins destroyed Like the bridge being the support of all worlds and such like (qualities) impossible in the case of the Jīva, although with his own nature manifested (and) being the controller of the sentient and the non-sentient, known from the etymology of the word Satya, prove the Daharākāśa being the Highest Brahman. Like the bridge, being the support of all worlds etc — (such attributes) are not possible (in the case of the Jīva) although with his own nature manifested,— this we shall reason out in (the Sūtra)

'Barring the dealings with the world' ॥18॥

(Bra. Sū 4 4 17)

[193] यद्येवं, दहरवाक्ये

'अथ य एष संप्रसादः'　　(छा. ८।३।४)

इत्यादिना जीवप्रस्तावः किमर्थः ? इति चेत्, तत्राह—

अन्यार्थश्च परामर्शः ॥ १९ ॥

दहराकाशस्यैव, अपहतपाप्मत्वजगद्विधरणत्वादिवन्मुक्तस्य तदुपसंपत्त्या, अपहतपाप्मत्वादिकल्याणगुणविशिष्टस्वाभाविकरूपप्राप्तिकथनेन तद्धेतुस्वरूपं परमपुरुषासाधारणं गुणमुपदेष्टुं प्रजापतिवाक्योक्तस्य जीवस्यात्र परामर्शः । प्रजापतिवाक्ये च मुक्तात्मस्वरूपयाथात्म्यविज्ञानं दहरविद्योपयोगितयोक्तम् । ब्रह्म प्रेप्सोर्हि जीवात्मनः स्वरूपं च ज्ञातव्यमेव । स्वयमपि कल्याणगुण एव सन्, अनवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणं परं ब्रह्मानुभविष्यति, इति ब्रह्मोपासनफलान्तर्गतत्वात्स्वरूपयाथात्म्यविज्ञानस्य ।

'सर्वांश्च लोकानाप्नोति सर्वांश्च कामान्'　　(छा ८।१२।६)

'स तत्र पर्येति जक्षत्क्रीडन्'　　(छा ८।१२।३)

इत्यादिकं प्रजापतिवाक्ये कीर्त्यमानं फलमपि दहरविद्याफलमेव ॥ १९ ॥

अल्पश्रुतेरिति चेत्तदुक्तम् ॥ २० ॥

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[193] If so, in the Dahara-passage

'Now, what this Samprasāda'　　(Chā 8 3 4)

etc., for what purpose is the introduction of the Jiva ? — If (it is asked) like that, there says (the Sūtrakāra)—

The reference is, again, in respect of another sense ॥ 19 ॥

Like (the qualities) such as being with sins destroyed and being the support of the worlds, of the Daharakāśa alone, by the mention of the acquisition of the natural form particularised by auspicious qualities, such as being with sins destroyed, in the case of the Released (soul) by being merged into that— here is the reference to the Jiva mentioned in the Prajāpati-passage in order to teach the nature of the cause of that, the peculiar quality belonging to the highest Purusa And in the Prajāpati-passage the right knowledge of the nature of the Released (soul) is mentioned as being useful for (knowing) the Daharavidyā And indeed for one desirous of attaining to Brahman, the nature of the Jivātman is something which has got to be known, because the right knowledge of one's own nature is included in the fruit of the worship of Brahman, inasmuch as one, though being himself possessed of auspicious qualities, would be realising the Highest Brahman, possessed of unlimited, excessive (and) innumerable auspicious qualities. The fruit also glorified in the Prajāpati-passage, such as

'And he secures all the worlds, and all desires'　　(Chā 8 12 6)

'He moves about there, eating, playing.'　　(Chā 8 12 3)

is the fruit of the Daharavidyā itself. ॥ 19 ॥

If (the objection is) on account of the Śruti referring to smallness, (the reply is) that has been explained ॥ 20 ॥

'दहरोऽस्मिन्' (छा ८।१।१)

इत्यल्पपरिमाणश्रुतिः, आराग्रोपमितस्य जीवस्यैवोपपद्यते न तु सर्वस्माज्ज्यायसो ब्रह्मण इति चेत्—तत्र यदुत्तरं वक्तव्यं तत्पूर्वमेवोक्तं

'निचाय्यत्वादेवम्' (ब्र. सू. १।२।७)

इत्यनेन। अतः, दहराकाशः, अनाघ्राताविद्याद्यशेषदोषगन्धः स्वाभाविकानिरतिशयज्ञानबलैश्वर्यवीर्यशक्तितेजःप्रभृत्यपरिमितोदारगुणसागरः पुरुषोत्तम एव। प्रजापतिवाक्यनिर्दिष्टस्तु

'घ्नन्ति त्वेवैनं विच्छादयन्ति' (छा ८।१०।४)

इत्येवमादिभिरवगतकर्मनिमित्तदेहपरिग्रहः पश्चात्परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य, आविर्भूतापहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणकस्वस्वरूपः, इति न दहराकाशः ॥ २० ॥

इतश्च तदेव—

अनुकृतेस्तस्य च ॥ २१ ॥

तस्य दहराकाशस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणोऽनुकारात्, अयमपहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणको विमुक्तबन्धः प्रत्यगात्मा, न दहराकाशः। तदनुकारः—तत्साम्यम्। तथा हि—प्रत्यगात्मना विमुक्तस्य परब्रह्मानुकारः श्रूयते

If it be argued that the passage in the Sruti

'The Dahara (small) in this' (Chā 8·1 1)

mentioning a small dimension, is appropriate in the case of the *Jiva* alone, comparable to the tip of the awl, and not in the case of Brahman greater than every thing—(we reply)—In that connection, whatever answer is to be given, *that has already been given by (the Sūtra)*

'On account of his being thus to be meditated upon'

(Bra Sū 1·2·7)

Therefore, the Daharākāśa is the highest Purusa alone, who has not smelt (even) the smell of any blemishes, Avidyā etc, (and who is) the ocean of unlimited, noble qualities such as knowledge, strength, overlordship, prowess, power, lustre etc that are natural (to him), and admit of no excess Because, the one pointed out in the Prajāpati-passage, however, possessed of a body resulting from Karman is known from (passages like)

'They however, strike him down, they dissect (him)'

(Cha· 8 10 4)

later on as having merged into the highest Light, with his own nature made manifest, and possessed of qualities like being with sins destroyed, he is not *the Daharākaśa.* ॥ 20 ॥

For this reason also, that is so—

On account also of the imitation of that ॥ 21 ॥

Tasya—of the Daharākāśa, *from the imitation of the Highest Brahman,* this one with the attributes such as being with sins destroyed and with bondage removed, is the inmost Ātman, (and) not the Daharākāśa Imitation of that (is) resemblance to that To the same effect is declared in the Sruti the resemblance to the Highest Brahman of the inmost Ātman in the case of one freed—

'यदा पश्यः पश्यते रुक्मवर्णं कर्तारमीशं पुरुषं ब्रह्मयोनिम् ।
तदा विद्वान्पुण्यपापे विधूय निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति ॥' (मु. ३।१।३)

इति । अतः, अनुकर्ता प्रजापतिवाक्ये निर्दिष्टोऽनुकार्यं ब्रह्म दहराकाशः ॥ २१ ॥

अपि स्मर्यते ॥ २२ ॥

संसारिणोऽपि मुक्तावस्थायां परमसाम्यापत्तिलक्षणः परब्रह्मानुकारः स्मर्यते ।

'इदं ज्ञानमुपाश्रित्य मम साधर्म्यमागताः ।
सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्ते प्रलये न व्यथन्ति च ॥' (भ. गी १४।२)

इति ।

केचित्, 'अनुकृतेस्तस्य चापि स्मर्यते' इति सूत्रद्वयमधिकरणान्तरं

'तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति' (मु. २।२।१०)

इत्यस्याः श्रुतेः परब्रह्मत्वनिर्णयाय प्रवृत्तं वदन्ति, तत्तु

'अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः' (ब्र. सू १।२।२२)
'द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं स्वशब्दात्' (ब्र. सू. १।३।१)

इत्यधिकरणद्वयेन तस्य प्रकरणस्य परब्रह्मविषयप्रतिपादनात्,

'When the seer sees the Puruṣa golden-coloured, the agent, the controller, born of Brahman, then the wise one, having shaken off merit and demerit (and thus becoming) blotless, attains to the maximum equality.' (Mu 3 1·3)

Therefore, the one resembling is pointed out in the Prajāpati-passage and the thing resembled (is) Brahman —the Daharākāśa. ॥ 21 ॥

Further it is described in the Smṛti ॥ 22 ॥

In the case of the worldly Soul also, is described in the Smṛtis, in the released state, the imitation of the Highest Brahman, characterised by the attaining to the greatest resemblance—

'Having attained to this knowledge, those who have come into possession of qualities similar to those of mine, are not born even in the (world-) creation, and are not adversely affected (lit. pained) at the time of (world-) dissolution'. (Gitā 14 2)

Some speak of the two Sūtras, 'On account also of the imitation of that, further it is described it the Smṛti' (21 and 22) as (forming) another topic, introduced for the purpose of ascertaining the nature of the Highest Brahman, owing to the Śruti (passage)—

'Him alone shining, shines after, everything; by his lustre all this shines forth'. (Mu. 2 2 10)

—But that is improper, on account of that Section propounding that the Highest Brahman is the subject matter in the two topics—

'The one possessed of qualities invisibility etc. on account of the statement of the characteristics' (Bra Sū. 1·2 22)

'(The Paramātman is) the abode of heaven, earth etc, on account of (the use of) the actual words themselves' (Bra Sū 1·3 1)

and on account of the apprehension of the Highest Brahman as possessed of the nature of refulgence in the Sūtra

'ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात्' (ब्र. सू. १।१।२५)

इत्यादिषु परस्य ब्रह्मणो भारूपत्वावगतेश्च पूर्वपक्षानुत्थानात्, अयुक्तं सूत्राक्षरवैरूप्याच्च ॥२२॥

दहराधिकरणं समाप्तम् (५)

शब्दादेव प्रमितः ॥ २३ ॥ (अधिकरण ६, सूत्राणि २३–४१)

[194] कठवल्लीषु श्रूयते—

'अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो मध्य आत्मनि तिष्ठति ।
ईशानो भूतभव्यस्य न ततो विजुगुप्सते ॥ एतद्वै तत् ।
अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो ज्योतिरिवाधूमकः ।
ईशानो भूतभव्यस्य स एवाद्य स उ श्वः ॥ एतद्वै तत् ।' (का. ४।१२-१३)

'अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषोऽन्तरात्मा सदा जनानां हृदये संनिविष्टः ।
तं स्वाच्छरीरात्प्रवृहेन्मुञ्जादिवेषीकां धैर्येण तं विद्याच्छुक्रममृतम् ॥'
(का. ६।१७)

इति । तत्र संदिह्यते—किमयमङ्गुष्ठमात्रप्रमितः प्रत्यगात्मा, उत परमात्मा ? इति । किं युक्तम् ? प्रत्यगात्मा, इति । कुतः ? जीवस्यान्यत्राङ्गुष्ठमात्रश्रुतेः ।

'प्राणाधिपः संचरति स्वकर्मभिः ।
अङ्गुष्ठमात्रो रवितुल्यरूपः

'Jyotis (is Brahman) on account of the mention of the feet'
(Bra. Sū. 1·1·25)

etc., the prima-facie view cannot start there and on account of the words in the Sūtra being of an opposite nature— (the view of the Kecit is improper) ॥ 22 ॥

Here ends the Daharādhikaraṇa (5)

Measured, from the word itself ॥23॥ (Adhikaraṇa 6–Sūtras 23–41)

[194] It is mentioned in the Śruti in the sections of the *Kaṭha* (Upaniṣad)—

'The Puruṣa of the measure of the thumb stays in the middle within the body; the Controller of the past and the future is not disgusted with that. This, verily, is that.

'The Puruṣa of the measure of the thumb is like the light (flame) without smoke, the Controller of the past and the future; he, verily, is today; he, verily, is to-morrow. This, verily, is that.'
(Kā. 4·12–13)

'The Puruṣa of the measure of the thumb, the inner Ātman, is always resting in the heart of people. Him, one with courage should extract from one's own body like the reed from the Muñja grass. One should know him as refulgent, immortal.' (Kā. 6·17)

There it is doubted—Is this one measured as having the measure of a thumb the inmost Atman or the Paramātman? What is proper (here)? The inmost Ātman Whence? On account of the Jīva being mentioned in the Śruti elsewhere as having the measure of a thumb, as in (the passage)

'The supreme master of the vital breaths 'moves on by his deeds — who having the measure of the thumb, with a form

संकल्पाहंकारसमन्वितो यः ।　　　　　　　　(श्वे. ५।७)

इति । न चान्यत्रोपासनार्थतयापि परमात्मनोऽङ्गुष्ठमात्रत्वं श्रूयते । एवं निश्चिते जीवत्वे, ईशानत्वं शरीरेन्द्रियभोग्यभोगोपकरणापेक्षया भविष्यति, इति प्राप्ते, ब्रूमः—

'शब्दादेव प्रमितः' । अङ्गुष्ठमात्रप्रमितः परमात्मा । कुतः ?

'ईशानो भूतभव्यस्य'　　　　　　　　(का. ४।१२)

इति शब्दादेव । न च भूतभव्यस्य सर्वस्येशितृत्वं कर्मपरवशस्य जीवस्योपपद्यते ॥ २३ ॥

कथं तर्हि परमात्मनोऽङ्गुष्ठमात्रत्वम् ? इति, अत्राह—

हृद्यपेक्षया तु मनुष्याधिकारात् ॥ २४ ॥

परमात्मन उपासनार्थम्, उपासकहृदये वर्तमानत्वात्, उपासकहृदयस्याङ्गुष्ठप्रमाणत्वात्, तदपेक्षया, इदमङ्गुष्ठप्रमितत्वमुपपद्यते । जीवस्याप्यङ्गुष्ठप्रमितत्वं हृदयान्तर्वर्तित्वात्, तदपेक्षमेव, तस्य, आराग्रमात्रत्वश्रुतेः । मनुष्याणामेवोपासकत्वसंभावनया शास्त्रस्य मनुष्याधिकारत्वान्मनुष्यहृदयस्य च तदङ्गुष्ठप्रमितत्वात्खरतुरगभुजगादीनाम्, अनङ्गुष्ठप्रमितत्वेऽपि न कश्चिद्दोषः । स्थितं तावदुत्तरत्र समापयिष्यते ॥ २४ ॥

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resembling the Sun, associated with thought and egoism.' (Śve. 5·7)

Not again is mentioned in the Sruti elsewhere, that the Highest Ātman is of the measure of a thumb even for the purposes of worship. When the nature of the Jīva (as Aṅguṣṭhamātra Puruṣa) is thus ascertained, (the characteristic) being controller would be there, relating to the means for the enjoyment of objects fit to be enjoyed by the body and the sense-organs— This (prima-facie view) being reached, we say (in reply)—

'Measured from the word itself'. *The one of the measure of the thumb* is the Paramātman. Whence? On account of the word itself

'The controller of the past and future'.　　　　(Kā. 4·12·)

Not, indeed, being the Controller of everything, past and future, is proper in the case of the Jīva who is subject to Karman. ॥ 23 ॥

In that case, how is (to be explained) the Paramātman as being of the measure of the thumb ?— To this (the Sūtrakāra) says (in reply)—

However, on account of the relation with the heart, owing to human beings being qualified ॥ 24 ॥

Because the Paramātman stays in the heart of the worshipper for the sake of the worship, because the heart of the worshipper *has the measure of a* thumb,— this measure of the thumb is proper in relation to that. The measure of a thumb in the case of the Jīva also, is in relation to that itself, owing to his being within the heart, on account of his being described in the Sruti as having the measure of the tip of the awl. Because human beings are qualified for (doing the rites prescribed in) the Śāstra owing to the possibility of human beings alone being the worshippers, and because the heart of human beings is of the measure of a thumb, there is no blemish whatsoever, even though asses, horses, serpents etc. have (their heart) not having the measure of a thumb. The matter at issue, for the matter of that, would be finished off later (in the subsequent Sūtras) ॥ 24 ॥

तदुपर्यपि बादरायणः संभवात् ॥ २५ ॥

परस्य ब्रह्मणोऽङ्गुष्ठप्रमितत्वोपपत्तये मनुष्याधिकारं ब्रह्मोपासनशास्त्रमित्युक्तम्। तत्प्रसङ्गेन, इदानीं ब्रह्मविद्यायां देवादीनामप्यधिकारोऽस्ति नास्ति, इति विचार्यते। किं तावद्युक्तम्? नास्ति देवादीनामधिकारः, इति। कुतः? सामर्थ्याभावात्। न ह्यशरीराणां देवादीनां विवेकविमोकादिसाधनसप्तकानुगृहीतब्रह्मोपासनोपसंहारसामर्थ्यमस्ति। न च देवादीनां सशरीरत्वे प्रमाणमुपलभामहे। यद्यपि परिनिष्पन्नेऽपि वस्तुनि व्युत्पत्तिसंभावनया वेदान्तवाक्यानि परे ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणभावमनुभवन्ति, तथापि देवादीनां विग्रहवत्त्वप्रतिपादनपरं न किंचिदपि वाक्यमुपलभ्यते। मन्त्रार्थवादास्तु, कर्मविधिशेषतयान्यपरत्वात्, न देवादिविग्रहसाधने प्रभवन्ति। कर्मविधयश्च स्वापेक्षितोद्देश्यकारकत्वातिरेकि देवतागतं किमपि न साधयन्ति। अत एव, तासामर्थित्वमपि न संभवति। अतः, सामर्थ्यार्थित्वयोरभावात्, देवादीनामनधिकारः, इत्येवं प्राप्ते, प्रचक्ष्महे—

'तदुपर्यपि बादरायणः संभवात्'। तदुपर्यपि—तत् ब्रह्मोपासनम्, उपरि देवादि-

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Even beyond that (says) Bādarāyaṇa, on account of the possibility ॥ 25 ॥

In order that the Highest Brahman may appropriately have the measure of a thumb, it has been stated that the Sāstra dealing with the worship of Brahman, expects human beings only, to be qualified (for the same) In connection with the same it is now discussed here, whether even gods and others have qualification or not for (the study of) Brahmavidyā— What, for the matter of that, (is) proper? Gods and others have no qualification Whence? On account of the absence of the (necessary) ability Not indeed, can the gods etc having no bodies have the capacity (ability) for (the purpose of) carrying to the end the worship of Brahman associated with the seven aids such as discrimination non-attachment etc Nor again, do we get any proof as to the possession of a body by the gods Although the Vedanta passages can have the nature of a means of proof in respect of the Highest Brahman, owing to the possibility of an etymological reference in respect of a thing already established, still there is to be found no passage whatsoever, propounding the possession of bodies by the deities The *Mantras* and the glorificatory passages on account of their referring to something else, being subordinate to the injunction about the rite, have no power to establish (the possession of) a body of the deities etc. And the injunctions about the rite, do not establish anything pertaining to the deities over and above their being the cause of the thing aimed at and expected by them For this very reason, there is no possibility of (the deities) possessing also the state of a suppliant Therefore deities etc are not qualified on account of the absence of capacity and of the state of a suppliant— This (prima-facie view) thus being reached, we say (in reply)—

'Even beyond that (says) Bādarāyana on account of the possibility.'

प्यपि संभवति, इति भगवान्बादरायणो मन्यते, तेषामर्थित्वसामर्थ्ययोः संभवात्। अर्थित्वं तावत्, आध्यात्मिकादिदुर्विषहदुःखाभितापात्, परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि च निरस्तनिखिलदोषगन्धेऽनवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणगणे निरतिशयभोग्यत्वादिज्ञानाच्च संभवति। सामर्थ्यमपि पटुतरदेहेन्द्रियादिमत्तया संभवति। देहेन्द्रियादिमत्त्वं च ब्रह्मादीनां सकलोपनिषत्सु सृष्टिप्रकरणेषु, उपासनप्रकरणेषु च श्रूयते। तथाहि—

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्। तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति। तत्तेजोऽसृजत' (छा ६।२।१-२)

इत्यारभ्य, सर्वमचेतनं तेजोबन्नप्रमुखावस्थाविशेषवद्व्याकृत्य,

'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि' (छा ६।३।२)

इति संकल्प्य, ब्रह्मादिस्थावरान्तं चतुर्विधं भूतजातं तत्तत्कर्मोचितशरीरं तदुचितनामभाक्चाकरोत्, इत्युक्तम्। एवं सर्वत्र सृष्टिवाक्येषु देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यस्थावरात्मना चतुर्विधा सृष्टिराम्नायते। देवादिभेदश्च तत्तत्कर्मानुगुणब्रह्मलोकप्रभृतिचतुर्दशलोकस्थफलभोगयोग्य-

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Taduparyapi—Tat—the worship of Brahman, upari—in the case of the deities etc, even, sambhavati—is possible—thus thinks the Revered Bādarāyana, on account of the possibility of the state of a suppliant and capacity in them The state of a suppliant, for the matter of that, is possible in view of the all-round pain difficult to bear due to grief, pertaining to the body etc, and from the knowledge of unsurpassed enjoyment etc in respect of the Highest Brahman with even the tinge of all blemishes driven away, (and) possessing a host of unlimited, excessive, and innumerable auspicious qualities Capacity also is possible owing to their being possessed of more efficient bodies and sense-organs And the possession of the body and sense-organs by Brahmadeva and others is mentioned in the Śruti passages, in all the *Upanisads*, in the creation-chapters and the worship-chapters To explain the same in detail—

In the passage beginning with

'Existence, alone, was all this my dear, in the beginning, one alone without a second It reflected—Let me be many, may I procreate It created Light (Cha 6 2 1–2)

after having manifested everything inanimate as being possessed of distinct states, chief of them being Light, Water and Food,—after having thought

'Having entered (into these) with this Living Self, let me modify name and form' (Cha 6 3 2)

(the Highest Deity, Parā Devatā), it is stated created the four-fold aggregate of beings beginning with Brahmadeva (and) ending with the inanimate (creation), possessed of bodies befitting their (respective) various duties, and possessed of names befitting the same In this way, everywhere in *the creation-passages is declared the four fold creation* as being constituted of gods, lower animals, human beings and inanimate things And the distinction, gods etc. is dependent upon the enjoyment by the body, sense-organs etc.

देहेन्द्रियादिभोगायत्तः, आत्मनां स्वतो देवादित्वाभावात् । तथा

'तद्धोभये देवासुरा अनुबुबुधिरे । ते होचुः इन्द्रो ह वै देवानामभिप्रवव्राज विरोचनोऽसुराणाम् । तौ हासंविदानावेव समित्पाणी प्रजापतिसकाशमाजग्मतुः । तौ ह द्वात्रिंशद्वर्षाणि ब्रह्मचर्यमूषतुः । तौ ह प्रजापतिरुवाच' (छा ८।७।२-३)

इत्यादिना विस्पष्टमेव शरीरेन्द्रियवत्त्वं देवादीनां प्रतीयते ।

कर्मविधिशेषभूतमन्त्रार्थवादेष्वपि

'वज्रहस्तः पुरंदरः । तेनेन्द्रो वज्रमुदयच्छत्' (तै सं २।४।१२)

इत्यादिभिः प्रतीयमानं विग्रहादिमत्त्वं प्रमाणान्तराविरुद्धं तत्प्रमेयमेव । न च, अनुष्ठेयार्थप्रकाशनस्तुतिपरत्वाभ्यां प्रतीयमानार्थान्तराविवक्षा शक्यते वक्तुम्। स्तुत्याद्युपयोगित्वात्, तेन विना स्तुत्याद्यनुपपत्तेश्च । गुणकथनेन हि स्तुतित्वम् । गुणानामसद्भावे स्तुतित्वमपि हीयते। न हि, असता गुणेन कथितेन प्ररोचना जायते। अतः, कर्म प्ररोचयन्तो गुणसद्भावं बोधयन्त्येव, अर्थवादाः। मन्त्राश्च कर्मसु विनियुक्ताः, तत्र तत्र किंचित्करत्वायानुष्ठेयार्थ

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befitting the enjoyment of the fruit in the fourteen worlds beginning with the Brahmaloka etc, in conformity with (their) various Karmans, on account of the absence of Ātmans themselves being deities etc Likewise by (the passage)

'Then, verily, gods and Asuras,—both of them understood They, verily, said Indra, verily of the gods, approached, Virocana, of the Asuras Both of them, verily although not really understanding, approached Prajāpati, with sacrificial sticks in hand (as presents) The two, verily, resided as celibate religious students for thirty-two years Prajāpati verily, said to the two (Chā 8 7 2–3)

etc, is very clearly understood the possession of body, sense-organs by the gods etc

Even in the *Mantra* and glorificatory portions, that are subsidiary to the injunction about the rite, what is not contradictory to the other means of proof the possession of body etc, understood from (passages) like—

'Purandara (Indra, the city-smasher) with the thunderbolt in hand and by that Indra lifted up his thunderbolt'

(Tait Sam 2 4 12)

is certainly to be known It is not again possible to say that there is no expec tancy for another sense that can be understood from (the passages) referring to the exposition of the sense of the rite to be performed and its glorification, on account of glorification etc being useful, and without that glorification etc would further be inappropriate Glorification is indeed due to the mention of the qualities In the absence of qualities, even glorification would suffer Not indeed can there be produced any great interest by the mention of a non existing quality Therefore the glorificatory passages do enlighten (one) about the existence of qualities while creating interest for the rite The *Mantras* also, employed in the rites, throwing light upon the rite to be performed, for doing something

प्रकाशयन्तो देवतादिगतविग्रहादिगुणविशेषमभिदधत एव तत्र किंचित्कुर्वन्ति। अन्यथा, इन्द्रादिस्मृत्यनुपपत्तेः। न च निर्विशेषा देवता, अपि, इयम्, धियमधिरोहति। तत्र प्रमाणान्तराप्राप्तान्गुणान्स्वयमेव बोधयित्वा तैः कर्म प्ररोचयन्ति गुणविशिष्टं वा प्रकाशयन्ति देवतादिगतविग्रहादिगुणविशेषमभिदधत एव। तत्र प्राप्तांश्चानूद्य तैः प्ररोचनप्रकाशने कुर्वन्ति। विरुद्धत्वे तु तद्वाचिभिः शब्दैरविरुद्धान्गुणाँल्लक्षयित्वा कुर्वन्ति। कर्मविधेश्च देवतायाः प्रमाणान्तरप्राप्तमैश्वर्यमपेक्षितमेव। कामिनः कर्तव्यतया कर्म विधीयमानं स्वयं क्षणप्रध्वंसि कालान्तरभाविनः फलस्य स्वर्गादेः साधकमपेक्षते। मन्त्रार्थवादयोश्च

'वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता वायुमेव स्वेन भागधेयेनोपधावति। स एवैनं भूतिं गमयति' (तै स २।१।१)

'यदनेन हविषाशास्ते तदस्यात्तदृध्यात्तदस्मै देवा रासन्ताम्' (तै ब्रा ३।५।१०।५)

इत्यादिषु देवतायाः कर्मणाराधितायाः फलदायित्वं तदनुगुणं चैश्वर्यं प्रतीयमानमपेक्षितत्वेन वाक्यार्थे समन्वीयते। देवपूजाभिधायिनो यजिधातोश्च यागाख्यं कर्म स्वाराध्यदेवताप्रधानं

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or other there (at the various stages), do something there, while indeed denoting the particular quality (attribute) viz body etc. belonging to the gods etc, otherwise the remembrance of Indra etc, would not stand to reason Not again, such a deity without any distinctive attributes can be thought of There, they (the *Mantras*) having themselves enlightened about the qualities not known by any other means of proof, do create interest in the rite through them, or while mentioning the distinctive qualities viz body etc belonging to *gods etc.*, throw light upon something as particularised by a quality And there, they create interest and enlightenment by means of them (the qualities), after having repeated those that are there In cases where they are contradictory, however they create (*prarocana* and *prakāśana*) having indicated non-conflicting qualities by words denotative of them For the deity of the rite to be performed, again, *glory known from other means of proof is certainly to be expected The* rite being enjoined as being fit to be performed by a suppliant, itself perishing in a moment, stands in need of something accomplishing the fruit accruing *after some time, viz heaven etc In the Mantra and glorificatory passages like*

'The Wind indeed is the swiftest deity he runs along to Wind himself, by his own good luck he (Wind) alone takes him to prosperity' (Tait Sam 2 1·1)

'Whatever he wishes for by this offering let him eat (enjoy) that, let it be prosperous, let the gods give it over to him' (Tait Bra 3 5 10 5)

being the giver of the fruit in the case of the deity propitiated by the rite, and the glory *in conformity with that, that is being conveyed, are brought* together in the sense of the passage as being expected And the rite viz the sacrifice from the root Yaj enjoining the worship of gods, is understood as having the deity to be worshipped by one, as prominent.

प्रतीयते। तदेवं कृत्स्नवाक्यपर्यालोचनया वाक्यादेव विध्यपेक्षितं सर्वमवगतम्, इति, न, अपूर्वाद्विकं व्युत्पत्तिसमयानवगतं कर्मविधिष्वभिधेयतया कल्प्यतया चाश्रयितव्यम्। तथा संकीर्णब्राह्मणमन्त्रार्थवादमूलेषु धर्मशास्त्रेतिहासपुराणेषु ब्रह्मादीनां देवासुरप्रभृतीनां देहेन्द्रियादयः स्वभावभेदाः स्थानानि भोगाः कृत्यानि चेत्येवमादयः सुव्यक्ताः प्रतिपाद्यन्ते। अतः, विग्रहादिमत्त्वात्, देवादीनामपि, अधिकारोऽस्त्येव ॥ २५॥

[195] विरोधः कर्मणीति चेन्नानेकप्रतिपत्तेर्दर्शनात् ॥ २६ ॥

देवादीनां विग्रहादिमत्त्वाभ्युपगमे कर्माणि विरोधः प्रसज्यते। बहुषु यागेषु युगपदेकस्येन्द्रस्य विग्रहवत्त्वे

'अग्निमग्न आवह' (तै. ब्रा. ३।५।३)

'इन्द्र आगच्छ। हरिव आगच्छ' (तै. ब्रा. १।१२।३)

इत्यादिना, आहूतस्य संनिधानानुपपत्तेः। दर्शयति च, अग्न्यादीनां तत्र तत्रागमनं

'कस्य वा ह देवा यज्ञमागच्छन्ति कस्य वा न। बहूनां यजमानानां यो वै देवताः पूर्वं परिगृह्णाति स एनाः श्वोभूते यजते' (तै. सं. १।६।७)

Therefore, in this way, because everything expected of the rite is understood from the passage itself by the all-round consideration of the passage as a whole, there is no need to resort to anything such as the Unseen not apprehended at the time of the practical use (performance), as being denoted or being imagined in respect of the injunctions of the rite. In the same way, in the Dharmaśāstra, Purāṇas (and) Itihāsas based upon *Mantras* and glorificatory passages in the miscellaneous *Brāhmana* portions, are very clearly propounded, bodies, sense-organs etc. distinct natures, abodes, enjoyments, (and) deeds and such other things, in the case of Brahmadeva and others, such as gods and Asuras. Therefore, on account of their being possessed of body etc gods etc also are definitely qualified. ॥ 25 ॥

[195] If it be objected, that there would be contradiction in respect of the rite, (we reply) — No, on account of the find of many assumptions (forms) ॥ **26** ॥

In admitting the possession of bodies by the gods etc., there would be the undesirable contingency viz. contradiction in respect of the rite, on account of the impossibility of the simultaneous presence of one Indra in many sacrifices when invited, as in (passages) like

'(O) *Agni, bring forth the fire*' (Tait Brā. 3·5·3)

'(O) *Indra, come,* (O) *one with the red horses, come*' (Tait. Brā. 1·12·3)

if he is possessed of a body (The Sruti passage) also points out to the arrival of Agni and others at the various places, in

'*The god do arrive, at somebody's sacrifice, verily, do not arrive at somebody's sacrifice here and there Of the various sacrificers, he who propitiates the deities first, he sacrifices unto them the next day.*' (Tait. Sam. 1·6·7)

इति । अतः, विग्रहादिमत्त्वे कर्मणि विरोधः प्रसज्यते, इति चेत्,—न । 'अनेकप्रतिपत्तेर्दर्शनात्' । दृश्यते हि सौभरिप्रभृतीनां शक्तिमतां युगपदनेकशरीरप्रतिपत्तिः ॥ २६ ॥

शब्द इति चेन्नातः प्रभवात्प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम् ॥ २७ ॥

विरोधः, इति वर्तते। मा भूत्कर्मणि विरोधः, अनेकशरीरप्रतिपत्तेः, शब्दे तु वैदिके विरोधः प्रसज्यते । अनित्यार्थसंयोगात् । विग्रहवत्त्वे हि सावयवत्वेन, इन्द्रादेरर्थस्यानित्यत्वमनिवार्यम् । ततो देवदत्तादिशब्दवत्, इन्द्राद्यर्थजन्मनः प्राग्विनाशात्, ऊर्ध्वं च, इन्द्रादिशब्दानां वैदिकानामर्थशून्यत्वमनित्यत्वं वा वेदस्य स्यात्, इति चेत्,—तन्न । 'अतः प्रभवात्' । अस्मात्, इन्द्रादिशब्दादेव पुनः पुनरिन्द्राद्यर्थस्य प्रभवात् । एतदुक्तं भवति—

न हि देवदत्तादिशब्दवत्, इन्द्रादिशब्दा वैदिका व्यक्तिविशेषमात्रे संकेतपूर्वकाः प्रवृत्ताः, अपि तु स्वभावत एव गवादिशब्दवदाकृतिविशेषवाचित्वेन । ततश्च, एकस्याम् इन्द्रव्यक्तौ विनष्टायाम्, अत एव वैदिकादिन्द्रशब्दान्मनसि विपरिवर्तमानात्, अवगततद्वाच्यभूतेन्द्राद्यर्थाकारो धाता तदाकारमेवापरमिन्द्रं सृजति, यथा कुलालो घटशब्दान्मनसि

Therefore, there would be the undesirable contradiction in respect of the rite, if there is a possession of the body etc (by the gods) — If it is argued thus— (we say) — 'No,— on account of the find of many assumptions (forms)' Indeed, the simultaneous assumption of many bodies is seen in the case of Saubhari and others possessed of (the necessary) power ॥ 26 ॥

There would be (contradiction) in the (Vedic) word if (it be argued) thus — (we say) — No owing to (the entity) being produced from this (as known) from the Śruti and the Smṛti ॥ 27 ॥

(The word) Virodha (contradiction) is there (before Śabde) There may *not be contradiction in respect of the rite on account of the assumption* of many bodies but there would certainly follow the contradiction in respect of the Vedic word on account of its association with a non-eternal entity For, if there is the possession of the body (by Indra etc), the impermanency of entities Indra and others cannot be avoided owing to their being possessed of parts Therefore, like the words Devadatta etc, there would be meaninglessness of the Vedic words Indra and others, prior to the origination *of the entity,* Indra and others, and also *after destruction, or* there would be the non eternal nature of Veda — If it is argued thus— (we reply) — That (is) not (so), 'owing to (the entity) being produced from this . Asmāt — from this very word Indra etc itself, there being the rise of the entity, Indra etc again and again. This is what is intended to be said—

Not, indeed, like the words Devadatta etc do the Vedic words Indra etc. refer to particular individuals being preceded by (some) convention but like the words Go etc., by denoting a particular configuration directly by nature And therefore, when one Indra individual has perished, from this very Indra word, revolved in the mind, the Creator creates another Indra possessed of that very configuration — (the Creator) who has understood the configuration of the past Indra denoted by that, as the potter (creates) the

विपरिवर्तमानात्, तदाकारमेव घटम्, इति।

कथमिदमवगम्यते ? 'प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम्' — श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्याम्, इत्यर्थः। श्रुतिस्तावत्,

'वेदेन नामरूपे व्याकरोत् । सतासती प्रजापतिः' (तै. ब्रा. २।६।२)

इति।

'तथा स भूरिति व्याहरत्स भूमिमसृजत । स भुव इति व्याव्हरत्सोऽन्तरिक्षम-सृजत' (तै. ब्रा. २।२।४)

इत्यादिवाचकशब्दपूर्वकं तत्तदर्थसंस्थानं स्मरंस्तत्तत्संस्थानविशिष्टं तं तमर्थं सृष्टवानित्यर्थः। स्मृतिरपि

'अनादिनिधना ह्येषा वागुत्सृष्टा स्वयंभुवा ।
आदौ वेदमयी दिव्या यतः सर्वाः प्रसूतयः ॥'

इति

'सर्वेषां तु स नामानि कर्माणि च पृथक्पृथक् ।
वेदशब्देभ्य एवादौ पृथक्संस्थाश्च निर्ममे ॥' (म. स्मृ. १।२१)

इति च। संस्थाः—संस्थानानि रूपाणि, इति यावत्। तथा

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jar possessed of the same configuration from the word Ghaṭa, revolved in the mind. —

How is this known? 'Pratyakṣānumānābhyām' — by means of the Sruti and the Smṛti — This is the sense. The Śruti, for the matter of that, —

'Prajāpati manifested by means of the Veda, names and forms, being and non-being (satāsati)' (Tait Brā 2 6 2)

Likewise —

'He uttered Bhūh, he created the earth, he uttered Bhuvah, he created the mid-region' (Tai Brā 2·2·4)

thus remembering the configuration of the various entities, preceded by such and other denotative words (in this way), he created the various entities particularised by the various configurations — This is the sense And the Smṛti also—

'In the beginning, this Speech without any beginning and end was, indeed, created by the self-born one, constituted of the Vedas, (and) divine, from which all (these) creations (have come forth)'

and again —

'He first created names and actions separately for all, from the Vedic words themselves, (and) different configurations'

(Manu 1·21)

Samsthāh — configurations, that is to say, forms. Likewise —

'नाम रूपं च भूतानां कृत्यानां च प्रपञ्चनम् ।
वेदशब्देभ्य एवादौ देवादीनां चकार सः ॥' (वि. पु. १।५।६२)

इति । अतः, देवादीनां विग्रहवत्त्वेऽपि वैदिकशब्दानामानर्थक्यं वेदस्यादिमत्त्वं च न प्रसज्यते ॥ २७ ॥

अत एव च नित्यत्वम् ॥ २८ ॥

यत एव, इन्द्रवसिष्ठादीनां देवर्षिवाचिनां तत्तदाकारवाचित्वं तत्तच्छब्देन तत्तदर्थस्मृतिपूर्विका च तत्तदर्थसृष्टिः, तत एव मन्त्रकृतो वृणीते ।

'नम ऋषिभ्यो मन्त्रकृद्भ्यः'

(तै. आ. ४, आ. श्रौ. सू. ८।१४)

'अयं सोऽग्निरिति विश्वामित्रस्य सूक्तं भवति' (तै. सं. ५।२।३)

इत्यादिभिर्वसिष्ठादीनां मन्त्रकृत्त्वकाण्डर्षित्वादौ प्रतीयमानेऽपि वेदस्य नित्यत्वमुपपद्यते । एभिरेव — मन्त्रकृतो वृणीते — इत्यादिभिर्वेदशब्दैस्तत्तत्काण्डसूक्तमन्त्रकृतामृषीणाम्, आकृतिशक्त्यादिकं परामृश्य, तत्तदाकारांस्तत्तच्छक्तियुक्तांश्च सृष्ट्वा, प्रजापतिस्तानेव तत्तन्मन्त्रादिस्मरणे नियुङ्क्ते । ते च प्रजापतिना, आहितशक्तयस्तत्तदनुगुणं तपस्तप्त्वा, वीर्यसिद्धान्पूर्वपूर्ववसिष्ठादिसृष्टान्मन्त्रादीनधीत्यैव स्वरतो वर्णतश्चास्खलितान्पश्यन्ति ।

'He made in the case of gods and others from the Vedic words themselves, in the beginning, names and forms of the beings, and the detailed scope of the actions.' (V. P. 1·5·62)

Therefore, even though the gods etc. are (taken to be) possessed of body etc, there would not result the undesirable contingency of the meaninglessness of the Vedic words, and of the Veda having a beginning. ॥ 27 ॥

For this very reason, is the eternal nature ॥ 28 ॥

Because, indeed, in the case of the words Indra, Vasiṣṭha etc., denoting gods and sages, there is the denotation of the various forms and the creation of the various entities preceded by the remembrance of the various entities, by the various words, therefore, for that very reason, he chooses the *Mantra*-composers. By the passage—

'A bow to the sages, to the Mantra-composers.'

(Tait. Ā. 4, Ā. Śrau Sū. 8·14)

'This is the fire — this is the hymn by Viśvāmitra'

(Tait. Sam. 5·2·3)

etc. the eternal nature of the Veda stands to reason, even though, it is apprehended that Vasiṣṭha and others are the sages of the particular Kāṇḍa (Section) (and) the composers of the *Mantras* By these very Vedic words such as — He chooses the *Mantra-composers*, — having thought of the form and the power etc. of the sages, the composers of the *Mantras* in the various *Mantra-hymns* and sections, having created the various forms endowed with the various powers, Prajāpati appoints the same for remembering the various *Mantras* etc. And they with powers invested in them by Prajāpati, having performed penance befitting those various (forms and powers), even without studying the *Mantra* and others created by the various preceding Vasiṣṭhas

अतश्च वेदानां नित्यत्वम्, एषां च मन्त्रकृत्त्वमुपपद्यते ॥ २८ ॥

[196] अथ स्यात्—नैमित्तिकप्रलयादिष्विन्द्राद्युत्पत्तौ वेदशब्देभ्यः पूर्वपूर्वेन्द्रादिस्मरणेन, प्रजापतिना देवादिसृष्टिरुपपद्यतां नाम । प्राकृतप्रलये तु स्रष्टुः प्रजापतेर्भूताद्यहंकारपरिणामशब्दस्य च विनष्टत्वात्, कथं प्रजापतेः शब्दपूर्विका सृष्टिरुपपद्यते ? कथंतरां विनष्टस्य वेदस्य नित्यत्वम् ? अतः, वेदनित्यत्ववादिना देवादीनां विग्रहवत्त्वाभ्युपगमे लोकव्यवहारस्य प्रवाहानादिता, आश्रयणीया, इति— । अत उत्तरं पठति—

समाननामरूपत्वाच्चावृत्तावप्यविरोधो दर्शनात्स्मृतेश्च ॥ २९ ॥

कृत्स्नोपसंहारे जगदुत्पत्त्यावृत्तावपि पूर्वोक्तात्, समाननामरूपत्वादेव न कश्चिद्विरोधः । तथाहि—

स भगवान्पुरुषोत्तमः प्रलयावसानसमये पूर्वसंस्थानं जगत्स्मरन्, बहु स्याम्, इति संकल्प्य, भोग्यभोक्तृजातं स्वस्मिन्शक्तिमात्रावशेषं प्रलीनं विभज्य, महदादि ब्रह्माण्डं हिरण्यगर्भपर्यन्तं यथापूर्वं सृष्ट्वा, वेदांश्च पूर्वानुपूर्वीविशेषसंस्थितानाविष्कृत्य, हिरण्य-

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etc., accomplished by their power, see without any mistake as regards the accents and the syllables. And therefore, the eternal nature of the Vedas, and being the *Mantra*-composers in the case of these do stand to reason. ॥ 28 ॥

[196] Now, it may be argued—Let it be, indeed, regarded as reasonable, the creation of gods etc. by Prajāpati, by remembering the various preceding Indra and others, from the Vedic words, while creating Indra and others, at the occasional universal dissolutions etc. But at the basic dissolution, on account of the creator Prajāpati and the words pointing to the modification, elements etc., and Ahamkāra, being all destroyed, how is the creation preceded by the word (expressive of it), by Prajāpati, to be accounted for? How much more impossible the eternal nature of the Veda completely destroyed? Therefore, by the disputant advocating the eternal nature of the Veda, in admitting the possession of body by gods etc. has got to be resorted to, the beginningless flow of the practical dealings in the world Therefore, (the Sūtrakāra) recites the answer—

There is non-contradiction even in the repetition, on account of similar names and forms, from the Śruti and the Smṛti ॥ 29 ॥

Even at the withdrawal of everything, there is no contradiction whatsoever, even in the repetition of the creation of the world, on account of (the creation) being possessed of the same names and forms, already spoken of. To explain the same—

That Lord Puruṣottama, having reflected — May I be many — at the time of the end of the dissolution, remembering the world in its previous configuration, having divided the aggregate of objects of enjoyment and the enjoyers, with only the essence remaining merged within himself, having created as before the Universe (Brahman)-Egg, beginning with Mahat and ending with Hiraṇyagarbha, having manifested the Vedas also, as formulated in the particular order of priority and posteriority, having taught them to Hiraṇyagarbha, (and) having appointed him to the (task of the) creation of

गर्भायोपदिश्य, पूर्ववदेव देवाद्याकारजगत्सर्गं तं नियुज्य, स्वयमपि तदन्तरात्मतया, अवतस्थे । अतः, यथोक्तं सर्वमुपपन्नम् । एतदेव च वेदस्यापौरुषेयत्वं नित्यत्वं च, यत् पूर्वपूर्वोच्चारणक्रमजनितसंस्कारेण तमेव क्रमविशेषं स्मृत्वा तेनैव क्रमेणोच्चार्यत्वम् । तदस्मासु सर्वेश्वरेऽपि समानम् । इयांस्तु विशेषः— संस्कारानपेक्षमेव स्वयमेवानुसंधत्ते पुरुषोत्तमः ।

कुत इदं यथोक्तमवगम्यते ? इति चेत्—तत्राह— 'दर्शनात्स्मृतेश्च' । दर्शनं तावत्

'यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं यो वै वेदांश्च प्रहिणोति तस्मै' (श्वे ६।१८)

इति । स्मृतिरपि मानवी

'आसीदिदं तमोभूतम्' (म स्मृ १।५)

इत्यारभ्य

'सोऽभिध्याय शरीरात्स्वात्सिसृक्षुर्विविधाः प्रजाः ।
अप एव ससर्जादौ तासु वीर्यमपासृजत् ॥
तदण्डमभवद्धैमं सहस्रांशुसमप्रभम् ।
तस्मिञ्जज्ञे स्वयं ब्रह्मा सर्वलोकपितामहः ॥' (म स्मृ १।८-९)

इति । तथा पौराणिकाः

'तत्र सुप्तस्य देवस्य नाभौ पद्ममजायत ।
तस्मिन्पद्मे महाभाग वेदवेदाङ्गपारगः ॥

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the world, and the forms of gods etc., just as before, even himself remained as the inmost Atman Therefore, everything as stated is (quite) appropriate. This itself—the Vedas being not composed by any human agency, and their eternal nature — is being *fit to be uttered exactly in the same order, having* remembered the same particular order by the impressions created by the order of utterance many times before. And that is common to us as well as to the All-controller There is, however, this difference The Purusottama, himself, of his own accord remembers without being dependent upon the impressions

Whence is this as stated known?— if this is asked — there (the Sūtrakāra says) 'From the Sruti and the Smrti'— The Sruti for the matter of that —

'Who, verily, creates Brahmadeva in the beginning and who verily sends the Vedas to him (Sve 6 18)

The Smrti composed by Manu also beginning with —

'This had been all darkness' (Manu 1 5)

(says)

'He, having reflected desirous of creating different creations from his own body, first created waters themselves (and) introduced in them his semen—

That became a golden Egg refulgent like the Sun (of a thousand rays) Therein was born Brahmadeva himself, the grand-father of all people' (Manu 1 8-9)

Likewise (say) the Purāṇa-knowers—

'In the navel of the God asleep there, was produced a lotus, in that lotus, (O) noble one, was born Brahmadeva, fully conversant

'मह्योत्पन्नः स तेनोक्तः प्रजाः सृज महामते।'

तथा

'परो नारायणो देवस्तस्माज्जातश्चतुर्मुखः।'

इति। तथा

'आदिसर्गमहं वक्ष्ये'

इत्यारभ्य, उच्यते

'सृष्ट्वा नारं तोयमन्तःस्थितोऽहं येन स्यात्मे नाम नारायणेति।
कल्पे कल्पे तत्र शयामि भूयः सुप्तस्य मे नाभिजं स्याद्यथाब्जम्॥'
'एवंभूतस्य मे देवि नाभिपद्मे चतुर्मुखः।
उत्पन्नः स मया प्रोक्तः प्रजाः सृज महामते॥'

इति। अतः, देवादीनामप्यर्थित्वसामर्थ्ययोगात्, ब्रह्मविद्यायामधिकारोऽस्ति, इति सिद्धम्॥ २९॥

देवताधिकरणं समाप्तम्। (६अ)

[197] मध्वादिष्वसंभवादनधिकारं जैमिनिः॥ ३०॥

(मध्वधिकरणं ६ब, सूत्राणि ३०–३२)

ब्रह्मविद्यायां देवादीनामप्यधिकारोऽस्तीत्युक्तम्। इदमिदानीं चिन्त्यते—येषूपास-

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with the Vedas and the limbs of the Vedas. He (Brahmā) was addressed by him (the God) — Create the creatures, (O) highly talented one.'

Likewise—

'The highest God Nārāyaṇa; from him was born the four-faced (Brahmadeva).'

Similarly, beginning with

'I shall now narrate the first creation'—

it is said—

'Having created Nāram, Water, I remained within, so that my name could be Nārāyaṇa. At each age (Kalpa) I sleep on there again, so that there could be a lotus produced out of my navel.'

'The four-faced one was born in the navel-lotus of me, remaining thus, (O) goddess; he was addressed by me —'Create the creatures, (O) highly talented one.''

Therefore, it is proved that the gods etc. also are qualified for the Brahmavidyā, on account of their being the suppliants and their association with the (requisite) capacity. ॥ 29 ॥

(Here ends the Devatādhikaraṇa (6 A))

[197] On account of the impossibility in the case of Madhu (-Vidyā) etc. there is no qualification — (thinks) Jaimini. ॥ 30 ॥

(Madhvadhikaraṇa 6 B, Sūtras 30–32)

It has been stated that even the gods are qualified in respect of the Brahmavidyā. Now this is being considered — Is there the qualification or

नेषु देवता एवोपास्यास्तेषु तासामधिकारोऽस्ति नेति ? किं प्राप्तम् ? नास्त्यधिकारस्तेः मध्वादिषु, इति जैमिनिर्मन्यते । कुतः ? असंभवात् । न हि, आदित्यवस्वादिभिरुपास्या आदित्यवस्वादयोऽन्ये संभवन्ति । न च वस्वादीनां सतां वस्वादित्वं प्राप्यं भवति । प्राप्तत्वात् । मधुविद्यायाम्, ऋग्वेदादिप्रतिपाद्यकर्मनिष्पाद्यास्यरश्मिद्वारेण प्राप्तस्य रसस्याश्रयतया लब्धमधुव्यपदेशस्यादित्यस्यांशानां वस्वादिभिर्भुज्यमानानाम्, उपास्यत्वं वस्वादित्वं च प्राप्यं श्रूयते ।

'असौ वा आदित्यो देवमधु' (छा ३।१।१)

इत्युपक्रम्य

'तद्यत्प्रथमममृतं तद्वसव उपजीवन्ति' (छा ३।६।१)

इत्युक्त्वा

'स य एतदेवममृतं वेद वसूनामेवैको भूत्वाऽग्निनैव मुखेनैतदेवामृतं दृष्ट्वा तृप्यति' (छा ३।६।३)

इत्यादिना ॥ ३० ॥

ज्योतिषि भावाच्च ॥ ३१ ॥

'तं देवा ज्योतिषां ज्योतिरायुर्होपासतेऽमृतम्' (बृ ४।४।१६)

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not in the case of those deities regarding the performances of worship where those very deities are to be worshipped ?— What (is) reached (as the prima-facie view)? Jaimini thinks that (the deities have) no qualification in regard to those *Madhuvidyā* and others Whence? On account of the impossibility — Not, indeed, can there possibly exist other Ādityas, Vasus etc, that are to be worshipped by Ādityas, Vasus and others And further, in case of Vasus and others who (already) exist there is not to be secured the nature of Vasus etc, on account of that having been (already) secured In the *Madhuvidyā*, it is declared in the Sruti passage that the state of being fit to be worshipped and the nature of Vasus etc, are the destination, of the portions of Āditya being enjoyed by Vasus and others— of Āditya who has secured the appellation Madhu on account of his being the resort of the flavour secured through the mouth and rays to be produced by the rite propounded in the Rgveda etc —beginning with

'This Āditya verily the god-Madhu (Chā 3 1 1)

—having stated

'There what is the first immortal (nectar), that the Vasus live on' (Chā 3 6 1)

in (the following passage) etc,

He who knew this very immortal, having become one of Vasus themselves, having seen this very Amrta, by the face, Agni himself, he becomes satisfied' (Chā 3 6·3)

॥ 30 ॥

And on account of the existence (of worship) in (respect of) the Light (Jyotis) ॥ **31** ॥

It is found in the Sruti passage that the worship of the Highest Brahman the Light, obtains in the case of the gods in

'Him the gods, verily, worship—the Light of lights, Life, immortal'. (Br 4 4 16)

इति ज्योतिषि परस्मिन्ब्रह्मण्युपासनं देवानां श्रूयते। देवमनुष्योभयसाधारणे परब्रह्मोपासने देवानामुपासकत्वकथनं देवानामितरोपासननिवृत्तिं द्योतयति। अत एव वस्वादीनामनधिकारः ॥ ३१ ॥

इति प्राप्ते, अभिधीयते--

[198] भावं तु बादरायणोस्ति हि ॥ ३२ ॥

आदित्यवस्वादीनामपि तेष्वधिकारभावं भगवान्बादरायणो मन्यते। अस्ति हि, आदित्यवस्वादीनामपि स्वावस्थब्रह्मोपासनेन वस्वादित्यप्राप्तिपूर्वकब्रह्मप्रेप्सासंभवः। इदानीं वसूनां सतामपि कल्पान्तरे वस्वादित्वप्राप्तिश्चापेक्षिता भवति। अत्र हि कार्यकारणोभयावस्थब्रह्मोपासनं विधीयते।

'असौ वा आदित्यो देवमधु' (छा. ३।१।१)

इत्यारभ्य

'अथ तत ऊर्ध्वमुदेत्य' (छा. ३।११।१)

इत्यतः प्रागादित्यवस्वादिकार्यविशेषावस्थं ब्रह्मोपास्यमित्युपदिश्यते।

'अथ तत ऊर्ध्वं नैवोदेता' (छा. ३।११।१)

इत्यादिना, आदित्यान्तरात्मतयावस्थितं कारणावस्थमेव ब्रह्मोपास्यमित्युपदिश्यते। तदेवं

With the worship of the Highest Brahman common to both gods and men, the mention of gods being the worshippers indicates the exclusion of other worship on the part of the gods. Therefore, in respect of these, Vasus and others have no qualification. ॥ 31 ॥

This (prima-facie view) being reached, it is stated (in reply)—

[198] But, the existence (of qualification is there)— (thinks) **Bādarāyaṇa; for, it is (there) ॥ 32 ॥**

The Revered Bādarāyana thinks that there is the existence of qualification in respect of those (*Madhuvidyā* etc.) for even Āditya, Vasus etc. For, there is, indeed, the possibility of the desire to reach Brahman, preceded by the attainment to the nature of Vasus and Āditya, by the worship of Brahman, in its own state, on the part even of Āditya, Vasus etc. The attainment of the nature of Vasus and others, again, can be required in a change of Kalpa even in the case of Vasus that exist now. For, here is enjoined worship of Brahman in both the states of cause and effect. Beginning with—

'This Āditya, verily, is the god-Madhu.' (Chā 3·1·1)

in the passage,

'And higher still rising up' (Chā. 3·11·1)

—prior to this is taught that Brahman in the particular state of effect like Āditya, Vasus etc. is to be worshipped.

By the passage beginning with,

'And, further, rises, not indeed higher,' (Chā. 3·11·1)

etc. it is taught that Brahman itself in the state of cause abiding as the inner Atman of Aditya is to be worshipped. Thus then, one worshipping

कार्यकारणोभयावस्थं ब्रह्मोपासीनः कल्पान्तरे वस्वादित्वं प्राप्य तदन्ते कारणं परं ब्रह्मैवाप्नोति ।

'न ह वा अस्मा उदेति न निम्रोचति सकृद्दिवा ह वास्मै भवति । य एतामेव ब्रह्मोपनिषदं वेद' (छा. ३।११।३)

इति कृत्स्नाया मधुविद्याया ब्रह्मोपनिषत्त्वश्रवणात्, ब्रह्मप्राप्तिपर्यन्तवस्वादित्वफलश्रवणाच्च, वस्वादिभोग्यभूतादित्यांशस्य विधीयमानमुपासनं तदवस्थस्यैव ब्रह्मणः, इत्यवगम्यते। अतः, एवंविधमुपासनमादित्यवस्वादीनामपि संभवति । एवं च ब्रह्मण एवोपास्यत्वात्

'तं देवा ज्योतिषां ज्योतिः' (बृ. ४।४।१६)

इत्युपपद्यते । तदाह वृत्तिकारः—अस्ति हि मध्वादिषु संभवो ब्रह्मण एव सर्वत्र निचाय्यत्वात्, इति ॥ ३२ ॥

मध्वधिकरणं समाप्तम् (६ ब)

[199] शुगस्य तदनादरश्रवणात्तदाद्रवणात्सूच्यते हि ॥ ३३ ॥

(अपशूद्राधिकरणम् ६क सूत्राणि ३३–३९)

ब्रह्मविद्यायां शूद्रस्याप्यधिकारोऽस्ति न वेति विचार्यते— किं प्राप्तम्? अस्तीति। कुतः? अर्थित्वसामर्थ्यप्रयुक्तत्वात्, अधिकारस्य । शूद्रस्यापि तत्संभवात् । यद्यपि,

Brahman in both the states of cause and effect, having reached the nature of Vasus etc. in another Age, secures at its end the Highest Brahman itself, the cause. On account of the whole of the *Madhuvidyā* being described as the *Brahmopanisad* in the Śruti, in (the passage).

'Not, indeed, for him does (the Sun) rise, nor does he set, there is day for him once for all, who knows this very Brahmopanisad, thus' (Chā. 3·11·3)

and on account of the mention, in the Śruti, of the fruit, the nature of Vasus, etc. right up to the attainment of Brahman, the worship enjoined of the portion of Āditya that is the object of enjoyment for Vasus and others, is apprehended to be that of Brahman which is in that same state. Therefore, this kind of worship is possible even in the case of Aditya, Vasus and others. And thus further, (the passage)—

'Him, the gods, verily, the Light of lights' (Br 4·4·16)

becomes appropriate on account of Brahman *itself being the object of* worship. To the same effect says the Vrttikāra—There is, indeed, the possibility in the case of *Madhu (Vidyā)* and others, on account of Brahman alone being everywhere fit to be meditated upon. ॥33॥

Here ends the Madhvadhikaraṇa (6 B)

[199] (The rise) of grief (in him) indeed, is indicated, on account of his running up to him (Raikva) on hearing (words of) disrespect. ॥33॥

(Apaśūdrādhikarana 6C, Sūtras 33–39)

Whether *even* the *Śūdra* has *qualification* or not in respect of Brahmavidyā—this is (now) considered—What (is) the prima facie view? There is. Whence? On account of the qualification being dictated by the state *of being a suppliant and the possession of the (requisite) capacity,—on account*

अग्निविद्यासाध्येषु कर्मसु, अनग्निविद्यत्वात्, शूद्रस्यानधिकारः, तथापि. मनोवृत्तिमात्रत्वात्, ब्रह्मोपासनस्य तत्राधिकारोऽस्त्येव । शास्त्रीयक्रियापेक्षत्वेऽप्युपासनस्य तत्तद्वर्णाश्रमोचितक्रियाया एवापेक्षितत्वात् । शूद्रस्यापि स्ववर्णोचितपूर्ववर्णशुश्रूषैव क्रिया भविष्यति ।

'*तस्माच्छूद्रो यज्ञेऽनवक्लृप्तः*' (तै. सं. ७।१।१)

इत्यपि,अग्निविद्यासाध्ययज्ञादिकर्मानधिकार एव न्यायसिद्धोऽनूद्यते। ननु—अनधीतवेदस्य, अश्रुतवेदान्तस्य, ब्रह्मस्वरूपतदुपासनप्रकारानभिज्ञस्य कथं ब्रह्मोपासनं संभवति? उच्यते—अनधीतवेदस्य, अश्रुतवेदान्तवाक्यस्यापि, इतिहासपुराणश्रवणेनापि ब्रह्मस्वरूपतदुपासनज्ञानं संभवति। अस्ति च शूद्रस्यापि, इतिहासपुराणश्रवणानुज्ञा

'*श्रावयेच्चतुरो वर्णान्कृत्वा ब्राह्मणमग्रतः।*' (म. भा. शा. ३१४।४५)

इत्यादौ। दृश्यन्ते च, इतिहासपुराणेषु विदुरादयो ब्रह्मनिष्ठाः। तथा, उपनिषत्स्वपि संवर्गविद्यायां शूद्रस्यापि ब्रह्मविद्याधिकारः प्रतीयते। शुश्रूषुं हि जानश्रुतिम्, आचार्यो रैक्वः

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of that being possible in the case even of the Sūdra. Although the Śūdra has no qualification in respect of rites that are to be accomplished by the *Agnividyā*, on account of his being not conversant with the *Agnividyā* (technique of fire-worship), still the worship of Brahman being concerned only with the *mind-tendency, there does exist qualification in respect of that,* because the action alone appropriate for the various castes and stages of life, is required, even though the worship stands in need of acts in accordance with the prescription of the Śāstra. In the case of the Śūdra also, there would be the action viz. service to the preceding (three) castes, which is appropriate for his caste. Even in (the passage)

'*Śūdra is not employed in (fitted for) the sacrifice*' (Tait. Sam. 7·1·1)

the disqualification itself for the sacrificial rite etc, to be accomplished by the *Agnividyā* is repeated as obtaining logically. I say (says the objector) — How is possible the worship of Brahman by one who has not studied the Vedas, who has not heard of (studied) the Vedāntas, who is ignorant of the nature of Brahman and the mode of its worship? —(We reply)—The knowledge of the nature of Brahman and its worship is possible even by means of the hearing of Itihāsa and Purāṇa in the case of one although he has not studied the Vedas, or heard the Vedānta-passages. And there is, indeed, permission even for the Śūdra to hear Itihāsa and Purāṇa in

'*One should make the four varnas (castes) hear, placing the Brāhmana at the head.*' (MBh. Śā. 314-45)

etc. And further, are found in Itihāsa and Purāṇa, Vidura and others devoted to Brahman. Likewise, in the *Upaniṣads* also, in the (chapter dealing with) *Saṁvarga* (Absorption) *Vidyā*, is apprehended qualification in the case of Brahmavidyā, even for the Śūdra. The preceptor Raikva, teaches

शूद्र, इत्यामन्त्र्य तस्मै ब्रह्मविद्यामुपदिशति

'आजहारेमा शूद्रानेनैव मुखेनाऽऽलापयिष्यथा' (छा ४।२।५)

इत्यादिना। अतः, शूद्रस्याप्यधिकारः संभवति, इति प्राप्ते, उच्यते—न शूद्रस्याधिकारः संभवति। कुतः? सामर्थ्याभावात्। न हि ब्रह्मस्वरूपतदुपासनप्रकारमजानत, तदङ्गभूतवेदानुवचनयज्ञादिष्वनधिकृतस्य, उपासनोपसंहारसामर्थ्यं संभवति। असमर्थस्य च, अर्थित्वसद्भावेऽपि, अधिकारो न संभवति। असामर्थ्यं च वेदाध्ययनाभावात्। यथैव हि त्रैवर्णिकविषयाध्ययनविधिसिद्धस्वाध्यायसंपाद्यज्ञानलाभेन कर्मविधयो ज्ञानतदुपायादीनपरान्न स्वीकुर्वन्ति, तथा ब्रह्मोपासनविधयोऽपि। अतः, अध्ययनविधिसिद्धस्वाध्यायाधिगतज्ञानस्यैव ब्रह्मोपासनोपायत्वाच्छूद्रस्य ब्रह्मोपासनसामर्थ्यासंभवः। इतिहासपुराणे अपि वेदोपबृंहणं कुर्वती, एवोपायभावमनुभवत, न स्वातन्त्र्येण। शूद्रस्य, इतिहासपुराणश्रवणानुज्ञानं पापक्षयादिफलार्थं नोपासनार्थम्। विदुरादयस्तु भवान्तराधिगतज्ञानाप्रमोषाज्ज्ञा-

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Brahmavidyā to Jānasruti, having indeed addressed him attending upon him as Sūdra, in

> '*You have brought, (O) Sudra these (presents, cows), you are making me speak by this very face (of your daughter)*'
>
> (Chā 4 2 5)

etc Therefore, qualification even for a Sūdra is possible— This (prima facie view) being reached, (this) is stated (in reply)— There cannot be any qualification for a Sūdra Whence? On account of the absence of the (requisite) capacity Not indeed in the case of a person not knowing the nature of Brahman and the mode of its worship and not qualified in respect of sacrifice and others (and) Vedic recitation forming part of the same is possible the capacity for carrying through the worship Even though there may exist the state of a suppliant, there cannot exist any qualification for one who is incapable and the incapacity is due to the absence of the Vedic study Just as, indeed, the injunctions of the rite do not comprise other (factors) — knowledge (and) the means thereof by the acquisition of knowledge to be secured by (the study of) one s own Vedic portion that is fixed by the injunction about study the subject confined to the three castes likewise, the injunctions about the worship of Brahman Therefore because the knowledge alone of his own Vedic portion fixed by the injunction regarding the study, is the means for the worship of Brahman there is the impossibility in the case of the Sūdra of the capacity for the worship of Brahman The Itihāsa and the Purāna also while just dilating in detail upon the Vedas, become the means not independently In the case of the Sūdra the knowledge secured after hearing the Itihāsa and the Purāna, is for the purpose of the fruit viz the destruction of sin etc. and not for the purpose of worship Vidura and others on the other hand, were possessed of knowledge due to their not being bereft of the knowledge secured in other births and became associated with such a birth by

नवन्तः प्रारब्धकर्मवशाच्च, ईदृशजन्मयोगिनः, इति तेषां ब्रह्मनिष्ठत्वम्। यत्तु संवर्गविद्यायां शुश्रूषोः शूद्र, इति संबोधनं शूद्रस्याधिकारं सूचयति, इति तन्नेत्याह—'शुगस्य तदनादरश्रवणात्तदाद्रवणात्सूच्यते हि'। शुश्रूषोर्जानश्रुतेः पौत्रायणस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानवैकल्येन हंसोक्तानादरवाक्यश्रवणात्तदैव ब्रह्मविदो रैक्वस्य सकाशं प्रत्याद्रवणात् शुगस्य संजाता, इति हि सूच्यते। अतः, स शूद्रेत्यामन्त्र्यते न चतुर्थवर्णत्वेन। शोचतीति हि शूद्रः।

'शुचेर्दश्च' (उणा. सू. २।२१)

इति रप्रत्यये धातोश्च दीर्घे चकारस्य दकारे शूद्र, इति भवति। अतः, शोचितृत्वमेवास्य शूद्रशब्दप्रयोगेण सूच्यते, न जातियोगः।

जानश्रुतिः किल पौत्रायणो बहुद्रव्यप्रदो बह्वन्नप्रदश्च बभूव। तस्य धार्मिकाग्रेसरस्य धर्मेण प्रीतयोः कयोश्चिन्महात्मनोरस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासामुत्पिपादयिषतोर्हंसरूपेण निशायामस्याविदूरे गच्छतोरन्यतर इतरमुवाच

'भो भो भल्लाक्ष भल्लाक्ष जानश्रुतेः पौत्रायणस्य समं दिवा ज्योतिराततं तन्मा प्रसाङ्क्षीस्तत्त्वा मा प्रधाक्षीत्' (छा. ४।१।२)

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virtue of the Karman that had started (giving its fruit)— and so, became devoted to Brahman. As regards (what has been stated that) the address as Sūdra in (the passage dealing with) *Samvarga-Vidyā*, to a person desirous of studying, indicates the qualification for a Sūdra,—(we reply)—That is not (so)—thus says (the Sūtrakāra)—'(The rise) of grief (in him), indeed, is indicated, on account of his running up to him (Raikva) on hearing (words of) disrespect.'—On account of hearing the passage containing disrespect, uttered by the swan owing to his deficiency regarding the knowledge of Brahman, in the case of Jānaśruti Pautrāyana (the grandson of Putra) desirous of studying, on account of his running on immediately then to the presence (vicinity) of the Brahman-knower Raikva,—that grief arose in him, verily, is indicated. For this reason, he is addressed as Sūdra and not as a person belonging to the fourth caste. He who feels grief is Śūdra, (the word) Sūdra is arrived at in accordance with the Sūtra

'S'uceh daśca' (Unā. Sū 2·21)

the ca changing over to da and the root becoming long (i. e Sū in place of Su) with the termination ra Therefore, his feeling grief is indicated by the use of the word Sūdra and not his belonging to (any) caste.

It is reported that Jānaśruti Pautrāyana was one gifting away large sums of money in charity and one giving large quantities of food Of (some) two high-souled ones, pleased with the righteousness of that foremost of the religious-minded persons, wishing to create in him a desire to know Brahman, while not moving about far from him, in the form of swans, at night time, one of them said to the other—

'Hey! Ho! Dear Bhallākṣa, Bhallākṣa! The splendour of Jānaśruti Pautrāyana has spread over like the sky (heaven). So, do not come into contact (with it), let it not consume you away' (Chā. 4·1·2)

इति । एवं जानश्रुतिप्रशंसारूपं वाक्यमुपश्रुत्यापरो हंसः प्रत्युवाच—

'कम्वर एनमेतत्सन्त सयुग्वानमिव रैक्वमात्थ'　　　　(छा ४।१।३)

इति । कं सन्तमेनं जानश्रुतिं सयुग्वानं रैक्वं ब्रह्मज्ञमिव गुणश्रेष्ठमेतदात्थ । स ब्रह्मज्ञो रैक्व एव लोके गुणवत्तरः । महता धर्मेण संयुक्तस्याप्यस्य जानश्रुतेरब्रह्मज्ञस्य को गुणो यद्गुणजनितं तेजो रैक्वतेज इव मां दहेत् इत्यर्थः । एवमुक्तेन परेण कोऽसौ रैक्वः ? इति पृष्टः, लोके यत्किंचित्साध्वनुष्ठितं कर्म, यच्च सर्वचेतनगतं विज्ञानम्, तदुभयं यदीयज्ञान-कर्मान्तर्भूतं स रैक्व, इत्याह । तदेतद्धंसवाक्यं ब्रह्मज्ञानविधुरतया, आत्मनिन्दागर्भं तद्वत्तया च रैक्वप्रशंसारूपं जानश्रुतिरुपश्रुत्य, तत्क्षणादेव क्षत्तारं रैक्वान्वेषणाय प्रेष्य, तस्मिन्विदित्वागते, स्वयमपि रैक्वमुपसद्य, गवां षट्शतम्, निष्कम्, अश्वतरीरथं च रैक्वायोपहृत्य, रैक्वं प्रार्थयामास—

'अनु म एतां भगवो देवतां शाधि यां देवतामुपास्से'　　　　(छा ४।२।२)

इति । त्वदुपास्यां परां देवतां मामनुशाधि, इत्यर्थः । स च रैक्व स्वयोगमहिमविदित लोकत्रयो जानश्रुतेर्ब्रह्मज्ञानविधुरतानिमित्तानादरगर्भहंसवाक्यश्रवणेन शोकाविष्टताम्,

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Having heard this sentence in praise of Jānaśruti, the other swan replied—

'Come, Oh, of whom existing, are you indeed speaking in this strain, as if of Raikva with the cart?　　　　(Chā 4 1 3)

Of whom existing—this Janaśruti, like Raikva with the cart, the Brahman-knower, pre-eminent in virtues,—are you thus saying? That Brahman-knower Raikva alone is most eminent in virtues in the world Of this Jānaśruti, although endowed with great righteousness (but) not a Brahman-knower, what merit (could there be) so that the lustre produced from that merit would be burning me like the lustre of Raikva?—this is the sense When asked by the other who was spoken to thus – who is this Raikva? he said-That (is) Raikva, included in whose knowledge and Karman are both the things— whatever is the good Karman performed in the world, and what is the special knowledge belonging to all sentient beings Then having heard this sentence uttered by the swan, implying his own censure on account of his being bereft of the knowledge of Brahman (and) involving the praise of Raikva owing to his being possessed of that, having dispatched his charioteer (A D C) at the very moment in search of Raikva having himself gone over to Raikva, after he (the charioteer) had returned on knowing (the whereabouts), having offered as presents six hundred cows a golden necklace and the chariot yoked with mules, Jānaśruti implored Raikva thus—

'Teach me, Revered Sir, this deity, which deity you worship'
(Chā 4 2 2)

—Teach me about the highest deity that is the object of worship by you—this is the sense. And that Raikva, who had the knowledge of the three worlds by virtue of his own mystic power, having come to know that Jānaśruti was overwhelmed with grief on hearing the sentence uttered by

तदनन्तरमेव ब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोद्योगं च विदित्वा, अस्य ब्रह्मविद्यायोग्यतामभिज्ञाय, चिरकाल-सेवां विना द्रव्यप्रदानेन शुश्रूषमाणस्यास्य यावच्छक्तिप्रदानेन ब्रह्मविद्या प्रतिष्ठिता भवति, इति मत्वा, तमनुगृह्णन्, अस्य शोकाविष्टताम्, उपदेशयोग्यताख्यापिकां शूद्रशब्देना-मन्त्रणेन ज्ञापयन्निदमाह—

'अपाहर त्वं शूद्र तवैव सह गोभिरस्तु' (छा. ४।२।३)

इति। सह गोभिरयं रथस्तवैवास्तु, नैतावता मह्यं दत्तेन ब्रह्मजिज्ञासया शोकाविष्टस्य तव ब्रह्मविद्या प्रतिष्ठिता भवति, इत्यर्थः। स च जानश्रुतिर्भूयोऽपि स्वशक्त्यनुगुणमेव गवादिकं धनं कन्यां च प्रदायोपससाद। स रैक्वः पुनरपि तस्य योग्यतामेव ख्यापयञ्छूद्रशब्दे-नामन्त्र्याह

'आजहारेमाः शूद्रानेनैव मुखेनालाऽऽपयिष्यथाः' (छा. ४।२।५)

इति। इमानि धनानि शक्त्यनुगुणान्याजहर्थ। अनेनैव द्वारेण चिरसेवया विनापि मां त्वदाभिलषितब्रह्मोपदेशरूपवाक्यमालापयिष्यसि, इत्युक्त्वा तस्मा उपदिदेश। अतः, शूद्र-शब्देन विद्योपदेशयोग्यताख्यापनार्थं शोक एवास्य सूचितो न चतुर्थवर्णत्वम् ॥ ३३ ॥

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the swan, implying censure due to his being bereft of Brahman-knowledge, and his efforts immediately after that, due to his desire to know Brahman; having realised his fitness for studying the Brahma-Vidyā; having known that, in the case of him desirous of studying by the offer of money without attendance (service) for a long time, Brahmavidyā would be well-established by the offer (of wealth) to the best of his ability, conferring favour upon him, making him know, by the address by the word Sūdra, his being overwhelmed with grief as proclaiming his fitness for (receiving) instruction, said thus—

'Take (this) away, you Sūdra; let it be yours alone, along with the cows' (Chā. 4·2·3)

—Let this chariot be yours alone, along with the cows; not by the offer of this much to me, would the Brahmavidyā be well-established for you overwhelmed with grief owing to the desire to know Brahman.—this is the sense. That Jānaśruti also once again approached him, having offered wealth, cows etc. befitting his capacity (and) also his daughter. That Raikva, once again proclaiming his fitness alone, having addressed him by the word Sūdra said,—

'You have brought, (O) Śūdra, these (presents); you are making me speak by this very face (of your daughter)' (Chā. 4·2·5)

These riches befitting (your) capacity, you have brought. By this face itself even without undergoing service for a long time, you would make me speak out the words involving instruction about Brahman, desired by you,—having spoken thus, he instructed him. Therefore by the word Sūdra is indicated grief itself, of him, for the purpose of proclaiming his fitness for the instruction in the Vidyā, and not his belonging to the fourth caste. ॥ 33 ॥

[200] क्षत्रियत्वावगतेश्च ॥ ३४ ॥

बहुदायी, इति दानपतित्वेन, बहुपाक्यः, इत्यादिना

'सर्वत एव मेऽत्स्यन्ति' (छा. ४।१।१)

इत्यन्तेन, बहुतरपक्वान्नप्रदायित्वप्रतीतेः,

'स ह संजिहान एव क्षत्तारमुवाच' (छा. ४।१।५)

इति क्षत्तृप्रेषणात्, बहुग्रामप्रदानावगतजनपदाधिपत्याच्च, अस्य जानश्रुतेः क्षत्रियत्वप्रतीतिश्च न चतुर्थवर्णत्वम् ॥ ३४ ॥

तदेवम्, उपक्रमगताख्यायिकायां क्षत्रियत्वप्रतीतिरुक्ता । उपसंहारगताख्यायिकायामपि क्षत्रियत्वमस्य प्रतीयते, इत्याह

उत्तरत्र चैत्ररथेन लिङ्गात् ॥ ३५ ॥

अस्य जानश्रुतेरुपदिश्यमानायामस्यामेव संवर्गविद्यायामुत्तरत्र कीर्त्यमानेन, अभिप्रतारिनाम्ना चैत्ररथेन क्षत्रियेण, अस्य क्षत्रियत्वं गम्यते । कथम् ?

'अथ ह शौनकं च कापेयमभिप्रतारिणं च काक्षसेनिं परिविष्यमाणौ ब्रह्मचारी बिभिक्षे' (छा. ४।३।५)

इत्यादिना

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[200] And on account of the knowledge of his being a Kṣatriya. ॥34॥

By (the use of the expression) Bahudāyī (giving much) showing that he was a great giver; in the passage beginning with Bahupākyah (cooking food for many) and ending with—

'They would be eating out of me everywhere' (Chā. 4·1·1)

on account of the knowledge of his giving away much cooked food and from (the passage)

'He just rising up from his bed, said to his charioteer,' (Chā. 4·1·5)

on account of the realisation of this Jānasruti being a Ksatriya, due to the despatch (as a messenger) of the charioteer, and also due to (the knowledge of) his being the chief of the country-region as understood from his giving away in charity many villages, he could not be belonging to the fourth caste. ॥ 34 ॥

Thus has been referred to, the realisation of his being a Ksatriya in the introductory story. Even in the ending story his being the Ksatriya is understood—So says (the Sūtrakāra)—

On account of the characteristic mark Caitraratha later on ॥ 35 ॥

Later on, in the same *Samvargavidyā* which is being taught to this Jānaśruti, is indicated his being the Ksatriya, which is known on account of Caitraratha Ksatriya, named Abhipratārin who is being described later. How? By the passage beginning with—

'Now (once upon a time) a celibate religious student begged (food) of Śaunaka Kāpeya and Abhipratārin Kākṣaseni to whom food was being served.' (Chā. 4·3·5)

and ending with

'ब्रह्मचारिन्निदमुपास्महे' (छा ४।३।७)

इत्यन्तेन कापेयाभिप्रतारिणोर्भिक्षमाणस्य ब्रह्मचारिणश्च संवर्गविद्यासंबन्धित्वं प्रतीयते। तेषु च, अभिप्रतारी क्षत्रियः, इतरौ ब्राह्मणौ। अतः, अस्यां विद्यायां ब्राह्मणस्य तदितरेषु च क्षत्रियस्यैवान्वयो दृश्यते, न शूद्रस्य। अतः, अस्यां विद्यायामन्वितात्, रैक्वात्, ब्राह्मणात्, अन्यस्य जानश्रुतेरपि क्षत्रियत्वमेव युक्तं न चतुर्थवर्णत्वम्।

ननु—अस्मिन्प्रकरणे, अभिप्रतारिणश्चैत्ररथत्व क्षत्रियत्वं च न श्रुतम्। तत्कथम्, अस्याभिप्रतारिणश्चैत्ररथत्वम्? कथं वा क्षत्रियत्वम्? तत्राह 'लिङ्गात्' इति।

'अथ ह शौनकं च कापेयमभिप्रतारिणं च काक्षसेनिम्' (छा ४।३।५)

इति, अभिप्रतारिणः कापेयसाहचर्यात्, लिङ्गात्, अस्याभिप्रतारिणः कापेयसंबन्धः प्रतीयते। अन्यत्र च

'एतेन वै चैत्ररथं कापेया अयाजयन्' (ता ब्रा २०।१२)

इति कापेयसंबन्धिनश्चैत्ररथत्वं श्रूयते। तथा चैत्ररथस्य क्षत्रियत्वम्, तस्मात्,

'चैत्ररथो नामैक· क्षत्रपतिरजायत'

इति। अतः, अभिप्रतारिणश्चैत्ररथत्वं क्षत्रियत्वं च गम्यते ॥ ३५ ॥

'(O) *Brahmacārin, we do not worship this*' (Chā 4 3 7)

is understood the connection with the *Samvargavidyā*, of Kāpeya and Abhipratārin, and the begging Brahmacārin Of them, Abhipratārin was a Ksatriya, and the other two were Brahmins Therefore, in the case of this *Vidyā* there is seen a connection of a Brāhmana and a Ksatriya alone out of the other (castes) and not of the Sūdra Therefore, it is proper that this Jānaśruti also is a Ksatriya and does not belong to the fourth caste, who is other than the Brāhmana Raikva, connected with this *Vidyā*

I say (says the objector)—In this chapter is not heard (mentioned) Abhipratārin being a Caitraratha, and being a Ksatriya So, how can this Abhipratarin be a Caitraratha, or how (can there be) the Ksatriya nature? There (the Sūtrakāra) says—'from the characteristic mark' From the characteristic mark viz the association of Abhipratārin with Kāpeya in (the passage)

'*Now (once upon a time a celibate religious student begged food) of Saunaka Kāpeya and Abhipratārin Kāksaseni*' (Chā 4·3 5)

is apprehended the connection with Kapeya, of this Abhipratārin Elsewhere also, is mentioned in the Sruti, his being Caitraratha, associated with Kāpeya, (in the passage)

'*By this very (Sāman), the Kāpeyas, verily, made Caitraratha sacrifice*' (Ta Brā 20 12)

Likewise, that Caitraratha was a Ksatriya is known from

'*There was born one Chief of the Ksatriyas called Caitraratha*

Thus is known that Abhipratārin was a Caitraratha, and a Ksatriya ॥ 35 ॥

तदेवं न्यायविरोधिनि शूद्रस्याधिकारे लिङ्गं नोपलभ्यते, इत्युक्तम् । इदानीं न्यायसिद्धः शूद्रस्यानाधिकारः श्रुतिस्मृतिभिरनुगृह्यते, इत्याह

संस्कारपरामर्शात्तदभावाभिलापाच्च ॥ ३६ ॥

ब्रह्मविद्योपदेशप्रदेशेषु, उपनयनसंस्कारः परामृश्यते

'उप त्वा नेष्ये' (छा ४।४।५)

'त होपनिन्ये' (श ब्रा ११।५।३।१३)

इत्यादिषु । शूद्रस्य चोपनयनादिसंस्काराभावोऽभिलप्यते

'न शूद्रे पातकं किंचिन्न च संस्कारमर्हति' (मनु १०।१२६)

इति ।

'चतुर्थो वर्ण एकजातिर्न च संस्कारमर्हति' (गौत-धर्म १०।५०)

इत्यादिषु ॥ ३६ ॥

तदभावनिर्धारणे च प्रवृत्तेः ॥ ३७ ॥

'नेतदब्राह्मणो विवक्तुमर्हति समिधं सोम्याहर' (छा ४।४।५)

इति शुश्रूषोर्जाबालस्य शूद्रत्वाभावनिर्धारणे सत्येव विद्योपदेशप्रवृत्तेश्च न शूद्रस्याधिकारः ॥ ३७ ॥

Thus there is not found any characteristic mark to establish the qualification of the Sūdra, which is opposed to reasoning. Now the disqualification of the Sūdra established by logical reasoning—says (the Sūtrakāra)—is favoured by the Sruti and the Smrti —

On account of the reference to the sacramental rites, and on account of the statement of their absence ॥ 36 ॥

In the Sections dealing with the instruction about Brahmavidyā, a reference is made to the Upanayana sacrament as in (the passages)

'I shall take you to (your teacher)' (Chā. 4 4·5)

'He indeed took him over' (Śa. Brā. 11·5·3 13)

etc And in the case of the Sūdra the absence of any sacramental rite like Upanayana is stated, in such (passages and others) as—

'There is no little sin in (the case of) the Sūdra, and he is not deserving of the sacramental rite.' (Manu 10 126)

'The fourth Varna consisting of one caste does not deserve the sacramental rite' (Gaut. Dhar. 10 50)

॥ 36 ॥

After having ascertained the absence of that (not being a Brāhmaṇa) on account of the commencement (of the teaching) ॥ 37 ॥

And there is no qualification for the Sūdra—

'Not a non-Brahmin would be able to discriminate, bring in (O) gentle one, the sacrificial sticks' (Chā 4 4 5)

—and only when thus there had been the ascertainment of Jābāla desirous of studying, not being a Sūdra, there was the commencement of the instruction in the Vidyā ॥ 37 ॥

श्रवणाध्ययनार्थप्रतिषेधात् ॥ ३८ ॥

शूद्रस्य वेदश्रवणतदध्ययनतदर्थानुष्ठानानि प्रतिषिध्यन्ते—

'पद्यु ह वा एतच्छ्मशानं यच्छूद्रस्तस्माच्छूद्रसमीपे नाध्येतव्यम्'

(वसिष्ठस्मृ. १८।९)

तस्माच्छूद्रो बहुपशुरयज्ञीय इति। बहुपशुः—पशुसदृशः, इत्यर्थः। अनुपशृण्वतोऽध्ययनतदर्थज्ञानतदर्थानुष्ठानानि न संभवन्ति। अतः, तान्यपि प्रतिनिषिद्धान्येव ॥ ३८ ॥

स्मृतेश्च ॥ ३९ ॥

स्मर्यते च श्रवणादिनिषेधः।

'अथ हास्य वेदमुपशृण्वतस्त्रपुजतुभ्यां श्रोत्रप्रपूरणम्, उदाहरणे जिह्वाच्छेदः, धारणे शरीरभेदः'

इति।

'न चास्योपदिशेद्धर्मं न चास्य व्रतमादिशेत्' (मनु ४।८०)

इति च। अतः, शूद्रस्यानधिकार इति सिद्धम्।

[201] ये तु — निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रं ब्रह्मैव परमार्थः, अन्यत्सर्वं मिथ्याभूतम्, बन्धश्चापारमार्थिकः, स च वाक्यजन्यवस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञाननिवर्त्यः, तन्निवृत्तिरेव मोक्षः—

Because there is the denial of hearing, studying the rite—(in the case of the Śūdra). ॥ 38 ॥

For a Sūdra, the hearing of the Veda, its study, and the performance of the rite for that purpose are repudiated—

*'Verily, this is a cemetery with feet—what a Śūdra is—
Therefore one should not study near a Śūdra.'*

(Vasistha Smr. 18·9)

Therefore the Sūdra, a Bahupaśu is not fit for sacrifice—Bahupaśu—resembling a Paśu (beast)—This is the sense. For one who has not heard (the recital of the Vedas), there are not possible, studying, the knowledge for that purpose and the performance of the rite (indicated) for that. Therefore, they also are definitely ruled out (denied). ॥ 38 ॥

And on account of the Smṛti ॥ 39 ॥

The denial of the hearing etc. is also found in the Smrtis—

'Now, verily, if he were to listen to the Vedas, there should be the filling of his ears with (melted) lead and lac, in the case of his uttering the same (there should be) the cutting of the tongue; in the case of his handling (the same), the breaking of the body.'

'And one should not teach him religious duties, one should not direct him to any vow' (Manu. 4 80)

etc. Therefore, it is established that the Sūdra has no qualification

[201] Those, however, who declare that Brahman, mere sentiency, without any distinctive attribute, is alone the highest Reality, everything else is false; and bondage is unreal and that can be turned away only by the knowledge of things as they are, produced from (Vedic) sentences;

इति वदन्ति तैर्ब्रह्मज्ञाने शूद्रादेरनधिकारो वक्तुं न शक्यते। अनुपनीतस्य, अनधीतवेदस्य, अश्रुतवेदान्तवाक्यस्य, अपि यस्मात्कस्मादपि निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रं ब्रह्मैव परमार्थः, अन्यत्सर्वं तस्मिन्परिकल्पितं मिथ्याभूतम्, इति वाक्यात्, वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञानोत्पत्तेस्तावतैव बन्धनिवृत्तेश्च। न च तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्येनैव ज्ञानोत्पत्तिः कार्या, न वाक्यान्तरेण, इति नियन्तुं शक्यम्। ज्ञानस्यापुरुषतन्त्रत्वात्। सत्यां सामग्र्याम्, अनिच्छतोऽपि ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः। न च वेदवाक्यादेव वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञाने सति, बन्धनिवृत्तिर्भवति, इति वक्तुं शक्यम्। येन केनापि वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञाने सति भ्रान्तिनिवृत्तेः। पौरुषेयादपि निर्विशेषं चिन्मात्रं ब्रह्म परमार्थः, अन्यत्सर्वं मिथ्याभूतम्, इति वाक्यात्, ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः। तावतैव भ्रमनिवृत्तेश्च। यथा पौरुषेयादपि, आप्तवाक्यात्, शुक्तिकारजतादिभ्रान्तिर्ब्राह्मणस्य शूद्रादेरपि निवर्तते, तद्वदेव शूद्रस्यापि वेदवित्संप्रदायावगतवाक्यात्, वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञानेन जगद्भ्रमनिवृत्तिरपि भविष्यति।

'न चास्योपदिशेद्धर्मम्' (मनु ४।८०)

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and that turning away is itself salvation,—*it is not possible for them to say* that Sūdras and others have no qualification for (securing) the knowledge of Brahman because even in the case of one who has not the thread-ceremony performed upon him (*upanīta*), who has not studied the Vedas, who has not heard the Vedānta passages there would be the production of knowledge of things as they are, by the statements—Brahman, mere sentiency, without any distinctive attribute, is alone the highest Reality, everything else being superimposed upon it, *is unreal—from some person or other, and the* cessation of bondage (comes) merely by that Not indeed is it possible to regulate that there should be the rise of knowledge through the sentence—That thou art—etc and not through another sentence, because knowledge is not dependent upon (the whims of) a person, because when there is the aggregate of means, there is bound to be the rise of knowledge, in one although not desiring. It is not possible further to say that there is the cessation of bondage *when there is the rise of knowledge of things as they are only from a* Vedic sentence, because there is bound to be the disappearance of illusion when there is the knowledge of things as they are, by any means whatsoever, because there would be the knowledge even from a sentence like—Brahman, mere sentiency, without any distinctive attribute is the only highest Reality, everything else is false —even when uttered by a person, and because there would be the cessation of illusion just by that Just as from an authoritative (*āpta*) *sentence uttered by a human being*, the illusion of silver etc in the case of the conch-shell, ceases for a Brāhmana as also for a Sūdra, in the same manner, even in the case of the Sūdra, there would arise even the cessation of the illusion of the world by the knowledge of things as they are, from a sentence known from the tradition of the Veda-knowers From the passage

'And one should not teach him religious duties' (Manu 4 80)

इत्यादिना वेदविदः शूद्रादिभ्यो न वदन्तीति च न शक्यं वक्तुम् । तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यावगत-ब्रह्मात्मभावानां वेदशिरसि वर्तमानतया दग्धाखिलाधिकारत्वेन निषेधशास्त्रस्याकिंचित्कर-त्वात् । अतिक्रान्तनिषेधैर्वा कैश्चिदुक्ताद्वाक्यात्, शूद्रादेर्ज्ञानमुत्पद्यत एव । न च वाच्यं शुक्तिकादौ रजतादिभ्रमनिवृत्तिवत्, पौरुषेयवाक्यजन्यतत्त्वज्ञानसमनन्तरं शूद्रस्य जगद्भ्रमो न निवर्तते, इति । तत्त्वमसि, इत्यादिवाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तरं ब्राह्मणस्यापि जगद्भ्रमानिवृत्तेः ।

निदिध्यासनेन द्वैतवासनायां निरस्तायामेव, तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यं निवर्तकज्ञानमु-त्पादयति, इति चेत्—पौरुषेयवाक्यमपि शूद्रादेस्तथैव, इति न कश्चिद्विशेषः । निदिध्यासनं हि नाम ब्रह्मात्मभावाभिधायिवाक्यं यदर्थप्रतिपादनयोग्यं तदर्थभावना । सैव विपरीतवासनां निवर्तयति, इति दृष्टार्थत्वं निदिध्यासनविधेर्ब्रूषे । वेदानुवचनादीन्यपि विविदिषोत्पत्तौ, एवोपयुज्यन्ते, इति, शूद्रस्यापि विविदिषायां जातायां पौरुषेयवाक्यान्निदिध्यासनादिभि-र्विपरीतवासनायां निरस्तायां ज्ञानमुत्पत्स्यते । तेनैव, अपारमार्थिको बन्धो निवर्तिष्यते ।

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etc. it is further not possible to say that the Veda-knowers do not speak to the Śūdras etc., because the denial passages in the Śāstra have no value whatsoever, owing to all the qualifications coming to naught for those who have apprehended the nature of Brahman and Ātman through the sentences like—That thou art—on account of their being preeminent in (at the top of) the Vedas. And the knowledge for the Sūdra etc. can certainly arise from sentences uttered by some who have gone beyond all denial (injunctions). And further, it should not be said that like the cessation of the illusion of silver etc. in the case of the conch-shell etc. the illusion about the world does not cease in the case of the Śūdra, immediately after the right knowledge produced by a sentence uttered by a human being; because even in the case of a Brāhmaṇa, illusion about the world does not cease, immediately on hearing a passage like—That thou art.

If it be argued that the sentence—That thou art etc. produces the remover-knowledge only after the conception of duality is removed by serious contemplation—then the sentence uttered by a human being also (would act) exactly in the same way for a Śūdra etc.—and so, there is no difference whatsoever (between the two cases). Deep contemplation, indeed, is the mental conception bearing upon that for the elucidation of which there is a proper sentence expressing the nature of Brahman and Ātman And that same removes the contrary mental activity—thus you speak of the injunction about deep contemplation leading to something tangible. Because even the after-recitals of the Vedas etc. are made use of only for creating the desire to know; when the desire to know has arisen even in the case of the Sūdra, (and) when the contrary mental activity is driven away by deep contemplation etc. by the passage uttered by a human being; and by that itself the unreal bondage would be turned away.

[202] अथ वा तर्कानुगृहीतात्, प्रत्यक्षादनुमानाच्च, निर्विशेषस्वप्रकाशचिन्मात्रप्रत्यग्वस्तुन्यज्ञानसाक्षित्वं तत्कृतविविधविचित्रज्ञातृज्ञेयविकल्परूपं कृत्स्नं जगच्चाध्यस्तम्, इति निश्चित्य, एवंभूतपरिशुद्धप्रत्यग्वस्तुनि, अनवरतभावनया विपरीतवासनां निरस्य, तदेव प्रत्यग्वस्तु साक्षात्कृत्य, शूद्रादयोऽपि विमोक्ष्यन्ते, इति मिथ्याभूतविचित्रैश्वर्यविचित्रसृष्ट्याद्यलौकिकानन्तविशेषावलम्बिना वेदान्तवाक्येन न किंचित्प्रयोजनमिह दृश्यते, इति शूद्रादीनामेव ब्रह्मविद्याधिकारः सुशोभनः। अनेनैव न्यायेन ब्राह्मणादीनामपि ब्रह्मवेदनसिद्धेः, उपनिषच्च तपस्विनी दत्तजलाञ्जलिः स्यात्। न च वाच्यम्—नैसर्गिकलोकव्यवहारे भ्राम्यतोऽस्य केनचित्, अयं लोकव्यवहारो भ्रमः, परमार्थस्तु, एवमेवम्, इति समर्थिते सत्येव, प्रत्यक्षानुमानवृत्तबुभुत्सा जायते, इति तत्समर्पिका श्रुतिरप्यास्थेया, इति। यतो भवभयभीतानां साङ्ख्यादय एव प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां वस्तुनिरूपणं कुर्वन्तः प्रत्यक्षानुमानवृत्तबुभुत्सां जनयन्ति। बुभुत्सायां च जातायां प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यामेव विविक्तस्वभावाभ्यां नित्यशुद्धस्वप्रकाशाद्वितीयकूटस्थचैतन्यमेव सत्, अन्यत्सर्वं तस्मिन्नध्यस्तम्, इति सुविवेचम्। एवंभूते स्वप्रकाशे वस्तुनि श्रुतिसमधिगम्याविशेषान्तरं च नाभ्युपगम्यते।

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[202] Or, having ascertained from direct perception and inference backed by logical reasoning, that there have been superimposed upon the inmost entity—without distinctive attributes, self-light and mere sentiency,—the nature of the witness of Ajñāna, and the entire world having the form of various variegated distinctions—knower, object of knowledge due to that;—having driven out the contrary mental activity about such an inmost entity, all unsullied, by unceasing mental revolvings: having realised that same inmost entity, the Sūdras and others also would secure salvation—and so, no purpose whatsoever is seen here of the Vedānta passage pertaining to the endless and supermundane distinctions such as variegated overlordship and variegated creation that are false—and thus that qualification for the Brahmavidyā only for Śūdras and others is all the more appropriate. In accordance with this very argument, there would be the accomplishment of the realisation of Brahman in the case of Brāhmaṇas and others also, and the poor Upaniṣad would be simply hounded out (offered funeral libations). And it must not be said that there would be produced the desire to *know the working of direct perception and inference in the case of* one who is groping about the natural worldly dealings, only after it has been authoritatively corroborated by some one saying—this practical dealing of the world is an illusion, (and) the Reality, however, is so and so,—and so, a Sruti passage favouring that should be resorted to, because the Sānkhyas and others while explaining the state of things by direct perception and inference do create a desire to know the working of direct perception and inference, in those frightened at the fear of the mundane existence. And when the desire to know has been produced, it is very easy to explain by direct perception and inference alone, with their natures distinct,—that sentiency is the only Sat,—sentiency which is eternal, pure, self-light, without a second, immutable,—and everything else is superimposed upon it. And in the case of such a self-illumining entity, cannot be apprehended any other *distinction to be known* from the Sruti.

अध्यस्तातद्रूपनिवर्तनी हि श्रुतिरपि त्वन्मते। न च सत आत्मन आनन्दरूपताज्ञानाय उपनिषदास्थेया। चिद्रूपताया एव सकलेतरव्यावृत्ततया तद्रूपत्वात्। यस्य तु—मोक्षसाधनतया वेदान्तवाक्यैर्विहितं ज्ञानम्, उपासनरूपम्, तच्च परब्रह्मभूतपरमपुरुषप्रीणनं तच्च शास्त्रैकसमधिगम्यम्। उपासनाशास्त्रं च, उपनयनादिसंस्कारसंस्कृताधीतस्वाध्यायजनितं ज्ञानं विवेकविमोकादिसाधनानुगृहीतमेव स्वोपायतया स्वीकरोति। एवंरूपोपासनाप्रीतः पुरुषोत्तम उपासकं स्वाभाविकात्मयाथात्म्यज्ञानदानेन कर्मजनिताज्ञानं नाशयन्, बन्धान्मोचयति—इति पक्षस्तस्य यथोक्तरीत्या शूद्रादेरनधिकार उपपद्यते ॥ ३९ ॥

अपशूद्राधिकरणं समाप्तम् (६ क)

[**203**] तदेवं प्रसक्तानुप्रसक्ताधिकारकथां परिसमाप्य प्रकृतस्य, अङ्गुष्ठप्रमितस्य भूतभव्येशितृत्वावगतपरब्रह्मभावोत्तम्भनं हेत्वन्तरमाह—

कम्पनात् ॥ ४० ॥

'अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो मध्य आत्मनि तिष्ठति' (का. ४।१२)

For, the Sruti also turns away what is superimposed and what is not its nature, in your opinion. And further, the Upaniṣad need not be resorted to, for the knowledge of the Sat Ātman, being possessed of bliss, because being constituted of sentiency itself, it is possessed of that nature, on account of its being excluded from everything else. But in the case of whom, the knowledge enjoined by the Vedānta passages as being the means of salvation, is of the nature of worship; and that (worship) too, is the propitiation of the highest Puruṣa, that is the Highest Brahman and that too is to be known only from the Sāstra; and the Sāstra describing the worship accepts as its producing agency, knowledge which is purified by the sacraments like Upanayana etc. and produced by the study of one's own Vedic portion, only after being favoured by the means such as discrimination, non-attachment, etc. The Purusottama propitiated by the worship of this kind, destroying the ignorance produced by Karman by the gift of the natural and right knowledge of the Ātman frees the worshipper from bondage,—this view of his is quite appropriate in (establishing) the disqualification of Śūdras and others, as mentioned before. ॥ 39 ॥

Here ends the Apaśūdrādhikarana (6 c)

[**203**] Now, thus having finished off the topic of qualification started and followed up in passing, (the Sūtrakāra) speaks of another reason, corroborating the nature of the Highest Brahman known from the control of the past and future, in the case of the (Soul) the matter in hand, measuring (the size of) a thumb —

On account of the trembling ॥ 40 ॥

It is declared in the Śruti

'The Purusa of the measure of the thumb, stays in the middle of the body.' (Kā. 4·12)

'अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषोऽन्तरात्मा'　　　　(का. ६।१७)

इत्यनयोर्वाक्ययोर्मध्ये

'यदिदं किं च जगत्सर्वं प्राण एजति निःसृतम् ।
महद्भयं वज्रमुद्यतं य एतद्विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति ॥'　　　　(का ६।२)

'भयादस्याग्निस्तपति भयात्तपति सूर्यः ।
भयादिन्द्रश्च वायुश्च मृत्युर्धावति पञ्चमः ॥'　　　　(का. ६।३)

इति कृत्स्नस्य जगतोऽग्निसूर्यादीनां च, अस्मिन्नङ्गुष्ठमात्रे पुरुषे प्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टे स्थितानां सर्वेषां ततो निःसृतानां तस्मात्संजातमहाभयनिमित्तमेजनं कम्पनं श्रूयते। तच्छासनातिवृत्तौ किं भविष्यति, इति महतो भयात्, वज्रादिव, उद्यतात्, कृत्स्नं जगत् कम्पते, इत्यर्थः।

'भयादस्याग्निस्तपति'　　　　(का. ६।३)

इत्यनेनैकार्थ्यात्। महद्भयं वज्रमुद्यतम्, इति पञ्चम्यर्थे प्रथमा। अयं च परस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वभावः

'एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठतः'
　　　　(बृ. ३।८।९)

'भीषास्माद्वातः पवते । भीषोदेति सूर्यः । भीषास्मादग्निश्चेन्द्रश्च । मृत्युर्धावति पञ्चमः'　　　　(तै. २।८)

इति परस्य ब्रह्मणः पुरुषोत्तमस्यैवंविधैश्वर्यावगतेः ॥ ४० ॥

'The Purusa of the measure of the thumb, the inner Ātman'
　　　　(Kā. 6·17)

in between these two passages—

'Whatever this entire world is,—when released trembles in the breath; great fear, uplifted adamant—those who know this, they become immortal'　　　　(Kā. 6·2)

'Through his fear, heats up fire, through fear heats up the Sun; through fear (heat up) Indra and Wind; and the fifth, Death runs on'.　　　　(Kā. 6·3)

Ejanam—trembling due to the great fear arising out of that, in the case of this entire world and in the case of Agni and Sūrya etc. all abiding in this Purusa measuring a thumb,'(and) indicated by the word Prāna, released forth from that,—What would happen at the transgression of his command?—Out of this great fear, as though from the uplifted adamant, the entire world trembles, —this is the sense, on account of (all this) having the same sense as in

'From his fear heats up fire'　　　　(Kā. 6·3)

Mahadbhayam Vajramudyatam—the nominative here is in the sense of the ablative. And this is the nature of the Highest Brahman, on account of the knowledge of this kind of overlordship in the case of the Purusottama, the Highest Brahman, in (the passages)

'By the command of this Imperishable, verily, (O) Gārgi, the Sun and the moon stay on supported'　　　　(Br. 3·8·9)

'By the fear from this one, the wind purifies; by the fear rises up the Sun; by the fear from this one, Agni and Indra; the fifth, Death, runs on'　　　　(Tai. 2·8)

॥ 40 ॥

इतश्चाङ्गुष्ठप्रमितः पुरुषोत्तमः ।

ज्योतिर्दर्शनात् ॥ ४१ ॥

तयोर्द्वयोरेव, अङ्गुष्ठप्रमितविषययोर्वाक्ययोर्मध्ये परब्रह्मासाधारणं सर्वतेजसां छादकं सर्वतेजसां कारणभूतम्, अनुग्राहकं च, अङ्गुष्ठप्रमितस्य ज्योतिर्दृश्यते

न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चन्द्रतारकं
नेमा विद्युतो भान्ति कुतोऽयमग्निः ।
तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं
तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति ॥ (का. ५।१५)

इति, अयमेव श्लोकः, आथर्वणे (मु. २।२।१०) परब्रह्माधिकृत्य श्रूयते। परज्योतिष्ट्वं च सर्वत्र परस्य ब्रह्मणः श्रूयते यथा

'परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते' (छा. ८।३।४, ८।१२।३)
'तं देवा ज्योतिषां ज्योतिरायुर्होपासतेऽमृतम्' (बृ. ४।४।१६)

इति ।

'अथ यदतः परो दिवो ज्योतिर्दीप्यते' (छा. ३।१३।७)

इत्यादिषु । अतः, अङ्गुष्ठप्रमितः परं ब्रह्म ॥ ४१ ॥

शब्दादेव प्रमिताधिकरणं समाप्तम् (६)

[204] आकाशोऽर्थान्तरत्वादिव्यपदेशात् ॥४२॥ (अधिकरण७,सूत्राणि४२-४४)

And for this reason also, the one measuring the thumb, is the Purusottama—
On account of the sight of the light. ॥ 41 ॥

In between these very two sentences pertaining to the one measuring a thumb, is seen the light of the one measuring a thumb, peculiar to the Highest Brahman, screening all lights, the cause of all lights, and the favouring agency thereof—

'Not (indeed) does the Sun shine there, nor the moon and the stars, shine not these lightnings,—whence (then) this Agni? Everything shines after him alone shining, by his lustre (shining), all this shines forth.' (Kā. 5·15)

—This very Śloka is found in the Ātharvaṇa Sruti (Mu. 2·2·10) as referring to the Highest Brahman Everywhere, being the highest light is declared in the Sruti, as referring to the Highest Brahmam as (in the passages)

'Having merged in the highest Light, he becomes manifest in his own form' (Chā. 8·3·4; 8·12·3)

'Him indeed, the gods worship, the Light of Lights, the life immortal' (Br. 4·4·16)

'Now, what the Light shines on, further beyond the sky' (Chā. 3·13·7)

etc Therefore, the one measuring the thumb, is the Highest Brahman. ॥ 41 ॥

'Here ends the Śabdādeva Pramitādhikarana (6)

Ākāśa (is the Highest Brahman) on account of the reference to its being a different entity etc. (from the inmost Ātman.) ॥ 42 ॥
(Adhikaraṇa 7, Sūtras 42-44)

छान्दोग्ये श्रूयते —

'आकाशो ह वै नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता ते यदन्तरा तद्ब्रह्म तदमृतं स आत्मा' (छा. ८।१४।१)

इति । तत्र संशयः—किमयम्, आकाशशब्दनिर्दिष्टो मुक्तात्मा, उत परमात्मा, इति । किं युक्तम् ? मुक्तात्मा, इति । कुतः ?

'अश्व इव रोमाणि विधूय पापं चन्द्र इव राहोर्मुखात्प्रमुच्य धूत्वा शरीरमकृतं कृतात्मा ब्रह्मलोकमभिसंभवामि' (छा. ८।१३।१)

इति मुक्तस्यानन्तरप्रकृतत्वात् ।

'ते यदन्तरा' (छा. ८।१४।१)

इति च नामरूपविमुक्तस्य तस्याभिधानात् ।

'नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता' (छा. ८।१४।१)

इति च स एव पूर्वावस्थयोपलिलक्षयिषितः । स एव हि देवादिरूपाणि नामानि च पूर्वमन्वभवत् । तस्यैव नामरूपविनिर्मुक्ता सांप्रतिक्यवस्था

'तद्ब्रह्म तदमृतम्' (छा. ८।१४।१)

इत्युच्यते । आकाशशब्दश्च तस्मिन्नपि, असंकुचितप्रकाशयोगादुपपद्यते ।

In the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad*, it is declared by the Sruti—

'The Ākāśa, indeed, is the manifester of name and form; what is in between the two, that (is) Brahman; that Immortal, that Ātman' (Chā. 8·14·1)

There arises a doubt—Is this one mentioned by the word Ākāśa the Released Ātman, or, the Paramātman? What (is) proper (here)? the Released Atman. Whence? On account of the released one being the immediate matter in hand in (the passage)

'Having shaken off the sin, like a horse its mane, like the moon getting out from the mouth of Rāhu, having shaken off the body, with the purpose accomplished (kṛtātmā), may I be attaining to the eternal (akṛtam) world of Brahman' (Chā. 8·13·1)

and on account of

'In between the two, what' (Chā. 8·14·1)

explicitly referring to him, released from name and form. By the expression

'The manifester of name and form' (Chā. 8·14·1)

again the same is intended to be pointed out by his previous state. He himself, indeed, experienced before, the forms of gods and others and the names. And the present state bereft of name and form of that same, is spoken of (in the passage)

'That (is) Brahman, that Immortal' (Chā. 8·14·1)

The word Ākāśa also is quite appropriate, referring to him also, on account of the possession of unrestricted light

ननु-दहरवाक्यशेषत्वादस्य, स एव दहराकाशोऽयमिति प्रतीयते । तस्य च परमात्मत्वं निर्णीतम् । नैवम् । प्रजापतिवाक्यव्यवधानात् । प्रजापतिवाक्ये च प्रत्यगात्मनो मुक्त्यवस्थान्तं रूपमभिहितम् । अनन्तरं च

'विधूय पापम्' (छा. ८।१३।१)

इति स एव मुक्तावस्थः प्रस्तुतः । अतः, अत्र, आकाशो मुक्तात्मा, इति प्राप्ते, उच्यते —

'आकाशोऽर्थान्तरत्वादिव्यपदेशात्' । आकाशः — परं ब्रह्म । कुतः ? अर्थान्तरत्वादिव्यपदेशात् । अर्थान्तरत्वव्यपदेशस्तावत्

'आकाशो ह वै नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता' (छा. ८।१४।१)

इति नामरूपयोर्निर्वोढृत्वं बद्धमुक्तोभयावस्थात् प्रत्यगात्मनोऽर्थान्तरत्वमाकाशस्योपपादयति । बद्धावस्थः स्वयं कर्मवशात्, नामरूपे भजमानः, न नामरूपे निर्वोढुं शक्नुयात् । मुक्तावस्थस्य जगद्व्यापारासंभवात्, न नितरां नामरूपनिर्वोढृत्वम् । ईश्वरस्य तु निखिलजगन्निर्माणधुरंधरस्य नामरूपयोर्निर्वोढृत्वम् श्रुत्यैव प्रतिपन्नम् ।

'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि' (छा ६।३।२)

I say (says the objector)—On account of this (passage) being the end-part of the passage referring to the Dahara, it is known that he is that same Daharākāśa, and that (Daharākāśa) being the Paramātman has (already) been concluded—Not so, (we reply),—owing to the passage dealing with Prajāpati intervening. In the Prajāpati-passage again has been stated the form of the inmost Ātman up to the released state. And later in (the passage)

'Having shaken off sin' (Chā. 8·13·1)

that same has been the subject in hand, as in the released state. Therefore here, the Ākāśa is the released Ātman.—This (prima-facie view) being reached, it is stated (in reply)—

'Ākāśa (is the Highest Brahman) on account of the reference to its being a different entity etc. (from the inmost Ātman).' Ākāśa—the Highest Brahman. Whence? On account of the reference to its being a different entity etc. The reference to its being a different entity, for the matter of that, in

'Ākāśa, indeed, is the manifester of name and form' (Chā. 8·14·1)

—being the manifester of name and form propounds Ākāśa being a different entity from the inmost Ātman—in both the conditions, bondage and release. One in the state of bondage, himself resorting to name and form through the power of Karman, would not be able to manifest name and form. In the case of the one in the state of release, there cannot be under any circumstances the state of a manifester of name and form, on account of the impossibility of dealings in respect of the world. As for the Lord, who is the supreme architect of the creation of the entire world, his being the manifester of name and form has been accepted by the Sruti itself, in

'Having entered into with this Living Self, let me manifest name and form.' (Chā. 6·3·2)

'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद्यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः ।
तस्मादेतद्ब्रह्म नाम रूपमन्नं च जायते ॥' (मु. १।१।९)

'सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचित्य धीरो
नामानि कृत्वाभिवदन्यदास्ते ।' (तै. आ. ३।१२।७)

इत्यादिषु । अतः, निर्वाह्यनामरूपात् प्रत्यगात्मनो नामरूपयोर्निर्वोढा, अयमाकाशोऽर्थान्तरभूतः परमेव ब्रह्म । तदेवोपपादयति

'ते यदन्तरा' (छा. ८।१४।१)

इति । यस्मादेवायमाकाशो नामरूपे अन्तरा ताभ्यामस्पृष्टोऽर्थान्तरभूतस्तस्मात्तयोर्निर्वोढा । अपहतपाप्मत्वात् सत्यसंकल्पत्वाच्च निर्वोढा, इत्यर्थः । आदिशब्देन ब्रह्मत्वात्मत्वामृतत्वादीनि गृह्यन्ते । निरुपाधिकबृहत्त्वादयो हि परमात्मन एव संभवन्ति । तेन, अत्राकाशः परमेव ब्रह्म ।

यत्, पुनरुक्तम् —

'धूत्वा शरीरम्' (छा. ८।१३।१)

इति मुक्तोऽनन्तरः प्रकृतः, इति — तन्न ।

'ब्रह्मलोकमभिसंभवामि' (छा. ८।१३।१)

'Who (is) omniscient' all-knower, whose penance is constituted of knowledge; from him, this Brahman, name, form and food originate' (Mu. 1·1·9)

'Having collected together all forms, the wise one, having given names (to them) stays on, calling (them).' (Tai. Ā. 3·12·7)

and such others. Therefore, this Ākāśa, the manifester of name and form, is the Highest Brahman itself, being a different entity from the inmost Ātman with name and form to be manifested. (The passage)

'In between the two, what' (Chā. 8·14·1)

expounds that same (thing). Whereas this Ākāśa—within which the (two) name and form are,—untouched by those (two) is a different entity, therefore, he is their manifester. He is the manifester, on account of his being with sins destroyed and having thoughts fulfilled.—This is the sense. By the word Ādi are to be understood the nature of Brahman, the nature of Ātman, immortality etc. Limitless magnitude and other (qualities) are, indeed, possible only in the case of the Paramātman. Therefore, here, Ākāśa is the Highest Brahman itself.

As to what has been stated that in

'Having shaken off sin' (Cha. 8·13·1)

the Released Soul is the immediate matter in hand—that (is) not (so), because in

'May I attain to (approach) the Brahmaloka' (Chā. 8·13·1)

इति परस्यैव ब्रह्मणोऽनन्तरप्रकृतत्वात्। यद्यपि, अभिसंभवितुर्मुक्तस्य, अभिसंभाव्यतया परब्रह्म निर्दिष्टं, तथाप्यभिसंभवितुर्मुक्तस्य नामरूपनिर्वोढृत्वाद्यसंभवात्, अभिसंभाव्यं परमेव ब्रह्मात्र प्रत्येतव्यम्। किं चाकाशशब्देन प्रकृतस्य दहराकाशस्यात्र प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्, प्रजापतिवाक्यस्याप्युपासकस्वरूपकथनार्थत्वात्, उपास्य एव दहराकाशः प्राप्यतयोपसंह्रियते, इति युक्तम्। आकाशशब्दश्च प्रत्यगात्मनि न क्वचिद्दृष्टचरः। अतः, अत्राकाशः परं ब्रह्म ॥ ४२ ॥

[205] अथ स्यात् — प्रत्यगात्मनोऽर्थान्तरभूतम्, आत्मान्तरमेव नास्ति। ऐक्योपदेशात्, द्वैतप्रतिषेधाच्च। शुद्धावस्थ एव हि प्रत्यगात्मा परमात्मा, परं ब्रह्म, परमेश्वरः, इति व्यपदिश्यते। अतः, प्रकृतान्मुक्तात्मनोऽभिसंभवितुर्नार्थान्तरमभिसंभाव्यो ब्रह्मलोकः। अतः, नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता, आकाशोऽपि स एव भवितुमर्हति, इति।

अत उत्तरं पठति—

सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेन ॥ ४३ ॥

'व्यपदेशात्' इति वर्तते। सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योः, प्रत्यगात्मनोऽर्थान्तरत्वेन परमात्मनो व्यपदेशात्, प्रत्यगात्मनोऽर्थान्तरभूतः परमात्मा, अस्त्येव। तथा हि वाजसनेयके

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the Highest Brahman itself is the immediate matter in hand Although the Highest Brahman is pointed as being fit for approaching for the released (Ātman) who is approaching, still the Highest Brahman itself fit to be approached should be understood to be meant here, on account of the impossibility of the Released (Soul) who is approaching, being the manifester of name and form etc. And further, on account of the recognition here of the Daharākāśa, the matter in hand, by the word Ākāśa, (and) on account of the Prajapati-passage also being intended for the description of the nature of the worshipper, it is proper (to understand) that the Daharākāśa which is just an object of worship, is referred to in the end as the destination And the word Ākāśa is never seen before as referring to the inmost Atman Therefore, here, Ākāśa is the Highest Brahman ॥ 42 ॥

[205] If it be argued — There cannot be any other Ātman, who is a different entity from the inmost Ātman, on account of the instruction about identity and the repudiation of duality. The inmost Ātman himself, in the pure state, is, indeed, referred to as Paramātman, the Highest Brahman, (and) the supreme Lord Therefore, there is no Brahmaloka, which is to be approached, a different entity from the released Ātman, the matter in hand, and who is the approacher Therefore he himself deserves to be the Ākāśa also, the manifester of name and form—

(The Sūtrakāra) now recites the answer—

By the difference between deep sleep and departure ॥ 43 ॥

'On account of reference' is (to be understood here) On account of the reference to the Paramātman as a different entity from the inmost Ātman in deep sleep and departure, there does exist the Paramātman as a different entity from the inmost Ātman To the same effect, in the Vājasaneyaka, with the introduction

'कतम आत्मा योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु' (बृ ४।३।७)

इति प्रकृत्य, तस्य प्रत्यगात्मनः सुषुप्त्यवस्थायाम्, अकिंचिज्ज्ञस्य सर्वज्ञेन परमात्मना परिष्वङ्ग आम्नायते।

'प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरम्' (बृ ४।३।२१)

इति। तथा, उत्क्रान्तावपि

'प्राज्ञेनात्मनान्वारूढ उत्सृजन्याति' (बृ ४।३।३५)

इति। न च, स्वपत उत्क्रामतो वापि, अकिंचिज्ज्ञस्य तदानीमेव स्वेनैव सर्वज्ञेन सता परिष्वङ्गान्वारोहौ संभवतः। न च क्षेत्रज्ञान्तरेण, तस्यापि सर्वज्ञत्वासंभवात् ॥ ४३ ॥

[206] इतश्च प्रत्यगात्मनोऽर्थान्तरभूतः परमात्मा, इत्याह—

पत्यादिशब्देभ्यः ॥ ४४ ॥

अयं परिष्वञ्जकः परमात्मा, उत्तरत्र पत्यादिशब्दैर्व्यपदिश्यते।

'सर्वस्याधिपतिः सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशानः स न साधुना कर्मणा भूयान्नो एवासाधुना कर्मणा कनीयानेष सर्वेश्वर एष भूताधिपतिरेष भूतपाल एष सेतुर्विधरण एषां लोकानामसंभेदाय। तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति ... एतमेव विदित्वा मुनिर्भवति। एतमेव प्रव्राजिनो लोकमिच्छन्तः प्रव्रजन्ति' (बृ ४।४।२२)

'What sort of Ātman, who this is constituted of Vijñāna among the Prānas?' (Br 4 3 7)

is ordained by the Sruti, close contact with the omniscient Paramātman, of that inmost Ātman knowing nothing in the deep-sleep-state, in

'In close contact with the Prājña (intelligent) Ātman, he knows not anything outside, not inside (either)' (Br 4 3 21)

Likewise, in the state of departure also in

'Mounted upon by the Prājña (intelligent) Ātman, he goes on leaving (the body)' (Br 4 3 35)

Not again, are possible close contact or mounting upon by himself being omniscient at that time, of one who knows nothing whether sleeping soundly, or departing, nor by another Ksetra-knower, because he also cannot be omniscient ॥ 43 ॥

[206] And for this reason also, Paramātman is a different entity from the inmost Ātman, says (the Sūtrakāra)—

On account of the words Pati (Lord) etc ॥ 44 ॥

This Paramātman who establishes contact is referred to later by the words Pati (Lord) etc, in (passages like)

'The Overlord of all, the Controller of all, the Ruler of all He is not greater by good deeds, He is, again not small by evil deeds, this one, the Lord of all this one, the King of creatures this one, the Protector of creatures, this one, the bridge (dam), the support for the non-disintegration of the worlds—this one him Brāhmanas desire to know by the recitation of the Vedas Having known this one alone, he becomes a sage.—Desirous of this one alone, ascetics renounce the world.' (Br 4 4 22)

'स वा एष महानज आत्मान्नादो वसुदानः' (बृ. ४।४।२४)

'अजरोऽमृतोऽभय आनन्दो ब्रह्म' (बृ. ४।४।२५)

इति । एते च जगत्पतित्वजगद्विधरणसर्वेश्वरत्वादयः प्रत्यगात्मनि मुक्तावस्थेऽपि न कथंचित्संभवन्ति । अतः, मुक्तात्मनोऽर्थान्तरभूतो नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता, आकाशः । ऐक्योपदेशस्तु सर्वस्य चिदचिदात्मकस्य ब्रह्मकार्यत्वेन तदात्मकत्वायत्त इति

'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलान्' (छा. ३।१४।१)

इत्यादिभिर्वाक्यैः प्रतिपाद्यते, इति पूर्वमेव समर्थितम् । द्वैतप्रतिषेधश्च तत एव, इत्यनवद्यम् ॥ ४४ ॥

आकाशोऽर्थान्तरत्वादिव्यपदेशाधिकरणं समाप्तम् । (७)

इति श्रीमद्भगवद्रामानुजविरचिते शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्ये
. प्रथमाध्यायस्य तृतीयः पादः समाप्तः ।

....

'He is, verily, the great unborn Ātman, the food-eater and wealth-giver.' (Br. 4·4·24)

'Ageless, immortal, fearless, bliss (is) Brahman.' (Br. 4·4·25)

And these—being the Lord of the world, the support of the world, and the overlordship of all, etc. are not possible in any manner in the case of the inmost Atman, even while in the state of release. Therefore, Ākāśa, the manifester of name and form, is a different entity from the Released Ātman. The instruction about identity, however, is dependent upon that, on account of everything constituted of sentient and non-sentient, being the product of Brahman—all this is propounded by (passages like)

'All this, verily, (is) Brahman, originating from it, merging into it, subsisting in it' (Chā. 3·14·1)

—this has already been corroborated. And the repudiation of duality, indeed, arises out of that itself,—and so (everything is) flawless. ॥ 44 ॥

Here ends the Ākāśorthāntaratvādivyapadeśādhikarana (7)

Here ends the third Quarter of the first Chapter (Ādhyāya) in the commentary on the Sārīraka-Mīmāmsā, composed by the Illustrious Revered Rāmānuja.

....

प्रथमाध्याये चतुर्थः पादः ।

[207] आनुमानिकमप्येकेषामिति चेन्न शरीररूपकविन्यस्तगृहीतेर्दर्शयति च ॥ १ ॥

(अधिकरण १, सूत्राणि १–७)

उक्तं परमपुरुषार्थलक्षणमोक्षसाधनतया जिज्ञास्य जगज्जन्मादिकारणं ब्रह्म, अचिद्वस्तुनः प्रधानादे:, चेतनाच्च बद्धमुक्तोभयावस्थाद्विलक्षणं, निरस्तसमस्तहेयगन्धं सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति सत्यसंकल्पं समस्तकल्याणगुणात्मकं सर्वान्तरात्मभूतं निरङ्कुशैश्वर्यम्, इति । इदानीं कापिलतन्त्रसिद्धाब्रह्मात्मकप्रधानपुरुषादिप्रतिपादनमुखेन प्रधानकारणत्वप्रतिपादनच्छायानुसारीण्यपि कानिचिद्वाक्यानि काासुचिच्छाखासु सन्ति, इत्याशङ्क्य ब्रह्मैककारणत्वस्थेम्ने तन्निराक्रियते ।

कठवल्लीष्वाम्नायते—

'इन्द्रियेभ्य परा ह्यर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च पर मन ।
मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्बुद्धेरात्मा महान्पर ॥
महत परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुष पर ।
पुरुषान्न पर किंचित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गति ॥' (का ३।१०–११)

The Fourth Quarter of the First Chapter

[207] If it be argued that the Ānumānika also (Pradhāna) according to some (we reply) — No on account of the apprehension of the metaphorical description severally of the body and (the Śruti) will show (the same) ॥ **1** ॥ (Adhikarana 1, Sūtras 1-7)

It has been (already) stated that what is fit to be desired to be known, as being the means of (securing) release, which is of the nature of the highest human purpose in life, is Brahman, the cause of the origination etc of the world, different from Pradhāna and others, the non-sentient, and from the sentient in both the states of bondage and release, from which even the tinge of all things fit to be abandoned is driven out omniscient, omnipotent, with thoughts fulfilled, constituted of all auspicious qualities the inner Ātman of all, *(and) with uncurbed overlordship* Now, *suspecting* that *there are some* passages in some recensions, apparently following the exposition of the Pradhana being the cause, through the propounding of Pradhana, Purusa etc not being Brahman *established in the Kapila system (of philosophy)—that is* being repudiated to establish firmly (the thesis) that Brahman alone is the cause (of the world)

In the Katha-chapters it is ordained by the Sruti —

'The objects (are) farther off than the sense-organs and the mind, farther off than the objects and understanding, farther off than the mind the Mahat-Ātman farther off than understanding the Unmanifest, farther off than the Mahat the Purusa, farther off than the Unmanifest nothing farther off than the Purusa — that the farthest limit, that, the highest state' (Ka 3 10-11)

इति। तत्र संदेहः—किं कापिलतन्त्रसिद्धमब्रह्मात्मकं प्रधानमिहाव्यक्तशब्देनोच्यते, उत नेति? किं युक्तम्? प्रधानमिति। कुतः?

'महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः।' (का. ३।११)

इति तत्प्रक्रियाप्रत्यभिज्ञानेन तस्यैव प्रतीतेः।

'पुरुषान्न परं किंचित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः।' (का. ३।११)

इति पञ्चविंशकपुरुषातिरिक्ततत्त्वनिषेधाच्च। अतोऽव्यक्तं कारणमिति प्राप्तम्। तदिदम्, उक्तम्, 'आनुमानिकमप्येकेषामिति चेत्,' इति। एकेषां शाखिनां शाखास्वानुमानिकं प्रधानमपि कारणमाम्नायते, इति चेत्, अत्रोत्तरं न, इति। नाव्यक्तशब्देनाब्रह्मात्मकं, प्रधानमिहाभिधीयते। कुतः? 'शरीररूपकविन्यस्तगृहीतेः'। शरीराख्यरूपकविन्यस्तस्य, अव्यक्तशब्देन गृहीतेः। आत्मशरीरबुद्धिमनइन्द्रियविषयेषु रथिरथादिभावेन रूपितेषु रथरूपणेन विन्यस्तशरीरस्य, अत्राव्यक्तशब्देन ग्रहणादित्यर्थः।

[208] एतदुक्तं भवति — पूर्वत्र हि

There (arises) the doubt—Is the Pradhāna, not being Brahman, described in the Kapila system, spoken of here by the word Avyakta or not? What (is) proper (here)? Pradhāna. Whence? On account of the apprehension of that itself, owing to the recognition of its technique in the passage—

'The Unmanifest, farther off than the Mahat; the Puruṣa, farther off than the Unmanifest' (Kā. 3·11)

and on account of the repudiation of any Principle, over and above the twentyfifth Puruṣa in

'There, nothing farther off than the Puruṣa—that, the farthest limit, that, the highest state' (Kā. 3·11)

—this (prima-facie view) is reached that the Avyakta (Unmanifest) is the Cause. That has been stated here in (the Sūtra portion)—'If it be argued that the Anumānika also, according to some.' Ekeṣām—of students of (some) recensions—in recensions it is ordained by the Śruti that the Ānumānika (to be known by inference) Pradhāna also is the Cause—if it is argued thus, the answer here (is)—No. Not by the word Avyakta (Unmanifest) is denoted here the Pradhāna, not being Brahman. Whence? 'On account of the apprehension of the metaphorical description severally of the body.' —On account of the apprehension of the detailed body-metaphor by the word Avyakta. The sense is—on account of the apprehension by the word Avyakta, here of the body described in detail, by the metaphor of the chariot, when the Atman, body, understanding, mind, sense-organs (and) objects (of senses), have been described in terms of the charioteer, chariot etc.

[208] This is what is intended to be said—Indeed, previously (in the passage) beginning with

'आत्मानं रथिनं विद्धि शरीरं रथमेव च ।
बुद्धिं तु सारथिं विद्धि मनः प्रग्रहमेव च ॥
इन्द्रियाणि हयानाहुर्विषयांस्तेषु गोचरान् ।' (का ३।३-४)

इत्यादिना

'सोऽध्वनः पारमाप्नोति तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम् ।' (का ३।९)

इत्यन्तेन, संसाराध्वनः पारं वैष्णवं पदं प्रेप्सन्तमुपासकं रथित्वेन तच्छरीरादीनि च रथ-रथाङ्गत्वेन रूपयित्वा, यस्यैते रथादयो वशे तिष्ठन्ति स एवाध्वनः पारभूतं वैष्णवं पदमाप्नोतीत्युक्त्वा, तेषु रथादिरूपितशरीरादिषु यानि येभ्यो वशीकार्यतया प्रधानानि तान्युच्यन्ते,

'इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्थाः' (का ३।१०)

इत्यादिना । तत्र हयत्वेन रूपितेभ्य इन्द्रियेभ्यो गोचरत्वेन रूपिता विषया वशीकार्यत्वेन पराः, वश्येन्द्रियस्यापि विषयसंनिधानात्, इन्द्रियाणां दुर्निग्रहत्वात् । तेभ्योऽपि परं प्रग्रहरूपितं मनः, मनसि विषयप्रवणे विषयासंनिधानस्याप्यकिंचित्करत्वात् । तस्मादपि

'Know the Ātman to be the warrior in the chariot, and the body just the chariot, know the understanding to be the charioteer, and the mind the reins themselves, they speak of the sense-organs as the horses and the objects of senses as coming within their ken'
(Ka. 3 3-4)

and ending with

'He reaches the end of the journey,—that (is) Viṣṇu's highest place.' (Ka 3 9)

—having metaphorically described the worshipper desirous of reaching the place of Viṣṇu, the end of the journey in mundane existence, as being the warrior in the chariot, and his body etc as the chariot and parts of the chariot, (and) having stated that he, under whose control these—chariot and others—stand, he alone reaches the place of Viṣṇu, the end of the journey,—(now) by the passage

'The objects are farther off than the sense-organs'
(Kā 3 10)

are spoken of which among the body etc, metaphorically described as chariot etc are the Principal (entities superior to) owing to their controlling capacity There the objects of senses metaphorically described as coming within the ken, are farther off than the sense-organs, that are metaphorically described as horses, owing to (their) controlling capacity, because even in the case of one who has control over the sense-organs, the sense-organs are difficult to be controlled, in the presence of the objects Farther than even them (is) the mind, metaphorically described as the reins, because if the mind is engrossed in objects (of senses), even the absence of objects does not matter at all Farther than that (mind is) the under-

सारथित्वरूपिता बुद्धिः परा, अध्यवसायाभावे मनसोऽप्यकिंचित्करत्वात्। तस्या अपि रथित्वरूपित आत्मा कर्तृत्वेन प्राधान्यात्परः। सर्वस्य चास्य, आत्मेच्छायत्तत्वात्, आत्मैव महान्, इति च विशेष्यते। तस्मादपि रथरूपितं शरीरं परम्। तदायत्तत्वात्, जीवात्मनः सकलपुरुषार्थसाधनप्रवृत्तीनाम्। तस्मादपि परः सर्वान्तरात्मभूतोऽन्तर्याम्यध्वनः पारभूतः परमपुरुषः। यथोक्तस्यात्मपर्यन्तस्य समस्तस्य तत्संकल्पायत्तप्रवृत्तित्वात्। स खल्वन्तर्यामितयोपासनस्यापि निर्वर्तकः।

'परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः' (ब्र. सू. २।३।४०)

इति हि जीवात्मनः कर्तृत्वं परमपुरुषायत्तम्, इति वक्ष्यते। वशीकार्योपासननिर्वृत्त्युपायकाष्ठाभूतः परमप्राप्यश्च स एव। तदिदमुच्यते

'पुरुषान्न परं किंचित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः।' (का. ३।११)

इति। तथा च, अन्तर्यामिब्राह्मणे

'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्' (बृ. ३।७।२२)

इत्यादिभिः सर्वं साक्षात्कुर्वन्सर्वं नियमयति, इत्युक्त्वा

'नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा' (बृ. ३।७।२३)

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standing metaphorically described as the charioteer; because in the absence of a definite resolve, the mind too cannot do anything. Farther than that (Buddhi is) the Atman metaphorically described as the warrior in the chariot, on account of his being the principal, as he is the active doer. Everything being dependent upon the will of the Ātman, the Ātman is particularised as Mahat (great). And even farther than that (is) the body metaphorically described as a chariot; because all the activities, the means of achieving the human purpose in life, of the Jīvātman, are dependent upon that. Farther even than that (is) the highest Puruṣa, who is the inner self of all, the inner Controller, (and) the destination (the end) of the journey; because everything up to the Ātman as described before, has its activity dependent upon His thought. He, indeed, being the inner Controller, is the one who carries through the worship as well. And further in (the Sūtra)

'From the Highest, because (there is) Sruti to that effect' (Bra. Sū 2·3·40)

would be told that the activity of the Jīvātman is dependent upon the highest Purusa. And he alone is the highest object to be reached, (and) the highest means for the controlling work, and carrying through of the worship. In connection with that this is stated—

'Nothing farther than the Purusa—that, the farthest limit; that, the highest state.' (Kā 3·11)

Likewise in the *Brāhmaṇa* passage dealing with the inner Controller in

'Who, abiding in the Ātman' (Br. 3·7·22)

etc.,—directly perceiving all, he controls all—having stated thus, the existence of another Controller is denied in

'Not other than this one is the seer' (Br. 3·7·23)

इत्यादिना नियन्त्रन्तरं निषिध्यते । भगवद्गीतासु च

'अधिष्ठानं तथा कर्ता करणं च पृथग्विधम् ।
विविधा च पृथक् चेष्टा दैवं चैवात्र पञ्चमम् ॥　(गी. १८।१४)

इति । दैवमत्र पुरुषोत्तम एव

'सर्वस्य चाहं हृदि संनिविष्टः
मत्तः स्मृतिर्ज्ञानमपोहनं च ।'　(गी. १५।१५)

इति वचनात् । तस्य च वशीकरणं तच्छरणागतिरेव । यथाह—

'ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति ।
भ्रामयन्सर्वभूतानि यन्त्रारूढानि मायया ॥
तमेव शरणं गच्छ सर्वभावेन भारत ।'　(गी. १८।६१–६२)

इति । तदेवम्

'आत्मानं रथिनं विद्धि'　(का. ३।३)

इत्यादिना रथ्यादिरूपकविन्यस्ता इन्द्रियादयः

'इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्थाः'　(का. ३।१०)

इत्यत्र स्वशब्दैरेव प्रत्यभिज्ञायन्ते, न रथरूपितं शरीरमिति परिशेषात्, तदव्यक्तशब्देनोच्यते, इति निश्चीयते । अतः, कापिलतन्त्रप्रसिद्धस्य प्रधानस्य प्रसङ्ग एवेह नास्ति ।

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etc. In the *Bhagavadgītā* also (is stated)

'The basis, likewise the agent, and various means, and various several activities, and Fate, also as the fifth (are) here'　(Gītā, 18·14)

Daiva (Fate) here is the Purusottama himself, on account of the statement in (the passage)

'I am stationed in the heart of all also; from me (come) remembrance, knowledge and exclusion'　(Gītā, 15·15)

And (the means for)captivating him is nothing but surrender to him. As (the Lord) says—

'The Supreme Lord stays, (O) Arjuna, in the heart of all creatures, revolving all creatures (as though) mounted on a machine, by (his) Māyā (wonderful power); go to him alone for refuge with all (your) heart, (O) Descendant of Bharata.'　(Gītā, 18·61–62)

Therefore, thus, the sense-organs referred to severally in the metaphor about the warrior in the chariot etc. in

'Know that Ātman to be the warrior in the chariot'　(Kā. 3·3)

etc., are recognised here by (being referred to in) the very words in

'The objects, indeed, (are) farther off than the sense-organs.'　(Kā. 3·10)

and not the body described as the chariot—and so, it is ascertained that, that (body) is mentioned by the word Avyakta, owing to that alone remaining (for being referred to). Therefore, there is no undesirable possibility even of (a reference to) Pradhāna, well-known in the Kapila system (of philosophy) here.

[209] न च, अत्र तन्त्रप्रसिद्धप्रक्रियाप्रत्यभिज्ञा ।

'इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्थाः' (का. ३।१०)

इति, इन्द्रियेभ्यो ह्यर्थानां शब्दादीनां परत्वकीर्तनात् । न हि शब्दादयः, इन्द्रियाणां कारणभूतास्तद्दर्शने ।

'अर्थेभ्यश्च परं मनः' (का. ३।१०)

इत्यपि न तत्तन्त्रे संगतम् । अकारणत्वादेव । तथा

'बुद्धेरात्मा महान्परः' (का. ३।१०)

इत्यप्यसंगतम्, बुद्धिशब्देन महत्तत्त्वाभ्युपगमात् । न हि महतो महान्पर इति संभवति । महत आत्मशब्देन विशेषणं च न संगच्छते । अतः, रूपकविन्यस्तानामेव, इह ग्रहणम् । दर्शयति च तदेव

'एष सर्वेषु भूतेषु गूढोऽऽत्मा न प्रकाशते ।
दृश्यते त्वग्र्यया बुद्ध्या सूक्ष्मया सूक्ष्मदर्शिभिः ॥
यच्छेद्वाङ्मनसी प्राज्ञस्तद्यच्छेज्ज्ञान आत्मनि ।
ज्ञानमात्मनि महति नियच्छेत्तद्यच्छेच्छान्त आत्मनि ॥' (का. ३।१२–१३)

इति —

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[209] Neither again, is here the recognition of the technique, established in that system, on account of the objects (of the sense-organs) Sabda etc being described as farther off than (superior to) the sense-organs in

'The objects, indeed, (are) farther off than the sense-organs' (Kā 3 10)

Not, indeed, are Sabda etc the cause of the sense-organs in that system

'The mind, again, farther off than the objects' (Ka 3·10)

also does not fit in well in that system, just because it is not the cause. Likewise—

'The Mahat-Ātman, farther off than the Understanding' (Kā. 3 10)

also does not harmonise, because by the word Buddhi is apprehended the Mahat-principle (by the Sāṅkhyas), for, it is not possible (to say) that Mahat is farther off than Mahat Mahat being qualified by the word Ātman also does not fit in Therefore, only those alone that are described severally in the metaphor are referred to here And the Śruti would be declaring the same —

'This one, the hidden Ātman, does not shine forth in all the beings, but he is seen with the subtle sharp Understanding by the subtle-perceivers'

'The Prājña (intelligent one) should restrain the Vāk (speech) in the mind, one should restrain that (mind) in the Jñāna-Ātman, one should restrain the Jñāna into the Mahat-Ātman, and restrain that in the tranquil Ātman.' (Kā 3·12–13)

[210] अजितबाह्याभ्यन्तरकरणैरस्य परमपुरुषस्य दुर्दर्शत्वमभिधाय, हयादिरूपितानामिन्द्रियाणां वशीकरणप्रकारोऽयमुच्यते-

'यच्छेद्वाङ्मनसी' (का. ३।१३)

इति। वाचं मनसि नियच्छेत्। वाक्पूर्वकाणि कर्मेन्द्रियाणि ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि च मनसि नियच्छेदित्यर्थः। वाक्शब्दे द्वितीयायाः

'सुपां सुलुक्' (पा. सू. ७।१।३९)

इति लुक्। मनसी — इति सप्तम्याश्छान्दसो दीर्घः। तद्यच्छेज्ज्ञान आत्मनि—तन्मनो बुद्धौ नियच्छेत्। ज्ञानशब्देनात्र पूर्वोक्ता बुद्धिरभिधीयते। ज्ञाने आत्मनि — इति व्यधिकरणसप्तम्यौ। आत्मनि वर्तमाने ज्ञाने नियच्छेदित्यर्थः। ज्ञानमात्मनि महति नियच्छेत् — बुद्धिं कर्तरि महत्यात्मनि नियच्छेत्। तद्यच्छेच्छान्त आत्मनि—तं कर्तारं परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि सर्वान्तर्यामिणि नियच्छेत्। व्यत्ययेन तदिति नपुंसकलिङ्गता। एवंभूतेन रथिना वैष्णवं पदं गन्तव्यमित्यर्थः ॥ १ ॥

[211] अव्यक्तशब्देन कथं व्यक्तस्य शरीरस्याभिधानम्? तत्राह—

सूक्ष्मं तु तदर्हत्वात् ॥ २ ॥

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[210] Having mentioned that this highest Puruṣa is difficult to be seen by those who have not controlled the external and internal sense-organs here is stated in (the passage)

'One should restrain the Vāk (speech) in the mind'

(Kā. 3·13)

the method for subjugating the sense-organs that are metaphorically described as horses etc., *Vācam manasi niyacchet* — one should restrain in the mind the organs of action and the organs of knowledge, headed by Vāk (speech) — this is the sense. In the word Vāk the elimination of the accusative (termination) is in accordance with the Sūtra —

'The Su-Luk in the case of case-endings' (Pā-Sū. 7·1·39)

Manasī — here (Sī) long in the locative (instead of Si short) is Vedic *Tadhacchet jñāna Ātmani* — one should restrain that mind, in the Understanding. By the word Jñāna here is referred to, Understanding mentioned before. *Jñāna Ātmani*—(used as) Vyadhikaraṇa locatives (having different abodes)—*The sense is—one should restrain in the Jñāna existing in the* Ātman. *Jñānam Ātmani mahati niyacchet*—One should restrain the Buddhi *in the Mahat-Ātman, the agent. Tadyacchet Śānta Ātmani*—One should restrain that agent in the Highest Brahman, the inner Controller of all. The *neuter gender is used here (to refer to the* Ātman) as Tat, by a change (of the case). The sense is—by the warrior in the chariot shaped thus, is fit to be reached the place of Viṣṇu. ॥ 1 ॥

[211] How can there be by the word Avyakta (Unmanifest) the denotation of the body which is manifest? There (the Sūtrakāra) says—

' But the Subtle, owing to its being fit for that ॥ 2 ॥

भूतसूक्ष्ममव्याकृतं हि, अवस्थाविशेषमापन्नं शरीरं भवति । तदव्याकृतमिह शारीरावस्थम्, अव्यक्तशब्देनोच्यते । 'तदर्हत्वात्'। तस्याव्याकृतस्याचिद्वस्तुन एव विकारमापन्नस्य रथवत्पुरुषार्थसाधनप्रवृत्त्यर्हत्वात् ॥ २ ॥

[212] यदि भूतसूक्ष्ममव्याकृतमभ्युपगम्यते, कापिलतन्त्रसिद्धोपादाने कः प्रद्वेषः ? तत्रापि हि भूतकारणमेवाव्यक्तमित्युच्यते । तत्राह —

तदधीनत्वादर्थवत् ॥ ३ ॥

परमकारणभूतपरमपुरुषाधीनत्वात्प्रयोजनवद्भूतसूक्ष्मम् । एतदुक्तं भवति — न हि वयमव्यक्तं तत्परिणामविशेषांश्च स्वरूपेण नाभ्युपगच्छामः, अपि तु परमपुरुषशरीरतया तदात्मकत्वविरहेण । तदात्मकत्वेनैव हि प्रकृत्यादयः स्वप्रयोजनं साधयन्ति । अन्यथा स्वरूपस्थितिप्रवृत्तिभेदास्तेषां न स्युः । तथा, अनभ्युपगमादेव हि तन्त्रसिद्धप्रक्रियानिरसनमिति । श्रुतिस्मृत्योर्हि जगदुत्पत्तिप्रलयवादेषु परमपुरुषमहिमवादेषु च प्रकृतिविकृतिपुरुषास्तदात्मकाः संकीर्त्यन्ते । तथा

'पृथिव्यप्सु प्रलीयते'

इत्यारभ्य

The subtle element, unmodified, indeed becomes the body, when attaining to a particular condition. (And) that unmodified is here spoken of as being in the condition of the body by the word Avyakta; '*Tadarhatvāt*' because, that unmodified non-sentient thing alone, which has undergone a transformation, is fit for activity for the attainment of the human purpose in life, like the chariot. ॥ 2 ॥

[212] If an unmodified subtle element is admitted (by you), why this great aversion to accepting (what is) established in the Kāpila system (of philosophy)? For, there also the producing cause of the element alone, is spoken of as the unmanifest.—There (the Sūtrakāra) says—

That serves its purpose, because it depends upon that (Puruṣa) ॥ 3 ॥

The subtle element serves its purpose (only) by being dependent upon the highest Puruṣa who is the highest Cause. This is what is intended to be said—Not indeed, do we not admit the Unmanifest and its particular modifications in their own nature, but as void of their having that as their Atman, on account of their being the body of the highest Purusa. Prakṛti and others accomplish their purpose, indeed, by having that alone as their Ātman. Otherwise, there would not be their distinctive nature, condition and activity, and just on account of the non-admittance of that, indeed, there is the repudiation of the technique established in (their) system. For, in the discussions about the origination and dissolution of the world and in the discussions about the glory of the highest Puruṣa, both in the Sruti and Smṛti passages, the Prakṛti, modifications, and the soul are described as having that (highest Purusa) as their Ātman. As for instance, in (the passage) beginning with

'*The earth dissolves in waters*'

'तन्मात्राणि भूतादौ लीयन्ते । भूतादिर्महति लीयते । महानव्यक्ते लीयते । अव्यक्तमक्षरे लीयते । अक्षरं तमसि लीयते । तमः परे देव एकीभवति' । (सुबालो)

तथा

'यस्य पृथिवी शरीरम् । यस्यापः शरीरम् । यस्य तेजः शरीरम् । यस्य वायुः शरीरम् । यस्याकाशः शरीरम् । यस्याहङ्कारः शरीरम् । यस्य बुद्धिः शरीरम् । यस्याव्यक्तं शरीरम् । यस्याक्षरं शरीरम् । यस्य मृत्युः शरीरम् । एष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मापहतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायण ।' (सुबालो)

तथा

'भूमिरापोऽनलो वायुः खं मनो बुद्धिरेव च ।
अहङ्कार इतीयं मे भिन्ना प्रकृतिरष्टधा ॥
अपरेयमितस्त्वन्यां प्रकृतिं विद्धि मे पराम् ।
जीवभूतां महाबाहो ययेदं धार्यते जगत् ॥
एतद्योनीनि भूतानि सर्वाणीत्युपधारय ।
अहं कृत्स्नस्य जगतः प्रभवः प्रलयस्तथा ॥
मत्तः परतरं नान्यत्किंचिदस्ति धनंजय ।
मयि सर्वमिदं प्रोतं सूत्रे मणिगणा इव ॥' (गी ७।४-७)

'*The subtle elements get dissolved in the elements etc, the elements etc get dissolved in the Mahat, the Mahat gets dissolved in the Unmanifest, the Unmanifest gets dissolved in the Immutable, the Immutable gets dissolved in the Tamas (and) the Tamas becomes one with the highest God*' (Subālo)

—Likewise,

'*Whose body, the Earth, whose body, the waters, whose body, the Tejas, whose body, the Wind, whose body, the Ākaśa, whose body, the Ahamkāra whose body, the Understanding, whose body, the Unmanifest, whose body, the Immutable, whose body, Death—this one (is) the shining god, the inmost Ātman of all beings, with sins destroyed, the one, Nārāyana*' (Subalo)

Likewise—

'*Earth, water, fire, wind, ether (or sky), mind, and understanding itself, egotism (I-idea)—thus this (is) my Nature (divided) eight-fold*

Lower (is) this—know my Higher Nature other than this which has become the Living Souls (O) long-armed one, by which is sustained this world

Bear in mind that all the creatures have these as (their) womb (or, source), I (am) the source likewise, the dissolution of the entire world

Farther beyond (or, superior to) me, nothing else whatsoever exists, (O) Dhanañjaya in Me all this is woven, as in the thread, the rows of pearls' (Gītā 7-4-7)

इति ।

'व्यक्तं विष्णुस्तथाऽव्यक्तं पुरुषः काल एव च ।' (वि. पु. १।२।१८)

इति ।

'प्रकृतिर्या मयाख्याता व्यक्ताव्यक्तस्वरूपिणी ।
पुरुषश्चाप्युभावेतौ लीयेते परमात्मनि ॥
परमात्मा च सर्वेषामाधारः पुरुषोत्तमः ।
विष्णुनामा स वेदेषु वेदान्तेषु च गीयते ॥' (वि. पु. ६।४।३८–३९)

इति च ॥ ३ ॥

[213] ज्ञेयत्वावचनाच्च ॥ ४ ॥

यदि तन्त्रसिद्धमिहाव्यक्तमविवक्षिष्यत्, तदास्य ज्ञेयत्वमवक्ष्यत । व्यक्ताव्यक्तविज्ञानान्मोक्षं वदद्भिस्तान्त्रिकैस्तेषां सर्वेषां ज्ञेयत्वाभ्युपगमात् । न चास्य ज्ञेयत्वमुच्यते, इति । अतः, न तन्त्रसिद्धस्येह ग्रहणम् ॥ ४ ॥

[214] वदतीति चेन्न प्राज्ञो हि प्रकरणात् ॥ ५ ॥

'अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं तथारसं नित्यमगन्धवच्च यत् ।
अनाद्यनन्तं महतः परं ध्रुवं निचाय्य तन्मृत्युमुखात्प्रमुच्यते ॥' (का. ३।१५)

'Viṣṇu (is) manifest; likewise the unmanifest (is) the Puruṣa and Time alone.' (V. P. 1·2·18)

And also—

'Prakṛti, which has been mentioned by me as having a manifest and an unmanifest form, and the Puruṣa also—both these get dissolved into the Paramātman. And the Paramātman, the support of all, the Puruṣottama,—he, called Viṣṇu, is glorified in the Vedas and in the Vedāntas also. (V. P. 6·4·38–39)

॥ 3 ॥

[213] And on account of the non-mention of that as fit to be known. ॥ 4 ॥

If here, the Unmanifest established in the (Kāpila) system was intended, then its being fit to be known would have been mentioned; because the followers of the (Kāpila) system speaking of salvation from the special knowledge of the manifest and the unmanifest, have admitted all these as fit to be known, but this has not been spoken of as being fit to be known. Therefore, there can be no acceptance of something established in that system in this connection. ॥ 4 ॥

[214] If it is argued that (the Śruti) says so, (we reply)— No, for, the Prājña on account of the context (is so described). ॥ 5 ॥

'Without sound, without touch, without form, without decrease; likewise without juice, and always without smell, beginningless, endless, the farthest limit of Mahat, eternal — having poundered over that, he is freed from the mouth of Death.' (Kā. 3·15)

इति, अव्यक्तस्य ज्ञेयत्वमनन्तरमेव वदतीयं श्रुतिरिति चेत्—तन्न । प्राज्ञः परमपुरुष प ह्यत्र श्लोके निचाय्यत्वेन प्रतिपाद्यते ।

'विज्ञानसारथिर्यस्तु मनः प्रग्रहवान्नरः ।
सोऽध्वनः पारमाप्नोति तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम् ॥' (का ३।९)
'एष सर्वेषु भूतेषु गूढोत्मा न प्रकाशते ।
दृश्यते त्वग्र्यया बुद्ध्या सूक्ष्मया सूक्ष्मदर्शिभिः ॥' (का ३।१२)

इति प्राज्ञस्यैव प्रकृतत्वात् । अत एव

'पुरुषान्न परं किंचित्' (का ३।११)

इति न पञ्चविंशकपुरुषातिरिक्ततत्त्वनिषेधः । तस्य च परमपुरुषस्याशब्दत्वादयो धर्मा

'यत्तदद्रेश्यमग्राह्यम्' (मु १।१।५)

इत्यादिश्रुतिप्रसिद्धाः ।

'महतः परं ध्रुवम्' (का ३।१५)

इत्यपि

'बुद्धेरात्मा महान्परः' (का ३।१०)

इति पूर्वप्रकृताज्जीवात्मनः परत्वमेवोच्यते ॥ ५ ॥

—If it is argued that (in this passage), this Sruti speaks of the Avyakta immediately after as being fit to be known,—(we say)—that (is) not (so), for, the Prajña the highest Purusa himself, is here in the verse spoken of as fit to be pondered For, in (the following passages)

'But, that person, who has Vijñāna as the charioteer, holding the mind-reins, reaches the end of the journey—that (is) the highest place of Visnu (Ka 3 9)

'This one, the hidden Ātman, does not shine forth in all the beings but he is seen with the subtle sharp Understanding by the subtle perceivers (Ka 3 12)

—the Prājña alone is the matter in hand And for this reason, by (the passage)

'There is nothing farther off than the Purusa' (Ka 3 11)

there is no repudiation of some principle over and above the twenty-fifth the Purusa And of that highest Purusa the qualities like being without sound etc, are well-known in the Sruti passages like—

'What that unperceivable not capable of being grasped' (Mu 1 1 5)

In (the passage) also

'Farther off than (superior to) Mahat, the eternal (Ka 3 15)

is the same spoken of as being, verily, farther off than the Jivātman under reference before in

'The Ātman-Mahat farther off than Buddhi' (Ka 3 10)

॥ 5 ॥

[215] त्रयाणामेव चैवमुपन्यासः प्रश्नश्च ॥ ६ ॥

अस्मिन्प्रकरणे हि, उपायोपेयोपेतॄणां त्रयाणामेव चैवमुपन्यासो ज्ञेयत्वेनोपन्यासस्तद्विषयश्च प्रश्नो दृश्यते, नान्यस्याव्यक्तादेः। तथाहि — नचिकेता नाम मुमुक्षुः सन्मृत्युप्रदत्ते वरत्रये, प्रथमेन वरेणात्मनः पुरुषार्थयोग्यतापादनीम्, आत्मनि पितुः सुमनस्कतां प्रतिलभ्य, द्वितीयेन वरेण मोक्षसाधनभूतां नचिकेता अग्निविद्यां वव्रे

'स त्वमग्निं स्वर्ग्यमध्येषि मृत्यो प्रब्रूहि त श्रद्दधानाय मह्यम्।
स्वर्गलोका अमृतत्वं भजन्त एतद्द्वितीयेन वृणे वरेण ॥' (का १।१३)

इति। स्वर्गशब्देनात्र परमपुरुषार्थलक्षणमोक्षोऽभिधीयते। अमृतत्वं भजन्ते, इति तत्रस्थस्य जननमरणाभावश्रवणात्, उत्तरत्र क्षयिफलकर्मनिन्दादर्शनाच्च।

'त्रिणाचिकेतस्त्रिभिरेत्य संधिं त्रिकर्मकृत्तरति जन्ममृत्यू।' (का. १।१७)

इति च प्रतिवचनात्। तृतीयेन वरेण मोक्षस्वरूपप्रश्नद्वारेण, उपेयस्वरूपम्, उपेतृस्वरूपम्, उपायभूतानुष्ठितकर्मानुगृहीतोपासनस्वरूपं च पृष्टम्।

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[215] Thus of only three (boons) (there is) the reference and the question ‖ 6 ‖

In this chapter, indeed, there is seen thus the introduction—introduction as being fit to be known of the three,—the means, the object to be reached and the person reaching it, and the question referring to that topic, and not of anything else, Avykta and others To explain the same—Naciketas, indeed, (or by name) being desirous of securing salvation, having ensured his father's favourable turn of mind conferring upon him fitness for securing human purpose in life by the first boon out of the three offered by Death—Naciketas chose *Agni-vidyā* which was the means for securing salvation, by the second boon, in (the passage)

> *'You, thus (sah) study the fire leading to heaven, (O) Death, tell that to me having faith (in you) People having the heaven-world resort to immortality—this I choose by the second boon.'* (Ka. 1·13)

By the word Svarga is denoted here salvation of the nature of the highest purpose in life On account of the Śruti statement about the absence of birth and death, in one staying therein—They resort to immortality—and on account of the mention of blame for the Karman with perishable fruit later on, and on account of the statement in reply—

> *'He who worships the three-fold Nāciketa (-fire), having united the three together, performing the three rites, crosses over birth and death'* (Kā 1·17)

By the third boon, by way of asking about the nature of salvation, is asked the nature of the object to be reached, the nature of the person reaching it, and the nature of worship favoured by the religious rites performed, that are the means—In the passage

'येयं प्रेते विचिकित्सा मनुष्येऽस्तीत्येके नायमस्तीति चैके ।
एतद्विद्यामनुशिष्टस्त्वयाहं वराणामेष वरस्तृतीयः ॥' (का १।२०)

इत्येवं मोक्षे पृष्टे, तदुपदेशयोग्यतां परीक्ष्योपदिदेश—

'तं दुर्दर्शं गूढमनुप्रविष्टं
गुहाहितं गह्वरेष्ठं पुराणम् ।
अध्यात्मयोगाधिगमेन देवं
मत्वा धीरो हर्षशोकौ जहाति ॥' (का २।१२)

इति । तदेवं सामान्येनोपदिष्टे, नचिकेताः प्रीतः सन्, देवं मत्वा, इत्युपास्यतया निर्दिष्टस्य प्राप्यभूतस्य देवस्य, अध्यात्मयोगाधिगमेन इति, वेदितव्यतया निर्दिष्टस्य प्राप्तुः प्रत्यगात्मनश्च, मत्वा धीरो हर्षशोकौ जहाति, इति निर्दिष्टस्य ब्रह्मोपासनस्य च स्वरूपविशोधनाय पुनः पप्रच्छ —

'अन्यत्र धर्मादन्यत्राधर्मादन्यत्रास्मात्कृताकृतात् ।
अन्यत्र भूताच्च भव्याच्च यत्तत्पश्यसि तद्वद ॥' (का २।१४)

इति । एवं सकलेतरातीतानागतवर्तमानसाध्यसाधनसाधकविलक्षणे त्रये क्रमेण पृष्टे, प्रथमं

'What this doubt (is), when a person has departed this world, — some (say) — This one is, and some (say)—This one is not, may I know this, favoured (or instructed) by you — this (is) the third boon amongst the boons'. (Ka 1·20) ;

a question about salvation being asked, thus — having scrutinised the fitness for (receiving) instruction about it, he (Death) instructed (as mentioned in the passage) —

'The wise person abandons (joy and sorrow), having known him difficult to be seen, concealed, entering subsequently, placed in the cave, staying in the cavern, the ancient one, the Refulgent one, by having recourse to the Yoga meditation of the Ātman within.' (Ka 2 12)

Thus this instruction in general being given Naciketas being pleased, for the purpose of the clarification of the nature of the God pointed out as being the object to be reached, pointed out in *Devam matvā* as being fit to be known — by the Yoga-meditation of the Atman within —, (the nature) of the inmost Atman, that reaches, and that of the worship of Brahman mentioned in—Having known, the wise one abandons joy and sorrow —asked again—

'Elsewhere other than merit, elsewhere other than demerit, elsewhere other than this done and this undone, elsewhere other than the past and the future, what that you see, speak that out' (Ka 2 14)

—Thus when three things quite apart from the thing to be reached, the means, and the person reaching it,—past, present and future being different from everything else, have been asked in order,—having first praised the Om, having once again in a general manner described the nature of the thing to

प्रणवं प्रशस्य, तद्वाच्यं प्राप्यस्वरूपं तदन्तर्गत च प्राप्तृस्वरूपं वाचकस्वरूपं च, उपायं पुनरपि सामान्येन ख्यापयन्प्रणवं तावदुपदिदेश—

'सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति
तपांसि सर्वाणि च यद्वदन्ति ।
यदिच्छन्तो ब्रह्मचर्यं चरन्ति
तत्ते पदं संग्रहेण ब्रवीम्योमित्येतत् ॥' (का २।१५)

इति । एवमुपदिश्य पुनरपि प्रणवं प्रशस्य, प्रथमं तावत्प्राप्तुः प्रत्यगात्मनः स्वरूपमाह

'न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चित्' (का २।१८)

इत्यादिना । प्राप्यस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणो विष्णोः स्वरूपम्,

'अणोरणीयान्' (का २।२०)

इत्यादिना

'क इत्था वेद यत्र सः' (का २।२४)

इत्यन्तेनोपदिशन्मध्ये

'नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो
न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन ।' (का २।२२)

इत्यादिना, उपायभूतस्योपासनस्य भक्तिरूपतामप्याह ।

'ऋतं पिबन्तौ' (का ३।१)

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be reached expressed by that (*Om*) and the nature of the person reaching it, implied in it, (and) the means expressive of the same (*Om*) (Death) instructed (Naciketas), for the matter of that about Om, in

'What place all Vedas declare, and which all the austerities speak about, wishing for which they practise celibacy—that place (word) I tell you in short viz Om' (Kā 2 15)

Having instructed thus, having once again glorified Om, (Death) first of all describes the nature of the inmost Ātman who reaches it, in (the passage)

'The wise one is not born does not die either' (Ka 2 18)

etc, intructing in (the passage) beginning with

'More atomic than the atom' (Ka 2 20)

and ending with

'Who knows thus, where he' (Ka 2 24)

the nature of Visnu, the Highest Brahman, to be reached, (Death) describes in the middle the means the worship as having the nature of devotion also, in (the passage)

'This Ātman is not to be secured by lectures, nor by intelligence, nor by vast learning' (Ka 2 22)

etc.—and having mentioned the nature of easy worship of the one to be worshipped on account of that staying with the worshipper, in

'(The two) drinking the Rta' (Ka 3 1)

इति च, उपास्यस्योपासकेन सहावस्थानात्सूपास्यतामुक्त्वा

'आत्मान रथिनं विद्धि' (का ३।३)

इत्यादिना

'दुर्गं पथस्तत्कवयो वदन्ति' (का ३।१४)

इत्यन्तेन, उपासनप्रकारमुपासीनस्य च वैष्णवपरमपदप्राप्तिमभिधाय,

'अशब्दमस्पर्शम्' (का ३।१५)

इत्यादिनोपसंहृतम्। अतः, त्रयाणामेवात्र ज्ञेयत्वेनोपन्यासः प्रश्नश्च। तस्मात्, नेह तान्त्रिकस्याव्यक्तस्य ग्रहणम् ॥ ६ ॥

महद्वच्च ॥ ७ ॥

यथा

'बुद्धेरात्मा महान्परः' (का ३।१०)

इत्यत्र, आत्मशब्देन सामानाधिकरण्यान्न तन्त्रसिद्धं महत्तत्त्वं गृह्यते, एवमव्यक्तमप्यात्मनः परत्वेनाभिधानात्, न कापिलतन्त्रसिद्धं गृह्यते, इति स्थितम् ॥ ७ ॥

आनुमानिकाधिकरण समाप्तम् (१)

[216] चमसवदविशेषात् ॥ ८ ॥ (अधिकरण २, सूत्राणि ८–१०)

—having described the mode of worship and the attainment by one worshipping, of the highest place of Visnu, in (the passage) beginning with

'Know the Ātman to be the warrior in the chariot' (Kā 3 3)

and ending with—

'The wise say that the path is difficult to traverse' (Kā 3 14)

—(by Death the whole topic) has been winded up, thus by (the passage)

'Without sound, without touch' (Ka 3 15)

etc Therefore, here is the introduction of three things only, as fit to be known, and of the (relevant) question as well Therefore, there is no reference here to the Avyakta (mentioned) in the (Kāpila) system ॥ 6 ॥

And like Mahat ॥ 7 ॥

Just as here in (the passage)—

'The Mahat-Ātman (is) farther off than Understanding' (Ka 3 10)

the Mahat principle established in the (Kāpila) system is not to be understood on account of the case-co-ordination with the word Ātman, in the same manner on account of Avyakta also being mentioned as farther off than (superior to) Atman, it cannot be understood as the one established in the Kāpila system (of philosophy)—This is established. ॥ 7 ॥

Here ends the Ānumānikādhikarana (1)

[216] On account of there being no peculiarity as in the case of the Camasa (cup for drinking Soma) ॥ 8 ॥

(Adhikarana, 2, Sūtras 8–10)

अत्रापि कापिलतन्त्रसिद्धप्रक्रिया निरस्यते—नाब्रह्मात्मकानां प्रकृतिमहदहंकारादीनां स्वरूपम्, श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यां ब्रह्मात्मकानां तेषां प्रतिपादनात् । यथा, आथर्वणिका अधीयते—

'विकारजननीमज्ञामष्टरूपामजां ध्रुवाम् ॥
ध्यायतेऽध्यासिता तेन तन्यते प्रेर्यते पुनः ।
सूयते पुरुषार्थं च तेनैवाधिष्ठिता जगद् ॥
गौरनाद्यन्तवती सा जनित्री भूतभाविनी ।
सितासिता च रक्ता च सर्वकामदुघा विभोः ॥
पिबन्त्येनामविषमामविज्ञाताः कुमारकाः ।
एकस्तु पिबते देवः स्वच्छन्दोऽत्र वशानुगाम् ॥
ध्यानक्रियाभ्यां भगवान्भुङ्क्तेऽसौ प्रसभं विभुः ।
सर्वसाधारणीं दोग्ध्रीं पीड्यमाना तु यज्वभिः ॥' (चूलि. ३–७)
'चतुर्विंशतिसंख्याकमव्यक्तं व्यक्तमुच्यते ॥' (चूलि. १४)

इत्यत्र प्रकृत्यादीनां स्वरूपमभिहितम् । यदात्मकाश्चैते प्रकृत्यादयः, स परमपुरुषोऽपि

'तं षड्विंशकमित्याहुः सप्तविंशमथापरे ।
पुरुषं निर्गुणं सांख्यमथर्वशिरसो विदुः ॥' (चूलि. १३–१४)

Here also is being refuted the technical exposition established in the Kāpila system, there is not the nature of Prakrti, Mahat, Ahamkāra etc. as not having Brahman as their Atman; because by both the Sruti and Smrti those are described as having Brahman as their Ātman. As the students of the Atharvaveda read—

'—the mother of (all) modifications, ignorant, eight-formed, unborn (sheep), (and) permanent.

She, supervised over by him is meditated upon, is spread out, is further incited, and supervised by him alone, she gives birth to the world and the human purpose in life—

The cow without beginning and end (is) she, the originator, the creator of creatures, white and black, and red, yielding all the desires of the Lord.

Children, unknowingly, drink (milk of) her, who is uniform, but one God drinks of her being under his control, at will, here.

The all-pervading Lord forcibly enjoys by meditation and action, the cow (giving milk) common to all, but being harassed by the sacrificers.' (Cūli 3–7)

'The unmanifest when become twenty-four in number, is spoken of as manifest.' (Cūli. 14)

—here the nature of Prakrti etc. has been described. One constituted of whom are these Prakrti etc.,—that highest Purusa also is described in

'Him they speak of as the twenty-sixth, and others as the twenty-seventh; the students of the Atharvaśiras (-Veda) know him as the Purusa void of qualities, mentioned in the Sāmkhya system.' (Cūli. 13-14)

इति प्रतिपाद्यते। अपरे च, आथर्वणिका अष्टौ प्रकृतयः षोडश विकारा इत्यधीयते श्वेताश्वतराश्च, एवं प्रकृतिपुरुषेश्वरस्वरूपमामनन्ति—

> 'संयुक्तमेतत्क्षरमक्षरं च व्यक्ताव्यक्तं भरते विश्वमीशः ।
> अनीशश्चात्मा बध्यते भोक्तृभावाज्ज्ञात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपाशैः ॥
> ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावजावीशानीशावजा ह्येका भोक्तृभोगार्थयुक्ता ।
> अनन्तश्चात्मा विश्वरूपो ह्यकर्ता त्रयं यदा विन्दते ब्रह्म चैतत् ॥
> क्षरं प्रधानममृताक्षरं हरः क्षरात्मानावीशते देव एकः ।
> तस्याभिध्यानाद्योजनात्तत्त्वभावाद्भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः ॥
> (श्वे १।८-१०)

इति। तथा

> 'छन्दांसि यज्ञाः क्रतवो व्रतानि भूतं भव्यं यच्च वेदा वदन्ति ।
> अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत्तस्मिंश्चान्यो मायया संनिरुद्धः ॥
> मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ।
> तस्यावयवभूतैस्तु व्याप्तं सर्वमिदं जगत् ॥' (श्वे ४।९-१०)

इति। तथा, उत्तरत्रापि

Other students of the Atharva-Veda read —eight Prakrtis and sixteen-fold modifications The followers of *Svetāśvatara* again speak of the nature of Prakrti, Purusa and Iśvara thus—

> *'The Ruler nourishes the universe — this perishable and imperishable combined manifest and unmanifest as well the helpless Ātman is but bound down owing to his being the enjoyer, having known (this) God he is released from all nooses*
>
> *(There are) two goats — the knower and the non-knower controller and non-controller — but one sheep earmarked for the purpose of enjoyment by the enjoyer the infinite Ātman however, of universal form indeed (is) the non-doer — when one knows the three—that is this Brahman*
>
> *The Pradhana (is) perishable,—immortal imperishable (is) Hara the one God rules over the two perishable Ātmans (there is) again at the end the cessation of the universal illusion owing to the contemplation of him on account of his directive through his power'* (Śve 1 8-10)

Likewise,

> *'Vedic passages rituals, sacrifices vows, the past and the future, which the Vedas speak of from this he possessed of wonderful power creates this universe and there the other one is hemmed in (well restrained) by the Māyā*
>
> *One should but know the Māyā to be the Prakrti, the one possessed of Māyā to be the Great Lord this whole world is pervaded by what are his portions'* (Śve 4 9-10)

Likewise later also —

'प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः संसारमोक्षस्थितिबन्धहेतुः ।' (श्वे ६।१६)

इति । स्मृतिरपि

'प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव विद्ध्यनादी उभावपि ।
विकारांश्च गुणांश्चैव विद्धि प्रकृतिसंभवान् ॥
कार्यकारणकर्तृत्वे हेतुः प्रकृतिरुच्यते ।
पुरुषः सुखदुःखानां भोक्तृत्वे हेतुरुच्यते ॥
पुरुषो प्रकृतिस्थो हि भुङ्क्ते प्रकृतिजान्गुणान् ।
कारणं गुणसङ्गोऽस्य सदसद्योनिजन्मसु ॥' (गीता १३।१९–२१)

'सत्त्वं रजस्तम इति गुणाः प्रकृतिसंभवाः ।
निबध्नन्ति महाबाहो देहे देहिनमव्ययम् ॥' (गीता १४।५)

तथा

'सर्वभूतानि कौन्तेय प्रकृतिं यान्ति मामिकाम् ।
कल्पक्षये पुनस्तानि कल्पादौ विसृजाम्यहम् ॥
प्रकृतिं स्वामवष्टभ्य विसृजामि पुनः पुनः ।
भूतग्राममिमं कृत्स्नमवशं प्रकृतेर्वशात् ॥' (गीता ९।७–८)

'*The Lord of Pradhāna, (and) the Individual Soul (the Kṣetra-knower), the Controller of qualities (is) the cause of release, sustenance and bondage in respect of the Saṃsāra*' (Śve 6 16)

The Smṛti also —

'*Know Prakṛti and also the Puruṣa — both of them as beginningless and know the modifications and qualities also as originating from Prakṛti*

Prakṛti is called the means in being the agent of cause and effect the Puruṣa is spoken of as the means in being the enjoyer of happiness and misery

Puruṣa abiding in Prakṛti, indeed enjoys the qualities arising out of Prakṛti attachment to the qualities of this one is the cause of the birth in the good and bad wombs'

(Gita 13 19–21)

'*Goodness, energy, darkness — (these) qualities arising out of Prakṛti bind down (O) long-armed one this immutable embodied one in the body*' (Gītā 14 5)

Likewise—

'*All creatures, (O) son of Kunti go to my material Nature (Prakṛti) at the end of the Kalpa those again I create (or, send forth) at the beginning of the Kalpa*

Having held fast to my own Prakṛti, I send forth again and again this entire aggregate of creatures helpless owing to the control of Prakṛti' (Gita 9 7–8)

'मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सूयते सचराचरम् ।
हेतुनानेन कौन्तेय जगद्विपरिवर्तते ॥' (गीता ९-१०)

ति । तस्मात्, अब्रह्मात्मकत्वेन कापिलतन्त्रसिद्धाः प्रकृत्यादयो निरस्यन्ते । श्वेताश्वतरोप-
ोपदि श्रूयते —

'अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः ।
अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥' (श्वे. ४।५)

ति । तत्र संदेहः—किमस्मिन्मन्त्रे केवला तन्त्रसिद्धा प्रकृतिरभिधीयते, उत ब्रह्मात्मिका? ति । किं युक्तम्? केवलेति । कुतः? अजामेकाम्, इत्यस्याः प्रकृतेरकार्यत्वश्रवणात्, ह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः, इति स्वातन्त्र्येण सरूपाणां बह्वीनां प्रजानां स्रष्टृत्व-वणाच्च । इत्येवं प्राप्ते, अभिधीयते —

'चमसवदविशेषात्' इति । नात्र तन्त्रसिद्धा प्रकृतिरभिधीयते । कुतः? न जायते, ति, अजा, इत्यजात्वमात्रप्रतिपादनात्, तन्त्रसिद्धाब्रह्मात्मकाजाग्रहणे विशेषाप्रतीतेः । मसवत् । यथा

'अर्वाग्बिलश्चमस ऊर्ध्वबुध्नः' (बृ २।२।३)

'With me as the presiding agent, the Prakrti gives birth to (everything) along with the movable and the immovable; by this means, (O) son of Kunti, the world revolves on.' (Gitā 9·10)

-Therefore, Prakrti etc. established in the Kāpila system are repudiated, as iese have not Brahman as their Ātman. In the *Śvetāśvatara–Upanisad*, it is clared by the *Śruti*—

'The one unborn female—red, white and black, producing many a progeny of similar form,—the one unborn male indeed, taking to her, sleeps with her; another unborn abandons this one who has enjoyed objects of enjoyment.' (Śve. 4·5)

There (arises) the doubt—Is in this *Mantra* described just the rakrti established in the (Kāpila) system, or the one having Brahman as the tman?—What (is) proper? Only (the Kāpila) Prakrti. Whence? On count of the mention in the Sruti of this Prakrti as not being a product, by he expression) Ajam ekām, and on account of the mention in the uti of the creation of many a similar progeny independently by (the pression) Bahvih Prajāh Srjamānām Sarūpāh (producing many a progeny of milar form).—This (prima-facie view) being reached, it is said (in reply)—

'On account of there being no peculiarity as in the case of the Camasa'—ot here is mentioned the Prakrti established in the (Kāpila) system. /hence? On account of the propounding of merely something being iborn, by the expression Ajā—one who is not born,—because in understand-g that Ajā (the unborn) established in the (Kāpila) system, as not having ahman as its Ātman, there would be no apprehension of any peculiarity out it, as in the case of the Camasa—As

'The cup with the top (hole) downwards, with the base upwards' (Br. 2·2·3)

इत्यस्मिन्मन्त्रे चमसस्य भक्षणसाधनत्वमात्रं चमसशब्देन प्रतीयते, इति न तावन्मात्रेण चमसविशेषप्रतीतिः, यौगिकशब्दानामर्थप्रकरणादिभिर्विनार्थविशेषनिश्चयायोगात् । तत्र च यथा

'इद तच्छिर एष ह्यर्वाग्बिलश्चमस ऊर्ध्वबुध्न' (बृ २।२।३)

इत्यादिना वाक्यशेषेण शिरसश्चमसत्वनिश्चय, तथात्रापि, अर्थप्रकरणादिभिरेवाजा निर्णेतव्या । न चात्र तन्त्रसिद्धाजाग्रहणहेतवोऽर्थप्रकरणादयो दृश्यन्ते । न चास्या विशेषग्रहे स्वातन्त्र्येण स्रष्टृत्वं प्रतीयते, बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां, इति स्रष्टृत्वमात्रप्रतीतेः। अतोऽनेन मन्त्रेण नाब्रह्मात्मिकाजाभिधीयते ॥ ८ ॥

[217] ब्रह्मात्मकाजाग्रहण एव विशेषहेतुरस्ति, इत्याह—

ज्योतिरुपक्रमा तु तथा ह्यधीयत एके ॥ ९ ॥

तुशब्दोऽवधारणार्थः । ज्योतिरुपक्रमैवेयाजा । ज्योति — ब्रह्म ।

'त देवा ज्योतिषा ज्योति' (बृ ४।४।१६)

'अथ यदत परो दिवो ज्योतिर्दीप्यते' (छा ३।१३।७)

इत्यादिश्रुतिप्रसिद्धेः । ज्योतिरुपक्रमा — ब्रह्मकारणिका — इत्यर्थः । तथा ह्यधीयत

—in this *Mantra*, is apprehended Camasa as merely an instrument for eating, by the word Camasa but there is no apprehension of a particular type of Camasa merely by that (reference), because words that are to be explained etymologically cannot be ascertained to have any particular meaning without knowing) the purpose and the context etc (thereof) And there just as

'*This his head indeed, is the Camas with the hole downwards, the base upwards*' (Br 2 2 3)

etc—by this remaining part of the passage, there is the ascertainment of the head as being the Camasa, so, here also by (looking to) the purpose, context etc themselves, the Ajā is to be finally decided upon And further here, the purpose, context etc—the reasons for understanding Aja established in the (Kapila) system—are not to be seen and further by understanding any peculiarity about this (Ajā) is not apprehended the nature of being the creator independently, on account of the apprehension of merely being the creator in (the passage) Bahvih prajāh srjamānam Therefore by this *Mantra* there is not denoted the Aja which has not Brahman for its Atman ‖ 8 ‖

[217] There is a special reason to understand only Aja as having Brahman for its Atman—so says (the Sūtrakāra)—

Beginning with Jyotis however for some read like that ‖ 9 ‖

The word Tu here is for the purpose of emphasis This Ajā does begin with Jyotis, Jyotis—Brahman on account of this being well-known in the Sruti (passages) like—

'*Him, the gods—the Light of Lights* (Br 4 4 16)

'*Now, what the Light beyond this, the sky, shines forth*' (Cha 3 13 7)

Jyotirupakramā—having Brahman as the cause—This is the sense, Tathā hi adhīyate eke — Hi is used in the sense of cause,—inasmuch as some students of

एके — हिंहतौ । यस्मात्, अस्या अजाया ब्रह्मकारणकत्वमेके शाखिनस्तैत्तिरीया अधीयते ।

'अणोरणीयान्महतो महीयानात्मा गुहायां निहितोऽस्य जन्तोः ।'

(ना. १२)

इति । निहितं गुहायामिति, हृदयगुहायामुपास्यत्वेन संनिहितं ब्रह्माभिधाय,

'सप्त प्राणाः प्रभवन्ति तस्मात्सप्तार्चिषः' (ना १२)

इत्यादिना सर्वेषां लोकानां ब्रह्मादीनां च तत उत्पत्तिमभिधाय, सर्वकारणीभूताजा तत उत्पन्नाभिधीयते

'अजामेका लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां
बह्वीं प्रजां जनयन्तीं सरूपाम् ।
अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते
जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥' (ना. १२।१)

इति । सर्वस्य तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य वस्तुजातस्य तत उत्पत्त्या, तदात्मकत्वोपदेशे क्रियमाणेऽभिधीयमानत्वात्, प्राणसमुद्रपर्वतादिवदेषाप्यजा बह्वीनां सरूपाणां प्रजानां स्रष्ट्री कर्मवश्येनात्मना भुज्यमाना, अन्येन विदुषात्मना त्यज्यमाना, ब्रह्मण उत्पन्ना ब्रह्मात्मिकावगन्तव्या, इत्यर्थः । अतः, वाक्यशेषाद्यमसाविशेषवच्छाखान्तरीयादेतत्सरूपात्प्रत्य-

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the Taittirīya recension read — this Ajā as having Brahman as its cause —

'More atomic than the atom, greater (bigger) than the great, the Ātman of this one born is placed in the cave'.

(Nā. 12)

Having mentioned the Brahman placed in the heart-cave as the object fit for worship in Nihitam guhāyām; having mentioned in (the passage)

'Seven Prāṇas arise from him, seven flames' (Nā. 12)

etc, the origination of all the worlds, of Brahmadeva and others from that; it is mentioned that the Ajā who is the cause of all, is born of that, in

'The one unborn female, red, white and black, producing many a progeny of similar form, — the one unborn male indeed, taking to her, sleeps with her; another unborn abandons this one who has enjoyed objects of enjoyment' (Nā. 12·1)

On account of the Ajā being mentioned with the instruction about eveything having that as its Atman being given, owing to the entire aggregate of entities other than that being originated from that; like Prāṇa, ocean and mountains, this Ajā also, the creator of various kinds of creatures of similar form, being enjoyed by the Atman subject to Karman; abandoned by another wise (-er) Atman, — is born of Brahman, that is to say, is to be understood as having Brahman as its Atman. *Therefore, this Ajā is ascertained* as having Brahman as its Atman, being confined (to this meaning), from the passage with its meaning being recognised from the remaining part of the sentence, belonging to another recension (and) bearing on the same

भिद्यमानार्थाद्वाक्यान्नियमिताजा ब्रह्मात्मिका, इति निश्चीयते। इहापि प्रकरणोपक्रमे

'किं कारणं ब्रह्म' (श्वे. १।१)

इत्यारभ्य

'ते ध्यानयोगानुगता अपश्यन्देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्निगूढाम्।' (श्वे. १।३)

इति परब्रह्मशक्तिरूपाया अजाया अवगतेः। उपरिष्टाच्च

'अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत्
तस्मिंश्चान्यो मायया संनिरुद्धः।
मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम्।' (श्वे. ४।९।१०)
'यो योनिं योनिमधितिष्ठत्येकः' (श्वे. ४।११)

इति च तस्या एव प्रतीतेः, नास्मिन्मन्त्रे तन्त्रसिद्धस्वतन्त्रप्रकृतिप्रतिपत्तिगन्धः ॥ ९ ॥

[218] कथं तर्हि ज्योतिरुपक्रमाया लोहितशुक्लकृष्णरूपाया अस्याः प्रकृतेरजात्वम्, अजाया वा कथं ज्योतिरुपक्रमात्वम्? इत्यत आह—

कल्पनोपदेशाच्च मध्वादिवदविरोधः ॥ १० ॥

प्रसक्ताशङ्कानिवृत्त्यर्थः, चशब्दः। अस्याः प्रकृतेरजात्वं ज्योतिरुपक्रमात्वं च

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subject like the particular Camasa. Here also, in the introduction to the chapter, beginning with

'What cause, Brahman' (Śve. 1·1)

there is the apprehension of Ajā being the power-form of the Highest Brahman, in (the passage)

'They endowed with the contemplation-yoga, saw the God's own power quite concealed by his own qualities' (Śve. 1·3)

And later also in (the passage)

'From this one, he, possessed of wonderful power, creates this universe; and there, the other one is hemmed in (well-restrained) by Māyā; one should but know the Māyā to be the Prakṛti, the one possessed of Māyā to be the great Lord'. (Śve. 4·9–10)

and also in

'Who alone abides in every womb' (Śve. 4·11)

there is the apprehension of that same (*Ajā*), so, there is not even the trace of the apprehension of any independent Prakṛti, established in the (Kāpila) system, in this *Mantra*. ॥ 9 ॥

[218] How could then there be the nature of Ajā, of this Prakṛti which begins with Jyotis, (and) which is red, white, and black in colour,—or, how could Ajā have Jyotis as the beginning?—To this, says (the Sūtrakāra in reply)—

And on account of the instruction about the creation, there is non-contradiction, as in the case of Madhu etc ॥ 10 ॥

The word Ca (is used) to remove the doubt that has arisen. In the case of this Prakṛti, being Ajā and beginning with Jyotis is not contradicted.

न विरुध्यते । कुतः ? 'कल्पनोपदेशात्' । कल्पनम् — क्लृप्तिः, सृष्टिः । जगत्सृष्ट्युपदेशादित्यर्थः, यथा

'सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत्' (म. ना. ५।७)

इति कल्पनं सृष्टिः । अत्रापि

'अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत्' (श्वे. ४।९)

इति जगत्सृष्टिरुपदिश्यते । स्वेनाविभक्तादस्मात्सूक्ष्मावस्थात्कारणात्, मायी सर्वेश्वरः सर्वं जगत्सृजति, इत्यर्थः । अनेन कल्पनोपदेशेन, अस्याः प्रकृतेः कार्यकारणरूपेणावस्थाद्वयान्वयोऽवगम्यते । सा हि प्रलयवेलायां ब्रह्मतापन्नाविभक्तनामरूपा, अव्यक्तादिशब्दवाच्या सूक्ष्मरूपेणावतिष्ठते । सृष्टिवेलायां तु, उद्भूतसत्त्वादिगुणा विभक्तनामरूपा व्यक्तादिशब्दवाच्या तेजोबन्नरूपेण च परिणता लोहितशुक्लकृष्णाकारा च, अवतिष्ठते । अतः, कारणावस्थाजा कार्यावस्था च ज्योतिरुपक्रमा, इति न विरोधः । मध्वादिवत्—यथा, ईश्वरेणादित्यस्य कारणावस्थायामेकस्यैवावस्थितस्य, कार्यावस्थायामृग्यजुःसामाथर्वप्रतिपाद्यकर्मनिष्पाद्यरसाश्रयतया वस्वादिदेवताभोग्यत्वाय मधुत्वकल्पनम्, उदयास्तमयकल्पनं च न विरुध्यते । तदुक्तं मधुविद्यायाम्

Whence? '*On account of the instruction about the creation.*' *Kalpanam*—planning, creation,—the sense is,—on account of the instruction about the creation of the world, just as in

'*The Creator planned (created) the Sun and the moon as before.*' (Mahā Nā. 5·7)

Kalpanam (means) creation. Here also in

'*From this, the one possessed of wonderful power creates this world*' (Śve. 4·9)

the creation of the world is taught. From this cause with the subtle state not different from himself, the Māyin, the Lord of all, creates the entire world—this (is) the sense. By this instruction about creation is known the association with the two states viz. cause and effect, of this Prakṛti. That indeed, at the time of the Universal dissolution stays on in a subtle form, identified with Brahman, with the name and form not distinct, (and) denoted by the words Avyakta etc. At the time of creation, however, (that Prakṛti) stays on, with the qualities, goodness etc., produced, with distinct name and form, denoted by the words Vyakta etc, and modified with the nature of light, water and food, and having the form—red, white and black. Therefore, Ajā in *the state of cause and (Ajā) in the state of effect have Jyotis as its beginning* and so, (there results) no contradiction. Madhvādivat—just as of Aditya, who is all alone staying with the Lord in the state of the cause, the description as Madhu, in the state of effect, for being enjoyed by the deities Vasu and others, owing to his being the resort of *flavour to be produced from the* sacrificial Karman described in the Ṛgveda, Yajurveda, Sāmaveda and Atharvaveda—and the description of the rise and set are not contradicted. That same is stated in the *Madhuvidyā* (-section) beginning with

'असौ वा आदित्यो देवमधु' (छा. ३।१।१)

इत्यारभ्य

'अथ तत ऊर्ध्वमुदेत्य नैवोदेता नास्तमेतैकल एव मध्ये स्थाता'

(छा. ३।११।१)

इत्यन्तेन । एकलः— एकस्वभावः । अतोऽनेन मन्त्रेण ब्रह्मात्मिकैवाजाभिधीयते, न कापिलतन्त्रसिद्धा, इति सिद्धम् ।

[219] अन्ये तु, अस्मिन्मन्त्रे तेजोबन्नलक्षणाजैकाभिधीयत इति ब्रुवते । ते प्रष्टव्याः—किं तेजोबन्नान्येव तेजोबन्नात्मिकाजैका, उत तेजोबन्नरूपं ब्रह्मैव, किं वा तेजोबन्नकारणभूता काचित् ? इति । प्रथमे कल्पे तेजोबन्नानामनेकत्वात्, अजामेकामिति विरुध्यते । न च वाच्यं तेजोबन्नानामनेकत्वेऽपि त्रिवृत्करणेनैकतापत्तिः, इति । त्रिवृत्करणेऽपि बहुत्वानपगमात् ।

'इमास्तिस्रो देवताः' । (छा. ६।३।२)

'तासां त्रिवृतं त्रिवृतमेकैकां करवाणि' (छा. ६।३।३)

इति प्रत्येकं त्रिवृत्करणोपदेशात् । द्वितीयः कल्पो विकल्प्यः—किं तेजोबन्नरूपेण विकृतं

'*That Āditya, verily, (is) the honey of the gods*'

(Chā. 3·1·1)

and ending with—

'*Then after that, having arisen, indeed, does not rise up, does not go to set, stands in the midst, the same (unchanged)*'

(Chā. 3·11·1)

Ekalah—having the same nature, therefore, by this *Mantra* is mentioned Ajā having Brahman as its Atman, alone, and not the one established in the Kāpila system —This is established.

[219] Others, however, say that in this *Mantra*, the one Ajā constituted of light, water and food, is mentioned. They are to be asked — Is this Ajā constituted of light, water and food, the (three elements) light, water and food themselves, or is it Brahman in the form of light, water and food, or someone (different) being the cause of light, water and food?— As regards the first view, because light, water, food etc. are not one, Ajām ekām is contradictory. Neither should it be said that although light, water and food are not one, they are to (be taken) as one, owing to their being tripartite,—because being more than one does not disappear even in their being tri-partite, on account of the instruction about each one of these being made tri-partite, in (the passages)

'*These three deities*' (Chā. 6·3·2)

'*Of them, may I make each one of them tripartite, tripartite*'

(Chā. 6·3·3)

—The second view is to be split up into the (following) alternatives—Is Brahman itself modified in the form of light, water and food, the one Ajā, or

ब्रह्मैवाजैका, किं वा स्वरूपेणावस्थितमविकृतम् ? इति । प्रथमः कल्पो बहुत्वानपायादेव निरस्तः । द्वितीयेऽपि लोहितशुक्लकृष्णामिति विरुध्यते । स्वरूपेणावस्थितं ब्रह्म तेजोबन्नलक्षणमिति वक्तुमपि न शक्यते । तृतीये कल्पेऽपि, अजाशब्देन तेजोबन्नानि निर्दिश्य, तैस्तत्कारणावस्थोपस्थापनीयेत्यास्थेयम् । ततो वरमजाशब्देन तेजोबन्नकारणावस्थायाः श्रुतिप्रसिद्धाया एवाभिधानम् ।

यत्पुनः— अस्याः प्रकृतेरजाशब्देन छागत्वपरिकल्पनमुपदिश्यते, इति — तदप्यसंगतम्, निष्प्रयोजनत्वात् । यथा

'आत्मानं रथिनं विद्धि' (का. ३।३)

इत्यादिषु ब्रह्मप्राप्त्युपायताख्यापनाय, शरीरादिषु रथादिरूपणं क्रियते, यथादित्ये वस्वादीनां भोग्यत्वख्यापनाय मधुत्वकल्पनं क्रियते, तद्वत्, अस्यां प्रकृतौ छागत्वपरिकल्पनं क्वोपयुज्यते ? न केवलमुपयोगाभाव एव विरोधश्च । कृत्स्नजगत्कारणभूतायाः स्वस्मिन्ननादिकालसंबद्धानां सर्वेषामेव चेतनानां निखिलसुखदुःखोपभोगापवर्गसाधनभूताया अचेतनाया अत्यल्पप्रजासर्गकरागन्तुकसंगमचेतनविशेषैकरूपात्यल्पप्रयोजनसाधनस्वपरि-

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(Brahman) unmodified (and) remaining in its own nature? The first view is out of question, on account of being many having not, indeed, disappeared. In the second (view) also, red, white and black—is contradicted. Brahman which remains in its own nature cannot be even talked about as characterised by light, water and food. According to the third view also, this should be understood viz.—by the word Ajā after pointing out to light, water and food, —by them the Ajā being in the state of cause is to be established. Therefore, it is better that by the word Ajā, there should be the mention of the state of cause of light, water and food, well-known in the Sruti itself—

As regards the view again,—that by the word Ajā is taught that this Prakrti is fancied as a sheep,—that also does not fit in, as it serves no purpose. Just as there is the metaphorical description of the body etc. as the chariot etc. in (*passages like*)

'Know the Ātman to be the warrior in the chariot'

(*Kā. 3·3*)

for the purpose of declaring its being the means of attainment to Brahman; just as there is the superimposition of the nature of Madhu etc on Āditya, in order to declare for the Vasus etc. his being the object of enjoyment; similarly, of what use is the superimposition of a sheep upon this Prakrti? Not merely is there the absence of any practical use but (in addition) a contradiction. In the case of that (Ajā), the non-sentient one, the cause of the whole world, the instrument of enjoyment of all happiness and misery and salvation, for all the sentients without exception, that are connected with itself right up from times immemorial, it is nothing but contradictory to describe its being that (sheep) for the purpose of declaring the nature of a goat having the form of a particular sentient, capable of abandoning that connection with itself, the cause of the abandonment by itself, the means for

त्यागहेतुभूतस्वसंबन्धपरित्यागसमर्थचेतनविशेषरूपच्छागस्वभावख्यापनाय तद्रूपत्वकल्पनं विरुद्धमेव।

'अजामेकाम्'''अजो ह्येकः ''' अजोऽन्यः' (श्वे. ४।५)

इत्यत्र, अजशब्दस्य विरूपार्थपरिकल्पनं च न शोभनम्। सर्वत्र छागत्वं परिकल्प्यते, इति चेत्—

'जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः' (श्वे. ४।५)

इति विदुष आत्यन्तिकप्रकृतिपरित्यागं कुर्वतोऽनेन चान्येन वा पुनरपि संबन्धयोग्यच्छागत्वपरिकल्पनमत्यन्तविरुद्धम् ॥ १० ॥

चमसाधिकरणं समाप्तम् (२)

[220] न संख्योपसंग्रहादपि नानाभावादतिरेकाच्च ॥ ११ ॥

(अधिकरण ३, सूत्राणि ११–१३)

वाजसनेयिनः समामनन्ति —

'यस्मिन्पञ्च पञ्चजना आकाशश्च प्रतिष्ठितः।
तमेव मन्य आत्मानं विद्वान्ब्रह्मामृतोऽमृतम् ॥' (बृ. ४।४।१७)

इति। किमयं मन्त्रः कापिलतन्त्रसिद्धतत्त्वप्रतिपादनपरः, उत न? इति संदिह्यते। किं

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serving a very little purpose, giving rise to creation of very few creatures, having the form of some particular sentient, on account of occasional connection with him. In (the passage)

'One unborn female ... one unborn ... another unborn' (Śve. 4 5)

here it is not fair to take different senses of the word Aja. If it is argued that everywhere the nature of the sheep is to be understood—in

'Another unborn abandons this one who has enjoyed the enjoyments' (Śve. 4·5)

in the case of the wise one practising the most complete renunciation of the Prakrti,—it is all the more completely contradictory to superimpose the nature of the sheep fit for connection once again either with this or with another. ॥ 10 ॥

Here ends the Camasādhikarana (2)

[220] Not (the Sāṅkhya) even by the mention of the number, on account of (the Tattvas) being of a different nature and their being over and above (the prescribed number) ॥ 11 ॥

(Adhikarana 3, Sūtras 11–13)

The followers of the Vājasaneya ordain:—

'Where five Pañcajanas and the Ākāśa as well are well-established, I immortal, consider that Ātman alone, knowing the immortal Brahman.' (Br. 4·4·17)

It is doubted—Is this *Mantra* intent on propounding the principles established in the Kāpila system, or not? What (is) proper (here)? (It

युक्तम् ? तन्त्रसिद्धतत्त्वप्रतिपादनपरः, इति। कुतः ? पञ्चशब्दविशेषितात्पञ्चजनशब्दात्पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वप्रतीतेः। एतदुक्तं भवति—पञ्चजनाः, इति समासः समाहारविषयः। पञ्चजनाः—पञ्चानां जनानां समूहाः पञ्चजनाः, पञ्चपूल्य इतिवत्। पञ्चजना इति लिङ्गव्यत्ययश्छान्दसः। ते च समूहाः कतीत्यपेक्षायां पञ्चजनशब्दविशेषणेन प्रथमेन पञ्चशब्देन समूहाः पञ्चेति प्रतीयन्ते, यथा पञ्च पञ्चपूल्यः, इति। अतः, पञ्च पञ्चजनाः, इति पञ्चविंशतिपदार्थावगतौ ते कतमे, इत्यपेक्षायां मोक्षाधिकारान्मुमुक्षुभिर्ज्ञातव्यतया स्मृतिप्रसिद्धाः प्रकृत्यादय एव ज्ञायन्ते।

> *'मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त।*
> *षोडशकश्च विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥'* (सा का ३)

इति हि कापिलानां प्रसिद्धिः। अतः, तन्त्रसिद्धतत्त्वप्रतिपादनपरः, इति प्राप्ते, प्रचक्ष्महे—'न संख्योपसंग्रहादपि' इति। पञ्च पञ्चजना इति पञ्चविंशतिसंख्योपसंग्रहादपि न तन्त्रसिद्धतत्त्वप्रतीतिः। कुतः ? *नानाभावात्—एषां पञ्चसंख्याविशेषितानां पञ्चजनानां* तन्त्रसिद्धेभ्यस्तत्त्वेभ्यः पृथग्भावात्।

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is) intent on propounding the principles established in the (Kāpila) system. Whence? On account of the apprehension of twenty-five principles from the word Pañcajana particularised by the word Pañca This is what is intended to be said—Pañcajanāh—This is a compound referring to the idea of a group Pañcajanāh—*groups of five people*, Pañcajanāh, like (the word) Pañcapūlyah. The change over of the gender in Pañcajanāh (masculine for neuter) is Vedic. And, how many such groups are there?—When there is the expectancy for this, by the first word Pañca—the qualifying attribute of the word Pañcajana—are apprehended as five (in number) the groups, as for instance, in (the expression) the five five pocket (vessels) Therefore, when are apprehended twenty-five entities by Pañca Pañcajanāh,—there being the expectancy—which are those?—are known Prakrti and others themselves well-known in the Smrti as being fit to be known by those desirous of salvation, being qualified for securing salvation

> '*The original Prakrti is untransformed, (there are) seven transformations of Prakrti beginning with Mahat and the modification (is) sixteen-fold Purusa is neither Prakrti nor transformation*' (San Ka 3)

—This is what is established by the followers of Kapila Therefore (the *Mantra* is) intent upon propounding the principles established in the system (of Kapila) —This (prima-facie view) being reached, we say (in reply)—'Not even by the mention of the number' Not even by the mention of the number twenty-five in (the expression) Pañca Pañcajanāh is there the apprehension of the principles established in the (Kapila) system Whence? Nanabhāvāt—on account of these Pañcajanas, particularised by the number five, having a different nature from the principles established in the (Kāpila) system In (the passage)

'यस्मिन्पञ्च पञ्चजना आकाशश्च प्रतिष्ठितः' (बृ. ४।४।१७)

इत्येषां यच्छब्दनिर्दिष्टब्रह्माश्रतया ब्रह्मात्मकत्वं हि प्रतीयते।

'तमेव मन्य आत्मानं विद्वान्ब्रह्मामृतोऽमृतम्।' (बृ. ४।४।१७)

इत्यत्र तमिति परामर्शेन यच्छब्दनिर्दिष्टं ब्रह्म, इत्यवगम्यते। अतः, तेभ्यः पृथग्भूताः पञ्च पञ्चजना इति न तन्त्रसिद्धा एते। अतिरेकाच्च। तन्त्रसिद्धेभ्यस्तत्त्वेभ्योऽत्र तत्त्वातिरेकोऽपि भवति। यच्छब्दनिर्दिष्ट आत्माकाशश्चात्रातिरिच्येते। अतः,

'तं षड्विंशकमित्याहुः सप्तविंशमथापरे'। (चू. १४)

इति श्रुतिप्रसिद्धसर्वतत्त्वाश्रयभूतः सर्वेश्वरेश्वरः परमपुरुषोऽत्राभिधीयते।

न संख्योपसंग्रहादपि, इत्यपिशब्दस्य पञ्च पञ्चजना इत्यत्र पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वप्रतीतिरेव न संभवति, इत्यभिप्रायः। कथम्? पञ्चभिरारब्धसमूहपञ्चकाभावात्। न हि तन्त्रसिद्धतत्त्वेषु पञ्चसु पञ्चस्वनुगतं तत्तत्संख्याविवेशनिमित्तं जात्याद्यस्ति। न च वाच्यं पञ्च कर्मेन्द्रियाणि, पञ्च ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि, पञ्च महाभूतानि, पञ्च तन्मात्राणि, अवशिष्टानि

'Where five Pañcajanas and the Ākāśa are well-established' (Bṛ. 4·4·17)

is, indeed, apprehended their having Brahman as their Ātman, owing to their having as their resort Brahman, pointed out by the word Yat. In (the passage)

'I, immortal, consider that Ātman alone, knowing the immortal Brahman' (Bṛ. 4·4·17)

by the reference Tam is understood Brahman, which is pointed out by the word Yat. Therefore, these are not those established in the system, because (these) five Pañcajanas are separate from them. And on account of (their number) being over and above.—Here would be the excess also of principles over and above the principles established in the (Kāpila) system, (for) here the Ātman pointed out by the word Yat, and the Ākāśa are in excess. Therefore, is mentioned here, the highest Puruṣa, the over-Lord of all, who is the resort of all the principles (Tattvas) established in the Śrutis, as in

'They speak of him as constituted of twenty-six; while others as constituted of twenty-seven.' (Cū. 14)

By the word Api in (the expression) *Na Saṁkhyopasaṁgrahādapi*, there cannot even be the apprehension itself (for the matter of that) of the twenty-five principles, by (the expression) Pañca Pañcajanāḥ—this (is) the idea. How? On account of the absence of a group of five, the group being made up of five; for, in the case of the principles established in the system (of Kapila), there is not anything, genus etc. common to sets of five, which is the cause of incorporating the various numbers referred to. Nor should it be said that there is something common, the cause of inclusion of the additional number as the five organs of action, the five organs of knowledge, the five great elements, the five subtle elements—(and) the remaining five; because

पञ्चेत्यवान्तरसंख्यानिवेशनिमित्तमस्त्येवेति—आकाशस्य पृथङ्निर्देशेन पञ्चभिरारब्धमहाभूतसमूहासिद्धेः । अतः, पञ्चजना इत्ययं समासो न समाहारविषयः । अयं तु

'दिक्संख्ये संज्ञायाम्' (पा सू २।१।५०)

इति संज्ञाविशेषविषयः । अन्यथा पञ्चजना इति लिङ्गव्यत्ययश्च । पञ्चजना नाम केचित्सन्ति । ते च पञ्चसंख्यया विशेष्यन्ते पञ्च पञ्चजना इति, सप्त सप्तर्षय इतिवत् ॥ ११ ॥

के पुनस्ते पञ्च पञ्चजनाः, इत्यत्राह—

प्राणादयो वाक्यशेषात् ॥ १२ ॥

'प्राणस्य प्राणमुत चक्षुषश्चक्षुः श्रोत्रस्य श्रोत्रमन्नस्यान्नं मनसो ये मनो विदुः' (बृ ४।४।१८)

इति वाक्यशेषात्, ब्रह्माश्रयाः प्राणादय एव पञ्च पञ्चजना इति विज्ञायन्ते ॥ १२ ॥

[221] अथ स्यात्—काण्वानां माध्यंदिनानां च

'यस्मिन्पञ्च पञ्चजना' (बृ ४।४।१७)

इत्ययं मन्त्रः समानः । प्राणस्य प्राणमित्यादिवाक्यशेषे काण्वानामन्नस्य पाठो न विद्यते । तेषां पञ्च पञ्चजनाः प्राणादय इति न शक्यते वक्तुमिति । अत्रोत्तरम्—

ज्योतिषैकेषामसत्यन्ने ॥ १३ ॥

Ākāśa being mentioned separately, there is the non-establishment of the group of elements made up of five Therefore the compound (expression) Pañcajanāh does not refer to a group. This (compound), for the matter of that, should refer to a particular name in accordance with the Sūtra—

'The quarter and number, to signify the name' (Pā Su 2 1 50)

Otherwise, there would further be a change of gender in (the expression) Pañcajanāh There do exist some called Pañcajanāh and they are particularised by the number five as Pañca Pañcajanāh, like (the expression)—the seven Saptarsis ॥ 11 ॥

Which again are those five Pañcajanas?—referring to this (the Sutrakara) says—

Prāna and others from the concluding passage ॥ 12 ॥

'The Prāna of Prana, or the Eye of the eye, the Ear of the ear, Food of food, the Mind of mind—those who know (all this) (Br 4 4 18)

—From this concluding part of the passage, the five Pañcajanas are known to be Prāna and others themselves having Brahman as their resort ॥ 12 ॥

[221] Now it may be argued—

'In which the five Pañcajanas (Br 4 4 17)

—this *Mantra* is common to the Kanvas and the Mādhyandinas In the concluding passage—the Prāna of Prāna etc—the Kanvas do not read *Annasya* For them, it is not possible to say that five Pañcajanas are Prana and others—Here the reply (is)—

Anna not being there for some (the gap is filled) by Jyotis ॥ 13 ॥

एकेषां काण्वानां पाठेऽसत्यन्ने ज्योतिषा पञ्चजना इन्द्रियाणीति विज्ञायन्ते। तेषां वाक्यशेषः प्रदर्शनार्थः। एतदुक्तं भवति—यस्मिन्पञ्च पञ्चजना इत्यस्मात्पूर्वस्मिन्मन्त्रे

'त देवा ज्योतिषा ज्योतिरायुर्होपासतेऽमृतम् ।' (बृ. ४।४।१६)

इति ज्योतिषां ज्योतिष्ट्वेन ब्रह्मण्यभिधीयमाने, ब्रह्माधीनस्वकार्याणि कानिचिज्ज्योतींषि प्रतिपन्नानि। तानि च विषयाणां प्रकाशकानीन्द्रियाणीति यस्मिन्पञ्च पञ्चजना इत्यनिर्धारितविशेषनिर्देशेनावगम्यन्ते, इति। प्राणस्येति प्राणशब्देन स्पर्शेन्द्रियं गृह्यते, वायुसंबन्धित्वात्स्पर्शेन्द्रियस्य, मुख्यप्राणस्य ज्योतिःशब्देन प्रदर्शनायोगात्। चक्षुष इति चक्षुरिन्द्रियम्, श्रोत्रस्येति श्रोत्रेन्द्रियम्, अन्नस्येति घ्राणरसनयोस्तन्त्रेणोपादानम्। अन्नशब्दोदितपृथिवीसंबन्धित्वात् घ्राणेन्द्रियमनेन गृह्यते। अद्यते, अनेन, इत्यन्नमिति रसनेन्द्रियमपि गृह्यते। मनस इति मनः। घ्राणरसनयोस्तन्त्रेणोपादानमिति पञ्चत्वमप्यविरुद्धम्। प्रकाशकानि मनःपर्यन्तानीन्द्रियाणि पञ्चजनशब्दनिर्दिष्टानि। तदविरोधाय घ्राणरसनयोस्तन्त्रेणोपादानम्। तदेवम्

'यस्मिन्पञ्च पञ्चजना आकाशश्च प्रतिष्ठित'। (बृ ४।४।१७)

According to (the reading of) some, viz the Kānvas, with food not being (mentioned), the Pañcajanas are known to be the sense-organs, on account of (the word) Jyotis The concluding portion is here for pointing out to them This is what is intended to be said—In the *Mantra* previous to —in which five Pañcajanas—

'The gods, verily, worship him—the Light of lights, Life, immortal' (Br. 4 4·16)

where Brahman is being mentioned as being the Light of lights, some lights are admitted to have their functions dependent upon Brahman And those are known to be the sense organs, illumining the objects (of senses), because of the particular reference being unascertained in the passage—In which, five Pañcajanas —In (the expression) *Prānasya*, the sense of touch is understood by the word Prāna, on account of the sense of touch being connected with wind, because of the impossibility of the word Jyotis pointing out to the chief Prana, in *Caksusah*, the sense of sight, in *Srotrasya*, the sense of hearing in *Annasya* is the apprehension of (the senses of) smell and taste due to their special feature, on account of its connection with the earth got up from the word Anna is taken here by this, the sense of smell. Annam—that which is eaten,—(by this etymology), the sense of taste also is understood (here), in *Manasah* the mind By taking (the senses of) smell and taste due to their special feature, being five also is not contradicted The sense-organs up to the mind, illumining (the objects) are pointed out by the word Pañcajana For securing non-contradiction with that, there is the taking up of (the senses of) smell and taste due to their special feature Therefore, because thus in (the *Mantra*),

'In which five Pañcajanas and the Ākāśa are established' (Br. 4 4 17)

इति पञ्चजनशब्दनिर्दिष्टानीन्द्रियाण्याकाशशब्दप्रदर्शितानि महाभूतानि च ब्रह्मणि प्रतिष्ठितानि, इति सर्वतत्त्वानां ब्रह्माश्रयत्वप्रतिपादनात्, न तन्त्रसिद्धपञ्चविंशतितत्त्वप्रसङ्गः। अतः, सर्वत्र वेदान्ते संख्योपसंग्रहे तदभावे वा, न कापिलतन्त्रसिद्धतत्त्वप्रतीतिरस्तीति स्थितम् ॥ १३ ॥

संख्योपसंग्रहाधिकरणं समाप्तम् (३)

[222] कारणत्वेन चाकाशादिषु यथाव्यपदिष्टोक्तेः ॥ १४ ॥

(अधिकरण ४, सूत्राणि १४–१५)

पुनः प्रधानकारणवादी प्रत्यवतिष्ठते — न वेदान्तेष्वेकस्मात्सृष्टिराम्नायते, इति जगतो ब्रह्मैककारणत्वं न युज्यते वक्तुम्। तथाहि—

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्'　　(छा. ६।२।१)

इति सत्पूर्विका सृष्टिराम्नायते।

'असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्'　　(तै. २।७।१)

इत्यसत्पूर्विका च। अन्यत्र,

'असदेवेदमग्र आसीत्तत्सदासीत्तत्समभवत्'　　(छा. ३।१९।१)

इति च। अतो वेदान्तेषु स्रष्टुरव्यवस्थितेर्जगतो ब्रह्मैककारणत्वं न निश्चेतुं शक्यम्। प्रत्युत

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all the *principles being mentioned as having* Brahman *as their resort*, inasmuch as the sense-organs pointed out by the word Pañcajana, and the great elements pointed out by the word Ākāśa, are established in Brahman, there is no undesirable contingency of (admitting) the twenty-five principles established in the (Kāpila) system. Therefore, it is established that there is *no apprehension of the* principles established in the Kāpila system, whether there is reference to the number in the Vedānta passages or not. ॥ 13 ॥

Here ends the Saṁkhyopasaṁgrahādhikaraṇa (3)

[222] But on account of the statement already made as being the cause, in respect of Ākāśa etc. ॥ 14 ॥

(Adhikaraṇa 4, Sūtras 14–15)

Again, the disputant holding that the Pradhāna is the cause of the world, stands up (to argue)—In the Vedānta passages, creation is not ordained as from one (entity) and so, it is not proper to speak of Brahman being the one cause of the world. To explain the same—

'Existence alone, my dear, this was in the beginning'　　(Chā. 6·2·1)

—herein creation preceded by Sat is ordained, and

'Non-existence, verily, this was in the beginning'　　(Tai. 2·7·1)

—here preceded by Asat also; and elsewhere in

'Asat alone was there in the beginning; that became Sat, and it came into being.'　　(Chā. 3·19·1)

So, in the Vedānta passages, on account of the non-establishment of the (one) creator of the world, it is not possible to conclude that the world

प्रधानकारणत्वमेव निश्चेतुं शक्यते ।

' तद्धेदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत् '　　(बृ. १।४।७)

इत्यव्याकृते प्रधाने जगतः प्रलयमभिधाय

' तन्नामरूपाभ्यां व्याक्रियत '　　(बृ. १।४।७)

इति, अव्याकृतादेव जगतः सृष्टिश्चाभिधीयते । अव्याकृतं हि, अव्यक्तम् । नामरूपाभ्यां न व्याक्रियते, न व्यज्यते, इत्यर्थः । अव्यक्तं प्रधानमेव । अस्य च स्वरूपनित्यत्वेन परिणामाश्रयत्वेन च जगत्कारणवादिवाक्यगतौ सदसच्छब्दौ ब्रह्मणीव, अस्मिन्न विरोत्स्येते । एवमव्याकृतकारणत्वे निश्चिते सति, ईक्षणादयः कारणगताः सृष्ट्यौन्मुख्याभिप्रायेण योजयितव्याः । ब्रह्मात्मशब्दावपि बृहत्त्वव्यापित्वाभ्यां प्रधान एव वर्तेते । अतः, स्मृतिन्यायप्रसिद्धं प्रधानमेव जगत्कारणं वेदान्तवाक्यैः प्रतिपाद्यते, इति प्राप्ते, प्रचक्ष्महे— 'कारणत्वेन चाकाशादिषु यथाव्यपदिष्टोक्तेः' । चशब्दस्तुशब्दार्थे । सर्वज्ञात्सर्वेश्वरात्सत्यसंकल्पान्निरस्तनिखिलदोषगन्धात्परस्माद्ब्रह्मण एव जगदुत्पद्यत इति निश्चेतुं शक्यते । कुतः ? आकाशादिषु कारणत्वेन यथाव्यपदिष्टस्योक्तेः । सर्वज्ञत्वादिविशिष्टत्वेन

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has Brahman as its only cause; on the other hand, it is possible to conclude that the (world has) Pradhāna alone as the cause. Having mentioned in

'This then therefore, was Unmodified'　　(Br. 1·4·7)

the dissolution of the world in the unmodified Pradhāna, in (the passage)

'It became modified by name and form'　　(Br 1·4 7)

the creation also of the world from the unmodified itself is spoken of. Avyākrta—indeed the unmanifest, that is to say, it is not modified by name and form; that is, not made manifest. And Avyakta is Pradhāna itself. Owing to its nature being eternal, and owing to its being the resort of modifications, the words Sat and Asat, occurring in the passages declaring the cause of the world, would not be, as in the case of Brahman, conflicting in this (Pradhāna). Thus when an unmodified cause (for the world) is decided upon, reflection etc. belonging to the cause, must be construed (understood) as giving the idea of readiness to create. The words Brahman and Ātman also are applicable to Pradhāna itself, owing to its being vast and pervading. Therefore, the Pradhāna proved by (the testimony of) the Smrti and reasoning (logic), is propounded by the Vedānta passages as the cause of the world—This (prima-facie view) being reached, we say (in reply) — 'But on account of the statement already made as being the cause, in respect of Ākāśa etc.' The word Ca is used in the sense of the word Tu (but). It is possible to conclude that the world originates from the Highest Brahman alone, which is omniscient, the over-lord of all, which is with thoughts fulfilled, (and) from which every tinge of blemish is driven away. Whence? On account of the statement about it already made as being the cause, in respect of Akāśa etc. By the expression *Yathāvyapadista* is spoken of, Brahman, propounded in (Sūtras) like

'जन्माद्यस्य यत ' (ब्र सू १।१।२)

इत्येवमादिषु प्रतिपादितं ब्रह्म यथाव्यपदिष्टमित्युच्यते। तस्यैकस्यैवाकाशादिषु कारणत्वेनोक्तेः।

'तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाश सभूत ' (तै. २।१)
'तत्तेजोऽसृजत ' (छा. ६।२।३)

इत्यादिषु सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्मैव कारणत्वेनोच्यते। तथाहि—

'सत्य ज्ञानमनन्त ब्रह्म। सोऽश्नुते सर्वान्कामान्सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता' (तै २।१)

इति प्रकृतं विपश्चिदेव ब्रह्म तस्माद्वा एतस्मादिति परामृश्यते। तथा

'तदैक्षत बहु स्याम्' (छा ६।२।३)

इति निर्दिष्टं सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्मैव

'तत्तेजोऽसृजत' (छा. ६।२।३)

इति परामृश्यते। एवं सर्वत्र सृष्टिवाक्येषु द्रष्टव्यम्। अतः, ब्रह्मैककारणं जगदिति निश्चीयते॥ १४॥

[223] ननु

'असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्' (तै २।७।१)

'Origination etc, of this (world) from whom' (Bra Sū 1 1 2) etc. as being particularised by omniscience etc, because that one alone is stated as the cause in respect of Ākāśa and others

'*From that, verily, from this Ātman, Ākaśa was originated*' (Tai 2 1)

'*That created Tejas (Light)*' (Chā 6 2·3)

—in these (passages) and others, the omniscient Brahman alone is stated as the cause To explain the same—The Vipascit alone, Brahman, the matter in hand in

'*Existence, knowledge, infinite, Brahman He enjoys all desires, along with Brahman, the wise one*' (Tai 2 1)•

is referred to by Tasmat va etasmat Similarly the omniscient Brahman itself pointed out in

'*It reflected—may I be many*' (Cha 6 2 3)

is referred to in

'*That created Tejas (Light)*' (Cha 6 2 3)

Thus, this (line of argument) should be taken in respect of all the passages dealing with creation Therefore, *it is definitely concluded that the world* has Brahman as the one cause ॥14॥

[223] I say (says the objector)— In (the passage)

'*Non-existence, verily, this was in the beginning*' (Tai 2 7 1)

—here Asat itself is referred to as the cause, so, how possibly could it be

इत्यसदेव कारणत्वेन व्यपदिश्यते । तत्कथमिव सर्वज्ञस्य सत्यसंकल्पस्य ब्रह्मण एव कारणत्वं निश्चीयते ? इत्यत्राह—

समाकर्षात् ॥ १५ ॥

'असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्' (तै. २।७।१)

इत्यत्रापि विपश्चिदानन्दमयं सत्यसंकल्पं ब्रह्मैव समाकृष्यते । कथम् ?

'तस्माद्वा एतस्माद्विज्ञानमयात् ।
अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमयः' (तै. २।५)

'सोऽकामयत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति' (तै. २।६)

'इदं सर्वमसृजत । यदिदं किं च । तत्सृष्ट्वा । तदेवानुप्राविशत् । तदनुप्रविश्य । सच्च त्यच्चाभवत्' (तै. २।६)

इत्यादिना ब्राह्मणेन, आनन्दमयं ब्रह्म सत्यसंकल्पं सर्वस्य स्रष्टृ सर्वानुप्रवेशेन सर्वात्मभूतमभिधाय,

'तदप्येष श्लोको भवति' (तै. २।६)

इत्युक्तस्यार्थस्य सर्वस्य साक्षित्वेन ह्युदाहृतोऽयं श्लोकः

'असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्' (तै. २।७।१)

इति । तथोत्तरत्र

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concluded that the Brahman, omniscient and with thoughts fulfilled, is alone the cause? To this, (the Sūtrakāra) says (in reply)—

From the carrying forward (of the same topic) ॥ 15 ॥

In (the passage)

'Non-existence, verily, this was in the beginning' (Tai. 2·7·1)

—also here, is carried forward Brahman itself which is intelligent (wise), constituted of bliss (and) with thoughts fulfilled. How?

'From that, verily, from this one constituted of Vijñāna, another within, the Ātman abounding in bliss' (Tai. 2·5)

'He desired— Let me be many; may I produce progeny.' (Tai. 2·6)

'It created all—whatsoever is this, having created that, it entered into that same; having entered into that, it become Sat and Tyat' (Tai. 2·6)

—By these and other *Brāhmana* passages, having mentioned Brahman, abounding in (or constituted of) bliss, with thoughts fulfilled, the creator of everything, being the Atman of all, by the entering within all, in (the passage)

'There also is this verse' (Tai. 2·6)

(having spoken of it) as the witness of all the objects referred to—has been cited this verse

'Non-existence, verily, this was in the beginning.' (Tai. 2·7·1)

Similarly later on, having carried forward that same Brahman, in (the passage)

'भीषास्माद्वात पवते ' (तै २।८)

इत्यादिना तदेव ब्रह्म समाकृष्य सर्वस्य प्रशासितृत्वनिरतिशयानन्दत्वादयोऽभिधीयन्ते। अतः, अयं मन्त्रस्तद्विषय एव। तदानीं नामरूपविभागाभावेन तत्संबन्धितयास्तित्वाभावात्, ब्रह्मैव, असच्छब्देनोच्यते।

'असदेवेदमग्र आसीत्' (छा ३।१९।१)

इत्यत्रापि, अयमेव निर्वाहः।

यदुक्तम्—

'तद्धेदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत्' (बृ १।४।७)

इत्यत्र प्रधानमेव जगत्कारणत्वेनाभिधीयत इति — न, इत्युच्यते। अत्रापि, अव्याकृतशब्देनाव्याकृतशरीरं ब्रह्मैवाभिधीयते।

'स एष इह प्रविष्ट आनखाग्रेभ्यः। पश्यंश्चक्षुः शृण्वञ्छ्रोत्रं मन्वानो मनः। आत्मेत्येवोपासीत' (बृ १।४।७)

इत्यत्र, स एषः, इति तच्छब्देनाव्याकृतशब्दनिर्दिष्टस्यान्तः प्रविश्य प्रशासितृत्वेनानुकर्षात्।

'तत्सृष्ट्वा। तदेवानुप्राविशत्' (तै २।६)

Through fear from this, the wind purifies' (Tai 2 8)

and others are mentioned (the qualities) — being the ruler of all, being bliss admitting of no excess etc Therefore this *Mantra* refers to the same topic Brahman itself is mentioned by the word Asat, owing to the absence of the division into name and form at that time, there being the absence of existence as being associated with it In (the passage)

Non existence, alone, this was in the beginning (Chā 3 19 1)

—here *too, this itself is the way out*

As to what has been said that in (the passage)

'That verily this was therefore unmodified' (Br 1 4 7)

Pradhāna alone is spoken of here as being the cause of the world—it is said (in reply)—Not so Here also, by the word Avyākrta is denoted Brahman alone with the unmodified form, on account of there being a continued reference to the (Ātman) pointed out by the word Avyakrta by the word Tat (that) in Sa esah as being the ruler having entered within in

'That this one has entered here right up to the tips of the nail, seeing the eye hearing the ear, thinking the mind — (thus) one should worship him as Ātman himself' (Br 1 4 7)

and on account of modification in name and form being well-known as due to the Highest Brahman which is the creator, omniscient, entering within the effect, as in

'Having created that, he entered into that same' (Tai 2 6)

'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि' (छा ६।३।२)

इति स्पष्टः सर्वज्ञस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणः कार्यानुप्रवेशेन नामरूपव्याकरणप्रसिद्धेश्च।

'अन्तः प्रविष्टः शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मा' (तै आ ३।११।२)

इति नियमनार्थत्वात्, अनुप्रवेशस्य, प्रधानस्याचेतनस्यैवंरूपोऽनुप्रवेशो न संभवति। अतः, अव्याकृतमव्याकृतशरीरं ब्रह्म

'तन्नामरूपाभ्यां व्याक्रियत' (बृ. १।४।७)

इति तदेवाविभक्तनामरूपं ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञं सत्यसंकल्पं स्वेनैव विभक्तनामरूपं स्वयमेव व्याक्रियते, इत्युच्यते। एवं च सति, ईक्षणादयो मुख्या एव भवन्ति। ब्रह्मात्मशब्दावपि निरतिशयबृहत्त्वनियमनार्थव्यापित्वाभावेन प्रधाने न कथंचिदुपपद्येते। अतः, ब्रह्मैक कारणं जगदिति स्थितम् ॥ १५ ॥

कारणत्वाधिकरणं समाप्तम् (४)

[224] जगद्वाचित्वात् ॥ १६ ॥ (अधिकरण ५, सूत्राणि १६–१८)

पुनरपि सांख्यः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते—यद्यपि वेदान्तवाक्यानि चेतनं जगत्कारणत्वेन प्रतिपादयन्ति, तथापि तन्त्रसिद्धप्रधानपुरुषातिरिक्तं वस्तु जगत्कारणं वेद्यतया न तेभ्यः प्रतीयते। तथाहि—

'Having subsequently entered into, by this Living Self, may I manifest name and form.' (Cha 6 3 2)

On account of the entering within serving the purpose of controlling in

'Entered within, the Controller of people the Ātman of all' (Tai 3 11 2)

—such an entering within is not possible in the case of the non-sentient Pradhāna Therefore, Brahman—unmodified, with the unmodified body—in

'That became modified in name and form (Br 1 4 7)

is stated that the same Brahman with name and form not separated, omniscient, with thoughts fulfilled, with the name and form separated by itself, is modified of its own accord And this being so, reflection etc are used in the primary sense itself The words Brahman and Atman also do not fit in any way with Pradhāna owing to the absence of vastness admitting no excess, of a controlling purpose and of the pervading nature Therefore, it remains (unchallenged) that the world has Brahman as the only cause ॥ 15 ॥

Here ends the Kāranatvādhikarana (4)

[224] On account of its denoting the world ॥ 16 ॥

(Adhikarana 5 Sūtras 16-18)

Once again, the Sānkhya (opponent) stands up—Although the Vedānta passages propound a sentient as being the cause of the world, still it is not apprehended from them an entity other than the Pradhāna and Puruṣa, established in the (Kāpila) system —the cause of the world, as an entity to be known To explain the same in detail—

भोक्तारमेव पुरुषं कारणं वेद्यतयाधीयते कौषीतकिनो बालाक्यजातशत्रुसंवादे ।

'ब्रह्म ते ब्रवाणि' (कौ. ब्रा. ४।१)

इत्युपक्रम्य,

'यो वै बालाक एतेषा पुरुषाणां कर्ता यस्य चैतत्कर्म स वै वेदितव्यः' (कौ. ब्रा. ४।१८)

इत्युपक्रमे, वक्तव्यतया बालाकिनोपक्षिप्तं ब्रह्माजानते तस्मा एव, अजातशत्रुणा स वै वेदितव्यः, इति ब्रह्म, उपदिश्यते । यस्य चैतत्कर्मेति कर्मसंबन्धात्प्रकृत्यध्यक्षो भोक्ता पुरुषो वेदितव्यतयोपदिष्टं ब्रह्मेति निश्चीयते, नार्थान्तरम्, तस्य कर्मसंबन्धानभ्युपगमात् । कर्म च पुण्यापुण्यलक्षणं क्षेत्रज्ञस्यैव संभवति । न च वाच्यम्—क्रियत इति कर्मेति व्युत्पत्त्या प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणोपस्थापितं जगदेतत्कर्मेति निर्दिश्यते । यस्यैतत्कृत्स्नं जगत्कर्म स वै वेदितव्यः, इति क्षेत्रज्ञादर्थान्तरमेव प्रतीयते, इति—

'यो वै बालाक एतेषा पुरुषाणा कर्ता यस्य चैतत्कर्म' (कौ. ४।१८)

Students of the *Kausītakı Upanısad*, read in the dialogue between Bālākı and Ajātaśatru, of the Purusa, the enjoyer alone as the cause, being fit to be known. Having introduced ın

'I shall speak of Brahman to you' (Kau. Brā. 4·1)

Brahman referred to by Bālākı in the ıntroductory part as being fit to be known ın (the passage)

'(O) Bālākı, he who, ındeed, (ıs) the maker of these Purusas, and whose (ıs) this act,— he ındeed ıs to be known.' (Kau. Brā. 4·18)

—this Brahman ıs taught in—*Sa vai veditavyah*—by Ajātaśatru, verily, to him (Bālākı) who was ıgnorant (of the same). In (the passage) *Yasya caetat karma*—ıt ıs concluded that on account of the association with Karman, the Purusa, the enjoyer (and) the supervısor of Prakrtı, ıs the Brahman which ıs taught as being the object to be known, and not any other entity, on account of the non-admission of the association with Karman ın ıts case. And Karman of the nature of merıt and demerıt ıs possible only ın the case of the Ksetra-knower. It should not agaın be said that, (ın conformity) with the etymology viz.—That is Karman which is done,—the world established by means of proof. direct perception and others ıs pointed by the (expression) *Etat karma* so that an entity different from the Ksetra-knower *ıs apprehended by*— Whose this entire world ıs Karman, he indeed is fit to be known. — or otherwise there would be the uselessness of a separate reference as ın

'(O) Bālākı, he who, ındeed (ıs) the maker of these Purusas and whose (ıs) this act' (Kau. 4·18)

इति पृथङ्निर्देशवैयर्थ्यात्, कर्मशब्दस्य च लोकवेदयोः पुण्यापुण्यरूप एव कर्मणि प्रसिद्धेः, तत्तद्भोक्तृकर्मनिमित्तत्वाज्जगदुत्पत्तेः। एतेषां पुरुषाणां कर्तेति च भोक्तुरेवोपपद्यते। तदयमर्थः—एतेषामादित्यमण्डलाद्यधिकरणानां क्षेत्रज्ञभोग्यभोगोपकरणभूतानां पुरुषाणां यः कारणभूतः, एतत्कारणभावहेतुभूतं पुण्यापुण्यलक्षणं च कर्म यस्य, स वै वेदितव्यः। तत्स्वरूपं प्रकृतेर्विविक्तं वेदितव्यमिति। तथोत्तरत्र

'तौ ह सुप्तं पुरुषमाजग्मतु'। तं यष्टिना विचिक्षेप' (कौ. ब्रा. ४।१८)

इति सुप्तपुरुषागमनयष्टिघातोत्थापनादीनि च भोक्तृत्वप्रतिपादन एव लिङ्गानि, इति। तथोपरिष्टादपि भोक्तैव प्रतिपाद्यते

'तद्यथा श्रेष्ठी स्वैर्भुङ्क्ते यथा वा स्वाः श्रेष्ठिनं भुञ्जन्त्येवमेवैष प्रज्ञात्मैतैरात्मभिर्भुङ्क्त एवमेवैत आत्मान एतमात्मानं भुञ्जन्ति' (कौ. ब्रा. ४।२०)

इति। तथा

'क्वैष एतद्बालाके पुरुषोऽशयिष्ट क्व वा एतदभूत्कुत एतदागाद्।' (कौ. ब्रा ४।१८)

इति पृष्टमर्थमजानते तस्मै स्वयमेवाजातशत्रुरुवाच—

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and because the word Karman is well-known in the Vedas and in the world, in the sense of Karman of the nature of merit and demerit, as the world is originated owing to the Karman of the various enjoyers, being the cause. The maker of these Purusas — this is appropriate in the case of the enjoyer alone. Thereof this is the sense—He should indeed be known, who is the cause of these Purusas, who abide in the Sun's circle etc., and who are the means of enjoyment of the objects of enjoyment by the Ksetra-knowers; and whose Karman is this characterised by merit and demerit, which is the cause of being the producer of this, his nature is to be known as distinct from that of the Prakrti. Similarly later on, in (the passage)

'The two, verily, went to the sleeping person — (one of them) struck him with a stick' (Kau. Brā. 4·18)

—going to a sleeping person, striking (him) with a stick, and arousing him etc., are again the indicative marks for propounding the nature itself of the enjoyer; similarly, later on also, the enjoyer alone is propounded in (the passage)—

'Just as a rich merchant eats with his (servants) or just as (servants) enjoy (feed) the rich merchant, in the same way this Prajñātman enjoys with these Ātmans,— in the same manner, these Ātmans enjoy this (Prajña) Ātman.' (Kau. Brā 4·20)

Likewise,

'Where did this Purusa, (O) Bālāki, sleep; where, indeed, was he; whence, indeed, did he come here?' (Kau. Brā. 4·18)

—Ajātaśatru himself spoke to him who did not know the matter inquired about, in (the passage)

'हिता नाम नाड्य तासु तदा भवति यदा सुप्त स्वप्न न कथचन पश्यत्यथास्मिन्प्राण एवैकधा भवति तदैन वाक्सर्वैर्नामभि सहाप्येति मन सर्वैर्ध्यानै सहाप्येति स यदा प्रतिबुध्यते यथाग्नेर्ज्वलत सर्वा दिशो विस्फुलिङ्गा विप्रतिष्ठेरन्नेवमेवैतस्मादात्मन प्राणा यथायतन विप्रतिष्ठन्ते प्राणेभ्यो देवा देवेभ्यो लोका '

(कौ ब्रा ४।१९)

इति सुषुप्त्याधारतया स्वप्नसुषुप्तिजागरितावस्थासु वर्तमानं वागादिकरणाप्ययोद्गमनस्थानमेनमेव जीवात्मानम्, अथास्मिन्प्राण एवैकधा भवति, इत्युक्तवान्। अस्मिञ्जीवात्मनि प्राणभृत्त्वनिबन्धनोऽयं प्राणशब्दः। स यदा प्रतिबुध्यते, इति प्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टस्य प्रबोधश्रवणान्मुख्यप्राणस्येश्वरस्य च सुषुप्तिप्रबोधयोरसंभवात्। अथ वा, अस्मिन्प्राण इति व्यधिकरणसप्तम्यौ। अस्मिन्नात्मनि वर्तमाने प्राणे, एकधा भवति वागादिकरणग्राम इति। प्राणशब्दस्य मुख्यप्राणपरत्वेऽपि जीव एव अस्मिन्प्रकरणे प्रतिपाद्यते, स्वतः प्राणस्य जीवोपकरणत्वात्। अतः, वक्तव्यतयोपक्रान्तं ब्रह्म पुरुष एवेति तद्व्यतिरिक्तेश्वरासिद्धिः। कारणगताश्चेक्षणादयश्चेतनधर्मा अस्मिन्नेवोपपद्यन्ते, इत्येतदधिष्ठितं प्रधानमेव जगत्कारणमिति प्राप्ते, प्रचक्ष्महे—

'The arteries named Hita, he abides in them when the sleeping one does not see anyhow a dream, then in this one, Prāna alone remains in one form, then Vak (speech) merges into him, with all names, the mind merges with all (its) musings, when he gets awakened, as sparks from the burning fire are scattered about all over the quarters exactly in this way from this Ātman, the vital breaths disperse to their own places, from the Prānas, the gods, from the gods, the worlds ' (Kau Bra 4 19)

—he spoke of this very Jivātman residing in the states of dream, deep sleep and awakening as being the support of deep-sleep, (and) the place of merging into and getting out, of the sense organs Vāk (speech) etc, in (the expression)—then in this one, Prāna alone remains in one form Asmin—in the Jivatman, this word Prana (is) restricted to its being the support of Prāna (the individual Soul), because in (the passage)—when he gets awakened—there is heard (the statement about) the awakening of one indicated by the word Prāna and because there is the impossibility of deep sleep and awakening in the case of the chief Prāna and the Lord Or, the expression Asmin Prana (refers to) two locatives indicating the abode thus (the expression means)—The whole group of the sense organs, speech and others, becomes uniform in the Prāna residing within this Ātman. Even though the word Prāna refers *to the chief Prāna Jiva alone is propounded in this chapter, because Prāna* himself is the serving instrument of the Jiva Therefore, Brahman introduced as the one to be spoken about, is the Purusa himself, —and so, Iśvara over and above him *cannot be established Reflection* etc, the qualities of the sentient belonging to the cause, are appropriate in this one alone—and so, the Pradhāna supervised over by this one (is) the cause of the world—This (prima-facie view) being reached, we say (in reply)—

[225] 'जगद्वाचित्वात्'। अत्र पुण्यापुण्यपरवशः क्षुद्रः क्षेत्रज्ञः स्वस्मिन्प्रकृतिधर्माध्यासेन तत्परिणामहेतुभूतः पुरुषो नाभिधीयते, अपि तु निरस्तसमस्ताविद्यादिदोषगन्धोऽनवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणगणनिधिर्निखिलजगदेककारणभूतः पुरुषोत्तमोऽभिधीयते। कुतः? यस्य चैतत्कर्म, इत्यत्रैतच्छब्दान्वितस्य कर्मशब्दस्य परमपुरुषकार्यभूतजगद्वाचित्वात्। एतच्छब्दो हि, अर्थप्रकरणादिभिरसंकुचितवृत्तिः, अविशेषेण प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणोपस्थापितनिखिलचिदचिन्मिश्रजगद्विषयः। न च पुण्यापुण्यलक्षणं कर्म, अत्र कर्मशब्दाभिधेयम्।

'ब्रह्म ते ब्रवाणि' (कौ. ४।१)

इत्युपक्रम्य, ब्रह्मत्वेन बालाकिना निर्दिष्टानामादित्यमण्डलाद्यधिकरणानां पुरुषाणामब्रह्मत्वेन,

'मृषा वै खलु मा संवदिष्ठाः' (कौ. ४।१८)

इति तमब्रह्मवादिनमपोद्य, तेनाविदितब्रह्मज्ञापनाय, अजातशत्रुणेदं वाक्यमवतारितम्

'यो वै बालाके' (कौ. ४।१८)

इत्यादि। पुण्यापुण्यलक्षणकर्मसंबन्धिन आदित्याद्यधिकरणास्तत्सजातीयाश्च पुरुषास्तेनैव

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[225] 'On account of its denoting the world'. Here is not denoted the Purusa, dependent upon merit and demerit, the insignificant Ksetra-knower, who is the cause of the modifications of that (Prakṛti) owing to the superimposition of the qualities of Prakrti upon himself; but it is the Puruṣottama that is denoted, from whom every tinge of blemish, Avidyā etc. is completely driven away, the treasure of the host of auspicious qualities (that are) unlimited, excessive, and innumerable, (and) who is the one cause of the entire world. Whence? On account of the word Karman associated with Etat (this) in (the expression)—This Karman—denoting the world, which is the work of the highest Purusa. The word Etat (this), indeed, with its function not contracted by purpose, context etc., refers to the world without any restriction, established by means of proof, direct perception etc. mixed up with the entire sentient and non-sentient Further, here by the word Karman is not denoted the Karman of the nature of merit and demerit. Having begun in (the passage) with

'I shall speak of Brahman to you' (Kau. 4·1)

—having ruled him (Bālāki) out of order because he was talking of things that are not Brahman, saying,

'Do not, indeed, verily, speak out what is false' (Kau. 4·18)

because the persons residing in the circle of the Sun etc., pointed out by Bālāki as being Brahman, were not Brahman, this passage viz.

'Who, verily, (O) Bālāki' (Kau 4·18)

etc., has been set forth by Ajātaśatru, to make (Bālāki) know Brahman that was not known to him. The Puruṣas, associated with Karman characterised by merit and demerit, abiding in the Sun etc, and homogeneous with them, were

विदिता इति, तदविदितपुरुषविशेषज्ञापनपरोऽयं कर्मशब्दो न पुण्यापुण्यमात्रवाची क्रियामात्रवाची वा, अपि तु कृत्स्नस्य जगतः कार्यवाची। एवमेव खल्वविदितोऽर्थ उपदिष्टो भवति। पुरुषस्य कर्मसंबन्धोपलक्षितस्वाभाविकस्वरूपस्याज्ञातस्य वेदितव्यत्वोपदेशे च लक्षणा। कर्मसंबन्धमात्रस्यैव वेदितव्यस्वरूपलक्षणत्वात्—यस्य कर्म स वेदितव्यः—इत्येतावतैव तत्सिद्धेः, यस्य चैतत्कर्म, इत्येतच्छब्दवैयर्थ्यं च। य एतेषां कर्ता, यस्य चैतत्कर्म, इति पृथङ्निर्देशस्य चायमभिप्रायः। ये त्वया ब्रह्मत्वेन निर्दिष्टाः पुरुषास्तेषां यः कर्ता, ते यत्कार्यभूताः किं विशिष्याभिधीयते, कृत्स्नं जगद्यस्य कार्यम्, उत्कृष्टा अपकृष्टाश्चेतना अचेतनाश्च सर्वे पदार्था यत्कार्यत्वेन तुल्याः, स परमकारणभूतः पुरुषोत्तमो वेदितव्य इति। जगदुत्पत्तेर्जीवकर्मनिबन्धनत्वेऽपि न जीवः स्वभोग्यभोगोपकरणादेः स्वयमुत्पादकः, अपि तु स्वकर्मानुगुण्येनेश्वरसृष्टं सर्वं भुङ्क्ते। अतः, न तस्य पुरुषान्प्रति कर्तृत्वमुपपद्यते। अतः, सर्ववेदान्तेषु परमकारणतया प्रसिद्धं परं ब्रह्मैवात्र वेदितव्यतयोपदिश्यते ॥ १६ ॥

[226] जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान्नेति चेत्तद्व्याख्यातम् ॥ १७ ॥

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already known by him, — and so, this word Karman is intended to make him *know that particular Purusa, not known by him — not denoting merely merit* and demerit or denoting merely action, but on the other hand, denoting the nature of the whole world as the product In this way alone, indeed, the matter unknown would be taught And there would be 'indication', if there is the teaching of an unknown thing in the case of the Purusa, with his natural form characterised by the association with Karman Because that is established by merely (the expression)—He should be known, whose Karman (is this)—on account of the mere connection with Karman alone being possessed of the nature and characteristics of something to be known, there would be the uselessness of the word Etat in the passage—of whom this (is) the Karman Of the separate mention in (the passage) — Who (is) the maker of these, and whose (is) this Karman—this is the intention — Those Purusas that are pointed out by you as being Brahman, — he who is the maker of them; whose products they are, referring to what particularly is this denoted, whose work is this entire world, and being the product of whom all entities—best and base, sentient and non-sentient are equal—he, the Purusottama, the highest cause is to be known—Even though the origination of the world is dependent upon the Karman of the Jiva, Jiva cannot himself be the producing agency of the serving instruments for the enjoyment of the objects of enjoyment by him, but on the other hand (the Jiva) enjoys eveything that is created by the Lord, being in conformity with that (Karman) Therefore, his being the creator in respect of the Purusas is not appropriate Therefore, the Highest Brahman alone, well-known as the highest cause in all the Vedānta passages, is taught here as being the entity to be known ॥ 16 ॥

[226] If (it is argued—it is) not on account of the characteristic marks of the Jiva and the chief Prāṇa, (we reply)—It has (already) been explained ॥ 17 ॥

अथ यदुक्तम्—जीवलिङ्गान्मुख्यप्राणसंकीर्तनाच्च लिङ्गाद्भोक्तैवास्मिन्प्रकरणे प्रतिपाद्यते, न परमात्मेति—तद्व्याख्यातम्। तस्य निर्वाहः प्रतर्दनविद्यायामभिहितः (ब्र. सू. १।१।३१)। एतदुक्तं भवति—यत्र, उपक्रमोपसंहारपर्यालोचनया ब्रह्मपरं वाक्यमिति निश्चितम्, तत्रान्यलिङ्गानि तदनुरोधेन वर्णनीयानि, इति तत्र प्रतिपादितम्। अत्राप्युपक्रमे

'ब्रह्म ते ब्रवाणि' (कौ. ४।१)

इति ब्रह्मोपक्षितम्। मध्ये च

'यस्य चैतत्कर्म' (कौ ४।१८)

इति निर्दिष्टं न पुरुषमात्रम्, अपि तु निखिलजगदेककारणं ब्रह्मैवेत्युक्तम्। उपसंहारे च

'सर्वान्पाप्मनोऽपहत्य सर्वेषां च भूतानां श्रैष्ठ्यं स्वाराज्यमाधिपत्यं पर्येति य एवं वेद' (कौ. ४।२०)

इति ब्रह्मोपासनैकान्तं सर्वपापापहतिपूर्वकं स्वाराज्यं च फलं श्रुतम्। अतः, अस्य वाक्यस्य ब्रह्मपरत्वनिश्चयेन जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान्यपि तत्परतया वर्णनीयानि, इति। प्रातर्दने हि, उपासात्रैविध्येन जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गानां ब्रह्मपरत्वमुक्तम्। अत्रापि

'अथास्मिन्प्राण एवैकधा भवति' (कौ. ब्रा. ४।१९)

Now as to what has been said — That in this chapter the enjoyer alone is propounded and not the Paramātman, on account of the characteristic of the Jiva and on account of the characteristic—viz. the description of the chief Prāna, — that has been (already) explained Its disposal (the way out) has been stated in the *Pratardanavidyā*, (Bra. Sū. 1·1·31) This is what is intended to be stated— Where it has been ascertained that a passage refers to Brahman, owing to the proper consideration of the introduction and the winding up, there the characteristics referring to another have got to be described in conformity with that (Brahman)—this has been propounded there (in the *Pratardanavidyā*). Here also, in the introduction, Brahman has been set forth in (the passage)

'I shall speak to you of Brahman.' (Kau. 4·1)

In the middle also, in (the passage)—

'And of whom (is) this Karman' (Kau 4·18)

what is pointed out is not just the Purusa, but Brahman itself, the one cause of the entire world,—this has been stated. In the concluding portion is stated in

'Having destroyed all sins, he attains to the eminence, suzerainty, overlordship of all beings, who knows thus' (Kau. 4·20)

the fruit viz suzerainty, preceded by the destruction of all sins, entirely due to the worship of Brahman. Therefore, owing to the ascertainment of this passage as referring to Brahman, the characteristics of the Jiva and the Prāna also have to be described as referring to the same. In the Pratardana-section, indeed, has been stated by the threefold nature of the object of worship, that the characteristics of the Jiva and the chief Prāna refer to Brahman. Here also in (the passage)—

'Now here in this one, Prāna alone becomes of one form' (Kau Brā. 4·19)

इति सामानाधिकरण्यसंभवे वैयधिकरण्यसंश्रयणायोगात्, ब्रह्मण्येव प्राणशब्दप्रयोगनिश्चयेन च प्राणशरीरब्रह्मोपासनार्थं प्राणसंकीर्तनं लिङ्गं युज्यते ॥ १७ ॥

[227] जीवलिङ्गानां ब्रह्मपरत्वं पुनः कथमित्यत्राह—

अन्यार्थं तु जैमिनिः प्रश्नव्याख्यानाभ्यामपि चैवमेके ॥ १८ ॥

तुशब्दो जीवसंकीर्तनेन वाक्यस्य तत्परत्वसंभावनाव्यावृत्त्यर्थः। अन्यार्थम्—जीवसंकीर्तनं जीवातिरिक्तब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रतिबोधनार्थमिति जैमिनिराचार्यो मन्यते स्म। कुतः? प्रश्नव्याख्यानाभ्याम्। प्रश्नस्तावत्

'तौ ह सुप्तं पुरुषमाजग्मतुः' (कौ. ४।१८)

इत्यादिना सुप्तस्य प्रबुद्धप्राणस्यैव प्राणनामभिरामन्त्रणाश्रवणयष्टिघातोत्थापनाभ्यां प्राणादिव्यतिरिक्तं जीवं प्रतिबोध्य, पुनर्जीवव्यतिरिक्तब्रह्मप्रतिबोधनपरो दृश्यते

'क्वैष एतद्बालाके पुरुषोऽशयिष्ट क्व वा एतदभूत्कुत एतदागात्' (कौ ४।१८)

इति। व्याख्यानमपि

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because it is not right to resort to different abodes, when case-co-ordination (or sameness of abode) *is possible, and owing to the ascertainment of the* use of the word Prāṇa to refer to Brahman alone, the characteristic viz. the description of Prāṇa *for the worship of Brahman having Prāṇa as the* body is (quite) appropriate. ॥ 17 ॥

[227] But how again, do the *characteristics of the Jīva refer to* Brahman?— To this (the Sūtrakāra) says here (in reply)—

But Jaimini (says that the passage is there) for another entity, owing to the question and the explanation; and further thus some (read) ॥ 18 ॥

The word Tu has the sense of excluding the possibility of the passage referring to that (Jīva) owing to the description of the Jīva. Anyārtham, the description of Jīva for the purpose of describing the nature of Brahman other than the Jīva —so indeed, the preceptor Jaimini thinks. Whence? Owing to the question and the explanation.

In (the passage) beginning with

'The two, verily, went to the sleeping person' (Kau. 4·18)

etc., having awakened the Jīva distinct from the Prāṇa and others, of the sleeping one with only the Prāṇa functioning, by striking him with the staff and making him get up, when (it was found that he was) not hearing when called by *the names of Prāṇa,* the question in

'Where, (O) Bālāki, did this Puruṣa sleep, where indeed was he, whence did he come? (Kau. 4·18)

for the matter of that, is again seen as referring to the enlightenment of Brahman which is distinct from the Jīva The explanation also, as in (the passage)

'यदा सुप्तः स्वप्नं न कथंचन पश्यत्यथास्मिन्प्राण एवैकधा भवति ।....
एतस्मादात्मनः प्राणा यथायतनं विप्रतिष्ठन्ते प्राणेभ्यो देवा देवेभ्यो लोकाः'
(कौ. ४।१९)

इति जीवादर्थान्तरभूतपरमात्मपरमेव । सुप्तस्य हि जीवस्य यत्रोषितस्य जागरितस्वप्नदशासंबन्धिविचित्रसुखदुःखानुभवकालुष्यविरहेण संप्रसन्नस्य स्वस्थतापत्तिः, पुनरप्यस्य यस्माद्भोगाय निष्क्रमणं सोऽयं परमात्मा । तथाहि—

'सता सोम्य तदा संपन्नो भवति' (छा. ६।८।१)

'प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरम्'
(बृ ४।३।२१)

इति सुषुप्त्याधारतया प्रसिद्धो जीवादर्थान्तरभूतः प्राज्ञः परमात्मा । अतः, प्रश्नप्रतिवचनाभ्यां जीवसंकीर्तनं जीवादर्थान्तरभूतपरमात्मप्रतिपादनार्थमिति निश्चीयते ।

[228] यदुक्तम्—प्रश्नव्याख्याने जीवपरे, सुषुप्तिस्थानं च नाड्य एव, करणग्रामश्च प्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टे जीव एवैकधा भवतीति–तदयुक्तम्, नाडीनां स्वप्नस्थानत्वात्, उक्तरीत्या ब्रह्मण एव सुषुप्तिस्थानत्वाच्च, प्राणशब्दनिर्दिष्टे ब्रह्मण्येव जीवस्य तदुपकरणभूतवागादिकरणग्रामस्य च, एकतापत्तिविभागवचनाच्च ।

'...when the sleeping one does not see anyhow a dream, then in this one, Prāṇa alone remains in one form .. from this Ātman the vital breaths disperse to their own places, from the Prāṇas, the gods; from the gods, the worlds' (Kau. 4·19)

refers to the Paramātman alone, (who is) an entity distinct from Jīva. This is indeed that Paramātman residing in whom, there is the attainment of his own nature (or, ease), for the sleeping Jīva, quite pleased, owing to the absence of the defilement due to the experience of variegated pleasure and pain, connected with the states of dream and awakening, and from whom once again there is his exit for enjoyment. To explain the same—In

'With the Sat, verily, (O) gentle one, he becomes then merged'
(Chā. 6·8 1)

'Enveloped closely by the Prājña-Ātman, he knew not any thing external, nor any thing internal' (Br. 4·3·21)

Prājña, well-known as the resort of deep sleep, a different entity from the Jīva, (is) the Paramātman. Therefore, it is ascertained that the description of the Jīva by the question and the answer is for the purpose of propounding the Paramātman who is a different entity from the Jīva.

[228] As to what has been stated —That the question and the answer refer to the Jīva; and the place of deep sleep (is) the arteries themselves, and the group of sense-organs becomes one in Jīva alone referred to by the word Prāna. — That is not proper, because in the manner aforesaid Brahman itself is the abode of deep sleep, the arteries being the abode of dream, and because there is the statement of becoming one with and getting separated from, of the Jīva and the group of sense-organs, speech etc. that are his serving instruments, the Brahman alone, which is pointed out by the word Prāṇa.

अपि चैवमेके—वाजसनेयिनोऽस्मिन्नेव बालाक्यजातशत्रुसंवादे सुषुप्ताद्विज्ञानमयाद्भेदेन तदाश्रयभूतं परमात्मानमामनन्ति

'य एष विज्ञानमयः पुरुषः क्वैष तदाभूत्कुत एतदागात् ।... यत्रैष सुप्तोऽभूत् । य एष विज्ञानमयः पुरुषस्तदेषां प्राणानां विज्ञानेन विज्ञानमादाय य एषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशस्तस्मिञ्छेते ' (बृ. २।१।१६–१७)

इति । आकाशशब्दश्च परमात्मनि प्रसिद्धः

'दहरोऽस्मिन्नन्तर आकाशः' (छा. ८।१।१)

इति । अतोऽत्र जीवसंकीर्तनं तस्मादर्थान्तरभूतस्य प्राज्ञस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणः प्रतिबोधनार्थमित्यवगम्यते । तस्मादस्मिन्वाक्ये पुरुषादर्थान्तरभूतस्य निखिलजगत्कारणस्य परस्यैव ब्रह्मणो वेदितव्यतयाभिधानात्, न तन्त्रसिद्धस्य पुरुषस्य तदधिष्ठितस्य वा प्रधानस्य कारणत्वं क्वचिदपि वेदान्ते प्रतीयते, इति स्थितम् ॥ १८ ॥

जगद्वाचित्वाधिकरणं समाप्तम् (५)

[229] वाक्यान्वयात् ॥ १९ ॥ (अधिकरण ६, सूत्राणि १९–२२)

And further some,—students of the *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā*, read in this very dialogue between Bālāki and Ajātaśatru, the Paramātman as distinct from the Ātman constituted of Vijñāna, and asleep, and as being his resort, in (the passage)—

'*Who this Puruṣa constituted of Vijñāna — where was this one then; whence did he come? ... where this one was asleep; who, again, this Puruṣa constituted of Vijñāna, having taken the Vijñāna, from the Vijñāna of these Prāṇas; who this one (is) the Ākāśa in the heart within, there he sleeps.*' (Bṛ. 2·1·16–17)

And the word Ākāśa further is well-known to mean the Paramātman as in (*the passage*)—

'*Dahara within this, the inner Ākāśa*' (Chā. 8·1·1)

Therefore, it is understood that the description of the Jīva here (is) for the purpose of enlightenment about Prājña, the Highest Brahman, a different entity from that (Jīva). Therefore, in this passage, on account of the mention as being fit to be known, of the Highest Brahman itself, the cause of the entire world, an entity different from the Puruṣa, nowhere in the Vedānta is apprehended the Puruṣa established in the system (of Kapila) or the Pradhāna supervised over by him as the cause. —this remains firm (unshaken) ॥ 18 ॥

Here ends the Jagadvācitvādhikaraṇa (5)

On account of the connection of the passages. ॥ 19 ॥

(Adhikaraṇa 6, Sūtras 19–22)

अत्रापि, कापिलतन्त्रसिद्धपुरुषतत्त्वावेदनपरं वाक्यं क्वचिद्दृश्यते, इति तद्व्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरो नाम न कश्चित्संभवति, इत्याशङ्क्य निराकरोति ।

बृहदारण्यके मैत्रेयीब्राह्मणे श्रूयते—

' न वा अरे पत्युः कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवत्यात्मनस्तु कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति ' (बृ. ४।५।६)

इत्यारभ्य

' न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवत्यात्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति । आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः । मैत्रेय्यात्मनि खल्वरे दृष्टे श्रुते मते विज्ञात इदं सर्वं विदितम् ।' (बृ. ४।५।६)

इति ।

तत्र संशयः—किमस्मिन्वाक्ये द्रष्टव्यतयोपदिश्यमानस्तन्त्रसिद्धपुरुष एव, अथवा सर्वज्ञः सत्यसंकल्पः सर्वेश्वरः ? इति । किं युक्तम् ? पुरुष इति । कुतः ? आदिमध्यावसानेषु पुरुषस्यैव प्रतीतिः । उपक्रमे तावत्, पतिजायापुत्रवित्तपश्वादिप्रियत्वयोगाज्जीवात्मैव प्रतीयते । मध्येऽपि

Here also (in this Sūtra, the Sūtrakāra) having put forth the doubt that no one called Īśvara is possible as apart from that (Puruṣa), because somewhere is seen a passage prone to declare the Purusa-principle established in the Kāpila system, removes (the same).

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, in the *Brāhmaṇa* chapter dealing with Maitreyī, it is stated in the Śruti, beginning with

' Not, verily, dear one, for the desire of the husband, the husband becomes dear; but, for the desire of the Ātman, the husband becomes dear ' (Br 4·5·6)

(and ending with)

' Not verily, dear one, for the desire of everything, everything becomes dear; but, for the desire of the Ātman, everything becomes dear.

The Ātman, verily, dear one, should be seen, should be heard, should be thought of, should be meditated upon.

(O) Maitreyī, dear one, with the Ātman, verily, seen, heard, thought of, known, all this is known. ' (Br. 4·5·6)

There (arises) the doubt (as follows)— Is (the one) being taught as fit to be seen in this passage, the Purusa himself established in the (Kāpila) system, or the Īśvara, omniscient, with thoughts fulfilled (and) the overlord? What (is) proper (here)? Purusa. Whence? Because there is the apprehension of the Purusa alone, in the beginning, in the middle and in the end (of the passage). In the introductory portion, for the matter of that, the Jīvātman alone is understood, on account of the connection with being agreeable to husband, wife, son, wealth, cattle etc. In the middle also, he himself is understood, on account of his connection with origination and destruction, as (stated) in (the passage)

'विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानुविनश्यति न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्ति' (बृ. ४।५।१३)

इत्युत्पत्तिविनाशयोगात्स एवावगम्यते। तथान्ते च

'विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात्' (बृ. ४।५।१५)

इति स एव ज्ञाता क्षेत्रज्ञ एव प्रतीयते, नेश्वरः। अतः, तन्त्रसिद्धपुरुषप्रतिपादनपरमिदं वाक्यमिति निश्चीयते।

ननु,

'अमृतत्वस्य तु नाशास्ति वित्तेन' (बृ. ४।५।३)

इत्युपक्रमादमृतत्वप्राप्त्युपायोपदेशपरमिदं वाक्यमित्यवगम्यते। तत्कथं पुरुषप्रतिपादनपरत्वमस्य वाक्यस्य? तदुच्यते—अत एव ह्यत्र पुरुषप्रतिपादनतन्त्रे हि, अचिद्धर्माध्यासवियुक्तपुरुषस्वरूपयाथात्म्यविज्ञानमेव, अमृतत्वहेतुत्वेनोच्यते। अतः, जीवात्मन प्रकृतिवियुक्तं स्वरूपमिह, अमृतत्वाय

'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः' (बृ. ४।५।६)

इत्यादिनोपदिश्यते। सर्वेषामात्मनां प्रकृतिवियुक्तं स्वरूपमेकरूपमिति प्रकृतिवियुक्तस्वात्मयाथात्म्यविज्ञानेन सर्वं एवात्मानो विदिता भवन्ति, इत्यात्मविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानमुपपन्नम्। देवादिस्थावरान्तेषु सर्वेषु भूतेष्वात्मस्वरूपस्य ज्ञानैकप्रकारत्वात्,

'इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा' (बृ ४।५।७)

'*The mass of Vijñāna alone, having risen up from these elements comes to nought after them; on departing (from them) there is no consciousness.*' (Br. 4·5·13)

Similarly in the concluding portion also, by (the passage)

'*By what, dear one, would one know the knower?*' (Br. 4·5·15)

that same knower, the Kṣatra-knower, is understood and not the Īśvara. Therefore, it is ascertained that this passage is aimed at propounding the Puruṣa established in the system (of Kapila).

I say (says one objector)—On account of the introductory remark viz.—

'*But there is no hope of immortality by wealth*' (Br. 4·5 3)

[illegible] means for the attainment to [illegible] e aiming at propounding the [illegible]—*For this very reason itself,* here in the system (of Kapila) propounding the Puruṣa, is stated that the knowledge as it is, of the nature of Puruṣa separated from the superimposition of the qualities of the non-sentient, is alone the cause of immortality. Therefore, here is taught the nature of Jīvātman as separated from the Prakṛti, as the cause of immortality, in (the passage)

'*Ātman, verily, dear one, is to be seen*' (Br. 4 5 6)

etc. Because the nature of all Ātmans, separated from Prakṛti is uniform, all the Ātmans are known by the real knowledge of their Ātman as he is, as separated from Prakṛti, [illegible] one knowledge-mode, there is the teaching of there being only one Ātman as in (the passage)

'*All this is what this Ātman*'. (Br. 4·5·7)

इत्यैकात्म्योपदेशः । देवाद्याकाराणामनात्माकारत्वाच्च,

' सर्वं तं परादात् ' (बृ. ४।५।७)

इत्यादिना, अन्यत्वनिषेधश्च ।

' यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति ' (बृ. ४।५।१५)

इति च नानात्वनिषेधेनैकस्वरूपे ह्यात्मनि देवादिप्रकृतिपरिणामभेदेन नानात्वं मिथ्या, इत्युच्यते ।

' तस्य ह वा एतस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतद्यदृग्वेदः ' (बृ ४।५।११)

इत्याद्यपि, प्रकृतेरधिष्ठातृत्वेन पुरुषनिमित्तत्वाज्जगदुत्पत्तेरुपपद्यते । एवम्, अस्मिन्वाक्ये पुरुषपरे निश्चिते सति, तदैकार्थ्यात्सर्वे वेदान्तास्तन्त्रसिद्धं पुरुषमेवाभिदधति, इति तदधिष्ठिता प्रकृतिरेव जगदुपादानम्, नेश्वरः, इति—

[230] एवं प्राप्ते, प्रचक्ष्महे—

' वाक्यान्वयात् ' इति । सर्वेश्वर एवास्मिन्वाक्ये प्रतीयते । कुतः ? वाक्यान्वयात् । एवमेव हि वाक्यावयवानामन्योन्यान्वयः समञ्जसो भवति ।

' अमृतत्वस्य तु नाशास्ति वित्तेन ' (बृ. २।४।२, ४।५।३)

इति याज्ञवल्क्येनाभिहिते,

And because there is the repudiation of anything else in

'Everything goes away from (or overwhelms) him' (Br. 4·5·7)

etc., on account of the forms of gods etc. not being the forms of the Ātman. By the repudiation also of manifoldness in (the passage)

'Where, verily, is as it were duality' (Br. 4·5·15)

the manifoldness caused by the distinction of the transformation of Prakṛti viz. gods etc., is spoken of as false, in the case of Atman of one uniform nature. This also—

'Of that, verily, of this vast being, the breath (is) this what (is) the Ṛgveda' (Br. 4·5·11)

etc., is appropriate, on account of the origination of the world being caused by Puruṣa, being the supervisor of the Prakṛti. Thus, when this passage is ascertained to be referring to the Puruṣa, all the Vedānta passages having the same meaning as that, speak of the Puruṣa alone established in the (Kāpila) system,—and so, Prakṛti alone supervised over by him, is the material (cause) of the world, and not Īśvara.—

[230] This (prima-facie view) being reached, we say (in reply)—

'On account of the connection of the passage'—The Overlord alone is apprehended in this passage. Whence? On account of the connection of the passage In this manner alone, the mutual interrelation of the parts of the passage becomes appropriate When Yājñavalkya declared in

'But there is no hope of immortality by wealth'

(Br. 2·4·2, 4·5·3)

this Ātman, the Paramātman himself, is taught as being fit to be seen as the means of that (immortality), to Maitreyī who was imploring for only the means of attaining to immortality, by showing disrespect towards wealth etc.

'येनाहं नामृता स्यां किमहं तेन कुर्यां यदेव भगवान्वेद तदेव मे ब्रूहि'
(बृ. २।४।३, ४।५।४)

इत्यमृतत्वानुपायतया वित्ताद्यनादरेणामृतत्वप्राप्त्युपायमेव प्रार्थयमानायै मैत्रेय्यै, तदुपायतया द्रष्टव्यतयोपदिष्टोऽयमात्मा परमात्मैव ।

'तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति' (श्वे. ३।८, ६।१५)
'तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति नान्यः पन्थाः' (तै. आ. ३।१२।७)

इत्यादिभिः, अमृतत्वस्य परमपुरुषवेदनैकोपायतया प्रतिपादनात्, परमपुरुषविभूतिभूतस्य प्राप्तुरात्मनः स्वरूपयाथात्म्यविज्ञानम्, अपवर्गसाधनभूतपरमपुरुषवेदनोपयोगितयावगन्तव्यं न स्वत एवोपायत्वेन । अतोऽत्र परमात्मैवामृतत्वोपायतया

'द्रष्टव्यः' (बृ. ४।५।६)

इत्यादिनोपदिश्यते । तथा

'तस्य ह वा एतस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतद्यदृग्वेदः' (बृ. ४।५।११)

इत्यादिना कृत्स्नस्य जगतः कारणत्वमुच्यमानं परमपुरुषादन्यस्य कर्मपरवश्यस्य मुक्तस्य निर्व्यापारस्य च पुरुषमात्रस्य न संभवति । तथा

'आत्मनो वा अरे दर्शनेन' (बृ. २।४।५)

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as they are not the means of securing immortality, as (described) in (the passage)

'By which I cannot be immortal,—what can I do with that? Whatever Your Reverence knows, that same, be pleased to declare to me'. (Bṛ. 2·4·3, 4·5·4)

On account of the propounding that immortality has the knowledge of the highest Puruṣa as the only means (for securing it) as in

'Having known him alone, he goes beyond death' (Śve. 3·8, 6·15)

'Knowing him thus, he becomes immortal here; no other path' (Tai. Āra. 3·12·7)

and others, the real knowledge of the nature of Ātman who is the manifestation of the highest Purusa, who is to secure (the highest) should be understood as being useful for the knowledge of the highest Puruṣa, the means of salvation, and not as being the means by itself. Therefore, the Paramātman alone is taught here by (the passage)

'Should be seen' (Br. 4·5·6)

etc., as the means of immortality. Similarly, being the cause of the entire world being described in the passage

'Of that, verily, of this vast being, the breath (is) this what (is) the Ṛgveda' (Bṛ. 4·5·11)

etc., is not possible in the case of one other than the highest Purusa, the released soul, a slave to Karman, and a mere Puruṣa who is without any activity. Similarly, the knowledge of everything by the knowledge of one, which is being declared in the passage—

'By the sight of the Ātman, verily, dear one' (Bṛ. 2·1·5)

इत्यादिना, एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानमभिधीयमानं सर्वात्मभूते परमात्मन्येवावकल्पते।

[231] यत्तु, एतदेकरूपत्वात्, आत्मनामेकात्मविज्ञानेन सर्वात्मविज्ञानमुच्यते, इति—तदयुक्तम्, अचेतनप्रपञ्चज्ञानाभावेन सर्वविज्ञानाभावात्। प्रतिज्ञोपपादनाय च

'इदं ब्रह्मेदं क्षत्रम्' (बृ. ४।५।७)

इत्युपक्रम्य,

'इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा' (बृ. ४।५।७)

इति प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धं चिदचिन्मिश्रं प्रपञ्चमिदमिति निर्दिश्यैतद्, अयमात्मा, इत्यैकात्म्योपदेशश्च परमात्मन एवोपपद्यते। न हि, इदंशब्दवाच्यं चिदचिन्मिश्रं जगत्पुरुषेणाचित्संसृष्टेन तद्वियुक्तेन वा स्वरूपेणावस्थितेन च, ऐक्यमुपगच्छति। अत एव,

'सर्वं तं परादाद्योऽन्यत्रात्मन सर्वं वेद' (बृ. ४।५।७)

इति व्यतिरिक्तत्वेन सर्ववेदननिन्दा च। तथा प्रथमे च मैत्रेयीब्राह्मणे,

'महद्भूतमनन्तमपारम्' (बृ. २।४।१२)

इति श्रुता महत्त्वादयो गुणाः परमात्मन एव संभवन्ति। अतः, स एवात्र प्रतिपाद्यते।

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etc., is appropriate in the case of the Paramātman, who is the Ātman of all.

[231] Again, as to what this has been said that (there would be) the knowledge of all Ātmans by the knowledge of one Ātman, on account of the Ātmans being uniform,—that (is) improper, because there could not be the knowledge of everything on account of the absence of knowledge of the non-sentient worldly existence. The instruction about only one Ātman as —this is this Atman—is appropriate in the case of the Paramātman alone, (given after) having introduced (the topic) by

'This is Brāhmaṇa, this is Kṣatriya' (Br. 4·5·7)

for accounting for the solemn declaration, having pointed out by (the word) Idam the worldly existence, mixed of sentient and non-sentient, which is proven by the (means of proof) direct perception etc., in (the passage)

'All this (is) what (is) this Ātman' (Br. 4·5·7)

Not, indeed, can the world mixed of sentient and non-sentient denoted by the word Idam, become identical with the Puruṣa residing in his own nature, closely associated with the non-sentient or apart from it. And for this very reason, in (the passage)

'Everything goes away from him, who knows everything elsewhere than in Ātman' (Br. 4·5·7)

(there is) the censure of knowledge of everything as being apart (from the Ātman). Similarly, in the first *Brāhmaṇa* (section) dealing with Maitreyī, the qualities, magnitude, etc. mentioned in the Śruti (passage) in

'The great being, endless, limitless' (Br. 2·4·12)

are possible in the case of the Paramātman alone. Therefore, he alone is here propounded.

[232] यत्तूक्तम्—पतिजायापुत्रवित्तपश्वादिप्रियान्वयिनो जीवात्मन उपक्रमे तु, अन्वेष्टव्यतया प्रतिपादनात्, तद्विषयमेवेदं वाक्यमिति—तदयुक्तम्

'आत्मनस्तु कामाय'　　　　　　　　　　(बृ. २।४।५, ४।५।६)

इत्यात्मशब्देन जीवात्मसंशब्दने तस्य

'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः'.　　　　　　　　　　(बृ. २।४।५, ४।५।६)

इत्यनेनानन्वयप्रसङ्गात्। आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः, इत्यात्मनो द्रष्टव्यतोपयोगितया, आत्मनस्तु कामाय, इत्युपदिष्टमिति प्रतीयते। आत्मनस्तु कामाय—आत्मनः कामसंपत्तये। काम्यन्त इति कामाः, आत्मन इष्टसंपत्तयः, इति यावत्। न च जीवात्मन इष्टसंपत्तये पत्यादयः प्रिया भवन्ति, इत्युक्ते सति तस्य जीवस्य स्वरूपमन्वेष्टव्यं भवति। प्रियमेव ह्यन्वेष्टव्यं न तु प्रियं प्रति शेषिणः प्रियवियुक्तं स्वरूपम्। यस्मादात्मन इष्टसंपत्तये पत्यादयः प्रिया भवन्ति, तस्मात्पत्यादि प्रियं परित्यज्य तद्वियुक्तमात्मस्वरूपमन्वेष्टव्यमित्यसंगतं भवति। प्रत्युत न पत्यादिशेषतया पत्यादीनां प्रियत्वम्, अपि त्वात्मनः शेषतया पत्यादीनां प्रियत्वम्, इत्युक्ते स्वशेषतया त एवोपादेयाः स्युः।

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[232] As to again what has been said—That because there is the propounding of the Jīvātman, connected with being agreeable to husband, wife, son, wealth, cattle etc., in the introduction, as being fit to be seen, this passage ought to refer to that (Jīvātman) alone—that (is) improper, on account of the undesirable contingency of the absence of connection with

'Ātman, verily, dear one, is to be seen'　(Br. 2·4·5, 4·5·6)

of that (Jīvātman), when the Jīvātman is designated by the word Atman in (the passage)

'But for the desire of the Ātman'　(Br. 2·4·5, 4·5·6)

It is understood that the instruction—But for the desire of the Ātman—is there, because of its being useful to understand Ātman as being fit to be seen as in—Atman, verily, dear one, is to be seen, Ātmanastu Kāmāya—for the fulfilling of the desires of the Ātman—Desires are *those that are longed for—that is to say, for the fulfilment of the desires* of the Atman. Further, there cannot be fitness for being searched for in the case of the nature of that Jīva, when it is declared that the husband etc. become dear for the fulfilment of the desires of the Jīvātman. What is fit to *be searched for is the dear thing itself, and not the* nature bereft of the dear thing, of something subordinate to the dear one. Inasmuch as the husband and others are dear to the Ātman for the fulfilment of his desires, so, it is inappropriate to say that the nature of Ātman is fit to be searched for, bereft of them, having given up the dear things—husband and others. On the *contrary, when it is said, being dear in the case of husband and others is not* due to their being subordinate to husband and others, but there is the dear nature of the husband etc. as subordinate to the Ātman, they themselves would have to be resorted to as being subordinate to themselves

'आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति' (बृ. २।४।५, ४।५।६)

इत्यस्य परेणानन्वये वाक्यभेदः प्रसज्यते। अभ्युपगम्यमानेऽपि वाक्यभेदे पूर्वस्य वाक्यस्य न किंचित्प्रयोजनं दृश्यते। अतः, पत्यादि सर्वं प्रियं परित्यज्य, आत्मन एवान्वेष्टव्यत्वं यथा प्रतीयते तथा वाक्यार्थो वर्णनीयः। सोऽयमुच्यते—

'अमृतत्वस्य तु नाशास्ति वित्तेन' (बृ. २।४।२, ४।५।३)

इति वित्तादीनां नित्यनिर्दोषनिरतिशयानन्दरूपामृतत्वप्राप्त्यनुपायत्वमुक्त्वा, वित्तपुत्रपतिजायादीनां सातिशयदुःखमिश्रकादाचित्कप्रियत्वमनुभूयमानं न पत्यादिस्वरूपप्रयुक्तम्, अपि तु निरतिशयानन्दस्वभावपरमात्मप्रयुक्तम्। अतः, य एवं स्वयं निरतिशयानन्दः सन्, अन्येषामपि प्रियत्वलेशास्पदत्वमापादयति, स परमात्मैव द्रष्टव्यः, इत्युपदिश्यते।

तदयमर्थः—न वा अरे पत्युः कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति—न हि पतिजायापुत्रवित्तादयो मत्प्रयोजनाय, अहमस्य प्रियः स्यामीति स्वसंकल्पात्प्रिया भवन्ति, अपि तु आत्मनः कामाय। परमात्मनः स्वाराधकप्रियप्रतिलम्भनरूपेष्टनिवृत्तये, इत्यर्थः। परमात्मा हि कर्मभिराराधितः, तत्तत्कर्मानुगुणं प्रतिनियतदेशकालस्वरूपपरिमाणम्, आराधकानां तत्तद्वस्तुगतं प्रियत्वमापादयति।

There would result the splitting of the sentence, if there is no connection with the other one, of (the passage)

'*But for the desire of the Ātman everything becomes dear.*' (Br. 2·4·5, 4·5·6)

Even though (the blemish) the splitting of the sentence is admitted (condoned), there does not seem any purpose for the previous passage. Therefore, the sense of the passage ought to be explained in that manner in which is apprehended Ātman alone being fit to be searched for, by giving up all dear things, husband etc. And the same is stated here—having mentioned in

'*But there is no hope of immortality by wealth*' (Br. 2·4·2, 4·5·3)

that wealth and others are not the means for securing immortality of the form eternal, blameless, bliss admitting of no excess — agreeableness being experienced now and then, mixed up with excessive misery, of wealth, son, husband, wife etc, is not caused by the nature of the husband etc. but caused by the Paramātman whose nature is bliss admitting of no excess. Therefore, He, who himself being possessed of abundant bliss, makes others also the abode of some slight dearness, — that Paramātman alone is to be seen, — this is taught —

This then the sense—Not indeed, dear one, for the desire of the husband, is the husband dear —Not indeed do the husband, wife, son, wealth etc. become dear from their own reflection,—For my sake, may I be dear to this one—but for the desire of the Ātman, — that is to say, for the purpose of accomplishing the desired aim of the form of being agreeable to those devoted to him, in the case of the Paramātman. Paramātman, indeed, propitiated by Karman confers upon the worshippers, dear-ness belonging to the various objects, in conformity with the various actions, with their modification and nature, in time and space earmarked, on account of the Śruti (passage).

'एष ह्येवानन्दयाति' (तै २।७।१)

इति श्रुतेः। न हि तत्तद्वस्तु स्वरूपेण प्रियमप्रियं वा। यथोक्तम्

'तदेव प्रीतये भूत्वा पुनर्दुःखाय जायते।
तदेव कोपाय यतः प्रसादाय च जायते॥
तस्माद्दुःखात्मकं नास्ति न च किंचित्सुखात्मकम्।' (वि पु २।६।४६–४७)

इति।

'आत्मनस्तु कामाय' (बृ २।४।५,४।५।६)

इत्यस्य जीवात्मपरत्वेऽपि,

'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः' (बृ २।४।५, ४।५।६)

इति तु परमात्मविषयमेव। तत्राप्ययमर्थः--यस्मात्पत्यादीनामिष्टसंपत्तये तत्परवशेन पत्यादयः प्रियत्वेन नोपादीयन्ते, अपि त्वात्मेष्टसंपत्तये स्वातन्त्र्येण स्वप्रियत्वेनोपादीयन्ते। तस्मात्, य एवात्मनो निरुपाधिकनिर्दोषनिरवधिकप्रियः परमात्मा, स एव हि द्रष्टव्यः, न दुःखमिश्राल्पसुखदुःखोदर्काः परायत्ततत्स्वभावाः पतिजायापुत्रवित्तादयो विषयाः, इति। अस्मिंस्तु प्रकरणे, जीवात्मशब्देनापि परमात्मन एवाभिधानात्,

'आत्मनस्तु कामाय। ..... आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः' (बृ २।४।५, ४।५।६)

'This one, verily, causes delight' (Tai 2·7·1)

Not, indeed, is any object in its own nature agreeable or disagreeable; as has been said in

'The same thing, having been there for one's pleasure, is produced again for pain, because the same is produced for causing anger and for causing satisfaction, therefore, nothing whatsoever is (by itself) constituted of misery, or constituted of happiness' (V P 2 6 46–47)

Even if (the expression)

'But for the desire of the Ātman' (Br. 2 4 5, 4·5 6)

is (taken) to be referring to the Jīvātman, (the expression)

'Ātman, verily, dear one, is to be seen' (Br 2 4 5, 4 5 6)

does, however, refer to the Paramatman alone There also, this is the sense—Inasmuch as the husband etc are not resorted to as being dear for the accomplishment of the agreeable nature of husband etc, by one dependent upon them, but are resorted to independently, as being dear to oneself for the accomplishment of the agreeable nature of Ātman, therefore, who alone is dear without adjuncts, without blemish, (and) without limit, to the Ātman—that Paramātman, he alone is to be seen and not the entities,—husband, wife, son, wealth etc. culminating in misery, a little happiness mixed with misery, with their natures dependent upon another. In this Section, however, on account of the mention of the Paramātman by the word Jīvātman,

'But for the desire of the Ātman, . the Ātman, verily, dear one, is to be seen' (Br 2 4 5, 4 5 6)

इति पूर्वोक्तप्रक्रियया, उभयत्रात्मशब्दावेकविषयौ ॥ १९ ॥

[233] मतान्तरेणापि जीवशब्देन परमात्माभिधानोपपादनायाह—

प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेर्लिङ्गमाश्मरथ्यः ॥ २० ॥

एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञासिद्धेरिदं लिङ्गं यज्जीवात्मवाचिशब्दैः परमात्मनोऽभिधानमिति, आश्मरथ्य आचार्यो मन्यते स्म । यद्ययं जीवः परमात्मकार्यतया परमात्मैव न भवेत्तदा तद्व्यतिरिक्ततया परमात्मविज्ञानादेतद्विज्ञानं न सेत्स्यति

'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्' (ऐ १)

इति प्राक्सृष्टेरेकत्वावधारणात् ।

'यथा सुदीप्तात्पावकाद्विस्फुलिङ्गा
सहस्रशः प्रभवन्ते सरूपाः ।
तथाक्षराद्विविधाः सोम्यभावाः
प्रजायन्ते तत्र चैवापियन्ति ॥' (मु २।१)

इत्यादिभिर्ब्रह्मणो जीवानामुत्पत्तिश्रवणात्, तस्मिन्नेवाप्ययश्रवणाच्च जीवानां ब्रह्मकार्यत्वेन ब्रह्मणैक्यमवगम्यते । अतः, जीवशब्देन परमात्मन एवाभिधानमिति ॥ २० ॥

—in both (these passages) the (two) words Ātman refer to one entity, owing to the procedure mentioned before ॥ 19 ॥

[233] (The Sutrakāra) says for the purpose of explaining the mention of the Paramatman by the word Jiva, even according to another view.

There is the logical mark for the accomplishment of the solemn declaration—so Āśmarathya— ॥ **20** ॥

For the accomplishment of the solemn declaration viz the knowledge of one by the knowledge of all, this (is) the logical mark viz the denotation of Paramatman by words denoting the Jivatman—thus the preceptor Āśmarathya does think If this Jiva would not be the Paramātman alone by being the product of the Paramatman, then owing to his being distinct from him this knowledge by the knowledge of the Paramatman would not result on account of the oneness being ascertained prior to the creation in (the passage)

Ātman verily — this was in the beginning alone (Ait 1)

In (the passage)

'As from the fire blazing forth well sparks in thousands, having the same form are produced so from the Immutable, (O) gentle one various entities are produced and are merged into the same (Mu 2 1)

and in others there is the mention by the Sruti of the Jivas being produced from Brahman and also the mention by the Sruti of their merging into the same —and so the identity of the Jivas with Brahman is apprehended owing to their being the product of Brahman Therefore, by the word Jiva there is the denotation of the Paramātman alone ॥ 20 ॥

[234] उत्क्रमिष्यत एवंभावादित्यौडुलोमिः ॥ २१ ॥

यदुक्तम्—जीवस्य ब्रह्मकार्यतया ब्रह्मणैक्येनैकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञोपपादनार्थं ब्रह्मणो जीवशब्देन प्रतिपादनमिति—तदयुक्तम्

'न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चित्' (का २।१८)

इत्यादिना, अजत्वश्रुतेः, जीवानां प्राचीनकर्मफलभोगाय, जगत्सृष्टयभ्युपगमाच्च । अन्यथा विषमसृष्टयनुपपत्तेश्च, ब्रह्मकार्यस्य जीवस्य ब्रह्मतापत्तिलक्षणो मोक्ष आकाशादिवद्वर्जनीयः, इति तदुपायविधानानुष्ठानानर्थक्याच्च, घटादिवत्कारणप्राप्तेर्विनाशरूपत्वेन मोक्षस्यापुरुषार्थत्वाच्च । जीवात्मन उत्पत्तिप्रलयवादोपपत्तिरुत्तरत्र (ब्र. सू. २।३।१८) प्रपञ्चयिष्यते । अतः,

'एष सम्प्रसादोऽस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते' (छा. ८।३।४)

'यथा नद्यः स्यन्दमानाः समुद्रेऽ-
स्तं गच्छन्ति नामरूपे विहाय ।
तथा विद्वान्नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः
परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम् ॥' (मु ३।२।८)

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[234] On account of (the Jiva of) this nature when about to depart (from the body)—So (says) Audulomi. ॥ 21 ॥

As to what has been said—That there is the reference to Brahman by the word Jiva for the purpose of accounting for the solemn declaration—by the knowledge of one there is the knowledge of all—, on account of the Jiva being identical with Brahman, as he is the product of Brahman—that (is) improper, on account of the unborn nature (of the Jiva) being mentioned in the Sruti passage

'The wise one is not born, nor dies' (Kā. 2·18)

and on account of the admitting of the creation of the world for the sake of enjoyment of the previous Karman by the Jivas; otherwise, the uneven, creation cannot be accounted for and also because there would be meaninglessness in the prescription and performance of means for that, because salvation of the nature of attaining to the nature of Brahman, by Jiva, who is the product of Brahman, is not capable of being avoided like Ākāśa etc, and because salvation would not be the human purpose in life on account of attainment to the cause being of the nature of destruction, as in the case of the earthen jar etc. The accounting for the view about the origination and dissolution of the Jivātman would be set forth in detail later on (Bra. Sū. II 3 18) Therefore, in (the passages)

'This Samprasāda rising up from this body, having attained to the highest Light, emerges in his own form' (Chā 8·3·4)

'As rivers trickling down disappear into the sea, giving up (their individual) names and forms, so, the wise one, completely freed from name and form, goes into the shining Purusa—higher than the high' (Mu 3·2 8)

इति, उत्क्रमिष्यतः परमात्मभावाज्जीवशब्देन, परमात्मनोऽभिधानमिति, औडुलोमिराचार्यो मन्यते स्म ॥ २१ ॥

[235] अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः ॥ २२ ॥

यदुक्तम्—उत्क्रमिष्यतो जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावाद्ब्रह्मणस्तच्छब्देनाभिधानमिति—तदप्ययुक्तम्, विकल्पासहत्वात्। अस्य जीवात्मन उत्क्रान्तेः पूर्वमनेवंभावः किं स्वाभाविकः, उत, औपाधिकः? तत्रापि पारमार्थिकोऽपारमार्थिको वा, इति। स्वाभाविकत्वे ब्रह्मभावो नोपपद्यते, भेदस्य स्वरूपप्रयुक्तत्वेन स्वरूपे विद्यमाने तदनपायात्।

अथ भेदेन सह स्वरूपमप्यपैतीति, तथा सति विनष्टत्वादेव तस्य न ब्रह्मभावः, अपुरुषार्थत्वादिदोषप्रसङ्गश्च। पारमार्थिकौपाधिकत्वेऽपि प्रागपि ब्रह्मैवेत्युत्क्रमिष्यत एवंभावादिति विशेषो न युज्यते वक्तुम्। अस्मिन्पक्षे हि, उपाधिब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेण वस्त्वन्तराभावात्, निरवयवस्य ब्रह्मण उपाधिना छेदाद्यसंभवाच्च, उपाधिगत एव भेद इत्युत्क्रान्तेः प्रागपि ब्रह्मैव। औपाधिकस्य भेदस्यापारमार्थिकत्वे, कस्यायमुत्क्रान्तौ ब्रह्मभावः? इति वक्तव्यम्।

ब्रह्मण एवाविद्योपाधितिरोहितस्वरूपस्येति चेत्—न, नित्यमुक्तस्वप्रकाशज्ञान-

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there is the denotation of the Paramātman by the word Jiva, on account of the Jiva being possessed of the nature of the Paramātman while getting out—so does think Auḍulomi ॥21॥

[235] On account of his staying in, so (says) Kāśakṛtsna ॥ 22 ॥

As to what has been said— That on account of Jiva about to go out, becoming Brahman, there is the denotation of Brahman by that word,—that also (is) improper, on account of (this matter) not being capable of having any alternatives (such as)—prior to the departure of this Jivātman is this his being not this natural or conditioned, (and) there again, is that real or unreal? If it be natural, being Brahman can not be accounted for, because the difference being caused by the nature would not go away when the nature is in existence

If (it be argued) the nature also goes away along with the distinction, —in that case, on account of his being definitely destroyed, there would not be the nature of Brahman in him (Jivātman), and there would result the undesirable contingency — the blemish of there being no human purpose in life etc. Even though the conditioned nature were real it is not proper to speak of the specific mention, on account of this nature of (the Jiva) about to depart —, because he is Brahman even before According to this view, indeed, there being no other entity over and above Brahman with its limiting adjuncts, and because there is the impossibility of dividing Brahman without parts, into parts etc. by the adjuncts, the difference belongs to the limiting adjuncts alone — and so (the Jiva) is Brahman even prior to the departure (from the body) If the difference due to the adjuncts is not real whose is this being Brahman on departure ?— this has to be stated (by you)—

If (it is stated that) it belongs to the Brahman itself, with its nature screened by the limiting adjunct, Avidyā— (we say) No, on account of the

स्वरूपस्याविद्योपाधितिरोधानासंभवात् । तिरोधानं नाम वस्तुस्वरूपे विद्यमाने तत्प्रकाशनिवृत्तिः । प्रकाश एव वस्तुस्वरूपम्, इत्यङ्गीकारे तिरोधानाभावः स्वरूपनाशो वा स्यात् । अतः, नित्याविर्भूतस्वस्वरूपत्वात्तस्योत्क्रान्तौ ब्रह्मभावे न कश्चिद्विशेषः, इत्युत्क्रमिष्यत इति विशेषणं व्यर्थमेव ।

'अस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य' (छा ८।३।४)

इति पूर्वमनेवंरूपस्य न तदानीं ब्रह्मतापत्तिमाह, अपि तु पूर्वसिद्धस्वरूपस्याविर्भावम् । तथा हि वक्ष्यते

'संपद्याविर्भावः स्वेनशब्दात्' (ब्र सू ४।४।१)

इत्यादिभिः । अतः,

'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि' (छा ६।३।२)

इति ।

'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरो यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा शरीरं य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति स त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः' (बृ ३।७।२२)

'योऽक्षरमन्तरे संचरन्यस्याक्षरं शरीरं यमक्षरं न वेद एष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मापहतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायणः ।' (सुबा)

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impossibility of the screening by the limiting adjunct Avidyā, in the case of one of the nature of knowledge, eternal, free and self-illumining Screening means— the nature of a thing being there, the absence of its illumining If it is accepted that the illumining itself is the nature of an entity, there would be the absence of screening or the destruction of its nature Therefore, on account of his own nature being always manifest, there is no particular difference about him in being Brahman when departing—and so the specific mention—while about to depart— would be indeed useless In (the passage)

'Rising up from this body, having attained to the highest Light' (Chā 8 3 4)

the *Sruti* speaks not of (the Jiva) being Brahman at that time, not being possessed of that form before, but of the manifestation of the nature already established To the same effect would be stated — by (the Sūtra)

'Manifestation on merging by the word Svena' (Bra Sū IV 4 1)

and others Therefore by (the passage)

'By this Living Self, Ātman having entered into may I modify name and form (Cha 6 3 2)

(and) by

'Who, abiding in the Ātman, within the Ātman, whom the Ātman knows not, whose body (is) the Ātman, who controls the Ātman within — he (is) your Ātman, the inner Controller, immortal' (Br 3 7·22)

'Who causing to move the Aksara within, whose body (is) Aksara, whom Aksara knows not — this one, the inmost Ātman of all, with sins destroyed, the shining god alone Nārāyana' (Subā)

'अन्तःप्रविष्टः शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मा' (तै. आ. ३।११।२)

इति स्वशरीरभूते जीवात्मन्यात्मतयावस्थिते जीवशब्देन ब्रह्मप्रतिपादनमिति काशकृत्स्न आचार्यो मन्यते स्म। जीवशब्दश्च जीवस्य परमात्मपर्यन्तस्यैव वाचको, न जीवमात्रस्य, इति पूर्वमेवोक्तं (पृ. १६७)

'नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि' (छा. ६।३।२)

इत्यत्र। एवमात्मशरीरभावेन तादात्म्योपपादने परस्य ब्रह्मणोऽपहतपाप्मत्वसर्वज्ञत्वादिगोचरा जीवस्याविदुषः शोचतो ब्रह्मोपासनान्मोक्षवादिन्यः, जगत्सृष्टिप्रलयाभिधायिन्यो जगतो ब्रह्मतादात्म्योपदेशपराश्च सर्वाः श्रुतयः सम्यगुपपादिता भवन्ति, इति काशकृत्स्नीयमेव मतं सूत्रकारः स्वीकृतवान्।

अयमत्र वाक्यार्थः—अमृतत्वोपाये मैत्रेय्या पृष्टे याज्ञवल्क्यः

'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः' (बृ. ४।५।६)

इत्यादिना परमात्मोपासनममृतत्वोपायमुक्त्वा,

'आत्मनि खल्वरे दृष्टे' (बृ. ४।५।६)

इत्यादिना, उपास्यलक्षणं दुन्दुभ्यादिदृष्टान्तैश्च, उपासनोपकरणभूतमनःप्रभृतिकरणग्रामनियमनं च सामान्येनाभिधाय,

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'Entered within, the Controller of people, the Ātman of all' (Tai. Ār. 3·11·2)

—the preceptor Kāśakṛtsna thinks that there is the propounding of Brahman by the word Jīva, when (the Brahman) has established itself as the Ātman in the Jīvātman that is its body. Further, that the word Jīva is denotative of the Jīva (the Living Soul) right up to the Paramātman himself, not merely of the Jīva,—this has been already stated (P. 167) in connection with

'May I modify name and form.' (Chā. 6·3 2)

Thus in propounding the identity of the Jīva and the Paramātman by the relation of Ātman-body, all the Sruti passages referring to the Highest Brahman having all the sins destroyed and being omniscient etc., (and the S'ruti passages) speaking of salvation for the Jīva feeling miserable, being unwise, from the worship of Brahman (and) speaking of the creation, annihilation of the world, and aiming at describing the identity of Brahman with the world, would be appropriately explained, and so, the Sūtrakāra accepted only Kāśakṛtsna's view.

This is the sense of the passages here—When Yājñavalkya was asked by Maitreyī about the means for (securing) immortality, (Yājñavalkya) having spoken of the worship of the Paramātman, in

'The Ātman, verily, dear one, is to be seen' (Br. 4 5 6)

etc., as the means for immortality, and having mentioned in a general manner the characteristics of the object of worship by the illustrations of the drum etc., and the control of the group of sense-organs, headed by the mind, that are the instruments of worship, in (the passage)

'When the Ātman, dear one, is seen' (Br. 4·5·6)

and having instructed at great length in (the passage)—

'स यथार्द्रैधाग्ने' (बृ. ४।५।११)

इत्यादिना

'स यथा सर्वासामपां समुद्र एकायनम्' (बृ ४।५।१२)

इत्यादिना च, उपास्यभूतस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणो निखिलजगदेककारणत्वं सकलविषयप्रवृत्तिमूलकरणग्रामनियमनं च विस्तीर्णमुपदिश्य,

'स यथा सैन्धवघन' (बृ ४।५।१३)

इत्यादिना, अमृतत्वोपायप्रवृत्तिप्रोत्साहनाय जीवात्मस्वरूपेणावस्थितस्य परमात्मनोऽपरिच्छिन्नज्ञानैकाकारतामुपपाद्य, तस्यैवापरिच्छिन्नज्ञानैकाकारस्य संसारदशायां भूतपरिणामानुवृत्तिम्,

'विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्य समुत्थाय तान्येवानुविनश्यति'

(बृ ४।५।१३)

इत्यभिधाय,

'न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्ति' (बृ ४।५।१३)

इति मोक्षदशायां स्वाभाविकापरिच्छिन्नज्ञानसंकोचाभावेन भूतसंघातैनैकीकृत्य, आत्मनि देवादिरूपज्ञानाभावमुक्त्वा, पुनरपि,

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'*He, as from the fire with wet fuel*' (Br 4 5·11)

and

'*He, as the ocean is the one rendezvous of all waters*'

(Br 4 5 12)

etc, about the Highest Brahman, the object of worship, being the sole cause of the whole world, and the control (by it) of the group of sense-organs that are the root-cause of all activity towards the objects of sense, —having propounded in (the passage)

'*He, as the mass of salt*' (Br 4 5 13)

etc, the uniform nature as infinite knowledge alone in the case of the Paramātman who abides in the form of the Jivātman, in order to encourage the activity towards the means of securing immortality, having mentioned in (the passage)—

'*The Vijñāna mass itself, having risen up from these beings (elements), perishes after them alone*' (Br 4 5–13)

the course of transformation of elements of that same (Paramatman) of uniform nature as infinite knowledge alone in the condition of worldly life, having in (the passage)

'*Having departed, there is no consciousness*' (Br 4 5 13)

spoken of, in the state of salvation, the absence of the knowledge of forms, gods etc in the case of the Ātman that has become one with the aggregate of elements on account of the contraction of the natural infinite knowledge, having once again driven away ideas about difference on account of the absence of another entity apart from Brahman in (the passage)

'यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति' (बृ. ४।५।१५)

इत्यादिना, ब्रह्मात्मकत्वेन नानाभूतवस्तुदर्शनमज्ञानकृतमिति निरस्तनिखिलाज्ञानस्य ब्रह्मात्मकं कृत्स्नं जगदनुभवतो ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तवस्त्वन्तराभावेन भेददर्शनं निरस्य,

'येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात्' (बृ. ४।५।१५)

इति च जीवात्मा स्वात्मतयावस्थितेन येन परमात्मनाहितज्ञानः सन् इदं सर्वं येन विजानाति, अयं तं केन विजानीयात्, न केनापि-'इति परमात्मनो दुरवगमत्वमुपपाद्य,

'स एष नेति नेति' (बृ. ४।५।१५)

इत्यादिना, अयं सर्वेश्वरः स्वेतरसमस्तचिदचिद्वस्तुविलक्षणरूप एव सर्वशरीरः सन्, सर्वस्यात्मतयावस्थित इति स्वशरीरभूतचिदचिद्वस्तुगतैर्दोषैर्न संस्पृश्यते, इत्यभिधाय,

'विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयादित्युक्तानुशासनासि मैत्रेय्येतावदरे खल्वमृतत्वम्' (बृ. ४।५।१५)

इति समस्तवस्तुविसजातीयं निरस्तनिखिलदोषं निखिलजगदेककारणभूतं सर्वस्य विज्ञातारं पुरुषोत्तममुक्तप्रकारादुपासनादृते, केन विजानीयात्–इतीदमेवोपासनममृतत्वोपायो ब्रह्म-

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'Where indeed, there is as it were duality' (Br. 4·5·15)

etc., because the idea of different elements and entities is caused by ignorance, on account of their having Brahman as their Ātman, in the case of one with his entire ignorance removed and experiencing the whole world as having Brahman as Ātman; and having propounded the difficulty of apprehending Paramātman in (passages) like

'By whom one knows all this, by what would one know him?' (Br. 4·5·15)

by whom—by the Paramātman staying as his Atman, this (Jīvātman) knows all this with his knowledge conferred upon him—by what should he be known?—not by anything; and having mentioned in (the passage)

'This one, he, not this, not this' (Br. 4·5·15)

etc., that this Overlord with his nature different from all sentient and non-sentient entities other than himself, having, verily, all as his body, stands as the Ātman of all, and so, is not touched by the blemishes belonging to the sentient and non-sentient entities that have become his body; and in (the passage)

'By what, dear one, would one know the knower? (O) Maitreyī, you have been thus given the instruction; so much, (O) dear one, (is), indeed, immortality.' (Br. 4·5·15)

—Yājñavalkya spoke of this worship itself as the means for immortality —and attainment to Brahman is called immortality,—because by what excepting the worship of the said kind, would one know the Puruṣottama of an entirely different nature from all things, with all blemishes removed, the one (sole) cause of the entire world, and the knower of everything? Therefore, because

प्तिरेव चामृत्वमभिधीयते, इत्युक्तवान्। अतः, परं ब्रह्मैवास्मिन्वाक्ये प्रतिपाद्यते, इति परमेव ब्रह्म जगत्कारणं पुरुषस्तदधिष्ठाता च प्रकृतिः, इति स्थितम् ॥ २२ ॥

वाक्यान्वयाधिकरण समाप्तम् (६)

[236] प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात् ॥ २३ ॥

(अधिकरण ७–सूत्राणि २३–२८)

एवं निरीश्वरसांख्ये निरस्ते सति सेश्वरसांख्यः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते। यद्यपि, ईक्षणादिगुणयोगात्सर्वज्ञमीश्वरं जगत्कारणत्वेन वेदान्ताः प्रतिपादयन्ति, तथापि वेदान्तैरेव जगदुपादानतया प्रधानमेव प्रतिपाद्यते, इति प्रतीयते। न हि वेदान्ताः सर्वज्ञस्यापरिणामिनोऽधिष्ठातुरीश्वरस्याधिष्ठेयेनाचेतनेन परिणामिना प्रधानेन विना जगतः कारणत्वमवगमयन्ति। तथाहि— अपरिणामिनमेनं प्रकृतिं चैतदधिष्ठितां परिणामिनीमधीयते—

' निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निरवद्यं निरञ्जनम् । (श्वे ६।१९)
' स वा एष महानज आत्माजरोऽमर ' (बृ ४।४।२५)
' विकारजननीमज्ञामष्टरूपामजां ध्रुवाम् ।
ध्यायतेऽध्यासिता तेन तन्यते प्रेर्यते पुन ॥

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the Highest Brahman itself is propounded in this passage, it is established that the Highest Brahman (is) the cause of the world, the Purusa, and the Prakrti has him as the supervisor ॥ 22 ॥

Here ends the Vākyānvayādhikarana (6)

[236] Also the Prakrti (the material cause is Brahman) in keeping with the solemn declaration and the illustrative instance ॥ 23 ॥

(Adhikarana 7, Sūtras 23-28)

With the god-less Sānkhya (system) being thus refuted, the Sānkhya (opponent) believing in Iśvara stands up —Although the *Upanisads* propound the omniscient Lord as the cause of the world on account of his association with the qualities, reflection etc still it is apprehended that by the same Upanisadic passages Pradhāna is propounded as the constituent material of the world Not indeed do the *Upanisads* declare as the cause of the world the Lord, omniscient, not undergoing transformation, and the supervisor without the Pradhāna, the one supervised over, non-sentient and undergoing transformation Thus they read of this one as not undergoing transformation, and of the Prakrti, supervised over by him and undergoing a transformation (in passages like)

' Without parts, without action, tranquil, blameless, without blemish ' (Śve 6 19)

' He, verily, this great unborn Ātman, ageless, deathless ' (Br 4 4 25)

' Her, the mother of (all) modifications, ignorant, eight-formed, unborn (speech) (and) permanent—she, supervised over by him, is meditated upon, is spread out, is further incited '.

सूयते पुरुषार्थांश्च तेनैवाधिष्ठिता जगत् ।
गौरनाद्यन्तवती सा जनित्री भूतभाविनी ॥' (चू ३–४)

इति । तथा प्रकृतिमुपादानभूतामधिष्ठायैवेश्वरो विश्वं जगत्सृजति, इति श्रूयते

'अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत् ।' (श्वे ४।९)
'मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ।' (श्वे. ४।१०)

इति । स्मृतिरपि

'मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सूयते सचराचरम् ।' (भ गी ९।१०)

इति । एवम्, अश्रुतेऽपि प्रधानोपादानत्वे, ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वश्रुत्यन्यथानुपपत्त्यैव प्रधानस्वरूपं तस्येश्वराधिष्ठितस्य जगदुपादानकारणत्वं च सिध्यति । एवमेव हि लोके निमित्तोपादानयोरत्यन्तभेदो दृश्यते । मृत्सुवर्णादेरचेतनस्य घटकटकाद्युपादानत्वम्, चेतनस्य कुलालस्वर्णकारादेश्च निमित्तत्वं च नियतमुपलभ्यते । कार्यनिष्पत्तिश्च नियमेनानेककारकसव्यपेक्षा दृष्टा । एवं निमित्तोपादानयोर्भेदनियमं कार्यनिष्पत्तेरनेककारणसव्यपेक्षत्वनियमं चातिक्रम्य, एकमेव ब्रह्मोपादानं निमित्तं च प्रतिपादयितुं न प्रभवन्ति वेदान्तवाक्यानि । अतः, ब्रह्म निमित्तकारणमेव, नोपादानम् । उपादानं तु तदधिष्ठितं

And, supervised by him alone, she gives birth to the world and the human purposes in life; the cow without beginning and end (is) she, the (female) originator, the creator of creatures' (Cū. 3-4)

Similarly, it is declared in the (following) Śruti (passages) that Iśvara creates the universal world, verily, taking his stand upon the Prakṛti which has become the constituent material—

'From this one, the Māyin creates this universe' (Śve. 4·9)
'One should know Māyā again, to be Prakṛti and the Māyin to be the Great Lord'. (Śve 4·10)

And the Smṛti also —

'With me as the presiding agent, Prakṛti produces, along with the movable and the immovable'. (Gītā. 9-10)

Thus, even though the Pradhāna as being the constituent material is not mentioned in the Śruti, on account of the very impossibility of accounting for otherwise, the Śruti passage referring to Brahman being the cause of the world, is established the nature of Pradhāna, and its being the constituent material cause of the world, being supervised over by the Lord, for, in this way alone, is seen in the world the absolute divergence between the instrumental cause and the material cause — the non-sentient clay, gold etc, being the material cause of jar, bracelet etc, and the sentient potter, goldsmith etc being the instrumental cause are invariably to be found. The production of the effect further is seen to depend upon more than one cause. Thus, violating the rule about the divergence between the instrumental cause and the material cause, and the rule about the production of the effect depending upon more than one cause, the Vedānta passages have no power to propound one and the same Brahman as being the material as well as the instrumental cause. Therefore, Brahman is the instrumental cause alone,

प्रधानमेवेति ।

[23] एवं प्राप्ते, अभिधीयते—' प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात् ' इति । प्रकृतिश्च—उपादानं च, न निमित्तकारणमात्रं ब्रह्म । उपादानकारणं च ब्रह्मैवेत्यर्थः । कुतः ? प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात् । एवमेव हि प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तौ नोपरुध्येते । प्रतिज्ञा तावत्,

> *' स्तब्धोऽस्युत तमादेशमप्राक्ष्यो येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातम् '* (छा. ६।१।१)

इत्येकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानविषया । दृष्टान्तश्च

> *' यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्यात् ... यथा सोम्यैकेन लोहमणिना ... यथा सोम्यैकेन नखनिकृन्तनेन '* (छा. ६।१।१-२-३)

इति कारणविज्ञानात्कार्यविज्ञानविषयः । यदि निमित्तकारणमेव जगतो ब्रह्म, तदा तद्विज्ञानान्न समस्तं जगद्विज्ञातं स्यात् । न हि कुलालादिविज्ञानेन घटादि विज्ञायते । अतः, प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तयोर्बाध एव । ब्रह्मण एवोपादानत्वे, उपादानभूतमृत्पिण्डलोहमणिनखनिकृन्तनविज्ञानेन घटमणिककटकमुकुटवासीपरश्वधादितत्कार्यविज्ञानवन्निखिलजगदेक-

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(and) not the material cause. The material cause, for the matter of that, is the Pradhāna alone *supervised over by that*—

[237] This (prima-facie view being reached), this is stated (in reply)— 'Also the Prakṛti (the material cause is Brahman) in keeping with the solemn declaration and illustrative instance. ' Prakṛtiśca—the material cause as well, not merely the instrumental cause (is) Brahman,— the sense is that Brahman alone is the material cause as well. Whence ? In conformity with the solemn declaration and illustrative instance. It is in this way indeed that the solemn declaration and the illustrative instance are not contradicted. The solemn declaration, for the matter of that—

> *' You are (quite) stiff. Did you indeed ask for the instruction by which the unheard of is heard , the unthought of is thought; the unknown is known ? '* (Chā 6·1·1)

refers to the knowledge of everything by the knowledge of one And the illustrative instance—

> *' Just as, (O) gentle one, by one clod of earth, everything made of earth may be known just as, (O) gentle one, by one nugget of gold ... just as (O) gentle one, by a pair of scissors '* (Chā 6·1·1–2–3)

refers to the knowledge of the effect from the knowledge of the cause. If Brahman were merely the instrumental cause of the world, then by the knowledge of that, the whole world could not be known. Not, indeed, by the knowledge of the potter etc., is known the jar etc. Hence, (there is) the stultification of the solemn declaration and the illustrative instance. If Brahman itself were the material cause, then as, by the knowledge of the clod of earth, the nugget of gold, and the nail-scissors

कारणभूते ब्रह्मणि विज्ञाते, तत्कार्यं निखिलं जगद्विज्ञातमेव स्यात्। कारणमेवावस्थान्तरमापन्नं कार्यम्, न द्रव्यान्तरम्—इति कार्यकारणरूपेणावस्थितमृत्तद्विकारादिनिदर्शनेन प्रतिज्ञासमर्थनात्, ब्रह्मैव जगदुपादानं च, इति निश्चीयते।

[238] यत्तु—निमित्तोपादनयोर्भेदः श्रुत्यैव प्रतीयते, इति—तदसत्, निमित्तोपादानयोरैक्यप्रतीतेः

'उत तमादेशमप्राक्ष्यो येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति' (छा. ६।१।१)

इति। आदिश्यते प्रशिष्यतेऽनेन, इत्यादेशः

'एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठतः' (बृ. ३।८।९)

इत्यादिश्रुतेः। साधकतमत्वेन कर्ता विवक्षितः। तम्—आदेष्टारम्, अप्राक्ष्यो येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति—इति। येनादेष्ट्रा, अधिष्ठात्रा श्रुतेनाश्रुतमपि श्रुतं भवतीति निमित्तोपादानयोरैक्यं प्रतीयते

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेव' (छा. ६।२।१)

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that have become the material cause, (comes) the knowledge of the jar, gemmed bracelet (and) crown, the hatchet, axe etc, that are the effects,—so, when Brahman, the sole cause of the entire world, is known, its effect, the whole world is bound to be known. The effect (is) the cause itself occupying another state and is not another substance,—and so, it is concluded that Brahman is also the material cause of the world, owing to the corroboration of the solemn declaration by the illustrations about earth and its modifications etc. that stay in the form of effect and cause.

[238] As to (the statement) that the difference between the instrumental cause and the constituent cause, is apprehended by means of the Sruti passage itself,—(we say), that (is) wrong, on account of the apprehension of the identity of the instrumental and constituent (causes), in (the passage)

'But did you ask for the instruction by which the unheard of is heard?' (Chā. 6·1·1)

—Adeśa is that by which something is directed or commanded, in accordance with the Sruti

'By the command of this Aksara, verily, (O) Gārgi, the Sun and the moon, stay on, held up' (Br. 3·8·9)

etc. The agent here is intended as being the most efficient (cause)—Did you ask for that director by whom the unknown is known? Yena—(by whom), by the director, the supervisor,—being heard,—even the unheard of becomes heard'—thus the identity of the instrumental and constituent causes is apprehended,—on account of the ascertainment of identity prior to creation as in

'Existence, alone, (O) gentle one, this was at the beginning, the one only.' (Chā. 6·2·1)

इति प्राक्सृष्टेरेकत्वावधारणात्, अद्वितीयपदेनाधिष्ठात्रन्तरनिषेधाच्च ।

नन्वेवं सति,

' विकारजननीम् ' (चू. ३)

' गौरनाद्यन्तवती ' (चू. ५)

इत्यादिभिः प्रकृतेराद्यन्तवद्विरहेण नित्यत्वं जगदुपादानत्वं च श्रूयमाणं कथमुपपद्यते ? तदुच्यते—तत्रापि, अविभक्तनामरूपं कारणावस्थं ब्रह्मैव प्रकृतिशब्देनाभिधीयते, ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तवस्त्वन्तराभावात् । तथाहि श्रुतयः

' सर्वं तं परादाद्योऽन्यत्रात्मनः सर्वं वेद ' (बृ. २।४।६)

' यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत्...केन कं विजानीयात् ' (बृ. ४।५।१५)

इत्याद्याः ।

' सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म ' (छा. ३।१४।१)

' ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम् ' (छा. ६।८।७)

इति कार्यावस्थं कारणावस्थं च सर्वं जगद्ब्रह्मात्मकमिति श्रवणाच्च । एतदुक्तं भवति—

' यः पृथिवीमन्तरे संचरन्यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं यं पृथिवी न वेद ' (सुबा.)

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and on account of the repudiation of another supervisor by the word Advitīya (without a second).

I say (says the objector)— This being the case, how can be accounted for the eternal nature of the Prakrti owing to its being void of beginning and end, and its being the constituent cause of the world, declared in the Sruti (passages) like

' The mother of modifications ' (Cū. 3)

' The cow, having no beginning nor end ' (Cū. 5)

—(to that) this is said (in reply)—There also by the word Prakrti is denoted Brahman itself with name and form not distinguished (separate), and being in the state of the cause, on account of the absence of any other entity over and above Brahman To the same effect (are) the Sruti (passages)—

' Everything abandons him who knows everything elsewhere than in Ātman ' (Br 2·4·6)

' But where, for whom everything has become Ātman alone; then by what would one see whom by what would one know whom? ' (Br. 4 5·15)

etc., and also on account of the declaration in the Sruti (passages)

' Everything indeed (is) this, Brahman ' (Chā 3·14·1)

' All this is constituted of this Ātman ' (Chā. 6 8·7)

that the whole world in the state of effect and in the state of cause, has Brahman as its Ātman. This is what is intended to be said—Beginning with

' Who, moving within the earth; whose body (is) the earth, whom the earth knows not ' (Subā.)

इत्यारभ्य,

'योऽव्यक्तमन्तरे सचरन्यस्याव्यक्त शरीर यमव्यक्त न वेद योऽक्षरमन्तरे सचरन्यस्याक्षर शरीर यमक्षर न वेद' (सुबा)

'य पृथिव्या तिष्ठन्य पृथिव्या अन्तरो य पृथिवी न वेद यस्य पृथिवी शरीर य पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयति' (बृ ३।७।३)

इत्यारभ्य,

'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरो यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा शरीर य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति स त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृत' (बृ ३।७।२२)

इति च सर्वचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरतया सर्वदा सर्वात्मभूत परं ब्रह्म कदाचिद्विभक्तनामरूपं कदाचिच्चाविभक्तनामरूपम्। यदा विभक्तनामरूपम्, तदा तदेव बहुत्वेन कार्यत्वेन चोच्यते, यदाविभक्तनामरूपं तदैकमद्वितीयं कारणमिति च। एवं सर्वदा चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणोऽविभक्तनामरूपा या कारणावस्था, सा

'गौरनाद्यन्तवती'। (चू ५)

'विकारजननीमज्ञाम्।' (चू ३)

'अजामेकाम्' (श्वे ४।५)

इत्यादिभिरभिधीयत इति।

'Who, moving within the Avyakta (Unmanifest), whose body is the Avyakta, whom the Avyakta knows not, who moving the Aksara within, whose body (is) the Aksara, whom the Aksara knows not' (Suba)

and beginning with

'Who, residing in the earth (is) different from the earth, whom the earth knows not, whose body (is) the earth, who controls the earth inside' (Br 3 7 3)

—up to

'Who, residing in the Ātman (is) different from the Ātman, whom the Ātman knows not, whose body (is) the Ātman who controls the Ātman inside, He (is) your Ātman inner Controller, immortal' (Br 3 7 22)

—the Highest Brahman, always the Ātman of everything owing to its having the entire sentient and non sentient entities for its body, (is) sometimes with name and form distinguished and sometimes with name and form not distinguished When it has name and form distinguished, then that same is spoken of as being many and as being the effect, and when it has name and form not distinguished, then (it is spoken of) as one without a second and the cause In this way, of the Highest Brahman having always the sentient and the non sentient entities as its body, the state of cause with name and form not distinguished, —that is denoted by (passages)

'The cow having no beginning nor end' (Cū 5)

'The mother of modifications ignorant' (Cū 3)

'The female goat, one' (Śve 4 5)

etc

[239] ननु च

'महानव्यक्ते लीयते अव्यक्तमक्षरे लीयते' (सुबा.)

इति प्रलयश्रुतेः, अव्यक्तस्योत्पत्तिप्रलयौ प्रतीयेते। तथा च महाभारते

'तस्मादव्यक्तमुत्पन्नं त्रिगुणं द्विजसत्तम'। (भा. शा. ३२१।२९)

'अव्यक्तं पुरुषे ब्रह्मन्निष्कले संप्रलीयते'। (भा. शा. ३२६।३०)

इति। नैष दोषः, अचिद्वस्तुशरीरस्य ब्रह्मणोऽव्यक्तशब्दवाच्यायास्त्रिगुणावस्थायाः कार्यत्वात्।

'यदा तमस्तन्न दिवा न रात्रिः' (श्वे. ४।१८)

इति कृत्स्नप्रलयदशायामपि ब्रह्मात्मकस्यातिसूक्ष्मस्याचिद्वस्तुनः स्थित्यभिधानाज्जगत्कारणस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणः प्रकारभूतमतिसूक्ष्मं चिदचिद्वस्तु नित्यमेवेति तत्प्रकारं ब्रह्मैव

'गौरनाद्यन्तवती' (चू. ५)

इत्यादिष्वभिधीयते। अत एव च,

'अक्षरं तमसि लीयते तमः परे देव एकीभवति' (सुबा.)

इति तमस एकीभावमात्रमेव श्रूयते, न तु लयः। एकीभावः, इति तमोऽभिधानातिसूक्ष्माचिद्वस्तुप्रकारस्य ब्रह्मणोऽविभक्तनामरूपतयावस्थानमभिधीयते।

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[239] I say (says the objector)—But

'The Mahat gets merged in the Avyakta; the Avyakta gets merged in the Akṣara' (Subā.)

—owing to this Sruti declaring the dissolution, the origination and the dissolution of the Avyakta are apprehended. To the same effect, in the *Mahābhārata*

'From that, the Unmanifest with three qualities, was originated, (O) best of Brahmins' (Mbh. Śānti 321·29)

'The Avyakta (Unmanifest) is well-merged in the Puruṣa without parts, (O) Brahman'. (Mbh. Śānti 326·30)

—(To this we reply)—This is no blemish, because the state of possessing three qualities, denoted by the word Avyakta is the product of Brahman having the non sentient entities as its body.

'When there was the darkness, then neither day nor night.' (Śve 4·18)

—here, even in the state of total dissolution, on account of the statement of the *existence of an extremely subtle non-sentient entity* having Brahman as its Ātman, is denoted Brahman itself possessed of those modes, because the extremely subtle, sentient and non-sentient entities, the modes of the Highest Brahman which is the cause of the world, are verily, eternal—in

'The cow having no beginning, nor end'. (Cū. 5)

For this reason itself, in

'The Akṣara is merged in Darkness, Darkness becomes one with the highest god' (Subā.)

is declared by the Śruti, Tamas (Darkness) being merely one with, and not the annihilation—By Ekībhāvaḥ—being one with—is denoted the state of Brahman, with name and form not distinguished and having the mode—the extremely subtle non-sentient entity called Tamas (Darkness). (The passages)

'तम आसीत्तमसा गूढमग्रे प्रकेतम् ।' (तै ब्रा. २।८।२)
'तमसस्तन्महिनाजायतैकम्' (तै ब्रा २।८।९)

इत्याद्यप्येतदेव वदति । तथा च मानवं वचनम्

'आसीदिदं तमोभूतमप्रज्ञातमलक्षणम् ।
अप्रतर्क्यमविज्ञेयं प्रसुप्तमिव सर्वतः ॥' (मनु १।५)

इति ।

'अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत्' (श्वे ४।९)

इत्याद्यनन्तरमेवोपपादयिष्यते ब्रह्मणोऽपरिणामित्वश्रुतयश्च ।

[240] यत्तु—एकस्य निमित्तत्वमुपादानत्वं च न संभवति, एककारकनिष्पाद्यत्वं च कार्यस्य, लोके तथा नियमदर्शनात् । अतः, अग्निना सिञ्चेत्, इतिवद्वेदान्तवाक्यान्येकस्मादेवोत्पत्तिं प्रतिपादयितुं न प्रभवन्तीति—अत्रोच्यते—सकलेतरविलक्षणस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणः सर्वशक्तेः सर्वज्ञस्यैकस्यैव सर्वमुपपद्यते । मृदादेरचेतनस्य ज्ञानाभावेनाधिष्ठातृत्वायोगात्, अधिष्ठातुः कुलालादेर्विचित्रपरिणामशक्तिविरहात्, असत्यसंकल्पतया च तथा दर्शननियमः । अतः, ब्रह्मैव जगतो निमित्तमुपादानं च ॥ २३ ॥

'*There was Darkness concealed by Darkness, in front the characteristic sign.*' (Tait. Brā. 2 8·2)

'*From Tamas was produced one by its greatness*' (Tait Brā 2 8 9)

etc, declare this same. To the same effect is the statement of Manu—

'*There was this, all darkness, unknown, undistinguishable, unthinkable, unknowable, as though deep in sleep everywhere*' (Manu 1 5)

'*From this, the Māyin creates this universe*' (Śve 4 9)

—This etc, would be explained immediately and also the Sruti passages declaring the non-modification of Brahman.

[240] As to (what has been said)—Being the instrumental cause and being the material cause in the case of one and the same are not possible, and also being produced by only one producing cause —because such a rule is not seen in the world Therefore like —One should sprinkle over with fire— the Vedānta passages have no power to propound the origination from only one (cause)—To this we reply—Everything is appropriate in the case of the one alone, the Highest Brahman, quite different from everything else, omnipotent, omniscient In the case of the non-sentient earth and others (however), there cannot be the status of a supervisor, owing to the absence of knowledge, and in the case of the potter etc. there is not the state of having thoughts fulfilled, owing to the obsence of the power of multifarious modifications— —and so there is that kind of rule about the things being seen like that (produced in a particular manner). Therefore, Brahman is the instrumental as well as the constituent cause of the world ॥ 23 ॥

[241] अभिध्योपदेशाच्च ॥ २४ ॥

इतश्चोभयं ब्रह्मैव,

' सोऽकामयत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय '   (तै. २।६)

इति

' तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय '   (छा. ६।२।३)

इति स्रष्टुर्ब्रह्मणः स्वस्यैव बहुभवनसंकल्पोपदेशात् । विचित्रचिदचिद्रूपेण, अहमेव बहु स्यां प्रजायेय, इति संकल्पपूर्विका हि सृष्टिरुपदिश्यते ॥ २४ ॥

साक्षाच्चोभयाम्नानात् ॥ २५ ॥

न केवलं प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्ताभिध्योपदेशादिभिरयमर्थो निश्चीयते । ब्रह्मण एव निमित्तत्वमुपादानत्वं च साक्षादाम्नायते

' किं स्विद्वनं क उ स वृक्ष आसीद्यतो द्यावापृथिवी निष्टतक्षुः ।
मनीषिणो मनसा पृच्छतेदु तद्यदध्यतिष्ठद्भुवनानि धारयन् ॥
ब्रह्म वनं ब्रह्म स वृक्ष आसीद्यतो द्यावापृथिवी निष्टतक्षुः ।
मनीषिणो मनसा विब्रवीमि वो ब्रह्माध्यतिष्ठद्भुवनानि धारयन् ॥

(तै ब्रा. २।८।९)

इति । अत्र हि स्रष्टुर्ब्रह्मणः किमुपादानं कानि चोपकरणानीति लोकदृष्ट्या पृष्टे, सकलेतर-

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[241] And on account of the instruction about reflection ॥ 24 ॥

And for this reason, Brahman alona is both, on account of the instruction about the reflection of Brahman, the creator, of being itself many by reflection, in

' He reflected— may I be many, may I procreate.'   (Tai. 2·6)

' It reflected— may I be many; may I procreate '   (Chā. 6·2·3)

in the form of the variegated sentient and non-sentient entities. ॥ 24 ॥

On account of the direct declaration about both in the Śruti ॥ 25 ॥

Not only is this matter ascertained by (taking into consideration) the solemn declaration, the illustrative instance, the mention of reflection: Brahman being the instrumental as well as the constituent cause is directly mentiond in the Sruti, in

' What possibly wood, what possibly the tree, verily, was that from which they fashioned out the heaven and the earth ? (O) wise men, ask in your mind about that, which stood (there), supporting the worlds '.

' Brahman the wood, Brahman the tree was (there) from which they fashioned out the heaven and the earth; (O) wise men, I speak out to you, (thinking) in the mind— Brahman stood (there), supporting the worlds. '   (Tai. Brā. 2·8·9)

Here, indeed, when a question was asked from the popular view-point —what was the material for the *creator* Brahman, and what were the instruments— (the objection) was refuted (by the reply) that Brahman itself

विलक्षणस्य ब्रह्मणः सर्वशक्तियोगो न विरुध्यते, इति ब्रह्मैवोपादानमुपकरणानि च, इति परिहृतम् । अतश्च, उभयं ब्रह्म ॥ २५ ॥

[242] आत्मकृतेः ॥ २६ ॥

'सोऽकामयत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' (तै २।६)

इति सिसृक्षुत्वेन प्रकृतस्य ब्रह्मण

'तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत' (तै २।७)

इति सृष्टेः कर्मत्वं कर्तृत्वं च प्रतीयते, इत्यात्मन एव बहुत्वकरणात्तस्यैव निमित्तत्वमुपादानत्वं च प्रतीयते । अविभक्तनामरूप एवात्मा कर्ता, स एव विभक्तनामरूपः कार्यम्, इति, कर्तृत्वकर्मत्वयोर्न विरोधः । स्वयमेवात्मानं तथाकुरुत, इति निमित्तमुपादानं च ॥ २६ ॥

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै २।१)

'आनन्दो ब्रह्म' (तै ३।६)

'अपहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोको विजिघत्सोऽपिपासः ।' (छा ८।१।५)

'निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निरवद्यं निरञ्जनम्' (श्वे ६।१९)

'स वा एष महानज आत्माजरोऽमरः' (बृ ४।४।२५)

(was) the material and the instruments because, in the case of Brahman which is different from everything else, the possession of all powers is not contradicted Therefore, also, Brahman is both ॥ 25 ॥

[242] On account of the doing of the Ātman ॥ 26 ॥

In the case of the Brahman which is the matter in hand as desirous of creation

'*He desired— May I be many may I procreate*' (Tai 2 6)

is apprehended the nature of the agent as well as of the object of creation in the passage

'*It, of its own accord created itself*' (Tai 2 7)

and so, is apprehended in the case of the Ātman his being the instrumental as well as the material cause on account of himself being made many The Atman himself with name and form not distinguished (is) the doer he himself with name and form distinguished (is) the effect so, there is no contradiction between the nature of the agent and the nature of the effect By (the statement)—he himself made himself like that—is apprehended (his being) the instrumental and the material (cause) ॥ 26 ॥

Existence Knowledge Infinite Brahman (Tai 2 1)

'*Bliss, Brahman* (Tai 3 6)

'*With sins destroyed ageless deathless without grief, without hunger, without thirst*' (Cha 8 1·5)

'*Without parts, without action tranquil, blameless without blemish*' (Śve 6 19)

'*He, verily this great unborn Ātman, ageless immortal*' (Bṛ 4 4 25)

इति स्वभावतो निरस्तसमस्तचेतनाचेतनवर्तिदोषगन्धस्य निरतिशयज्ञानानन्दैकतानस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणो विचित्रानन्तापुरुषार्थास्पदविचित्रचिदचिन्मिश्रप्रपञ्चरूपेण, आत्मनो बहुभवनसंकल्पपूर्वकं बहुभवनं कथमुपपद्यते ? इत्याशङ्क्याह—

[243] परिणामात् ॥ २७ ॥

परिणामस्वाभाव्यात्, नात्रोपदिश्यमानस्य परिणामस्य परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि दोषावहत्वस्वभावः, प्रत्युत निरङ्कुशैश्वर्यावहत्वमेव, इत्यभिप्रायः। एवमेव हि परिणाम उपदिश्यते। अशेषहेयप्रत्यनीककल्याणैकतानं स्वेतरसमस्तवस्तुविलक्षणं सर्वज्ञं सत्यसंकल्पमवाप्तसमस्तकाममनवधिकातिशयानन्दं स्वलीलोपकरणभूतसमस्तचिदचिद्वस्तुजातशरीरतया तदात्मभूतं परं ब्रह्म, स्वशरीरभूते प्रपञ्चे तन्मात्राहंकारादिकारणपरंपरया तमःशब्दवाच्यातिसूक्ष्माचिद्वस्त्वेकशेषे सति, तमसि च स्वशरीरतया पृथग्विनिर्देशानर्हातिसूक्ष्मदशापत्त्या स्वस्मिन्नेकतामापन्ने, तथाभूततमःशरीरं ब्रह्म पूर्ववद्विभक्तनामरूपचिदचिन्मिश्रप्रपञ्चशरीरं स्यामिति संकल्प्य, अप्ययक्रमेण जगच्छरीरतयात्मानं परिणमयति, इति सर्वेषु वेदान्तेषु परिणामोपदेशः।

—(In these passages) in the case of the Highest Brahman that is by nature with even the tinge of blemish residing in the entire sentient and non-sentient entities driven away, uniform in excessive knowledge and bliss—how can being many be accounted for, preceded by the reflection about being many in the case of the Atman in the form of the worldly life mixed up with variegated sentient and non-sentient things, that is the abode of the objects not serving the human purpose in life and are variegated and endless ?—Having raised this objection (the Sūtrakāra) says—

[243] On account of modification ॥ 27 ॥

On account of modification being the nature, there cannot be here, in the case of the Highest Brahman, the nature involving blemish, of modification that is being taught; but on the other hand there is the nature involving uncurbed overlordship—this is the intention. It is, indeed, thus that modification is being taught. The Highest Brahman having the uniform nature of auspiciousness that is the opposite of everything to be abandoned, (which is) different from all objects other than itself, omniscient, with all thoughts fulfilled, with all desires secured, (which is) endless and excessive bliss, which, on account of having the aggregate of all sentient and non-sentient entities that have become the means of its sport, has become their *Ātman*,—*when there is the worldly life that* has become its body with an extremely subtle non-sentient entity remaining, denoted by the word Tamas owing to the series of causes, Tanmātras, ego, etc., and when the Tamas (darkness) has become one within itself on account of its being reduced to an extremely subtle state not befitting a separate mention, being its body.—Brahman modifies itself with the world as its body in the order of dissolution, having first reflected—May I, Brahman having the Darkness reduced to that state as the body, have the body of worldly existence mixed with sentient and non-sentient objects with name and form distinguished as *before—such (is)* the instruction about modification in all the Vedāntas.

तथैव बृहदारण्यके कृत्स्नस्य जगतो ब्रह्मशरीरत्वं ब्रह्मणस्तदात्मकत्वं चाम्नायते—

'यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन्पृथिव्या अन्तरो यं पृथिवी न वेद यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं यः पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयत्येष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः' (बृ. ३।७।३)

इत्यारभ्य,

'यस्यापः शरीरं यस्याग्निः शरीरं यस्यान्तरिक्षं शरीरं यस्य वायुः शरीरं यस्य द्यौः शरीरं यस्यादित्यः शरीरं यस्य दिशः शरीरं यस्य चन्द्रतारकं शरीरं यस्याकाशः शरीरं यस्य तमः शरीरं यस्य तेजः शरीरं यस्य सर्वाणि भूतानि शरीरं यस्य प्राणः शरीरं यस्य वाक्शरीरं यस्य चक्षुः शरीरं यस्य श्रोत्रं शरीरं यस्य मनः शरीरं यस्य त्वक्शरीरं यस्य विज्ञानं शरीरं यस्य रेतः शरीरम्' (बृ. ३।७।४-२३)

इत्येवमन्तेन काण्वपाठे । माध्यंदिने तु पाठे विज्ञानस्य स्थाने—यस्यात्मा शरीरमिति विशेषः। लोकयज्ञवेदानां परमात्मशरीरत्वमधिकम्। सुबालोपनिषदि च पृथिव्यादीनां तत्त्वानां परमात्मशरीरत्वमभिधाय, वाजसनेयकेऽनुक्तानामपि तत्त्वानां शरीरत्वं ब्रह्मण आत्मत्वं च श्रूयते

To the same effect in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* is declared the entire world being the body of Brahman, and Brahman being its Ātman in the Kāṇvapāṭha, beginning with

'Who, residing in the earth (is) different from the earth, whom the earth knows not; whose body (is) the earth, who controls the earth within,—this (is) your Ātman, the inner-Controller, immortal' (Br. 3·7·3)

(and) ending with

'Whose body (is) waters; whose body (is) Agni; whose body (is) the mid-region; whose body (is) the wind; whose body (is) the sky; whose body (is) the Sun; whose body (is) the quarters; whose body (is) the moon and stars; whose body (is) the Ākāśa; whose body (is) darkness; whose body (is) the light; whose body (is) all beings; whose body (is) Prāṇa; whose body (is) Vāk (speech); whose body (is) the eye; whose body (is) the ear; whose body (is) the mind; whose body (is) the skin; whose body (is) the Vijñāna; whose body (is) the semen.' (Br. 3·7·4–23)

In the Mādhyandina recension, however, in place of Vijñāna, (there is) whose body (is) the Atman—this (is) the difference, and there is the additional (statement) about the worlds, sacrifices and Vedas being the body of the Paramātman. And in the *Subālopaniṣad* after the mention of the principles, the earth etc. as the body of the Paramātman, are declared the principles even though not mentioned in the *Vājasaneyaka* as the body and Brahman being their Ātman—in

'यस्य बुद्धिः शरीरं यस्याहंकारः शरीरं यस्य चित्तं शरीरं यस्याव्यक्तं शरीरं यस्याक्षरं शरीरं यो मृत्युमन्तरे संचरन्यस्य मृत्युः शरीरं यं मृत्युर्न वेदैष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मापहतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायणः' (सुबा)

इति । अत्र मृत्युशब्देन परमसूक्ष्ममचिद्वस्तु तमःशब्दवाच्यमभिधीयते,

'अव्यक्तमक्षरे लीयतेऽक्षरं तमसि लीयते' (सुबा.)

इति तस्यामेवोपनिषदि क्रमप्रत्यभिज्ञानात् । सर्वेषामात्मनां ज्ञानावरणानर्थमूलत्वेन तदेव हि तमो मृत्युशब्दव्यपदेश्यम् । सुबालोपनिषदि, एवं ब्रह्मशरीरतया तदात्मकानां तत्त्वानां ब्रह्मण्येव प्रलय आम्नायते

'पृथिव्यप्सु प्रलीयते, आपस्तेजसि लीयन्ते तेजो वायौ लीयते वायुराकाशे लीयते, आकाशमिन्द्रियेष्विन्द्रियाणि तन्मात्रेषु तन्मात्राणि भूतादौ लीयन्ते भूतादिर्महति लीयते महानव्यक्ते लीयतेऽव्यक्तमक्षरे लीयतेऽक्षरं तमसि लीयते तमः परे देव एकीभवति' (सुबा)

इति । अविभागापत्तिदशायामपि चिदचिद्वस्त्वतिसूक्ष्मं सकर्मसंस्कारं तिष्ठति, इत्युत्तरत्र वक्ष्यते

'Whose body (is) Buddhi; whose body (is) Ahamkāra; whose body (is) Citta; whose body (is) Avyakta, whose body (is) Aksara; who moving Mrtyu within; whose body (is) Mrtyu, whom Mrtyu knows not,—this, the inmost Ātman of all beings, with sins destroyed, the shining god, the one, Nārāyana'. (Subā)

Here by the word Mrtyu is denoted the extremely subtle non-sentient entity expressed by the word Tamas, on account of the recognition of the order in the same *Upanisad*, in (the passage)

'The Avyakta is merged in the Aksara, the Aksara is merged in Tamas' (Subā)

Owing to (Tamas) being, indeed, the root of disaster in the form of the veil of knowledge in the case of all Ātmans, the same Tamas is fit to be referred to by the word Mrtyu In the *Subālopanisad* thus, owing to their being the body of Brahman, the principles having that as the Ātman, are declared as *merging in Brahman alone*—

'The earth is merged in the waters, the waters are merged in Tejas, Tejas is merged in Vāyu, Vayu is merged in the Ākāśa, Ākāśa in the sense-organs, the sense-organs, in subtle elements, the subtle elements are merged in elements etc, the elements etc are merged in Mahat, Mahat is merged in Avyakta, Avyakta is merged in Aksara, Aksara is merged in Tamas; Tamas becomes one with the highest god' (Subā.)

Even in the state of not being divided, the sentient and the non-sentient entity extremely subtle, stands with the impressions of the Karman— this would be mentioned later (in the Sūtra)

'न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्नानादित्वादुपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते च।'

(ब्र. सू. २।१।३५)

इति।

एवं स्वस्माद्विभागव्यपदेशानर्हतया परमात्मन्येकीभूतात्यन्तसूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरादेकस्मादेवाद्वितीयान्निरतिशयानन्दात्सर्वज्ञात्सर्वशक्तेः सत्यसंकल्पाद्ब्रह्मणो नामरूपविभागार्हस्थूलचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरतया बहुभवनसंकल्पपूर्वको जगदाकारेण परिणामः श्रूयते

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. २।१)

'तस्माद्वा एतस्माद्विज्ञानमयात्। अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमयः' (तै. २।५)

'एष ह्येवानन्दयाति' (तै. २।७)

'सोऽकामयत। बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति। स तपोऽतप्यत। स तपस्तप्त्वा। इदं सर्वमसृजत। यदिदं किं च। तत्सृष्ट्वा। तदेवानुप्राविशत्। तदनुप्रविश्य। सच्च त्यच्चाभवत्। निरुक्तं चानिरुक्तं च। निलयनं चानिलयनं च। विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च। सत्यं चानृतं च सत्यमभवत्' (तै. २।६)

इति। अत्र तपःशब्देन प्राचीनजगदाकारपर्यालोचनरूपं ज्ञानमभिधीयते,

'यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः' (मु. १।१।९)

'Not owing to the non-division of Karman,— if it is argued thus, (the reply is)— No, on account of (the Saṁsāra) having no beginning; this is proper and this is also noticed.'

(Bra. Sū. II. 1. 35)

Thus, the modification in the form of the world preceded by the reflection about being many, with the gross sentient and non-sentient objects fit for the distinction of name and form, being its body, is declared in the Śruti in the case of Brahman, from itself, having for its body extremely subtle sentient and non-sentient entities that have become one in the Paramātman, owing to their not being fit for a separate mention, —one alone, without a second, having excessive bliss, omniscient, omnipotent, with thoughts fulfilled, in

'Existence, Knowledge, Infinite (is) Brahman' (Tai. 2·1)

'From that, verily, from this Vijñānamaya— another, inner Ātman, Ānandamaya (abounding in bliss)' (Tai. 2·5)

'This one, verily, causes delight' (Tai. 2·7)

'He desired— May I be many, may I procreate— He practised penance; he, having practised penance, created all this— whatever indeed (is) this; having created that, he entered into that same; having entered into that, he became Sat and Tyat, divided and un-divided, abode and non-abode, Vijñāna and non-Vijñāna; truth and untruth, he became Satya.' (Tai. 2·6)

Here by the word Tapas is denoted the knowledge in the form of revolving upon the old form of the world, on account of the Sruti (passage)

'Whose (is) the penance constituted of knowledge' (Mu. 1·1·9)

इत्यादिश्रुतेः। प्राक्सृष्टं जगत्संस्थानमालोच्य, इदानीमपि तत्संस्थानं जगदसृजत्, इत्यर्थः। तथैव हि ब्रह्म सर्वेषु कल्पेष्वेकरूपमेव जगत्सृजति

'सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत्
दिवं च पृथिवीं चान्तरिक्षमथो सुवः।' (म. ना. ५।७)
'यथर्तुष्वृतुलिङ्गानि नानारूपाणि पर्यये।
दृश्यन्ते तानि तान्येव तथा भावा युगादिषु' (वि. पु. १।५।६४)

इति श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यः।

तदयमर्थः—स्वयमपरिच्छिन्नज्ञानानन्दैकस्वभावोऽत्यन्तसूक्ष्मतयासत्कल्पः स्वलीलोपकरणचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरतया तन्मयः परमात्मा विचित्रानन्तक्रीडनकोपादित्सया स्वशरीरभूतप्रकृतिपुरुषसमष्टिपरंपरया महाभूतपर्यन्तमात्मानं तत्तच्छरीरकं परिणमय्य, तन्मयः पुनः सत्त्यच्छब्दवाच्यविचित्रचिदचिन्मिश्रदेवादिस्थावरान्तजगद्रूपोऽभवत्।

'तदेवानुप्राविशत्। तदनुप्रविश्य' (तै. २।६)

इति कारणावस्थायामात्मतयावस्थितः परमात्मैव कार्यरूपेण विक्रियमाणद्रव्यस्याप्या-

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etc. The sense is— Having considered the configuration of the world created before, he created even at the present moment, the world having that configuration. In the very same manner, Brahman creates the world of this same one form in all the Kalpas—

'The Creator planned the Sun and the moon, as before, —the heaven and the earth: the mid-region and the light.' (Ma. Nā 5·7)

'Just as during the seasons, the characteristic features of seasons having various forms are seen at the change over,—the same over and over again—so, the beings at the beginnings of the Yugas.' (V. P 1·5·64)

—thus in the Srutis and the Smrtis.

So, this is the sense—The Paramātman, himself possessing the nature of unlimited knowledge and bliss alone, almost non-existing on account of being extremely subtle; owing to having sentient and non-sentient objects that are the means of sport for his body, being made up of those; having modified himself right up to the gross elements, by the series of the cosmos Prakrti and Purusa that have become his body, with a desire to take up variegated endless play-things; became once again possessed of the form of the world beginning with the gods and ending with the inanimate things, mixed up with the variegated sentient and non-sentient expressed by the words Sat and Tyat— Paramātman, himself staying as Ātman in the state of cause, himself became various things, having remained as Ātman even in the objects being modified in the form of the effect— as in

'He entered into that same; having entered into that' (Tai. 2·6)

Thus— in the modification in the form of the world constituted of the sentient and non-sentient aggregate, of the Paramātman, all the portions of the sentient

त्मतयावस्थाय तत्तद्भवदित्युच्यते। एवं परमात्मचिदचित्संघातरूपजगदाकारपरिणामे परमात्मशरीरभूतचिदचिदंशगताः सर्वे एवापुरुषार्थाः, तथाभूताचिदंशगताश्च सर्वविकाराः परमात्मनि कार्यत्वं तदवस्थयोस्तयोर्नियन्तृत्वेनात्मत्वं च। परमात्मा त्वनयोः स्वशरीरभूतयोर्नियन्तृतयात्मभूतस्तद्गतापुरुषार्थैर्विकारैश्च न स्पृश्यते। अपरिच्छिन्नज्ञानानन्दमयः सर्वदैकरूप एव जगत्परिवर्तनलीलयावतिष्ठते। तदेतदाह

' सत्यं चानृतं च सत्यमभवत् ' (तै. २।६)

इति। विचित्रचिदचिद्रूपेण विक्रियमाणमपि ब्रह्म सत्यमेवाभवत्, निरस्तानिखिलदोषगन्धमपरिच्छिन्नज्ञानानन्दमेकरूपमेवाभवत्, इत्यर्थः। सर्वाणि चिदचिद्वस्तूनि सूक्ष्मदशापन्नानि स्थूलदशापन्नानि च परस्य ब्रह्मणो लीलोपकरणानि सृष्ट्यादयश्च लीला, इति भगवद्द्वैपायनपराशरादिभिरुक्तम्

' अव्यक्तादिविशेषान्तं परिणामर्द्धिसंयुतम् ।
क्रीडा हरेरिदं सर्वं क्षरमित्युपधार्यताम् ॥ (म भा. शा २०६।५८)
' क्रीडतो बालकस्येव चेष्टां तस्य निशामय ' (वि. पु. १।२।१८)
' बालः क्रीडनकैरिव ' (वायु पु. उत्तर. ३६।६९)

इत्यादिभिः। वक्ष्यति च

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and the non-sentient that have become the body of the Paramātman are indeed not conducive to the human purpose in life ; the portions of the non-sentient becoming likewise, all modifications — the state of the effect in the Paramātman and the nature of both in that state, as the Ātman, because they are controlled by him. The Paramātman, however, is not touched by the activities not conducive to the human purpose in life, and by the modifications associated with them that have become his body, being the Ātman of them owing to his being the controller, abounding in unlimited knowledge and bliss, always of a uniform nature, he stays sporting in the modification of the world. Thus says (the Sruti) in

'Truth and untruth, he became Satya.' (Tai. 2·6)

The Brahman, even though undergoing transformation in the variegated forms of sentient and non-sentient became Satya alone,—the sense is—it became, with even the tinge of blemishes removed, unlimited bliss and knowledge and uniform only. All the sentient and non-sentient objects attaining to the subtle state and also attaining to the gross state, are the means of sport for the Highest Brahman, and creation etc. are the sport — this has been stated by His Holiness Dvaipāyana, Parāśara etc.—in

' All this, beginning with the Unmanifest etc. and ending with distinctions, associated with the glory of modification,—(all this is) perishable, the sport of Hari,—let this be borne in mind.' (MBh Śā. 206 58)

' Listen to his activity like the play of a child sporting '. (V. P. 1·2·18)

' Like a child with the playthings '. (Vāyu. P. Uttara. 36·69)

and such other (passages). (The Sūtrakāra) will also state

'लोकवत्तु लीलाकैवल्यम्' (ब्र. सू. २।१।३३)

इति ।

'अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत्
तस्मिंश्चान्यो मायया संनिरुद्धः ।' (श्वे. ४।९)

इति च ब्रह्मणि जगद्रूपतया विक्रियमाणेऽपि तत्प्रकारभूताचिदंशगताः सर्वे विकारास्तत्प्रकारभूतक्षेत्रज्ञगताश्चापुरुषार्था इति विवेक्तुं प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्ब्रह्मशरीरभूतयोस्तदानीं तथानिर्देशानर्हातिसूक्ष्मदशापन्नया ब्रह्मणैकीभूतयोरपि भेदेन व्यपदेशः,

'तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत' (तै. २।७)

इत्येवमादिभिरैकार्थ्यात् । तथा च मानवं वचः

'सोऽभिध्याय शरीरात्स्वात्सिसृक्षुर्विविधाः प्रजाः ।
अप एव ससर्जादौ तासु वीर्यमपासृजत् ॥' (मनु. १।८)

इति । अत एव, ब्रह्मणो निर्दोषत्वनिर्विकारत्वश्रुतयश्चोपपन्नाः । अतः, ब्रह्मैव जगतो निमित्तमुपादानं च ॥ २७ ॥

योनिश्च हि गीयते ॥ २८ ॥

इतश्च जगतो निमित्तमुपादानं च ब्रह्म । यस्माद्योनित्वेनाप्यभिधीयते

'*As in the world* (*there is*) *mere sport*'. (Bra. Sū. II·1·33)

And in (the passage)—

'*From this one, the Māyin creates this universe; and in that, another is well restrained by the Māyā*'. (Śve. 4·9)

in the case of Brahman although being modified in the form of the world, all the modifications associated with the non-sentient portion, that are its modes and those not conducive to salvation, associated with the Kṣetrajña, that are its modes— in order to distinguish (this) there (is) a separate mention of the Prakṛti and Puruṣa, that are the body of Brahman, even though they have *become one with Brahman, owing to their being reduced to an extremely* subtle state not befitting such a mention at that time, on account of all this having the same sense as in (passages)

'*That, of its own accord, modified itself*' (*Tai 2·7*)

etc. To the same effect, is the statement of Manu—

'*He, having reflected, desirous of creating from his own body various kinds of people, created in the beginning waters, verily, and let off in them his semen*'. (Manu. 1·8)

For this reason itself, the Śruti passages dealing with Brahman being without blemish and being without modification are appropriate. Therefore, Brahman alone (is) the instrumental as well as the material cause of the world ॥ 27 ॥

And it is sung as the Producing Source ॥ 28 ॥

For this reason also, Brahman (is) the instrumental and the constituent cause, because it is mentioned as being the Yoni also, in (the passage)

'कर्तारमीशं पुरुषं ब्रह्मयोनिम्' (मु. ३।१।३)

इति।

'यद्भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ति धीराः' (मु. १।१।६)

इति च। योनिशब्दश्चोपादानवचन इति

.'यथोर्णनाभिः सृजते गृह्णते च' (मु. १।१।७)

इति वाक्यशेषादवगम्यते ॥ २८॥

प्रकृत्यधिकरणं समाप्तम् (७)

एतेन सर्वे व्याख्याता व्याख्याताः ॥ २९॥

(अधिकरण ८, सूत्र २९)

एतेन, पादचतुष्टयोक्तन्यायकलापेन सर्ववेदान्तेषु जगत्कारणप्रतिपादनपराः सर्वे वाक्यविशेषाश्चेतनाचेतनविलक्षणसर्वज्ञसर्वशक्तिब्रह्मप्रतिपादनपरा व्याख्याताः। व्याख्याता इति पदाभ्यासोऽध्यायपरिसमाप्तिद्योतनार्थः ॥ २९॥

सर्वव्याख्यानाधिकरणं समाप्तम् (८)

इति श्रीमद्भगवद्रामानुजाचार्यविरचिते शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्ये
प्रथमस्याध्यायस्य चतुर्थः पादः समाप्तः।
प्रथमाध्यायः समाप्तः।

'The doer, the Lord, the Puruṣa, the Brahman-Yoni' (Mu. 3·1·3)

and

'What the wise visualise as the Yoni of the beings'. (Mu. 1·1·6)

The word Yoni expresses material—this is known from the remaining passage–

'As the spider creates and also grasps'. (Mu. 1·1·7)

॥ 28 ॥

Here ends the Prakṛtyadhikarana (7)

By this, all are explained, are explained ॥ 29 ॥

By this aggregate of reasonings mentioned in the four Quarters, all the particular passages in all the Vedāntas aiming at propounding the cause of the world are explained as propounding Brahman different from the animate and the inanimate, omniscient, (and) omnipotent. The repetition of (the word) Vyākhyātāh is intended to point out to the end of the Adhyāya, ॥ 29 ॥

Here ends the Sarvavyākhyānādhikaraṇa ॥ 8 ॥

Here ends the fourth Quarter of the first Chapter (Ādhyāya) in the commentary on the Śārīraka-Mīmāṃsā, composed by the Illustrious Revered Rāmānuja.

Here ends the First Chapter

द्वितीयाध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः

स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्नान्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गात् ॥ १ ॥

(अधिकरण १, सूत्र–१–२)

[244] प्रथमेऽध्याये प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणगोचरात्, अचेतनात्, तत्संसृष्टाद्वियुक्ताच्च चेतनात्, अर्थान्तरभूतं निरस्तनिखिलाविद्याद्यपुरुषार्थगन्धम्, अनन्तज्ञानानन्दैकतानम्, अपरिमितोदारगुणसागरम्, निखिलजगदेककारणं सर्वान्तरात्मभूतं परं ब्रह्म वेदान्तवेद्यम्, इत्युक्तम्। अनन्तरम्, अस्यार्थस्य संभावनीयसमस्तप्रकारदुर्धर्षणत्वप्रतिपादनाय द्वितीयोऽध्याय आरभ्यते। प्रथमं तावत्, कपिलस्मृतिविरोधात्, वेदान्तानामतत्परत्वम्, आशङ्क्य निराक्रियते—

कथं स्मृतिविरोधात्, श्रुतेरन्यपरत्वम्? उक्तं हि

'*विरोधे त्वनपेक्षं स्यात्*' (जै सू १।३।३)

इति श्रुतिविरुद्धायाः स्मृतेरनादरणीयत्वम्। सत्यम्। औदुम्बरीं स्पृष्ट्वोद्गायति—इत्यादिषु

First Quarter of the Second Chapter

If (it be argued that if Brahman were the cause of the world) there would be the undesirable contingency viz the blemish about (Kapila-) Smrti having no scope, —(to this we reply) — No, in that case there would be the undesirable contingency, viz the blemish about there being *no scope for other Smrtis* ॥ 1 ॥

(Adhikarana 1, Sūtras 1–2)

[244] In the first Adhyāya it has been stated that the Highest Brahman is what is to be known from the Vedāntas— (the Highest Brahman which is) a different entity from the non-sentient that is within the purview of the means of proof, direct perception etc. and from the *sentient* who is mixed up with, and separate from that, from which (even) the tinge of things not conducive to human purpose in life, like Avidyā etc. is driven away, uniform in endless knowledge and bliss the ocean of limitless noble qualities, the one cause of the whole world, (and) which is the inmost Ātman of all *Afterwards, is now commenced the Second Chapter in order to propound that* this matter cannot be challenged in all its possible bearings First, for the matter of that, having raised the doubt that the Vedāntas do not aim at the above view, owing to the contradiction with the Kapila-Smrti— (that) is refuted—

How could the Sruti be aiming at something else because of contradiction with the Smrti? It has indeed been stated in (the Sūtra)

'*When (there is the) contradiction, (that Smrti) is not to be regarded*' (Jai Su 1·3 3)

that the Smrti which is in contradiction with the Sruti should not be respected—(The reply is)—True, in—He sings after having touched the Udumbara branch—etc there being the possibility of the meaning being ascertained of its own accord, the Smrti contradicting the same is certainly

स्यत एवार्थनिश्चयसंभवात्, तद्विरुद्धा स्मृतिरनादरणीयेव। इह तु वेदान्तवेद्यतत्त्वस्य दुरवबोधत्वेन, परमर्षिप्रणीतस्मृतिविरोधे सति, अयमर्थः, इति निश्चयायोगात्, स्मृत्या श्रुतेः, अतत्परत्वोपपादनमविरुद्धम्। एतदुक्तं भवति—

प्राचीनभागोदितनिखिलाभ्युदयसाधनभूताग्निहोत्रदर्शपूर्णमासज्योतिष्टोमादिकर्माणि यथावदभ्युपगच्छता श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणेषु

'ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलम्' (श्वे. ५।२)

इत्यादिवाक्यैराप्तत्वेन संकीर्तितेन परमर्षिणा कपिलेन परमनिःश्रेयसतत्साधनावबोधित्वेन, उपनिबद्धस्मृत्युपबृंहणेन विना, अल्पश्रुतैर्मन्दमतिभिर्वेदान्तार्थनिश्चयायोगात्, यथाश्रुतार्थग्रहणे च, आप्तप्रणीतायाः सांख्यस्मृतेः सकलाया एवानवकाशत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च, स्मृतिप्रसिद्ध एवार्थो वेदान्तवेद्यः, इति बलादभ्युपगमनीयमिति। न च वाच्यम्—मन्वादिस्मृतीनां ब्रह्मैकत्वकारणत्ववादिनामेवं सति, अनवकाशत्वदोषप्रसङ्ग इति—धर्मप्रतिपादनद्वारेण प्राचीनभागोपबृंहणे, एव सावकाशत्वात्। अस्यास्तु कृत्स्नायाः, तत्त्व-

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not to be respected. But here, because the principle to be known from the *Upanisads* is difficult to be known, when there is the contradiction with the Smṛti composed by the great sages, it is not wrong to propound the Sruti as not aiming at that, with (the aid of) the Smṛti, as there cannot be any ascertainment—viz. such is the (real) meaning. This is what is intended to be said—

Without the amplification by the Smṛti composed for the purpose of enlightening about the highest bliss and the means thereof, by the great sage Kapila who has been glorified as being a truthful speaker in passages like—

'*The sage Kapila born*' (Śve. 5·2)

in the Sruti, Smṛti, History and Purāṇas—(Kapila) who has understood in their real nature the (sacrificial) rites like the Agnihotra, the New-moon and the Full-moon sacrifice, Jyotistoma etc. that are the means of all material prosperity, described in the previous (Pūrvamīmāṃsā) portion, there being no possibility of the ascertainment of the meaning of the *Upanisads* by dull-witted people with little study (hearing) to their credit, and there being the undesirable contingency of the whole of the Sāṅkhya-Smṛti composed by the reliable (Kapila) having no scope, in case the meaning of the Sruti is accepted as it is, it has got to be admitted inspite of yourself (*balāt*) that the subject-matter established in the Smṛti alone, is what is to be known in the Vedāntas. It should not again be stated that in that case, there would be the undesirable contingency viz. the blemish of there being no scope for the Smṛtis of Manu and others, that describe Brahman alone as the cause (of the world); because they have got a scope in the amplification itself of the previous (Karmakāṇḍa) portion through the propounding of religious duty. In the case of this (Smṛti) however, on account of the whole of it aiming at the propounding of the Reality, there would be no scope at all (for it), if (the)

प्रतिपादनपरत्वात्, तथानभ्युपगमे निरवकाशत्वमेव स्यात्। तदिदमाशङ्कते—'स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्ग इति चेत्' इति।

अत्रोत्तरम्—'नान्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गात्' इति। अन्या हि मन्वादिस्मृतयो ब्रह्मैककारणतां वदन्ति। यथाह मनुः—

'आसीदिदं तमोभूतम्' (मनु. १।५)

इत्यारभ्य

'ततः स्वयंभूर्भगवानव्यक्तो व्यञ्जयन्निदम्।
महाभूतादिवृत्तौजाः प्रादुरासीत्तमोनुदः॥' (मनु. १।६)

'सोऽभिध्याय शरीरात्स्वात्सिसृक्षुर्विविधाः प्रजाः।
अप एव ससर्जादौ तासु वीर्यमपासृजत्॥' (मनु. १।८)

इति। भगवद्गीतासु च

'अहं कृत्स्नस्य जगतः प्रभवः प्रलयस्तथा।' (गी. ७।६)

'अहं सर्वस्य प्रभवो मत्तः सर्वं प्रवर्तते।' (गी. १०।८)

इति च। तथा च महाभारते

'कुतः सृष्टमिदं सर्वं जगत्स्थावरजङ्गमम्।
प्रलये च कमभ्येति तन्मे ब्रूहि पितामह। (भा. शा. १७५।१)

Smrti is) not admitted as referring to that (nature of Reality). This is the doubt raised by (the expression)— 'If (it be argued that if Brahman were the cause of the world) there would be the undesirable contingency viz. the blemish about (Kapila) Smrti having no scope—'

Here the answer (is)—'No, in that case, there would be the undesirable contingency viz the blemish about there being no scope for other Smrtis.' For, the others—the Smrtis of Manu and others,—speak of Brahman alone as the cause (of the world), as says Manu, beginning with

'This had been turned into darkness' (Manu 1.5)

'Then the Self-born divine one, unmanifest, appeared manifesting this, with his lustre residing in the great elements, etc dispelling the darkness' (Manu 1·6)

'He, having reflected, desirous of creating various kinds of people from his body, created the waters themselves, in the beginning; in them, he let off (his) semen' (Manu 1·8)

And in the *Bhagavadgitā*—

'I (am) the source, likewise, the dissolution of the entire world' (Gita 7.6)

'I (am) the source of all, from me proceeds everything.' (Gītā 10·8)

Similarly again, in the *Mahābhārata*

'Whence is this whole world, movable and immovable, created? And whom does it go to, at dissolution?—Speak that to me, (O) grandfather—' (Mbh Śā 175·1)

इति पृष्ट आह

'नारायणो जगन्मूर्तिरनन्तात्मा सनातनः।' (भा. शा. १७५·१०)

इति। तथा

'तस्मादव्यक्तमुत्पन्नं त्रिगुणं द्विजसत्तम। (भा. शा. ३२१।२९)

इति

'अव्यक्तं पुरुषे ब्रह्मन्निष्क्रिये संप्रलीयते।' (भा. शा. ३२६।३०)

इति च। आह च भगवान्पराशरः

'विष्णोः सकाशादुद्भूतं जगत्तत्रैव च स्थितम्।
स्थितिसंयमकर्तासौ जगतोऽस्य जगच्च सः॥' (वि. पु १।१।३५)

इति। आह च, आपस्तम्बः

'पूः प्राणिनः सर्वगुहाशयस्य न हन्यमानस्य विकल्मषस्य'

(आ. ध. सू. १।२२।४)

इत्यारभ्य

'तस्मात्कायाः प्रभवन्ति सर्वे स मूलं शाश्वतिकः स नित्यः'

(आ. ध. सू. १।२३।२)

इति। यदि कपिलस्मृत्या वेदान्तवाक्यार्थव्यवस्था स्यात्, तदैतासां सर्वासां स्मृतीनामनवकाशत्वरूपो महान्दोषः प्रसज्येत।

अयमर्थः—यद्यपि वेदान्तवाक्यानाम्, अतिक्रान्तप्रत्यक्षादिसकलेतरप्रमाण-

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—When asked thus, he (the grandfather) says

Nārāyana has the world as his form, eternal, with infinite Ātman' (MBh. Śā. 175·10)

Similarly—

'From him was produced the Avyakta, with the three qualities, (O) best of Brāhmaṇas' (MBh. Śā. 321·29)

And

'The Avyakta gets merged in the non active Puruṣa, (O) Brahman' (MBh. Śā. 326 30)

And the Revered Parāśara also says—

'From the presence of Viṣṇu, rose up the world, and stays on there itself; he (is) the maker of the stability and control of this world; and he (is) the world.' (V. P. 1·1·35)

Āpastamba also says, beginning with,

'The city of the Living Self, abiding in the caves (Prakṛti) of all, not being killed, free from all blemish' (Āpa. Dha. Sū. 1·22·4)

'From him proceed all bodies; he (is) the root, he (is) permanent, eternal.' (Āpa Dha. Sū. 1·23·2)

If the meaning of the Vedānta passages is to be adjusted by the Kapila Smṛti, then there would be the very great inevitable blemish— viz. all those Smṛtis not having any scope.

This is the sense— Although the Vedānta passages aim at propounding the Reality as it is, that over-rides the possibility of the use of all other means

संभावनाभूमिभूतार्थप्रतिपादनपरत्वात्, तदर्थवैशद्याय, अल्पश्रुतानां प्रतिपत्तॄणां तदुपबृंहणमपेक्षितम्, तथापि, तदर्थानुसारिणीनाम्, आप्ततमप्रणितानां बह्वीनां स्मृतीनां तदुपबृंहणाय प्रवृत्तानाम्, अनवकाशता मा प्रसाङ्क्षीत्, इति श्रुतिविरुद्धार्था कापिलस्मृतिरुपेक्षणीया। उपबृंहणं च श्रुतिप्रतिपन्नार्थविशदीकरणम्। तच्च विरुद्धार्थया स्मृत्या न शक्यते कर्तुम्। न च, एतासां स्मृतीनां प्राचीनभागोदितधर्मांशविशदीकरणेन सावकाशत्वम्। परब्रह्मभूतपरमपुरुषाराधनत्वेन धर्मान् विदधतीनाम्, एतासाम्, आराध्यभूतपरमपुरुषप्रतिपादनाभावे सति तदाराधनभूतधर्मप्रतिपादनासंभवात्। तथा हि परमपुरुषाराधनरूपता सर्वेषां कर्मणां स्मर्यते—

'यतः प्रवृत्तिर्भूतानां येन सर्वमिदं ततम्।
स्वकर्मणा तमभ्यर्च्य सिद्धिं विन्दति मानवः॥' (गी. १८।४६)
'ध्यायेन्नारायणं देवं स्नानादिषु च कर्मसु।
ब्रह्मलोकमवाप्नोति न चेहावर्तते पुनः॥' (द. स्मृ.)
'यैः स्वधर्मपरैर्नाथ नरैराराधितो भवान्।
ते तरन्त्यखिलामेतां मायामात्मविमुक्तये॥' (वि. पु. ५।३०।१६)

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of proof, direct perception etc., an amplification of the same is required for the clarification of that matter in the case of the learners having slight learning to their credit; still the Smrti of Kapila has got to be rejected, propounding a matter contradicted by the S'ruti, in order that there may not be want of scope for many Smrtis composed by extremely reliable persons, following the sense of them (Vedāntas) and functioning for the amplification thereof. And Upabrṁhaṇa (is) the clarification of the sense declared by the Sruti, and that is not possible to be accomplished by a Smrti giving an opposite sense. Neither can these Smrtis have scope by the clarification of the portion relating to religious duty referred to in the previous (Karmakāṇḍa) portion, because when there is (in them) the absence of the propounding of the highest Purusa, the object of worship,— these (Smrtis) laying down religious duties as the worship of the highest Purusa who is the Highest Brahman, there is not the possibility of their propounding the religious duties involving his worship. Thus it is pointed out in the Smrtis that all actions have the form of the worship of the highest Purusa—

'From whom (arises) the activity of (all) beings, (and) by whom all this is spread out,— having worshipped him by one's own appointed action (Karman), a human being secures perfection (success)' (Gītā 18-46)

'One should meditate upon God Nārāyana in acts like taking bath etc. He secures the world of Brahman and does not return again' (D. Smr.)

'By whom devoted to their own religious duties, (O) Lord, you are worshipped,— they cross over this entire Māyā for the release of their Ātman'. (V. P. 5·30·16)

इति । न च, ऐहिकामुष्मिकसांसारिकफलसाधनकर्मप्रतिपादनेन, एतासां सावकाशत्वम्, यतस्तेषामपि कर्मणां परमपुरुषाराधनत्वमेव स्वरूपम् । यथोक्तम्—

> ' येऽप्यन्यदेवता भक्ता यजन्ते श्रद्धयान्विताः ।
> तेऽपि मामेव कौन्तेय यजन्त्यविधिपूर्वकम् ॥
> अहं हि सर्वयज्ञानां भोक्ता च प्रभुरेव च ।
> न तु मामभिजानन्ति तत्त्वेनातश्च्यवन्ति ते ॥ ' (गी. ९।२३-२४)

इति । तथा

> ' यज्ञैस्त्वमिज्यसे नित्यं सर्वदेव मयाच्युत ।
> हव्यकव्यभुगेकस्त्वं पितृदेवस्वरूपधृक् ॥ ' (वि. पु. ५।२०।९७)

इति च । यदुक्तम्—

> ' ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलम् ' (श्वे. ५।२)

इति कपिलस्याप्ततया संकीर्तनात्, तत्स्मृत्यनुसारेण वेदार्थव्यवस्थापनं न्याय्यमिति,—तदसत्, बृहस्पतेः श्रुतिस्मृतिषु सर्वेषामतिशयितज्ञानानां निदर्शनत्वेन संकीर्तनात्, तत्प्रणीतेन लोकायतेन श्रुत्यर्थव्यवस्थापनप्रसक्तेः, इति ॥ १ ॥

Nor can these have any scope by propounding rites, the means for securing the fruit pertaining to this world, the hereafter, and worldly life, because even those acts have the nature of the worship it self of the highest Puruṣa. As has been said—

> '*Those also, the devotees of other deities, who endowed with faith offer worship— they also, (O) son of Kuntī, do worship me alone, (but) not in conformity with (the acknowledged) regulations.*'
>
> '*I (am), indeed, the enjoyer of all sacrifices, and also the sole Lord (thereof); but they do not know me in reality; therefore, they drop away.*' (Gītā. 9·23-24)

Similarly—

> '*You are being always worshipped with sacrifices, (O) All-God, by me, (O) Immutable one; you (are) the one enjoyer of offerings to gods and manes, holding the form of gods and manes.*' (V. P. 5·20 97)

As to what has been said— that owing to the glorification of Kapila as a reliable person in (the passage)

> '*The sage born, Kapila*' (Śve. 5·2)

it is just that there should be the adjustment of the sense of the Vedas in conformity with the Smṛtis— that is wrong, on account of there being a danger of the adjustment of the sense of the Śruti by the Lokāyata (materialistic) system of philosophy composed by him (Bṛhaspati) on account of the glorification of Bṛhaspati in the Śruti and the Smṛti as the illustration (model) of all excessively learned persons ॥ 1 ॥

[245] अथ स्यात्—कपिलस्य स्वयोगमहिम्ना वस्तुयाथात्म्योपलब्धेः तत्स्मृत्यनुसारेण वेदार्थो व्यवस्थापयितव्यः, इति । अतः, उत्तरं पठति—

इतरेषां चानुपलब्धेः ॥ २ ॥

च शब्दः, तुशब्दार्थः, चोदिताशङ्कानिवृत्त्यर्थः । इतरेषां मन्वादीनां बहूनां स्वयोगमहिमसाक्षात्कृतपरावरतत्त्वयाथात्म्यानां निखिलजगद्भेषजभूतस्ववाक्यार्थतया

'यद्वै किं च मनुरवदत्तद्भेषजम्' (तै सं २।२।१०।२)

इत्यादिश्रुतिप्रसिद्धानां कपिलदृष्टप्रकारेण तत्त्वानुपलब्धे, श्रुतिविरुद्धा कपिलोपलब्धिः, भ्रान्तिमूला, इति न तया यथोक्तो वेदान्तार्थश्चालयितुं शक्यते, इति सिद्धम् ॥ २ ॥

स्मृत्यधिकरण समाप्तम् (१)

[246] एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः ॥ ३ ॥

(अधिकरण २, सूत्र–३)

एतेन कापिलस्मृतिनिराकरणेन योगस्मृतिरपि प्रत्युक्ता । का पुनरत्राधिका शङ्का यन्निराकरणाय न्यायातिदेशः ? योगस्मृतावीश्वराभ्युपगमात्, मोक्षसाधनतया वेदान्तविहितयोगस्य चाभिधानात्, वक्तुर्हिरण्यगर्भस्य सर्ववेदान्तप्रवर्तनाधिकृतत्वाच्च,

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[245] Now it may be (contended) that on account of Kapila having secured the knowledge of things as they are by his own Yogic power, the sense of the Vedas is to be adjusted in conformity with his Smrti—So (the Sūtrakāra) recites (this) answer—

On account of the others not realising (the Reality as described by Kapila) ॥ 2 ॥

The word Ca has the sense of the word Tu (but), for the purpose of removing the doubt raised *Itaresām*— of Manu and others, many of whom have directly realised the Reality, high and low, by their Yogic power, well-known in the Sruti passages like

'*Whatever indeed Manu said, that (is) medicine*'. (Tai 2 2 10 2)

—on account of the sense of the passages uttered by them being the medicine for the entire world— on account of their not realising the Reality in the manner visualised by Kapila, the realisation by Kapila, opposed to the Sruti is rooted in misconception —and so, it is not possible to shake off the sense of the Vedāntas as mentioned before— this is established ॥ 2 ॥

Here ends the Smrtyadhikarana (1)

[246] By this (refutation) is Yoga refuted ॥ 3 ॥

(Adhikarana 2, Sūtra 3)

By this refutation of the Smrti of Kapila the Yoga-Smrti is also refuted What again (is) the additional doubt here for the dispelling of which (is) this extended application of the rule ? (It is there) on account of the admission of Isvara in the Yoga-Smrti and on account of the mention of the Yoga prescribed in the *Upanisads* as the means for salvation, and on account of the speaker Hiranyagarbha being an authority on the promulgation of all Vedānta,—the amplification of the Vedāntas by his Smrti is proper—

तत्स्मृत्या वेदान्तोपबृंहणं न्याय्यमिति। परिहारस्तु, अब्रह्मात्मकप्रधानकारणवादात्, निमित्तकारणमात्रेश्वराभ्युपगमात्, ध्यानात्मकस्य योगस्य ध्येयैकनिरूपणीयस्य ध्येयभूतयोरात्मेश्वरयोर्ब्रह्मात्मकत्व जगदुपादानतादिसर्वकल्याणगुणात्मकत्वविरहेण, अवैदिकत्वात्, वक्तुर्हिरण्यगर्भस्यापि क्षेत्रज्ञभूतस्य कदाचिद्रजस्तमोभिभवसंभवाच्च, योगस्मृतिरपि तत्प्रणीतरजस्तमोमूलपुराणवद्भ्रान्तिमूला, इति न तया वेदान्तोपबृंहणं न्याय्यम्, इति ॥ ३ ॥

योगप्रत्युक्त्यधिकरणं समाप्तम् (२)

न विलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात् ॥ ४ ॥

(अधिकरण ३, सूत्राणि ४–१२)

[247] पुनरपि स्मृतिविरोधवादी तर्कमवलम्बमानः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते—

यत्साङ्ख्यस्मृतिनिराकरणेन जगतो ब्रह्मकार्यत्वमुक्तम्, तन्नोपपद्यते। अस्य—प्रत्यक्षादिभिरचेतनत्वेन, अशुद्धत्वेन, अनीश्वरत्वेन, दुःखात्मकत्वेन चोपलभ्यमानस्य चिदचिदात्मकस्य—जगतः, भवदभ्युपेतात्, सर्वज्ञात्, सर्वेश्वरात्, हेयप्रत्यनीकात्, आनन्दैकतानात्, ब्रह्मणो विलक्षणत्वात्। न केवलं प्रत्यक्षादिभिरेव जगतो वैलक्षण्यमुपलभ्यते।

The refutation, again, (is as follows) — On account of the view about Pradhāna which has not the nature of Brahman, as the cause (of the world), on account of admitting Īśvara as the instrumental cause alone, on account of the Yoga involving meditation not being based on the Vedas, on account of the thing described as the only object of meditation being void of the nature of having all auspicious qualities, such as being the material cause of the world and having Brahman as the Ātman, in the case of Atman and Īśvara (that are the) objects of meditation, and on account of the speaker Hiranyagarbha, who is the the Ksetra-knower, being possibly overwhelmed by Rajas and Tamas (qualities) some time or other, —the Yoga-Smrti also is rooted in misconception, like the Purāna rooted in Rajas and Tamas, composed by him,—and so, the amplification of the Vedānta (passages) by that (Smrti is) not just. ॥ 3 ॥

Here ends the Yogapratyuktyadhikarana (2)

No, owing to this (world) being different from (Brahman) and its being of that nature from the Word ॥ 4 ॥

(Adhikarana 3, Sūtras 4-12)

[247] Once again, the disputant taking his stand upon the contradiction by the Smrti, stands up, resorting to logical reasoning—

What has been said— that by the repudiation of the Sānkhya-Smrti, the world is the product of Brahman —that cannot stand, on account of this world constituted of the sentient and the non-sentient (entities), which is experienced by means of proof, direct perception and others as being non-sentient, impure, not powerful, and constituted of misery, being different from Brahman admitted by you, (which is) omniscient, all-controller, the opposite of something to be abandoned and of a uniform nature of bliss alone. Not only is the

शब्दाच्च तथात्वं विलक्षणत्वमुपलभ्यते ।

'*विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च*' (तै. २।६।१)
'*एवमेवैता भूतमात्राः प्रज्ञामात्रास्वर्पिताः प्रज्ञामात्राः प्राणेऽर्पिताः*'
(कौ. ३।८)
'*समाने वृक्षे पुरुषो निमग्नोऽनीशया शोचति मुह्यमानः ।*' (श्वे. ४।७)
'*अनीशश्चात्मा बध्यते भोक्तृभावात्*' (श्वे १।८)

इत्यादिभिः कार्यस्य हि जगतोऽचेतनत्वदुःखित्वादयो निर्दिश्यन्ते । यद्धि यत्कार्यं तत्तस्माद-विलक्षणम्, यथा मृत्सुवर्णादिकार्यं घटरुचकादि । अतः, ब्रह्मविलक्षणस्यास्य जगतस्त-त्कार्यत्वं न संभवति, इति साङ्ख्यस्मृत्यनुरोधेन कार्यसलक्षणं प्रधानमेव कारणं भवितु-मर्हति ।

अवश्यं च शास्त्रस्य, अनन्यापेक्षस्य, अतीन्द्रियार्थगोचरस्यापि तर्कोऽनुसरणीयः । यतः सर्वेषां प्रमाणानां क्वचित्क्वचिद्विषये तर्कानुगृहीतानामेव, अर्थनिश्चयहेतुत्वम् । तर्को हि नाम, अर्थस्वभावविषयेण सामग्रीविषयेण वा निरूपणेन, अर्थविशेषे प्रामाण्यं व्यवस्था-पयत्, तत्, इतिकर्तव्यतारूपम्, ऊहापरपर्यायं ज्ञानम् । तदपेक्षा च सर्वेषां प्रमाणानां समाना ।

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difference of the world (from Brahman) experienced by (the means of proof), direct perception etc. alone. From the Śruti text itself, the same nature,— being different, —is known—

'*Consciousness as well as non-consciousness.*' (Tai. 2·6·1)
'*In this same way, these portions of beings are put on the portions of Prajñā; the portions of Prajñā are put on Prāṇa*'
(Kau. 3·8)
'*On the same tree, the Puruṣa sunk deep by helplessness, is grieved, being infatuated*' (Śve. 4·7)
'*And the Ātman (who is) not the ruler is bound down on account of his being the enjoyer*' (Śve. 1·8)

—by such passages are pointed out the non-sentient nature, being possessed of misery etc. of the product, the world. What (is) indeed the product of which, —that is not different from that; as for instance, the product of earth, gold etc., —jar, ornament etc. Therefore, because this world is different from Brahman, Brahman cannot be its cause; so, Pradhāna alone homogeneous with the product deserves to be the cause (of the world) in conformity with the Sānkhya-Smṛti.

And logical reasoning has perforce to be resorted to, in the case of the Sāstra even though it is not dependent upon anything else, and deals with super-sensuous matter; because all the means of proof are the cause of the ascertainment of the sense in the case of some matter of other, only when favoured by logical reasoning. For, logical reasoning, for the matter of that, establishing the authoritative nature in the case of a particular object by the exposition dealing with the nature of the object or dealing with the accessories, — is the knowledge, alternatively called Ūha, of the nature of what is to be done. And dependence upon that (is) common to all means

शास्त्रस्य तु विशेषेण, आकाङ्क्षासंनिधियोग्यताज्ञानाधीनप्रमाणभावस्य सर्वत्रैव तर्कानुग्रहापेक्षा। उक्तं च मनुना

'यस्तर्केणानुसंधत्ते स धर्मं वेद नेतरः' (मनु १२।१०६)

इति। तदेव हि तर्कानुगृहीतशास्त्रार्थप्रतिपादनं श्रुत्या च, मन्तव्यः, इत्युच्यते।

अथ, उच्येत—श्रुत्या जगतो ब्रह्मैककारणत्वे निश्चिते सति तत्कार्यस्यापि जगतश्चैतन्यानुवृत्तिरभ्युपगम्यते। यथा चेतनस्य सुषुप्तिमूर्छादिषु चैतन्यानुपलम्भः, तथा घटादिष्वपि सदेव चैतन्यमनुद्भूतम्। अत एव चेतनाचेतनविभागः, इति—नैतदुपपद्यते, यतो नित्यानुपलब्धिरसद्भावमेव साधयति। अत एव चैतन्यशक्तियोगोऽपि तेषु निरस्तः। यस्य हि क्वचित्कदाचिदपि यत्कार्यानुपलब्धिः, तस्य हि तत्कार्यशक्तिं ब्रुवाणो वन्ध्यासुतसमितिषु तज्जननीनां प्रजननशक्तिं ब्रूयात्। किं च, वेदान्तैर्जगतो ब्रह्मोपादानताप्रतिपादननिश्चये सति, घटादीनां चैतन्यशक्तेः, चैतन्यस्य च, अनुद्भूतस्य सद्भावनिश्चयः, तन्निश्चये सति, वेदान्तैर्जगतो ब्रह्मोपादानताप्रतिपादननिश्चयः, इति, इतरेतराश्रयत्वम्। विलक्षणयोर्हि कार्यकारणभाव प्रतिपादयितुमेव न शक्यते।

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of proof In the case of the Sâstra however, particularly there (is) the dependence on the favour of logical reasoning, everywhere without exception, as its authoritative nature is dependent upon the knowledge of expectancy, juxta-position and compatibility Manu has also said—

'One who combines (his knowledge) with logical reasoning, knows his religious duties, not the other' (Manu 12·106)

And that same establishment of the sense of the Sastra as favoured by logical reasoning is described by the Sruti—in Mantavyah (is to be meditated upon)

If it be argued—when on the strength of the Sruti, it is ascertained that the world has Brahman alone as the cause it is admitted that its product, the world also, is associated with sentiency Just as in the case of the sentient there is the absence of consciousness in deep sleep swoon etc, so also in the case of jar etc the consciousness although existing does not rise to view It is for this reason that (there exists) the division of sentient and non-sentient—(to this we reply)—This is not right, because a permanent non-experience proves non existence itself. For this same reason even the association of the power of consciousness is ruled out in their case, for, where there is the non-experience of a particular effect, anywhere or at any time—let the person who talks of the power of producing the effect in that object, talk about, in the assemblies of sons of barren women, the power of producing children, possessed by their mothers! And further, when on the strength of the Vedantas there is the ascertainment of the propounding of the world having Brahman as the constituent cause—there is the ascertainment of the existence of the power of consciousness in the jar and others, and of consciousness not rising to view, and when that has been ascertained, there is the ascertainment of the propounding of the world as having Brahman as the constituent cause—thus there is the (fault of) mutual interdependence Indeed in the case of two different objects it is not possible to postulate the nature of cause and effect itself

[248] किं पुनः प्रकृतिविकारयोः सालक्षण्यमभिप्रेतं यदभावाज्जगतो ब्रह्मोपादानत्वप्रतिपादनासंभवं ब्रूषे ? न तावत्सर्वधर्मसारूप्यम्, कार्यकारणभावानुपपत्तेः । न च मृत्पिण्डकार्येषु घटशरावादिषु पिण्डत्वाद्यनुवृत्तिर्दृश्यते । अथ येन केनचिद्धर्मेण सारूप्यम्, तज्जगद्ब्रह्मणोरपि सत्तादिलक्षणं संभवति । तदुच्यते—येन स्वभावेन कारणभूतं वस्तु वस्त्वन्तराद्व्यावृत्तं तस्य स्वभावस्य तत्कार्येऽपि, अनुवृत्तिः कार्यस्य कारणसालक्षण्यम् । येन ह्याकारेण मृदादिभ्यो हिरण्यं व्यावर्तते तदाकारानुवृत्तिस्तत्कार्येषु कुण्डलादिषु दृश्यते । ब्रह्म च हेयप्रत्यनीकज्ञानानन्दैश्वर्यस्वभावम् । जगच्च तत्प्रत्यनीकस्वभावमिति न तदुपादानम् । ननु च—वैलक्षण्येऽपि कार्यकारणभावो दृश्यते, यथा चेतनात् पुरुषात्, अचेतनानि केशनखदन्तलोमानि जायन्ते । यथा च, अचेतनात् गोमयात् चेतनो वृश्चिको जायते, चेतनाच्चोर्णनाभेः, अचेतनस्तन्तुः—नैतदेवम्, यतस्तत्राप्यचेतनांशे, एव कार्यकारणभावः ॥ ४ ॥

[249] अथ स्यात्—अचेतनत्वेनाभिमतानामपि चैतन्ययोगः श्रुतिषु श्रूयते

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[248] (We ask you) — What again, is the homogeneity of the cause and effect, intended by you, on account of the absence of which you talk of the impossibility of propounding the world to have Brahman as the constituent cause ? Not, for the matter of that, being possessed of the same form with all the characteristics, on account of the relation of cause and effect not being possible (in such cases). Not, indeed, is seen in the products, — the clod of earth, the saucer etc. — the continuity of the nature of the clod etc. If (you now want to say that) there is parity owing to some characteristic or other, — then even in the case of the world and Brahman, that (parity) characterised by existence etc. is possible. This is what may be said (in clarification by the objector) — By which nature an object which is the cause is differentiated from other objects, the continuity of that nature even in its effect is the homogeneity of the effect with the cause. For, by what form gold is differentiated from earth etc , — the continuity of that form is to be seen in its products, ear-rings etc , Brahman further has the nature of knowledge, bliss, overlordship, being the opposite of things fit to be abandoned, and the world has its nature opposite to that, — and so, it cannot have that (Brahman) as the constituent cause — I say (says the objector) — even when there is a differentiation, the relation of cause and effect is seen ; for instance, — *from a sentient human being, the non-sentient* hair, nail, *teeth*, short hair are produced ; and for instance, — from the non-sentient cow-dung the sentient scorpion is produced ; and from the sentient spider the non-sentient thread, — (to this we reply) — This (is) not so ; for, there also there is the relation of cause and effect in respect of the non-sentient portions alone. ॥ 4 ॥

[249] Now, it may be (argued) that association with consciousness *is declared in the Śruti passages even in respect of objects acknowledged* to be not being sentient—

'तं पृथिव्यब्रवीत्' (तै. सं. ५।६।२)
'आपो वा अकामयन्त' (तै. ब्रा. ३।१।५)
'ते हेमे प्राणा अहंश्रेयसे विवदमाना ब्रह्म जग्मुः' (बृ. ६।१।७)

इति। नदीसमुद्रपर्वतादीनामपि चैतन्यं पौराणिका आतिष्ठन्ते। अतः, न वैलक्षण्यम्, इति—अत उत्तरं पठति—

अभिमानिव्यपदेशस्तु विशेषानुगतिभ्याम् ॥ ५ ॥

तुशब्दश्चोदिताशङ्कानिवृत्त्यर्थः। पृथिव्याद्यभिमानिन्यो देवताः

'तं पृथिव्यब्रवीत्' (तै. सं. ५।६।२)

इत्यादिषु पृथिव्यादिशब्दैर्व्यपदिश्यन्ते। कुतः? 'विशेषानुगतिभ्याम्'। विशेषः—विशेषणम्। देवताशब्देन विशेष्य पृथिव्यादयोऽभिधीयन्ते।

'हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवताः' (छा. ६।३।२)

इति तेजोबन्नानि देवताशब्देन विशेष्यन्ते।

'सर्वा ह वै देवता अहंश्रेयसे विवदमानाः' (कौ. २।१४)
'ते देवाः प्राणे निःश्रेयसं विदित्वा' (कौ. २।१४)

इति च। अनुगतिः—अनुप्रवेशः।

'Prthivi said to him' (Tai. Sam. 5·6·2)
'Waters, verily, desired' (Tai. Brā. 3·1·5)
'They, indeed, these Prāṇas disputing about the pre-eminent position, went to Brahman' (Br. 6·1·7)

The Purāṇa-writers approve of consciousness even in river, ocean, mountain etc. Hence, there (is) no differentiation.—To this (the Sūtrakāra) recites the reply—

But (there is) the indication of the supervising deity, on account of the qualifying attribute and subsequent entering. ॥5॥

The word Tu (is) for the purpose of removing the doubt raised. The deities supervising over the earth etc are indicated by the words Prthivī etc. in

'Prthivī said' (Tai. Sam. 5·6·2)

and other (passages). Whence? 'On account of the qualifying attribute and subsequent entering'. Viśeṣa—the qualifying attribute: the earth etc are denoted by being particularised by the word Devatā.

'Goodness! I, these three deities' (Chā. 6·3·2)

—Here light, water and food are particularised by the word Devatā (deity). and in

'All the deities, indeed, disputing about the pre-eminent position' (Kau. 2·14)
'Those gods having known the highest good in Prāṇa'. (Kau. 2·14)

Anugatih—subsequent entrance.

'अग्निर्वाग्भूत्वा मुखं प्राविशत् । आदित्यश्चक्षुर्भूत्वाक्षिणी प्राविशत् । वायुः प्राणो भूत्वा नासिके प्राविशत्' (ऐ. आ. २।४।२।४)

इत्यादिना वागाद्यभिमानित्वेनाग्न्यादीनाम्, अनुप्रवेशः श्रूयते । अतः, जगतोऽचेतनत्वेन विलक्षणत्वाद्ब्रह्मकार्यानुपपत्तेः, तर्कानुगृहीतस्मृत्यनुरोधेन जगतः प्रधानोपादानत्वं वेदान्तैः प्रतिपाद्यते, इति ॥ ५ ॥

[250] एवं प्राप्ते, अभिधीयते—

दृश्यते तु ॥ ६ ॥

तुशब्दात्पक्षो विपरिवर्तते । यदुक्तम्—जगतो ब्रह्मविलक्षणत्वेन ब्रह्मोपादानत्वं न संभवतीति—तदयुक्तम्, विलक्षणयोरपि कार्यकारणभावदर्शनात् । दृश्यते हि माक्षिकादेर्विलक्षणस्य कृम्यादेस्तस्मादुत्पत्तिः ।

ननु— उक्तम्, अचेतनांश एव कार्यकारणभावात्तत्र सालक्षण्यम्—सत्यमुक्तम् । न तावता कार्यकारणयोर्भवदभिमतसालक्षण्यासिद्धिः । यथाकथंचित्सालक्षण्ये सर्वस्य सर्वसालक्षण्येन सर्वस्मात्सर्वोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गभयात्, वस्तुनो वस्त्वन्तराद्व्यावृत्तिहेतुभूतस्य,

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'*Agni* (*Fire*), *having become Vāk* (*Speech*) *entered the mouth; Āditya (the Sun), having become the eye entered the (two) eyes; Vāyu* (*the wind*), *having become Prāṇa* (*breath*) *entered the* (*two*) *nostrils*' (Ai. Brā. 2·4·2·4)

—In these passages etc. is declared by the Sruti the subsequent entrance of fire etc. as the supervising deities of speech etc. Therefore, on account of the impossibility of the world being the product of Brahman, as (it is) different from the same by being non-sentient, it is propounded by the Vedānta passages that the world has Pradhāna as the constituent cause, in conformity with the Smrti favoured by logical reasoning. ॥ 5 ॥

[250] This having been reached (as the prima-facie view) it is stated (by way of reply)—

But it is seen ॥ 6 ॥

On account of the word Tu (but), the view (stated above) turns away. *What has been stated — it is not possible that the world has Brahman* for its constituent cause, owing to its being different from Brahman — that (is) improper, on account of the relation of cause and effect being seen even in the case of (two) different objects. It is indeed seen (that there is) the origination of worms etc different from honey etc., from that (honey)

I say (says the objector) — It has already been stated (by you) that there is the homogeneity, on account of the relation of cause and effect being there in respect of the non-sentient portion alone — (the reply is) — True, that was said (by us). By that, (however) there cannot be the establishment of homogeneity favoured by you, between the cause and the effect. On account of the fear of the undesirable contingency of everything being *originated from everything, owing to everything being possessed of homo-*

आकारस्यानुवृत्तिः सालक्षण्यं भवताम्युपेतम्। स तु नियमो माक्षिकादिभ्यः कृम्याद्युत्पत्तौ न दृश्यते, इति ब्रह्मविलक्षणस्यापि जगतो ब्रह्मकार्यत्वं नानुपपन्नम्। न हि मृद्धिरण्यघटमुकुटादिष्विव वस्त्वन्तरव्यावृत्तिहेतुभूतासाधारणाकारानुवृत्तिः माक्षिकगोमयकृमिवृश्चिकादिषु दृश्यते ॥ ६ ॥

असदिति चेन्न प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात् ॥ ७ ॥

[251] यदि कार्यभूताज्जगतः कारणभूतं ब्रह्म विलक्षणम्, तर्हि कार्यकारणयोर्द्रव्यान्तरत्वेन कारणे परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि कार्यं जगत्, न विद्यते, इति, असत एव जगत उत्पत्तिः प्रसज्यते, इति चेत्—नैतदेवम्। कार्यकारणयोः सालक्षण्यनियमप्रतिषेधमात्रमेव हि पूर्वसूत्रेऽभिहितम्, न तु कारणात् कार्यस्य द्रव्यान्तरत्वम्। कारणभूतं ब्रह्मैव स्वस्माद्विलक्षणजगदाकारेण परिणमते, इत्येतत्तु न त्यक्तम्। कृमिमाक्षिकयोरपि हि सति च वैलक्षण्ये, कुण्डलहिरण्ययोरिव द्रव्यैक्यमस्त्येव ॥ ७ ॥

[252] अत्र चोदयति—

अपीतौ तद्वत्प्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम् ॥ ८ ॥

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geneity with everything, if homogeneity is admitted to exist somehow or other, you have admitted homogeneity to be the continuity of the form, which is the cause of differentiating one thing from another. But that rule is not seen in the origination of worms etc. from honey etc, — and so, that the world is the product of Brahman, although different from Brahman, is not inappropriate. Not, indeed, as in the case of earth, gold—jar, coronet etc.—is to be seen in the case of honey, cowdung — worms, scorpion etc. — the continuity of the peculiar form which is the cause of exclusion of other objects. ॥ 6 ॥

If (it be argued) that (the world would be) non-existent, (we say)—No, on account of the mere repudiation (of the homogeneity-rule) ॥7॥

[251] If it be argued—If Brahman which is the cause is different from the world which is the effect; then, because the effect and the cause are different substances, in the Highest Brahman, the cause, the world, the effect cannot exist,—and so, there would result the undesirable contingency of the origination of the world from the non-existing (Asat) itself.—To this we reply)—This (is) not so. In the previous Sūtra has been, indeed, stated merely the repudiation of the rule about homogeneity between cause and effect, but not that the effect is not a different object from the cause. This stand, however, has not been abandoned viz. Brahman alone which is the cause is modified in the form of the world different from itself. In the case of the worm, honey etc. also, even though there is the differentiation, there does exist the identity of substance as in the case of ear-ring and gold. ॥ 7 ॥

[252] Here (the Pūrvapakṣin) drives on once again (vigorously puts forth his view) —

On account of the undesirable contingency of (Brahman) being possessed of that (state of the world) in dissolution, (the Vedānta passage is) unreasonable ॥ 8 ॥

अपीतौ, इति, अपीतिपूर्वकसृष्ट्यादिप्रदर्शनार्थम्

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' (छा. ६।२।१)

'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्' (ऐ. १।१)

इत्यादिषु, अप्ययावस्थोपदेशपूर्वकत्वदर्शनात्, सृष्ट्यादेः। यदि कार्यकारणयोर्द्रव्यैक्यमभ्युपेतम्, तदा कार्यस्य जगतो ब्रह्मणि, अप्ययसृष्ट्यादिषु सत्सु, ब्रह्मण एव तत्तदवस्थान्वयः, इति कार्यगताः सर्व एव, अपुरुषार्था ब्रह्मणि प्रसज्येरन्, सुवर्ण इव कुण्डलगता विशेषाः। ततश्च वेदान्तवाक्यं सर्वमसमञ्जसं स्यात्।

'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्' (मु. १।१।९)

'अपहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युः' (छा. ८।१।५)

'न तस्य कार्यं करणं च विद्यते न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते' (श्वे ६।८)

'तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्ति' (श्वे ४।६, मु. ३।१।१)

'अनीशश्चात्मा बध्यते भोक्तृभावात्' (श्वे. १।८)

'अनीशया शोचति मुह्यमानः' (श्वे. ४।७, मु. ३।१।२)

इत्येकस्मिन्नेव वस्तुनि, एषां परस्परविरुद्धानां प्रसक्तेः।

Apitau — this is for the purpose of indicating creation etc. preceded by dissolution, on account of the creation etc. being seen described, preceded by the teaching about the state of dissolution in (passages)

'Existence alone, gentle one, was this in the beginning' (Chā. 6·2·1)

'The Ātman, verily, was this, the one only in the beginning' (Ait. 1·1)

etc. If the identity of substance is admitted in the case of cause and effect, then in the case of the effect, the world, when there are the dissolution, creation etc., in respect of Brahman, there is the association of Brahman alone with the various states.—so, all the things not conducive to human purpose in life associated with the effect, would perforce over-run Brahman, like the particular characteristics associated with the ear-ring, gold. And then all the Vedānta passages would be inappropriate—

'Who, omniscient, all-knower' (Mu. 1·1·9)

'With sins destroyed, ageless, deathless' (Chā. 8·1·5)

'Of him, exist not the effect (body) and the instruments (sense-organs); no one equal, or superior to him is seen'. (Śve. 6·8)

'Of the two, one eats the Pippala (fruit)' (Śve. 4·6 ; Mu. 3·1·1)

'And the helpless Ātman is bound, owing to his being the enjoyer'. (Śve. 1·8)

'Owing to helplessness, he grieves, being infatuated'. (Śve. 4·7 ; Mu. 3·1·2)

—on account of these objects mutually opposite being perforce to be found in one and the same object, in such passages.

[253] अथ, उच्येत — चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरकस्य परस्यैव ब्रह्मणः कार्यकारणभावात्, शरीरभूतचिदचिद्वस्तुगतत्वाच्च दोषाणां, न शरीरिणि ब्रह्मणि कार्यावस्थे कारणावस्थे च प्रसङ्गः, इति—तदयुक्तम् । जगद्ब्रह्मणोः शरीरशरीरिभावस्यैवासंभवात् । संभवे च ब्रह्मणि शरीरसंबन्धनिबन्धनदोषाणामनिवार्यत्वात् । न हि चिदचिद्वस्तुनोर्ब्रह्मणः शरीरत्वं संभवति । शरीरं हि नाम कर्मफलरूपसुखदुःखोपभोगसाधनभूतेन्द्रियाश्रयः पञ्चवृत्तिप्राणाधीनधारणः पृथिव्यादिभूतसंघातविशेषः । तथाविधस्यैव लोकवेदयोः शरीरत्वप्रसिद्धेः । परमात्मनश्च,

'अपहतपाप्मा विजरः' (छा. ८।१।५)

'अनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति' (श्वे. ४।६; मु. ३।१।१)

'अपाणिपादो जवनो ग्रहीता पश्यत्यचक्षुः स शृणोत्यकर्णः' (श्वे. ३।१९)

'अप्राणो ह्यमनाः' (मु. २।१।२)

इत्यादिभिः कर्मतत्फलभोगयोरभावात्, इन्द्रियाधीनभोगत्वाभावात्, प्राणवत्त्वाभावाच्च, न तं प्रति चेतनाचेतनयोः शरीरत्वम् । न च, अचेतनव्यष्टिरूपतृणकाष्ठादीनां समष्टिरूपस्य

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[253] *If it be argued*—On account of the relation of cause and effect being in respect of the Highest Brahman itself having the sentient and the non-sentient objects as its body, and on account of the blemishes being associated with the sentient and the non-sentient objects that have become the body, there is not the undesirable possibility of their existing in the embodied Brahman in the state of cause and in the state of effect—(the reply is)—That (is) improper, on account of the impossibility of the very relation of the body and the embodied one in the case of the world and Brahman. If there is (such) a possibility (in Brahman), the blemishes depending upon the relation with the body would be unavoidable in Brahman. Not indeed, can there be the possibility of sentient and non-sentient objects being the body of Brahman. *The body, indeed, for the matter of that, is a particular aggregate of elements, the earth etc., the resort of sense-organs,* the means of enjoyment of happiness and misery forming the fruits of the deeds done (Karman), and with its sustenance depending upon the Prāṇa with his five activities. (An object) of that nature alone is known to have the nature of a body in the world and in the Vedas. In the case of the Paramātman, however, (in accordance with the passages)

'With sins destroyed, bereft of old age' (Chā. 8·1·5)
'Not eating, another looks on' (Śve. 4·6; Mu. 3·1·1)
'Without hands and feet, speeding on, grasping, he, eyeless, sees; ear-less, hears' (Śve. 3·19)
'Without Prāṇa, indeed, without the mind' (Mu. 2·1·2)

etc.—on account of the absence of Karman and enjoyment of its fruit, on account of the absence of enjoyment dependent upon the sense-organs, and the absence of having the Prāṇa, the sentient and the non-sentient cannot have the nature of a body in respect of him. Neither, again, in the case of

भूतसूक्ष्मस्य च, इन्द्रियाश्रयत्वादि संभवति। भूतसूक्ष्मस्य पृथिव्यादिसंघातत्वं च न विद्यते। चेतनस्य तु ज्ञानैकाकारस्य सर्वमेतन्न संभवति, इति नेतरां शरीरत्वसंभवः।

न च, भोगायतनत्वं शरीरत्वम्, इति शरीरत्वसंभव, भोगायतनेषु वेश्मादिषु शरीरत्वाप्रसिद्धेः।

[254] यत्र वर्तमानस्यैव सुखदुःखोपभोगस्तदेव भोगायतनमिति चेत्, न। परकायप्रवेशजन्मसुखदुःखोपभोगायतनस्य परकायस्य प्रविष्टशरीरत्वाप्रसिद्धेः। ईश्वरस्य तु स्वतःसिद्धनित्यनिरतिशयानन्दस्य भोगं प्रति चिदचिदोरायतनत्वानियमो न संभवति। एतेन भोगसाधनमात्रस्य शरीरत्वं प्रत्युक्तम्।

अथ मतम्—यदिच्छाधीनस्वरूपस्थितिप्रवृत्ति यत्तत्तस्य शरीरम्—इति, सर्वस्येश्वरेच्छाधीनस्वरूपस्थितिप्रवृत्तित्वेन, ईश्वरशरीरत्वं संभवति, इति—तदपि न साधीयः, शरीरतया प्रसिद्धेषु तत्तच्चेतनेच्छायत्तस्वरूपत्वाभावात्, रुग्णशरीरस्य तदिच्छाधीनप्रवृत्तित्वाभावात्, मृतशरीरस्य तदायत्तप्रवृत्तित्वाभावाच्च, सालभञ्जिकादिषु चेतनेच्छाधीन-

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the non-sentient things, grass, wood etc, severally, and of the subtle elements in the cosmic form, being the resort of the sense organs is possible. In the case of the subtle elements, there does not exist further the nature of the aggregate of the earth etc But in the case of the sentient having the form of consciousness alone, all this is not possible,—and so, no possibility under any circumstances, of his being the body.

Not again, is the possibility of (these) being the body, on the plea that the nature of a body is the nature of an abode for enjoyment, because houses etc (that are) the abodes of enjoyment are not known to have the nature of the body.

[254] If (it be said) that where there is the enjoyment of happiness and misery belonging to the present alone, that alone is the abode of enjoyment,—(we reply)—No, because the body of another, the abode of enjoyment of happiness and misery arising out of entrance into another body, is not known to be the body that has entered into In the case of the Lord, on the other hand, no regulation is possible about the abode of the sentient and the non-sentient in respect of enjoyment of self-established, permanent, excessive bliss. By this is refuted the nature of the body in the case of something that is merely the means of enjoyment

If the view (is)—what has its nature, sustenance and activity dependent upon whose will, that (is) the body of that (person), so, everything would be the body of Iśvara owing to everything having its nature, sustenance and activity dependent upon the Lord,—that also (is) not convincing, on account of the absence of the nature as dependent upon the will of the various sentient objects, in the case of (objects) well-known as the body, on account of the absence of activity dependent upon the will of that (sentient) in the case of the body affected by disease, and on account of the absence of activity dependent upon that, in the case of the dead body, and on account of the

स्वरूपस्थितिप्रवृत्तिषु तच्छरीरत्वाप्रसिद्धेश्च । चेतनस्य नित्यस्य, ईश्वरेच्छायत्तस्वरूपत्वाभावाच्च न तच्छरीरत्वसंभवः ।

न च, यद्यदेकनियाम्यं यदेकधार्यं यदेकशेषभूतं तत्तस्य शरीरमिति वाच्यम् । क्रियादिषु व्यभिचारात् ।

'अशरीरं शरीरेषु' (का. २।२२)

'अपाणिपादो जवनो ग्रहीता' (श्वे. ३।१९)

इत्यादिभिश्च, ईश्वरस्य शरीराभावः प्रतिपाद्यते । अतः, जगद्ब्रह्मणोः शरीरशरीरिभावस्यासंभवात्, तत्संभवे च ब्रह्मणि दोषप्रसङ्गात्, ब्रह्मकारणवादे वेदान्तवाक्यानामसामञ्जस्यम्, इति ॥ ८ ॥

[255] अत्र, उत्तरम्—

न तु दृष्टान्तभावात् ॥ ९ ॥

नैवम्, असामञ्जस्यम्, एकस्यैव, अवस्थाद्वयान्वयेऽपि गुणदोषव्यवस्थितेर्दृष्टान्तस्य विद्यमानत्वात् । तुशब्दोऽत्र हेयसंबन्धगन्धस्यासंभावनीयतां द्योतयति । एतदुक्तं भवति — चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरतया तदात्मभूतस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणः संकोचविकासात्मककार्यकारण-

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puppets etc. with their nature, sustenance, activity, dependent upon the will of the sentient, not known to be the body of that (sentient). There is not the possibility of the eternal sentient being the body of him, on account of the absence of his nature being dependent upon the will of the Lord.

Nor should it be said that whatever is controllable by one, supportable by one, what is subordinate to one, — that (is) the body of that, on account of the violation (of this rule) in the case of actions etc. And further in (the passages)

'Bodiless in the bodies' (Kā. 2 22)

'Without hands and feet, speeding on, grasping'. (Śvc. 3·19)

and others—the absence of the body in the case of the Lord is propounded. Therefore, there being the impossibility of the relation of the body and the embodied one, between the world and Brahman, on account of the blemishes being forced upon Brahman, if there is that possibility, the Vedānta passages would be inadequate to prove Brahman as the cause of the world— ॥ 8 ॥

[255] Here the answer (is)—

But (it is) not (that) on account of the existence of illustration ॥ 9 ॥

There is no inadequacy of this, in this way, on account of an illustration existing in respect of the establishment of qualities and blemishes in the case of one thing itself, even when having an association with two states. The word Tu here points out to the impossibility of (even) the tinge of association with things to be abandoned. This is what is intended to be said—In the case of the Highest Brahman which has become (their) Ātmān owing to the sentient and non-sentient entities being its body, there would not be any contradiction even when there is the association with the two states of

भावावस्थाद्वयान्वयेऽपि न कश्चिद्विरोधः, यतः संकोचविकासौ परब्रह्मशरीरभूतचिदचिद्वस्तुगतौ । शरीरगतास्तु दोषा नात्मनि प्रसज्यन्ते, आत्मगताश्च गुणा न शरीरे; यथा देवमनुष्यादीनां सशरीराणां क्षेत्रज्ञानां शरीरगता बालत्वयुवत्वस्थविरत्वादयो नात्मनि संबध्यन्ते, आत्मगताश्च ज्ञानसुखादयो न शरीरे । अथ च, देवो जातः, मनुष्यो जातः, तथा स एव बालो युवा स्थविरश्च, इति व्यपदेशाश्च मुख्यः । भूतसूक्ष्मशरीरस्यैव क्षेत्रज्ञस्य देवमनुष्यादिभावः, इति

'तदन्तरप्रतिपत्तौ' (ब्र. सू. ३।१।१)

इति वक्ष्यते, इति ।

[256] यत्पुनरुक्तम्—चिदचिदात्मकस्य जगतः स्थूलस्य सूक्ष्मस्य च परमात्मानं प्रति शरीरभावो नोपपद्यते, इति—तत्, अनाकलितसम्यङ्न्यायानुगृहीतवेदान्तवाक्यगणस्य स्वमतिपरिकल्पितकुतर्कविजृम्भितम् । सर्व एव हि वेदान्ताः स्थूलस्य सूक्ष्मस्य चेतनस्याचेतनस्य समस्तस्य च परमात्मानं प्रति शरीरत्वं श्रावयन्ति । वाजसनेयके तावत्, काण्वशाखायां माध्यंदिनशाखायां चान्तर्यामिब्राह्मणे

'यः पृथिव्या तिष्ठन्...यस्य पृथिवी शरीरम्' (बृ. ३।७।३)

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effect and cause constituted of contraction and expansion, because contraction and expansion belong to the sentient and the non-sentient entities that have become the body of the Highest Brahman. The blemishes belonging to the body, however, cannot be carried over to the Atman, nor the qualities belonging to the Ātman over to the body; just as childhood, youth, old age etc. belonging to the bodies of the embodied Ksetra-knowers, —gods, men etc are not related to the Ātman, and knowledge, happiness etc. belonging to the Ātman, to the body. And further, — god is born, man is born, — likewise, he himself is the child, youth and old man, — such reference is the primary one. The nature of god, man etc. of the Ksetra-knower belongs to the body *of the subtle elements itself — this (the Sūtrakara) would be stating in* (the Sūtra)

'On attaining to the other one' (Bra Sū III 1·1)

[256] As to what again has been said — that of the world constituted of the sentient and the non-sentient, which is gross and subtle, the nature of the body in respect of the Paramātman is not appropriate — (we say in reply) — This is all the display of bad logic imagined by one's own mind, by a person who has not properly understood the hosts of passages from the *Upanisads* favoured by proper reasoning; for, all the Vedānta passages without exception declare the gross, the subtle, the sentient and the non-sentient,— everything as being the body in respect of the *Paramātman. In the Vājasaneyaka (Samhitā)*, for the matter of that, in the Kānva recension as also in the Mādhyandina recension in the *Brāhmana* dealing with the inner Controller, beginning with—

'Who residing in the earth whose body (is) the earth'.
(Br. 3·7·3)

इत्यारभ्य, पृथिव्यादि समस्तमचिद्वस्तु

> 'यो विज्ञाने तिष्ठन्यस्य विज्ञानं शरीरम्'　　　　(बृ का ३।७।२२)
>
> 'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्यस्यात्मा शरीरम्'　　　　(बृ. मा ३।७।२२)

इति चेतनं च पृथक्पृथङ्निर्दिश्य तस्य तस्य परमात्मशरीरत्वमभिधीयते, सुबालोपनिषदि च

> 'य पृथिवीमन्तरे सचरन्यस्य पृथिवी शरीरम्'　　　　(सुबा. ७)

इत्यारभ्य,

> 'य आत्मानमन्तरे सचरन्यस्यात्मा शरीरम्'　　　　(सुबा ७)

इति तद्वदेव चिदचितोः सर्वावस्थयोः परमात्मशरीरत्वमभिधाय,

> 'एष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मापहतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायण'
>
> (सुबा ७)

इति तस्य सर्वभूतानि प्रत्यात्मत्वमभिधीयते। स्मरन्ति च

> 'जगत्सर्वं शरीरं ते'　　　　(रा यु १२०।२९)
>
> 'यदम्बु वैष्णव काय'　　　　(वि पु २।१२।३७)
>
> 'तत्सर्वं वै हरेस्तनुः'　　　　(वि पु १।२२।३७)
>
> 'तानि सर्वाणि तद्वपु'　　　　(वि पु १।२२।८४)

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the entire non-sentient entity, the earth etc in

> '*Who, residing in Vijñāna, whose body (is) Vijñāna*'.
> (Br Ka 3 7 22)
>
> '*Who, residing in the Ātman whose body (is) the Ātman*'
> (Br Mā 3 7 22)

mentioning the sentient separately, are stated the various (entities) as the body of the Paramātman and in the *Subālopanisad*, beginning with

> '*Who, moving the earth within, whose body (is) the earth*'
> (Suba 7)

in

> '*Who, moving the Ātman within, whose body (is) the Ātman*'　　(Subā 7)

— having mentioned in the same manner as before the sentient and the non-sentient in all the states, as being the body of the Paramātman — in (the passage)

> '*This one, the inmost Ātman of all beings, with sins destroyed, the shining god, the one, Nārāyana*'　　(Suba 7)

is stated his being the Ātman in respect of all beings They declare in the Smrtis also —

> '*The entire world (is) your body*'　　(Ra Yu 120 29)
>
> '*What (is) water, (that is) Visnu's body*'　(V P 2 12 37)
>
> '*All that, verily (is) Haris body*'　　(V P 1 22 37)
>
> '*All those, his body*'　　(V P 1 22 84)

'सोऽभिध्याय शरीरात्स्वात्' (मनु १।८)

इत्यादि। भूतसूक्ष्मात् — स्वाच्छरीरादित्यर्थः।

लोके च शरीरशब्दो घटादिशब्दवदेकाकारद्रव्यानियतवृत्तिमनासादितः कृमिकीटपतङ्गसर्पनरपशुप्रभृतिषु, अत्यन्तविलक्षणाकारेषु द्रव्येषु, अगौणः प्रयुज्यमानो दृश्यते। तेन तस्य प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तव्यवस्थापनं सर्वप्रयोगानुगुण्येनैव कार्यम्।

त्वदुक्तं च कर्मफलभोगहेतुः, इत्यादिकं प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तलक्षणं न सर्वप्रयोगानुगुणम्, यथोक्तेष्वीश्वरशरीरतयाभिहितेषु पृथिव्यादिषु, अव्याप्तेः। किं च, ईश्वरस्येच्छाविग्रहेषु मुक्तानां च

'स एकधा भवति' (छा ७।२६।२)

इत्यादिवाक्यावगतेषु विग्रहेषु तल्लक्षणमव्याप्तम्, कर्मफलभोगनिमित्तत्वाभावात्तेषाम्। परमपुरुषेच्छाविग्रहाश्च न पृथिव्यादिभूतसंघातविशेषाः

'न भूतसंघसंस्थानो देहोऽस्य परमात्मनः' (म भा शा २०७।६०)

इति स्मृतेः। अतः भूतसंघातरूपत्वं च शरीरस्याव्याप्तम्। पञ्चवृत्तिप्राणाधीनधारणत्वं च स्थावरशरीरेष्वव्याप्तम्, स्थावरेषु हि प्राणसद्भावेऽपि तस्य पञ्चधावस्थाय शरीरस्या-

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'Having reflected, he from his own body' (Manu 1 8)

etc. — From his own body — from the subtle elements — this is the sense

In the world also, the word Sarira, not confined like the word Ghaṭa etc to one configuration of a substance, is seen used in a primary sense referring to substances possessing entirely distinct forms,—like worm, insect, bird, serpent, man beast etc ,—and therefore, the adjustment of the cause of (their) activity has got to be effected in conformity with all usage alone

The characteristic, the cause of activity, spoken of by you, such as the cause of enjoyment of the fruit of Karman, is not in conformity with all usage, on account of this not pervading in the case of earth etc that are declared to be the body of the Lord, as stated already And further, that definition does not cover the bodies taken by the Lord at will, and in respect of the bodies of the released Souls, known from passages like

'He becomes onefold' (Chā 7 26 2)

on account of the absence of the cause of the enjoyment of fruit in respect of them And the bodies taken at will by the highest Purusa cannot be the particular aggregates of elements, the earth etc as declared in the Smrti,

'The body of this Paramātman is not the configuration of the aggregate of elements' (MBh Śā 207 60)

Therefore, having the form of the aggregate of the elements is less extensive than the body. Having the sustenance dependent upon the Prāna with his five activities (is) less extensive than the bodies of inanimate objects for in the case of inanimate objects, even though the Prāna exists, there is not his presence as the supporter of the body, remaining in the five-fold state In the case of bodies of Ahalyā and others, of stone, wood etc as a result of Karman, being the resort of sense-organs and being the cause of happiness

धारकतया, अवस्थानं नास्ति। अहल्यादीनां कर्मनिमित्तशिलाकाष्ठादिशरीरेषु, इन्द्रियाश्रयत्वं सुखदुःखहेतुत्वं च, अव्याप्तम्। अतः, यस्य चेतनस्य यद्द्रव्यं सर्वात्मना स्वार्थे नियन्तुं धारयितुं च शक्यम्, तच्छेषतैकस्वरूपं च तत्तस्य शरीरम्, इति शरीरलक्षणमास्थेयम्। रुग्णशरीरादिषु नियमनाद्यदर्शनं विद्यमानाया एव नियमनशक्तेः प्रतिबन्धकृतम्, अग्न्यादेः शक्तिप्रतिबन्धात्, औष्ण्याद्यदर्शनवत्। मृतशरीरं च चेतनवियोगसमय एव विशरितुमारब्धम्, क्षणान्तरे च विशीर्यते। पूर्वं शरीरतया परिक्लृप्तसंघातैकदेशत्वेन च तत्र शरीरत्वव्यवहारः। अतः, सर्वं परमपुरुषेण सर्वात्मना स्वार्थे नियाम्यं धार्यं तच्छेषतैकस्वरूपम्, इति सर्वं चेतनाचेतनं तस्य शरीरम्।

'अशरीरं शरीरेषु' (का. २।२२)

इत्यादि च कर्मनिमित्तशरीरप्रतिषेधपरम्, यथोक्तसर्वशरीरत्वश्रवणात्। उपरितनाधिकरणेषु चैतदुपपादयिष्यते।

'अपीतौ तद्वत्प्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम्,' 'न तु दृष्टान्तभावात्'

(ब्र. सू. २।१।८-९)

इति सूत्रद्वयेन

'इतरव्यपदेशात्' (ब्र. सू. २।१।२१)

इत्याधिकरणसिद्धोऽर्थः स्मारितः ॥ ९ ॥

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and misery, are less extensive. Therefore,—Of which sentient thing what substance is possible to control completely and to support for his purpose, that with its one nature being subordinate to that, that is his body—this definition of body should be accepted. The non-perception of any control in respect of the ailing bodies is caused by the obstruction of the regulating power although existing, like the non-perception of heat etc. on account of the obstruction of the power of fire etc. The dead body, again, begins to shatter away right from the time of separation from the sentient, and in a moment it gets shattered away; and there is the current usage about it as a body, on account of its being a portion of the aggregate of elements brought together, forming the body before. Therefore, everything has to be controlled, supported fully by the highest Puruṣa for his own purpose, and it is of the one nature of being subordinated to him,—so, all the sentient and the non-sentient are his body and the passage

'Bodiless, in bodies' (Kā 2·22)

etc. aims at the repudiation of the body due to Karman, on account of the declaration in the Sruti (passage), everything being the body (of the Highest) as stated before, And this would be explained in the Adhikaranas below. By the two Sūtras—

'On account of the undesirable contingency of (Barhman) being possessed of that (state of the world) in dissolution, (the Vedānta passage is unreasonable)' 'But (it is) not (that), on account of the existence of illustration' (Bra. Sū. II. 1·8 9)

is brought to mind, the matter established in the Adhikaraṇa—

'On account of the reference to the other' (Brā. Sū. II. 1·21)

॥ 9 ॥

[257] स्वपक्षदोषाच्च ॥ १० ॥

न केवलं ब्रह्मकारणवादस्य निर्दोषत्वेनैतत्समाश्रयणम् । प्रधानकारणवादस्य दुष्टत्वाच्च तत्परित्यज्यैतदेव समाश्रयणीयम् । प्रधानकारणवादे हि जगत्प्रवृत्तिर्नोपपद्यते । तत्र हि निर्विकारस्य चिन्मात्रैकरसस्य पुरुषस्य प्रकृतिसंनिधानेन प्रकृतिधर्माध्यासनिबन्धना जगत्प्रवृत्तिः । निर्विकारस्य चिन्मात्ररूपस्य प्रकृतिधर्माध्यासहेतुभूतं प्रकृतिसंनिधानं किंरूपमिति विवेचनीयम्—किं प्रकृतेः सद्भाव एव, उत तद्गतः कश्चिद्विकारः, अथ पुरुषगत एव कश्चिद्विकारः ? न तावत्पुरुषगतः, अनभ्युपगमात् । नापि प्रकृतेर्विकारः, तस्य, अध्यासकार्यतयाभ्युपगतस्य, अध्यासहेतुत्वासंभवात् । सद्भावमात्रस्य संनिधानत्वे मुक्तस्याप्यध्यासप्रसङ्गः, इति तत्पक्षे जगत्प्रवृत्तिर्नोपपद्यते । अयमर्थः साङ्ख्यपक्षप्रतिक्षेपसमये

'अभ्युपगमेऽप्यर्थाभावात्' (ब्र सू २।२।८)

इत्यादिना प्रपञ्चयिष्यते ॥ १० ॥

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[257] And on account of the blem'shes in one's own views. ॥ 10 ॥

Not merely is this to be resorted to, on account of the doctrine of Brahman (being) the cause (of the world) being free from blemishes — this is to be resorted to, on account of the doctrine of Pradhāna (being) the cause (of the world) being fallacious as well, (and so) this same has to be resorted to, after having abandoned it. For, in the doctrine about the Pradhāna being the cause (of the world) the activity for the world is not possible. For there, in the case of the Puruṣa who undergoes no change and who is constituted uniformly of consciousness alone, the activity for the world is by being near the Prakṛti and dependent upon the superimposition of the attributes of Prakṛti Of what nature this, being near the Prakṛti, which is the cause of the superimposition of the attributes of Prakṛti, in the case of (Puruṣa) — this has to be looked into — (Is it) the existence of Prakṛti itself, or some modification associated with it. or some modification belonging to the Puruṣa himself? — Not, for the matter of that, associated with the Puruṣa, because that is not admitted (by you); nor again (is it) the modification of Prakṛti, on account of the impossibility of being the cause of superimposition, in the case of that which is admitted to be the effect of superimposition. If merely existence is being near, then there would be the undesirable contingency viz. the superimposition of the released Soul also, and so according to that view, activity in the case of the world is not appropriate. This same matter would be explained in detail by (the Sūtra).

'Even though admitted, on account of the absence of objects' (Bra. Sū. II·2·8)

etc. at the time of the attack on the Sāṅkhya doctrine. ॥ 10 ॥

तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादपि ॥ ११ ॥

तर्कस्याप्रतिष्ठितत्वादपि श्रुतिमूलो ब्रह्मकारणवाद एव समाश्रयणीयो न प्रधानकारणवादः। शाक्यौलूक्याक्षपादक्षपणककपिलपतञ्जलितर्काणामन्योन्यव्याघातात्, तर्कस्याप्रतिष्ठितत्वं गम्यते ॥ ११ ॥

अन्यथानुमेयमिति चेदेवमप्यनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गः ॥ १२ ॥

[258] इदानीं विद्यमानानां शाक्यादीनां तर्कानुदूष्य, अन्यथा प्रधानकारणवादमतिक्रान्ततदुपदर्शितदूषणत्वेन, अनुमन्यामहे, इति चेत्—एवमपि पुरुषबुद्धिमूलतर्कैकावलम्बनस्य तथैव देशान्तरकालान्तरेषु त्वदधिकतमतर्ककुशलपुरुषोत्प्रेक्षिततर्कदूष्यत्वसंभावनया तर्काप्रतिष्ठानदोषादनिर्मोक्षो दुर्वारः। अतः, अतीन्द्रियेऽर्थे शास्त्रमेव प्रमाणम्। तदुपबृंहणायैव तर्क उपादेयः। तथा चाह—

'आर्षं धर्मोपदेशं च वेदशास्त्राविरोधिना।
यस्तर्केणानुसंधत्ते स धर्मं वेद नेतरः॥' (मनु. १२।१०६)

Also on account of reasoning being not well-founded ॥ **11** ॥

On account of logical reasoning not having a firm basis also, the doctrine of Brahman being the cause (of the world) being based upon the Śruti, is alone to be resorted to, not the doctrine about the Pradhāna being the cause. That reasoning has no firm basis—that is known from the mutual annihilation of reasonings resorted to by Sākya (Bauddhas), Ulūka (Naiyāyikas), Aksapāda (Vaiśesikas), Ksapanaka (Jains), Kapila (Sāṅkhyas) and Patañjali (Yogas). ॥ 11 ॥

If it be argued (that the matter) should be inferred otherwise, (the answer is) — even then there would be the undesirable contingency viz. absence of freedom (from the same blemish) ॥ 12 ॥

[258] Now if it is argued — Having found fault with the reasonings of the present Sākya and others, we assent otherwise to the doctrine of Pradhāna being the cause (of the world) owing to the blemishes pointed out being superceded (here) — (we reply) — In this way also, in the case of the sole dependence upon reasoning rooted in the understanding of a person, the freedom from the blemish of reasoning having no firm basis is unavoidable, owing to the possibility of the condemnation in the same way of the fallacious nature of reasoning imagined by persons far more expert in reasoning than you, existing in different times and different places. Therefore, in super-sensuous matters Śāstra alone (is) the authority. Reasoning should be resorted to, for its amplification alone. And to that effect says (Manu)

'Who combines with reasoning, — not conflicting with the Veda-Śāstra, — instruction about religious duties, given by the sages,— he knows the religious duty, not any one else.' (Manu 12·106)

इति । वेदाख्यशास्त्राविरोधिना, इत्यर्थः । अतः, वेदविरोधित्वेन वेदार्थविशदीकरणरूपवेदोपबृंहणतर्कोपादानाय साङ्ख्यस्मृतिर्नादरणीया ॥ १२ ॥

विलक्षणत्वाधिकरणं समाप्तम् (३)

[259] एतेन शिष्टापरिग्रहा अपि व्याख्याताः ॥ १३ ॥ (अधिकरण ४, सूत्र–१३)

शिष्टाः—परिशिष्टाः । न विद्यते वेदपरिग्रहो येषाम्, इति, अपरिग्रहाः । शिष्टाश्चापरिग्रहाश्च शिष्टापरिग्रहाः । एतेन वेदापरिगृहीतसाङ्ख्यपक्षक्षपणेन परिशिष्टाश्च वेदापरिगृहीताः कणभक्षाक्षपादक्षपणकभिक्षुपक्षाः क्षपिता वेदितव्याः । परमाणुकारणवादेऽमीषां सर्वेषां संवादात्, कारणवस्तुविषयस्य तर्कस्याप्रतिष्ठितत्वं न शक्यते वक्तुम्, इत्यधिका शङ्का । तावन्मात्रसंवादेऽपि तर्कमूलत्वाविशेषात्परमाणुस्वरूपेऽपि शून्यात्मकत्वाशून्यात्मकत्वज्ञानात्मकत्वार्थात्मकत्वक्षणिकत्वनित्यत्वैकान्तत्वानेकान्तत्वसत्यासत्यात्मकत्वादिविसंवाददर्शनाच्च, अप्रतिष्ठितत्वमेव, इति परिहारः ॥ १३ ॥

शिष्टापरिग्रहाधिकरणं समाप्तम् (४)

भोक्त्रापत्तेरविभागश्चेत्स्याल्लोकवत् ॥ १४ ॥ (अधिकरण ५, सूत्र–१४)

—The sense is — not conflicting with the Śāstra known as Veda. Therefore the Sānkhya Smṛti should not be respected, because it is in conflict with the Vedas, in order to accept reasoning for the amplification of the Vedas, contributing to the clarification of the sense of the Vedas. ॥ 12 ॥

Here ends the Vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa (3)

[259] By this the remaining (systems) and not accepted (by the Vedas,) also have been explained away ॥ 13 ॥

(Adhikaraṇa 4, Sūtra 13)

Siṣṭāḥ:— the remaining, — Aparigrahāḥ —for whom there is no acceptance of the Vedas. Siṣṭāśca aparigrahāśca (A Dvandva compound) the remaining and those that are not accepted by (or, do not accept) the Vedas. Etena —, by this smashing of the system of the Sānkhyas and the *remaining not accepted by the Vedas. — the systems of Kaṇāda, Gautama,* Jainas and Bauddhas, should be regarded as being smashed—on account of all these systems agreeing to the doctrine of the Paramāṇu (atom) being the cause (of the world), it is not possible to speak of logic as having a firm basis in respect of the causal entity—this (is) the additional doubt. Even though there is agreement about that much, on account of being rooted in reason being common, on account of disagreement being found even in respect of the nature of the atoms,—such as being constituted of void, not being constituted of void; being constituted of knowledge; being constituted of a substance, momentariness, eternality, uniformity, multifarious nature, being constituted of reality, unreality etc.—*there does remain the* state of having no firm basis (in their case). ॥ 13 ॥

Here ends the Siṣṭāparigrahādhikaraṇa (4)

If there is the non-differentiation on account of the contingency of being the enjoyer, (the answer is) this may be possible as (found) in the world. ॥ 14 ॥

(Adhikaraṇa 5, Sūtra 14)

[260] पुनरपि साङ्ख्यः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते । यदुक्तम् — स्थूलसूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणः कार्यकारणरूपत्वात्, जीवब्रह्मणोः स्वभावविभाग उपपद्यते — इति, स तु विभागो न संभवति । ब्रह्मणः सशरीरत्वे तस्य भोक्तृत्वापत्तेः । सशरीरत्वे जीवस्येव, ईश्वरस्यापि सशरीरत्वप्रयुक्तसुखदुःखयोर्भोक्तृत्वस्यावर्जनीयत्वात् ।

ननु च

'संभोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न वैशेष्यात्' (ब्र. सू. १।२।८)

इत्यत्र, ईश्वरस्य भोगप्रसङ्गपरिहार उक्तः — नैवम् । तत्र हि, उपास्यतया हृदयायतने संनिहितस्य शरीरान्तर्वर्तित्वमात्रेण भोगप्रसङ्गो न विद्यते, इत्युक्तम् । इह तु जीववद्ब्रह्मणोऽपि सशरीरत्वे तद्वदेव सुखदुःखयोर्भोक्तृत्वप्रसङ्गो दुर्वारः, इत्युच्यते । दृश्यते हि सशरीराणां जीवानां शरीरगतबालत्वयुवत्वस्थविरत्वादिविकारासंभवेऽपि शरीरधातुसाम्यवैषम्यनिमित्तसुखदुःखयोगः । श्रुतिश्च

'न ह वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति । अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः' (छा. ८।१२।१)

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[260] Again, the Sāṅkhya opponent stands up (raising a doubt)— As to what has been said, in the case of the Highest Brahman having for its body, the gross, the subtle, the sentient and the non-sentient entities, there would be natural differentiation between Jīva and Brahman on account of the nature of cause and effect, (one can say) — but that differentiation is not possible; because if Brahman is possessed of a body, there will be the undesirable result viz. it would be the enjoyer. If (Brahman) has a body, as in the case of the Jīva, so even in the case of the Īśvara, his being the enjoyer of happiness and misery caused by his being possessed of a body is unavoidable.

I say (says some objector) — In (the Sūtra)

'If (it is objected that) there would be the attainment of enjoyment, (we say) — No, on account of the distinction' (Bra. Sū. 1·2·8)

has been stated the refutation about the contingency of Īśvara having enjoyment, — (we reply) — Not so There was stated that there would not be the undesirable contingency of enjoyment merely by residing within the body, (on the part of Īśvara) who is present in the abode, the heart, for being worshipped But here it is stated that, if Brahman also were to be possessed of a body like the Jīva, as in the case of the Jīva himself, the contingency of being the enjoyer of happiness and misery (in the case of Brahman) is difficult to ward off, for, it is seen that in the case of Jīvas possessed of bodies, although there is the impossibility of changes like childhood, youth, old age, etc. belonging to the body, there is the association with happiness and misery due to the state of equilibrium or otherwise of the constituent elements of the body And (there is) the Sruti (passage)

'Not, verily, indeed is the discarding of the agreeable and the disagreeable in one existing with a body; the agreeable and the disagreeable touch not, verily, him existing without a body.' (Chā. 8·12·1)

इति । अतः, सशरीरब्रह्मकारणवादे जीवेश्वरस्वभावविभागाभावात्, केवलब्रह्मकारणवादेऽपि मृत्सुवर्णादिवत्, जगद्गतापुरुषार्थादिसर्वविशेषाश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च, प्रधानकारणवाद एव ज्यायान्, इति चेत्—

[261] अत्र, उत्तरं 'स्यात् लोकवत्' इति। स्यादेव विभागो जीवेश्वरस्वभावयोः। न हि जीवस्य शरीरधातुसाम्यवैषम्यनिमित्तं सुखदुःखयोर्भोक्तृत्वं सशरीरत्वकृतम्, अपि तु पुण्यपापरूपकर्मकृतम्।

'न ह वै सशरीरस्य' (छा. ८।१२।१)

इत्यपि कर्मारब्धदेहविषयम्।

'स एकधा भवति त्रिधा भवति' (छा. ७।२६।२)

'स यदि पितृलोककामो भवति' (छा. ८।२।१)

'स तत्र पर्येति जक्षन्क्रीडन्रममाणः' (छा. ८।१२।३)

इति कर्मसंबन्धविनिर्मुक्तस्य, आविर्भूतस्वरूपस्य, सशरीरस्यैवापुरुषार्थगन्धाभावात्। अपहतपाप्मनस्तु परमात्मनः स्थूलसूक्ष्मरूपकृत्स्नजगच्छरीरत्वेऽपि कर्मसंबन्धगन्धो

Therefore, there being the absence of the differentiation of the natures of Jīva and Īśvara in the doctrine of the Brahman possessed of a body being the cause (of the world), and there being also the undesirable contingency of (the Brahman) being the resort of all particularities, such as things not conducive to human purpose in life, existing in the world, like earth, gold etc: even according to the doctrine of pure Brahman being the cause (of the world) — the doctrine of the Pradhāna alone being the cause (of the world) is superior—If (the objector says) so —

[261] Here (is) the answer — 'This may be possible as (found) in the world'. There would certainly be the differentiation between the natures of Jīva and Īśvara. Not, indeed, is the state of the enjoyer of happiness and misery due to the equilibrium or otherwise of the constituent elements of the body, caused by the possession of a body, but caused by the Karman constituted of merit and sin. The passage

'Not, verily, indeed, in one with a body' (Chā. 8·12·1)

also refers to the body produced by Karman; for, in (the passages)

'He becomes one-fold, becomes three-fold' (Chā. 7·26·2)

'If he is desirous of securing the world of the manes' (Chā. 8·2·1)

'He there moves about, eating, sporting, enjoying' (Chā. 8·12·3)

— there is the absence even of the tinge of something not the human purpose in life, in the case of him freed from association with Karman, in whom is manifested his own nature and who is indeed possessed of the body. In the case of the Paramātman who is, however, with sins destroyed, even though he is possessed of the body, viz. the whole world, of the form of the gross and the subtle, there is not even the tinge of association with Karman, — and

नास्तीति, नतरामपुरुषार्थगन्धप्रसङ्गः । लोकवत् । यथा लोके राजशासनानुवर्तिनां तदतिवर्तिनां च राजानुग्रहनिग्रहकृतसुखदुःखयोगेऽपि न सशरीरत्वमात्रेण शासके राजन्यपि शासनानुवृत्त्यतिवृत्तिनिमित्तसुखदुःखयोर्भोक्तृत्वप्रसङ्गः ।

यथाह द्रमिडभाष्यकारः — यथा लोके राजा प्रचुरदन्दशूके घोरेऽनर्थसङ्कटेऽपि प्रदेशे वर्तमानोऽपि व्यजनाद्यवधूतदेहो दोषैर्न स्पृश्यते, अभिप्रेतांश्च लोकान्पुनरपि पालयिष्यति, भोगांश्च गन्धादीन्विश्वजनोपभोग्यान्धारयति, तथा, असौ लोकेश्वरो भ्रमत्स्वसामर्थ्यचामरो दोषैर्न स्पृश्यते, रक्षति च लोकान्ब्रह्मलोकादीन्भोगांश्च विश्वजनोपभोग्यान्धारयति, इति । मृत्सुवर्णादिवद्ब्रह्मस्वरूपपरिणामस्तु नैवाभ्युपगम्यते । अविकारत्वनिर्दोषतादिश्रुतेः ।

[262] यत्तु, परैर्ब्रह्मकारणवादे भोक्तृभोग्यविभागाभावमाशङ्क्य समुद्रफेनतरङ्गदृष्टान्तेन विभागप्रतिपादनपरं सूत्रं व्याख्यातम् — तदयुक्तम् । अन्तर्भावितशक्त्यविद्योपाधिकाद्ब्रह्मणः सृष्टिमभ्युपगच्छताम्, एवमाक्षेपपरिहारयोरसंगतत्वात् ।

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so, there cannot be by far the undesirable contingency of even the tinge of a thing that is not the human purpose of life. Lokavat (as in the world) — As in the world in the case of those who comply with the orders of the king, and those who transgress them, even though there is the association of happiness and misery due to favour and punishment by the king, there is not, by merely being possessed of a body, the undesirable contingency of being the enjoyer of happiness and misery due to the compliance with, and transgression of the orders, in the case of the ruling king also.

As says Dramida, the commentator (on the *Brahma-sūtras*) — As in the world, a king although residing in a terrible region abounding in mosquitoes, beset with disasters, with his body fanned by fans etc., is not affected by undesirable effects, protects once again the regions liked by him, takes to enjoyments, uses fragrant powders etc., fit to be enjoyed by all people— in the same way, that Lord of the worlds, with the *cāmaras* (chowries) in the form of his own power, whirled about, is not touched by blemishes and protects the worlds —the world of Brahmā and others, takes to enjoyments (and) uses objects of enjoyment fit to be enjoyed by all people —Again, the modification of the nature of Brahman, as in the case of earth and gold is not at all admitted by us, on account of the Sruti (passages) pointing out to (Brahman) not undergoing any modification and being free from all blemishes.

[262] As to again the exposition of the Sūtra by others, raising the doubt about the absence of the differentiation viz. the enjoyer and the enjoyed, in the doctrine of Brahman being the cause (of the world), by pointing out to the differentiation in the light of the illustrations—the ocean, foam, and waves— that (is) improper; for, such an objection and refutation do not go well in the case of those who admit the creation by Brahman possessed of the limiting adjunct Avidyā with its power implied within. On account of

कारणान्तर्गतशक्त्यविद्योपाध्युपाहितस्य भोक्तृत्वात्, उपाधेश्च भोग्यत्वात्, विलक्षणयोस्तयोः परस्परभावापत्तिर्हि न संभवति। स्वरूपपरिणामस्तु तैरपि नाभ्युपेयते

'न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्नानादित्वात्' (ब्र. सू. २।१।३५)

इति क्षेत्रज्ञानां तद्गतकर्मणां च, अनादित्वप्रतिपादनात्। स्वरूपपरिणामाभ्युपगमेऽपि भोक्तृभोग्याविभागशङ्का कस्यचिदपि न जायते। मृत्सुवर्णादिपरिणामरूपघटशरावकटकमुकुटादिविभागवद्भोक्तृभोग्यविभागोपपत्तेः। स्वरूपपरिणामेऽपि ब्रह्मण एव भोक्तृभोग्यत्वापत्तिः, इति पुनरप्यसामञ्जस्यमेव ॥ १४ ॥

भोक्त्रापत्त्यधिकरणं समाप्तम् (५)

तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः ॥ १५ ॥ (अधिकरण ६, सूत्राणि १५–२०)

[263] *'असदिति चेन्न प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात्'* (ब्र. सू. २।१।७)

इत्यादिषु कारणभूताद्ब्रह्मणः कार्यभूतस्य जगतोऽनन्यत्वमभ्युपगम्य ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वमुपपादितम्। इदानीं तदेवानन्यत्वमाक्षिप्य समाधीयते—

(Brahman) screened by the limiting adjunct Avidyā, with its power within the cause, being the enjoyer, and the limiting adjunct being the enjoyed, the *contingency of the two different from each other, attaining to mutual natures* is, indeed, not possible. As regards the modification of the nature, that is not admitted even by them, on account of the Ksetra-knowers and their Karmans being described as beginningless in (the Sūtra)

'If (it be argued) that on account of the non-differentiation of the Karman, (Īśvara cannot be the cause of the world, we reply) No, on account of (the world) being beginningless' (*Bra. Sū. II·1·35*)

Even though the modification of nature be admitted, there could not possibly be arising in anybody a doubt as regards the non-differentiation of the enjoyer and the enjoyed, on account of the differentiation of the enjoyer and the enjoyed being in order like the differentiation of jar, saucer, bracelet, coronet etc., that are the modifications of earth, gold, etc. Even in the case of the modification of nature, *there would be the undesirable contingency of the* same Brahman being the enjoyer and the enjoyed — thus again there would be the inappropriate nature (of the view propounded). ॥ 14 ॥

Here ends the Bhoktrāpattyadhikarana (5)

(The world has) a not-differentnature from that (Brahman) on account of the words Ārambhaṇa etc. ॥ **15** ॥

(Adhikarana 6, Sūtras 15-20)

[263] In (the Sūtra)

'If (it be argued) that (the world would be) non-existent, (we say) — No, on account of the mere repudiation (of the homogeneity rule)' (Bra. Sū II·1·7)

and others, having admitted the non-different nature of the world which is the effect, from Brahman that is the cause, has been justified Brahman's being the cause of the world. And now, having first called into question that same non-different nature, (the objection) is removed (as under) —

तत्र काणादाः प्राहुः — न कारणात्कार्यस्यानन्यत्वं संभवति। विलक्षणबुद्धिबोध्यत्वात्। न खलु तन्तुपटमृत्पिण्डघटादिषु कार्यकारणविषया बुद्धिरेकरूपा। शब्दभेदाच्च, न हि तन्तवः पट इत्युच्यन्ते पटो वा तन्तवः, इति। कार्यभेदाच्च, न हि मृत्पिण्डेनोदकमाह्रियते घटेन वा कुड्यं निर्मीयते। कालभेदाच्च, पूर्वकालं च कारणम्, अपरकालं च कार्यम्। आकारभेदाच्च, पिण्डाकारं कारणं कार्यं च पृथुबुध्नोदराकारम्। तथा सत्यामेव मृदि घटो नष्ट इति व्यवह्रियते। संख्याभेदश्च दृश्यते, बहवस्तन्तवः, एकश्च पटः। कारकव्यापारवैयर्थ्यं च — कारणमेव चेत्कार्यम्, किं कारकव्यापारसाध्यं स्यात्?

सत्यपि कार्ये, कार्योपयोगितया कारकव्यापारेण भवितव्यं चेत्, सर्वदा कारकव्यापारेण नोपरन्तव्यम्। सर्वस्य सर्वदा सत्त्वेन नित्यानित्यविभागश्च न स्यात्। अथ, कार्यं सदेव पूर्वमनभिव्यक्तं कारकव्यापारेणाभिव्यज्यते, अतः, कारकव्यापारार्थवत्त्वं नित्यानित्यविभागश्चोच्यते — तदसत्। अभिव्यक्तेरभिव्यक्त्यन्तरापेक्षत्वेऽनवस्थानात्। अनपेक्षत्वे कार्यस्य नित्योपलब्धिप्रसङ्गात्।

There the followers of Kanāda say — It is not possible that there could be a non different nature of the effect from the cause, on account of (these) being understood by cognition as different — not, indeed, is the cognition of the same nature, in respect of the cause and the effect, in the case of the thread (and) a piece of cloth, the clod of earth (and) the jar etc, and on account of the difference of words (used) — not, indeed, are threads spoken of as a piece of cloth, nor the piece of cloth as the threads either, and on account of the difference in the purpose to be served — not indeed, is water fetched by means of the clod of earth, nor again a wall built by means of a jar, and on account of the difference of time,— the cause belongs to the prior time and the effect to the posterior time, and on account of the difference in configurations — the cause has the form of a clod, and the effect has a circular form and a wide base. Similarly, although earth exists, it is said that the jar has perished And there is seen the difference in number — the threads are many and the piece of cloth one — And there would be the uselessness of causal operation, — if the cause itself is the effect, what is going to be accomplished by the causal operation?

Even though the effect exists the causal operation has got to be there as being useful for the effect — If (it be argued) thus then the causal agency ought not to be ceasing at all times And further, everything being always existent, there would not be the differentiation as eternal and non-eternal If (it be said) that the effect although existing (but) unmanifest before, is brought to light by the causal operation so, it is said that the causal operation is significant and (there can be) the division of eternal and non-eternal — (the reply is) — That is wrong, because there is the (fault of) endlessness, if the manifestation were to be dependent upon another manifestation (If it is) not dependent (upon another manifestation) there would be the undesirable contingency of the effect being always found

तदुत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमे च, असत्कार्यवादप्रसङ्गात्। किं च कारकव्यापारस्याभिव्यञ्जकत्वे घटार्थेन कारकव्यापारेण करकादेरप्यभिव्यक्तिः प्रसज्यते, संप्रतिपन्नाभिव्यञ्जकभावेषु दीपादिष्वभिव्यङ्ग्यविशेषनियमादर्शनात्। न हि घटार्थमारोपितः प्रदीपः करकादीन्नाभिव्यनक्ति। अतः, असतः कार्यस्योत्पत्तिहेतुत्वेनैव कारकव्यापारार्थवत्त्वम्। अतश्च सत्कार्यवादासिद्धिः। न च नियतकारणोपादानं सत एव कार्यत्वं साधयति, कारणशक्तिनियमादेव तदुपपत्तेः।

ननु — असत्कार्यवादिनोऽपि कारकव्यापारो नोपपद्यते। प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्यासत्त्वात्, कार्यादन्यत्र कारकव्यापारेण भवितव्यम्। तत्र, अन्यत्वाविशेषात्, तन्तुगतकारकव्यापारेण घटोत्पत्तिरपि प्रसज्येत—नैवम्, यत्कार्योपादानशक्तं यत्कारणं तद्गतकारकव्यापारेण तत्कार्योत्पत्तिसिद्धेः।

[264] अत्राहुः — कारणादनन्यत्कार्यम्। न हि परमार्थतः कारणव्यतिरिक्तं कार्यं नाम वस्त्वस्ति, अविद्यानिबन्धनत्वात्, सकलकार्यतद्व्यवहारयोः। अतः, यथा

If its production is admitted, there would be the undesirable contingency (of your accepting) the doctrine of the effect not existing (prior to the cause). Furthermore, if the causal agency is the cause of manifestation, there would result *the manifestation of even hail etc., by the causal operation intended* for a jar, on account of the non-perception of a particular restriction about things to be manifested in the case of lamp and others whose nature as manifesters is already accepted. Not, indeed, does a lamp put up for the sake of (perceiving) the jar, not manifest hail etc. Thus the causal operation is purposeful in being the cause of production alone, of the effect that does not exist. And hence also, the non-establishment of the doctrine of the effect existing (before). Not again, does the acceptance of a definite cause (for a definite effect) prove that *the existent alone is the effect, on account* of that being accounted for, just by the regulated power of the cause.

I say (says the objector) — Even in the case of one who holds that the effect does not exist *before, the causal operation is not appropriate.* The effect being not existent prior to its production, the causal operation has got to be connected somewhere (with some one) other than the effect. In that case, on account of being something else being common, there *would result* the production of the jar also, by the causal operation pertaining to the threads. (The reply would be) — Not so, because what cause is powerful to produce what *effect, the production of that effect is effected by the causal operation* pertaining to that.

[264] Here (some) say — The effect is not different from the cause. Not, indeed, is there in reality, any entity called effect over and above the cause, on account of all effects and their practical usage being dependent upon Avidyā. Therefore, *just as* the *effect—jar, saucer etc.,* over and above the earth-substance etc., *the cause,* (and) which *is found* in *the modifications,*

कारणभूतात्, मृद्द्रव्यात्, घटादिषु विकारेषूपलभ्यमानात्, व्यतिरिक्तं घटशरावादि कार्यं व्यवहारमात्रालम्बनं मिथ्या, कारणभूतं मृद्द्रव्यमेव सत्यम्, तथा निर्विशेषसन्मात्राद् कारणभूताद्, ब्रह्मणोऽन्योऽहंकारादिव्यवहारालम्बनः कृत्स्नः प्रपञ्चो मिथ्या, कारणभूतं सन्मात्रं ब्रह्मैव सत्यम्। तस्मात्, कारणव्यतिरिक्तं कार्यं नास्ति, इति कारणादनन्यत् कार्यम्। न च वाच्यम् — शुक्तिकारजतादीनामिव घटादिकार्याणामसत्यत्वाप्रसिद्धेः, दृष्टान्तानुपपत्तिः, इति — यतः, तत्रापि युक्त्या मृद्द्रव्यमात्रमेव सत्यतया व्यवस्थाप्यते, तद्व्यतिरिक्तं तु युक्त्या बाध्यते। का पुनरत्र युक्तिः? मृद्द्रव्यमात्रस्य, अनुवर्तमानत्वम्, तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य च व्यावर्तमानत्वम्। रज्जुसर्पादिषु हि, अनुवर्तमानस्याधिष्ठानभूतस्य रज्ज्वादेः सत्यता, व्यावर्तमानस्य च सर्पभूदलनाम्बुधारादेः, असत्यता दृष्टा। तथा, अनुवर्तमानमधिष्ठानभूतं मृद्द्रव्यमेव सत्यम्, व्यावर्तमानास्तु घटशरावादयोऽसत्यभूताः। किं च, सत आत्मनो विनाशाभावात्, असतश्च शशविषाणादेरुपलब्ध्यभावात्, उपलब्धिविनाशयोगि कार्यं सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वचनीयम्, इति गम्यते। अनिर्वचनीयं च शुक्तिकारजतादिवत्, मृषैव। तस्य च, अनिर्वचनीयत्वं प्रतीतिबाधाभ्यां सिद्धम्।

किं च, कार्यमुत्पादयन्मृदादि कारणद्रव्यम्, किम्, अविकृतमेव कार्यमुत्पादयति,

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jar etc, and which being dependent upon mere practical usage is false, the earth-substance alone, which is the cause is real, in the same way, the whole worldly existence dependent upon the practical usage, due to egoism etc, which is different from Brahman, the cause, which is mere consciousness without attributes, is false, Brahman, pure consciousness, the cause, is alone real Therefore, because the effect as apart from the cause does not exist, the effect is not different from the cause Nor should it be said that because the effects, jar etc, are not known to be unreal, like the silver etc, on the conch shell, there is the invalidity of the illustration for, there too, merely the earth-substance alone is established by reasoning as being real, but what is apart from that is contradicted by reasoning. What again is the reasoning here?—the continuing of merely the earth-substance, and the turning away of something apart from it In the case of the serpent on the rope etc, is seen the reality of the rope etc, which is the basis of the continuity thereof, and the unreality of the serpent the ground-crevices the line of water etc, which are being excluded In the same way, the earth-substance alone, which continues and which is the basis, (is) real but the jar, saucer etc, that are being excluded, (are) unreal Furthermore, on account of the absence of destruction of the Sat Ātman and on account of the non-perception of the horn of the hare etc, that are Asat, the effect connected with perception and destruction is known to be not capable of being described as existent or non-existent Incapability of being described is again nothing but being false like the silver on the conch-shell, etc Its being not capable of being described is established by apprehension and stultification

Furthermore, does the causal substance earth etc, producing the effect, produce the effect without undergoing any change or having attained to some particular state? Not for the matter of that, does it (cause) produce, being

उत कंचन विशेषमापन्नम् ? न तावत्, अविकृतमुत्पादयति, सर्वदोत्पादकत्वप्रसङ्गात्। नापि विशेषान्तरमापन्नम्। विशेषान्तरापत्तेरपि विशेषान्तरापत्तिपूर्वकत्वेन भवितव्यम्, तस्या अपि तथेत्यनवस्थानात्।

अविकृतमेव देशकालनिमित्तविशेषसंबद्धं कार्यमुत्पादयति, इति चेत्, न। देशादिविशेषसंबन्धोऽपि हि, अविकृतस्य विशेषान्तरमापन्नस्य च पूर्ववन्न संभवति। न च वाच्यम् — मृत्सुवर्णदुग्धादिभ्यो घटरुचकदध्यादीनामुत्पत्तिर्दृश्यते। शुक्तिकारजतादिवत्, देशकालादिप्रतिपन्नोपाधौ बाधश्च न दृश्यते। अत, प्रतीतिशरणाना कारणात्कार्योत्पत्तिरवश्याश्रयणीया, इति — विकल्पासहत्वात्। किं हेमादिमात्रमेव स्वस्तिकादेरारम्भकम्, उत रुचकादिः, अथ रुचकाद्याश्रयो हेमादिः? न तावत्, हेमादिमात्रमारम्भकम्। हेमव्यतिरिक्तस्य कार्यस्याभावात्। स्वात्मानं प्रत्यात्मन आरम्भकत्वासंभवाच्च। हेमव्यतिरिक्तं स्वस्तिकं दृश्यते, इति चेत्, न हेमव्यतिरिक्तं तत्, हेमप्रत्यभिज्ञानात्, तदतिरिक्तवस्त्वन्तरानुपलब्धेश्च।

बुद्धिशब्दान्तरादिभिर्वस्त्वन्तरत्वं साधितमिति चेत्, न। अनिरूपितवस्त्वव-

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unmodified, otherwise, there would be the undesirable contingency of its being always the producer Nor again (does the cause produce) having attained to another particular state, because even attaining to another particular state has got to be preceded by attaining to another particular state and that too in the same manner (further on) — thus there would be (the fault of) endlessness

If it be argued that the cause (itself) being unmodified, produces the effect being connected with *particularities due to space and time* — (the reply is) — No, for the particular connection with space etc, also of the (cause) unmodified attaining to another particular state, is not possible as before Nor should it be said that there is seen the production of jar, ornament, curds etc, from clay, gold, milk etc, and there is not to be seen any stultification in respect of the limiting adjuncts apprehended in respect of space, time etc, as in the case of the silver etc, on the conch-shell Therefore, the production of the effect from the cause has got to be accepted by those taking their stand upon the apprehension—on account of this admitting of no *alternatives — Is* merely gold etc., alone the cause of Svastika (ornament) etc., or the Rucaka (ornament) etc, or gold etc., the resort of Rucaka etc? Not, for the matter *of that, is merely gold etc., the producing cause on account* of the absence of the effect over and above the gold, and on account of the impossibility of oneself being the producing cause of oneself If it is argued that the Svastika is seen as apart from gold, (the reply is) — that (is) not apart from gold on account of the recognition of gold (therein), and on account of the non-perception of another entity apart from that.

If it be argued that being another entity is established by the different cognitions and (the use of) different words etc., — (the reply is) — No

लम्बनानां बुद्धिशब्दान्तराशीनां शुक्तिकारजतबुद्धिशब्दादिवत्, भ्रान्तिमूलत्वेन वस्त्वन्तरसद्भावासाधकत्वात् । नापि रुचकादि स्वस्तिकादेरारम्भकम् । स्वस्तिके हि रुचकं पट इव तन्तवो भवतापि नोपलभ्यते। नापि रुचकाश्रयभूतं हेम, रुचकाश्रयाकारेण हेम्नः स्वस्तिकेऽनुपलब्धेः । अतः, मृदादिकारणातिरिक्तस्य कार्यस्यासत्यत्वदर्शनाद्ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तं कृत्स्नं जगत्, तत्कार्यत्वेन मिथ्याभूतम् ।—

[265] तदिदं ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तमिथ्यात्वसुखप्रतिपत्तये काल्पनिकमृदादिसत्यत्वमाश्रित्य कार्यस्यासत्यत्वं प्रतिपादितम् । परमार्थतस्तु मृत्सुवर्णादिकारणमपि घटरुचकादिकार्यवन्मिथ्याभूतम्, ब्रह्मकार्यत्वाविशेषात् ।

'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यम्' (छा. ६।८।७)

'नेह नानास्ति किंचन' (बृ. ४।४।१९)

'मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति' (का. ४।१०; बृ. ४।४।१९)

'यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं पश्यति यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत्' (बृ. २।४।१४; ४।५।१५)

'इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते' (बृ. २।५।१९)

इत्येवमादिभिः श्रुतिभिश्च ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य मिथ्यात्वमवगम्यते । न च, आगमावगतार्थस्य

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because different cognitions and words etc., associated with substances not apprehended, being rooted in illusion like the cognition, words etc., about silver on the conch-shell, cannot establish the existence of another entity. Nor again, can the Rucaka (ornament) etc., be the producing cause of the Svastika (ornament) etc; for, by your honour also is not perceived the Rucaka in the Svastika, like threads in the piece of cloth, nor again, is the gold, the resort of Rucaka (the producer), on account of the non-perception, in Svastika, of gold in the form of the resort of Rucaka. Therefore, because the effect as apart from the cause, earth etc, is seen to be unreal, the whole world as apart from Brahman is false, owing to its being the effect thereof—

[265] All this, the unreality of the effect, has been propounded resorting to the imaginary reality of earth etc., for the easy apprehension of the unreality of (everything) other than Brahman. In reality, however, even the cause, earth, gold etc., is false like the effect, jar, Rucaka etc., on account of these being the products of Brahman without distinction.

'All this has this as Ātman, that (is) Satya' (Chā. 6·8·7)

'There is here nothing manifold whatsoever' (Br. 4·4·19)

'He goes over from death to death, who sees here as it were manifold' (Kā 4·10; Br 4·4·19)

'Where indeed there is as it were duality, then another sees another; but where for one all had been Ātman, then by what would one see whom?' (Br 2·4·14; 4·5·15)

'Indra goes by his Māyās, in many forms' (Br. 2·5·19)

—By these and other Śruti passages, is apprehended the unreal nature of (things) apart from Brahman. And one should not doubt that there is a

प्रत्यक्षाविरोधः शङ्कनीयः, यथोक्तप्रकारेण कार्यस्य सर्वस्य मिथ्यात्वावगमात्, प्रत्यक्षस्य सन्मात्रविषयत्वाच्च । विरोधे सत्यपि, असंभावितदोषस्य चरमभाविनः स्वरूपसद्भावादौ प्रत्यक्षाद्यपेक्षत्वेऽपि, प्रमितौ निराकाङ्क्षस्य निरवकाशस्य शास्त्रस्य बलीयस्त्वात् । अतः, कारणभूतात्, ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत्सर्वं मिथ्या । न च प्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वेन जीवमिथ्यात्वमाशङ्कनीयम्, ब्रह्मण एव जीवभावात् । ब्रह्मैव हि सर्वशरीरेषु जीवभावमनुभवति

'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य' (छा. ६।३।२)
'एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः' (श्वे. ६।११)
'एको देवो बहुधा निविष्टः' (तै. आ. ३।१३)
'एष सर्वेषु भूतेषु गूढोत्मा न प्रकाशते' (का. ३।१२)
'नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा' (बृ. ३।७।२३)

इत्येवमादिभ्यः ।

[266] ननु — एकमेव ब्रह्म सर्वशरीरेषु जीवभावमनुभवति, इति चेत्, 'पादे मे वेदना शिरसि सुखम्' इतिवत्सर्वशरीरेषु सुखदुःखप्रतिसंधानं स्यात् । जीवेश्वरबद्धमुक्तशिष्याचार्यज्ञत्वाज्ञत्वादिव्यवस्था च न स्यात् ।

अत्र केचिदद्वितीयत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽभ्युपयन्त एवैवं समादधते । एकस्यैव ब्रह्मणः प्रति-

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contradiction with direct perception in the case of a matter known from the (Āgama) Śāstras, on account of all effects being apprehended as false in the manner spoken of before, and on account of direct perception being concerned with mere existence; and because even though there be contradiction, the Śāstra is more powerful, in which no blemish can be thought of, which comes into existence afterwards, which is independent in the matter of apprehension, having no scope (elsewhere) although dependent upon direct perception etc., as regards its nature and existence. Therefore, everything other than Brahman, which is the cause, is false. Nor again, should it be doubted that Jiva is false owing to the worldly existence being false, on account of Brahman itself being the *Jiva*; for, *Brahman itself experiences the nature* of Jiva in all bodies —

'Having entered into, with the Living Self' (Chā. 6·3·2)
'One god, concealed in all beings' (Śve. 6·11)
'One God enjoys variously' (Tai. Ā. 3·13)
'This hidden Ātman in all beings, shines not' (Kā. 3 12)
'There is no other Seer than this one' (Br. 3·7·23)

(as stated) in these and other (passages).

[266] I say (says the objector)—if one Brahman alone experiences the nature of Jiva in all bodies, — then there would be the association of pleasure and pain in all bodies, like 'pain in my foot, and ease in the head' And there would not be the adjustment, — such as Jiva, Īśvara; bound down, freed; pupil, *preceptor; knowledge, ignorance etc.*

In this connection, some while *definitely* admitting Brahman *to be* without a second, give this explanation — In the case of the Jivas, the

बिम्बभूतानां जीवानां सुखित्वदुःखित्वादयः, एकस्यैव मुखस्य प्रतिबिम्बानां मणिकृपाणदर्पणादिषु, उपलभ्यमानानाम्, अल्पत्वमहत्त्वमलिनत्वविमलत्वादिवत्, तत्तदुपाधिवशात्, व्यवस्थाप्यन्ते ।

ननु—

'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य' (छा ६।३।२)

इत्यादिश्रुतेर्न जीवा ब्रह्मणो भिद्यन्ते, इत्युक्तम् । सत्यं परमार्थतः, काल्पनिकं तु भेदमाश्रित्य, इयं व्यवस्थोच्यते। कस्य पुनः कल्पना ? न तावद्ब्रह्मणः, तस्य परिशुद्धज्ञानात्मनः कल्पनाशून्यत्वात् । नापि जीवानाम्, इतरेतराश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गात् । कल्पनाधीनो हि जीवभावः, जीवाश्रया च कल्पना,—इति । नैतदेवम्, अविद्याजीवभावयोर्बीजाङ्कुरन्यायेनानादित्वात् । किं च, प्रासादनिगरणादिवत्, अनुपपन्नैकवेषायामवस्तुभूतायामविद्यायां नेतरेतराश्रयादयो वस्तुदोषा अनवक्लृप्तिमावहन्ति । वस्तुतः, ब्रह्माव्यतिरिक्तानां जीवानां स्वतो विशुद्धत्वेऽपि कृपाणादिगतमुखप्रतिबिम्बश्यामतादिवत्, औपाधिकाशुद्धिसंभवात्, अविद्याश्रयत्वोपपत्तेः काल्पनिकत्वोपपत्तिः । प्रतिबिम्बगतश्यामतादिवत्, जीवगताशुद्धिरपि भ्रान्तिरेव, अन्यथा निर्मोक्षत्वप्रसङ्गात् । जीवानां भ्रमस्य प्रवाहानादित्वात्, न तद्धेतुरन्वेषणीयः, इति —

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reflections of one and the same Brahman, being happy, being miserab'e etc, are regulated by virtue of the various limiting adjuncts, like smallness, bigness, dusty nature, spotlessness in the reflections of one and the same face that are perceived in gem, sword, mirror etc.

I say (says the objector) — In the Sruti (passage)

'Having entered into, with this Living Self' (Chā 6 3·2)

etc, it is stated that the Jivas are not different from Brahman—(the reply is)—(This is) true from the stand-point of the reality, this adjustment, however, is stated, as resorting to imaginary difference Whose again (is this) imagination? Not, for the matter of that, of Brahman, on account of its being void of any imaginary thoughts, constituted as it is of all pure consciousness Nor again, of the Jivas, on account of the undesirable contingency of mutual inter-dependence For, the nature of Jiva is dependent on imagination and imagination has Jiva for its resort — (the reply is)—(It is) not so, on account of Avidyā and the nature of Jīva being beginningless, after the maxim of the seed and the sprout Furthermore, in the case of Avidyā, which is not an (existing) entity, which is all dressed in only the garb of non-appropriateness, like the swallowing of a mansion blemishes associated with an entity, mutual dependence etc, are not impossible. As a matter of fact, in the case of Jivas which are not different from Brahman, although themselves of a spotless nature, there is the possibility of impurity due to the limiting adjuncts like the blackness of the reflection of the face in the sword etc,—and so, the imaginary nature can be accounted for, on account of the possibility of these having the resort of Avidyā. The impurity associated with the Jiva also, like the blackness associated with reflections, is nothing but illusion Otherwise, there would be the undesirable contingency of non-salvation The illusion of the Jivas being endless like a stream, its cause need not be searched after —

[267] तदेतत्, अविदिताद्वैतयाथात्म्यानां भेदवादश्रद्धालुजनसबहुमानावलोकनालिप्साविजृम्भितम् । तथाहि — जीवस्याकल्पितस्वाभाविकरूपेणाविद्याश्रयत्वे ब्रह्मण एवाविद्याश्रयत्वमुक्तं स्यात् । तदतिरिक्तेन तस्मिन्कल्पितेनाकारेण, अविद्याश्रयत्वे जडस्याविद्याश्रयत्वमुक्तं स्यात् । न खलु, अद्वैतवादिनस्तदुभयव्यतिरिक्तमाकारमभ्युपगच्छन्ति । कल्पिताकारविशिष्टेन स्वरूपेणैव, अविद्याश्रयत्वमिति चेत्, तन्न । स्वरूपस्याखण्डैकरसस्य, अविद्यामन्तरेण विशिष्टरूपत्वासिद्धेः । अविद्याश्रयाकार एव हि निरूप्यते। किं च, बन्धमोक्षादिव्यवस्थासिद्ध्यर्थं जीवाज्ञानस्य समाश्रयणम् । सा तु व्यवस्था जीवाज्ञानपक्षेऽपि न सिध्यति । अविद्याविनाश एव हि मोक्षः । तत्र, एकस्मिन्मुक्ते, अविद्याविनाशात्, इतरेऽपि विमुच्येरन् । अन्यस्यामुक्तत्वात्, अविद्या तिष्ठति, इति चेत्, तर्हि, एकस्याप्यमुक्तिः स्यात्, अविद्याया अविनष्टत्वात् ।

प्रतिजीवमविद्याभेदः कल्प्यते, तत्र यस्याविद्या विनष्टा स मोक्ष्यते, यस्य त्वनष्टा स भन्त्स्यते, इति चेत्, तन्न । प्रतिजीवमिति जीवभेदमाश्रित्य ब्रूषे, स जीवभेदः किं स्वाभाविकः, उत, अविद्याकल्पितः ? न तावत्स्वाभाविकः, अनभ्युपगमात् । भेदसिद्ध्यर्थं

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[267] All this (is) the display of a desire for respectful treatment, by people believing in the doctrine of difference, of those who have not understood the real nature of non-duality. To explain the same — If Jiva is the resort of Avidyā, in its natural form not superimposed, it is tantamount to speaking of Brahman as a resort of Avidyā itself If that superimposed form *as apart from that (Brahman) is the resort of Avidyā, it would be tantamount* to saying that the non-sentient is the resort of Avidyā Not, indeed, do the sponsors of non duality admit of any form apart from the two If it be said that there is the resort of Avidyā, by its very nature particularised by the superimposed form, (we reply) — Not so on account of the non-establishment of a particular nature in the case of a uniform unbroken nature (of a thing) without Avidya, for, only the form, the resort of Avidyā, is apprehended Furthermore, the ignorance of Jīva is admitted (or, resorted to) for the purpose of establishing the adjustment of bondage, salvation etc That adjustment, however, is not established even with the admission of the ignorance of Jiva, for, the destruction of Avidyā alone is salvation In that case, when one is released, others also would be (automatically) released on account of the destruction of Avidyā If it be said that Avidyā stays on, owing to another *not being released, then there would not be release even* for the one, on account of Avidyā not being destroyed

If it be said that a different Avidyā is imagined for every Jīva, thus — *in whose case* Avidyā is *destroyed*, he would be released, in whose *case* however, it is not destroyed, he is bound down — (we reply) — Not so the *difference of Jiva of which you talk, resorting to the difference in the Jiva in* saying 'Pratijīva' (for every Jīva) — is that natural, or superimposed by Avidyā ? Not, for the matter of that, natural, because it is not so admitted

स्यास्य च, अविद्याकल्पनस्य व्यर्थत्वात्। अथ, अविद्याकल्पितः, तत्र, इयं जीवभेदकल्पिकाविद्या किं ब्रह्मणः, उत जीवानाम्? ब्रह्मण इति चेत्, आगतोऽसि मदीयं मार्गम्। अथ, जीवानाम्, किमस्या जीवभेदक्लृप्तिसिद्ध्यर्थतां विस्मरसि?

अथ, प्रतिजीवं बद्धमुक्तव्यवस्थासिद्ध्यर्थं या अविद्याः कल्प्यन्ते, ताभिरेव जीवभेदोऽपीति मनुषे, जीवभेदसिद्धौ ताः सिध्यन्ति, तासु सिद्धासु जीवभेदसिद्धिः, इति, इतरेतराश्रयत्वम्।

न च, अत्र बीजाङ्कुरन्यायः सिध्यति। बीजाङ्कुरेषु हि, अन्यदन्यद्बीजम्, अन्यस्यान्यस्याङ्कुरस्योत्पादकम्। इह तु, याभिरविद्याभिर्ये जीवाः कल्प्यन्ते तानेवाश्रित्य तासां सिद्धिरित्यशङ्कनीयता। अथ बीजाङ्कुरन्यायेन पूर्वपूर्वजीवाश्रयाभिरविद्याभिरुत्तरोत्तरजीवकल्पनां मन्यसे, तथा सति, जीवानां भङ्गुरत्वम्, अकृताभ्यागमकृतप्रहाणादिप्रसङ्गश्च। अत एव, ब्रह्मणः पूर्वपूर्वजीवाश्रयाभिरविद्याभिरुत्तरोत्तरजीवकल्पनमित्यपि निरस्तम्। अविद्याप्रवाहेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने, तत्तत्कल्पितजीवभावस्यापि तद्वत्प्रवाहानादिता स्यात्, न ध्रुवरूपता। आ मोक्षाच्च जीवभावस्य ध्रुवत्वमिष्टं न सिध्येत्।

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and the superimposition by Avidyā would be useless to establish difference in his case. And if superimposed by Avidyā, there — Does this Avidyā superimposing the difference of Jīvas, belong to Brahman, or to Jīvas? If it (belongs) to Brahman, then you have come to my way (of thinking). If, to the Jīvas, (we ask) — Are you forgetting its serving the purpose of establishing the idea of difference in the Jīvas?

Now, as regards these Avidyās that are imagined for the purpose of the establishment of the adjustment of the bound and the released in the case of each Jīva, by those very (Avidyās) there is the difference in the Jīvas — if you think thus — Those would be established when the difference in the Jīvas is established; when those are established, there would be the establishment of the difference in the Jīvas—thus there would be (the fault of) mutual interdependence.

Nor again, would the maxim of the seed and the sprout succeed here; for, in the case of the seeds and the sprouts, another and another seed produces another and another sprout. Here, on the other hand, by which Avidyās, which Jivas are superimposed, there is the establishment of those Avidyās by resorting to the same Jivas — this is beyond doubt. If, after the maxim of the seed and the sprout, you think, that the various succeeding Jivas are superimposed by the Avidyās that are the resort of the various preceding Jivas,— then, in that case, the Jīvas would be transitory, and there would be the undesirable contingency of accepting (being responsible for) what is not done, and giving up of what is done etc. For this very reason, is ruled out also, the superimposition by Brahman of the various succeeding Jīvas by the Avidyās, the resort of the various preceding Jivas. If it is admitted that there is the Avidyā stream, then there would be, like that itself — beginninglessness of the stream even in the case of the various natures of the Jīva superimposed and not the eternal nature (thereof). And the desired permanancy of the nature of Jivas, up to the state of salvation, would not be established.

[268] यच्चोक्तम्—अविद्याया अवस्तुरूपत्वेन, अनुपपत्त्येकवेषाया नेतरेतराश्रयत्वादयो वस्तुदोषा अनवक्लृप्तिमावहन्ति—इति, तथा सति मुक्तान्परं च ब्रह्माश्रयेदविद्या। शुद्धविद्यास्वरूपत्वात्, अशुद्धिरूपा न तत्र प्रसजति, इति चेत्—किम्, उपपत्त्यनुपपत्त्यनुवर्तिनी, अविद्या? एवं तर्हि, उक्ताभिरनुपपत्तिभिर्जीवानपि नाश्रयेत्। किं च, जीवाश्रयाया अविद्यायास्तत्त्वज्ञानोदयात्, नाशे सति, जीवो नश्येत्, वा न वा? यदि नश्येत्, स्वरूपोच्छित्तिलक्षणो मोक्षः स्यात्। नो चेत्, अविद्यानाशेऽपि, अनिर्मोक्षः, ब्रह्मस्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तजीवत्वावस्थानात्।

[269] यच्चोक्तम्—मणिकृपाणदर्पणादिषु, उपलभ्यमानमुखमलिनत्वविमलत्वादिवत्, शुद्ध्यशुद्ध्यादिव्यवस्थोपपत्तिः, इति—तत्रेदं विमर्शनीयम्। अल्पत्वमलिनत्वादय औपाधिका दोषाः कदा नश्येयुः? इति। कृपाणाद्युपाध्यपगमे, इति चेत्, किं तदा, अल्पत्वाद्याश्रयः प्रतिबिम्बस्तिष्ठति न वा? तिष्ठति, इति चेत्, तत्स्थानीयस्य जीवस्यापि स्थितत्वात्, अनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गः। नश्यति चेत्, तद्वदेव जीवनाशात्

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[268] As to what has been stated — Because Avidyā has the nature of a non-existing entity, the blemishes associated with an entity, like mutual dependence, are not impossible in the case of Avidyā dressed only in the garb of non-appropriateness — (we reply) — In that case, Avidyā would be resorting to the released souls and Brahman If it be said that on account of their having the nature of pure knowledge, (Avidyā) of an impure nature would not be encroaching there —, (we ask) — Is Avidyā following propriety and non-propriety? In that case, (Avidyā) would not resort to Jivas also in view of the various arguments pointing out the impropriety mentioned before Furthermore, when there is the destruction of Avidyā the resort of Jivas, through the rise of the knowledge of reality— would the Jiva perish or not? If he were to perish then salvation would be of the nature of the destruction of one's nature If not, there would be the absence of salvation, even when Avidyā is destroyed, on account of the nature of Jiva remaining as apart from Brahman

[269] *As to what has been said that there would be the proper adjustment of purity, impurity etc, like the dustiness, spotlessness etc., of the face perceived in gem sword mirror etc,—there* this has got to be *considered*—When are the blemishes *due to* limiting adjuncts such as smallness, *dustiness etc going to perish?* If (it be said by way of reply) — at the disappearance of the limiting adjunct sword etc then (our query is)— Does then the reflection, the resort of smallness etc stay or not? If (it be said that) it stays, then the Jiva also belonging to the same category stays there, and so there would be the undesirable contingency of no freedom (from worldly life) If (you say) it perishes then like that itself, the Jiva would perish, and so there would be salvation characterised by annihilation of one's nature Furthermore, for whom there is the apparent apprehension of blemishes constituted of objects (that are) not the human

स्वरूपोच्छित्तिलक्षणो मोक्षः स्यात् । किं च, यस्य हि, अपुरुषार्थरूपदोषप्रतिभासः, तस्य तदुच्छेदः पुरुषार्थः । तत्र, किम्, औपाधिकदोषप्रतिभासो बिम्बस्थानीयस्य ब्रह्मणः, उत प्रतिबिम्बस्थानीयस्य जीवस्य, उत, अन्यस्य कस्यचित् ? आद्ययोः कल्पयोर्दृष्टान्तोऽयं न संगच्छते, मुखस्य मुखप्रतिबिम्बस्य च, अल्पत्वादिदोषप्रतिभासशून्यत्वात् । न हि मुखं तत्प्रतिबिम्बं वा चेतयते । ब्रह्मणो दोषप्रतिभासे ब्रह्मणोऽविद्याश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गश्च । तृतीयोऽपि कल्पो न कल्पते, जीवब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य द्रष्टुरभावात् ।

[270] किं च, अविद्याकल्प्यस्य जीवस्य कल्पकः कः, इति निरूपणीयम् । न तावत्, अविद्या, अचेतनत्वात् । नापि जीवः, आत्माश्रयदोषप्रसङ्गात्, शुक्तिकारजतादिवत्, अविद्याकल्प्यत्वाच्च जीवभावस्य । ब्रह्मैव कल्पकम्, इति चेत् — ब्रह्माज्ञानमेवायातम् । किं च, ब्रह्माज्ञानानभ्युपगमे, किं ब्रह्म जीवान्पश्यति न वा ? न पश्यति चेत्, ईक्षापूर्विका विचित्रसृष्टिर्नामरूपव्याकरणमित्यादि ब्रह्मणो न स्यात् । अथ पश्यति, अखण्डैकरसं ब्रह्म, अनाद्यविद्यामन्तरेण जीवान् पश्यति, इति ब्रह्माज्ञानप्रसङ्गः । अत एव मायाविद्याविभागवादोऽपि निरस्तः । अज्ञानमन्तरेण हि मायिनोऽपि ब्रह्मणो जीवदर्शित्वं न स्यात् ।

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purpose in life,—for him the annihilation of that, would be the human purpose in life In that case—Does the apparent apprehension of the blemishes belonging to the adjuncts, belong to the Brahman standing in the place of the original, or to the Jiva standing in the place of reflection, or to some another? In the case of the first two alternatives, this illustration would not go well, on account of the face and the reflection of the face being void of the apparent apprehension of the blemishes, smallness etc Not indeed, is the face or its reflection conscious of that. If the apparent apprehension of the blemish belongs to Brahman, there would again be the undesirable contingency of Brahman being the resort of Avidyā The third alternative also cannot stand, on account of the absence of any seer over and above Jiva and Brahman,

[270] Furthermore, it has got to be scrutinised — Who is the superimposer of the Jiva that is fit to be superimposed by Avidyā? Not, for the matter of that, Avidyā, on account of its being non-sentient Nor again, Jiva, on account of the undesirable contingency of the blemish belonging to oneself, because the nature of Jiva is to be superimposed by Avidyā, like the silver etc, on the conchshell If Brahman itself is the superimposer then it follows that the Ajñāna belongs to Brahman Furthermore, if the Ajñāna of Brahman is not admitted, — Does Brahman perceive the Jivas or not? If (Brahman) perceives not then the variegated creation preceded by reflection the modification of name and form, etc, would not be Brahman's If (Brahman) perceives, then because Brahman which is of a uniform unbroken nature perceives the Jivas without the beginningless Avidya, — there would be the undesirable contingency of Brahman being possessed of Ajñāna For this very reason, the doctrine of the division by Māyā Avidyā, is also refuted, for, without the Ajñāna, Brahman even though possessed of

न च मायावी परानदृष्ट्वा मोहयितुमलम् । न च माया मायाविनो दर्शनसाधनम्, दृष्टेषु परेषु तन्मोहनसाधनमात्रत्वात्तस्याः ।

अथ, ब्रह्मणो माया तस्य जीवदर्शित्वं कुर्वती जीवमोहनहेतुरिति मन्यसे, तर्हि परिशुद्धस्याखण्डैकरसस्वप्रकाशस्य ब्रह्मणः परदर्शनं कुर्वती माया मायापरपर्यायाविद्यैव स्यात् ।

[271] अथ मतम् — विपरीतदर्शनहेतुरविद्या । माया तु मिथ्याभूतं ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तं मिथ्यात्वेनैवं दर्शयन्ती न ब्रह्मणो विपरीतदर्शनहेतुः । अतः, तस्या नाविद्यात्वम् — इति । नैवम् । चन्द्रैकत्वे ज्ञायमाने, द्विचन्द्रज्ञानहेतोरप्यविद्यात्वात् । यदि च ब्रह्म मिथ्यात्वेनैव स्वव्यतिरिक्तं जानाति, न तर्हि तन्मोहयति । न ह्युन्मत्तो मिथ्यात्वेन ज्ञातान्मोहयितुमीहते ।

अथ, अपुरुषार्थापरमार्थदर्शनहेतुः, अविद्या, माया तु ब्रह्मणो नापुरुषार्थदर्शनहेतुः । अत, अस्या नाविद्यात्वमिति मतम्, तन्न । द्विचन्द्रज्ञानस्य दुःखहेतुत्वाभावेनापुरुषार्थत्वाभावेऽपि तद्धेतुरविद्यैव । तन्निरसने च प्रयस्यन्ति । यदि च, न, अपुरुषार्थकरी माया,

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Māyā cannot be perceiving the Jiva Not again is a juggler competent to infatuate others, without seeing them Not again is illusion, a means of perception for the juggler, because that is merely the means of their infatuation, when others are seen

Now, if you think that the Māyā (-power) of Brahman effecting its being the perceiver of Jiva is the cause of the infatuation of Jiva, — then the *Māyā, effecting the perception of another by Brahman which is pure all round, self-illumined and of a uniform nature would be nothing but Avidyā itself, Mayā being (just) its synonym*

[271] Now if the view is — Avidyā is the cause of contrary perception, Māyā, on the other hand causing one to see the unreal entities other than Brahman as being certainly false, cannot be the cause of contrary perception of Brahman Therefore, it (Mayā) has not the nature of Avidyā — *(the reply is) — Not so when the oneness of the moon is being apprehended, the cause of the knowledge of two moons also has the nature of Avidyā If* again Brahman knows (entities) other than itself as being certainly false, then surely it does not infatuate Not indeed, one not intoxicated desires to infatuate things known as false

Now, Avidyā is the cause of perception of unreality and of what is not the human purpose in life Maya on the other hand is not the cause of the perception of what is not the human purpose in life in the case of Brahman. Therefore, Māya has not the nature of Avidyā — if this is the view, (our reply is), — That (is) not (so) because even though the knowledge of two moons is not the human purpose in life owing to the absence of its being the cause of misery, the cause of that is Avidya itself and people endeavour for its removal If again Mayā were not the cause of what is not the human purpose in life, then owing to its being not fit to be removed it

तर्हि, अनुच्छेद्यतया नित्या ब्रह्मस्वरूपानुबन्धिनी स्यात्। अस्तु, को दोषः? इति चेत्—द्वैतदर्शनमेव दोषः—

'*यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति*'　　　　(बृ २।४।१४; ४।५।१५)

'*यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत्*'　　　　(बृ २।४।१४, ४।५।१५)

इत्यादि-अद्वैतश्रुतयः प्रकुप्येयुः। परमार्थविषया अद्वैतश्रुतयः, मायायास्त्वपरमार्थत्वात्, अविरोध इति चेत्—अपरिच्छिन्नानन्दैकस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणोऽपरमार्थभूतमायादर्शनं तद्वत्तां चाविद्यामन्तरेण नोपपद्यते। किं च, अपरमार्थभूतयानित्यया मायया किं प्रयोजनं ब्रह्मणः? जीवमोहनम्, इति चेत्—अपुरुषार्थेन मोहनेन किं प्रयोजनम्? क्रीडा, इति चेत्—अपरिच्छिन्नानन्दस्य किं क्रीडया?

परिपूर्णभोगानामेव क्रीडा पुरुषार्थत्वेन लोके दृष्टा, इति चेत्—नैवमिहोपपद्यते। न हि, अपरमार्थभूतैः क्रीडोपकरणैः, अपरमार्थतया प्रतिभासमानैः, निष्पन्नया, अपरमार्थभूतया क्रीडया, अपरमार्थभूतेन च तत्प्रतिभासेन, अनुन्मत्तानां क्रीडारसो निष्पद्यते। मायाश्रयतया, अभिमतब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेण, अविद्याश्रयस्य जीवस्य कल्पनासंभवश्च पूर्ववदेव

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would be eternal and thus would be following the nature of Brahman If (it be said) — Let that be, what harm? — (our reply is) — The perception of duality (is) itself the harm The Śruti passages, advocating non-duality, — such as

'*Where indeed there is at were duality*' (Br 2 4 14, 4 5 15)

'*Where for one, every thing has become Ātman himself, then by what would one see whom?*' (Br 2 4 14, 4·5 15)

would be contradicted (lit getting angry) If it be said that the Sruti passages advocating non-duality refer to the highest reality, Māyā, on the other hand, is not the highest reality, and so, there is no contradiction — (our reply is) — In the case of Brahman having an unbroken uniform nature of bliss alone, the perception of Māyā which is not real and being possessed of that (Māyā) would not be taking place without Avidyā Furthermore, what purpose (is served in the case) of Brahman by Māyā which is not real, and which is not eternal? If (it be said) — The infatuation of Jiva, — (our reply is) — What purpose (is served) by infatuation which is not the human purpose in life? If sport, what use of sport in the case of one with an unbroken bliss?

If (it be argued that) in this world, is seen sport as serving human purpose in life in the case of only those whose enjoyments are all fulfilled — (our answer is) — This would not be appropriate here (in the present case). Not, indeed, can there be produced the sport-enjoyment in the case of non-intoxicated people, by sport which is unreal and which is produced by the means of sport that are unreal, that appear as unreal! The impossibility of imagining Jiva as the resort of Avidyā as apart from Brahman taken to be the resort of Māyā, should be understood as already explained Therefore, Brahman itself, mixed with beginningless, manifold Avidyā, perceives

द्रष्टव्यः । अतः, ब्रह्मैव, अनाद्यविद्याशबलं स्वगतनानात्वं पश्यति, इति, अद्वितीयत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽभ्युपयद्भिरभ्युपेतम् ।

[272] यत्तु बन्धमोक्षव्यवस्था नोपपद्यते, इति — न तद्ब्रह्माज्ञानवादिनश्चोद्यम् । एकस्यैव ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञस्य स्वाज्ञाननिवृत्त्या मोक्ष्यमाणत्वात्, बद्धमुक्तादिव्यवस्थाया एवाभावात् । व्यवह्रियमाणायाश्च बद्धमुक्तशिष्याचार्यादिव्यवस्थायाः काल्पनिकत्वात् । स्वप्नदर्शिन इव चैकस्यैवाविद्यया सर्वकल्पनोपपत्तेः । स्वप्नदृशा हि, एकेन दृष्टाः शिष्याचार्यादयस्तदविद्याकल्पिता एव । अत एव, बह्वविद्याकल्पनमपि न युक्तिमत् । पारमार्थिकी बन्धमोक्षव्यवस्था स्वपरव्यवस्था च जीवाज्ञानवादिनापि नाभ्युपेयते । अपारमार्थिकी तु, एकस्यैव, अविद्ययोपपद्यते । प्रयोगाश्च—

(१) बन्धमोक्षव्यवस्थाः स्वपरव्यवस्थाश्च स्वाविद्याकल्पिताः ।
अपारमार्थिकत्वात्,
स्वप्नदृष्टव्यवस्थावत् ।

इति ।

(२) शरीरान्तराण्यपि मयैवात्मवन्ति ।
शरीरत्वात्,
एतच्छरीरवत् ।

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manifoldness belonging to itself; — thus, those who hold the Brahman to be without a second, admit.

[272] As to (what has been said) the adjustment regarding bondage and salvation would not be appropriate—this cannot be argued against one who holds Ajñāna as belonging to Brahman, on account of the absence of the adjustment of bound and released, itself, in the case of one and the same ignorant Brahman, which is to be freed, by the turning away of its own ignorance, and on account of the adjustment about—bound, released; pupil, preceptor etc., which is in usage being imaginary; for, as in the case of a dream-perceiver, all fancies would be quite appropriate owing to Avidyā in the case of one alone. The pupils, preceptors etc, seen by one perceiving a dream, are surely imagined by Avidyā belonging to him. For this very reason, imagining Avidyā to be many, is also not reasonable. A real adjustment about bondage and salvation, and adjustment about oneself and another are not admitted even by one holding that Ajñāna belongs to Jīva. But if that be unreal, it would be quite appropriate, owing to Avidyā in the case of one alone. And there are the following syllogisms—

(1) *Adjustments regarding bondage and salvation, and adjustment about* oneself and another are fancied by one's own Avidyā
On account of their being unreal.
Like the adjustment perceived in a dream,

(2) Other bodies also are possessed of Ātman on account of me alone
On account of their being the body.
Like this body.

(३) शरीरान्तराण्यपि मदविद्याकल्पितानि ।
शरीरत्वात्, कार्यत्वात्, जडत्वात्, कल्पितत्वात्, वा,
एतच्छरीरवत् ।

(४) विवादाध्यासितं चेतनजातमहमेव ।
चेतनत्वात्,
यदनहं तदचेतनं दृष्टं यथा घटः ।

अतः, स्वपरविभागो बद्धमुक्तशिष्याचार्यादिव्यवस्थाश्चैकस्याविद्याकल्पिताः द्वैतवादिनापि बद्धमुक्तव्यवस्था दुरुपपादा, अतीतानां कल्पानामानन्त्यात् । एकैकस्मिन्कल्पे, एकैकमुक्तावपि सर्वेषां मोक्षसंभवात्, अमुक्तानुपपत्तेः ।

अनन्तत्वादात्मनाम्, अमुक्ताश्च सन्तीति चेत् — किमिदम्, अनन्तत्वम् असंख्येयत्वम्, इति चेत् , न । भूयस्त्वात्, अल्पज्ञैरसंख्येयत्वेऽपि, ईश्वरस्य सर्वज्ञस्य संख्येय एव । तस्यापि, अशक्यत्वे सर्वज्ञत्वं न स्यात् । आत्मनां निःसंख्येयत्वात्, ईश्वरस्य अविद्यमानसंख्यावेदनाभावो न, असार्वज्ञ्यमावहतीति चेत् — न । भिन्नत्वे संख्याविधुरत्वं नोपपद्यते—

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(3) Other bodies also are fancied by Avidyā belonging to me
On account of their being the body, on account of their bein[g] a product, on account of their being non-santient, on account o[f] their being imagined,
Like this body.

(4) The aggregate of sentient entities, the matter under dispute, i[s] I, myself
On account of its being sentient,
Whatever is not I, that is seen to be non-sentient, as for instance the jar.

Therefore, the division,—(belonging to) oneself and (belonging to) others, and the adjustments—bound, released; pupil, preceptor etc., are (all) fancie[d] by Avidyā, in the case of one. The adjustment bound and released,—[is] difficult to sustain even by one holding the doctrine of duality, on account o[f] the endlessness of past aenons; for, even though in each aenon, (only) on[e] is released, it would be possible for all to secure salvation and so, no non[-]released would be forthcoming

If (it be said that) on account of the endlessness of Ātmans, ther[e] would remain the non-released,—(we ask)—What (is) this endlessness[?] If it is incapability of being counted, (we say)—No; although they cannot b[e] counted because of their vastness—by those who know little, they are al[l] surely fit to be counted by Īśvara, the omniscient. If even he finds tha[t] impossible there would not be omniscience in him. If (it be said that) o[n] account of the Atmans being countless, the absence of the knowledge o[f] the non-existing number does not result in the non-omniscience o[f] Īśvara,—(we reply)—No; when things are different, there cannot possibly b[e] any uncountable nature—

आत्मानः संख्यावन्तः ।
भिन्नत्वात्,
माषसर्षपघटपटादिवत् ।

भिन्नत्वे चात्मनां घटादिवत्, जडत्वम्, अनात्मत्वं क्षयित्वं च प्रसज्यते; ब्रह्मणश्च, अनन्तत्वं न स्यात्। अनन्तत्वं नाम परिच्छेदरहितत्वम्। भेदवादे च, वस्त्वन्तराद्विलक्षणत्वेन ब्रह्मणो वस्तुतः परिच्छेदरहितत्वं न शक्यते वक्तुम्। वस्त्वन्तराभाव एव हि वस्तुतः परिच्छेदः। वस्तुतः परिच्छिन्नस्य देशतः कालतश्चापरिच्छिन्नत्वं न युज्यते। वस्त्वन्तराद्विलक्षणत्वेन वस्तुतः परिच्छिन्ना एव हि घटादयो देशतः कालतश्च परिच्छिन्ना दृष्टाः। तथा सर्वे चेतना ब्रह्म च, वस्तुतः परिच्छिन्ना देशकालाभ्यामपि परिच्छिद्यन्ते। एवं च

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तम्' (तै २।१)

इत्यादिभिः सर्वप्रकारपरिच्छेदरहितत्वं वदद्भिर्विरोधः। उत्पत्तिविनाशादयश्च जीवानां ब्रह्मणश्च प्रसज्येरन्। कालपरिच्छेद एव हि, उत्पत्तिविनाशभागित्वम्। अतः, एकस्यैवापरिच्छिन्नस्य ब्रह्मणोऽविद्याविजृम्भितं ब्रह्मादि स्तम्बपर्यन्तं कृत्स्नं जगत्। सुखदुःखप्रतिसंधानव्यवस्थादयोऽपि स्वाप्नव्यवस्थावत्, अविद्यास्वाभाव्यादुपपद्यन्ते। तस्मात्, एकमेव

The Ātmans are possessed of number (can be counted)
On account of their being different,
Like bean, mustard-seed, jar, cloth etc

If the Ātmans are different, there would ensue the undesirable contingency of their being like the jar etc, *non-sentient, non-Ātman and perishable* There would further not be the limitless nature of Brahman Anantatvam means —being void of a limit In the Difference-doctrine, Brahman being different from any other *entity, it is not possible really to speak of* Brahman being void of a limit. The absence of a different entity itself is really a limit, In the case of a thing that is really limited it is not right (to speak of it) as being not limited by time and space *for, the jar etc, alone that are really limited owing to their being different from other entities are seen to be limited by time and* space Similarly, all sentient entities and Brahman, being really limited are limited *also by space and time And thus there is contradiction* with those (Sruti passages) which speak of (the Highest) being void of limitation of every kind like

'*Existence, Knowledge, Infinite (is) Brahman*' (Tait 2 1 1)

And origination, destruction etc would come to be associated with Jivas and Brahman for limitation by time *itself* shares in origination and destruction For this very reason, the whole world beginning with Brahmā and ending with a tuft of grass (is) the display of Avidyā by Brahman, one only, without any limit *Adjustments about the* association of pleasure and pain etc, also *can be justified* on account of their partaking in the nature of Avidyā, like the adjustment in a dream Therefore one and the same (Brahman) with *its free eternal self-illumining* nature, is modified

नित्यमुक्तस्वप्रकाशस्वभावम्, अनाद्यविद्यावशात्, जगदाकारेण विवर्तते, इति परमार्थतो ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्ताभावात्, तदनन्यत्वं जगतः, इति ।—

[273] अत्रोच्यते— निर्विशेषस्वप्रकाशमात्रं ब्रह्म, अनाद्यविद्यातिरोहितस्वस्वरूपं स्वगतनानात्वं पश्यति, इत्येतत्प्रकाशस्वरूपस्य निरंशस्य प्रकाशनिवृत्तिरूपतिरोधाने स्वरूपनाशप्रसङ्गेन तिरोधानासंभवादिभ्यः सकलप्रमाणविरुद्धं स्ववचनविरुद्धं च, इति पूर्वमेवोक्तम् ।

[274] यत्पुनरुक्तम् — कारणव्यतिरिक्तं कार्यं युक्तिबाधितत्वेन शुक्तिकारजतादिवत्, भ्रमः, इति — तदयुक्तम् । युक्तेरभावात् ।

यत्तु — अनुवर्तमानस्य कारणमात्रस्य सत्यत्वम्, व्यावर्तमानानां घटशरावादिकार्याणाम्, असत्यत्वम् — इति, तदपि, अन्यत्र दृष्टस्यान्यत्र व्यावर्तमानता न बाधिका, इत्यादिभिः पूर्वमेव परिहृतम् ।

यच्च—उपलभ्यमानत्वाविनाशित्वाभ्यां सदसदनिर्वचनीयत्वेन कार्यस्य मृषात्वम्— इति, तदसत् । उपलब्धिविनाशयोगो हि न मिथ्यात्वं साधयति किं तु, अनित्यत्वम् । यद्देशकालसंबन्धितया यदुपलब्धम्, तद्देशकालसंबन्धितया बाधितत्वमेव हि तस्य मिथ्यात्वे हेतुः । देशान्तरकालान्तरसंबन्धितया, उपलब्धस्य, अन्यदेशकालसंबन्धित्वेन बाधितत्वं

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in the form of the world, through the power of the beginningless Avidyā,—and so, on account of the absence of being apart from Brahman in reality the world (is) not different from it—

[273] Here this is stated (by way of reply)—Brahman which is only self-light without any attributes, with its own nature screened by the beginningless Avidyā perceives manifoldness belonging to itself, and so, on account of the impossibility of screening etc., in the case of something impartite with such illumining as its nature, on account of the contingency of the destruction of its own nature, if there is the screening of the form of the withdrawal of the light—this statement is opposed to all means of proof and contradicted by your own words—This has already been stated.

[274] As to what has been stated viz.—the effect as apart from the cause, being stultified by reasoning (is) illusion, like the silver on the conch-shell etc.,—that (is) improper, on account of the absence of any (logical) reasoning.

As to (the statement) that only the cause which perseveres, is real; the effects, jar, saucer etc., that are being excluded are unreal—that too has already been refuted by (arguments) such as—in the case of a thing seen elsewhere, its being excluded from another place is not the stultifying factor.

As to (the statement) that the product (effect) is false, owing to its being indescribable as existing (sat) or non-existing (asat), on account of its being perceived and being perishable—that (is) wrong; for, the association with perception and destruction does not prove a false nature but (only) non-permanency; for, whatever is perceived as being related with which space and time, its stultification only with being related to that space and time (is) the cause of the false nature of the thing. Stultification owing to its being associated with another space and time in the case of an object perceived

देशान्तरकालान्तरव्याप्तिमात्रं साधयति न तु मिथ्यात्वम्। प्रतिप्रयोगश्च—

घटादिकार्यं सत्यम्।

देशकालादिप्रतिपन्नोपाध्यबाधितत्वात्,

आत्मवत्।

यच्चोक्तम् — कारणस्वरूपात्, अविकृताद्विकृतत्वाच्च, कार्योत्पत्तिर्न संभवति— इति, तदसत्। देशकालादिसहकारिसमवहितात्, कारणात्कार्योत्पत्तिसंभवात्।

तत्समवधानं च विकृतस्याविकृतस्य च न संभवति,—इति यदुक्तं तदयुक्तम्। पूर्वमविकृतस्यैव कालादिसमवधानसंभवात्।

अविकृतत्वाविशेषात्, पूर्वमपि देशकालादिसमवधानं प्रसज्यते — इति चेत्, न। देशकालादिसमवधानस्य कारणान्तरायत्तस्य, एतदायत्तत्वाभावात्। अत', देशकालादिसमवधानरूपविशेषमापन्नं कारणं कार्यमुत्पादयति, इति न किंचिदवहीनम्। कारणस्य च कार्यं प्रति, आरम्भकत्वमबाधितं दृश्यमानं न केनापि प्रकारेण, अपह्नोतुं शक्यते।

[275] यत्तु — हैमादिमात्रस्य रुचकादिकार्यस्य तदाश्रयस्य वा, हेमादेरा-

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as being associated with different space and different time, proves only its not pervading another space and another time but not its false nature And there (is) the counter-syllogism—

The product, jar etc, is real

On account of its not being stultified by the limiting adjuncts associated with space and time etc,

Like the Ātman

As to what has been said that the production of the effect is not possible from the natural form of the cause either modified or unmodified—that (is) wrong, on account of the possibility of the production of the effect from the cause, obliged by accessories, space and time etc.

As to the statement made—that kind of obligation is not possible in the case of (the cause) either modified or unmodified—that (is) improper, on account of the possibility of the obligation by time etc only in the case of the cause, itself unmodified before

If (it be argued) that the obligation by space, time etc, would perforce be there even before on account of the unmodified nature of the cause being a common factor —(*we reply*)—*No, because* the obligation by space, time etc, being dependent upon another cause, there is the absence of its being dependent on this So a cause attaining to a special form by the obligation by space time etc, produces the effect—thus, there is nothing objectionable (*here*), *and the fact that the cause does produce the effect—this*, which is being perceived unchallenged, is not possible to be put out of sight in any way

[275] As to again (what has been said)—that gold etc, cannot be the producing factors of the products, the ornaments etc, mere gold etc., or of the resort of them—that (is) improper, on accoun t of the possibility of even

रम्भकत्वं न संभवति—इति, तदयुक्तम् । हेमादिमात्रस्यैव यथोक्तपरिकरयुक्तस्य, आरम्भकत्वसंभवात् । न च, आरम्भकहेमव्यतिरिक्तं कार्यं न दृश्यते, इति वक्तुं शक्यम् । हेमातिरिक्तस्य स्वस्तिकस्य दर्शनात्, बुद्धिशब्दान्तरादिभिर्वस्त्वन्तरस्य साधितत्वाच्च । न च, अयं शुक्तिकारजतादिवत्, भ्रमः । उत्पत्तिविनाशयोरन्तराले, उपलभ्यमानस्य तद्देशकालसंबन्धितया बाधादर्शनात् । न च, अस्या उपलब्धेर्बाधिका काचिदपि युक्तिर्दृश्यते । प्रागनुपलब्धस्वस्तिकोपलब्धिवेलायामपि, हैमप्रत्यभिज्ञा स्वस्तिकाश्रयतया हेम्नोऽप्यनुवृत्तेरविरुद्धा । श्रुतिभिस्तु प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वसाधनं पूर्वमेव निरस्तम् । यच्च, अन्यत्र प्रत्यक्षविरोधादि प्रतिवक्तव्यम्, तदपि सर्वं पूर्वमेव सूक्तम् ।

[276] यच्चोक्तम्—एकेनात्मना सर्वाणि शरीराण्यात्मवन्ति—इति, तदसत् । एकस्यैव सर्वशरीरप्रयुक्तसुखदुःखप्रतिसंधानप्रसङ्गात् । सौभरिप्रभृतिषु हि, आत्मैकत्वेन, अनेकशरीरप्रयुक्तसुखादिप्रतिसंधानम्, एकस्य दृश्यते । न च, अहमर्थस्य ज्ञातृत्वात्, तद्भेदात्प्रतिसंधानाभावः, न, आत्मभेदादिति वक्तुं शक्यम् । आत्मा ज्ञातैव, स च, अहमर्थ एव । अन्तःकरणभूतस्तु, अहंकारो जडत्वात्करणत्वाच्च शरीरेन्द्रियादिवत्, न ज्ञाता, इत्युपपादितत्वात् ।

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mere gold etc , endowed with the aforesaid paraphernalia, being the producing cause Not again, is it possible to say that no product apart from the cause, gold, is not seen, because the Svastika as apart from gold is seen, and because that it is a different object is proved by different notions and words etc . Further, this (is) not illusion, like the silver on the conch-shell etc because there is seen no stultification of its being perceived between the two ends–production and destruction—as being associated with the particular space and time And further no reasoning whatsoever is seen capable of stultifying its perception Even at the time of the perception of the Svastika not perceived before, the recognition of gold is not contradicted owing to the perseverence even of gold as the resort of the Svastika The reasoning to prove the false nature of worldly existence has already been refuted by the Sruti passages And something else which can be said by way of reply here, such as contradiction with direct perception etc , has alreedy been well–stated before

[276] As to what has been stated—all bodies can be (said to be) possessed of Ātman, by one Ātman–that (is) wrong, because there would be the undesirable contingency of one and the same person being associated with happiness and misery prompted by many bodies In the case of Saubhari and others, indeed, the association of happiness etc prompted by more than one body is seen in one (person) owing to their having one Atman Further, it is not possible to say that there is the absence of association, on account of the I–entity being the knower and on account of the difference due to that, and not on account of the difference of the Ātmans because, Ātman himself is the knower, he further is the I–entity itself but egoism, which is the inner sense-organ is not the knower on account of its being non–sentient and being the instrument, like the body and the sense-organs etc —This has been reasoned out

यच्च, शरीरत्वजडत्वकार्यत्वकल्पितत्वैः सर्वशरीराणाम्, एकस्याविद्याकल्पितत्वमुक्तम्, तदपि सर्वशरीराणामविद्याकल्पितत्वस्यैवाभावात्, अयुक्तम्। तदभावश्च, अबाधितस्य सत्यत्वोपपादनात्।

यच्च, चेतनादन्यस्य जडत्वदर्शनात्, सर्वचेतनानामनन्यत्वम्, उक्तम्—तदपि सुखदुःखव्यवस्थया भेदोपपादनादेव निरस्तम्।

यत्तु—मय्येवात्मवन्ति मदविद्याकल्पितानि, अहमेव सर्वं चेतनजातम्—इति, अहमर्थस्यैक्यमुपपादितम्, तदज्ञातस्वसिद्धान्तस्य भ्रान्तिजल्पितम्। अहंत्वमाद्यर्थविलक्षणं चिन्मात्रं हि, आत्मा त्वन्मते।

[277] किं च, निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रातिरेकि सर्वं मिथ्या, इति वदतो
(१) मोक्षार्थश्रवणादिप्रयत्नो निष्फलः।
अविद्याकार्यत्वात्,
शुक्तिकारजतादिषु रजताद्युपादानादिप्रयत्नवत्।
(२) मोक्षार्थप्रयत्नो व्यर्थः।
कल्पिताचार्यायत्तज्ञानकार्यत्वात्,
शुकप्रह्लादवामदेवादिप्रयत्नवत्।

As to what has been stated—that all the bodies are superimposed by Avidyā in the case of one, on account of the fancy about being possessed of a body, being non-sentient, being a product—all that (is) improper, on account of the absence itself of all bodies being superimposed by Avidyā, and the *absence of that is propounded because an unstultified thing is real*

As to what has been stated—that all sentient things are not different from one another, on account of a thing other than the sentient being perceived as non-sentient—that also has been refuted by the difference itself being propounded by the adjustment of happiness and misery

As to again, (your) putting forth the oneness of the I-entity as in (expressions) like—(these bodies) are possessed of Ātman, only because of me, fancied by Avidyā belonging to me, I alone (am) the entire aggregate of the sentients—that is a prattle due to misconception by one who has not *understood his own doctrine, for, according to your view, the Ātman* which is pure consciousness (is) different from the entities I, You, etc

[277] Furthermore, for one who speaks of everything being false apart from pure consciousness without any attributes—

(1) The effort such as hearing (the sacred *texts*) *etc, for the sake of* salvation is fruitless
On account of that being the effect of Avidya,
Like the effort of taking the silver etc, in the silver on the conch-shell etc

(2) The effort for the sake of salvation (is) useless
On account of that being the result of knowledge dependent upon a superimposed preceptor,
Like the effort of Śuka, Prahlāda and Vāmadeva

(३) तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यजन्यं ज्ञानं न बन्धनिवर्तकम् ।
अविद्याकल्पितवाक्यजन्यत्वात्, स्वयमविद्यात्मकत्वात्, अविद्याकल्पित-ज्ञात्राश्रयत्वात्, कल्पिताचार्यायत्तश्रवणजन्यत्वाद्वा,
स्वाप्नबन्धनिवर्तकवाक्यजन्यज्ञानवत् ।

किं च,

(४) निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रं ब्रह्म मिथ्या ।
अविद्याकार्यज्ञानगम्यत्वात्, अविद्याकल्पितज्ञात्राश्रितज्ञानगम्यत्वात्, अविद्यात्मकज्ञानगम्यत्वाद्वा,
यदेवं तत्तथा यथा स्वाप्नगन्धर्वनगरादि ।

न च निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रं ब्रह्म स्वयं प्रकाशते, येन न प्रमाणान्तरमपेक्षते । यत्तु, आत्मसाक्षिकं स्वयं प्रकाशज्ञानं दृश्यते, तत्तु ज्ञेयविशेषसिद्धिरूपं ज्ञातृगतमेव दृश्यते,

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(3) The knowledge produced from the passages—that thou art etc.,—does not remove bondage
On account of its being produced by passages imagined by Avidyā,
or
On account of being itself constituted of Avidyā,
or
On account of having as the resort the knower imagined by Avidya,
or
On account of being produced from hearing depending on a superimposed preceptor,
Like the knowledge produced from passages removing the bondage in dreams.

And further,

(4) Brahman, pure consciousness without any attributes, is false
On account of being comprehended by knowledge which is the effect of Avidyā,
or
On account of being comprehended by knowledge resorting to a knower imagined by Avidyā,
or
On account of being comprehended by knowledge constituted of Avidyā,
Whatever is thus, is of that nature; as for instance, the city of the Gandharvas etc., in a dream.

Nor again, does Brahman which is pure consciousness without any attributes, shine forth of its own accord, so that it does not stand in need of any other means of proof.—What again the self-illumining knowledge having Atman as the witness is perceived, that again is perceived as belonging to the knower himself, being of the nature of comprehension of a specific object of knowledge—this has been stated already. As for the knowledges endowed

इति पूर्वमेवोक्तम् । यानि च तस्य निर्विशेषत्वसाधनानि यौक्तिकानि ज्ञानान्युपन्यस्तानि, तानि च, अनन्तरोक्तैरविद्याकार्यत्वात्, इत्यादिभिरनुमानैर्निरस्तानि ।

न च निर्विशेषस्य चिन्मात्रस्य, अज्ञानसाक्षित्वम्, अहंकारादिजगद्भ्रमश्चोपपद्यते । साक्षित्वभ्रमादयोऽपि हि ज्ञातृविशेषगता दृष्टाः, न ज्ञप्तिमात्रगताः । न च तस्य प्रकाशकत्वं स्वायत्तप्रकाशता वा सिध्यति । प्रकाशो हि नाम कस्यचित्पुरुषस्य कंचनार्थविशेषं प्रति सिद्धिरूपो दृश्यते । तत एव हि तस्य स्वयंप्रकाशतोपपाद्यते भवद्भिरपि । न च, अताद्रूप्यस्य निर्विशेषस्य स्वप्रकाशता संभवति । यः पुनः स्वगोष्ठीषु, अपरमार्थादपि परमार्थकार्यं दृश्यते, इत्युद्घोषः, सोऽपि तानि कार्याणि सर्वाणि, अबाधितकल्पानि व्यावहारिकसत्यानि, वस्तुतस्तु, अविद्यात्मकान्येव, इति स्वाभ्युपगमादेव निरस्तः ।

अस्माभिरपि सर्वत्र परमार्थादेव कारणात्सर्वकार्योत्पत्तिमुपपादयद्भिः पूर्वमेव निरस्तः । न च त्वया, एषामनुमानानां श्रुतिविरोधो वक्तुं शक्यते । श्रुतेरपि, अविद्याकार्यत्वेन, अविद्यात्मकत्वेन च, उक्तदृष्टान्तेभ्यो विशेषाभावात् ।

[278] यत्तु — ब्रह्मणोऽपारमार्थिकज्ञानगम्यत्वेऽपि पश्चात्तनबाधादर्शनात्, ब्रह्म सत्यमेव — इति, तदसत् । दुष्टकारणजन्यज्ञानगम्यत्वे निश्चिते सति, पश्चात्तनबाधा-

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with reasoning, the means of proving the attributeless nature of that (Brahman), that have been put forth—all those are refuted by the syllogisms —on account of being the effect of Avidyā etc., set forth later.

Further, in the case of attributeless pure consciousness, are not proper,— being the witness of Ajñāna, and the illusion of the world, egoism etc.; for, being the witness, illusion etc., are seen as belonging to a specific knower and not as belonging to mere knowledge. Nor again, can its illumining nature or its light depending upon itself be proved, for illumining, indeed, is seen as fruitful (effective) in the case of some person pertaining to some specific entity. And, indeed, for that same reason, its self-illumining nature is propounded by your honour as well. Not again is possible the self-illumining nature in the case of an attributeless entity not of that nature. As to the loud announcement in your own schools viz even from an unreal thing is seen a real effect,—that also is refuted by your own admitted doctrine viz. all those effects almost unstultified are real in the Vyāvahārika sense; in reality, however, they are just constituted of Avidyā—

By us, too, propounding the origination of all effects everywhere from the real cause itself, has that (Udghoṣa of yours) been already refuted. Again it is not possible for you to say that there is contradiction with the Sruti of these syllogisms, because the Sruti also, being the effect of Avidyā and being constituted of Avidyā, cannot be different from the illustrations given.

[278] As to (the statement) that although Brahman can be comprehended by unreal knowledge, Brahman is real all the same on account of the non-perception of subsequent stultification—that (is) wrong. When

बाधादर्शनस्याकिंचित्करत्वात्। यथा शून्यमेव तत्त्वम्, इति वाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्य पश्चात्तनबाधादर्शनेऽपि दोषमूलत्वनिश्चयादेव तदर्थस्यासत्यत्वम्। किं च

'नेह नानास्ति किंचन' (बृ. ४।४।१९)
'विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म' (बृ. ३।९।२८)

इति विज्ञानमात्रातिरिक्तस्य कृत्स्नस्य वस्तुजातस्य निषेधकत्वेन सर्वस्मात्परत्वात्पश्चात्तनबाधादर्शनमुच्यते। शून्यमेव तत्त्वमिति तस्याप्यभावं वदतस्तस्मात्परत्वेन पश्चात्तनबाधो दृश्यते। सर्वशून्यतातिरेकिनिषेधासंभवात्, तस्यैव पश्चात्तनबाधादर्शनम्। दोषमूलत्वं तु प्रत्यक्षादीनां वेदान्तजन्मनः सर्वशून्यज्ञानस्याप्यविशिष्टम्। अतः, सर्वं विज्ञानजातं पारमार्थिकज्ञातृगतं स्वयं च परमार्थभूतम्, अर्थविशेषसिद्धिरूपम्। तत्र किंचिज्ज्ञानं दोषमूलम्, दोषश्च परमार्थः, किंचिच्च निर्दोषं पारमार्थिकसामग्रीजन्यम्, इति यावन्नाभ्युपेयते, न तावत्सत्यमिथ्यार्थव्यवस्था लोकव्यवहारश्च सेत्स्यति। लोकव्यवहारो हि पारमार्थिको भ्रान्तिरूपश्च पारमार्थिकज्ञातृगतार्थविशेषसिद्धिरूपप्रकाशपूर्वकः। निर्विशेषसन्मात्रस्य तु, पारमार्थिकस्य, अपारमार्थिकस्य च प्रतिभासादेर्हेतुत्वासंभवात्, लोकव्यवहारो न संभवति।

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something as being comprehended by knowledge produced from a defective cause, is definitely ascertained, the non-perception of subsequent stultification is of no consequence. Just as even though there is the non-perception of subsequent stultification of the knowledge produced from the passage—The reality (is) void itself,—the purport of that (sentence) is false on account of the ascertainment itself of its being rooted in blemish. Furthermore, by (the passages)—

'*Nothing whatsoever is here many*' (Br. 4·4·19)
'*Vijñāna, Bliss, Brahman*' (Br. 3·9·28)

repudiating the entire aggregate of entities over and above pure consciousness, is stated the absence of any subsequent stultification. In the case of one speaking of the absence even of that, in the form—The reality (is) void itself,—there is seen the stultification of something subsequent, owing to its being beyond that; on account of the impossibility of repudiation of something over and above everything void, there would be the non-perception of subsequent stultification of that itself. As to direct perception and others being rooted in defect (misconception) that is common to the knowledge of everything being void produced by the Vedāntas. Therefore, the entire aggregate of knowledge belongs to a real knower and is itself real, being of the form of establishment of a particular object. There some knowledge is rooted in defect and the defect is real; something again is without any blemish, produced by a real aggregate of means—if this is not admitted, there cannot be the division of real and false objects and the practical dealings in the world would not proceed; for, the practical dealings in the world real and illusory, are preceded by the illumining in the form of the establishment of a particular object belonging to a real knower. In the case of pure attributeless existence (sat), however, there being the impossibility of the perception of either the real or the unreal, the practical dealings in the world would not be possible.

[279] यच्च तैर्निरधिष्ठानभ्रमासंभवात्, सर्वाध्यासाधिष्ठानस्य सन्मात्रस्य पारमार्थिकत्वमुक्तम्, तदपि दोषदोषाश्रयत्वज्ञातृत्वज्ञानानाम्, अपारमार्थ्येऽपि भ्रमोपपत्तिवत्, अधिष्ठानापारमार्थ्येऽपि भ्रमोपपत्तेर्निरस्तम्।

अथ, अधिष्ठानापारमार्थ्ये न क्वचिद्भ्रमो दृष्टः, इति सन्मात्रस्य पारमार्थिकत्वमवश्याश्रयणीयम्, इति मन्यसे,— हन्त तर्हि, दोषदोषाश्रयत्वज्ञातृत्वज्ञानानामपारमार्थ्येऽपि न क्वचिद्भ्रमो दृष्टः, इति दर्शनानुगुण्येन तेषामपि पारमार्थ्यमवश्याश्रयणीयम्, इति न कश्चिद्विशेषोऽन्यत्र संरम्भात्।

[280] यत्तु — भेदपक्षेऽप्यतीतकल्पानामानन्त्यात्, सर्वेषामात्मनां मुक्तत्वेन बद्धासंभवात्, बद्धमुक्तव्यवस्था न संभवति, इति—तदात्मानन्त्येन परिहृतम्।

यत्तु — आत्मनां भिन्नत्वे, माषसर्षपघटादिवत्संख्यावत्त्वमवर्जनीयम्—इति, तत्र घटादीनामप्यनन्तत्वात्, दृष्टान्तः साध्यविकलः स्यात्।

दश घटाः, सहस्रं माषाः, इति संख्यावत्त्वं दृश्यते, इति चेत्, सत्यम्। तत्तु न घटादिस्वरूपगतम्, अपि तु देशकालाद्युपाधिमद्घटादिगतम्, तादृशं तु संख्यावत्त्व-

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[279] As to what has been stated by them viz.—pure existence, the foundation of all superimposition, is real, on account of the impossibility of a baseless illusion—that too is refuted, on account of the *propriety* of illusion existing even though its basis is unreal, like the existence of illusion even though the blemish, the resort of the blemish, the nature of knower, and knowledge are unreal.

Now, if you think that the real nature of pure existence has got necessarily to be resorted to, because nowhere is illusion seen where the basis is unreal,—Goodness! then because no illusion is anywhere seen even though the blemish, the resort of blemish, the nature of knower, knowledge, are unreal, their real nature has also got to be necessarily admitted in conformity with perception; so, there is no speciality (here), excepting pig-headed-ness (on your part).

[280] As to (the statement)—even according to *the doctrine of* difference, the past aenons being endless, all the Atmans would be free and there would be the impossibility of anybody being in bondage —and so, there would be no regulated arrangement about—bound and free—that is rebutted by the endlessness of the Ātmans (being admitted).

As to (the statement), though the Ātmans are different, their being associated with a number is unavoidable as in the case of bean, mustard, jar etc.,—In that case, jar etc., also being endless, the *illustration* is *incapable* of proving what is to be proved.

If (it be argued) that being associated with a number is seen (in their case) as in (statements like)—Ten jars, a thousand beans, (we reply)—True: that, however, does not belong to the nature of the jar etc., but belongs to the jar etc., associated with the limiting adjuncts of space and time etc. That

मात्मनामप्यभ्युपगच्छामः। न च तावता सर्वमुक्तिप्रसङ्गः, आत्मस्वरूपानन्त्यात्।

यत्तु — आत्मनां भिन्नत्वे, घटादिवत्, जडत्वानात्मत्वक्षयित्वप्रसङ्गः — इति, तदयुक्तम्। एकजातीयानां भेदस्य तज्जातीयानां जात्यन्तरीयत्वानापादकत्वात्। न हि घटानां भेदस्तेषां पटत्वमापादयति।

यत्तु — भिन्नत्वे वस्तुतः परिच्छेदात्, देशकालाभ्यामपि परिच्छेदो ब्रह्मणः प्रसज्यते, इत्यनन्तत्वं ब्रह्मणो न सिध्यति, इति — तदयुक्तम्। वस्तुतः परिच्छिन्नानामपि देशकालपरिच्छेदस्य न्यूनाधिकभावेन, अनियमदर्शनात्, देशकालसंबन्धेयत्तायाः प्रमाणान्तरायत्तनिर्णयत्वेन ब्रह्मणः सर्वदेशकालसंबन्धस्यापि प्रमाणान्तरात्, आपाततो विरोधाभावात्।

वस्तुतः, परिच्छेदमात्रादपि सर्वप्रकारपरिच्छेदरहितत्वाभावात्, आनन्त्यासिद्धिः, इति चेत् — तन्नवतोऽप्यविद्याविलक्षणत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽभ्युपयतः समानम्। अतः, सतोऽविद्याविलक्षणत्वाभ्युपगमात्, ब्रह्मणोऽपि भिन्नत्वेन भेदप्रयुक्ता दोषाः सर्वे तवापि प्रसज्येरन्।

[281] यदि, अविद्याविलक्षणत्वं नाभ्युपेयते, तर्हि, अविद्यात्मकमेव ब्रह्म स्यात्।

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kind of association with a number again, we do admit in the case of the Ātmans; but by that there would not be the undesirable contingency of all being free, on account of the endlessness of the natures of Ātmans.

As to (the statement)—if the Ātmans were different, there would be as in the case of jar etc., the undesirable contingency of their being non-sentient, non-Ātman and perishable—that (is) improper, on account of the difference of those belonging to one genus, not being capable of producing the nature of another genus, in the case of the objects belonging to that genus. Not, indeed, does the difference between jars produce the state of cloth in them.

As (*to the statement*) *if* (*the Ātmans*) *are different, there being* a real demarcation, there would perforce be limitation of Brahman, due even to space and time; and so, the infinite nature of Brahman would not ensue—that (is) improper;—because even in the case of objects really limited, there is perceived *no regulation* on account *of the limitation due to space and time* being greater or smaller—and so, the limitation due to the association with space and time having its ascertainment dependent upon another means of proof, in the case of Brahman also, the relation of all space and time being found there by other means of proof, there is no contradiction.

If (it be argued),—although there be a limitation, referring to itself endlessness would not be proved, owing to the absence of being free of limitations of all kinds, then that applies to you also, admitting Brahman to be different from Avidyā. *Therefore, by* (*your*) *admitting Sat being different from* Avidyā, Brahman is also different and so, all blemishes due to difference would also be accruing in your (doctrine) also.

[281] If being different from Avidyā is not admitted, then, Brahman *would be constituted of Avidyā itself. For that very reason, the defining* passage

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. २।१)

इति लक्षणवाक्यमपि तत एव, अपार्थकं स्यात्। भेदतत्त्वानभ्युपगमे हि स्वपक्षपरपक्षसाधनदूषणादिविवेकाभावात्, सर्वम्, असमञ्जसं स्यात्। आनन्त्यप्रसिद्धिश्च देशकालपरिच्छेदरहितत्वमात्रेण। वस्तुतोऽपि परिच्छेदरहितत्वे तथाविधस्य शशविषाणायमानस्यानुपलब्धेः। भेदवादिनस्तु सर्वचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरत्वेन ब्रह्मणः सर्वप्रकारत्वात्, स्वतः परतोऽपि परिच्छेदो न विद्यते। तदेवं कारणाद्भिन्नस्य कार्यस्य सत्यत्वात्, ब्रह्मकार्यं कृत्स्नं जगत्, ब्रह्मणोऽन्यदेव, इति प्राप्ते, प्रचक्ष्महे—'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः'। तस्मात् परमकारणाद्ब्रह्मणः, अनन्यत्वं जगतः, आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः,—तदुपपादयद्भ्योऽवगम्यते। आरम्भणशब्द आदिर्येषां वाक्यानां तानि, आरम्भणशब्दादीनि।

'वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्' (छा. ६।१।१)

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (छा. ६।२।१)

'तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति। तत्तेजोऽसृजत' (छा. ६।२।३)

'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य' (छा. ६।३।२)

'Existence, Knowledge, Infinite (is) Brahman' (Tai. 2·1)

also would be meaningless. If the principle of difference is not admitted, indeed, everything would be absurd on account of the absence of discrimination etc.,—such as one's own side, the opponent's side; argument for, argument against etc. The well-known nature of endlessness (in Brahman) is due to its being divested of limitation in time and space, only. If it were divested of limitations also in reality, such a thing imitating the hare-horn would not be found. In the case of those holding the doctrine of difference Brahman being possessed of all modes, on account of its having all sentient and non-sentient entities as its body, there cannot exist limitation either due to itself or due to something else. So, in this way, the effect as different from the cause being real, the entire world, the product of Brahman, is definitely other than Brahman—this (prima-facie view) being reached, we reply—'(The world has) a non-different nature from that (Brahman), on account of the words Ārambhana etc'. From that,—from the highest cause, from Brahman; Ananyatvam—not being different from the world, on account of the words Ārambhana etc. propounding the same, is understood.

Ārambhanaśabdādīni—those passages at the beginning of which there is the word Ārambhana—

'Modification has its beginning in speech, a (mere) name—clay alone is real' (Chā. 6·1·1)

'Existence alone, gentle one, this was at the beginning, one alone, without a second.' (Chā. 6·2·1)

'It reflected—May I be many, may I procreate—it created Light' (Chā. 6·2·3)

'Having entered into, by this living Self' (Chā. 6·3·2)

'सन्मूलाः सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सदायतनाः सत्प्रतिष्ठाः' (छा. ६।८।६)
'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो' (छा. ६।८।७)

इत्येतानि प्रकरणान्तरस्थानान्यपि, एवंजातीयकानि, अत्राभिप्रेतानि। एतानि हि वाक्यानि चिदचिदात्मकस्य जगतः, परस्माद्ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यत्वमुपपादयन्ति। तथाहि—

'स्तब्धोऽस्युत तमादेशमप्राक्ष्यो येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातम्' (छा. ६।१।१)

इति कृत्स्नस्य जगतो ब्रह्मैककारणत्वं कारणात्कार्यस्यानन्यत्वं च हृदि निधाय कारणभूतब्रह्मविज्ञानेन कार्यभूतस्य सर्वस्य विज्ञाने प्रतिज्ञाते सति, कृत्स्नस्य ब्रह्मैककारणतामजानता शिष्येण

'कथं नु भगवः स आदेशः' (छा. ६।१।१)

इति, अन्यज्ञानेन, अन्यज्ञानासंभवं चोदितो जगतो ब्रह्मैककारणतामुपदेक्ष्यँल्लौकिकप्रतीतिसिद्धं कारणात्कार्यस्यानन्यत्वं तावत्

'यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृण्मयं विज्ञातं स्यात्' (छा. ६।१।१)

इति दर्शयति। यथा, एकमृत्पिण्डारब्धानां घटशरावादीनां तस्मादनतिरिक्तद्रव्यतया

'*Rooted in Sat, gentle one, all these creatures having their abode in Sat, established in Sat*' (Chā. 6·8·6)

'*All this has this as the Ātman, that is Satya, that Atman, that thou art, (O) S'vetaketu*' (Chā. 6·8·7)

—These and others, although occurring in other contexts elsewhere, of such nature are intended. These passages, indeed, propound the world constituted of the sentient and the non-sentient, as not being different from the Highest Brahman. To explain the same—in (the passage)

'*You are stiff,—did you ask about that instruction by which the unheard is heard, the unthought of, thought, the unknown, known?*' (Chā. 6·1·1)

the entire world having Brahman as the only cause, and the effect being not different from the cause,—with this being borne in mind, the knowledge of everything, the effect, being solemnly proclaimed to be due to the knowledge of Brahman, the cause, pressed by the pupil not knowing Brahman as the only cause, the preceptor regarding the impossibility of the knowledge of something else, by the knowledge of something else in (the passage)

'*How indeed, Revered Sir, (is) that instruction?*' (Chā. 6·1·1)

instructing about Brahman alone being the cause of the world, —(the preceptor) points out in the passage

'*As, gentle one, by one clod of earth, everything constituted of earth is known*' (Chā. 6·1·1)

the effect not being different from the cause, for the matter of that,—that is proved by popular comprehension—the sense is—as in the case of jar, saucer etc., produced from one clod of earth, there is the known-ness by the knowledge of that, on account of (those substances) eing not over and above that

तज्ज्ञानेन ज्ञातता, इत्यर्थः। अत्र, काणादवादेन कारणात्कार्यस्य द्रव्यान्तरत्वमाशङ्क्य लोकप्रतीत्यैव कारणात्कार्यस्यानन्यतामुपपादयति

'वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्' (छा. ६।१।१)

इति। आरभ्यते-आलभ्यते, स्पृश्यते, इति, आरम्भणम्

'कृत्यल्युटो बहुलम्।' (पा. सू. ३।३।११३)

इति कर्मणि ल्युट्। वाचा—वाक्पूर्वकेण व्यवहारेण हेतुना, इत्यर्थः। घटेनोदकमाहर, इत्यादिवाक्यपूर्वको हि, उदकाहरणादिव्यवहारः। तस्य व्यवहारस्य सिद्धये तेनैव मृद्द्रव्येण पृथुबुध्नोदरत्वादिलक्षणो विकारः संस्थानविशेषः, तत्प्रयुक्तं च 'घट' इत्यादि नामधेयं स्पृश्यते। उदकाहरणादिव्यवहारविशेषसिद्ध्यर्थं मृद्द्रव्यमेव संस्थानान्तरनामधेयान्तरभाग्भवति। अतः, घटाद्यपि, मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यं-मृत्तिकाद्रव्यम्, इत्येव सत्यं प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते, इत्यर्थः। न तु द्रव्यान्तरत्वेन। अतः, तस्यैव मृद्धिरण्यादेर्द्रव्यस्य संस्थानान्तरभाक्त्वमात्रेण बुद्धिशब्दान्तरादय उपपद्यन्ते। यथा, एकस्यैव देवदत्तस्य, अवस्थाविशेषैः, बालो युवा स्थविरः, इति बुद्धिशब्दान्तरादयः कार्यविशेषाश्च दृश्यन्ते।

(clod of earth). Here, raising a doubt that the effect is a substance other than the cause, in accordance with the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas, he propounds in (the passage)

'Modification has its beginning in speech, a (mere) name—clay alone is real' (Chā. 6·1·1)

the effect being not different from the cause by the popular comprehension itself. Ārambhaṇam— which is begun, which is found, which is touched—there is the Lyuṭ (termination) in the sense of effect, in accordance with

'The Lyuṭ to show the effect in many cases.' (Pā. Sū. 3·3·113)

Vācā—by the cause, the practical use preceded by speech—this (is) the sense. For, the practical dealing such as bringing the water etc , is preceded by the words—Bring the water in a jar, etc. In order to accomplish that practical dealing by that same earth-substance, is referred to the particular configuration, the modification charactetised by broadness, a narrow neck, the hollow etc., and the name 'Jar' etc., prompted by the same. For the sake of the accomplishment of the specific practical dealing such as bringing the water etc , the earth-substance itself becomes associated with a different configuration and a different name. Therefore the jar etc., also, (as) earth alone is a real thing—(as) the earth-substance alone is the real thing—(this) is found out from the means of proof—this is the sense—not however, on account of its being a different substance. Therefore, on account of the same substance such as earth, gold, etc., being only associated with another configuration, different knowledges and different words become appropriate (available); just as in the case of one and the same Devadatta, on account of the specific postures, different knowledges, words etc. and specific effects such as (he is) a child, a youth, and an old man—are seen.

[282] यदुक्तम्—सत्यामेव मृदि घटो नष्टः, इति व्यवहारात्, कारणादन्यत्कार्यम्, इति—तदुत्पत्तिविनाशादीनां कारणभूतस्यैव द्रव्यस्यावस्थाविशेषाभ्युपगमादेव परिहृतम्। तत्तदवस्थस्य तस्यैव द्रव्यस्य ते ते शब्दाः, तानि तानि च कार्याणि, इति युक्तं द्रव्यस्य तत्तदवस्थत्वं कारकव्यापारायत्तम्, इति तस्यार्थवत्त्वम्। अभिव्यक्त्यनुबन्धीनि चोद्यानि तस्या अनभ्युपगमादेव परिहृतानि। उत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमेऽपि सत्कार्यवादो न विरुध्यते, सत उत्पत्तेः। विप्रतिषिद्धमिदमभिधीयते-- पूर्वमेव सत्तदुत्पद्यते च, इति। अज्ञानोत्पत्तिविनाशयाथात्म्यस्य, इदं चोद्यम्—द्रव्यस्य, उत्तरोत्तरसंस्थानयोगः, पूर्वपूर्वसंस्थानसंस्थितस्य विनाशः, स्वावस्थस्य तूत्पत्तिः। अतः, सर्वावस्थस्य द्रव्यस्य सत्त्वात् सत्कार्यवादो न विरुध्यते।

संस्थानस्यासत उत्पत्तौ, असत्कार्यप्रसङ्गः, इति चेत्—असत्कार्यवादिनोऽपि, उत्पत्तेरनुत्पत्तिमत्त्वे सत्कार्यवादप्रसङ्गः, उत्पत्तिमत्त्वे च, अनवस्था। अस्माकं तु, अवस्थानां पृथक्प्रतिपत्तिकार्ययोगानर्हत्वात्, अवस्थावत एव, उत्पत्त्यादिकं सर्वम्, इति निरवद्यम्। कपालत्वचूर्णत्वपिण्डत्वावस्थाप्रहाणेन घटत्वावस्थावत्, एकत्वावस्थाप्रहाणेन बहुत्वावस्था, तत्प्रहाणेन, एकत्वावस्था च, इति न कश्चिद्विरोधः।

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[282] As to what has been stated—that the effect is different from the cause, according to the practical usage—the jar is destroyed, even though earth exists—that is refuted by admitting a specific state itself, of the substance which is the cause of the origination, destruction etc, of that The various words, and the various effects belong to the same substance in the various states, so, it is proper that the substance should have the various states dependent upon the causal operation—and so, that is significant (serving a purpose) The arguments advanced, associated with the manifestation are refuted by our not admitting that same Even if the origination is admitted, the doctrine of the effect existing (before its production) is not contradicted, because the origination is of the existent alone It is something contradictory when it is said viz the thing was already existing before and that is being originated —This can be an argument to be advanced in the case of something whose origination and destruction are not properly known There is the association with later and later configurations of a substance and the destruction of the (substance) staying in the former and former configurations— but there is the origination of it in its own state Therefore, the substance existing in all the states the Satkāryavada is not contradicted

If (it be argued) — there would be the contingency of (your admitting) the Asatkāryavāda if the non-existing configuration is originated—then there would be the contingency of the Satkāryavāda being admitted by the follower of the Asatkāryavada, if origination has non-origination If the origination has an origination there would be endlessness As for us, however, (different) states being (regarded as) incompetent for association with effects comprehended as different, origination etc,—all belong to a substance alone, possessed of the states — and so, everything is without any blemish like the state of being a jar, by the abandonment of the states of being the potsherd, the pounded dust, a clod — there is the state of being

तज्ज्ञानेन ज्ञातता, इत्यर्थः। अत्र, काणादवादेन कारणात्कार्यस्य द्रव्यान्तरत्वमाशङ्क्य लोकप्रतीत्यैव कारणात्कार्यस्यानन्यतामुपपादयति

> *'वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्'* (छा ६।१।१)

इति। आरभ्यते आलभ्यते, स्पृश्यते, इति, आरम्भणम्

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संस्थानस्यासत उत्पत्तौ, असत्कार्यप्रसङ्गः, इति चेत्—असत्कार्यवादिनोऽपि, उत्पत्तेरनुत्पत्तिमत्त्वे सत्कार्यवादप्रसङ्गः, उत्पत्तिमत्त्वे च, अनवस्था। अस्माकं तु, अवस्थानां पृथक्प्रतिपत्तिकार्ययोगानर्हत्वात्, अवस्थावत एव, उत्पत्त्यादिकं सर्वम्, इति निरवद्यम्। कपालत्वचूर्णत्वपिण्डत्वावस्थाप्रहाणेन घटत्वावस्थावत्, एकत्वावस्थाप्रहाणेन बहुत्वावस्था, तत्प्रहाणेन, एकत्वावस्था च, इति न कश्चिद्विरोधः।

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तथा—

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्'　　(छा ६।२।१)

इति सदेवेदम्, इदानीं विभक्तनामरूपत्वेन नानारूपं जगत्, अग्रे नामरूपविभागाभावेन, एकमेवासीत्, सर्वशक्तित्वेनाधिष्ठात्रन्तरासद्भावतया, अद्वितीयं च, इति, अनन्यत्वमेवोपपादितम् । तथा—

'तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय'　　(छा ६।२।३)

इति स्रक्ष्यमाणतेजःप्रभृतिविविधविचित्रस्थिरत्रसरूपजगत्त्वेन, आत्मनः बहुभवनं संकल्प्य, जगत्सर्गाभिधानात्, कार्यभूतस्य जगतः परमकारणात् परस्माद्ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यत्वमवसीयते । सच्छब्दवाच्यस्यैव परस्य ब्रह्मणः सर्वज्ञस्य सत्यसंकल्पस्य निरवद्यस्यैव सदेवेदम्, इति निर्देशार्हजगत्त्वम्, सच्छब्दवाच्यस्य च जगतो नामरूपविभागाभावेन, एकत्वम्, अद्वितीयत्वम्, अधिष्ठात्रन्तरनिरपेक्षत्वम्, पुनरपि तस्यैव विचित्रस्थिरत्रसरूपजगत्त्वेन बहुभवनसंकल्परूपेक्षणम्, यथासंकल्पं सर्गश्च कथमुपपद्यते ? इति आशङ्क्य, आह—

'सेयं देवतैक्षत हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि'

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many by the abandonment of the state of being one, and by the abandonment of that state, there is the state of being one — and hence no contradiction whatsoever

Similarly, in (the passage)

'Existent alone, dear one, this was at the beginning, one alone, without a second'　　(Cha 6 2 1)

not being different itself is propounded — the existent itself, this world, possessed of different forms now, owing to separate name and form, at the beginning was just one alone owing to the absence of the division in name and form and was without a second not tolerating any other supervisor owing to (Brahman) being all powerful Similarly, in (the passage)

'It reflected — May I be many, may I procreate' (Cha 6 2 3)

it is concluded that the world which is the effect is not different from the Highest Brahman, the original (highest) cause on account of the creation of the world being mentioned after Brahman had contemplated its being many as the world constituted of (the elements), light etc., that are being created and varied multifarious immovable and movable Of the Highest Brahman denoted by the word Sat itself, omniscient, with thoughts fulfilled and blameless there is the state of the world deserving mention as Existence alone, this— and the world denoted by the word Sat, being one owing to the absence of the division in name and form being without a second, being not dependent upon another supervisior, — once again in the case of that same (Brahman), the reflection in the form of being many in the form of the variegated movable and immovable world, and the creation as thought out— How does all this stand to reason ?—, Having raised this doubt, (the Sruti says)—

'That this Deity reflected — Goodness ! Having entered into these three deities, with the Living Self, may I modify name and form'

इति,

'तासां त्रिवृतं त्रिवृतम्' (छा. ६।३।२–३)

इत्यादि। तिस्रो देवताः, इति कृत्स्नमचिद्वस्तु निर्दिश्य, स्वात्मकजीवानुप्रवेशेन, एतद्विचित्रनामरूपभाक् करवाणि, इत्युक्तम्। अनेन जीवेनात्मना, मदात्मकजीवेनात्मतया, अनुप्रविश्यैतद्विचित्रनामरूपभाक् करवाणि, इत्यर्थः। स्वात्मनो जीवस्य चात्मतयानुप्रवेशकृतं नामरूपभाक्त्वम्, इत्युक्तं भवति।

'तत्सृष्ट्वा। तदेवानुप्राविशत्। तदनुप्रविश्य। सच्च त्यच्चाभवत्' (तै. २।६)

इति श्रुत्यन्तरेण स्पष्टं सजीवं जगत्, परेण ब्रह्मणा, आत्मतयानुप्रविष्टमिति, तदेतत्कार्यावस्थस्य कारणावस्थस्य च चिदचिद्वस्तुनः सकलस्य स्थूलस्य सूक्ष्मस्य च परब्रह्मशरीरत्वम्, परस्य च ब्रह्मण आत्मत्वम्, अन्तर्यामिब्राह्मणादिषु सिद्धं स्मारितम्। अनेन पूर्वोक्ता शङ्का निरस्ता। अचिद्वस्तुनि सजीवे ब्रह्मणि, आत्मतयावस्थिते, नामरूपव्याकरणवचनात्, चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरकं ब्रह्मैव जगच्छब्दवाच्यम्, इति

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र एकमेवासीत्' (छा. ६।२।१)

इत्यादि सर्वमुपपन्नतरम्। शरीरभूतचिदचिद्वस्तुगताः सर्वे विकाराश्च, अपुरुषार्थाश्च, इति

'Of them, three-fold, three-fold' (Chā· 6·3·2–3)

etc.— Having referred to the entire non-sentient entities, by (the expression)— The three deities, it has been stated—I shall be making this possessed of varied names and forms by the entrance within of the Jiva, constituted of its Ātman— The sense is— Anena Jivena, Ātmanā,— by the Jīva, constituted of myself as the Ātman— having entered within I shall make this possessed of varied names and forms. In the case of the Jiva, one's own Ātman, there is the association of name and form due to entering within, as Ātman— this is what is meant. By another Śruti—

'Having created that, it entered into that itself; having entered into, it became Sat and Tyat' (Tai. 2·6)

the world with the Jīva is clearly stated to be entered into by the highest Brahman as Atman— this being the body of the Highest Brahman, the sentient and not-sentient entities in the state of effect and in the state of cause,— everything gross and subtle; and the Highest Brahman being the Ātman which is proved in the *Brāhmana* sections dealing with the inner-controller,— this is brought to our mind thus.— By this, the doubt spoken of before is removed. In the case of the non-sentient entity, Brahman with the Jiva staying as Ātman, there is the statement of the modification in name and form— and so, Brahman itself having for the body, the sentient and the non-sentient entities, is to be denoted by the word Jagat (the world)—, and so (the passage)

'Existence itself, gentle one, was this at the beginning, one alone' (Chā. 6·2·1)

etc.— all this is far more reasonable. And all modifications belong to the sentient and the non-sentient entities that are the body, are also those not the human purpose in life— and so, Brahman being blameless and being the mine

ब्रह्मणो निरवद्यत्वं कल्याणगुणाकरत्वं च सुस्थितम् । तदेतत्

'अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात्' (ब्र सू २।१।२२)

इति, अनन्तरमेव वक्ष्यति । तथा

'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम्' (छा. ६.८।७)

इति कृत्स्नस्य चेतनाचेतनस्य ब्रह्मतादात्म्यमुपदिशति । तदेव च

'तत्त्वमसि' (छा. ६।८।७)

इति निगमयति । तथा प्रकरणान्तरस्थेष्वपि वाक्येषु

'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म' (छा. ३।१४।१)
'आत्मनि खल्वरे दृष्टे श्रुते मते विज्ञात इदं सर्वं विदितम्' (बृ ४।५।६)
'इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा' (बृ. २।४।५, ४।५।७; नृ. ता. ५)
'ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वम्' (नृ. ता. ५)
'आत्मैवेदं सर्वम्' (नृ. ता. ५)

इति, अनन्यत्वं प्रतीयते । तथा, अन्यत्वं च निषिध्यते

'सर्वं तं परादाद्योऽन्यत्रात्मनः सर्वं वेद' (बृ २।४।६, ४।५।७)
'नेह नानास्ति किंचन' (बृ.४।४।१९)
'मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति' (का ४।१०, बृ. ४।४।१९)

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of auspicious qualities is well established. Now, this, (the Sūtrakāra) would just immediately say (in the Sūtra)—

'*(Brahman) is more, owing to the pointing out of difference*' (Bra. Sū II. 1·22)

Similarly in (the passage),

'*All this has this as the Ātman*' (Chā 6 8 7)

(the Sruti) teaches the identity with Brahman of the entire sentient and non-sentient, and that same (the Sruti) concludes by

'*That thou Art*' (Chā 6 8 7)

Similarly in the passages occurring in other contexts,

'*All this, verily, (is) Brahman*' (Chā 3·14 1)
'*When the Ātman, verily, dear one, is seen heard, thought of, known,— all this is known*' (Br. 4·5 6)
'*All this (is), what this Ātman*' (Br. 2 4 5, 4 5 7: Nr. Tā 5)
'*Brahman alone (is) all this*' (Nr. Tā 5)
'*Ātman alone (is) all this*' (Nr. Tā 5)

(Jagat) being not different (from Brahman) is understood. Likewise, (the world) being different from Brahman is also repudiated in

'*Everything forsakes him who knows everything elsewhere than in Ātman*' (Br. 2·4 6, 4·5·7)
'*Not here is manifold whatsoever*' (Br. 4·4·19)
'*He secures (or goes over to) death from death, who perceives here as though manifold*' (Kā. 4·10, Br. 4·4·19)

इति । तथा

'यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं पश्यति यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत्' (बृ २।४।१४, ४।५।१५)

इति, अविदुषो द्वैतदर्शनं विदुषश्चाद्वैतदर्शनं प्रतिपादयत्, अनन्यत्वमेव तात्त्विकमिति प्रतिपादयति । तदेवम्, आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः, जगतः परमकारणात्परस्माद्ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यत्वमुपपद्यते ।

[283] अत्र, इदं तत्त्वम्—चिदाचिद्वस्तुशरीरतया तत्प्रकारं ब्रह्मैव सर्वदा सर्वशब्दाभिधेयम् । तत्, कदाचित्स्वस्मात्स्वशरीरतयापि पृथग्व्यपदेशानर्हसूक्ष्मदशापन्नचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं तत्कारणावस्थं ब्रह्म । कदाचिच्च विभक्तनामरूपव्यवहारार्हस्थूलदशापन्नचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं तच्च कार्यावस्थम्, इति कारणात्परस्माद्ब्रह्मणः कार्यरूपं जगदनन्यत् । शरीरभूतचिदचिद्वस्तुनः शरीरिणो ब्रह्मणश्च कारणावस्थायां कार्यावस्थायां च श्रुतिशतसिद्धया स्वभावव्यवस्थया गुणदोषव्यवस्था च

'न तु दृष्टान्तभावात्' (ब्र सू २।१।९)

इत्यत्रोक्ता ।

ये तु कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वं कार्यस्य मिथ्यात्वाश्रयणेन वर्णयन्ति, न तेषां

Similarly in (the passage)

'Where, verily, there is as it were duality, then another sees another, where, for one, everything had become Ātman alone, then by what would one see whom?' (Bṛ 2 4 14, 4 5·15)

(the Sruti) propounds being not different itself is real, while propounding that the non-wise one perceives duality and the wise one perceives non-duality. Thus by the passages beginning with the word Ārambhana etc, is appropriately stated about the world being not different from the Highest Brahman which is the original cause

[283] Here this is the fact—Brahman itself having those modes on account of the sentient and non-sentient entities being its body, is always *denoted by the word Sarva That sometimes having the sentient and the* non-sentient entities as the body, attaining to a subtle state that is not fit to be described separately is the Brahman in the state of cause, and sometimes that same having the sentient and the non-sentient entities as the body, attaining to a gross state fit for being described as having a separate name and form is in the state of effect—and so, the world of the form of effect is different from the Highest Brahman, the cause In the case of Brahman with a body, having the sentient and the non-sentient entities as the body, the regulated arrangement regarding qualities and blemishes in the state of the cause and in the state of the effect due to the adjustment of the nature, proved by a hundred Sruti passages, is spoken of here (in the Sūtra) —

'But not, on account of the existence of illustration' (Bra Su II 1 9)

As to those who describe the non difference between effect and cause by resorting to the false nature of the effect, the non-difference between

कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वं सिध्यति। सत्यमिथ्यार्थयोरैक्यानुपपत्तेः। तथा सति, ब्रह्मणो मिथ्यात्वं जगतः सत्यत्वं वा स्यात्।

ये च कार्यमपि पारमार्थिकमभ्युपयन्त एव जीवब्रह्मणोरौपाधिकम्, अन्यत्वम्; स्वाभाविकं च, अनन्यत्वम्, अचिद्ब्रह्मणोस्तु द्वयमपि स्वाभाविकम्, इति वदन्ति, तेषामुपाधिब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तवस्त्वन्तराभावात्, निरवयवस्याखण्डितस्य ब्रह्मण एवोपाधिसंबन्धात्, ब्रह्मस्वरूपस्यैव हेयाकारपरिणामाच्च, शक्तिपरिणामाभ्युपगमे शक्तेर्ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यत्वाच्च, जीवब्रह्मणोः कर्मवश्यत्वापहतपाप्मत्वादिव्यवस्थावादिन्योऽचिद्ब्रह्मणोश्च परिणामापरिणामवादिन्यः श्रुतयो व्याकुप्येयुः।

ये पुनः, निरस्तनिखिलभोक्तृत्वादिविकल्पविप्लवं सर्वशक्तियुक्तं सन्मात्रद्रव्यमेव कारणं ब्रह्म, तच्च प्रलयवेलायां शान्ताशेषसुखदुःखानुभवविशेषं स्वप्रकाशमपि सुषुप्तात्मवत्, अचिद्विलक्षणमवस्थितम्, सृष्टिवेलायां मृत्तिकाद्रव्यमिव घटशरावादिरूपम्, समुद्र इव च फेनतरङ्गबुद्बुदादिरूपः, भोक्तृभोग्यनियन्तृरूपेण, अंशत्रयावस्थमवतिष्ठते। अतः, भोक्तृत्वभोग्यत्वनियन्तृत्वानि तत्प्रयुक्ताश्च गुणदोषाः शरावत्वघटत्वमणिकत्ववत्,

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cause and effect cannot be proved in their case, on account of the impossibility of identity between truth and falsehood In that case, there may be the false nature of Brahman or the reality of the world

As to those who definitely admitting even the effect as real, speak of Jiva and Brahman as being different owing to limiting adjuncts and being non-different naturally, and that both these (being different and being non different) are natural in the case of the non-sentient and Brahman—in their case on account of the absence of any other entity over and above Brahman with limiting adjuncts, and on account of the nature of Brahman itself modifying in a form fit to be abandoned on account of the impartite unbroken Brahman alone having association with the limiting adjuncts, and on account the Sakti (power) not being different from Brahman, if modification by power is admitted,— (in their case), would be stultified (lit enraged) the Sruti passages speaking of the arrangement of Jiva and Brahman (*respectively*) depending upon Karman and being with sins destroyed etc and speaking of modification and non-modification of the non sentient and Brahman (respectively)

As to those again, who firmly declare the world as being not different *from Brahman, because Brahman (which is) an entity,* pure existence alone endowed with all powers, with all the flood of fancy, such as the enjoyer etc, removed, (is) the cause, and that (Brahman) remaining at the time of the world-dissolution, different from the non-sentient like the Ātman in deep sleep, although self-illumining with the specific experience of happiness and *misery sublated stays on at the time of creation,* like the earth substance having the form of jar, saucer etc, and like the ocean having the form of foam, waves, bubbles etc, in the state of three portions in the form of enjoyer, being enjoyed (and) the controller, therefore, being the enjoyer, being the object of enjoyment, being the controller etc., and the qualities and blemishes prompted by them, *do stay on like the state of saucer, the state*

तद्गतकार्यभेदवच्च व्यवतिष्ठन्ते। भोक्तृभोग्यनियन्तृणां सदात्मनैकत्वं च घटशरावमणिकादीनां मृदात्मनैकत्ववत्, उपपद्यते। अतः, सन्मात्रमेव द्रव्यं सर्वावस्थावस्थितम्, इति ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यज्जगत्, आतिष्ठन्ते—तेषां सकलश्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणन्यायविरोधः। सर्वा हि श्रुतयः सस्मृतीतिहासपुराणाः सर्वेश्वरेश्वरं सदैव सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिं सत्यसंकल्पं निरवद्यं देशकालानवच्छिन्नानवधिकातिशयानन्दं परमकारणं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयन्ति, न पुनरीश्वरादपि परम्, ईश्वरांशि सन्मात्रम्। तथाहि—

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (छा. ६।२।१)

'तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति' (छा. ६।२।३)

'ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीदेकमेव। तदेकं सन्न व्यभवत्। तच्छ्रेयोरूपमत्यसृजत क्षत्रं यान्येतानि देवक्षत्राणीन्द्रो वरुणः सोमो रुद्रः पर्जन्यो यमो मृत्युरीशानः' (बृ १।४।११)

इति।

'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीन्नान्यत्किंचन मिषत्स ऐक्षत लोकान्नु सृजा इति' (ऐ. १।१)

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of jar and the state of pitcher, and like the different states of their effects. The oneness of the enjoyer, being enjoyed and the controller — on account of being constituted of Sat, is but appropriate, like the oneness of jar, saucer, pitcher etc., on account of (these) being constituted of clay. Therefore, the substance, pure existence, alone stays on in all states — (the reply is) — In their case, there would be contradiction with the reasoning (found) in all Śrutis, Smṛtis, Itihāsas, and Purāṇas; for, all the Srutis along with the Smrtis, Itihāsas and Purāṇas propound Brahman as the Over-lord of all lords, always indeed omniscient, all-powerful, with thoughts fulfilled, blameless, supreme (excessive) endless bliss not conditioned by space and time, the original cause; nor again, is pure existence something beyond even Īśvara, with Īśvara as its portion — To explain the same —

'Existence alone, gentle one, this was at the beginning; one alone, without a second' (Chā. 6·2·1)

'It reflected — May I be many, may I procreate' (Chā. 6·2·3)

'Brahman, verily, this was at the beginning, one alone—that being one, did not become modified, that created Ksatra having the form of Sreyas, — which these, the Ksatriyas among the gods — Indra, Varuna, Soma, Rudra, Rain, Yama, Death and the Controller (Lord)' (Br. 1·4·11)

'Ātman, verily, this, one alone was at the beginning; nothing else blinking;— He reflected— May I indeed create worlds (people)' (Ai. 1·1)

'एको ह वै नारायण आसीन्न ब्रह्मा नेशानो नेमे द्यावापृथिवी न नक्षत्राणि नापो नाग्निर्न सोमो न सूर्यः स एकाकी न रमते तस्य ध्यानान्तस्थस्य' (म ना. १)

इत्यादिभिः परमकारणं सर्वेश्वरेश्वरो नारायण एवेत्यवगम्यते। सद्ब्रह्मात्मशब्दा हि तुल्यप्रकरणस्थाः, तत्तुल्यप्रकरणस्थेन नारायणशब्देन विशेषिताः, तमेवागमयन्ति।

'तमीश्वराणां परमं महेश्वरं तद्दैवतानां परमं च दैवतम्' (श्वे. ६।७)

'स कारणं करणाधिपाधिपो न चास्य कश्चिज्जनिता न चाधिपः' (श्वे ६।९)

इति, ईश्वरस्यैव कारणत्वं श्रूयते। स्मृतिरपि मानवी

'ततः स्वयंभूर्भगवान्' (मनु १।६)

इति प्रकृत्य

'सोऽभिध्याय शरीरात्स्वात्सिसृक्षुर्विविधाः प्रजाः।
अप एव ससर्जादौ तासु वीर्यमवासृजत्॥' (मनु १।८)

इति। इतिहासपुराणान्यपि पुरुषोत्तममेव परमकारणमभिदधति

'नारायणो जगन्मूर्तिरनन्तात्मा सनातनः।
स सिसृक्षुः सहस्रांशादसृजत्पुरुषान्द्विधा॥' (म. भा)

'One alone, verily, Nārāyana was (there), neither Brahmadeva, nor the Lord (Controller, Śiva), nor these, heaven and earth, nor the stars, nor waters, nor fire, nor Soma (the moon), nor the Sun— Alone, he enjoyed not— of him remaining in contemplation'

(Ma Nā 1)

—By these and others, is comprehended the highest (original) cause, the Overlord of all lords, Nārāyana alone, for, the words Sat, Brahman, Ātman found in similar contexts, being particularised by the word Nārāyana found in contexts similar to the same, do make one understand that same (Nārāyana). By (the passages)

'Him, the highest great Lord of lords, and that highest Deity of deities' (Śve. 6 7)

'He, the Cause, the Lord of the lords of the sense-organs; for him no producer, and no lord either' (Śve 6 9)

—Īsvara alone is referred to (in the Sruti) as the Cause. The Smrti composed by Manu also, referring to the matter in hand

'Then the self-born Lord' (Manu 1·6)

(says)

'Having contemplated, he, desirous of creating varied peoples from his body, created in the beginning waters themselves, in them he let off (his) semen' (Manu. 1 8)

The Itihāsas and Purānas also speak of Purusottama alone as the original Cause—

'Nārāyana with the world as his form, the infinite Ātman, eternal— He, desirous of creating, created from (his) one-thousandth portion, men in two ways' (MBh.)

'विष्णोः सकाशादुद्भूतं जगत्तत्रैव च स्थितम् ।' (वि. पु. १।१।३५)

इत्यादिषु ।

न च, ईश्वरः सन्मात्रमेव वक्तुं शक्यम्, तस्य तदंशत्वाभ्युपगमात् सविशेषत्वाच्च । न च तस्य ज्ञानानन्दाद्यनन्तकल्याणगुणयोगः कादाचित्क इति वक्तुं शक्यते, तेषां स्वाभाविकत्वेन सदातनत्वात् ।

'परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च' (श्वे. ६।८)

'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्' (मु. १।१।९, २।२।७)

इत्यादिभ्यो ज्ञानानन्दादिशक्तियोग एवास्य स्वाभाविकः, इति मा वोचः । शक्तिः स्वाभाविकी, ज्ञानबलक्रिया च स्वाभाविकी, इति पृथङ्निर्देशाल्लक्षणाप्रसङ्गाच्च । न च पाचकादिवत् सर्वज्ञ इत्यादिषु शक्तिमात्रे कृत्प्रत्यय इति वक्तुं शक्यम् । कृत्प्रत्ययमात्रस्य शक्तावस्मरणात् ।

'शक्तौ हस्तिकपाटयोः' (पा. सू. ३।२।५४)

इत्यादिषु केषांचिदेव कृत्प्रत्ययानां शक्तिविषयत्वस्मरणात् । पाचकादिषु तु, अगत्या लक्षणा समाश्रीयते ।

किं च, ईश्वरस्य तदंशविशेषत्वात्तस्य चांशित्वे, तरङ्गात्समुद्रस्येव, अंशादंशिनोऽ-

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'The world, produced from Viṣṇu's presence, and staying there itself' (V. P. 1·1·35)

—in these (passages) etc.

Nor is it possible to say that Īśvara is nothing but pure existence, because that is admitted as being his portion and on account of his being particularised. Nor again is it possible to say that his association with infinite auspicious qualities such as knowledge, bliss, is occasional, on account of their being always there, being natural. Do not say that from (the passages)

'His highest power is declared (in the Śruti) as varied, natural, and knowledge, strength, activity' (Śve. 6·8)

'Who, omniscient, all-knower' (Mu. 1·1·9, 2·2·7)

etc., his association with the powers, knowledge, bliss etc, alone (is) natural, on account of their separate mention—power (is) natural and knowledge, strength, action (are) also natural, and on account of the undesirable contingency of (the passage being understood as involving) Lakṣaṇā (metaphorical use). Nor again, it is possible to say that the Kṛt termination in the case of (words) Sarvajña etc., is merely in the sense of power, as in the case of (the word) Pācaka etc, because of the Kṛt termination alone not being known to refer to power. In accordance with (the Sūtra)

'In (the sense of) power, in the case of (the words) Hastin and Kapāṭa' (Pā. Sū. 3·2·54)

etc., only certain Kṛt terminations are mentioned as referring to power. In the case of words like Pācaka etc., indication is resorted to, there being no other alternative.

Furthermore, on account of Īśvara being particularised by that portion, and if that is the whole, on account of the whole being more than the part,

धिकत्वात्

'तमीश्वराणां परमं महेश्वरम्' (श्वे. ६।७)

'न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते' (श्वे. ६।८)

इत्यादीनि, ईश्वरविषयाणि परःशतानि वचांसि बाध्येरन्। किं च, सन्मात्रस्य सर्वात्मकत्वेंऽशित्वे च, ईश्वरस्य तदंशविशेषत्वात्, तस्य सर्वात्मकत्वांशित्वोपदेशा व्याहन्येरन्। न हि मणिकात्मकत्वं तदंशत्वं वा घटशरावादेः।

स्वांशेषु सर्वेषु सन्मात्रस्य पूर्णत्वेनेश्वरांशेऽपि तस्य पूर्णत्वात्तदात्मकानि तदंशाश्चेतराणि वस्तूनि, इति चेत्—न। घटेऽपि सन्मात्रस्य पूर्णत्वात्, ईश्वरस्यापि घटात्मकत्वात्तदंशत्वप्रसङ्गात्। न च सन्मात्रस्य घटोऽस्ति पटोऽस्ति, इति वस्तुधर्मतयावगतस्य द्रव्यत्वं कारणत्वं चोपपद्यते। व्यवहारयोग्यता हि सत्त्वम्, विरोधिव्यवहारयोग्यता च तद्व्यवहारयोग्यस्यासत्त्वम्। द्रव्यमेव सदित्यभ्युपगमे क्रियादीनामसत्त्वप्रसङ्गः। क्रियादिषु काशकुशावलम्बनेऽपि सर्वत्रैकरूपा सत्ता दुरुपपादा। सदात्मना च सर्वस्याभिन्नत्वे सर्वज्ञत्वेन सर्वस्वभावप्रतिसंधानात्सर्वगुणदोषसंकरप्रसङ्गश्च पूर्वमेवोक्तः। अतः, यथोक्तप्रकारमेवानन्यत्वम् ॥१५॥

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like the ocean (the whole) being more than the wave (the part), hundreds of passages, referring to Īśvara, such as —

'Him, the highest great Lord of Lords' (Śve. 6 7)

'Not is seen, equal to him or greater than (superior to) him' (Śve. 6·8)

would be stultified. Furthermore, if pure existence is the Ātman of all and the whole entity; on account of Īśvara being a particular portion of the same (Sat) all the instructions about his being whole, the Ātman of all, would be contradicted; for, surely the jar, the saucer etc., are not constituted of the pitcher or its portion.

If it be argued that because pure existence is complete in all its portions, it is complete even in the Īsvara-portion, other entities are constituted of that, and are its portions— (we reply)—No, because pure existence being complete in the jar also, there would be the undesirable contingency of Īśvara also being constituted of jar and being its portion. Nor again, is it right for pure existence to be a substance and the cause, being comprehended as being the attribute of an entity in expressions —The jar exists, the piece of cloth exists; for, existence is fitness for practical use; and fitness for a contrary practical use is non-existence of something fit for that practical use. If substance itself is comprehended as Sat, action etc., would have to be declared as not existent —an undesirable contingency— In the case of action etc., although depending upon the Kāśa flower, grass etc., existence of a uniform nature would be difficult to sustain. And if everything were to be non-different, being constituted of Sat, there would be the association of all natures on account of its being omniscient, there would be the undesirable contingency of a mixture of all qualities and blemishes — this has already been stated Therefore, the non-difference is of the nature already stated || 15 ||

[284] अथोच्येत — एकस्यैवावस्थान्तरयोगेऽपि बुद्धिशब्दान्तरादयो बालत्वयुवत्वादिषु दृश्यन्ते। मृद्दारुहिरण्यादिषु द्रव्यान्तरत्वेऽपि दृश्यन्ते। तत्र मृद्घटादिषु कार्यकारणेषु बुद्धिशब्दान्तरादयोऽवस्थानिबन्धना एव, इति कुतो निर्णीयते? इति— तत्रोत्तरम् —

भावे चोपलब्धेः ॥ १६ ॥

कुण्डलादिकार्यसद्भावे च कारणभूतहिरण्यस्योपलब्धेः। इदं कुण्डलं हिरण्यमिति हिरण्यत्वेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्, इत्यर्थः। न च, एवं हिरण्यादिषु द्रव्यान्तरेषु मृदादय उपलभ्यन्ते। अतः, बालयुवादिवत् कारणभूतमेव द्रव्यम्, अवस्थान्तरापन्नं कार्यमिति गीयते। द्रव्यान्तरवादिनाप्यभ्युपेतेन, अवस्थान्तरयोगेन बुद्धिशब्दान्तरादिषूपपन्नेष्वनुपलब्धद्रव्यान्तरकल्पनानुपपत्तेश्च। न च जातिनिबन्धना, इयं प्रत्यभिज्ञा, जात्याश्रयभूतद्रव्यान्तरानुपलब्धेः। एकमेव हि हेमजातीयं द्रव्यं कार्यकारणोभयावस्थं दृश्यते। न च द्रव्यभेदे समवायिकारणानुवृत्त्या कार्ये प्रतिसंधानमिति वक्तुं शक्यम्। द्रव्यान्तरत्वे सति, आश्रयानुवृत्तिमात्रेण तदाश्रिते द्रव्यान्तरे प्रतिसंधानानुपलब्धेः।

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[284] If it be said that even in the association with another state, in the case of one and the same thing, other notions and words etc., are seen in respect of childhood, youth etc.; they are seen in respect of earth, wood, gold etc, even when they are other substances. There, how is it determined that in the case of earth, jar, etc.,— the effects and causes,— other notions and words are dependent upon the states alone? — there the answer (is) —

And on account of the perception (of the cause) when (the effect) is existent ॥ 16 ॥

And on account of the perception of gold etc, the cause, when the effect ear-ring etc., is existing; — on account of the recognition as being gold in the form — This ear-ring is gold — this (is) the sense. Not again in this way, are to be perceived earth etc., in other substances, gold etc. Therefore, like the child and the youth etc., a substance that is the cause itself, is declared (lit. sung) to be the effect in another state, and on account of the impropriety of fancying different substances that are not perceived, when the different notions and words are appropriate owing to the association of a different state, admitted even by one who holds the doctrine (of the effect) being a different substance (from the cause). Nor again, is this recognition dependent upon the genus, on account of the non-perception of another substance which is the resort of the genus; for, one and the same substance belonging to the genus gold, is seen, as having both the states, the effect and the cause Nor further is it possible to say that the continued association in the effect is due to the continuation of the material cause though the substances are different, because when the nature of the substance is different, the continuation is not perceived in another substance, resorting to that, merely by the continuation of the resort.

गोमयादिकार्ये वृश्चिकादौ गोमयादिप्रतिसंधानं न दृश्यते, इति चेत् — न। तत्रापि, आदिकारणभूतपृथिवीद्रव्यप्रत्यभिज्ञानात्।

अग्निकार्ये धूमेऽग्निप्रत्यभिज्ञानं न दृश्यते, इति चेत् — भवतु न तत्र प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्। तथापि न दोषः, अग्नेर्निमित्तकारणमात्रत्वात्। अग्निसंयुक्तार्द्रेन्धनात्, हि धूमो जायते। गन्धैक्याच्च, आर्द्रेन्धनकार्यमेव धूमः। अतः, कार्यभावे च तदेवेदमित्युपलब्धेः, बुद्धिशब्दान्तरादयोऽवस्थाभेदमात्रनिबन्धना, इत्यवगम्यते। तस्मात्, कारणादनन्यत्कार्यम्॥१६॥

इतश्च

सत्त्वाच्चापरस्य ॥ १७ ॥

अपरस्य, कार्यस्य कारणे सत्त्वाच्च, कारणात्कार्यस्यानन्यत्वम्। लोकवेदयोर्हि कार्यमेव कारणतया व्यपदिश्यते। यथा लोके, सर्वमिदं घटशरावादिकं पूर्वाह्णे मृत्तिकैवासीत्, इति। वेदे च

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' (छा ६।२।१)

इति ॥ १७ ॥

असद्व्यपदेशान्नेति चेन्न धर्मान्तरेण वाक्यशेषाद्युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच्च ॥ १८ ॥

If (it be argued) that in the case of the scorpion etc, the effect of cow-dung etc., is not seen the continued association with cow-dung etc, —(we reply)— No, on account of the recognition of the substance, earth, the original cause, even there

If (it be argued) that in respect of smoke, the effect of fire, is not seen the recognition of fire —(we reply)— Let there be no recognition there, still (there is) no blemish (attached to our statement) because the fire is merely the instrumental cause for, smoke is produced from wet fuel conjoint with the fire and the smoke is the effect of fuel itself on account of the sameness of the smell Therefore when the effect is present on account of the perception —this (is) that same— other notions and words are dependent merely on the different states— This is comprehended Thus the effect is not different from the cause ॥ 16 ॥

And for this reason—

And on account of the existence (in the cause) of the subsequent (effect) ॥ 17 ॥

And on account of the effect which is subsequent, being present in the cause, there is the *non difference of the effect from the cause* Indeed in popular parlance and Vedic texts the effect itself is described as being the cause —as in popular parlance (they say) — All this, jar, saucer etc was nothing but earth in the forenoon — and in the Vedic texts as —

'Existence alone, gentle one was this in the beginning' (Chā 6 2 1)

॥ 17 ॥

If on account of the description as Asat (it is argued that the effect is) not (in the cause, we reply) No on account of (its reference by) other attributes, from the remaining part of the passage, from reasoning and from other passages ॥ 18 ॥

[285] यदुक्तम् — कारणे कार्यस्य सत्त्वं लोकवेदाभ्यामवगम्यते, इति — तदयुक्तम्, असद्व्यपदेशात्

'असदेवेदमग्र आसीत्' (छा. ३।१९।१, ६।२।१)

'असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्' (तै. २।७)

'इदं वा अग्रे नैव किंचनासीत्' (बृ. १।२।१)

इति। लोके च, सर्वं घटशरावादिकं पूर्वाह्णे नासीत्, इति। अतः, यथोक्तं नोपपद्यते, इति चेत् — तत्, न। धर्मान्तरेण तथा व्यपदेशात्। स खलु, असद्व्यपदेशः, तस्यैव कार्यद्रव्यस्य पूर्वकाले धर्मान्तरेण संस्थानान्तरेण, न भवदभिप्रेतेन तुच्छत्वेन। सत्त्वासत्त्वे हि द्रव्यधर्मौ, इत्युक्तम्। तत्र सत्त्वधर्मात्, धर्मान्तरमसत्त्वम्। इदंशब्दनिर्दिष्टस्य जगतः सत्त्वधर्मो नामरूपे। असत्त्वधर्मस्तु तद्विरोधिनी सूक्ष्मावस्था। अतः, जगतो नामरूपयुक्तस्य तद्विरोधिसूक्ष्मदशापत्तिः, असत्त्वम्।

कथमिदमवगम्यते? 'वाक्यशेषाद्युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच्च'। वाक्यशेषस्तावत्,

'इदं वा अग्रे नैव किंचनासीत्' (बृ. १।२।१)

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[285] As to what has been said that the existence of the cause in the effect is known from popular parlance and Vedic texts, —that (is) improper, on account of the reference as Asat (non-existent) in (the Vedic passages)

'Non-existent alone was this in the beginning' (Chā. 3·19·1 ; 6·2·1)

'Non-existent, verily, this was in the beginning' (Tai. 2·7)

'This, verily, was nothing whatsoever in the beginning' (Br 1·2·1)

And in popular parlance— All (this)—jar, saucer etc., was not there in the forenoon—thus what is said before (is) inappropriate —If you say so (we reply)— That (is) not (so), on account of the reference in that way being due to other attributes. Indeed, that description as Asat is due to that same substance which is the effect, being associated in the preceding period with another attribute, with another configuration, and not due to being unsubstantial favoured by you; for, existence and non-existence are spoken of as the attributes of a substance; there non-existence is a different attribute from the existence-attribute. The existence-attribute of the world indicated by the word. This is name and form; and the non-existence-attribute, again (is) the subtle state, contrary to that. Therefore, in the case of the world associated with name and form, non-existence (is) the attaining to the subtle state contrary to that.

How is this known? 'From the remaining part of the passage, from reasoning, and from other passages'. The remaining part of the passage, again,

'This, verily, was nothing whatsoever in the beginning' (Br. 1·2·1)

इति, अत्र

'तदसदेव सन्मनोऽकुरुत स्यामिति' (बृ १।२।१)

इति । अनेन वाक्यशेषगतेन मनस्कारलिङ्गेन, असच्छब्दार्थे तुच्छातिरिक्ते निश्चिते तदैकार्थ्यात्

'असदेवेदम्' (छा ३।१९।१, ६।२।१)

इत्यादिष्वपि, असच्छब्दस्यायमेवार्थ', इति निश्चीयते ।

युक्तेश्च, असत्त्वस्य धर्मान्तरत्वमवगम्यते । युक्तिर्हि सत्त्वासत्त्वे पदार्थधर्मावव-गमयति । मृद्द्रव्यस्य पृथुबुध्नोदराकारयोगो घटोऽस्तीति व्यवहारहेतु' । तस्यैव तद्विरोध्य-वस्थान्तरयोगो घटो नास्तीतिव्यवहारहेतुः । तत्र कपालाद्यवस्थायास्तद्विरोधित्वेन सैव घटाद्यवस्थस्य नास्तीतिव्यवहारहेतु' । न च तद्व्यतिरिक्तो घटाभावो नाम कश्चि-दुपलभ्यते । न च कल्प्यते, तावतैवाभावव्यवहारोपपत्ते ।

तथा शब्दान्तराच्च, पूर्वकाले धर्मान्तरयोग एवावगम्यते । शब्दान्तरं च पूर्वोदाहृतं

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' (छा ६।२।१)

इत्यादिकम् । तत्र हि

— here (is the passage) —

'That being non-existent itself, fixed its mind upon that' (Br 1 2 1)

By this characteristic of the existence of the mind found in the remaining part of the passage the meaning of the word Asat being determined to be something other than unsubstantiality, even in

'The non-existent itself this (Cha 3 19 1, 6 2 1)

etc, on account of their having the same sense of that it is concluded that this alone (is) the sense of the word Asat

And on account of reasoning is understood non existence being another attribute for reasoning points out to existence and non-existence as the attributes of an object The association of the earth substance with a broad bottom circular form (is) the cause of the practical usage— There is a jar And the association of that same thing with another state contrary to that, (is) the cause of the practical usage —The jar is not There the state of pot sherds etc being contrary to that that same (is) the cause of the practical usage —is not—if in the state of the jar etc Further there is not found anything apart from that, called the absence of a jar Nor is it to be imagined because by that itself, the practical usage about absence is appropriate

And similarly from other Sruti passages association itself with another attribute in the preceding period of time is understood Sabdantaram (is) what has already been cited—

'The Existent alone, gentle one, this was in the beginning' (Cha 6 2 1)

and others And there also having called into question the unsubstantiality in (the passage)

'कुतस्तु खलु सोम्यैवं स्यात्' (छा. ६।२।२)

ा तुच्छत्वमाक्षिप्य

'सत्त्वेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' (छा. ६।२।२)

ते स्थापितम्।

'तद्धेदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत्। तन्नामरूपाभ्यां व्याक्रियत' (बृ. १।४।७)

ते सुस्पष्टमुक्तम् ॥ १८ ॥

[286] इदानीं कार्यस्य कारणादनन्यत्वे निदर्शनद्वयं द्वाभ्यां सूत्राभ्यां र्शयति—

पटवच्च ॥ १९ ॥

यथा तन्तव एव व्यतिषङ्गविशेषभाजः पट इति नामरूपकार्यान्तरादिकं भजन्ते द्ब्रह्मापि ॥ १९ ॥

यथा च प्राणादिः ॥ २० ॥

यथा च वायुरेक एव शरीरे वृत्तिविशेषं भजमानः प्राणापानादिनामरूपकार्यान्तराणि भजते, तद्वत्, ब्रह्मैकमेव विचित्रस्थिरत्रसरूपं जगद्भवति, इति परमकारणात्, रस्माद्ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यत्वं जगतः सिद्धम् ॥ २० ॥

आरम्भणाधिकरणं समाप्तम् (६)

'*Whence, however, gentle one, can indeed it be so?*' (Chā. 6·2 2)

has been established—

'*Existence alone, gentle one, was this indeed in the beginning.*' (Chā 6 2 2)

n (the passage)

'*That then, verily, this was unmodified; that became modified in name and form.*' (*Br. 1·4·7*)

this has been very clearly stated. ॥18॥

[286] Now, two illustrations in respect of the effect being not different from the cause, (the Sūtrakāra) indicates by two Sūtras—

And like a piece of cloth ॥ 19 ॥

Just as threads themselves resorting to a specific mixed arrangement resort to another name, form, function etc., as a piece of cloth, in the same manner, the Brahman also.

And as Prāṇa etc ॥ 20 ॥

And as one and the same wind resorting to specific activity in the body takes to different names, Prāṇa, Apāna etc, forms, and functions; in the same way the one Brahman becomes the world constituted of the variegated movable and immovable—and so, it has been proved that the world is not different from the Highest Brahman, the original cause. ॥20॥

Here ends the Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa (6)

इतरव्यपदेशाद्धिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिः ॥ २१ ॥

(अधिकरण ७, सूत्राणि २१–२३)

[287] जगतो ब्रह्मानन्यत्वं प्रतिपादयद्भिः

'तत्त्वमसि' (छा ६।८।७)

'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' (बृ २।५।१९)

इत्यादिभिर्जीवस्यापि ब्रह्मानन्यत्वं व्यपदिश्यते, इत्युक्तम्। तत्रेदं चोद्यते—यदि, इतरस्य जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावोऽमीभिर्वाक्यैर्व्यपदिश्यते तदा ब्रह्मणः सार्वज्ञ्यसत्यसंकल्पादियुक्तस्यात्मनो हितरूपजगदकरणम्, अहितरूपजगत्करणम्, इत्यादयो दोषा प्रसज्येरन्। आध्यात्मिकाधिदैविकाधिभौतिकानन्तदुःखाकरं चेदं जगत्। न चेदृशे स्वानर्थे स्वाधीनो बुद्धिमान्प्रवर्तते। जीवाद्ब्रह्मणो भेदवादिन्यः श्रुतयो जगद्ब्रह्मणोरनन्यत्वं वदता त्वयैव परित्यक्ताः। भेदे सति, अनन्यत्वासिद्धेः।

औपाधिकभेदविषया भेदश्रुतयः; स्वाभाविकाभेदविषयाश्च, अभेदश्रुतयः, इति चेत्— तत्रेदं वक्तव्यम्। स्वभावतः स्वस्मादभिन्नं जीवं किम्, अनुपहितं जगत्कारणं ब्रह्म जानाति वा न वा? न जानाति चेत्, सर्वज्ञत्वहानिः। जानाति चेत्, स्वस्मादभिन्नस्य

And on account of the reference to the other one (Jiva), *there would occur blemishes perforce—, doing what is not beneficial etc* ॥ 21 ॥

(Adhikarana 7, Sūtras 21–23)

[287] It has been stated by those who propound the world being not different from Brahman, that the Jiva also is described as not different from Brahman in (passages)

'That thou art (Cha 6 8 7)

'This Ātman Brahman' (Br 2 5 19)

etc There, this is emphatically put forth by the opponent —If, being Brahman in the case of the other one Jiva is referred to by these passages, then in the case of Brahman endowed with omni-science, having its thoughts fulfilled etc., would perforce follow blemishes, such as not creating the world with a beneficent outlook, creating a world involving evil for himself This world is for the matter of that, a mine of endless misery pertaining to the body, god made and caused by the elements and not such a disaster would a wise one being independent, be working for The Sruti passages advocating the difference of Brahman from the Jiva have been abandoned by you yourself when talking about the non-difference between the world and Brahman, because non-difference cannot be established when there is difference

If it be argued that the S'ruti passages advocating the difference, refer to the difference due to the limiting adjuncts the non-different Sruti passages refer to the natural non-difference —There this has got to be said (by way of reply)— Does the unscreened Brahman, the cause of the world, know the Jiva, naturally non-different from it, or not? If it knows not, there would be the

जीवस्य दुःखं स्वदुःखमिति जानतो ब्रह्मणो हिताकरणाहितकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिरनिवार्या ।

जीवब्रह्मणोरज्ञानकृतो भेदः, तद्विषया भेदश्रुतिः, इति चेत्— तत्रापि जीवाज्ञानपक्षे पूर्वोक्तो विकल्पस्तत्फलं च तदवस्थम् । ब्रह्माज्ञानपक्षे स्वप्रकाशस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञान-साक्षित्वं तत्कृतजगत्सृष्टिश्च न संभवति । अज्ञानेन प्रकाशस्तिरोहितश्चेत्, तिरोधानस्य प्रकाशनिवृत्तिकरत्वेन प्रकाशस्यैव स्वरूपत्वात्, स्वरूपनिवृत्तिरेवेति स्वरूपनाशादिदोष-सहस्रं प्रागेवोदीरितम् । अतः, इदमसंगतं ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वम् ॥ २१ ॥

[288] इति प्राप्ते, अभिधीयते —

अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात् ॥ २२ ॥

तुशब्दः पक्षं व्यावर्तयति । आध्यात्मिकादिदुःखयोगार्हात्, प्रत्यगात्मनोऽधिकम्, अर्थान्तरभूतं ब्रह्म । कुतः ? 'भेदनिर्देशात्' । प्रत्यगात्मनो हि भेदेन निर्दिश्यते परं ब्रह्म

'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरो यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा शरीरं य आत्मान-मन्तरो यमयति स त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः' (बृ. ३।७।२२)

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loss of omni-science. If it knows, in the case of Brahman knowing the misery of Jīva, not different from itself, as its own misery, the inevitable association with blemishes — not doing what is beneficial, doing what is not beneficial, etc., is unavoidable.

If (it be said) that the difference betwren Jīva and Brahman is due to Ajñāna and the Śruti passage advocating difference refers to that, then there too, in the view which speaks of the Ajñāna existing in Jīva, the aforesaid alternative and its fruit remain exactly the same. In the view advocating Ajñāna in the case of Brahman,— in Brahman with its self-illumining nature, being the witness of Ajñāna and the creation of the world due to that, are not possible. If (it be said) that the illumining is screened by the Ajñāna, —on account of the screening being the cause of warding off the illumining, and illumining itself being its nature, there would be the cessation of its own nature itself— thousands of blemishes like the destruction of its own nature have been cited before, —so this, —Brahman being the cause of the world, does not fit in. ॥ 21 ॥

[288] This (prima-facie view) being reached, (this) is stated (in reply)—

But (Brahman) is additional on account of the reference as different (from Jīva) ॥ 22 ॥

The word Tu (but) turns away the (prima-facie) view. Brahman is an additional entity other than the inmost Self who is fit for being associated with misery pertaining to the body etc. Whence (How do you say that) ? 'On account of the reference as different'; for, the Highest Brahman is indicated as being different from the inmost Self, by

'Who, residing in the Ātman is within the Ātman; whom the Ātman knows not; whose body (is) the Ātman, who controls the Ātman, within; — that, your Ātman, the inner Controller, immortal' (Br. 3·7·22)

'इद वाग्रे नैव किंचनासीत्' (बृ १।२।१)
'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्' (ऐ. १।१)

इत्यादिषु कारणावस्थायां ब्रह्मैकमेव निरवयवमासीत, इति कारणावस्थायां निरस्ताचिदचिद्विभागतया निरवयवं ब्रह्मैवासीत्, इत्युक्तम्। तद्विभागमेकं निरवयवमेव ब्रह्म 'बहु स्याम्' इति संकल्प्य, आकाशवाय्वादिविभागं ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तक्षेत्रज्ञविभागं चाभवत्, इति चोक्तम्। एवं सति तदेव परं ब्रह्म कृत्स्नं कार्यत्वेनोपयुक्तम्, इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्।

अथ, चिदंशः क्षेत्रज्ञविभागविभक्तः, अचिदंशश्च, आकाशादिविभागविभक्तः, इत्युच्यते, तदा

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (छा ६।२।१)
'ब्रह्मैकमेव' (बृ १।४।११)
'आत्मैक एव' (बृ. १।४।१७)

इत्येवमादयः कारणभूतस्य ब्रह्मणो निरवयवत्ववादिनः शब्दाः कुप्येयुः, बाधिता भवेयुः। यद्यपि सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं ब्रह्म कारणम्, स्थूलचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं ब्रह्म कार्यम्, इत्यभ्युपगम्यते, तथापि शरीरांशस्यापि कार्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्, उक्तदोषो दुर्वारः। तस्य निरवयवस्य बहुभवनं च नोपपद्यते। कार्यत्वानुपयुक्तांशस्थितिश्च नोपपद्यते। तस्मात्,

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'This, verily, was in the beginning nothing whatsoever' (Br I 2 1)

'The Ātman, verily, this alone was in the beginning' (Ai 1 1)

etc. in the causal state, the one Brahman alone was there, impartite; and so, it has been stated that Brahman itself was impartite owing to the distinction of sentient and non-sentient being removed That undivided one, the impartite Brahman alone, having reflected 'May I be many—' became possessed of the division into Ākāsa, wind etc and of the division beginning with Brahmadeva and ending with the tuft of grass and the division into Ksetra-knowers—This also has been stated This being so, it should be comprehended that the same entire Highest Brahman is used for being the product.

If it is stated (by the objector)—The sentient portion is divided as the division of Ksetra-knowers and the non-sentient portion is divided as the division Ākāśa etc then the Vedic words (passages) advocating the impartite nature of Brahman, which is the cause, such as these and others—

'Existence alone, gentle one, this was in the beginning, one alone without a second' (Chā 6 2 1)
'Brahman (is) one alone' (Br. 1 4 11)
'Ātman, one alone' (Br. 1 4 17)

would be angry, would be stultified Although it is admitted that Brahman having the subtle sentient and non-sentient as the body, is the cause, (Brahman) having gross sentient and non sentient as the body, is the effect; still the aforesaid blemish is unavoidable owing to a portion of the embodied also being admitted as the effect Further in the case of that impartite, being many is not appropriate. And the state of some portion not being used for

असमञ्जसमेवाभाति । अतः, ब्रह्मकारणत्वं नोपपद्यते ॥ २६ ॥

इत्याक्षिप्ते समाधत्ते—

श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात् ॥ २७ ॥

तुशब्दः, उक्तदोषं व्यावर्तयति । नैवम्, असामञ्जस्यम् । कुतः ? श्रुतेः । श्रुतिस्तावत् निरवयवत्वं ब्रह्मणस्ततो विचित्रसर्गं चाह । श्रौतेऽर्थे यथाश्रुति प्रतिपत्तव्यम्, इत्यर्थः ।

ननु श्रुतिरपि, अग्निना सिञ्चेत्, इतिवत्, परस्परान्वयायोग्यमर्थं प्रतिपादयितुं न समर्था—अत आह । 'शब्दमूलत्वात्' इति । शब्दैकप्रमाणकत्वेन सकलेतरवस्तुविसजातीयत्वात्, अस्यार्थस्य विचित्रशक्तियोगो न विरुध्यते, इति न सामान्यतो दृष्टं साधनं दूषणं वा, अर्हति ब्रह्म ॥ २७ ॥

आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि ॥ २८ ॥

किं च, एवं वस्त्वन्तरसंबन्धिनो धर्मस्य वस्त्वन्तरे चारोपणे सत्यचेतने घटादौ दृष्टा धर्मास्तद्विसजातीये चेतने नित्य आत्मनि प्रसज्यन्ते । तद्प्रसक्तिश्च भावस्वभाववैचित्र्यात्, इति, आह—' विचित्राश्च हि ' इति । यथा, अग्निजलादीनाम्, अन्योन्यविसजातीयानाम्, औष्ण्यादिशक्तयश्च विसजातीया दृश्यन्ते, तद्वत्, लोकदृष्टसर्वविसजातीये परे ब्रह्मणि तत्र

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the effect would not also be appropriate. Therefore, it all appears to be absurd. Therefore, Brahman being the cause (of the world) is not reasonable. ॥ 26 ॥

It being objected to thus—(the Sūtrakāra) explains (as follows)—

But on account of Śruti: on account of being based upon the Word. ॥ 27 ॥

The word Tu (but) turns away the aforesaid blemish. There is no absurdity thus—Whence? On account of the Śruti (statement). The Śruti, for the matter of that, speaks of the impartite nature of Brahman and of the variegated creation from it. In a matter which is (to be understood) from the Sruti (alone) it has got to be comprehended in conformity with the Śruti.

Surely, even the Sruti dare not propound a sense unfit for mutual relation, as in (the expression) He should sprinkle with fire—, (regarding this contention) so says (the Sūtrakāra) 'On account of being based upon the Word'. This matter being dissimilar to all other things, the possession of wonderful powers is not contradicted owing to its having the Word as the only means of proof,— and so, Brahman does not deserve (stand in need of) an argument, for or against, which is ordinarily met with ॥ 27 ॥

And in the Self, thus again, indeed, the manifold (powers) ॥ 28 ॥

Furthermore, if there is a superimposition of an attribute connected with another thing, upon another thing, the attributes perceived in the non-sentient jar etc., would perforce be ascribed even to the dissimilar sentient eternal Ātman. But the absence of such forcible ascription is due to the varied nature of the natures of entities—so, (the Sūtrakāra) says—' Again, indeed, the manifold (powers).' Just as in the case of fire, water etc., that are mutually dissimilar are seen dissimilar powers like, heat etc.; in the same manner in the case of the Highest Brahman which is dissimilar to everything

इतरव्यपदेशाद्धिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिः ॥ २१ ॥

(अधिकरण ७, सूत्राणि २१–२३)

[287] जगतो ब्रह्मानन्यत्वं प्रतिपादयद्भिः

'तत्त्वमसि' (छा. ६।८।७)

'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' (बृ. २।५।१९)

इत्यादिभिर्जीवस्यापि ब्रह्मानन्यत्वं व्यपदिश्यते, इत्युक्तम् । तत्रेदं चोद्यते—यदि, इतरस्य जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावोऽमीभिर्वाक्यैर्व्यपदिश्यते तदा ब्रह्मणः सार्वज्ञ्यसत्यसंकल्पादियुक्तस्यात्मनो हितरूपजगदकरणम्, अहितरूपजगत्करणम्, इत्यादयो दोषाः प्रसज्येरन् । आध्यात्मिकाधिदैविकाधिभौतिकानन्तदुःखाकरं चेदं जगत् । न चेदृशे स्वानर्थे स्वाधीनो बुद्धिमान्प्रवर्तते । जीवाद्ब्रह्मणो भेदवादिन्यः श्रुतयो जगद्ब्रह्मणोरनन्यत्वं वदता त्वयैव परित्यक्ताः । भेदे सति, अनन्यत्वासिद्धेः ।

औपाधिकभेदविषया भेदश्रुतयः; स्वाभाविकाभेदविषयाश्च, अभेदश्रुतयः, इति चेत्—तत्रेदं वक्तव्यम् । स्वभावतः स्वस्मादभिन्नं जीवं किम्, अनुपहितं जगत्कारणं ब्रह्म जानाति वा न वा? न जानाति चेत्, सर्वज्ञत्वहानिः । जानाति चेत्, स्वस्मादभिन्नस्य

And on account of the reference to the other one (Jiva), there would occur blemishes perforce—, doing what is not beneficial etc. ॥ 21 ॥

(Adhikaraṇa 7, Sūtras 21–23)

[287] It has been stated by those who propound the world being not different from Brahman, that the Jiva also is described as not different from Brahman in (passages)

'*That thou art*' (Chā. 6·8·7)

'*This Ātman, Brahman*' (Bṛ. 2·5·19)

etc. There, this is emphatically put forth by the opponent. —If, being Brahman in the case of the other one, Jiva, is referred to by these passages, then in the case of Brahman endowed with omni-science, having its thoughts fulfilled etc., would perforce follow blemishes, such as not creating the world with a beneficent outlook, creating a world involving evil for himself. This world is, for the matter of that, a mine of endless misery pertaining to the body, god-made and caused by the elements; and not such a disaster would a wise one being independent, be working for. The Śruti passages advocating the difference of Brahman from the Jiva have been abandoned by you yourself when talking about the non-difference between the world and Brahman, because non-difference cannot be established when there is difference.

If it be argued that the S'ruti passages advocating the difference, refer to the difference due to the limiting adjuncts; the non-different Sruti passages refer to the natural non-difference. —There this has got to be said (by way of reply)— Does the unscreened Brahman, the cause of the world, know the Jiva, naturally non-different from it, or not? If it knows not, there would be the

जीवस्य दुःखं स्वदुःखमिति जानतो ब्रह्मणो हिताकरणाहितकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिरनिवार्या ।

जीवब्रह्मणोरज्ञानकृतो भेदः, तद्विषया भेदश्रुतिः, इति चेत्— तत्रापि जीवाज्ञानपक्षे पूर्वोक्तो विकल्पस्तत्फलं च तदवस्थम् । ब्रह्माज्ञानपक्षे स्वप्रकाशस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञान-साक्षित्वं तत्कृतजगत्सृष्टिश्च न संभवति । अज्ञानेन प्रकाशस्तिरोहितश्चेत्, तिरोधानस्य प्रकाशनिवृत्तिकरत्वेन प्रकाशस्यैव स्वरूपत्वात्, स्वरूपनिवृत्तिरेवेति स्वरूपनाशादिदोष-सहस्रं प्रागेवोदीरितम् । अतः, इदमसंगतं ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वम् ॥ २१ ॥

[288] इति प्राप्ते, अभिधीयते —

अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात् ॥ २२ ॥

तुशब्दः पक्षं व्यावर्तयति । आध्यात्मिकादिदुःखयोगार्हात्, प्रत्यगात्मनोऽधिकम्, अर्थान्तरभूतं ब्रह्म । कुतः ? 'भेदनिर्देशात्' । प्रत्यगात्मनो हि भेदेन निर्दिश्यते परं ब्रह्म

'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरो यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा शरीरं य आत्मान-मन्तरो यमयति स त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः' (बृ. ३।७।२२)

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loss of omni-science. If it knows, in the case of Brahman knowing the misery of Jīva, not different from itself, as its own misery, the inevitable association with blemishes — not doing what is beneficial, doing what is not beneficial, etc., is unavoidable.

If (it be said) that the difference betwren Jiva and Brahman is due to Ajñāna and the Śruti passage advocating difference refers to that, then there too, in the view which speaks of the Ajñāna existing in Jīva, the aforesaid alternative and its fruit remain exactly the same. In the view advocating Ajñāna in the case of Brahman,— in Brahman with its self-illumining nature, being the *witness of Ajñāna and the creation of the world due to that, are not* possible. If (it be said) that the illumining is screened by the Ajñāna, —on account of the screening being the cause of warding off the illumining, and illumining itself being its nature, there would be the cessation of its own nature itself— thousands of blemishes like the destruction of its own nature have been cited before, —so this, —Brahman being the cause of the world, does not fit in. ॥ 21 ॥

[288] This (prima-facie view) being reached, (this) is stated (in reply)—

But (Brahman) is additional on account of the reference as different (from Jīva) ॥ 22 ॥

The word Tu (but) turns away the (prima-facie) view. Brahman is an additional entity other than the inmost Self who is fit for being associated with misery pertaining to the body etc. Whence (How do you say that)? 'On account of the reference as different'; for, the Highest Brahman is indicated as being different from the inmost Self, by

'Who, residing in the Ātman is within the Ātman; whom the Ātman knows not; whose body (is) the Ātman, who controls the Ātman, within; — that, your Ātman, the inner Controller, immortal'. (Br. 3·7·22)

'पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टस्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेति' (श्वे. १।६)

'स कारणं करणाधिपाधिपः' (श्वे ६।९)

'तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति' (मु. ३।१।१, श्वे. ४।६)

'ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावजावीशानीशौ' (श्वे. १।९)

'प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तः' (बृ. ४।३।२१)

'प्राज्ञेनात्मनान्वारूढः' (बृ ४।३।३५)

'अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत्तस्मिंश्चान्यो मायया संनिरुद्धः' (श्वे. ४।९)

'प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः' (श्वे ६।१६)

'नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानामेको बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान्' (श्वे. ६।१३)

'योऽव्यक्तमन्तरे संचरन्यस्याव्यक्तं शरीरं यमव्यक्तं न वेद । यो क्षरमन्तरे संचरन्यस्याक्षरं शरीरं यमक्षरं न वेद । यो मृत्युमन्तरे संचरन्यस्य मृत्युः शरीरं यं मृत्युर्न वेद । एष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मापहतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायणः' (सुबा १५)

इत्यादिभिः ॥ २२ ॥

'Having thought of the Ātman as separate and as impeller, he, pleased, thereupon, attains to immortality' (Śve. 1·6)

'He, the cause, the Lord of lords of the sense-organs' (Śve 6·9)

'Of the two, one eats the sweet Pippala (fruit); the other, not eating, looks on' (Mu. 3·1·1; Śve 4·6)

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'Covered over by the wise Ātman' (Bṛ. 4·3·21)

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'Who moving Avyakta within, whose body (is) Avyakta; whom Avyakta knows not, who moving Akṣara within, whose body (is) Akṣara, whom Akṣara knows not; who moving Mṛtyu within, whose body (is) Mṛtyu, whom Mṛtyu knows not— this one, the inmost Ātman, of all beings, with sins destroyed, the shining God, the one Nārāyaṇa'. (Subā 15)

etc. ॥ 22 ॥

अश्मादिवच्च तदनुपपत्तिः ॥ २३ ॥

[289] अश्मकाष्ठलोष्टतृणादीनामत्यन्तहेयानां सततविकारास्पदानाम चिद्विशेषाणां निरवद्यनिर्विकारनिखिलहेयप्रत्यनीककल्याणैकतानस्वेतरसमस्तवस्तुविल क्षणानन्तज्ञानानन्दैकस्वरूपनानाविधानन्तमहाविभूतिब्रह्मस्वरूपैक्यं यथा नोपपद्यते, तथ चेतनस्याप्यनन्तदुःखयोगार्हस्य खद्योतकल्पस्य

'अपहतपाप्मा' (छा. ८।१।५)

इत्यादिवाक्यावगतसकलहेयप्रत्यनीकानवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणाकरब्रह्मभावानुप पत्तिः। सामानाधिकरण्यनिर्देशो

'यस्यात्मा शरीरम्' (बृ. ३।७।२२)

इत्यादिश्रुतेर्जीवस्य ब्रह्मशरीरत्वात्, ब्रह्मणो जीवशरीरतया तदात्मत्वेनावस्थितेर्जीवप्रकार ब्रह्मप्रतिपादनपरश्च, एतदविरोधी। प्रत्युत, एतस्यार्थस्योपपादकश्चेति

'अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः' (ब्र. सू. १।४।२२)

इत्यादिभिरसकृदुपपादितम्। अतः, सर्वावस्थं ब्रह्म चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरमिति, सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तु शरीरं ब्रह्म कारणम्, तदेव ब्रह्म स्थूलचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं जगदाख्यं कार्यमिति, जगद्ब्रह्मणो

And like stone etc., that is not appropriate ॥ 23 ॥

[289] Just as in the case of specific non-sentient objects such as stone wood, clod, grass, that are fit to be discarded in toto, which are the resort o constant modification,—is not appropriate, identity with the nature of Brahman that has varied endless supreme manifestations, whose nature is infinit knowledge and bliss alone, which is different from all objects other than itsel which is uniformly auspicious, being the opposite of all things fit to be aban doned, which is blameless, not subject to modification; —in the same wa even in the case of the sentient (Jiva) fit for association with infinite miser (insignificant) almost like a glow-worm, there is the impossibility of hi having the nature of Brahman which is the mine of infinite, excessive innumerable auspicious qualities, which is the opposite of everything fit to b abandoned, comprehended from passages like

'*With sins destroyed*' (Chā. 8·1·5)

Indication by a case-co-ordination in (the Sruti passage)

'*Whose body (is) the Ātman*' (Br 3·7·22)

etc., aims at propounding Brahman having the mode, the Jiva; because Jiv is the body of Brahman, and Brahman resides as his Ātman on account o having the Jiva for the body, —this is not contrary to this (reference); on th contrary it advocates the same meaning, —This has been set forth by u often in (Sūtras) like

'*On account of the state,—so Kāśakṛtsna*' (Bra. Sū. I·4·22)

Therefore, Brahman in all states has the sentient and the non-sentient entitie as its body— and so, Brahman having subtle sentient and non-sentient entitie as the body (is) the cause: that same Brahman, having gross sentient and non-sentient entities as the body (is) the effect called the world— thus i

'पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टस्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेति' (श्वे. १।६)

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'अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत्तस्मिंश्चान्यो मायया संनिरुद्धः' (श्वे. ४।९)

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अश्मादिवच्च तदनुपपत्तिः ॥ २३ ॥

[289] अश्मकाष्ठलोष्ठतृणादीनामत्यन्तहेयानां सततविकारास्पदानामचिद्विशेषाणां निरवद्यनिर्विकारनिखिलहेयप्रत्यनीककल्याणैकतानस्वेतरसमस्तवस्तुविलक्षणानन्तज्ञानानन्दैकस्वरूपनानाविधानन्तमहाविभूतिब्रह्मस्वरूपैक्यं यथा नोपपद्यते, तथा चेतनस्याप्यनन्तदुःखयोगार्हस्य खद्योतकल्पस्य

'अपहतपाप्मा' (छा. ८।१।५)

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इत्यादिश्रुतेर्जीवस्य ब्रह्मशरीरत्वात्, ब्रह्मणो जीवशरीरतया तदात्मत्वेनावस्थितेर्जीवप्रकारब्रह्मप्रतिपादनपरश्च, एतदविरोधी । प्रत्युत, एतस्यार्थस्योपपादकश्चेति

'अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः' (ब्र. सू. १।४।२२)

इत्यादिभिरसकृदुपपादितम् । अतः, सर्वावस्थं ब्रह्म चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरमिति, सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं ब्रह्म कारणम्, तदेव ब्रह्म स्थूलचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं जगदाख्यं कार्यमिति, जगद्ब्रह्मणोः

And like stone etc., that is not appropriate ॥ 23 ॥

[289] Just as in the case of specific non-sentient objects such as stone, wood, clod, grass, that are fit to be discarded in toto, which are the resort of constant modification,—is not appropriate, identity with the nature of Brahman, that has varied endless supreme manifestations, whose nature is infinite knowledge and bliss alone, which is different from all objects other than itself, which is uniformly auspicious, being the opposite of all things fit to be abandoned, which is blameless, not subject to modification;—in the same way, even in the case of the sentient (Jīva) fit for association with infinite misery, (insignificant) almost like a glow-worm, there is the impossibility of his having the nature of Brahman which is the mine of infinite, excessive, innumerable auspicious qualities, which is the opposite of everything fit to be abandoned, comprehended from passages like

'With sins destroyed' (Chā. 8.1.5)

Indication by a case-co-ordination in (the Sruti passage)

'Whose body (is) the Ātman' (Br 3.7.22)

etc., aims at propounding Brahman having the mode, the Jīva; because Jīva is the body of Brahman, and Brahman resides as his Ātman on account of having the Jīva for the body, —this is not contrary to this (reference); on the contrary it advocates the same meaning, —This has been set forth by us often in (Sūtras) like

'On account of the state,—so Kāśakṛtsna' (Bra. Sū. I.4.22)

Therefore, Brahman in all states has the sentient and the non-sentient entities as its body— and so, Brahman having subtle sentient and non-sentient entities as the body (is) the cause; that same Brahman, having gross sentient and non-sentient entities as the body (is) the effect called the world— thus is

सामानाधिकरण्योपपत्तिः । जगतो ब्रह्मकार्यत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यत्वम्, अचिद्वस्तुनो जीवस्य च ब्रह्मणश्च परिणामित्वदुःखित्वकल्याणगुणाकरत्वस्वभावासंकरः सर्वश्रुत्य विरोधश्च भवति ।

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेव' (छा. ६।२।१)

इति, अविभागावस्थायामचिद्युक्तजीवस्य ब्रह्मशरीरतया सूक्ष्मरूपेणावस्थानमवश्याभ्युपगन्तव्यम्,

'वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात् । न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्नानादित्वादुपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते च' (ब्र. सू. २।१।३४–३५)

इति सूत्रद्वयोदितत्वात्, तदानीमपि सूक्ष्मरूपेणावस्थानस्य । अविभागस्तु नामरूपविभागाभावादुपपद्यते । अतः, ब्रह्मकारणत्वं संभवत्येव ।

ये तु पुनः, अस्यैव जीवस्याविद्याविमुक्तावस्थामभिप्रेत्य, इमं भेदं वर्णयन्ति — तेषामिदं सर्वमसंगतं स्यात् । न हि तदवस्थस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वेश्वरत्वं समस्तकारणत्वं सर्वात्मकत्वं सर्वनियन्तृत्वमित्यादीनि सन्ति । अनेनैव रूपेण हि, आभिः श्रुतिभिः प्रत्यगात्मनो भेदः प्रतिपाद्यते, तस्य सर्वस्याविद्यापरिकल्पितत्वात् । तत्सर्वं हि, अविद्यापरिकल्पितं त्वन्मते । न च, अविद्यापरिकल्पितस्य, अविद्यावस्थायां शुक्तिकारजतादिभेदवत्परस्परभेदोऽत्र सूत्रकारेण

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accounted for, the case-co-ordination of the world and Brahman; and the world being the effect of Brahman, and being non-different from Brahman and the non-mixture of the natures of non-sentient things, Jīva and Brahman (respectively) such as being modified, being miserable; being the mine of auspicious qualities, —and the non-contradiction with all the S'ruti passages. In (the passage)

'The Existent alone, gentle one, was this one alone, in the beginning' (Chā. 6·2·1)

has got to be necessarily admitted— Jīva along with the non-sentient remaining in a subtle state, owing to his being the body of Brahman in the undivided state, on account of his remaining in the subtle form even at that time as pointed out into two Sūtras—

'Partiality and cruelty not (found in Īśvara) on account of His depending (on the Karman of the Jīva)'

'If (it be said) there would be no Karman on account of the non-division. (we reply) No, on account of the beginninglessness, (of the Kṣetra-knowers and Karman); this is appropriate and is also so found' (Bra. Sū. II. 1·34·35)

The non-division again is appropriate owing to the absence of division into name and form. Therefore, Brahman being the cause of the world is definitely possible.

But those again who describe this difference, bearing in mind the state of the Jīva, as not separated from Avidyā, —in their case all this would be absurd. Not, indeed, in the case of (the Jīva) having that state, exist omniscience, overlordship, being the cause of all, being the Ātman of all, being the controller of all, etc. By these S'ruti passages is described the difference of the inmost Ātman in this very form, on account of all that being superimposed by Avidyā. All that is superimposed by Avidyā in your opinion. Not again is propounded here by the Sūtrakāra in Sūtras like

'अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात्' (ब्र. सू. २।१।२२)

इत्यादिषु प्रतिपाद्यते। ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या, इति जिज्ञास्यतया प्रक्रान्तस्य ब्रह्मणो जगज्जन्मादिकारणस्य वेदान्तवेद्यत्वं तस्य च स्मृतिन्यायविरोधपरिहारश्च क्रियते।

'अपीतौ तद्वत्प्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम्। न तु दृष्टान्तभावात्' (ब्र. सू. २।१।८-९)

इति सूत्रद्वयमेतदधिकरणासिद्धमनुवदति। तत्र हि विलक्षणयोः कार्यकारणभावसंभव एवाधिकरणार्थः।

'असदिति चेन्न प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात्' (ब्र. सू. २।१।७)

इति च पूर्वाधिकरणस्थमनुवदति ॥ २३ ॥

इतरव्यपदेशाधिकरणं समाप्तम् (७)

उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेति चेन्न क्षीरवद्धि ॥ २४ ॥ (अधिकरण ८; सू. २४-२५)

[289 A] परस्य ब्रह्मणः सर्वज्ञस्य सत्यसंकल्पस्य स्थूलसूक्ष्मावस्थसर्वचेतनाचेतनवस्तुशरीरतया सर्वप्रकारत्वेन सर्वात्मकत्वं सकलेतरविलक्षणत्वं चाविरुद्धमिति

'But greater than (superior to), on account of the reference to difference' (Bra. Sū. II. 1·22)

mutual difference, like the difference of the conch-shell and silver etc., in the state of Avidyā, in the case of one superimposed by Avidyā. What is done (here) is that Brahman is introduced as being fit for being known, by (the statement)— The desire to know Brahman should be effected, —which is the cause of the origination etc., of the world etc., being fit to be known from the Vedānta, and the refutation of contradiction with Smṛti passages and reasoning in respect of the same. The two Sūtras—

'On account of the undesirable contingency of being like that in dissolution, that is absurd'

'But not, on account of the presence of illustration' (Bra. Sū. II. 1·8-9)

repeat the thing established in this topic; for, there also the purpose of the topic is the possibility itself of being the effect and cause in the case of two distinct things. And (the Sūtra)

'If (it be argued) that it is Asat (we reply)— No, on account of there being only the repudiation' (Bra. Sū. II·1·7)

repeats what has been stated in the previous topic. ‖ 23 ‖

Here ends the Itaravyapadeśādhikaraṇa (7)

If (it be argued that Brahman can) not (be the cause of the world), on account of the aggregate (of helping materials) being seen (to be used)— (we reply)— No, for, (it is) like milk. ‖ 24 ‖

(Adhikaraṇa 8, Sūtras 24-25)

[289 A] It has been established that in the case of the Highest Brahman which is omniscient with thoughts fulfilled—being the Ātman of all, because it has all modes, and being different from everything else, are not contradictory, on account of all sentient and non-sentient entities in gross

सामानाधिकरण्योपपत्तिः । जगतो ब्रह्मकार्यत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यत्वम्, अचिद्वस्तुनो जीवस्य च ब्रह्मणश्च परिणामित्वदुःखित्वकल्याणगुणाकरत्वस्वभावासंकरः सर्वश्रुत्य विरोधश्च भवति ।

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'असदिति चेन्न प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात्' (ब्र.सू २।१।७)

इति च पूर्वाधिकरणस्थमनुवदति ॥ २३ ॥

इतरव्यपदेशाधिकरणं समाप्तम् (७)

उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेति चेन्न क्षीरवद्धि ॥ २४ ॥ (अधिकरण ८, सू २४-२५)

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स्थापितम् । इदानीं सर्वज्ञस्य सत्यसंकल्पस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणः संकल्पमात्रेण विचित्रजगत्सृष्टियोगो न विरुद्धः, इति स्थाप्यते ।

ननु च—परिमितशक्तीनां कारककलापोपसंहारसापेक्षत्वदर्शनेनैव सर्वशक्तेर्ब्रह्मणः कारककलापानुपसंहारेण जगत्कारणत्वाविरोधः कथमाशङ्क्यते ? उच्यते—लोके तत्तत्कार्यजननशक्तियुक्तस्यापि तत्तदुपकरणापेक्षितत्वदर्शनात्, सर्वशक्तियुक्तस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणोऽपि तत्तदुपकरणविरहिणः स्रष्टृत्वं नोपपद्यते, इति कस्यचिन्मन्दधियः शङ्का जायते, इति सा निराक्रियते । घटपटादिकारणभूतानां कुलालकुविन्दादीनां तज्जननसामर्थ्ये सत्यपि, कानिचिदुपकरणान्युपसंहृत्यैव जनयितृत्वं दृश्यते । तज्जननाशक्ताः कारककलापोपसंहारेऽपि जनयितुं न शक्नुवन्ति । शक्ताः पुनः कारककलापोपसंहारे जनयन्ति, इत्येतावानेव विशेषः । ब्रह्मणोऽपि सर्वशक्तेः सर्वस्य जनयितृत्वं तदुपकरणानामनुपसंहारे नोपपद्यते । प्राक्सृष्टेश्चासहायत्वं

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्'　　(छा. ६।२।१)

'एको ह वै नारायण आसीत्'　　(महा. १)

इत्येवमादिषु प्रतीयते । अतः स्रष्टृत्वं नोपपद्यते, इत्येवं प्राप्तम् ।

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and subtle states being its body. Now is established in the case of the Highest Brahman omniscient with thoughts fulfilled, the association with the creation of the variegated world merely by reflection is not contradictory.

I say (says the objector) —How could this be doubted— the contradiction viz being the cause of the world in the case of the omnipotent Brahman by not getting together the causal aggregate agency, because in the case of those who have limited powers, there is seen their being dependent upon getting together the causal aggregate ? (This) is said (in reply)— Because in the world there is seen even in the case of (a person) endowed with power to produce the various effects, his standing in need of the various instruments, —even in the case of the Highest Brahman, endowed with all powers, divested of the various instruments, creation would not be forthcoming— such a doubt may arise in the case of some dull-witted fellow, and so, that is removed (here). In the case of the potter, weaver etc, that are the causes of jar, piece of cloth etc, there is seen the state of a producer only after having got together some instruments, though they do possess the power to produce. Those, powerless to produce, are not able to produce even though the causal aggregate is got together, the powerful, on the other hand, produce when the causal aggregate is got together —this is the only difference Even in the case of the omnipotent Brahman, being the creator of all would not materialise, when the instruments for the same are not got together. The absence of any helper prior to creation is comprehended from passages like

'Existence alone, gentle one, this was in the beginning'
(Cha 6·2 1)

'One alone, verily, was Nārāyana'　　(Maha 1)

Therefore, being the creator cannot materialise —This is what is arrived at (as the prima-facie view)

तादिदमाशङ्कते — उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेति चेत् — इति। परिहरति 'न क्षीरवद्धि'
ति।

न सर्वेषां कार्यजननशक्तानामुपसंहारसापेक्षत्वमस्ति। यथा क्षीरजलादेर्दधिहिम-
जननशक्तस्य तज्जनने। एवं ब्रह्मणोऽपि स्वयमेव सर्वजननशक्तेः सर्वस्य जनयितृत्वमुप-
पद्यते। हि, इति प्रसिद्धयानिर्देशश्चोद्यस्य मन्दताख्यापनाय। क्षीरादिष्वातञ्चनाद्यपेक्षा, न
ध्यादिभावाय, अपि तु शैघ्र्यार्थं रसविशेषार्थं वा ॥ २४ ॥

देवादिवदपि लोके ॥ २५ ॥

यथा देवादयः स्वे स्वे लोके संकल्पमात्रेण स्वापेक्षितानि सृजन्ति, तथासौ
रुषोत्तमः कृत्स्नं जगत्संकल्पमात्रेण सृजति। देवादीनां वेदावगतशक्तीनां दृष्टान्ततयोपादानं
ब्रह्मणो वेदावगतशक्तेः सुखग्रहणायेति प्रतिपत्तव्यम् ॥ २५ ॥

उपसंहारदर्शनाधिकरणं समाप्तम् (८)

[290] कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्वशब्दकोपो वा ॥ २६ ॥

(अधिकरण ९, सूत्राणि २६–३१)

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' (छा. ६।२।१)

There is this doubt raised—If (it be argued that Brahman can) not (be the cause of the world), on account of the aggregate (of helping materials) being seen (to be used)—(The Sūtrakāra) refutes, (the same) by 'No, for (it is) like the milk'.

—Not in the case of all competent to produce the effect is there dependence upon the aggregate got together, as in the case of milk, water etc., competent to produce curds, snow etc., in producing them. Thus in the case of Brahman also, which is competent to produce, of its own accord, its being the creator of everything is quite appropriate. (The world) Hi pointing out to something that is well-known, is for the purpose of proclaiming the stupidity of the opponent (the person to be goaded). The dependence upon churning etc., in the case of milk etc., is not for the sake of producing curds etc., but for the sake of (bringing out the result) rapidly or for (producing) a particular kind of flavour ॥ 24 ॥

Like the Gods also, in (their) world. ॥ 25 ॥

Just as the gods etc., in their respective worlds create things desired by them, merely by reflecting—likewise this Puruṣottama creates the entire world merely by reflecting. Taking gods etc., whose powers are known from the Vedas, as the illustrative instance, should be understood for the sake of the easy understanding of Brahman whose power is known from the Veda. ॥ 25 ॥

Here ends the Upasaṁhāradarśanādhikaraṇa (8)

[290] The entire (Brahman) being inevitably used, or the anger of the Word, about the impartite nature (of Brahman) ॥ 26 ॥

(Adhikarana 9, Sūtras 26–31)

In (passages)

'Existence alone, gentle one, this was in the beginning' (Chā. 6·2·1)

'इद वाग्रे नैव किंचनासीत्' (बृ १।२।१)
'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्' (ऐ. १।१)

इत्यादिषु कारणावस्थायां ब्रह्मैकमेव निरवयवमासीत, इति कारणावस्थायां निरस्ताचिदचिद्विभागतया निरवयवं ब्रह्मैवासीत, इत्युक्तम्। तदविभागमेकं निरवयवमेव ब्रह्म 'बहु स्याम्' इति संकल्प्य, आकाशवाय्वादिविभागं ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तक्षेत्रज्ञविभागं चाभवत्, इति चोक्तम्। एवं सति तदेव परं ब्रह्म कृत्स्नं कार्यत्वेनोपयुक्तम्, इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्।

अथ, चिदंशः क्षेत्रज्ञविभागविभक्तः, अचिदंशश्च, आकाशादिविभागविभक्तः, इत्युच्यते, तदा

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (छा ६।२।१)
'ब्रह्मैकमेव' (बृ १।४।११)
'आत्मैक एव' (बृ १।४।१७)

इत्येवमादयः कारणभूतस्य ब्रह्मणो निरवयवत्ववादिनः शब्दाः कुप्येयुः, बाधिता भवेयुः। यद्यपि सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं ब्रह्म कारणम्, स्थूलचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं ब्रह्म कार्यम्, इत्यभ्युपगम्यते, तथापि शरीरांशस्यापि कार्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्, उक्तदोषो दुर्वारः। तस्य निरवयवस्य बहुभवनं च नोपपद्यते। कार्यत्वानुपयुक्तांशस्थितिश्च नोपपद्यते। तस्मात्,

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'This, verily, was in the beginning nothing whatsoever' (Br I 2 1)

'The Ātman, verily, this alone was in the beginning' (Ai 1 1)

etc in the causal state, the one Brahman alone was there, impartite, and so, it has been stated that Brahman itself was impartite owing to the distinction of *sentient and non-sentient being removed* That undivided one, the impartite Brahman alone, having reflected 'May I be many—' became possessed of the division into Ākāsa, wind etc, and of the division beginning with Brahmadeva and ending with the tuft of grass, and the division into Ksetra-knowers—This also has been stated This being so, it should be comprehended that the same entire Highest Brahman is used for being the product.

If it is stated (by the objector)—The sentient portion is divided as the division of Ksetra-knowers, and the non-sentient portion is divided as the division Akāsa etc, then the Vedic words (passages) advocating the impartite nature of Brahman, which is the cause, such as these and others—

'Existence alone, gentle one, this was in the beginning, one alone, without a second' (Chā 6 2 1)
'Brahman (is) one alone' (Br. 1 4 11)
'Ātman, one alone' (Br 1 4 17)

would be angry, would be stultified Although it is admitted that Brahman having the subtle sentient and non-sentient as the body, is the cause, (Brahman) having gross sentient and non-sentient as the body, is the effect, still the aforesaid blemish is unavoidable owing to a portion of the embodied also being admitted as the effect Further in the case of that impartite, being many is not appropriate. And the state of some portion not being used for

असमञ्जसमेवाभाति । अतः, ब्रह्मकारणत्वं नोपपद्यते ॥ २६ ॥

इत्याक्षिप्ते समाधत्ते—

श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात् ॥ २७ ॥

तुशब्दः, उक्तदोषं व्यावर्तयति । नैवम्, असामञ्जस्यम् । कुतः ? श्रुतेः । श्रुतिस्तावत् निरवयवत्वं ब्रह्मणस्ततो विचित्रसर्गं चाह । श्रौतेऽर्थे यथाश्रुति प्रतिपत्तव्यम्, इत्यर्थः ।

ननु श्रुतिरपि, अग्निना सिञ्चेत्, इतिवत्, परस्परान्वयायोग्यमर्थं प्रतिपादयितुं न समर्था—अत आह । 'शब्दमूलत्वात्' इति । शब्दैकप्रमाणकत्वेन सकलेतरवस्तुविसजातीयत्वात्, अस्यार्थस्य विचित्रशक्तियोगो न विरुध्यते, इति न सामान्यतो दृष्टं साधनं दूषणं वा, अर्हति ब्रह्म ॥ २७ ॥

आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि ॥ २८ ॥

किं च, एवं वस्त्वन्तरसंबन्धिनो धर्मस्य वस्त्वन्तरे चारोपणे सत्यचेतने घटादौ दृष्टा धर्मास्तद्विसजातीये चेतने नित्य आत्मनि प्रसज्यन्ते । तदप्रसक्तिश्च भावस्वभाववैचित्र्यात्, इति, आह—' विचित्राश्च हि ' इति । यथा, अग्निजलादीनाम्, अन्योन्यविसजातीयानाम्, औष्ण्यादिशक्तयश्च विसजातीया दृश्यन्ते, तद्वत्, लोकदृष्टसर्वविसजातीये परे ब्रह्मणि तत्र

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the effect would not also be appropriate. Therefore, it all appears to be absurd. Therefore, Brahman being the cause (of the world) is not reasonable. || 26 ||

It being objected to thus—(the Sūtrakāra) explains (as follows)—

But on account of Śruti : on account of being based upon the Word. || 27 ||

The word Tu (but) turns away the aforesaid blemish. There is no absurdity thus—Whence ? On account of the Śruti (statement). The Śruti, for the matter of that, speaks of the impartite nature of Brahman and of the variegated creation from it. In a matter which is (to be understood) from the Sruti (alone) it has got to be comprehended in conformity with the Sruti.

Surely, even the Śruti dare not propound a sense unfit for mutual relation, as in (*the expression*) *He should sprinkle with fire*—, (regarding this contention) so says (the Sūtrakāra) 'On account of being based upon the Word'. This matter being dissimilar to all other things, the possession of wonderful powers is not contradicted owing to its having the Word as the only means of proof,—and so, Brahman does not deserve (stand in need of) an argument, for or against, which is ordinarily met with || 27 ||

And in the Self, thus again, indeed, the manifold (powers) || 28 ||

Furthermore, if there is a superimposition of an attribute connected with another thing, upon another thing, the attributes perceived in the non-sentient jar etc., would perforce be ascribed even to the dissimilar sentient eternal Ātman. But the absence of such forcible ascription is due to the varied nature of the natures of entities—so, (the Sūtrakāra) says—' Again, indeed, the manifold (powers).' Just as in the case of fire, water etc., that are mutually dissimilar are seen dissimilar powers like, heat etc. ; in the same manner in the case of the Highest Brahman which is dissimilar to everything

तत्रादृष्टाः सहस्रशः शक्तयः सन्ति, इति न किंचिदनुपपन्नम्। यथोक्तं भगवता पराशरेण-

'निर्गुणस्याप्रमेयस्य शुद्धस्याप्यमलात्मन ।
कथ सर्गादिकर्तृत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽभ्युपगम्यते ॥' (वि पु १।३।१)

इति सामान्यदृष्ट्या परिचोद्य

'शक्तय सर्वभावानामचिन्त्यज्ञानगोचरा ।
यतोऽतो ब्रह्मणस्तास्तु सर्गाद्या भावशक्तय ।
भवन्ति तपता श्रेष्ठ पावकस्य यथोष्णता ॥' (वि पु १।३।२-३)

इति। श्रुतिश्च

'किंस्विद्वन क उ स वृक्ष आसीद्यतो द्यावापृथिवी निष्टतक्षु ।
मनीषिणो मनसा पृच्छतेदु तद्यद्ध्यतिष्ठद्भुवनानि धारयन् ॥
ब्रह्म वन ब्रह्म स वृक्ष आसीद्यतो द्यावापृथिवी निष्टतक्षु ।
मनीषिणो मनसा विब्रवीमि वो ब्रह्माध्यतिष्ठद्भुवनानि धारयन् ॥'
(तै ब्रा २।८।९)

इति। सामान्यतो दृष्टं चोद्यं सर्ववस्तुविलक्षणे परे ब्रह्मणि नावतरति, इत्यर्थः ॥ २८॥

[291] इतश्च

स्वपक्षदोषाच्च ॥ २९ ॥

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seen in this world, there are thousands of powers not seen here and there—and so nothing is unaccountable As has been said by the Revered Parāśara—

'How is apprehended the nature of the agent for creation etc, in the case of Brahman which is attributeless unknowable, pure and also of spotless nature?' (V P 1 3 1)

—Having thus put forth the objection from the general standpoint,

'As there are in Brahman powers not within the ken of krowledge, that can be thought of, of all entities—those, therefore, beginning with creation are the powers of the entities (O) the foremost of the lustrous ones, like heat in fire (V P 1 3 2-3)

And the Sruti—

'Whatlike (was) the forest, what, indeed, was that tree, from which they cut away (carved) the heaven and the earth? (O) wise ones inquire about this by the mind, which stayed on, supporting the worlds, Brahman (was) the forest Brahman was that tree from which they cut away (carved) the heaven and the earth, (O) wise ones, I speak out to you by the mind —Brahman stayed on supporting the worlds' (Tai Brā 2 8 9)

—The sense is—whatever is argued and generally perceived cannot possibly have bearing on (lit —descend to) Brahman which is different from all other entities ॥ 28 ॥

[291] And for this reason also

On account of the blemishes in one's own (the objector's) doctrine ॥ 29 ॥

स्वपक्षे प्रधानादिकारणवादे लौकिकवस्तुविसजातीयत्वाभावेन प्रधानादेर्लोकदृष्टा दोषास्तत्र भवेयुरिति सकलेतरविलक्षणं ब्रह्मैव कारणमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। प्रधानं च निरवयवम्। तस्य निरवयवस्य कथमिव महदादिविचित्रजगदारम्भ उपपद्यते ?

सत्त्वं रजस्तम इति तस्यावयवा विद्यन्ते, इति चेत् — तत्रेदं विवेचनीयम्। किं सत्त्वरजस्तमसां समूहः प्रधानम्, उत सत्त्वरजस्तमोभिरारब्धं प्रधानम्? अनन्तरे कल्पे, प्रधानं कारणमिति स्वाभ्युपगमविरोधः, स्वाभ्युपेतसंख्याविरोधश्च। तेषामपि निरवयवानां कार्यारम्भविरोधश्च। समूहपक्षे च तेषां निरवयवत्वेन प्रदेशभेदमनपेक्ष्य संयुज्यमानानां न स्थूलद्रव्यारम्भकत्वसिद्धिः।

परमाणुकारणवादेऽपि तथैव। अणवो हि निरंशा निष्प्रदेशाः प्रदेशभेदमनपेक्ष्य परस्परं संयुज्यमाना अपि न स्थूलकार्यारम्भाय प्रभवेयुः ॥ २९ ॥

सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात् ॥ ३० ॥

सकलेतरवस्तुविसजातीया परा देवता सर्वशक्त्युपेता च। तथैव परां देवतां दर्शयन्तीह श्रुतयः—

In one's own doctrine—the doctrine advocating Pradhāna etc., as the cause of the world, there would be the blemishes as perceived in the world in Pradhāna etc., on account of the absence of dissimilarity from ordinary things there,— and so, Brahman alone, different from everything else, has to be comprehended as the cause. Now, Pradhāna is impartite. In the case of that impartite one, how possibly is appropriate the production of the variegated world beginning with the Mahat?

If (it be argued) that there do exist its limbs (parts) viz. (qualities of) goodness, energy and ignorance,—in that case, this has got to be scrutinised.— Is the aggregate of (qualities) goodness, energy and ignorance, Pradhāna? Or, is Pradhāna produced by goodness, energy and ignorance? In the case of the latter view, there is contradiction with your admitted doctrine that Pradhāna is the cause, and there would be contradiction also in respect of *the number (of principles) admitted by you. And there would be contradiction* also with the production of the effect, even in the case of those that are impartite. In the case of the view about the aggregate (of the three qualities being the cause), when they (the three qualities) are being joined irrespective of the division of space owing to their being impartite, they would not be able to produce gross substances.

In the case of the doctrine advocating atoms as the cause, the same (argument holds good); for, the atoms that are impartite, space-less, even when being mutually joined irrespective of the division in space, would not be able to produce the gross effect. ‖ 29 ‖

Being endowed with all (powers), and on account of that being seen. ‖ 30 ‖

The highest Deity (is) dissimilar to all other entities and is endowed with all powers. The Srutis, here, describe the Aighest Deity in the same manner—

'परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च' (श्वे ६।८)

तथा

'अपहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोको विजिघत्सोऽपिपासः' (छा ८।१।५)

इति सकलेतरविसजातीयता परस्या देवताया प्रतिपाद्य

'सत्यकाम सत्यसकल्प' (छा ८।१।५)

इति सर्वशक्तियोग प्रतिपादयन्ति । तथा

'मनोमय प्राणशरीरो भारूप सत्यसकल्प आकाशात्मा सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्ध सर्वरस सर्वमिदमभ्यात्तोऽवाक्यनादर' (छा ३।१४।२)

इति च ॥ ३० ॥

विकरणत्वान्नेति चेत्तदुक्तम् ॥ ३१ ॥

यद्यप्येकमेव ब्रह्म सकलेतरविलक्षण सर्वशक्ति, तथापि

'न तस्य कार्यं करण च विद्यते' (श्वे ६।८)

इति करणविरहिणस्तस्य न कार्यारम्भ सभवति, इति चेत्—तत्रोत्तर

'शब्दमूलत्वाद्विचिनाश्च हि' (ब्र सू २।१।२७।२८)

इत्युक्तम् ।

'His power is heard (in the Sruti) as high and varied and natural knowledge strength and action' (Śve 68)

Likewise

With sins destroyed ageless, deathless, bereft of grief, bereft of hunger bereft of thirst' (Chā 815)

—having propounded the dissimilarity of the Highest Deity from everything else, (the Srutis) propound the association with all the powers in

With desires fulfilled with thoughts fulfilled (Cha 815)

and likewise in

Constituted of mind with Prānas as the body of the nature of lustre with thoughts fulfilled constituted of Ākāsa all-doer with all desires with all smell with all flavour—enveloping all this without speech without care (Cha 3142)

॥ 30 ।

If (it be said that there is) no (production of the effect) on account of the absence of instruments (we reply)—that has been replied to ॥ 31 ॥

Although Brahman is one alone different from all other (entities) possessed of all powers — still it being divested of sense organs as (described) in

There exists not the body nor the sense-organs' (Śve 68)

the commencement of the (production of the) effect is not possible— If (it is argued) thus— the reply thereto is given (in the Sutras)—

'On account of being based on the Word And the manifold (powers) indeed (Bra Su II 1-27-28)

शब्दैकप्रमाणकं सकलेतरविलक्षणं तत्तत्करणविरहेणापि तत्तत्कार्यसमर्थम्, इत्यर्थः। तथा च श्रुतिः

'पश्यत्यचक्षुः स शृणोत्यकर्णः' (श्वे. ३।१९)
'अपाणिपादो जवनो ग्रहीता' (श्वे. ३।१९)

इत्येवमाद्या ॥ ३१ ॥

कृत्स्नप्रसक्त्यधिकरणं समाप्तम् (९)

न प्रयोजनवत्त्वात् ॥ ३२ ॥ (अधिकरण १०, सूत्राणि ३२–३६)

[292] यद्यपीश्वरः प्राक्सृष्टेरेक एव सन्सकलेतरविलक्षणत्वेन सर्वार्थशक्तियुक्तः स्वयमेव विचित्रं जगत्स्रष्टुं शक्नोति, तथापि, ईश्वरस्य कारणत्वं न संभवति। प्रयोजनवत्त्वात् विचित्रसृष्टेः, ईश्वरस्य च प्रयोजनाभावात्। बुद्धिपूर्वकारिणामारम्भे द्विविधं हि प्रयोजनम्—स्वार्थः परार्थो वा। न हि परस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वभावत एवावाप्तसमस्तकामस्य जगत्सर्गेण किंचन प्रयोजनमनवाप्तमवाप्यते। नापि परार्थः। आप्तसमस्तकामस्य परार्थता हि परानुग्रहेण भवति। न च, ईदृशगर्भजन्मजरामरणनरकादिनानाविधानन्तदुःखबहुलं जगत्करुणावान्सृजति, प्रत्युत सुखैकतानमेव सृजेज्जगत्, करुणया सृजन्। अतः, प्रयोजनाभावात्, ब्रह्मणः कारणत्वं नोपपद्यते, इति ॥ ३२ ॥

—The sense is— that (Brahman) different from everything else (known) by the means of proof, the Word alone is competent to produce the various effects, although divested of the various sense-organs. To the same effect the Sruti

'Eyeless, (he) perceives; earless, (he) hears' (S've. 3-19)
'Speedying, grasping, without hands and feet' (S've. 3-19)

etc. ॥ 31 ॥

Here ends the Krtsnaprasaktyadhikarana (9)

(Īsvara is) not (the cause of the world) on account of (the creation) being possessed of a purpose. ॥ 32 ॥
(Adhikarana 10, Sūtras 32-36)

[292] Although the Lord, being all alone prior to creation is able, of his own accord to create the variegated world, endowed with all material and powers, owing to his being different from everything else,— still Īśvara cannot be the cause, on account of the variegated creation being possessed of a purpose, and on account of the absence of a purpose in the case of the Lord. In the matter of beginning to produce (something) by people reflecting about it before, there (is) indeed a two-fold purpose,— one's own purpose or purpose for the sake of another. Not indeed, in the case of the Highest Brahman which is by nature itself, one which has secured all its desires, there can be any purpose whatsoever, (hitherto) not secured, (which is to be secured) by the creation of the world. Nor again (is there) any purpose for the sake of another; in the case of one who has secured all desires, the purpose for the sake of another can (only) be by obliging another. And he would not, possessed of mercy as he is, create the world abounding in endless misery of various kinds, such like the embryo, birth, old age, death, hell etc., on the contrary, he would create the world as uniformly happy, creating (the same) out of pity. So, on account of the absence of any purpose, Brahman being the cause (of the world) is not appropriate. ॥ 32 ॥

एवं प्राप्ते, प्रचक्ष्महे—

लोकवत्तु लीलाकैवल्यम् ॥ ३३ ॥

अवाप्तसमस्तकामस्य परिपूर्णस्य स्वसंकल्पविकार्यविविधचिदचिन्मिश्रजगत्सर्गे लीलैव केवला प्रयोजनम् । लोकवत् । यथा लोके सप्तद्वीपां मेदिनीमधितिष्ठतः संपूर्णशौर्यवीर्यपराक्रमस्यापि महाराजस्य केवललीलैकप्रयोजनाः कन्दुकाद्यारम्भा दृश्यन्ते, तथैव परस्यापि ब्रह्मणः स्वसंकल्पमात्रावक्लृप्तजगज्जन्मस्थितिध्वंसादेर्लीलैव प्रयोजनमिति निरवद्यम् ॥ ३३ ॥

वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात्तथा हि दर्शयति ॥ ३४ ॥

[293] यद्यपि परमपुरुषस्य सकलेतरचिदचिद्वस्तुविलक्षणस्य, अचिन्त्यशक्तियोगात्, प्राक्सृष्टेरेकस्य निरवयवस्यापि विचित्रचिदचिन्मिश्रजगत्सृष्टिः संभाव्येत, तथापि देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यस्थावरात्मना, उत्कृष्टमध्यमापकृष्टसृष्ट्या पक्षपातः प्रसज्येत । अतिघोरदुःखयोगकरणात्, नैर्घृण्यं चावर्जनीयम्, इति । तत्रोत्तरम्— न सापेक्षत्वात्, इति । न प्रसज्येयातां वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये । कुतः ? सापेक्षत्वात् । सृज्यमानदेवादिक्षेत्रज्ञकर्मसापेक्ष-

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This (prima-facie view) being reached, we state (in reply)—

But, as in the world mere sport. ॥ 33 ॥

In the case of one who has secured all his desires, who is quite complete (in himself), just sport alone is the purpose in the matter of the creation of the world, mixed with varied sentient and non-sentient objects, that undergo modification by his own fancy. *Lokavat—Just as in the world in the case of* a great king ruling (presiding) over the earth constituted of the seven islands, although perfect in bravery, heroism and exploits, are to be seen (*playing with*) *the* ball etc., having *mere sport alone* as the *purpose*, in the same manner there is sport alone, the purpose, also in the case of the Highest Brahman which by its mere reflection ensures the creation, sustenance and destruction etc., of the world,—thus, everything (is) all right (blameless) ॥ 33 ॥

Partiality and cruelty (are) not (in Brahman), on account *of* (*Brahman*) *being dependent* (*on the Karman*); for (the Scriptures) declare that way ॥ 34 ॥

[293] Even though the creation of the world mixed up with *variegated non-sentient and sentient* objects, may be possible in the case of the highest Purusa, different from all other sentient and non-sentient objects, even though impartite and one, prior to creation, on account of his association with unthinkable powers,—still there would perforce be partiality in the creation constituted of gods, animals (birds), men, immovable objects, best, middling and inferior—and on account of his bringing about extremely terrible misery, mercilessness is unavoidable (on his part). There the answer (is)—Na sāpekṣatvāt—partiality and mercilessness would not be there perforce—Whence? On account of being dependent—on account of the uneven creation being dependent upon the actions of the Kṣetra-knowers, gods etc.

त्वात्, विषमसृष्टेः । देवादीनां क्षेत्रज्ञानां देवादिशरीरयोगं तत्तत्कर्मसापेक्षं दर्शयन्ति हि श्रुतिस्मृतयः—

> 'साधुकारी साधुर्भवति पापकारी पापो भवति पुण्य पुण्येन कर्मणा पाप पापेन कर्मणा' (बृ ४।४।५)

तथा भगवता पराशरेणापि देवादिवैचित्र्यहेतुः सृज्यमानानां क्षेत्रज्ञानां प्राचीनकर्मशक्तिरेवेत्युक्तम्—

> 'निमित्तमात्रमेवासौ सृज्याना सर्गकर्मणि ।
> प्रधानकारणीभूता यतो वै सृज्यशक्तयः ॥
> निमित्तमात्र मुक्त्वैव नान्यत्किंचिदपेक्षते ।
> नीयते तपता श्रेष्ठ स्वशक्त्या वस्तु वस्तुताम् ॥' (वि. पु १।४।५१–५२)

इति । स्वशक्त्या, स्वकर्मणैव देवादिवस्तुताप्राप्तिरिति ॥ ३४ ॥

न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्नानादित्वादुपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते च ॥ ३५ ॥

प्राक्सृष्टेः क्षेत्रज्ञा नाम न सन्ति । कुतः ? अविभागश्रवणात्

> 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' (छा ६।२।१)

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that are being created For, the Sruti and the Smrti (passages) describe the association with the body of gods etc , in the case of the Ksetra-knowers, gods etc , as being dependent upon the various acts (done by them)—

> '*One acting well becomes a good man, one acting sinfully becomes a sinner, (becomes) a meritorious one, by meritorious act, a sinner, by a sinful act*' (Br 4 4 5)

Likewise, by the Revered Parāśara also is stated the power of the previous Karman (done in the last birth) alone as the cause of the variegated nature as gods etc , in the case of the Ksetra-knowers that are being created—

> '*He (is) just merely the accidental cause in the matter of the creation of those to be created, because the powers of those to be created are the principal cause, having merely being the accidental cause, nothing else whatsoever is required, (O you) the best of those performing penance a thing is made to possess the nature of a thing by its own power* (V P 1 4 51–52)

Svasaktyā— by one s own Karman itself there is the attainment to the state of a thing,— of gods and others ‖ 34 ‖

If (it be said) there would be no Karman on account of the non-division, (we reply)—No, on account of the beginninglessness (of the Kṣetra knowers and Karman), this is appropriate, and is also found ‖ 35 ‖

(If it be argued that) the Ksetra-knowers indeed do not exist prior to creation— Whence ? On account of the Sruti speaking of non-division in (the passage)—

> '*Existence alone, gentle one, this was in the beginning*' (Cha 6 2 1)

इति । अतः, तदानीं तदभावात्तत्कर्म न विद्यते, कथं तदपेक्षं सृष्टिवैषम्यमित्युच्यते ?— इति चेत् — न । अनादित्वात्क्षेत्रज्ञानां तत्कर्मप्रवाहाणां च । तदनादित्वेऽप्यविभाग उपपद्यते च, यतस्तत्क्षेत्रज्ञवस्तु परित्यक्तनामरूपं ब्रह्मशरीरतयापि पृथग्व्यपदेशानर्हमतिसूक्ष्ममवतिष्ठते । तथानभ्युपगमे, अकृताभ्यागमकृतविप्रणाशप्रसङ्गश्च । उपलभ्यते च तेषामनादित्वम्

'न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चित्' (का. २।१८)

इति । सृष्टिप्रवाहानादित्वं च

'सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत्' (म. ना. ५।७)

इत्यादौ ।

'तद्धेदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत्तन्नामरूपाभ्यां व्याक्रियत' (बृ. १।४।७)

इति नामरूपव्याकरणमात्रश्रवणात्क्षेत्रज्ञानां स्वरूपानादित्वं सिद्धम् । स्मृतावपि

'प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव विद्ध्यनादी उभावपि' (गीता १३।१९)

इति । अतः, सर्वविलक्षणत्वात्, सर्वशक्तित्वात्, लीलैकप्रयोजनवत्त्वात्, क्षेत्रज्ञकर्मानुगुण्येन विचित्रसृष्टियोगात्, ब्रह्मैव जगत्कारणम् ॥ ३५ ॥

सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३६ ॥

Therefore, on account of (their) absence at that time, Karman does not exist (in their case); how is then the uneven nature of creation depending upon that, spoken of ?— (we reply)— No, on account of the beginninglessness of the Kṣetra-knowers, and the streams of their Karman. Even though they are beginningless, the non-division is appropriate, because that entity, —the Kṣetra-knower— with the name and form abandoned, remains in a very subtle form, unfit to be described separately, although forming the body of Brahman, and if it is not so admitted, there would be the undesirable contingency of experiencing (the fruit of) what is not done, and the destruction of what is done. And their beginninglessness is known in

'The wise one is not born, nor dies'. (Kā 2·18)

And the beginninglessness of the stream of creation in

'The creator planned the Sun and the moon as before' (Ma. Nā. 5·7)

etc. The beginninglessness of the nature of the Ksetra-knowers is established from the statement by the Sruti of mere modification in name and form in

'It, verily, this was then unmodified, that became modified in name and form' (Br. 1·4·7)

In the Smrti (passage) also

'Prakrti and Purusa also — know even both these to be beginningless' (Gītā 13·19)

Therefore, Brahman alone is the cause of the world on account of its being different from everything, on account of its being possessed of all powers, on account of its having mere sport as the purpose, on account of its effecting variegated creation in conformity with the deeds of the Ksetra-knowers ॥ 35 ॥

And on account of the propriety of all attributes ॥ 36 ॥

प्रधानपरमाण्वादीनां कारणत्वे यद्धर्मवैकल्यमुक्तं वक्ष्यमाणं च, तस्य सर्वस्य धर्मजातस्य कारणत्वोपपादिनो ब्रह्मण्युपपत्तेश्च ब्रह्मैव जगत्कारणमिति स्थितम् ॥ ३६ ॥

प्रयोजनवत्त्वाधिकरणं समाप्तम् (१०)

इति श्रीमद्भगवद्रामानुजाचार्यविरचिते शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्ये द्वितीयाध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ॥

....

And whatever deficiency in attributes was spoken of—in (the doctrine of) Pradhāna, Paramāṇu etc., being the cause (of the world) and what further would be stated later— all that aggregate of attributes propounding the cause (of the world) being appropriate in the case of Brahman, it is established that Brahman alone is the cause of the world. ॥ 36 ॥

Here ends the Prayojanavattvādhikaraṇa (10)

Here ends of the First Quarter of the Second Chapter (Adhyāya) in the Commentary on the Śārīraka-Mīmāṁsā, composed by the Illustrious Revered Rāmānuja.

....

द्वितीयाध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः

रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १ ॥ (अधिकरण १, सूत्राणि १–९)

[294] उक्तं जगज्जन्मादिकारणं परं ब्रह्मेति । तत्र परैरुद्भाविता दोषाश्च परिहृताः । इदानीं स्वपक्षरक्षणाय परपक्षाः प्रतिक्षिप्यन्ते । इतरथा, कस्यचिन्मन्दधियस्तेषां पक्षाणां युक्त्याभासमूलतामजानतः प्रामाणिकत्वशङ्कया वैदिकपक्षे किञ्चिच्छ्रद्धावैकल्यं जायेतापि । अतः, परपक्षप्रतिक्षेपायानन्तरः पादः प्रवर्तते ।

तत्र प्रथमं तावत्कापिलमतं निरस्यते, वैदिकानुमतसत्कार्यवादाद्यर्थसंग्रहेण तस्य सत्पक्षनिक्षेपसंभावनाभ्रमहेतुत्वातिरेकात् ।

'ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम्' (ब्र. सू. १।१।५)

इत्यादिभिर्वैदिकवाक्यानामतत्परत्वमात्रमुक्तम् । अत्रैव तत्पक्षस्वरूपप्रतिक्षेपः क्रियत इति न पौनरुक्त्याशङ्का ।

एषा सांख्यानां दर्शनस्थितिः —

Second Quarter of the Second Chapter

On account of the impossibility of the arrangement, Pradhāna not (the cause of the world), and on account of the activity ॥ 1 ॥

(Adhikaraṇa 1, Sūtras 1-9)

[294] It has been stated that the Highest Brahman is the cause of the origination etc., of the world; and the blemishes pointed out by the opponents there, have been refuted. Now, for the sake of defending our own view, views of the opponents are attacked (challenged); otherwise, in the case of some dull-witted person, not comprehending that their views are rooted in fallacious reasoning, would arise even a slight waning of faith in the doctrine sanctioned by the Veda, on account of suspicion about their being of an authoritative nature. Therefore, (this) subsequent Quarter is proceeding for the attack on the view of the opponents (Para).

There, to start with, the doctrine of the followers of Kapila is refuted, on account of there being plenty of cause for misconception about the possibility of its being included in the right doctrine, owing to the inclusion of items such as the Satkāryavāda accepted by the followers of the Veda. By (the Sūtra)

'On account of Reflection, Pradhāna (is) not (the cause of the world)' (Bra. Sū. I. 1·5)

etc., it was merely stated that the passages in the Vedas do not refer to that (the Kāpila doctrine). And because here, verily, is made an onslaught on the nature of that doctrine, there should be no suspicion about repetition.

This (is) the philosophical position of the followers of the Sāṅkhya (system or philosophy)—

'मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।
षोडशकश्च विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥' (सा. का. ३)

इति तत्संग्रहः ।

मूलप्रकृतिर्नाम सुखदुःखमोहात्मकानि लाघवप्रकाशचलनावष्टम्भनगौरवावरणकार्याण्यत्यन्तातीन्द्रियाणि कार्यैकनिरूपणीयविवेकान्यन्यूनातिरेकाणि समतामुपेतानि सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि द्रव्याणि । सा च सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यरूपा प्रकृतिः, एका स्वयमचेतनानेकचेतनभोगापवर्गार्था नित्या सर्वगता सततविक्रिया, न कस्यचिद्विकृतिः, अपि तु परमकारणमेव । महदाद्यास्तद्विकृतयोऽन्येषां च प्रकृतयः सप्त—महानहंकारः शब्दतन्मात्रं स्पर्शतन्मात्रं रूपतन्मात्रं रसतन्मात्रं गन्धतन्मात्रमिति । तत्र, अहंकारस्त्रिविधो वैकारिकस्तैजसो भूतादिश्च, क्रमात्सात्त्विको राजसस्तामसश्च । तत्र वैकारिकः सात्त्विक इन्द्रियादिः । भूतादिस्तामसो महाभूतहेतुभूततन्मात्रहेतुः । तैजसो राजसस्तूभयोरनुग्राहकः । आकाशादीनि पञ्च महाभूतानि, श्रोत्रादीनि पञ्च ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि, वागादीनि पञ्च कर्मेन्द्रियाणि, मन इति केवलविकाराः षोडश । पुरुषस्तु निष्परिणामत्वेन न कस्यचित्प्रकृतिर्न कस्यचिद्विकृतिः । तत एव निर्धर्मकश्चैतन्यमात्रवपुर्नित्यो निष्क्रियः सर्वगतः प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नश्च ।

'*The original Prakṛti (is) unmodified; seven modifications of the Prakṛti, Mahat etc., and the sixteenfold effect; Puruṣa,— neither Prakṛti nor modification.*' (Sā. Kā. 3)

—*such (is) the summing up thereof.*

The original Prakṛti, indeed, (is)—the substances, Sattva (goodness) Rajas (passion) and Tamas (ignorance) attained to the state of equilibrium, constituted of happiness, misery, (and) infatuation; producing lightness, light, movement; firmness, heaviness, veiling; extremely super-sensuous, discrimination (in them) capable of being noticed only through their effects, neither less, nor more. And that one Prakṛti constituted of the equilibrium of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, itself non-sentient serving the purpose of enjoyment and salvation for the many sentient (Jīvas), eternal, all-pervading, always undergoing modification, (is) not the modification of any one, but is the highest cause itself. Its modifications, Mahat etc., and the Prakṛtis of others—(are) *seven, viz.* Mahat, *Ahaṁkāra, subtle sound,* subtle touch, subtle colour, subtle flavour, (and) subtle smell—There, the Ahaṁkāra is threefold,—Vaikārika (belonging to modifications), Taijasa (belonging to light), Bhūtādi (Elements etc.,)—respectively dominated by the Sattva, dominated by the Rajas, and dominated by the Tamas. There Vaikārika Sāttvika—the sense-organs etc.; the Tāmasa Bhūtādi—the cause of the subtle elements that are the cause of the great elements. The Taijasa Rājasa again, obliges both. The five great elements—Ākāśa etc.; the five knowledge-sense organs, ear etc.; the five action-sense-organs, tongue etc.: (and) the mind,—thus sixteen mere modifications. The Puruṣa, however, not undergoing any modification is neither the Prakṛti of anything, nor the modification of anything. And for that reason itself, he is bereft of all attributes, with the body constituted of pure consciousness, eternal, without activity, all-pervading and different for each body. On account of his being without any modification and any action, it is not possible for him to be the doer and the

निर्विकारत्वान्निष्क्रियत्वाच्च तस्य कर्तृत्वं भोक्तृत्वं च न संभवति। एवंभूतेऽपि तत्त्वे, मूढाः प्रकृतिपुरुषसान्निधिमात्रेण पुरुषस्य चैतन्यं प्रकृतावध्यस्य, प्रकृतेश्च कर्तृत्वं स्फटिकमणाविव जपाकुसुमस्यारुणिमानं पुरुषेऽध्यस्य, अहं कर्ता भोक्ता, इति मन्यन्ते।

एवमज्ञानाद्भोगः, तत्त्वज्ञानाच्चापवर्गः। तदेतत्प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमैः साधयन्ति। तत्र प्रत्यक्षसिद्धेषु पदार्थेषु नातीव विवादास्पदमस्ति। आगमोऽपि कपिलादिसर्वज्ञज्ञानमूल इति सोऽपि प्रथमे काण्डे प्रमाणलक्षणे निरस्तप्रायः। यदिदं प्रधानमेव जगत्कारणमित्यनुमानं तन्निरसनेन तन्मतं निरस्तं भवति, इति तदेव निरस्यते।

ते चेवं वर्णयन्ति—कृत्स्नस्य जगत एकमूलत्वमवश्यमभ्युपगमनीयम्, अनेकेभ्यः कार्योत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमे कारणानवस्थानात्। तन्तुप्रभृतयो ह्यवयवाः स्वांशभूतैः षड्भिः पार्श्वैः परस्परं संयुज्यमाना अवयविनमुत्पादयन्ति। ते च तन्त्वादयः स्वावयवैस्तथाभूतैरुत्पाद्यन्ते। ते च तथाभूतैः स्वावयवैरिति परमाणुभिरपि स्वकीयैः षड्भिः पार्श्वैः संयुज्यमानैरेव स्वकार्योत्पादनमभ्युपेतव्यम्, अन्यथा प्रथिमानुपपत्तेः। परमाणवोऽप्यंशित्वेन

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enjoyer. Even though the real state of things is like this, stupid people superimposing the sentient nature of Purusa on the Prakrti merely on the strength of the nearness (presence) of the Purusa with the Prakrti, and (superimposing) the nature of the doer, of the Prakrti on the Purusa, like the redness of the jasmine flower on the white crystal gem, think—I (am) the doer, the enjoyer.

Thus, the enjoyment (arises) from ignorance, and salvation from right knowledge and this (the Sānkhyas) prove by the (Pramānas) Direct perception, Inference and Scripture There in matters that are proved by Direct perception, there is not much room for discussion As regards the Scripture, which is (claimed to be) based on the knowledge of omniscient persons, Kapila etc., that too has almost been refuted in the first Chapter (*Pūrvamimāmsā* of Jaimini) dealing with the means of proof As to this inference that Pradhāna itself (is) the cause of the world that alone is refuted here in the belief that by its refutation would be refuted their doctrine

They (the Sankhyas) further describe (their position) thus—That the entire world has only one cause must be necessarily admitted, on account of the endlessness of causes if the origination of the effect from many (causes) is admitted The parts (of cloth), such as the threads etc., indeed, produce the whole object (the piece of cloth) when they are mutually joined together on the six sides which form their parts They, the threads and others, in their turn, are produced by their own parts in that position They too, by their own parts in that position— thus, the production of their effect has got to be admitted even in the case of the atoms, verily, by their own six sides being joined, otherwise grossness is impossible. The atoms also are produced exactly in the same way by their parts, on account of their being possessed of

स्वांशैस्तथैवोत्पाद्यन्ते, ते च स्वांशैरिति न क्वचित्कारणव्यवस्थितिः। अतः, कारणव्यवस्थासिद्ध्यर्थमेकं द्रव्यं विविधविचित्रपरिणामशक्तियुक्तं स्वयमप्रच्युतस्वरूपमेव महदाद्यनन्तावस्थाश्रयं कारणमाश्रयणीयम्। तच्चैकं कारणं गुणत्रयसाम्यरूपं प्रधानमिति तत्कल्पनहेतूनुपन्यस्यन्ति —

> *'भेदानां परिमाणात्समन्वयाच्छक्तितः प्रवृत्तेश्च।*
> *कारणकार्यविभागादविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य॥*
> *कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तम्'* (सां. का. १५।१६)

इति।

अयमर्थः—विश्वरूपमेव वैश्वरूप्यम् विचित्रसंनिवेशं तनुभुवनादि कृत्स्नं जगत्। तच्च जगद्विचित्रसंनिवेशत्वेन कार्यभूतं तत्सरूपाव्यक्तकारणकम्। कुतः? कार्यत्वात्। कार्यस्य हि सर्वस्य तत्सरूपात्कारणविशेषाद्विभागस्तस्मिन्नेवाविभागश्च दृश्यते, यथा घटमुकुटादेः कार्यस्य तत्सरूपान्मृत्सुवर्णादेः कारणाद्विभागस्तस्मिन्नेव चाविभागः। अतो विश्वरूपस्य जगतस्तत्सरूपात्प्रधानादुत्पत्तिस्तस्मिन्नेव लयश्चेति प्रधानकारणकमेव जगत्। गुणत्रयसाम्यरूपं प्रधानमेव जगत्सरूपं कारणम्, सत्त्वरजस्तमोमयसुखदुःखमोहात्मकत्वा-

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parts, and they (the parts) by their parts—thus there is nowhere any regulated arrangement about the cause. Therefore, in order to prove some regulated arrangement about the cause, one substance endowed with powers of varied and variegated modifications,— itself, indeed, having an immutable nature, the *resort of endless states,—Mahat etc.—must be accepted as the cause;* and that one cause (is) the Pradhāna in the form of the equilibrium of the three Guṇas—*thus they put forth the logical reasons for that idea—*

> *'On account of the limited dimension of different objects, on account of the continuation, on account of their power, on account of activity, and on account of the division of cause and effect, and non-division (of cause and effect)—the Unmanifest (Avyakta) (is) the cause of the universal world.'* (Sā. Kā. 15-16)

This is the sense—Vaiśvarūpya is Viśvarūpa itself—having variegated configuration, the entire world, body, universe, etc., and that world is the effect on account of its variegated configuration, has the Unmanifest homogeneous with it, as the cause. Whence? Because it is a *product; for, in* the case of all products is seen division from the specific cause, possessed of the same form and dissolution (non-division) in that itself, as in the case of the product—jar, crown etc., the division from the cause, earth, gold etc., homogeneous with them and dissolving in those (causes) themselves. Therefore, there is the origination of the universal world from Pradhāna, homogeneous with it and dissolving in that (Pradhāna) itself—So, the world has Pradhāna alone as the cause. Pradhāna alone constituted of the equilibrium of the three Guṇas is the cause, homogeneous with the world on account of the world being constituted of happiness, misery, infatuation constituted (respectively) of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas; as for instance, the substance, earth alone is the cause of

ज्जगतः, यथा च मृदात्मनो घटस्य मृद्द्रव्यमेव कारणम् । तदेव हि तदुत्पत्त्याख्यप्रवृत्तिशक्तिमत्, तथा दर्शनात् । अव्यक्तस्य गुणसाम्यरूपस्य देशतः कालतश्चापरिमितस्यैव कारणत्वं भेदानां महदहंकारतन्मात्रादीनां परिमितत्वादवगम्यते । महदादीनि च घटादिवत्परिमितानि कृत्स्नजगदुत्पत्तौ न प्रभवन्ति । अतः, त्रिगुणं जगद्गुणत्रयसाम्यरूपप्रधानैककारणकमिति निश्चीयते—अत्रोच्यते—'रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानं प्रवृत्तेश्च'। अनुमीयत इति, अनुमानम्—

न भवदुक्तं प्रधानं विचित्रजगद्रचनासमर्थम्
अचेतनत्वे सति तत्स्वभावाभिज्ञानधिष्ठितत्वात् ।

यदेवं तत्तथा यथा रथप्रासादादिनिर्माणे केवलदार्वादिकम्—
दार्वादेरचेतनस्य तज्ज्ञानाधिष्ठितस्य कार्यारम्भानुपपत्तेर्दर्शनात्, तज्ज्ञानाधिष्ठितस्य कार्यारम्भप्रवृत्तेर्दर्शनाच्च न प्राज्ञानधिष्ठितं प्रधानं कारणमित्युक्तं भवति । चकारादन्वयस्यानैकान्त्यं समुच्चिनोति । न ह्यन्वितं शौक्ल्यगोत्वादि कारणत्वव्याप्तम् । न च वाच्यम्, माभूदन्वितानामपि शौक्ल्यादिधर्माणां कारणत्वम् । द्रव्यस्य तु हेमादेः कार्यान्वितस्य

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the jar constituted of earth ; for that same is possessed of the power for activity known as production of that, because it is so seen. That the Unmanifest alone, constituted of the equilibrium of the Guṇas and not limited either in space or in time, is the cause, is comprehended from the limited nature of the different objects, Mahat, Ahaṁkāra, the subtle elements etc. Mahat etc., again, being limited in dimension like jar etc., are not powerful to produce the entire world. Therefore, it is ascertained that the world constituted of the three Guṇas has as its only cause, the Pradhāna constituted of the equilibrium of the three Guṇas—Here is said (by way of reply)—'On account of the impossibility of the arrangement. Pradhāna not (the cause) and on account of the activity'— Anumānam— what is inferred—

Pradhāna spoken of by you is incompetent for the arrangement of the variegated world,

Because, being non-sentient, it is not supervised over by one knowing *its nature*,

What is thus, is like that— As for instance, only wood etc., in (the matter of) building chariot, mansion, etc.

Because, in the case of the non-sentient wood etc., is seen the impossibility of commencing the production of the effect, when it is not supervised over by one expert in that and because the activity for the production of the effect is seen, when (the wood etc., are) supervised over by an expert, it is as good as stated that Pradhāna not-supervised over by some one intelligent (Prājña) is not the cause. The word Ca (in the Sūtra) emphasises that the continuity is not exclusive (absolute). Not, indeed, the whiteness, bullness etc., that persist (in the product) are invariably associated with the nature of the cause. And it should not be said—Let not the attributes whiteness etc., even though they persist be the cause; but in the

कारणत्वव्याप्तिरस्त्येव। सत्त्वादीन्यपि द्रव्याणि कार्यान्वितानि कारणत्वव्याप्तानि, इति—

यतः सत्त्वादयो द्रव्यधर्मा न तु द्रव्यस्वरूपम्, सत्त्वादयो हि पृथिव्यादिद्रव्यगतलघुत्वप्रकाशादिहेतुभूतास्तत्स्वभावविशेषा एव, न तु मृद्धिरण्यादिवद्द्रव्यतया कार्यान्विता उपलभ्यन्ते। गुणा इत्येव च सत्त्वादीनां प्रसिद्धिः।

यच्च कारणव्यवस्थासिद्धये जगत एकमूलत्वमुक्तम्, तदपि सत्त्वादीनामनेकत्वान्नोपपद्यते। अत एव कारणव्यवस्था च न सिध्यति। साम्यावस्थाः सत्त्वादय एव हि प्रधानमिति त्वन्मतम्। अतः, कारणबहुत्वादनवस्था तदवस्थैव। न च तेषामपरिमितत्वेन व्यवस्थासिद्धिः। अपरिमितत्वे हि त्रयाणामपि सर्वगतत्वेन न्यूनाधिकभावाभावाद्वैषम्यासिद्धेः कार्यारम्भासंभवात्कार्यारम्भायैव परिमितत्वमवश्याश्रयणीयम् ॥ १ ॥

[295] यत्र रथादिषु स्पष्टं चेतनाधिष्ठितत्वं दृष्टं तद्व्यतिरिक्तं सर्वं पक्षीकृतमित्याह—

पयोम्बुवच्चेत्तत्रापि ॥ २ ॥

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case of the substance gold etc., which persist in the effect, there *is* the invariable association with the nature of the cause— the substances Sattva etc., also, persisting in the effect are invariably associated with the nature of the cause—(To this, our reply is)—

Because Sattva etc., are the attributes of a substance, and not the nature of a substance; for, Sattva etc., being the causes of lightness, light etc., belonging to the substances earth etc., are nothing but their particular natures, and are not found persisting in the effect as substances, like earth, gold etc. Sattva etc., are well-known as attributes alone.

As to (the argument put forth),— the world has one base for the accomplishment of the proper adjustment of the cause,— that too is not appropriate on account of Sattva etc., being many. For this very reason, the proper arrangement about the cause would not be possible (either); for, your view is that Sattva etc., in the state of equilibrium, themselves are the Pradhāna. Therefore, on account of the causes being many, (the fault of) endlessness does continue in that state. Nor could there be the accomplishment of the proper arrangement, owing to their being unlimited in dimension; for, if they are unlimited in dimension, even all the three being all-pervading, there would be the absence of the nature of being more or less,— and so, the uneven nature is not established and (consequently) there would be the impossibility of the production of the effect,— and so, for the production of the effect itself, (their) being limited in dimension has got to be necessarily resorted to ॥ 1 ॥

[295] Where in the case of the chariot etc., there is clearly seen being supervised over by some sentient—barring that, everything is included in the Pakṣa (about which something is to be proved)—and so, says (the Sūtrakāra)—

If (it be) like milk and water, there too (no activity) ॥ 2 ॥

यदुक्तम्—प्रधानस्य प्राज्ञानधिष्ठितस्य विचित्रजगद्रचनानुपपत्तिरिति—तन्न। यतः पयोम्बुवत्प्रवृत्तिरुपपद्यते। पयसस्तावद्दधिभावेन परिणममानस्यानन्यापेक्षस्याद्य-परिस्पन्दनप्रभृतिपरिणामपरंपरा स्वत एवोपपद्यते। यथा च वारिदविमुक्तस्याम्बुन एक-रसस्य नालिकेरतालचूतकपित्थनिम्बतिन्तिण्यादिविचित्ररसरूपेण परिणामप्रवृत्तिः स्वत एव दृश्यते, तथा प्रधानस्यापि परिणामस्वभावस्यान्यानधिष्ठितस्यैव प्रतिसर्गावस्थायां सदृशपरिणामेनावस्थितस्य सर्गावस्थायां गुणवैषम्यनिमित्तविचित्रपरिणाम उपपद्यते। यथोक्तम्—

'परिणामतः सलिलवत्प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात्।' (सां. का. १६)

इति। तदेवमव्यक्तमन्यानपेक्षं प्रवर्तत इति चेत्, अत उत्तरम्—तत्रापि, इति।

यत्क्षीरजलादिदृष्टान्ततया निदर्शितं तत्रापि प्राज्ञानधिष्ठाने प्रवृत्तिर्नोपपद्यते। तदपि पूर्वत्र पक्षीकृतमित्यभिप्रायः।

'उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेति चेन्न क्षीरवद्धि' (ब्र. सू. २।१।२४)

As to what has been said that in the case of Pradhāna not supervised over by the Prājña, there would be the impossibility of the arrangement of the variegated world—(we say)—that (is) not (so), because activity as in the case of milk and water is possible. In the case of milk, for the matter of that, which is being modified into curds, not being dependent on anything else, there is possible from itself, the series of modifications beginning with the first throbbing movement; and just as in the case of water, let off by the cloud, which is of a unform nature, is seen from itself, activity towards modification in the form of various kinds of juices such as (associated with) the cocoanut, palm-tree, mango, Kapittha, Nimba, Tintini etc., would be appropriate, so in the case even of the Pradhāna, with its nature of modification even though not supervised over by another and which remains suitably modified in the state of dissolution, is appropriate the variegated modification caused by the disparity of the qualities in the state of creation. As has been stated—

'On account of the modification like water, on account of being the particular resort of every corresponding quality'
(Sā. Kā. 16)

If (it be argued) that in this manner, the Unmanifest not dependent upon another begins its activity—the answer (is)—There too—

As to what has been illustrated by the illustrative instance—milk, water etc.,—(on the strength of such illustrations), even there the activity of the Pradhāna, with the Prājña not supervising, is not possible. The idea is,—that also has been a part of the Pakṣa (about which something is to be proved) before. In (the Sūtra)—

'If (it be argued) that (Brahman cannot be the cause of the world) on account of the presence of the aggregate (of helping materials) being seen (to be used)—(we reply)—No; for, (it is) like milk'
(Bra Sū. II. 1·24)

इत्यत्र दृष्टपरिकरान्तररहितस्यापि स्वासाधारणपरिणाम उपपद्यते, इत्येतावदुक्तं न प्राज्ञाधिष्ठितत्वं पराकृतम्,

'योऽप्सु तिष्ठन्' (बृ ३।७।४)

इत्यादिश्रुतेः । २ ॥

व्यतिरेकानवस्थितेश्चानपेक्षत्वात् ॥ ३ ॥

[296] इतश्च सत्यसंकल्पेश्वराधिष्ठानानपेक्षपरिणामित्वे सर्गव्यतिरेकेण प्रतिसर्गावस्थाया अनवस्थितिप्रसङ्गाच्च न प्राज्ञानधिष्ठितं प्रधानं कारणम् । प्राज्ञाधिष्ठितत्वे तस्य सत्यसंकल्पत्वेन सर्गप्रतिसर्गविचित्रसृष्टि॰व्यवस्थासिद्धिः । न च वाच्यम्—प्राज्ञाधिष्ठितत्वेऽपि तस्यावाप्तसमस्तकामस्य परिपूर्णस्यानवधिकातिशयानन्दस्य निरवद्यस्य निरञ्जनस्य सर्गप्रतिसर्गव्यवस्थाहेत्वभावात्, विषमसृष्टौ निर्दयत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च समानोऽयं दोष इति,—परिपूर्णस्यापि लीलार्थप्रवृत्तिसंभवात्, सर्वज्ञस्य तस्य परिणामविशेषापन्नप्रकृतिदर्शनरूपसर्गप्रतिसर्गविशेषहेतोः संभवात्, क्षेत्रज्ञकर्मणामेव विषमसृष्टेर्व्यवस्थापकत्वाच्च ।

—what has been stated here is just this viz, one's own peculiar modification although without any perceptible accessory is appropriate and being supervised over by a Prājña is not refuted, on account of (the Sruti passage)

'Who residing in waters' (Br 3 7 4)

etc ॥2॥

And on account of the endlees nature of being apart (from creation) owing to (modification) not dependent upon (Īśvara) ॥3॥

[296] And for this reason also, on account of the undesirable contingency of the endless state of dissolution as apart from the creation, if the Pradhana were to have its modification not dependent upon the supervision by Īśvara with thoughts fulfilled, Pradhana not supervised over by the Prājña cannot be the cause If it were to be supervised over by the Prajña, on account of his having thoughts fulfilled, there would be forthcoming the arrangement about creation, dissolution and variegated creation Further, it should not be said that even though (the Pradhana) is supervised over by the Prājña, because he has all his desires fulfilled, is all perfect, has limitless excessive bliss is blameless stainless, and so, there being no purpose for the arrangement regarding creation and dissolution and because, he would perforce have to be pitiless in creating disparity—this blemish is common (to both the views) — (our reply is) — Even in the case of one who is all perfect there is the possibility of activity just for the sake of sport, and because it is possible for him, the omniscient, to have a special cause for creation and dissolution in the manifestation of Prakrti undergoing special modification and because the Karmans themselves of the Ksetra knowers bring about the disparity in creation

ननु—एवं क्षेत्रज्ञपुण्यापुण्यकर्मभिरेव सर्वा व्यवस्थाः सिध्यन्ति, इति कृतमीश्वरेणाधिष्ठात्रा । पुण्यापुण्यरूपानुष्ठितकर्मसंस्कृता प्रकृतिरेव पुरुषार्थानुरूपं तथा तथा व्यवस्थया परिणंस्यते । यथा विषादिदूषितानामन्नपानादीनामौषधिविशेषाप्यायितानां च सुखदुःखहेतुभूतः परिणामविशेषो देशकालव्यवस्थया दृश्यते । अतः, सर्गप्रतिसर्गव्यवस्था देवादिविषमसृष्टिः कैवल्यव्यवस्था च सर्वप्रकारपरिणामशक्तियुक्तस्य प्रधानस्यैवोपपद्यते, इति—

अनभिज्ञो भवान्पुण्यापुण्यकर्मस्वरूपयोः । पुण्यापुण्यस्वरूपे हि शास्त्रैकसमधिगम्ये । शास्त्रं च, अनादिनिधनाविच्छिन्नपाठसंप्रदायानाघ्रातप्रमादादिदोषगन्धवेदाख्याक्षरराशिः । तच्च परमपुरुषाराधनतद्विपर्ययरूपे कर्मणी पुण्यापुण्ये तदनुग्रहनिग्रहायत्ते च तत्फले सुखदुःखे, इति वदति । तथा चाह द्रमिडाचार्यः—फलसंविधित्सया हि कर्मभिरात्मानं पिप्रीषन्ति, स प्रीतोऽलं फलायेति शास्त्रमर्यादा, इति । तथा च श्रुतिः—

'इष्टापूर्तं बहुधा जातं जायमानं विश्वं बिभर्ति भुवनस्य नाभिः'

(म. ना. १।६)

I say (says the objector)—If in this way all the regulated arrangements become possible by the meritorious and non-meritorious Karmans themselves of the Kṣetra-knowers, away with Īśvara, the supervisor! The Prakṛti itself influenced by the *effected Karman of the form of merit* and demerit, would undergo modification by the necessary arrangement in conformity with the purpose in life; just as in the case of food, drink, etc., defiled by poison etc., but fortified by special medicinal herbs, a special kind of effect leading to happiness and misery is seen by the arrangement about space and time. Therefore, the arrangement viz. creation and dissolution, the uneven creation such as gods etc., and the arrangement about salvation, are possible in the case of Pradhāna itself, endowed with the power for modification and mode of every kind—(To this our answer is)—

Your honour is quite ignorant about the nature of meritorious and non-meritorious Karmans. The natures of merit and demerit, indeed, are to be understood from the Sāstra alone and the Sāstra is the mass of words called the Veda that is without beginning and without end, which has an unbroken tradition of study, which has never even smelt the smell of error etc. And that (Sāstra) speaks of merit and demerit as the actions (respectively) constituted of the worship of the highest Puruṣa, and its opposite, and happiness and misery as the two fruits (respectively) dependent upon his favour and disfavour. To the same effect says Ācārya Dramiḍa—They desire to gratify Atman by their deeds, owing to their desire for securing the fruit—and he, gratified, is competent to give the fruit—such is the regulation (limit) of the Sāstra. And likewise the Sruti

'He, the navel of the universe, bears the world, produced and being produced in various ways, the sacrifices and gifts'

(Ma. Nā. 1·6)

इति। तथा च भगवता स्वयमेवोक्तम्

> *'यतः प्रवृत्तिर्भूतानां येन सर्वमिदं ततम्।*
> *स्वकर्मणा तमभ्यर्च्य सिद्धिं विन्दति मानवः॥'* (गीता १८।४६)

इति।

> *'तानहं द्विषतः क्रूरान् संसारेषु नराधमान्।*
> *क्षिपाम्यजस्रमशुभानासुरीष्वेव योनिषु॥'* (गीता १६।१९)

इति च। स च भगवान्पुरुषोत्तमोऽवाप्तसमस्तकामः सर्वज्ञः सर्वेश्वरः सत्यसंकल्पः स्वमाहात्म्यानुगुणलीलाप्रवृत्त एतानि कर्माणि समीचीनान्येतान्यसमीचीनानीति कर्मद्वैविध्यं संविधाय, तदुपादानोचितदेहेन्द्रियादिकं तन्नियमनशक्तिं च सर्वेषां क्षेत्रज्ञानां सामान्येन प्रदर्श्य, स्वशासनाववोधि शास्त्रं च प्रदर्श्य तदुपसंहारार्थं चान्तरात्मतयानुप्रविश्यानुमन्तृतया च नियच्छंस्तिष्ठति। ते क्षेत्रज्ञास्तु तदाहितशक्तयस्तत्प्रदिष्टकरणकलेवरादिकास्तदाधाराश्च स्वयमेव स्वेच्छानुगुण्येन पुण्यापुण्यरूपे कर्मणी, उपाददते। ततश्च पुण्यरूपकर्मकारिणं स्वशासनानुवर्तिनं ज्ञात्वा धर्मार्थकाममोक्षैर्वर्धयते। शासनातिवर्तिनं च तद्विपर्ययैर्योजयति। अतः स्वातन्त्र्यादिवैकल्यचोद्यानि नावकाशं लभन्ते।

To the same effect has been said by the Lord himself—

> *'From whom (arises) the activity among beings, by whom is spread out all this; having worshipped him with one's own tack (properly done) man secures success'* (Gītā 18·46)

And also,

> *'Those merciless haters (enemies), the meanest of men in the worldly existences, I throw unceasingly the unauspicious ones into (births in) the Asura-wombs themselves'* (Gītā 16·19)

And that divine Puruṣottama with all his desires secured, omniscient, overlord of all, with thoughts fulfilled, acting sportively in conformity with his august state, having well adjusted the two-fold nature of the Karmans as—these Karmans are good, these Karmans are bad;—having indicated in a general manner in the case of all Kṣetra-knowers, the body, sense-organs etc., fit for being taken by them and the power to control them, and also having indicated the Śāstra that throws light upon his commands, and having entered within as the inmost Ātman for the purpose of withdrawing them, stays on controlling them as the sanctioning authority. Those Kṣetra-knowers again, with powers endowed by him, with sense-organs and body awarded by him, with him as their support, of their own accord, in conformity with their will, take to Karmans of the nature of merit and demerit. And then, having known (a person) performing a deed of the nature of merit and acting in accordance with his ordinance—(the Paramapuruṣa) makes him prosper in religious duty, material prosperity, love and salvation; he unites one transgressing (his) ordinance with their opposites. Therefore, the arguments based on deficiency in respect of independence etc., have no scope.

दया हि नाम स्वार्थनिरपेक्षा परदुःखासहिष्णुता । सा च स्वशासनातिवृत्तिव्यवसायिन्यपि वर्तमाना न गुणायावकल्पते । प्रत्युत, अपुंस्त्वमेवावहति । तन्निग्रह एव तत्र गुणः, अन्यथा शत्रुनिग्रहादीनामगुणत्वप्रसङ्गात् । स्वशासनातिवृत्तिव्यवसायनिवृत्तिमात्रेणानाद्यनन्तकल्पोपचितदुर्विषहानन्तापराधानङ्गीकारेण निरतिशयसुखसंवृद्धये स्वयमेव प्रवर्तते । यथोक्तम्—

> *'तेषां सततयुक्तानां भजतां प्रीतिपूर्वकम् ।*
> *ददामि बुद्धियोगं तं येन मामुपयान्ति ते ॥*
> *तेषामेवानुकम्पार्थमहमज्ञानजं तमः ।*
> *नाशयाम्यात्मभावस्थो ज्ञानदीपेन भास्वता ॥'* (गीता १०।१०-११)

इति । अतः प्राज्ञानधिष्ठितं प्रधानमकारणम् ॥ ३ ॥

[297] अथ स्यात्—यद्यपि प्राज्ञानधिष्ठितायाः प्रकृतेः परिस्पन्दप्रवृत्तिरपि न संभवतीत्युक्तं तथाप्यनपेक्षाया एव परिणामप्रवृत्तिः संभवति, तथा दर्शनात् । धेन्वादिनोपभुक्तं हि तृणोदकादि स्वयमेव क्षीराद्याकारेण परिणममानं दृश्यते । अतः, प्रकृतिरपि स्वयमेव जगदाकारेण परिणंस्यत इति चेत्—तत्राह—

Dayā, indeed, for the matter of that, is—not being able to stand the misery of another, completely independent of self-interest, and that although existing in the case of one who carries on, transgressing the orders for him, cannot lead on to virtue, on the other hand, it smacks of unmanliness itself There, controlling it alone (is) virtue, otherwise, there would be the undesirable contingency of the control (or punishment) of the enemies being not a virtue (The Paramapurusa) of his own accord, works for the augmentation of excessive bliss by the mere cessation of a positive activity regarding the transgression of his commands and not minding endless faults extremely difficult to bear, heaped up together in the beginningless and endless Kalpas As has been said—

> *'To them ever devoted worshipping (me) with affection, I give that Yoga of understanding by which they come unto me For the sake of compassion for them alone, I stationed in (their) Ātman-state, destroy the ignorance-born darkness, with the shining knowledge-lamp'* (Gita 10 10-11)

Therefore Pradhāna not supervised over by the Prājña is not the cause ‖3‖

[297] Now it may be—even though it has been stated that in the case of Prakrti not supervised over by the Prajña, even the throbbing activity is not possible, still, activity towards modification is possible verily, (in the Prakrti) not dependent (upon anything else), on account of such being the experience For, grass, water etc taken up by a cow etc, are seen of their own accord as being modified in the form of milk etc. Therefore Prakrti also of its own accord would be modified in the form of the world —If (it be argued by the Purvapaksin thus) (the Sūtrakara) says (in reply)—

• अन्यत्राभावाच्च न तृणादिवत् ॥ ४ ॥

नैतदुपपद्यते, तृणादेः प्राज्ञानधिष्ठितस्य परिणामाभावाद्दृष्टान्तासिद्धेः कथमसिद्धिः ? 'अन्यत्राभावात्'। यदि हि तृणोदकादिकमनडुहाद्युपभुक्तं प्रहीणं वा क्षीराकारेण परिणंस्यते, तदा प्राज्ञानधिष्ठितमेव परिणमते, इति वक्तुं शक्येत। न चैतदस्ति! अतः, धेन्वाद्युपभुक्तं प्राज्ञ एव क्षीरीकरोति।

'पयोम्बुवच्चेत्तत्रापि' (ब्र. सू. २।२।२)

इत्युक्तमेवात्र प्रपञ्चितं तत्रैव व्यभिचारप्रदर्शनाय ॥ ४ ॥

पुरुषाश्मवदिति चेत्तथापि ॥ ५ ॥

[298] अथोच्येत—यद्यपि चैतन्यमात्रवपुः पुरुषो निष्क्रियः, प्रधानमपि दृक्शक्तिविकलं, तथापि पुरुषसंनिधानादचेतनं प्रधानं प्रवर्तते, तथा दर्शनात्। गमनशक्तिविकलदृक्शक्तियुक्तपङ्गुसंनिधानात्तच्चैतन्योपकृतो दृक्शक्तिविकलः प्रवृत्तिशक्तियुक्तोऽन्धः प्रवर्तते। अयस्कान्ताश्मसंनिधानाच्चायः प्रवर्तते। एवं प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगकृतो जगत्सर्गः प्रवर्तते। यथोक्तम्—

And on account of the absence (of the modification) elsewhere, not like grass etc. ॥ 4 ॥

This (what you have said) is not proper. Your illustrative instance cannot be effective on account of the absence of modification in the grass, etc., not supervised over by Prājña (intelligent sentient being). How not effective? 'On account of the absence elsewhere.' If indeed, grass, water etc., taken up by a bull etc., or thrown away, would be modified in the form of the milk, then it may be possible to say that (a thing) not supervised over by a Prājña, verily, is modified. But this is not the case. Therefore, the Prājña alone modifies what is taken up by the cow etc., into milk. What was stated in (the Sūtra)—

'*If it be like water and stone,* (*the reply is*)—*Still*' (Bra.Sū.II.2·2)

—that itself is described in detail here, to indicate its discrepancy in that (Sūtra) itself in that connection ॥ 4 ॥

If (it be argued) — Like man and stone (activity of creation) would be there, still (no activity of Pradhāna) ॥ 5 ॥

[298] If it is stated— even though the Purusa having pure consciousness as his body, is actionless; and the Pradhāna also is deficient in the power of seeing, still the non-sentient Pradhāna proceeds (to activity) on account of the proximity of the Purusa, such being the experience. On account of the proximity of the lame person deficient in the power of going, (but) endowed with the power of seeing, the blind man obliged by his (special) consciousness (although) deficient in the power of seeing, endowed with the power of movement proceeds on. Again, iron moves, on account of the proximity of the lode-stone (*Ayaskānta*). Thus the creation of the world proceeds, effected by the union of Prakṛti and Puruṣa. As has been stated—

'पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।
पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥'　　　　　(सां. का. २१)

इति । पुरुषस्य प्रधानोपभोगार्थं कैवल्यार्थं च पुरुषसंनिधानात्प्रधानं सर्गादौ प्रवर्तते, इत्यर्थः ।

अत्रोत्तरम्, 'तथापि' इति । एवमपि प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्त्यसंभवस्तद्वस्य एव । पङ्गोर्गमनशक्तिविकलस्यापि मार्गदर्शनतदुपदेशादयः कादाचित्का विशेषाः सहस्रशः सन्ति । अन्धोऽपि चेतनः संस्तदुपदेशाद्यवगमेन प्रवर्तते । तथायस्कान्तमणेरप्ययःसमीपागमनादयः सन्ति, पुरुषस्य तु निष्क्रियस्य न तादृशा विकाराः संभवन्ति । संनिधानमात्रस्य नित्यत्वेन नित्यसर्गप्रसङ्गः, नित्यमुक्तत्वेन बन्धाभावोऽपवर्गाभावश्च ॥ ५ ॥

अङ्गित्वानुपपत्तेश्च ॥ ६ ॥

[299] गुणानामुत्कर्षनिकर्षनिबन्धनाद्गाङ्गिभावाद्धि जगत्प्रवृत्तिः
'प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात्'　　　　　(सां. का. १६)
इति वद्भिर्भवद्भिरभ्युपगम्यते । प्रतिसर्गावस्थायां तु साम्यावस्थानां सत्त्वरजस्तम-

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'For the sake of the perception (in the case) of Purusa, likewise for the sake of salvation, (in the case) of Pradhāna, (there is) even the union of both of them, like (that) of the lame and blind persons, and the creation is effected by that' (Sā. Kā. 21)

The sense is that the Pradhāna becomes active at the beginning of the creation on account of the proximity of the Puruṣa, in order that the Puruṣa might enjoy the Pradhāna, and for his salvation.

Here the answer (is)—'Still'—In this way also the impossibility of activity in the case of the Pradhāna remains exactly in the same state. In the case of the lame man, though deficient in the power of going, there are thousands of accidental particular features like showing the path, instructing about the same etc. The blind man also, being sentient, proceeds on, comprehending his instructions etc. Similarly, even in the case of the lode-stone, there are (Viśeṣās),—coming near the iron etc., but in the case of the actionless Purusa, modifications of that nature are not possible. On account of mere proximity being there always, there would be the undesirable contingency of creation taking place always, and on account of people being always released there would be the absence of bondage and the absence of salvation. ॥ 5 ॥,

And on account of the impossibility of the relation of being the Principal ॥ 6 ॥

[299] Activity towards the creation of the world is admitted by you honourable gentlemen, while stating forth (the Kārikā)

'On account of the specific resort of the various respective qualities'　　　　　(Sā. Kā. 16)

as being, verily, due to the relation of the whole (principal) and the parts, dependent upon the increase and decrease of the qualities. But in the state of dissolution, there is the absence of mutual superiority and inferiority of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, in the state of equilibrium,— so, the relation of

सामन्योन्याधिक्यन्यूनताभावादङ्गाङ्गिभावानुपपत्तेर्न जगत्सर्ग उपपद्यते । तथापि वैषम्याभ्युपगमे नित्यसर्गप्रसङ्गः । अतश्च न प्राज्ञानधिष्ठितं प्रधानं कारणम् ॥ ६ ॥

अन्यथानुमितौ च ज्ञशक्तिवियोगात् ॥ ७ ॥

दूषितप्रकारातिरिक्तप्रकारान्तरेण प्रधानानुमितौ च प्रधानस्य ज्ञातृत्वशक्तिवियोगात्त एव दोषाः प्रादुःष्युः । अतो न कथंचिदप्यनुमानेन प्रधानसिद्धिः ॥ ७ ॥

अभ्युपगमेऽप्यर्थाभावात् ॥ ८ ॥

अनुमानेन प्रधानसिद्ध्यभ्युपगमेऽपि प्रधानेन प्रयोजनाभावान्न तदनुमातव्यम् ।
'पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य' (सां. का. २१)
इति प्रधानस्य प्रयोजनं पुरुषभोगापवर्गावभिमतौ । तौ च न संभवतः । पुरुषस्य चैतन्यमात्रवपुषो निष्क्रियस्य निर्विकारस्य निर्मलस्य तत एव नित्यमुक्तस्वरूपस्य प्रकृतिदर्शनरूपो भोगस्तद्वियोगरूपोऽपवर्गश्च न संभवति। एवंरूपस्यैव प्रकृतिसंनिधानात्तत्परिणामविशेष-

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principal and subordinate is not possible— and therefore, the creation of the world would not be effected. Still, if disparity is admitted, there would be the undesirable contingency of unceasing creation— and therefore, Pradhāna not supervised over by the Prājña is not the cause (of the world). ॥ 6 ॥

And if (Pradhāna) is inferred otherwise, (the same blemishes continue) on account of the power of knowing being absent ॥ 7 ॥

If the Pradhāna is inferred (described) in a different manner from the manner objected to, the same blemishes would be defiling (your proposition), on account of the Pradhāna being divested of the power of knowing. Therefore, Pradhāna cannot be proved (to be the cause of the world) by any kind of hypothesis (inference) whatsoever. ॥ 7 ॥

Even though it be admitted (that Pradhāna can be established by inference, that should not be arrived at) on account of the absence of any purpose (to be served by the Pradhāna) ॥ 8 ॥

Even if it is admitted that Pradhāna is proved by inference; that inference (itself) should not be there, on account of the absence of any purpose (served) by the Pradhāna.

In (the Kārikā)

'For the sake of perception in the case of the Puruṣa, likewise for salvation, of the Pradhāna' (Sā. Kā. 21)

the enjoyment by the Purusa and salvation are admitted as the purpose of the Pradhāna; but those two are not possible. In the case of the Puruṣa with pure consciousness as his body, actionless, without modification, spotless, and for that very reason, with his nature eternal and free, is not possible enjoyment in the form of the perception of Prakṛti, and salvation in the form of separation from that. Even if on account of the proximity of the Prakṛti, arises the possibility in the case (of the Puruṣa) of this nature of enjoyment

सुखदुःखदर्शनरूपभोगसंभावनायां प्रकृतिसंनिधानस्य नित्यत्वेन कदाचिदप्यपवर्गो न सेत्स्यति ॥ ८ ॥

विप्रतिषेधाच्चासमञ्जसम् ॥ ९ ॥

[300] विप्रतिषिद्धं चेदं सांख्यानां दर्शनम्। तथाहि—प्रकृतेः परार्थत्वेन दृश्यत्वेन भोग्यत्वेन च प्रकृतेर्भोक्तारमधिष्ठातारं द्रष्टारं साक्षिणं च पुरुषमभ्युपगम्य, प्रकृत्येव साधनभूतया तस्य कैवल्यमपि प्राप्यं वदन्त एव तस्य नित्यनिर्विकारचैतन्यमात्रस्वरूपतया, अकर्तृत्वं कैवल्यं च स्वरूपमेवाहुः। तत एव बन्धमोक्षसाधनानुष्ठानं मोक्षं च प्रकृतेरेवाहुः। एवंभूतनित्यनिर्विकारौदासीनपुरुषसंनिधानात्प्रकृतेरितरेतराध्यासेन सर्गादिप्रवृत्तिं पुरुषभोगापवर्गार्थत्वं चाहुः—

'संघातपरार्थत्वात्त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।
पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात्कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥'　　　　(सा का १७)
'तस्माच्च विपर्यासात्सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।
कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वं कर्तृभावश्च ॥'　　　　(सा का १९)

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in the form of perception (experience) of happiness and misery, the special modifications of that,— then owing to the permanent nature of the proximity of Prakrti, salvation would not result any time ॥ 8 ॥

And on account of the contradictions, (the Sāṅkhya doctrine is) unreasonable ॥ 9 ॥

[300] Further, the system of philosophy of the Sānkhyas teems with contradictions—To explain the same—Having admitted the Purusa to be the enjoyer, supervisor, seer, and witness of the Prakrti, owing to the Prakrti being the object of perception and the object of enjoyment, being intended for the sake of another, and talking again of his salvation as the object to be reached through Prakrti itself, that is the means, they speak of Purusa (in the same breath) as not being the agent owing to his being possessed of the nature of pure consciousness, being eternal and without modification, and at the same time of having attributelessness, as his nature For that very reason, they speak of the use of the means of Bondage and Salvation, and Salvation as belonging to Prakrti itself. And they speak of the activity towards creation etc , and the purpose of enjoyment by the Purusa, and salvation (of the Purusa) as belonging to the Prakrti by mutual superimposition, on account of the proximity of the Purusa, described as above, eternal, without modification, and indifferent—

'The Purusa exists, on account of the aggregate being there for the sake of another, on account of his being the opposite of the three Gunas etc , on account of the resort, on account of the nature of enjoyer, and on account of the activity being for the sake of salvation'　　(Sa Ka 17)

'And from that contradictory nature, the nature as witness of the Purusa is proved,' and also mereness, indifference, the nature of the perceiver, and the nature of the doer'　(Sā. Kā 19)

इति ।

> 'पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ।' (सां. का. ५८)

इत्युक्त्वैवमाहुः—

> 'तस्मान्न बध्यते नापि मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् ।
> संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥' (सां. का. ६३)

इति । तथा

> 'तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।
> गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः ॥'
> 'पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।
> पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥' (सां का २०–२१)

इति । साक्षित्वद्रष्टृत्वभोक्तृत्वादयो नित्यनिर्विकारस्याकर्तुरुदासीनस्य कैवल्यैकस्वरूपस्य न संभवन्ति । एवंरूपस्य तस्याध्यासमूलो भ्रमोऽपि न संभवति, अध्यासभ्रमयोरपि विकारत्वात् । प्रकृतेश्च तौ न संभवतः, तयोश्चेतनधर्मत्वात् । अध्यासो हि नाम चेतनस्यान्यस्मिन्नन्यधर्मानुसंधानम् । स च चेतनधर्मो विकारश्च । न च पुरुषस्य प्रकृतिसंनिधि-

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Having spoken of (in)—

> '*Likewise, there is the activity of the Pradhāna, leading to the salvation of the Purusa*' (Sā. Ka. 58)

—they say thus—

> '*Therefore, (the Purusa) is neither bound, nor again is released, nor does move about anywhere; the Prakrti having many resorts, moves about, is bound, and is released*' (Sa. Kā 63)

Also—

> '*Therefore, the non-sentient Linga becomes as though sentient on account of its connection with that (Purusa), and in respect of being the agent for the qualities, (the Purusa) is indifferent and, verily, a non-agent in that way*'
>
> '*For the sake of perception (in the case) of the Purusa, likewise for the sake of salvation, (in the case) of Pradhāna, (there is) the union of both of them, like (that of) the lame and blind persons, and the creation is effected by that*' (Sā Ka. 20–21)

—(The qualities) being the witness, being the seer, being the enjoyer etc., are not possible in the case of one who is eternal, without modification, non-agent, indifferent, with attributelessness (mereness) as his sole nature In (the case of) him of this nature, even illusion based on superimposition is not possible, on account of superimposition and misconception also being modification Those two are not possible in (the case of) the Prakrti either, on account of those two being the attributes of a sentient being For, superimposition, for the matter of that, is—attributing the attributes of another to another, by the sentient one, and that is an attribute of a sentient being and a modification Nor again, are superimposition and others possible merely by

मात्रेणाध्यासादयः संभवन्ति, निर्विकारत्वादेव । संभवन्ति चेत्, नित्य प्रसज्येरन् । संनिधेरकिंचित्करत्वं च

'न विलक्षणत्वात्' (ब्र सू २।१।४)

इत्यत्र प्रतिपादितम् ।

प्रकृतिरेव संसरति वध्यते मुच्यते चेत्, कथं नित्यमुक्तस्य पुरुषस्योपकारिणी सा, इत्युच्यते ? वदन्ति हि—

'नानाविधैरुपायैरुपकारिण्यनुपकारिणि पुंस ।
गुणवत्यगुणस्य सतस्तस्यार्थमपार्थक चरति ॥' (सा का ६१)

इति । तथा प्रकृतिर्येन पुरुषेण यथास्वभावा दृष्टा तस्मात्पुरुषात्तदानीमेव निवर्तत इति चाहुः—

'रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।
पुरुषस्य तथात्मान प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृति ॥' (सा का ६०)

'प्रकृते सुकुमारतर न किंचिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ।
या दृष्टास्मीति पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥' (सा का ६२)

इति, तदप्यसंगतम्—पुरुषो हि नित्यमुक्तत्वान्निर्विकारत्वाच्च तां कदाचिदपि पश्यति नाध्यस्यति च । स्वयं च स्वात्मान न पश्यति, अचेतनत्वात् । पुरुषस्य स्वात्मदर्शनं

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the proximity of the Prakrti in (the case of) the Purusa, on account of his being without any modification itself If they are possible, they would always be intruding And (mere) proximity as being of no consequence has been propounded here in (the Sūtra)

'Not, on account of being different' (Bra Su II 1 14)

If the Prakrti alone moves about, is bound, is released — then how is it said that it obliges the Purusa who is always released ? For, they say—

'By various means (Prakrti) which obliges, is possessed of attributes, moves about for the sake of the Purusa who does not oblige and who is without any attributes, sets in motion his purpose, without any benefit (to itself) (Sa Ka 61)

Similarly, by which Pususa is seen Prakrti possessed of such nature,— from that Purusa, at that very time, it turns away— so say they—

'Just as a female dancer turns away from dancing on displaying (herself) to the stage (audience),— so, Prakrti manifesting itself to the Purusa turns away ' (Sā Kā 60)

'It is my opinion that there is nothing whatsoever more delicate (modest) than the Prakrti, which does not come again in the view of the Purusa, thinking— I have been seen by him —' (Sa Ka 62)

—That too is not appropriate for, Purusa, on account of his being always released and being without any modification neither sees it (Prakrti) at any time nor superimposes upon that And that (Prakrti) of its own accord does not perceive itself, on account of its being non-sentient Neither does it

स्वदर्शनामिति नाध्यस्यति च। स्वयमचेतनत्वात्, पुरुषस्य च दर्शनरूपविकारासंभवात्।

अथ संनिधिमात्रमेव दर्शनमित्युच्यते, संनिधेर्नित्यत्वेन नित्यदर्शनप्रसङ्ग इत्युक्तम्। स्वरूपातिरिक्तकादाचित्कसंनिधिरपि नित्यनिर्विकारस्य नोपपद्यते।

किं च मोक्षहेतुस्तु स्वसंनिधिमात्रमेव दर्शनं चेत्, बन्धहेतुरपि तदेवेति, नित्यं तद्बन्धो मोक्षश्च स्याताम्।

अयथावद्दर्शनं बन्धहेतुर्यथावत्स्वरूपदर्शनं मोक्षहेतुरिति चेत्, उभयविधस्यापि दर्शनस्य संनिधानरूपतानतिरेकात्सदोभयप्रसङ्ग एव।

संनिधेरनित्यत्वे तस्य हेतुरन्वेषणीयस्तस्यापीत्यनवस्था।

अथैतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षया स्वरूपसद्भाव एव संनिधिरिति, तदा स्वरूपस्य नित्यत्वेन नित्यवद्बन्धमोक्षौ। अत एवमादिविप्रतिषेधात्सांख्यानां दर्शनमसमञ्जसम्।

[301] येऽपि कूटस्थनित्यनिर्विशेषस्वप्रकाशचिन्मात्रं ब्रह्माविद्यासाक्षित्वेनापारमार्थिकबन्धमोक्षभागिति वदन्ति, तेषामप्युक्तनीत्याविद्यासाक्षित्वाध्यासाद्यसंभवाद-

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superimpose in the form,— The perception by the Purusa of his self, is its own perception,— on account of its being itself non-sentient, and on account of the impossibility of modification in the form of perception in (the case of) the Purusa.

If it is said that mere proximity itself is the perception,—it has (already) been stated (in reply) that there would be the undesirable contingency of constant perception, on account of proximity being constant An occasional proximity, apart from one's nature also, is not possible, in (the case of) one who is always without any modification

Furthermore, if the cause of salvation be the perception which is mere proximity to oneself, then the cause of bondage would be the very same— and so, there would always be his constant bondage and salvation

If (it be argued) that wrong perception (is) the cause of bondage, and right perception of one's own nature (is) the cause of salvation,—there would still be the undesirable contingency of both being always there, on account of the two-fold perception also not being over and above the form of proximity

If the proximity is not permanent, then some cause for that has got to be found, for that also another cause (has to be found)—so the fault of endlessness

If with a desire to get rid of this blemish (it is argued) that proximity is nothing but the existence of one's own nature—then on account of one's own nature being permanent, bondage and salvation would be permanent, for this and such other contradictions, the system of philosophy of the Sānkhyas is absurd

[301] As to those also, who speak of Brahman which is immutable, eternal, attributeless self-illumining and pure consciousness, as the resort of unreal bondage and salvation, being the witness of Avidya—in their case also there is nothing but absurdity, on account of the impossibility of (Brahman)

सामञ्जस्यमेव । इयांस्तु विशेषः—सांख्या जननमरणप्रतिनियमादिव्यवस्थासिद्धयर्थं पुरुषबहुत्वमिच्छन्ति, ते तु तदपि नेच्छन्तीति सुतरामसामञ्जस्यम् ।

यत्तु प्रकृतेः पारमार्थ्यापारमार्थ्यविभागेन वैषम्यमुक्तम्, तदयुक्तम्, पारमार्थिकत्वे नित्यनिर्विकारस्य प्रकाशैकरसचिन्मात्रस्य स्वव्यतिरिक्तसाक्षित्वाद्यनुपपत्तेः । अपारमार्थिकत्वे तु तस्याद्दश्यत्वबाध्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्सुतरामसंगतम् । औपाधिकभेदवादेऽप्युपाधिसंबन्धिनो ब्रह्मणोऽयमेव स्वभाव इत्युपाधिसंबन्धाद्यनुपपत्तेरसामञ्जस्यं पूर्वमेवोक्तम् ॥ ९ ॥

रचनानुपपत्त्यधिकरणं समाप्तम् (१)

महद्दीर्घवद्वा ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्याम् ॥ १० ॥ (अधिकरण २, सूत्राणि १०–१६)

[302] प्रधानकारणवादस्य युक्त्याभासमूलतया विप्रतिषिद्धत्वाच्चासामञ्जस्यमुक्तम् । संप्रति परमाणुकारणवादस्याप्यसामञ्जस्यं प्रतिपाद्यते 'महद्दीर्घवद्वा ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्याम्,' इति । असमञ्जसमिति वर्तते । वा शब्दश्चार्थे । ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्यां द्व्यणुकपरमाणुभ्यां महद्दीर्घवत्, त्र्यणुकद्व्यणुकोत्पत्तिवादवदन्यच्च तदभ्युपगतं सर्वमसम-

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being the witness of Avidyā, superimposition etc , by the reasoning mentioned before There is however, this further speciality (about this Advaita-view)—the followers of the Sankhyas want (admit) many Purusas for the regulation of the arrangement about birth death counter rules, etc, but they (the Advaitins) do not want even that—and so the absurdity is all the greater

As to what has been said, that the disparity is due to the division of reality and unreality in (the case of) the Prakrti—that (is) improper, if there is reality (division in Prakrti) there would not be the nature of the witness etc , apart from itself in the case of (Brahman) that is eternal and without any modification uniformly illumining and pure consciousress If unreal, then (the whole *thing is) extremely absurd on account of the* admission of its being incapable of being seen or stultified In the doctrine advocating difference due to the limiting adjuncts on account of the impossibility of a *connection etc* , with a *limit ng adjunct in the form—this verily, (is) the nature* of Brahman, connected with the limiting adjuncts—the absurdity (involved) has already been referred to ॥ 9 ॥

Here ends the Racanānupapattyadhikarana (1)

And like Mahat and Dirgha from short and atomic size ॥ 10 ॥

(Adhikarana 2, Sūtras *10–16*)

[302] The absurdity of the doctrine advocating the Pradhāna as the cause of the world, is stated (to be there) on account of its being full of contradictions being rooted in fallacious reasoning Now, *the absurdity also* in advocating atoms as the cause, is propounded in (the Sutra)— 'And like Mahat and Dirgha from short and atomic size' Absurd (from the last *Sutra*) is to be taken as continued here The word Vā has the sense—and Hrasvaparimaṇḍalabhyam—by the binary and the atom, Mahaddirghavat—like the view about the origination of the trinary and the binary, and anything

असम् । परमाणुभ्यो द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण जगदुत्पत्तिवादवदन्यदप्यसमञ्जसम् , इत्यर्थः ।

तथाहि—तन्तुप्रभृतयो ह्यवयवाः स्वांशैः षड्भिः पार्श्वैः संयुज्यमाना अवयविन-मुत्पादयन्ति । परमाणवोऽपि स्वकीयैः षड्भिः पार्श्वैः संयुज्यमाना एव द्व्यणुकादीना-मुत्पादका भवेयुः । अन्यथा परमाणूनां प्रदेशभेदाभावे सति सहस्रपरमाणुसंयोगेऽपि, एकस्मात्परमाणोरनतिरिक्तपरिमाणतयाणुत्वह्रस्वत्वमहत्त्वदीर्घत्वाद्यसिद्धिः स्यात् । प्रदेश-भेदाभ्युपगमे परमाणवोऽपि सांशाः स्वकीयैरंशैस्ते च स्वकीयेरंशैः, इत्यनवस्था । न च वाच्यम्, अवयवाल्पत्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां हि सर्षपमहीधरयोर्वैषम्यम् । परमाणोरपि, अनन्ता-वयवत्वेऽवयवानन्त्यसाम्यात्, सर्षपमहीधरयोर्वैषम्यासिद्धेरवयवापकर्षकाष्ठावश्याभ्युप-गमनीया, इति । परमाणूनां प्रदेशभेदाभावे सति, एकपरमाणुपरिमाणातिरेकिप्रथिमा न जायेत, इति सर्षपमहीधरयोरेवासिद्धेः । किं कुर्मः ? इति चेत्—वैदिकः पक्षः परिगृह्यताम् ।

यत्तु परैर्ब्रह्मकारणवाददूषणपरिहारपरमिदं सूत्रं व्याख्यातम् — तदसंगतं पुनरुक्तं च । ब्रह्मकारणवादे परोक्तान्दोषान्पूर्वस्मिन्पादे परिहृत्य परपक्षप्रतिक्षेपो

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else admitted by them— all is absurd The sense is— Like the doctrine about the origination of the world from the atoms in the order of binary etc., every thing else also is absurd.

To explain the same— The parts, threads etc, indeed being joined on the six sides, with their portions produce the whole possessed of parts The atoms also, being joined together by their six parts verily, would be the producers of the binary etc, otherwise, if there is the absence of difference of (occupied) regions in the case of the atoms, there would not be — even when there is a conjunction of a thousand atoms — the production of atomic nature, smallness, bigness, length etc, on account of their being possessed of a dimension not apart from that of one atom If difference of (occupied) regions is admitted the atoms would also be possessed of parts (conjoined) with their own parts, and they also (in their turn) with their own parts— thus (there would be) endlessness Nor should it be said that the disparity between the mustard-seed and the mountain is due to the smallness and grossness of their parts, if the atom also is possessed of infinite parts, there can not be proved the disparity between the mustard-seed and the mountain on account of the infinite nature of the parts being common — and so, it must be admitted that there is necessarily the lowest limit for the parts If there is the absence of any difference of (occupied) regions, in the case of the atoms, there would not come into existence, grossness, beyond the dimension of one atom, and so, *the mustard* and the *mountain themselves* would not be forthcoming What then are we going to do? — if (the objector helplessly asks) thus, (our answer is)—Come within the fold of the Vedic doctrine

As to the explanation of the Sūtra given by others, as aiming at the refutation of the blemishes in the doctrine about Brahman being the cause, that is inappropriate and tautologous, for, having refuted in the previous Quarter the blemishes pointed out by the opponents in the *Brahmakāranavāda*,

ह्यस्मिन्पादे क्रियते । चेतनाद्ब्रह्मणो जगदुत्पत्तिसंभवश्च

'न विलक्षणत्वात्' (ब्र सू २।१।४)

इत्यत्रैव प्रपञ्चितः । अतः, ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्यां महद्दीर्घाणुह्रस्वोत्पत्तिवदन्यच्च तदभ्युपगतं सर्वमसमञ्जसम्, इत्येव सूत्रार्थः ॥ १० ॥

[303] किमत्रान्यदसमञ्जसम्? इत्याह—

उभयथापि न कर्मातस्तदभावः ॥ ११ ॥

परमाणुकारणवादे हि परमाणुगतकर्मजनिततत्संयोगपूर्वकद्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण जगदुत्पत्तिरिष्यते । तत्र निखिलजगदुत्पत्तिकारणभूतपरमाणुगतमाद्यं कर्मादृष्टकारितम्, इत्यभ्युपगम्यते

'अग्नेरूर्ध्वज्वलनं वायोस्तिर्यग्गमनमणुमनसोश्चाद्यं कर्मेत्यदृष्टकारितानि'

(वै सू ५।२।१३)

इति । तदिदं परमाणुगतं कर्म स्वगतादृष्टकारितम्, आत्मगतादृष्टकारितं वा? उभयथापि न संभवति, क्षेत्रज्ञपुण्यपापानुष्ठानजनितस्यादृष्टस्य परमाणुगतत्वासंभवात् । संभवे च

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the attack on the opponent's view is made in this Quarter and the possibility of the origination of the world from the sentient Brahman has been shown in detail here itself—(in the Sūtra)

'Not, on account of being different' (Bra Sū II 1 4)

Therefore like the origination of Mahat, Dirgha, atomic nature shortness etc, from the shortness and atomic dimension, everything else admitted by them is absurd—This, verily, is the purport of the Sūtra ॥ 10 ॥

(In answer to the query)—What else is absurd here? (the Sūtrakāra says)—

Even in both ways no activity (in the atoms) therefore the absence of that (creation) ॥ 11 ॥

In the *Paramāṇukāraṇavāda* the origination of the world is, indeed, expected (wished for) in the order of binary etc, preceded by the conjunction of them (atoms) caused by the Karman associated with the atoms There it is admitted that the original Karman belonging to the atoms the cause of the origination of the entire world, is caused by the Unseen, in (the Sūtra)—

'The flaming up of the fire, the movement at a tangent of the wind, the first Karman belonging to the atom and the mind—these are caused by the Unseen' (Vai Su 5 2 13)

Now this Karman belonging to the atoms—Is it caused by the Unseen belonging to themselves or caused by the Unseen belonging to the Ātman?—It is not possible even either way, on account of the impossibility of the Unseen caused by the act of merit and sin by the Kṣetra-knowers, belonging to the atoms If again there is the possibility, there would be the undesirable

सद्योत्पादकत्वप्रसङ्गः। आत्मगतस्य चादृष्टस्य परमाणुगतकर्मोत्पत्तिहेतुत्वं न संभवति।

अथ, अदृष्टवदात्मसंयोगादणुषु कर्मोत्पत्तिः, तदा तस्यादृष्टप्रवाहस्य नित्यत्वेन नित्यसर्गप्रसङ्गः।

ननु—अदृष्टं विपाकापेक्षं फलायालम्। कानिचिददृष्टानि तदानीमेव विपच्यन्ते, कानिचिज्जन्मान्तरे, कानिचित्कल्पान्तरे। अतः, विपाकापेक्षत्वान्न सर्वदोत्पादकत्वप्रसङ्गः, इति — नैतत्, अनन्तैरात्मभिरसंकेतपूर्वकयुगपदनुष्ठितानेकविविधकर्मजनितानामदृष्टानामेकस्मिन्काल एकरूपविपाकस्याप्रामाणिकत्वात्। अत एव, युगपत्सर्वसंहारो द्विपरार्धकालमविपाकेनावस्थानं च न संगच्छते। न च, ईश्वरेच्छाहितविशेषादृष्टसंयोगादणुषु कर्म, आनुमानिकेश्वरासिद्धेः

'*शास्त्रयोनित्वात्*' (ब्र. सू. १।१।४)

इत्यत्रोपपादितत्वात्। अतः, जगदुत्पत्तेरणुगतकर्मपूर्वकत्वाभावः ॥ ११ ॥

समवायाभ्युपगमाच्च साम्यादनवस्थितेः ॥ १२ ॥

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contingency of (the atoms) being always the producers. In the case of the Unseen belonging to the Ātman, again, its being the cause of the origination of Karman belonging to the atoms is not possible.

If (it is argued) that there is the origination of Karman in the atoms, on account of the connection with the Ātman possessed of the Unseen, then there would be the undesirable contingency of creation being always constant, owing to that stream of Unseen being constant.

I say (says the objector)— the Unseen is competent to give fruit, depending upon the ripening (of the Karman). Some Unseens become ripened (lit. are cooked up) on the spot; some of them, in another birth; some of them, in another aeon. Therefore, they being dependent upon the ripening (of the Karman,) there will not be the contingency of their being always the producers— (We reply)— (It is) not so;— because a uniform ripening at one and the same time is not supported by any means of proof, in the case of Unseens caused by many various kinds of Karman, performed by infinite Ātmans simultaneously without any previous consultation (thought). . For this very reason, simultaneous universal destruction, and remaining without ripening throughout the period of two Parārdhas, cannot stand. Nor can there be Karman in the atoms, on account of the connection with a particular kind of Unseen put in by the will of the Lord, on account of (the existence of) the Lord as not being ascertained by inference, being propounded in the Sūtra

'*On account of the Śāstra being the cause*' (Bra. Sū I 1·4)

Therefore, the origination of the world cannot be preceded by the Karman belonging to the atoms || 11 ||

And on account of the admission of Samavāya, on account of the endlessness due to resemblance || 12 ||

[304] समवायाभ्युपगमाच्च, असमञ्जसम् । कुतः ? साम्यादनवस्थितेः । समवायस्यापि, अवयविजातिगुणवदुपपादकान्तरापेक्षासाम्यात्, उपपादकान्तरस्यापि तथा, इत्यनवस्थितेरसमञ्जसमेव । एतदुक्तं भवति—अयुतसिद्धानामाधाराधेयभूतानामिह-प्रत्ययहेतुर्यः संबन्धः, स समवायः, इति समवायोऽभ्युपगम्यते ।

अपृथक्स्थित्युपलब्धीनां जात्यादीनां तथाभावस्य निर्वाहकत्वेन चेत्समवायोऽभ्युपगम्यते, समवायस्यापि तत्साम्यात्तथाभावहेतुरन्वेषणीयः, तस्यापि तथेत्यनवस्थितिः । समवायस्य तदपृथक्सिद्धत्वं स्वभाव इति परिकल्प्यते चेत्, जातिगुणादीनामेवैष स्वभावः परिकल्पनीयः । न पुनरदृष्टचरं समवायमभ्युपगम्य तस्यैष स्वभाव इति कल्पयितुं युक्तम्, इति । समवायस्य नित्यत्वेऽनित्यत्वे च, अयं दोषः समानः ॥ १२ ॥

[305] नित्यत्वे दोषान्तरं चाह—

नित्यमेव च भावात् ॥ १३ ॥

समवायस्य संबन्धत्वात्संबन्धिनित्यत्वे संबन्धिनो जगतश्च नित्यमेव भावादसमञ्जसम् ॥ १३ ॥

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[304] And the absurdity (is there) on account of the admission of the Intimate relation. Whence? Sāmyādanavasthiteh— On account of the common factor viz. being dependent upon another producing agency, also in (the case of) the intimate relation, like the whole (possessed of parts), the genus, and *the qualities; and another producing agency also would be like that,— and so, on account of the endlessness there does exist the* absurdity.—This is what is intended to be said— Intimate relation is admitted as— that relation is intimate relation, which is the cause of apprehension in the form, here (something exists),— in the case of objects proved to be not joined and which are functioning as the resort and the thing resorting to.

If Samavāya is to be admitted on account of genus etc., which are not found as remaining separate, continuing throughout that same nature, then for *Samavāya also on account of the same common factor a reason* for its being of the same nature has got to be found; for that (reason) also in the same way (another reason has to be found)— thus (the fault of) endlessness. If it be imagined that, not being proved as remaining separate, is the nature of Samavāya, then this same nature should be postulated in the case of genus, qualities etc. Not again (is) it right to imagine that—this is its (of Samavāya) nature—after admitting the intimate relation not seen anywhere. The same blemish is common, when the Samavāya is eternal or non-eternal ॥ 12 ॥

[305] If Samavāya (is taken as) eternal, (the Sūtrakāra) speaks also of another blemish.

And on account of the existence (of the world) as being eternal itself. ॥ 13 ॥

Because Intimate relation is a relation, when the relation is eternal, there would be the eternal nature of the world which is the object related to —and so, the absurdity. ॥ 13 ॥

रूपादिमत्त्वाच्च विपर्ययो दर्शनात् ॥ १४ ॥

परमाणूनां पार्थिवाप्यतैजसवायवीयानां चतुर्विधानां रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शवत्त्वाभ्युपगमात्, अभिमतनित्यत्वसूक्ष्मत्वनिरवयवत्वादिविपर्ययेण, अनित्यत्वस्थूलत्वसावयवत्वादि प्रसज्येत, रूपादिमतां घटादीनामनित्यत्वं तथाविधकारणान्तरारब्धत्वादिदर्शनात् । न हि दर्शनानुगुण्येन, अदृष्टोऽर्थः कल्प्यमानः स्वाभिमतविशेषं व्यवस्थापयितुं शक्यः । दर्शनानुगुण्येन हि परमाणूनां रूपादिमत्त्वं त्वया कल्प्यते । अतोऽप्यसमञ्जसम् ॥ १४ ॥

[306] अथ, एतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षया परमाणूनां रूपादिमत्त्वं नाभ्युपगम्यते, तत्राह—

उभयथा च दोषात् ॥ १५ ॥

न केवलं परमाणूनां रूपादिमत्त्वाभ्युपगम एव दोषः । रूपादिविरहेऽपि कारणगुणपूर्वकत्वात्कार्यगुणानां पृथिव्यादयो रूपादिशून्याः स्युः । तत्परिजिहीर्षया रूपादिमत्त्वाभ्युपगमे पूर्वोक्तदोषः, इति, उभयथा च दोषात्, असमञ्जसम् ॥ १५ ॥

अपरिग्रहाच्चात्यन्तमनपेक्षा ॥ १६ ॥

And on account of being possessed of colour etc., the opposite, as seen ॥ 14 ॥

On account of the admission in the case of four-fold atoms—belonging to the earth, water, light and wind, being possessed of colour, flavour, smell and touch—there would perforce be the intruding of the natures of non-eternal, gross, being possessed of parts etc., the opposite natures of eternal, subtle, being without parts, admitted (by you in the case of the atoms), as the non-permanent nature of jar etc., possessed of colour etc , is there on account of the apprehension of their being produced by other causes of the same nature. Not, indeed, is a thing imagined, not perceived in conformity with what is seen, competent to establish a particular aspect desired by you; for, by you is postulated being possessed of colour etc., by the atoms in conformity with the perception thereof. Therefore also, (the view of the opponent is) absurd ॥ 14 ॥

[306] If, with a desire to avoid this blemish, being possessed of colour etc., by the atoms is not admitted—in that connection (the Sūtrakāra) says—

And on account of blemish in both ways ॥ 15 ॥

The admission alone of being possessed of colour etc., in the case of the atoms, is not the only blemish. Even in the absence of colour etc., (there would be the blemish viz.) the earth etc., would be without colour etc., on account of the qualities of the effect being in accordance with the qualities of the cause. If the possession of colour etc., is admitted, with a desire to avoid that (blemish), then there is the blemish spoken of before; thus, on account of the blemish being there in both ways,— (the view of the opponent is) absurd ॥ 15 ॥

And on account of not being accepted, total ignoring ॥16॥

कापिलपक्षस्य श्रुतिन्यायविरोधपरित्यक्तस्यापि सत्कार्यवादादिना क्वचिदंशे वैदिकैः परिग्रहोऽस्ति। अस्य तु काणादपक्षस्य केनाप्यंशेनापरिग्रहादनुपपन्नत्वाच्च, अत्यन्तमनपेक्षैव निःश्रेयसार्थिभिः कार्या ॥ १६ ॥

महद्दीर्घाधिकरण समाप्तम् (२)

समुदाय उभयहेतुकेपि तदप्राप्तिः ॥ १७ ॥ (अधिकरण ३, सूत्राणि १७–२६)

[307] परमाणुकारणवादिनो वैशेषिका निरस्ताः। सौगताश्च जगतः परमाणुकारणत्वमभ्युपगच्छन्ति, इत्यनन्तरं तन्मतेऽपि जगदुत्पत्तिव्यवहारादिकं नोपपद्यत इत्युच्यते । ते च चतुर्विधाः—केचित्पार्थिवाप्यतैजसवायवीयपरमाणुसंघातरूपान्भूतभौतिकान्बाह्यांश्चित्तचैत्तरूपांश्चाभ्यन्तरानर्थान्प्रत्यक्षानुमानासिद्धानभ्युपयन्ति । अन्ये तु बाह्यार्थान्सर्वान्पृथिव्यादीन्विज्ञानानुमेयान्वदन्ति । अपरे तु, अर्थशून्यं विज्ञानमेव परमार्थसद्बाह्यार्थास्तु स्वाप्नार्थकल्पा इत्याहुः । त्रयोऽप्येते स्वाभ्युपगतं वस्तु क्षणिकमाचक्षते । उक्तभूतभौतिकचित्तचैत्तव्यतिरिक्तमात्माकाशादिकं स्वरूपेणैव नानुमन्यन्ते । अन्ये तु सर्वशून्यत्वमेव संगिरन्ते ।

Though the doctrine of the followers of Kapila is set aside on account of its contradiction with Sruti and reasoning, there is its acceptance, partly by the followers of Veda in some respects, like the Satkāryavāda etc As for the doctrine of the followers of Kanāda, it being not accepted in any part whatsoever, and on account of its being quite inappropriate, people hankering after salvation should entertain the most complete disregard for the same || 16 ||

Here ends the Mahaddirghādhikarana (2)

Regarding even the aggregate due to both causes, there would be non-establishment of that || 17 ||

(Adhikarana 3, Sūtras 17–26)

[307] The Vaiśesikas— the advocates of the Paramānukāranavāda— have been refuted The followers of Buddha also admit atoms being the cause of the world, and so, as a consequence, even according to their view the origination of the world and the practical dealings in it etc, would not be forthcoming— so it is now stated And they (the Bauddhas) are four-fold— Some of them admit external elements and the products of elements constituted of the aggregate of earth, water, light and wind-atoms, and internal objects constituted of mind and mind-products (that can be) established by Direct perception and Inference Others, on the other hand, speak of all external objects, earth etc, as being inferable by Vijñāna Others again say that Vijñāna alone void of any material objects is the really existent, external objects, however, are almost like dream-objects All these three (Schools) admit the thing admitted by them as momentary They do not admit Ātman, Akāśa etc, verily, in their own nature, as apart from elements, the products of elements, mind, mind-objects spoken of before Others further, agree about everything being nothing but void

तत्र ये बाह्यार्थास्तित्ववादिनस्ते तावन्निरस्यन्ते—

ते चैवं मन्यन्ते—रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शस्वभावाः पार्थिवाः परमाणवः, रूपरसस्पर्शस्वभावाश्चाप्याः, रूपस्पर्शस्वभावास्तैजसाः, स्पर्शस्वभावाः, वायवीयाः पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुरूपेण संहन्यन्ते। तेभ्यश्च पृथिव्यादिभ्यः शरीरेन्द्रियविषयरूपसंघाता भवन्ति। तत्र च शरीरान्तर्वर्तिग्राहकाभिमानारूढो ज्ञानसंतान एवात्मत्वेनावतिष्ठते। तत एव सर्वो लौकिकव्यवहारः प्रवर्तत इति।

तत्राभिधीयते—'समुदाय उभयहेतुकेऽपि तदप्राप्तिः'। योऽयमणुहेतुकः पृथिव्यादिभूतात्मकः समुदायो यश्च पृथिव्यादिहेतुकः शरीरेन्द्रियविषयरूपः समुदायः, तस्मिन्नुभयहेतुकेऽपि समुदाये तदप्राप्तिर्नोपपद्यते। जगदात्मकसमुदायोत्पत्तिर्नोपपद्यत इत्यर्थः, परमाणूनां पृथिव्यादिभूतानां च क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमात्। क्षणध्वंसिनः परमाणवः, भूतानि च कदा संहतौ व्याप्रियन्ते? कदा वा संहन्यन्ते? कदा विज्ञानविषयीभूताः? कदा च हानादिव्यवहारास्पदतां भजन्ते?—को वा विज्ञानात्मा? कं च विषयं स्पृशति? कश्च विज्ञानात्मा कमर्थं कदा वेदयते? कं वा विदितमर्थं कश्च कदोपादत्ते?—स्प्रष्टा हि नष्टः स्पृष्टश्च नष्टः, तथा वेदिता विदितश्च नष्टः—कथं चान्येन स्पृष्टमन्यो वेदयते? कथं चान्येन विदित-

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Of them, those who advocate the existence of external objects, are first (tāvat) refuted—

And thus they think— The earth-atoms possessing colour, flavour, touch, smell; and the water (-atoms) possessing colour, flavour, touch; light (-atoms) possessing colour, touch; and wind (-atoms) possessing touch; —(these) come close together in the form of earth, water, light and wind; and from those, earth etc., aggregates in the form of body, sense-organs and objects come into being; and there, the stream of knowledge itself depending upon the perceptive egoism within the body, remains as Ātman and from that itself all practical dealing in the world proceeds.

There it is said (in reply)— 'Regarding even the aggregate due to both causes, there would be the non-establishment of that.'—What this aggregate constituted of the elements earth etc, with atoms as their cause; and what the aggregate constituted of body, sense-organs and objects, with earth etc., as the cause— in respect of the aggregate even with both the causes, the establishment of the aggregate would not take place. The sense is—The origination of the aggregate constituted of the world would not take place, on account of the admission of atoms and the elements, earth etc., as being momentary. When do the atoms perishing in a moment and the elements operate together? When again, do they come close together? When do they become the objects of Vijñāna? And when do they become eligible for the practical dealing like abandonment etc.? Who again, is the Vijñānātman? And what object does he touch? And when does which Vijñānātman make known which object? And who again, does secure when, what object known? For, the perceiver (responsible for the touch) is no more and the perceived is also no more! Similarly, the knower and the known are also no more! How again does another know what is perceived by another?

मन्यमर्थमन्य उपादत्ते ? संतानानामेकत्वेऽपि संतानिभ्यस्तेषां वस्तुतो वस्त्वन्तरत्वानभ्युपगमात्, न तन्निबन्धनं व्यवहारादिकमुपपद्यते। अहमर्थ एवात्मा, स च ज्ञातैवेति च, उपपादितं पुरस्तात् ॥ १७ ॥

इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वादुपपन्नमिति चेन्न संघातभावानिमित्तत्वात् ॥ १८ ॥

[303] अविद्यादीनामितरेतरहेतुत्वेनोपपन्नं संघातभावादिकमिति चेत्, एतदुक्तं भवति — यद्यपि क्षणिकाः सर्वे भावास्तथाप्यविद्ययैतत्सर्वमुपपद्यते। अविद्या हि नाम विपरीतबुद्धिः क्षणिकादिषु स्थिरत्वादिगोचरा। तया संस्काराख्या रागद्वेषादयो जायन्ते। ततश्चित्ताभिज्वलनरूपं विज्ञानम्। ततश्च नामाख्याश्चित्तचैत्ताः। ततश्च पृथिव्यादिकं च रूपिद्रव्यम्। ततः षडायतनाख्यमिन्द्रियषट्कम्। ततः स्पर्शाख्यः कायः। ततो वेदनादयः। ततश्च पुनरप्यविद्यादयो यथोक्ता इति, अनादिरियमविद्यादिकान्योन्यमूला चक्रपरिवृत्तिः। एतच्च सर्वं पृथिव्यादिभूतभौतिकसंघातमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते। अतः, संघातभावादिकमुपपन्नमिति।

तत्रोत्तरम् —' न संघातभावानिमित्तत्वात् ' इति। नैतदुपपद्यते, एषामविद्यादीनां

How again does another take up an object known by another? Although the streams are one, on account of their non-admission as other objects in reality from the objects in the series, any practical dealing etc., depending upon it cannot take place. The I entity alone (is) the Ātman and that alone (is) the knower— This has been propounded before ॥ 17 ॥

If (it be said) that this is accounted for, by mutual (causal) relation, (the answer is)—No, on account of (Avidyā etc.) not being the cause of the aggregate coming into being. ॥ 18 ॥

[308] If (it be argued) that the existence of the aggregate etc., are accounted for, by Avidyā etc., being mutually the cause of one another— This is what is intended to be said (by the objector)—Although all the entities are momentary, still all this is accounted for, by Avidyā; 'for, Avidyā, for the matter of that, is the contrary knowledge—perceiving permanence etc., in momentary objects etc. By that are produced passion, hatred, etc., called Impressions (*samskāras*); from them (comes forth) the Vijñāna, in the form of the flaming up of the mind; and from that, mind and mind-products called Name (*nāman*), and from them further, earth etc., substances possessed of form; from them the six sense-organs called the Sixfold aggregate, (*sadāyatana*), from those, the body called Touch (*sparśa*); from that, agony etc., and from them once again Avidyā etc, as mentioned before— thus is the beginningless turning of the wheel mutually dependent, beginning with Avidyā; and all this would not be forthcoming without the aggregate of the elements, earth etc., and the products of elements. Therefore, the aggregate coming into being etc., is in order—

There the answer (is)—' No, on account of (Avidyā etc.) not being the cause of the aggregate coming into being. This would not be in order, on account of these, Avidyā etc, not being the cause in respect of the elements, earth etc., the element-products, the existence of the aggregate

पृथिव्यादिभूतभौतिकसंघातभावं प्रत्यनिमित्तत्वात् । न खल्वस्थिरादिषु स्थिरत्वादिबुद्ध्यात्मिकाविद्या, तन्निमित्ता रागद्वेषादयो वा, अर्थान्तरस्य क्षणिकस्य संहतिहेतुतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते । शुक्तिकारजतादिबुद्धिर्हि न शुक्त्याद्यर्थसंहतिहेतुर्भवति । किं च, यस्य क्षणिके स्थिरबुद्धिः स तदैव नष्ट इति कस्य रागादय उत्पद्यन्ते ? संस्काराश्रयं स्थिरमेकद्रव्यमनभ्युपगच्छतां संस्कारानुवृत्तिरपि न शक्या कल्पयितुम् ॥ १८ ॥

उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात् ॥ १९ ॥

[309] इतश्च क्षणिकत्वपक्षे जगदुत्पत्तिर्नोपपद्यते । उत्तरक्षणोत्पत्तिवेलायां पूर्वक्षणस्य विनष्टत्वात्, तस्योत्तरक्षणं प्रति हेतुत्वानुपपत्तेः । अभावस्य हेतुत्वे सर्वं सर्वत्र सर्वदोत्पद्येत ।

अथ पूर्वक्षणवर्तित्वमेव हेतुत्वमित्युच्यते, एवं तर्हि कश्चिदेव घटक्षणस्तदुत्तरकालभाविनां सर्वेषामेव गोमहिषाश्वकुड्यपाषाणादीनां त्रैलोक्यवर्तिनां हेतुः स्यात् ।

अथ, एकजातीयस्यैव पूर्वक्षणवर्तिनो हेतुत्वमिष्यते, तथापि सर्वदेशवर्तिनामुत्तरक्षणभाविनां घटानामेक एव पूर्वक्षणवर्ती घटो हेतुः स्यात् ।

Not, indeed, do Avidyā constituted of the perception of permanence etc in impermanent objects etc., and passion, hatred etc, caused by it, attain to the status of being the cause of bringing together other objects that are momentary For, the knowledge of silver in the conch-shell etc, is not the cause of welding up the object, conch-shell etc Furthermore, he, who had the perception of stability in the momentary object, is no more, even at that very moment— so, in whom are produced passion etc ? By those who do not *admit one stable substance, as a resort of impressions, cannot possibly be* postulated even the continuity of the impressions ॥ 18 ॥

And on account of the destruction of the preceding, at the (time of the) origination of the succeeding ॥ 19 ॥

[309] *And for this reason, the origination of the world is not* possible, according to the doctrine of momentariness On account of the preceding moment being destroyed at the time of the origination of the succeeding moment, that (preceding moment) cannot be the cause in respect of the succeeding moment If non existence (is to be taken) as the cause, everything would be produced everywhere always

If (it be said that) existence at the preceding moment is itself the cause then in this way, some jar-moment alone would be the cause of all objects without exception, existing in the succeeding moment and abiding within the three worlds, such as the cow, buffalo, horse, wall-fencing stones etc

If it is intended (by you that) an object existing in the preceding moment is the cause of homogeneous objects alone, still (in that case) one jar alone, existing at the preceding moment, would be the cause of jars abiding in all places and existing in the succeeding moments

अथैकस्यैव हेतुरेक इति मनुषे, तथापि कस्यैकस्य को हेतुरिति न ज्ञायते ।

अथ यस्मिन्देशे यो घटक्षणः स्थितस्तद्देशसंनिधन एवोत्तरघटक्षणस्य हेतुरिति—किं देशस्य स्थिरत्वं मनुषे ? किं च चक्षुरादिसंप्रयुक्तस्यार्थस्य ज्ञानोत्पत्तिकालेऽनवस्थितत्वात्, न कस्यचिदर्थस्य ज्ञानविषयत्वं संभवति ॥ १९ ॥

असति प्रतिज्ञोपरोधो यौगपद्यमन्यथा ॥ २० ॥

[310] असत्यपि हेतौ कार्यमुत्पद्यते चेत्, सर्वं सर्वत्र सर्वदोत्पद्येत, इत्युक्तम् । न केवलमुत्पत्तिविरोध एव, प्रतिज्ञा च भवतामुपरुध्येत । अधिपतिसहकार्यालम्बनसमनन्तरप्रत्ययाश्चत्वारो विज्ञानोत्पत्तौ हेतव इति वः प्रतिज्ञा । अधिपतिरिन्द्रियम् । अथ प्रतिज्ञानुपरोधाय घटक्षणे स्थित एव घटक्षणान्तरोत्पत्तिरिष्यते, तथा च सति द्वयोः कार्यकारणयोर्घटक्षणयोर्यौगपद्येनोपलब्धिः प्रसज्येत । न च तथोपलभ्यते । क्षणिकत्वप्रतिज्ञा चैवं हीयेत । क्षणिकत्वं स्थितमेवेति चेत्, इन्द्रियसंप्रयोगज्ञानयोर्यौगपद्यं प्रसज्येत ॥ २० ॥

If you (now) think that one is the cause of one thing alone, then it is not known— which (one is) the cause of which one thing ?

If (you reply that) which jar-moment abides in which region, that is the cause of the succeeding jar-moment belonging to that very region— (W want to ask)— What ? Are you thinking of the stability of the region ? Furthermore, on account of the objects connected with the (sense-organs) eye etc., not residing at the time of the origination of the knowledge, no object whatsoever can possibly be the object of knowledge ‖ 19 ‖

> If non-existent (it will be) contrary to (your) declaration, or, there would be simultaneity (of cause and effect) ‖ 20 ‖

[310] If (it be argued) that the effect is produced, even when the cause is non-existent,—then everything would be produced everywhere always—This has already been said. Not only is there opposition to the origination, the solemn declaration of you honourable gentlemen, would be stultified. Your declaration is that there are four causes in respect of the production of Vijñāna—the sense-organ (*adhipati*), accessory, the resort, and the subsequent (*samanantara*) cognitions. Adhipati is the sense-organ. If in order that the declaration may not be infractuous, you intend (to suggest) that there is the origination of another jar-moment when the first jar-moment is still there,—then, in that case there would be perforce the simultaneous perception of the two jar-moments, that are the effect and the cause.—That, however, is not perceived that way; and thus, the solemn declaration about the momentariness would be affected. If the momentariness does stay on, then there would be the undesirable contingency of the simultaneity of the knowledge, and conjunction of the sense-organs. ‖ 20 ‖

ज्ञानेऽर्थसरूपं रूपमास्थेयम् । तावतैव सर्वव्यवहारोपपत्तेस्तद्व्यतिरिक्तार्थकल्पना निष्प्रमाणिका । अतः, विज्ञानमात्रमेव तत्त्वं न बाह्यार्थोऽस्ति, इत्येवं प्राप्ते, प्रचक्ष्महे— 'नाभाव उपलब्धेः' इति ।

[317] ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तस्यार्थस्याभावो वक्तुं न शक्यते । कुतः? उपलब्धेः । ज्ञातुरात्मनोऽर्थविशेषव्यवहारयोग्यतापादनरूपेण ज्ञानस्योपलब्धेः । एवमेव हि सर्वे लौकिकाः प्रतियन्ति घटमहं जानामीति । एवंरूपेण सकर्मकेण सकर्तृकेण ज्ञाधात्वर्थेन सर्वलोकसाक्षिकमपरोक्षमवभासमानेनैव ज्ञानमात्रमेव परमार्थ इति साधयन्तः सर्वलोकोपहासोपकरणं भवन्ति, इति वेदवादच्छद्मप्रच्छन्नबौद्धनिराकरणे निपुणतरं प्रपञ्चितम् (पृ. ६०) ।

यत्तु सहोपलम्भनियमादभेदो नीलतद्धियो', इति तत्स्ववचनविरुद्धम्, साहित्यस्यार्थभेदहेतुकत्वात् । तदर्थव्यवहारयोग्यतैकस्वरूपस्य ज्ञानस्य तेन सहोपलम्भनियमः, तस्मादवैलक्षण्यसाधनमिति च हास्यम् । निरन्वयविनाशिनां ज्ञानानामनुवर्तमानस्थिराकारविरहाद्वासना च दुरुपपादा । विनष्टेन पूर्वज्ञानेनानुत्पन्नमुत्तरज्ञानं कथं वास्यते?

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would not be forthcoming without its being possessed of similar forms of the various objects And all practical dealing being accounted for by that much (hypothesis) alone, the postulating of (existence of) an object over and above that is backed by no means of proof Thus pure Vijñāna alone is the Reality, the external object does not exist —This (prima facie view) being reached, we say in reply —'Not the absence (of the objects) on account of the apprehension (of their cognition)'

[317] It is not possible to speak of the negation of the object as apart from cognition Whence? On account of its comprehension—on account of the comprehension of the cognition in the form of making it fit for practical dealing in respect of particular objects, by the knower Ātman In this way, indeed, all people in general, comprehend—I know the jar —Thus in this way those who try to prove that mere cognition alone is the highest reality by the direct apprehension itself, by the sense of the root Jñā characterised by having an agent, by having an object and witnessed by all people,—they become the instrument (object) of ridicule—thus this has been very deftly propounded in the refutation of the Bauddhas in disguise masquerading under the Vedic doctrine (P 60)

As to the non difference between the blue and its cognition on account of these being invariably perceived together, that is opposed to your own statement on account of the joint nature being caused by the difference in objects That the cognition having just the one nature of being fit for practical dealing regarding the object is invariably perceived together along with it, and from that non-difference is proved—(all) this is ridiculous In the case of cognitions that perish outright, the mental impression also is difficult to be established on account of the absence of a steady continuing form How can the succeeding cognition unproduced be influenced by the

अतः, ज्ञानवैचित्र्यमप्यर्थवैचित्र्यकृतमेव। तत्तदर्थव्यवहारयोग्यतापादनरूपतया साक्षात्प्रतीयमानस्य ज्ञानस्य तत्तदर्थसंबन्धायत्तं तत्तदसाधारण्यम्। संबन्धश्च संयोगलक्षणः। ज्ञानमपि हि द्रव्यमेव। प्रभाद्रव्यस्य प्रदीपगुणभूतस्येव ज्ञानस्याप्यात्मगुणभूतस्य द्रव्यत्वमविरुद्धम्, इत्युक्तम्। अतः, न बाह्यार्थाभावः ॥ २७ ॥

[318] यत्परैः स्वप्नज्ञानदृष्टान्तेन जागरितज्ञानानामपि निरालम्बनत्वमुक्तं तत्राह—

वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् ॥ २८ ॥

स्वप्नज्ञानवैधर्म्याज्जागरितज्ञानानामर्थशून्यत्वं न युज्यते वक्तुम्। स्वप्नज्ञानानि हि निद्रादिदोषदुष्टकरणजन्यानि बाधितानि च। जागरितज्ञानानि तु तद्विपरीतानीति तेषां न तत्साम्यम्। सर्वेषां च ज्ञानानामर्थशून्यत्वे भवद्भिः साध्योऽप्यर्थो न सिध्यति, निरालम्बनानुमानज्ञानस्याप्यर्थशून्यत्वात्। तस्यार्थवत्त्वे ज्ञानत्वस्यानैकान्त्यात्सुतरामर्थशून्यत्वासिद्धिः ॥ २८ ॥

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dead preceding cognition? Therefore the varied nature also of cognition is effected by the varied nature of the object itself. In the case of the cognition that is directly apprehended in the form of being made fit for the practical dealing with various objects, the peculiar nature of the various things is dependent upon the relation with the various objects. And a relation is of the nature of conjunction, cognition also is a substance, indeed. It has been said, that like the lustre-substance that is the quality of a lamp, cognition also which is the quality of the Ātman is a substance—this cannot be objected to. Thus, there is no negation of external objects. ॥ 27 ॥

[318] As to what has been said by the opponents on the strength of the illustrative instance of dream-cognition,—the waking cognitions also have no resort—There (the Sūtrakāra) says—

And on account of being dissimilar (the waking cognition) **not like dream etc ॥ 28 ॥**

On account of dissimilarity with the dream-cognition, it is not proper to speak of the waking cognitions as being without the objects; for, the dream-cognitions are produced by defective sense-organs, due to the derangement, sleep etc., and are stultified. Waking cognitions, on the other hand, are the opposite of them; therefore, there is no similarity in their case. And if all cognitions were to be without the objects, even the matter intended to be proved by you would not be proved, because the inferential knowledge also having no resort, would be without any object. If that were to be associated with the object, the nature of the cognition would not be certain (definite)—and so, being without the object cannot be proved all the more. ॥ 28 ॥

न भावोनुपलब्धेः ॥ २९ ॥

न केवलस्यार्थशून्यस्य ज्ञानस्य भावः संभवति । कुतः ? क्वचिदप्यनुपलब्धेः । न ह्यकर्तृकस्याकर्मकस्य वा ज्ञानस्य क्वचिदुपलब्धिः । स्वप्नज्ञानादिष्वपि नार्थशून्यत्वमिति ख्यातिनिरूपणे (पृ १४५) प्रतिपादितम् ॥ २९ ॥

उपलब्ध्यधिकरण समाप्तम् (४)

सर्वथानुपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३० ॥ (अधिकरण ५, सूत्र ३०)

[319] अत्र सर्वशून्यवादी माध्यमिकः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते । शून्यवाद एव हि सुगतमतकाष्ठा । शिष्यबुद्धियोग्यतानुगुण्येनार्थाभ्युपगमादिना क्षणिकत्वादय उक्ताः । विज्ञानं बाह्यार्थाश्च सर्वे न सन्ति । शून्यमेव तत्त्वम् । अभावापत्तिरेव च मोक्षः, इत्येव बुद्धस्याभिप्रायः । तदेव हि युक्तम्, शून्यस्याहेतुसाध्यतया स्वतःसिद्धेः । सत एव हि हेतुरन्वेषणीयः । तच्च सद्भावादभावाच्च नोत्पद्यते । भावात्तावन्न कस्यचिदुत्पत्तिर्दृष्टा । न हि घटादिरनुपमृदिते पिण्डादिके जायते । नाप्यभावादुत्पत्तिः संभवति । नष्टे पिण्डादिके ह्यभावादुत्पद्यमानं घटादिकमभावात्मकमेव स्यात् । तथा स्वतः परतश्चोत्पत्तिर्न

Not the existence (of cognition without the object) on account of not being apprehended ॥ 29 ॥

The existence of mere cognition without the object is not possible Whence ? On account of not being apprehended anywhere Not, indeed, *is cognition to be found anywhere, without any agent, or without any object* Even in the case of dream-cognitions etc , there exists no state of being without an object—this has been expounded in the exposition of Khyātis (P. 145)

Here ends the Upalabdhyadhikarana (4)

And on account of the absurdity in every way ॥ 30 ॥
(Adhikarana 5, Sūtra 30)

[319] Now, the Mādhyamika advocating everything to be void, stands up , for, the doctrine of the Void alone is the *ne plus ultra* of the Bauddha doctrine Momentariness etc , (these notions) have been stated having regard to the apprehension of things etc , in conformity with the fitness of the intellects of the pupils (to grasp them) Vijñana and the external objects—(all these) do not exist, the Void alone is the reality , and attaining to the Void itself salvation—this alone is the view of Buddha That alone is proper, as the Void is self-established on account of its being not fit to be proved by any cause , for, (some) *cause has got to be found in the case of an existing* thing alone , and that cannot come from existence, as well as from non existence Not, *for the matter of that is seen origination of anything from existence* Not, indeed are jar etc , produced unless the clod etc , are pounded Nor again is origination possible out of non-existence, for when the clod etc , perish, the jar etc , being produced from the non existent would be possessed of the nature of non-existence alone Likewise, origination from oneself or from another is not possible In the case of origination from oneself, there would perforce arise the blemish viz having oneself as the resort, and also the

संभवति, स्वतश्चोत्पत्तावात्माश्रयदोषप्रसङ्गात्प्रयोजनाभावाच्च। परतः परोत्पत्तौ परत्वाविशेषात्सर्वेषां सर्वेभ्य उत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः। जन्माभावादेव विनाशस्याप्यभावः। अत., शून्यमेव तत्त्वम्। अतो जन्मविनाशसदसदादयो भ्रान्तिमात्रम्। न च निरधिष्ठानभ्रमासंभवाद्भ्रमाधिष्ठानं किञ्चित्पारमार्थिकं तत्त्वमाश्रयितव्यम्, दोषदोषाश्रयत्वज्ञातृत्वाद्यपारमार्थ्येऽपि भ्रमोपपत्तिवदधिष्ठानापारमार्थ्येऽपि भ्रमोपपत्तेः। अतः शून्यमेव तत्त्वमिति प्राप्ते, उच्यते—

'सर्वथानुपपत्तेश्च'—सर्वथानुपपत्तेः सर्वशून्यत्वं च भवदभिप्रेतं न संभवति। किं भवान्सर्वं सदिति वा प्रतिजानीते, असदिति वान्यथा वा? सर्वथा तवाभिप्रेतं तुच्छत्वं न संभवति, लोके भावाभावशब्दयोस्तत्प्रतीत्योश्च विद्यमानस्यैव वस्तुनोऽवस्थाविशेषयोगितैव प्रतिज्ञाता भवति, इति भवदभिमता तुच्छता न कुतश्चिदपि सिध्यति। किं च कुतश्चित्प्रमाणाच्छून्यत्वमुपलभ्य शून्यत्वं सिसाधयिषता तस्य प्रमाणस्य सत्यत्वमभ्युपेत्यम्। तस्यासत्यत्वे सर्वं सत्यं स्यादिति। सर्वथा सर्वशून्यत्वं चानुपपन्नम्॥ ३०॥

सर्वथानुपपत्त्यधिकरणं समाप्तम् (५)

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absence of any purpose If another thing is originated from another, being another being common to all things, there would perforce be the origination of all from all There is the absence of destruction also, on account of the absence of origination itself Thus the Void alone is the reality. Therefore, origination, destruction, existent, non existent etc ,—(all this is) merely an illusion Nor again, (should it be argued) that a real substratum has to be resorted to as the basis of illusion on account of the impossibility of an illusion without any basis, because illusion can be accounted for even though the basis is not real like the existence of illusion, even though the blemish, the resort of the blemish, being the knower, etc , are unreal Therefore, the Void alone is the reality —This (prima facie view) being reached, we reply—

'On account of the absurdity in every way '—On account of the absurdity in every way, everything being void of which you are fond is not possible—Does your honour admit everything to be existent or non-existent, or as being something else ? In every way, the unsubstantial nature favoured by you is not possible because in the world the words existence and non-existence and their cognitions are propounded as being associated with the peculiar states of an existing thing alone — and so, the unsubstantial nature (of everything) favoured by you cannot be proved by any means And further, while one is desirous of proving the state of void, having found out the state of void by some means of proof or other, then the real nature of that means of proof has got to be admitted If *that* is unreal, everything would be real. In every way, everything being void is quite inappropriate

Here ends the Sarvathānupapattyadhikarana (5)

नैकस्मिन्नसंभवात् ॥ ३१ ॥(अधिकरण ६, सूत्राणि ३१—३४)

[320] निरस्ताः सौगताः। जैना अपि परमाणुकारणत्वादिकं जगतो वदन्ति, इत्यनन्तरं जैनपक्षः प्रतिक्षिप्यते।

ते किल मन्यन्ते —

जीवाजीवात्मकं जगदेतन्निरीश्वरम्। तच्च षड्द्रव्यात्मकम्। तानि च द्रव्याणि जीवधर्माधर्मपुद्गलकालाकाशाख्यानि।

तत्र जीवा बद्धा योगसिद्धा मुक्ताश्चेति त्रिविधाः।

धर्मो नाम गतिमतां गतिहेतुभूतो द्रव्यविशेषो जगद्व्यापी।

अधर्मश्च स्थितिहेतुभूतो व्यापी।

पुद्गलो नाम वर्णगन्धरसस्पर्शवद्द्रव्यम्। तच्च द्विविधं, परमाणुरूपं तत्संघातरूपं च पवनज्वलनसलिलधरणीतनुभुवनादिकम्।

कालस्त्वभूदस्तिभविष्यतीतिव्यवहारहेतुरणुरूपो द्रव्यविशेषः।

आकाशोऽप्येकोऽनन्तप्रदेशश्च।

तेषु चाणुव्यतिरिक्तद्रव्याणि पञ्चास्तिकाया इति च संगृह्यन्ते, जीवास्तिकायो धर्मास्तिकायोऽधर्मास्तिकायः पुद्गलास्तिकाय आकाशास्तिकाय इति।

Not in one (entity), on account of the impossibility ॥ 31 ॥
(Adhikaraṇa 6, Sūtras 31–34)

[320] The Bauddhas have been refuted. The Jainas also speak of the atoms being the cause etc., of the world—and so, next, the doctrine of the Jainas is attacked.

They, indeed, think (like this)—

This world constituted of the Jīva and the non-Jīva is without any Lord, and that is constituted of six substances; and those substances are known as Jīva, Dharma, Adharma, Pudgala, Kāla (time) and Ākāśa.

There, the Jīvas are of three kinds,—Bound, perfected by Yoga, and released.

Dharma, indeed, is a special substance, which is the cause of the movement of those who move, and pervades the world.

Adharma also is the cause of standing still, and pervading.

The Pudgala is a substance possessing colour, smell, flavour, and touch; and that is twofold— of the nature of atoms, and of the nature of their aggregate,— wind, fire, water, earth, body, worlds etc.

The Kāla is again a special substance, atomic, the cause of practical dealing in the form of—Was, Is, Would be.

The Ākāśa also is one, an endless region.

And within those, substances other than the atoms are also brought in—viz., the five Astikāyas—Jīva- astikāya, Dharma-astikāya, Adharma-astikāya, Pudgala-astikāya and Ākāśa-astikāya.

अनेकदेशवर्तीनि द्रव्येऽस्तिकायशब्दः।

जीवानां मोक्षोपयोगिनमपरमपि संग्रहं कुर्वन्ति जीवाजीवास्रवबन्धनिर्जरसंवरमोक्षा इति।

मोक्षसंग्रहेण मोक्षोपायश्च गृहीतः। स च सम्यग्ज्ञानदर्शनचारित्ररूपः।

तत्र जीवस्तु ज्ञानदर्शनसुखवीर्यगुणः, अजीवश्च जीवभोग्यवस्तुजातम्।

आस्रवस्तद्भोगोपकरणभूतमिन्द्रियादिकम्।

बन्धश्चाष्टविधो घातिकर्मचतुष्टयमघातिकर्मचतुष्टयं चेति।

तत्राद्यं जीवगुणानां स्वाभाविकानां ज्ञानदर्शनवीर्यसुखानां प्रतिघातकरम्। अपरं शरीरसंस्थानतदभिमानतत्स्थितितत्प्रयुक्तसुखदुःखोपेक्षाहेतुभूतम्।

निर्जरं मोक्षसाधनमर्हदुपदेशावगतं तपः।

संवरो नामेन्द्रियनिरोधः समाधिरूपः।

मोक्षस्तु निवृत्तरागादिक्लेशस्य स्वाभाविकात्मस्वरूपाविर्भावः।

पृथिव्यादिहेतुभूताश्चाणवो वैशेषिकादीनामिव न चतुर्विधा अपि त्वेकस्वभावाः, पृथिव्यादिभेदस्तु परिणामकृतः।

The word Astikāya refers to a substance residing in many regions.

They (the Jainas) also make another aggregate useful for the salvation of Jivas,— Jīva, Ajīva, Āsrava, Bandha, Nirjara, Samvara, and Mokṣa

By the inclusion of Mokṣa is also implied the means for Mokṣa, and that is constituted of right knowledge, right perception and right conduct.

There, the Jiva again has the qualities of knowledge, perception, happiness, and valour And the Ajiva is the aggregate of entities fit to be enjoyed by the Jiva.

Āsrava is the sense-organs and others that are the instruments of enjoyment by him.

And Bandha is eightfold—the fourfold destructive (*ghāti*) Karman and the fourfold non destructive Karman

There, the first is the cause of the destruction of the natural qualities of the Jiva—knowledge, perception, happiness and valour The latter is the cause of happiness, misery, and indifference prompted by the configuration of the body, attachment to it and its sustenance

Nirjara in the penance, the means of salvation, known from the instruction of the Arhat (the Revered Jina)

Samvara, indeed, is of the nature of concentration, the control of the *sense-organs*

Moksa (salvation) again, is the appearance of one's own natural form, of one from whom the afflictions, passion etc , have gone away

The atoms, the causes of the earth and others, are not fourfold, like those of the Vaiśesikas, but are of a uniform nature. The difference such as the earth etc., is again due to the modifications,

सर्वं च वस्तुजातं सत्त्वासत्त्वनित्यत्वानित्यत्वभिन्नत्वाभिन्नत्वादिभिरनैकान्तिकमिच्छन्ति — १ स्यादस्ति २ स्यान्नास्ति ३ स्यादस्ति च नास्ति च ४ स्यादवक्तव्यम् ५ स्यादस्ति चावक्तव्यम् ६ स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यम् ७ स्यादस्ति च नास्ति चावक्तव्यं च, इति सर्वत्र सप्तभङ्गिनयावतारात्। सर्वं वस्तुजातं द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकमिति द्रव्यात्मना सत्त्वैकत्वनित्यत्वाद्युपपादयन्ति, पर्यायात्मना च तद्विपरीतम्। पर्यायाश्च द्रव्यस्यावस्थाविशेषाः। तेषां च भावाभावरूपत्वात्सत्त्वासत्त्वादिकं सर्वमुपपन्नमिति —

[321] अत्राभिधीयते — 'नैकस्मिन्नसंभवात्' इति।

नैतदुपपद्यते। कुतः?

एकस्मिन्नसंभवात्, एकस्मिन्वस्तुन्यस्तित्वनास्तित्वादेर्विरुद्धस्य च्छायातपवद्युगपदसंभवात्। एतदुक्तं भवति—

द्रव्यस्य तद्विशेषणभूतपर्यायशब्दाभिधेयावस्थाविशेषस्य च पृथक्पदार्थत्वात्, नैकस्मिन्विरुद्धधर्मसमावेशः संभवति। तथाहि — एकेनास्तित्वादिनावस्थाविशेषेण विशिष्टस्य तदानीमेव न तद्विपरीतनास्तित्वादिविशिष्टत्वं संभवति। उत्पत्तिविनाशाख्यपरिणामविशेषास्पदत्वं च द्रव्यस्यानित्यत्वं तद्विपरीतं च नित्यत्वं तस्मिन्कथं समैति?

And the whole aggregate of entities they desire as many-pointed—(considerations such as) existence, non-existence, permanency, impermanency, difference, non difference etc.,— (1) May be, is; (2) May be, is not, (3) May be, is, and is not, (4) May be, is indescribable, (5) May be, is, and indescribable, (6) May be, is not, and indescribable, (7) May be, is, is not, and indescribable— in this way everywhere there is the application of the Seven modes (*Saptabhanginaya*) As the entire aggregate of entities has substance as *an alternative, they describe existence, oneness, eternal nature etc*, *as* referring to substance, and it is the opposite of that, referring to the alternative And the alternatives are the particular states of the substance, and every thing is appropriate in their case, existence, non-existence etc, on account of their nature, as presence and absence

[321] In this connection this is said (by the Sūtrakāra in reply)—'Not in one (entity), on account of the impossibility'—

—This (is) not proper Whence?

On account of the impossibility in one (entity),—on account of the impossibility of simultaneous existence of contradictory things like existence and non-existence in one entity, like shadow and light. This is what is intended to be said—

Because the substance and its particular state fit to be described by a synonym qualifying that are separate objects, there is no possibility of the inclusion of contradictory qualities in one To explain the same—In the case of something particularised by one particular state such as existence etc, is not possible at the same time, its being particularised by non-existence etc, the opposite of that Non-permanency of a substance is its being the resort of particular modifications called origination and destruction, how can the permanent nature opposed to that come in there? Being different is being

विरोधिधर्माश्रयत्वं च भिन्नत्वं तद्विपरीतं चाभिन्नत्वं कथं वा तस्मिन्समवैति ? यथाश्वत्व-महिषत्वयोर्युगपदेकस्मिन्नसंभवः । अयमर्थः पूर्वमेव भेदाभेदवादिनिरसनसमये

'तत्तु समन्वयात्' (ब्र सू १।१।४)

इत्यत्र प्रपञ्चितः । कालस्य पदार्थविशेषणतयैव प्रतीतेस्तस्य पृथगस्तित्वनास्तित्वादयो न वक्तव्या न च परिहर्तव्याः । कालोऽस्ति नास्तीति व्यवहारो व्यवहर्तॄणां जात्याद्यस्तित्वनास्तित्वव्यवहारतुल्यः । जात्यादयो हि द्रव्यविशेषणतयैव प्रतीयन्ते, इति पूर्वमेवोक्तम् ।

कथं पुनरेकमेव ब्रह्म सर्वात्मकमिति श्रोत्रियैरुच्यते ? सर्वचेतनाचेतनशरीरत्वात्सर्वज्ञस्य सर्वशक्तेः सत्यसंकल्पस्य पुरुषोत्तमस्य, इत्युक्तम् । शरीरशरीरिणोस्तद्धर्माणां चात्यन्तवैलक्षण्यमप्युक्तम् । किं च जीवादीनां षण्णां द्रव्याणामेकद्रव्यपर्यायत्वाभावात्तेषु द्रव्यैकत्वेन पर्यायात्मना चैकत्वानेकत्वादयो दुरुपपादाः ।

अथोच्येत षडेतानि द्रव्याणि स्वकीयैः पर्यायैः स्वेन स्वेन चात्मना तथा भवन्ति, इति । एवमपि सर्वमनैकान्तिकमित्यभ्युपगमविरोधः, अन्योन्यतादात्म्याभावात् । अतो

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the resort of opposite qualities,—How could this, being non-different opposed to that come in there ?—just as it is not possible for the nature of a horse and the nature of a buffalo to exist simultaneously in one (entity) This same matter has been expounded in detail already in (the Sūtra)

'*But that, on account of co-relation*' (Bra Su I 1 4)

at the time of the refutation of the advocates of the difference-non-difference doctrine As regards Time, it being apprehended as only a qualifying attribute of objects, its separate existence, non existence, etc , are neither capable of being described, nor capable of being refuted The practical assertion viz Time exists, exists not—is on a par with the practical description by those who deal with these matters as existence, non-existence of genus etc , for, genus etc , *are comprehended as indeed particularising a substance* —*this has* already been stated

How again is stated by the learned Brāhmaṇas that one Brahman alone is the Ātman of all ? It is said like that, on account of the omniscient all-powerful Puruṣottama with desires fulfilled having the sentient and the non-sentient as his body And further, the extreme difference of the body and the *embodied one, and of their attributes has also been stated Moreover, because* the six substances Jiva and others cannot have one substance as the mode (alternative) it is difficult to propound in their case, being one or being many etc., (respectively), owing to the substance being one, and owing to its being constituted of modes

Now, if it were argued that these six substances would become like that *by their own modes and by their respective natures,*— (the reply is)— Even thus there would be contradiction with the tenet —Everything is indefinite (lit not leading to extremities)— on account of the absence of mutual

प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधाप्राप्तिरविच्छेदात् ॥ २१ ॥

[311] एवं तावदसत उत्पत्तिर्निरस्ता। सतो निरन्वयो विनाशोऽपि नोपपद्यते, इत्युच्यते — क्षणिकत्ववादिभिर्मुद्गराभिघाताद्यनन्तरभावितयोपलब्धियोग्यः सदृशसंतानावसानरूपः स्थूलो यः, सदृशसंताने प्रतिक्षणभावी च, उपलब्ध्यनर्हः सूक्ष्मश्च यो निरन्वयो विनाशः प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधशब्दाभ्यामभिधीयते, तौ न संभवत इत्यर्थः।

'अविच्छेदात्' सतो निरन्वयविच्छेदासंभवात्। असंभवश्च सत उत्पत्तिविनाशौ नामावस्थान्तरापत्तिरेव। अवस्थायोगि तु द्रव्यमेकमेव स्थिरमिति कारणादनन्यत्वं कार्यस्योपपादयद्भिरस्माभिः

'तदनन्यत्वम्' (ब्र. सू. २।१।१५)

इत्यत्र प्रतिपादितम्। निर्वाणस्य दीपस्य निरन्वयविनाशदर्शनादन्यत्रापि विनाशो निरन्वयोऽनुमीयते, इति चेत्—न। घटशरावादौ मृदादिद्रव्यानुवृत्त्युपलब्ध्या सतो द्रव्यस्यावस्थान्तरापत्तिरेव विनाश इति निश्चिते सति, प्रदीपादौ सूक्ष्मदशापत्त्याप्यनुपलम्भोपपत्तेः,

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The deliberate and non-deliberate destruction would not be there on account of the absence of a complete cutting away. ॥ 21 ॥

[311] Thus has been refuted the origination from the Asat. Now, it is stated that even an outright destruction of an existent object can not take place. The gross destruction, fit for being perceived as coming into existence later due to the striking by a club, etc, and of the nature of the cessation of homogeneous continuity (of the object),—and the subtle, not fit for perception occurring every moment, in the homogeneous continuity—the outright destruction—which are spoken of by the advocates of the doctrine of momentariness, by the words Pratisamkhyā destruction and Apratisamkhyā destruction—those two are not possible —this (is) the sense.

'On account of the absence of a complete cutting away'—on account of the impossibility of an outright cutting away of the existent. And the impossibility is (like this)—the origination and destruction of an existing thing are but changing into another name and state. For, a substance associated with a state is just one alone and stable—this has been propounded by us while reasoning out that the effect is not different from the cause, in connection with (the Sūtra)

'Not being different from that' (Bra. Sū. II. 1·15)

If (it be argued) that on account of the perception of an outright destruction in respect of the lamp extinguished, destruction elsewhere also, as being outright can be inferred,—(we reply)—No. When it has been ascertained that destruction is nothing but assuming another state, in the case of an existing thing, on account of the perception of the continuity of the substance, earth etc., in jar, saucer etc.,—it is right to postulate the assumption of another state, even there in the case of the lamp etc., because the non-

तत्राप्यवस्थान्तरापत्तिकल्पनस्यैव युक्तत्वात् ॥ २१ ॥

उभयथा च दोषात् ॥ २२ ॥

[312] क्षणिकत्ववादिभिरभ्युपेतात्तुच्छादुत्पत्तिः, उत्पन्नस्य तुच्छतापत्तिश्च, न संभवतीत्युक्तम्। तदुभयप्रकाराभ्युपगतो दोषश्च भवति। तुच्छादुत्पत्तौ तुच्छात्मकमेव कार्यं स्यात्। यद्धि यस्मादुत्पद्यते तत्तदात्मकं दृष्टं यथा मृत्सुवर्णादेरुत्पन्नं मणिकमुकुटादि मृत्सुवर्णाद्यात्मकं दृष्टम्। न च जगत्तुच्छात्मकं भवद्भिरभ्युपगम्यते न च प्रतीयते। सतो निरन्वयविनाशे सति, एकक्षणादूर्ध्वं कृत्स्नस्य जगतस्तुच्छतापत्तिरेव स्यात्। पश्चात्तु तुच्छाज्जगदुत्पत्तावनन्तरोक्तं तुच्छात्मकमेव स्यात्। अतः, उभयथापि दोषाच्च भवदुक्त-प्रकारावुत्पत्तिनिरोधौ ॥ २२ ॥

आकाशे चाविशेषात् ॥ २३ ॥

[313] बाह्यान्तरवस्तुनः स्थिरत्वप्रतिपादनाय प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधयो-स्तुच्छरूपता निराकृता। तत्प्रसङ्गेन ताभ्यां सह तुच्छत्वेन सौगतैः परिगणित-स्याकाशस्यापि तुच्छता प्रतिक्षिप्यते। आकाशे च निरुपाख्यता न युक्ता, भावरूपत्वेना-भ्युपगतपृथिव्यादिवदाकाशस्याप्यबाधितत्वप्रतीतिसिद्धत्वाविशेषात्। प्रतीयते ह्याकाशोऽत्र

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perception therein can be accounted for, by the assumption of a subtle state. ॥ 21 ॥

And on account of the blemish in both ways ॥ 22 ॥

[312] It has been stated that origination from the unsubstantial, admitted by the advocates of the doctrine of momentariness, and the assumption of an unsubstantial nature by the produced thing, are not possible. And thus there would be the blemish admitted in respect of both the modes. If something is produced from an unsubstantial thing, the effect would be nothing but unsubstantial. For, whatever is produced from which, that is constituted of that,—as the pitcher, crown, etc., produced from earth, gold, etc., are seen as being constituted of earth, gold, etc. Neither again, is the world admitted by you honourable people, as being unsubstantial; nor is it so comprehended. If there were to be an outright destruction of an existing thing, there would be after just one moment, unsubstantiality itself of the entire world. Afterwards, if the world is produced from an unsubstantial thing, whatever is spoken of just later, is also unsubstantial. Thus, there being blemish in both ways, there cannot be origination and destruction as outlined by you. ॥ 22 ॥

In respect of Ākāśa also, on account of no special distinction ॥ 23 ॥

[313] In order to propound the stability of external and internal objects, the unsubstantial nature of Pratisaṁkhyā and Apratisaṁkhyā destructions, is refuted. In passing, (now) is attacked the unsubstantial nature of the Ākāśa as well, along with those two, which is held by the Bauddhas (followers of Sugata) as unsubstantial. The nature of not being fit to be described, is not proper in the case of Ākāśa; because, as in the case of the earth etc., admitted as having the nature of existence, in the case of Ākāśa also, being established by unchallenged perception is common. For, the

श्येनः पतति, अत्र गृध्रः, इति श्येनादिपतनदेशत्वेन। न च पृथिव्याद्यभावमात्रमाकाश इति वक्तुं शक्यम्, विकल्पासहत्वात्—पृथिव्यादेः प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसाभाव इतरेतराभावोऽत्यन्ताभावो वा, आकाशः। सर्वथाप्यकाशप्रतीत्यनुपपत्तिः स्यात्।

प्रागभावप्रध्वंसाभावयोराकाशत्वे पृथिव्यादिषु वर्तमानेषु, आकाशप्रतीत्ययोगान्निराकाशं जगत्स्यात्। इतरेतराभावस्याकाशत्वेऽपि, इतरेतराभावस्य तत्तद्वस्तुगतत्वेन तेषामन्तराल आकाशप्रतीतिर्न स्यात्। अत्यन्ताभावस्तु पृथिव्यादीनां न संभवति। अभावस्य विद्यमानपदार्थावस्थाविशेषत्वोपपादनाच्चाकाशस्याभावरूपत्वेऽपि न निरुपाख्यत्वम्। अण्डान्तर्वर्तिन आकाशस्य त्रिवृत्करणोपदेशप्रदर्शितपञ्चीकरणेन रूपवत्त्वाच्चाक्षुषत्वेऽप्यविरोधः॥ २३॥

अनुस्मृतेश्च॥ २४॥

[314] पूर्वप्रस्तुतं वस्तुनः स्थिरत्वमेवोपपाद्यते। अनुस्मरणं पूर्वानुभूतवस्तुविषयं ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्, इत्यर्थः। तदेवेदमिति सर्वं वस्तुजातमतीतकालानुभूतं प्रत्यभिज्ञायते। न च भवद्भिर्ज्वालादिष्विव सादृश्यनिबन्धनोऽयमेकत्वव्यामोह इति वक्तुं

Ākāśa is apprehended as a region for flying by a hawk etc , in (expressions)—Here is the hawk flying, Here the vulture—Nor again, is it possible to say that Akāśa *is just merely the absence of earth, etc*, *on account of the alternatives* not being possible Akāśa (can be) either the antecedent negation of earth etc „ or, the deliberate negation , or, the mutual negation or total negation —*whatever view is held there would be no apprehension of the sky*

If antecedent negation and deliberate negation were to be the Ākaśa, there would be the absence of the apprehension of Ākāśa in the *existing earth etc*, and the world would be without Akāśa Even if mutual negation is regarded as Ākāśa, because mutual negation belongs to the various objects, there would be no apprehension of Ākāśa in their case, in the intervening space *Total negation, for the matter of that, is not possible in* the case of the earth and others And on account of negation being described as a particular condition of existing objects, even if Akāśa is of the nature of *negation, it cannot be (said to be) incapable of being described* And on account of Ākāśa abiding within the Egg being possessed of a form by the process of Pañcikarana (five-fold transformation) as indicated in the instruction about the three-fold transformation — there is non-contradiction even (about) Akāsa being actually perceptible to the eyes ॥23॥

And on account of recognition ॥ 23 ॥

[314] The permanence of *the entity, discussion about* which has been started before, is itself being justified (now) Anusmarana — the knowledge referring to a thing experienced before —that is,—recognition The entire aggregate *of things experienced in the past time, is recognised in* the form —This is that same Not again, is it possible for you honourable people to say, that this infatuation about oneness is dependent upon similarity as in the case of flames etc ,—on account of (your) non admission of one knower who is suffering from infatuation For, neither oneness nor similarity of

शक्यम्, व्यामुहतो ज्ञातुरेकस्यानभ्युपगमात् । न ह्यन्यानुभूतेनैकत्वं सादृश्यं वा स्वानुभूतस्यान्योऽनुसंधत्ते । अतः, भिन्नकालवस्त्वाश्रयसादृश्यानुभवनिबन्धनमेकत्वव्यामोहं वदद्भिर्ज्ञातुरेकत्वमवश्याश्रयणीयम् । न च ज्ञेयेष्वपि घटादिषु ज्वालादिष्विव भेदसाधनप्रमाणमुपलभामहे येन सादृश्यनिबन्धनां प्रत्यभिज्ञां कल्पयेम ।

यदपि चेदमुच्यते—प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां घटादेः क्षणिकत्वं सिध्यति । प्रत्यक्षं तावद्वर्तमानार्थविषयमवर्तमानाद्वस्तुनो व्यावृत्तं स्वविषयमवगमयति नीलमिव पीतात् । एवं च भूतभविष्यद्यावर्तमानस्य वस्त्वन्तरत्वमवगतं भवति । अनुमानमपि—

अर्थक्रियाकारित्वात्सत्त्वाच्च

घटादि क्षणिकम् ।

यदक्षणिकं शशविषाणादि तदनर्थक्रियाकार्यसच्च ।

तथा,

अन्त्यघटक्षणसत्त्वात्पूर्वघटक्षणसत्त्वानि विनाशीनि

घटक्षणसत्त्वादन्त्यघटक्षणसत्त्ववत्,

इति । तच्च कार्यकारणभावानुपपत्त्यादिभिः पूर्वमेव निरस्तम् । किं च प्रत्यक्षगम्या

what is experienced by oneself, another associates with what is experienced by another So, you have necessarily to resort to the oneness of the knower, in talking of the infatuation about oneness being dependent upon the experience of similarity having for its resort objects existing at different times Nor further, do we come across any means of proof to prove the difference in the case of jar, etc, that are fit for being objects of knowledge as in the case of flames etc, so that we might postulate recognition as dependent upon similarity

If again this is said further—The momentariness of jar and others would be proved by Direct perception and Inference Direct perception, for the matter of that, referring to an existing entity makes one comprehend its object as excluded from a non-existing entity, as blue (colour) from yellow (colour) and in this way, becomes known the nature of a different thing being excluded from the past and the future (there is) also the Inference (to prove this)—

Jar etc, are momentary

Because they function for some purpose and because they exist

Whatever is not momentary, the horn of the hare, etc, is not functioning for some purpose and is non existing

In the same way—The preceding existences of jar-moments are perishable on account of the existence of the last jar moment,

Like the existence of the last jar moment, from the existence of the jar-moment —

And that has already been refuted by arguments (like) unaccountability of the relation of cause and effect And further the exclusion of an existing thing from a non existing one that is directly apprehended does not make one comprehend that the existing thing is a different entity, but merely

वर्तमानस्यावर्तमानाद्व्यावृत्तिर्न वर्तमानस्य वस्त्वन्तरत्वमवगमयति, अपि तु वर्तमानकालयोगितामात्रम्। न च तावता वस्त्वन्तरत्वं सिध्यति, तस्यैव कालान्तरयोगसंभवात्।

यत्तु सत्त्वादर्थक्रियाकारित्वादिति क्षणिकत्वे हेतुद्वयमुक्तम्, तदभिमतविपरीतसाधनत्वाद्विरुद्धम्—

सत्त्वादर्थक्रियाकारित्वाद्वा घटादि स्थास्नु।

यदस्थास्नु तदसदनर्थक्रियाकारि च यथा शशविषाणम्,

इत्यपि वक्तुं शक्यम्। किं च, अर्थक्रियाकारित्वमक्षणिकत्वमेव साधयेत्। क्षणध्वंसिनो हि व्यापारासंभवादर्थक्रियाकारित्वं न संभवति, इत्युक्तम्। तथा, अन्त्यघटक्षणस्य हेतुतो नाशदर्शनादितरेऽपि घटक्षणा हेत्वपेक्षविनाशाः स्युः, इत्या मुद्गरादिहेतूपनिपातात्स्थास्नुत्वमेव। न च वाच्यम्—न मुद्गरादयो विनाशहेतवोऽपि तु कपालादिविसदृशसंतानोत्पत्तिहेतव इति, कपालत्वावस्थापत्तिरेव घटादीनां विनाश इत्युपपादितत्वात्। कपालोत्पत्तिव्यतिरिक्तत्वाभ्युपगमेऽपि विनाशस्य विनाशहेतुत्वमेव मुद्गरादेरानन्तर्याद्युक्तम्। अतः, प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः

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its being associated with the present time But not by that is proved that it is a different entity, on account of that same being possibly connected with a different time

As to the two logical marks stated by you to prove momentariness—on account of existence and on account of functioning for some purpose—that is just a contrary mark, (fallacious) on account of (its being a logical mark), proving the contrary of what you desire

Jar etc, are stable

On account of existence, and on account of functioning for some purpose

What is unstable, that is non-existing and not functioning for some purpose, as the horn of a hare—

—it is possible to say this also Further again functioning for some purpose would prove non-momentariness itself It has been stated that in the case of a thing perishing in a moment, functioning for some purpose is not possible on account of the impossibility of any operation Similarly, the last jar-moment being seen to perish through a cause other jar-moments would have their destruction dependent on some cause So, there is the stability itself (of the jar-moment) up to the contact of the cause (of destruction), the club etc Nor again should it be said that the club etc, although the causes of destruction but the causes of the origination of dissimilar continuity of potsherds etc, on account of it being propounded that attaining to the state of being potsherds itself is the destruction of the jar and others Even if destruction is admitted to be different from the production of the potsherds it is proper that the club etc, are indeed, the causes of destruction, because nothing intervenes Therefore, it is not possible to conceal by any method whatsoever, the stability of recognition being comprehended. One talking

स्थिरत्वमगम्यमानं न केनापि प्रकारेणापह्नोतुं शक्यम् । पूर्वापरकालसंबन्ध्यर्थैक्यविषयायाः प्रत्यभिज्ञाया अन्यविषयत्वं ब्रुवन्नीलादिज्ञानानामपि नीलादेरर्थान्तरविषयत्वं ब्रूयात् । किं च प्रमातृप्रमेययोः क्षणिकत्वं वदद्भिर्व्याप्त्यवधारणतत्स्मरणपूर्वकानुमानाभ्युपगमोऽपि दुःशकः । तथा, इदं क्षणिकमित्यादिप्रतिज्ञापूर्वकहेतूपन्यासादिकमपि नोपपद्यते भवताम्, प्रतिज्ञोपक्रमक्षण एव वक्तुर्विनष्टत्वात् । न ह्यन्येनोपक्रान्तमजानद्भिरन्यैः समापयितुं शक्यम् ॥ २४ ॥

नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात् ॥ २५ ॥

[315] एवं तावद्वैभाषिकसौत्रान्तिकयोर्बाह्यार्थास्तित्ववादिनोः साधारणानि दूषणान्युक्तानि । तत्र यदुक्तम्, संप्रयुक्तस्यार्थस्य ज्ञानोत्पत्तिकालेऽनवस्थितत्वान्न कस्यचिदर्थस्य ज्ञानविषयत्वं संभवति, इति—तत्र सौत्रान्तिकः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते—

न ज्ञानकालेऽवस्थानमर्थस्य ज्ञानविषयत्वहेतुः । ज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुत्वमेव हि ज्ञानविषयत्वम् । न चैतावता चक्षुरादेर्ज्ञानविषयत्वप्रसङ्गः, स्वाकारसमर्पणेन ज्ञानहेतोरेव ज्ञानविषयत्वाभ्युपगमात् । ज्ञाने स्वाकारं समर्प्य विनष्टोऽप्यर्थो ज्ञानगतेन नीलाद्याकारेणा-

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about recognition referring to oneness of the object connected with the prior and the posterior time, as referring to another object, could as well talk about even the cognitions of blue (colour) etc , as referring to other objects than blue (colour) etc And further, even the admission of an inference preceded by the ascertainment of the invariable concomitance and its remembrance is difficult to sustain in the case of those who talk about the momentariness of the knower and the object of knowledge Likewise this launching of logical marks preceded by the premiss in the form—This is momentary, etc ,—this does not become you on account of the speaker perishing even at the moment of the introduction of the premiss, and it is not indeed possible for others to complete something, not knowing what has been introduced by another. || 24 ||

Not from a non-existing thing, on account of not being seen || 25 ||

[315] Thus, for the matter of that have been mentioned the blemishes common to the advocates of the existence of external and internal objects—the Vaibhasikas and the Sautrantikas—there, what has been stated—that the object connected not remaining at the time of the origination of the cognition, it is not possible for any entity to be the object of cognition There the Sautrāntika stands up (to defend his position)—

Being present at the time of cognition is not the cause of the entity being the object of cognition being the cause of the origination of cognition is indeed being the object of cognition Nor again, by this (being admitted) would the eye and others perforce be regarded as the objects of cognition, on account of the cause of cognition alone being admitted as the object of cognition, *owing to its imposing its own form upon it* An *entity* even though it has perished after having imposed its own form upon the cognition

नुमीयते। न च पूर्वपूर्वज्ञानेनोत्तरोत्तरज्ञानाकारसिद्धिः, नीलज्ञानसंततौ पीतज्ञानानुत्
प्रसङ्गात्। अतोऽर्थकृतमेव ज्ञानवैचित्र्यमिति।

अत्रोच्यते—'नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात्' इति। योऽयं ज्ञाने नीलादिराकार उपल
स विनष्टस्यासतोऽर्थस्याकारो भवितुं नार्हति। कुतः? अदृष्टत्वात्। न खलु धर्मिणि वि
तद्धर्मस्यार्थान्तरे संक्रमणं दृष्टम्। प्रतिबिम्बादिकमपि स्थिरस्यैव भवति, तत्रापि न
मात्रस्य। अतोऽर्थवैचित्र्यकृतं ज्ञानवैचित्र्यमर्थस्य ज्ञानकालेऽवस्थानादेव भवति॥ २५।

पुनरपि साधारणं दूषणमाह—

उदासीनानामपि चैवं सिद्धिः ॥ २६ ॥

एवं क्षणिकत्वासद्भुत्पत्त्यहेतुकविनाशाद्यभ्युपगम उदासीनानामनुद्युञ्जानाना
सर्वार्थसिद्धिः स्यात्। इष्टप्राप्तिरनिष्टनिवृत्तिर्वा प्रयत्नादिभिः साध्यते। क्षणध्वंसे
सर्वेषां भावानां पूर्वपूर्ववस्तु तद्गतो वा विशेषः संस्कारादिकोऽविद्यादिर्वोत्तरत्र न क
दनुवर्तत इति प्रयत्नादिसाध्यं न किंचिदस्ति। एवं सति, अहेतुसाध्यत्वात्सर्वसिद्धी
मुदासीनानामप्यैहिकामुष्मिकफलं मोक्षश्च, सिध्येत्॥ २६॥

समुदायाधिकरण समाप्तम्। (३)

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is inferred by the form blue etc, belonging to the cognition Not again
established the form of each succeeding cognition by each preceding cogniti
on account of the undesirable contingency of the non-production of
cognition of yellow colour in the series of cognitions of the blue colo
Therefore, the varied nature of the cognition is effected by the object itself—

Here it is stated (in reply)—'Not from a non-existing thi
on account of not being seen" As to this form of blue etc, in the cognitio
that is perceived, that cannot be the form of the object which has perish
and which is not existent Whence? On account of not being seen N
indeed when the entity has perished, is seen the transference of an attribu
of that to another object, even reflection etc, take place in the case of
stable object itself, and there too not merely of the attribute Therefore, th
varied nature of cognition effected by the varied nature of objects takes plac
on account of the object itself existing at the time of cognition. ॥ 25 ॥

Once again (the Sūtrakāra) states the common blemish—

Even in the case of the indifferent, there would be the accomplishment in this way ॥ 26 ॥

[illegible] origination from non-existenc
and [illegible] the accomplishment of all thing
eve [illegible] ing towards the same Acquisi
tion of something desired and refraining from something not desirable i
accomplished by effort etc If, indeed, all objects are destroyed in a moment
each preceding thing, or any particular attribute, impression etc., belongin
to it, or Avidyā etc,—nothing persists latter, and so, there is nothing that i
to be accomplished by effort etc Such being the case, all accomplishment
being fit to be secured without any cause, there would be fruit accomplishe
[illegible]

स्थिरत्वमवगम्यमानं न केनापि प्रकारेणापह्नोतुं शक्यम्। पूर्वापरकालसंबन्ध्यर्थैक्यविषयायाः प्रत्यभिज्ञाया अन्यविषयत्वं ब्रुवन्नीलादिज्ञानानामपि नीलादेरर्थान्तरविषयत्वं ब्रूयात्। किं च प्रमातृप्रमेययोः क्षणिकत्वं वदद्भिर्व्याप्त्यवधारणतत्स्मरणपूर्वकानुमानाभ्युपगमोऽपि दुःशकः। तथा, इदं क्षणिकमित्यादिप्रतिज्ञापूर्वकहेतूपन्यासादिकमपि नोपपद्यते भवताम्, प्रतिज्ञोपक्रमक्षण एव वक्तुर्विनष्टत्वात्। न ह्यन्येनोपक्रान्तमजानद्भिरन्यैः समापयितुं शक्यम् ॥ २४ ॥

नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात् ॥ २५ ॥

[315] एवं तावद्वैभाषिकसौत्रान्तिकयोर्बाह्यार्थास्तित्ववादिनोः साधारणानि दूषणान्युक्तानि। तत्र यदुक्तम्, संप्रयुक्तस्यार्थस्य ज्ञानोत्पत्तिकालेऽनवस्थितत्वान्न कस्यचिदर्थस्य ज्ञानविषयत्वं संभवति, इति—तत्र सौत्रान्तिकः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते—

न ज्ञानकालेऽवस्थानमर्थस्य ज्ञानविषयत्वहेतुः। ज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुत्वमेव हि ज्ञानविषयत्वम्। न चैतावता चक्षुरादेर्ज्ञानविषयत्वप्रसङ्गः, स्वाकारसमर्पणेन ज्ञानहेतोरेव ज्ञानविषयत्वाभ्युपगमात्। ज्ञाने स्वाकारं समर्प्य विनष्टोऽप्यर्थो ज्ञानगतेन नीलाद्याकारेणा-

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about recognition referring to oneness of the object connected with the prior and the posterior time, as referring to another object, could as well talk about even the cognitions of blue (colour) etc., as referring to other objects than blue (colour) etc. And further, even the admission of an inference preceded by the ascertainment of the invariable concomitance and its remembrance is difficult to sustain in the case of those who talk about the momentariness of the knower and the object of knowledge. Likewise this launching of logical marks preceded by the premiss in the form—This is momentary, etc ,—*this does not become you on account of the speaker perishing* even at the moment of the introduction of the premiss; and it is not indeed possible for others to complete something, not knowing what has been introduced by another. ॥ 24 ॥

Not from a non-existing thing, on account of not being *seen* ॥ *25* ॥

[315] Thus, for the matter of that, have been mentioned the blemishes common to the advocates of the existence of external and internal objects—the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas—there, what has been stated—

Being present at the time of cognition is not the cause of the entity being the object of cognition , being the cause of the origination of cognition *is indeed being the object of cognition. Nor again, by this (being admitted)* would the eye and others perforce be *regarded* as the objects of cognition, on account of the cause of cognition alone being *admitted as the object of* cognition, owing to its imposing its own form upon it. An entity even though it has perished after having imposed its own *form* upon *the cognition*

नुमीयते । न च पूर्वपूर्वज्ञानेनोत्तरोत्तरज्ञानाकारसिद्धिः, नीलज्ञानसंततौ पीतज्ञानानुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । अतोऽर्थकृतमेव ज्ञानवैचित्र्यमिति ।

अत्रोच्यते — 'नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात्' इति । योऽयं ज्ञाने नीलादिराकार उपलभ्यते स विनष्टस्यासतोऽर्थस्याकारो भवितु नार्हति । कुतः ? अदृष्टत्वात् । न खलु धर्मिणि विनष्टे तद्धर्मस्यार्थान्तरे संक्रमणं दृष्टम् । प्रतिबिम्बादिकमपि स्थिरस्यैव भवति, तत्रापि न धर्ममात्रस्य । अतोऽर्थवैचित्र्यकृतं ज्ञानवैचित्र्यमर्थस्य ज्ञानकालेऽवस्थानादेव भवति ॥ २५ ॥

पुनरपि साधारणं दूषणमाह—

उदासीनानामपि चैवं सिद्धिः ॥ २६ ॥

एवं क्षणिकत्वासदुत्पत्त्यहेतुकविनाशाद्यभ्युपगम उदासीनानामनुद्युञ्जानानामपि सर्वार्थसिद्धिः स्यात् । इष्टप्राप्तिरनिष्टनिवृत्तिर्वा प्रयत्नादिभिः साध्यते । क्षणध्वंसे हि सर्वेषां भावानां पूर्वपूर्ववस्तु तद्गतो वा विशेष संस्कारादिकोऽविद्यादिर्वोत्तरत्र न कश्चिदनुवर्तत इति प्रयत्नादिसाध्यं न किंचिदस्ति । एवं सति, अहेतुसाध्यत्वात्सर्वसिद्धीनामुदासीनानामप्यैहिकामुष्मिकफलं मोक्षश्च, सिध्येत् ॥ २६ ॥

समुदायाधिकरण समाप्तम् । (३)

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is inferred by the form blue etc, belonging to the cognition Not again is established the form of each succeeding cognition by each preceding cognition on account of the undesirable contingency of the non-production of the cognition of yellow colour in the series of cognitions of the blue colour Therefore, the varied nature of the cognition is effected by the object itself—

Here it is stated (in reply)—'Not from a non-existing thing, on account of not being seen As to this form of blue etc, in the cognition, that is perceived, that cannot be the form of the object which has perished and which is not existent Whence? On account of not being seen Not indeed when the entity has perished, is seen the transference of an attribute of that to another object, even reflection etc, take place in the case of a stable object itself, and there too not merely of the attribute Therefore the varied nature of cognition effected by the varied nature of objects takes place on account of the object itself existing at the time of cognition ॥ 25 ॥

Once again (the Sūtrakāra) states the common blemish—

Even in the case of the indifferent, there would be the accomplishment in this way ॥ 26 ॥

Thus in admitting momentariness, origination from non existence and causeless destruction, there would be the accomplishment of all things *even in the case of the indifferent not working towards the same* Acquisition of something desired and refraining from something not desirable is accomplished by effort etc If, indeed all objects are destroyed in a moment each preceding thing or any particular attribute, impression etc, belonging to it, or Avidya etc —nothing persists latter, and so there is nothing that is to be accomplished by effort etc Such being the case, all accomplishments being fit to be secured without any cause there would be fruit accomplished in this world as also in the other, and salvation even, for those who stand still ॥ 26 ॥

Here ends the Samudayādhikarana (3)

नाभाव उपलब्धेः ॥ २७ ॥ (अधिकरण ४, सूत्राणि २७–२९)

[316] विज्ञानमात्रास्तित्ववादिनो योगाचाराः प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते —

यदुक्तमर्थवैचित्र्यकृतं ज्ञानवैचित्र्यमिति तन्नोपपद्यते, अर्थवज्ज्ञानानामेव साकाराणां स्वयमेव विचित्रत्वात् । तच्च स्वरूपवैचित्र्यं वासनावशादेवोपपद्यते । वासना च विलक्षणप्रत्ययप्रवाह एव । यद्घटाकारं ज्ञानं कपालाकारज्ञानस्योत्पादकं तस्य तथाविधस्योत्पादकं तत्पूर्वघटज्ञानं तस्य च तथाविधस्योत्पादकं ततःपूर्वघटज्ञानम्, इत्येवंरूपः प्रवाह एव वासना, इत्युच्यते ।

कथं बहिष्ठसर्षपमहीधरादिराकार आन्तरस्य ज्ञानस्यैवेत्युच्यते ? इत्थम् — अर्थस्यापि व्यवहारयोग्यत्वं ज्ञानप्रकाशायत्तम्, अन्यथा स्वपरवेद्ययोरनतिशयप्रसङ्गात् । प्रकाशमानस्य च ज्ञानस्य साकारत्वमवश्याश्रयणीयम्, निराकारस्य प्रकाशायोगात् । एकश्चायमाकार उपलभ्यमानो ज्ञानस्यैव । तस्य च बहिर्वद्वभासोऽपि भ्रमकृतः । ज्ञानार्थयोः सहोपलम्भनियमाच्च ज्ञानादव्यतिरिक्तोऽर्थः । किं च बाह्यमर्थमभ्युपयद्भिरपि घटपटादिविज्ञानेषु ज्ञानस्य तत्तदर्थासाधारण्यं तत्तदर्थसारूप्यमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते, इत्यवश्यं

Not the absence (of the objects), on account of the apprehension (of their cognition) ॥ 27 ॥
(Adhikaraṇa 4, Sūtras 27–29)

[316] The Yogācāras who advocate the existence of mere Vijñāna stand up—

What has been stated that the varied nature of cognition is effected by the varied nature of objects,—that is not proper, because like the objects, cognitions as well possessed of forms, become varied of their own accord ; and that varied nature results from the power of Vāsanā itself. Vāsanā, for the matter of that, is, verily, the stream of varied impressions. What cognition having the form of jar is the producing cause of the cognition of the potsherd form—of that in such a form, the cognition of the jar preceding is the producing cause; and of that in that form, the cognition of jar prior to that is the producing cause—such kind of a stream itself is called Vāsanā.

How is it said that the form of the outside mustard-seed, mountain etc., belongs to the internal cognition itself ? (It is stated in reply) —Thus, Being fit for practical dealing in the case of an object also, is dependent upon its being illumined by knowledge; otherwise, there would not be any difference between something to be known by some one, and something by another—an undesirable contingency. And in the case of cognition which is illumining, the possession of a form has got to be admitted, because a thing not possessed of a form is not associated with illumining, and this one form which is experienced, belongs to the cognition alone. And its comprehension as being like one external, is caused by illusion; and on account of cognition and the object being experienced as a rule together, the object is not different from cognition; and further, even by those who admit objects to be external has got to be accepted a form similar to the form of the object in the cognition necessarily, because the cognition peculiar to the various objects, in the case of the special cognitions of jar, cloth, etc.,

न युक्तमिदं जैनमतम्। ईश्वरानधिष्ठितपरमाणुकारणवादे पूर्वोक्ता दोषास्तथैवावतिष्ठन्ते ॥३१॥

एवं चात्माकात्स्न्र्यम् ॥ ३२ ॥

एवं भवदभ्युपगमे सति, आत्मनश्चाकात्स्न्र्यं प्रसज्यते। जीवोऽसंख्यातप्रदेशो देहपरिमाण इति हि भवतां स्थितिः। तत्र हस्त्यादिशरीरे स्थितस्यात्मनस्ततो न्यूनपरिमाणे पिपीलिकाशरीरे प्रविशतोऽल्पदेशव्याप्तित्वेनाकात्स्न्र्यं प्रसज्यते। अपरिपूर्णता प्रसज्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ ३२ ॥

अथ संकोचविकाशधर्मतयात्मनः पर्यायशब्दाभिधेयावस्थान्तरापत्त्या विरोधः परिह्रियते, इत्युच्यते, तत्राह —

न च पर्यायादप्यविरोधो विकारादिभ्यः ॥ ३३ ॥

न च संकोचविकाशरूपावस्थान्तरापत्त्यापि विरोधः परिहर्तुं शक्यते, विकारतत्प्रयुक्तानित्यत्वादिदोषप्रसक्तेर्घटादितुल्यत्वादिदोषप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ३३ ॥

अन्त्यावस्थितेश्चोभयनित्यत्वादविशेषः ॥ ३४ ॥

जीवस्य यदन्त्यं परिमाणं मोक्षावस्थागतं तस्य पश्चाद्देहान्तरपरिग्रहाभावादव-

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identity. Therefore, this Jaina doctrine is not proper. The blemishes pointed out in the doctrine advocating atoms not supervised over by the Lord, as the cause (of the world) remain as they are (in this Jaina doctrine also) ॥31॥

And also, the absence of all-pervading nature of Ātman ॥ 32 ॥

This being your tenet, there would perforce be the non-all-pervading nature of the Ātman. This is your position— The Jīva is of the size of the body, having innumerable regions There, in the case of the Atman abiding in the body of an elephant etc , afterwards entering the body of an ant having a small dimension, there would perforce be the absence of an all-pervading nature, owing to its pervading a small region,— *that is to say, there would perforce be the non-filling up completely.* ॥ 32 ॥

If it is stated—because the Ātman is possessed of attributes of contraction and expansion, the contradiction is removed, owing to his attaining to different states denoted by the alternative words— There (the Sūtrakāra) says

And there is no non-contradiction, even on account of the alternative mode, on account of the modification etc ॥ 33 ॥

Not again is it possible to remove the contradiction even by (the Ātman) attaining to different states constituted of contraction and expansion, because the blemishes, modification, impermanent nature etc., caused by that would be perforce there and there would be the undesirable contingency of blemishes such as being on a par with jar etc. ॥ 33 ॥

On account of the final (dimension) remaining, and on account of both being eternal, there would be non-difference ॥34॥

What is the final dimension of the Jīva belonging to the state of salvation— that would be continuing on account of the absence of taking to another

स्थितत्वाद्दात्मनश्च मोक्षावस्थस्य तत्परिमाणस्य चोभयोर्नित्यत्वात्, तदेवात्मनः स्वाभाविकं परिमाणमिति पूर्वमपि तस्मादविशेषः स्यात् । अतः, देहपरिमाणत्वमात्मनो न स्यात्, इत्यसंगतमेवेदमार्हतमतम् ॥ ३४ ॥

एकस्मिन्नसंभवाधिकरणं समाप्तम् (६)

पत्युरसामञ्जस्यात् ॥ ३५ ॥ (अधिकरण ७, सूत्राणि ३५–३८)

[322] कपिलकणादसुगतार्हतमतानामसामञ्जस्यात्, वेदबाह्यत्वाच्च निःश्रेयसार्थिभिरनादरणीयत्वमुक्तम् । इदानीं पशुपतिमतस्य वेदविरोधादसामञ्जस्याच्च, अनादरणीयतोच्यते । तन्मतानुसारिणश्चतुर्विधाः, कापालाः कालामुखाः पाशुपताः शैवाश्चेति । सर्वे चैते वेदविरुद्धां तत्त्वप्रक्रियामैहिकामुष्मिकश्रेयःसाधनकल्पनां च कल्पयन्ति । निमित्तोपादानयोर्भेदं निमित्तकारणं च पशुपतिमाचक्षते । तथा निःश्रेयससाधनमपि मुद्रिकाषट्कधारणादिकम् । यथाहुः कापालाः —

> *' मुद्रिकाषट्कतत्त्वज्ञः परमुद्राविशारदः ।*
> *भगासनस्थमात्मानं ध्यात्वा निर्वाणमृच्छति ॥*
> *कण्ठिका रुचकं चैव कुण्डलं च शिखामणिः ।*
> *भस्म यज्ञोपवीतं च मुद्राषट्कं प्रचक्षते ॥*
> *आभिर्मुद्रितदेहस्तु न भूय इह जायते ।'*

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body afterwards, and the Ātman having that dimension in the state of salvation,— both being permanent— that same is the natural dimension of the Ātman — and so there would be non-difference even before (salvation) from that (*parimāna*). Therefore, there would not be the body-dimension of Ātman. So, this view of the Jainas is nothing but absurd. ॥ 34 ॥

Here ends the Ekasminnasaṁbhavādhikaraṇa (6)

(Not) of (Paśu-) pati, on account of the absurdity ॥ 35 ॥ (Adhikaraṇa 7, Sūtras 35–38)

[322] It has been stated that the doctrines of Kapila, Kaṇāda, Buddha, and Jina being absurd and being outside the pale of the Vedas, should not be respected by those craving for (true) salvation. Now it is stated that the doctrine of Paśupati, being opposed to the Veda and being absurd, is also not fit to be respected. There are four (schools of the) followers of that view—Kāpālas, Kālāmukhas, Pāśupatas, and Saivas. And all these postulate details about reality, and ideas about the means (of securing) bliss in this world as also in the other world, opposed to the Vedas. And they speak of the difference between the instrument and the material and Paśupati as the instrumental cause. Similarly, the means of securing salvation also is, wearing the sixfold Mudrā badges etc.,— as say the Kāpālas.—

> *'He who knows the essence of the sixfold Mudrā badges, who is expert in the highest Mudrā attains to salvation, meditating upon himself, occupying the Bhaga posture*
>
> *They speak of the sixfold Mudrā badges as— the necklace and Rucaka as well, ear-ring, as also the crest-jewel, ashes and the sacred thread— And he with the body marked with these, is not born here again.'*

इत्यादि। तथा कालामुखा अपि कपालपात्रभोजनशवभस्मस्नानतत्प्राशनलगुडधारणसुराकुम्भस्थापनतदाधारदेवपूजादिकमैहिकामुष्मिकसकलफलसाधनमभिदधति।

'रुद्राक्षकङ्कणं हस्ते जटा चैका च मस्तके।
कपालं भस्मना स्नानम्...'

इत्यादि च प्रसिद्धं शैवागमेषु। तथा केनचित्क्रियाविशेषेण विजातीयानामपि ब्राह्मण्यप्राप्तिमुत्तमाश्रमप्राप्तिं चाहुः

'दीक्षाप्रवेशमात्रेण ब्राह्मणो भवति क्षणात्।
कापालं व्रतमास्थाय यतिर्भवति मानवः॥'

इति।

तत्रेदमुच्यते— 'पत्युरसामञ्जस्यात्' इति। 'नैकस्मिन्नसंभवात्', इत्यतो नेत्यनुवर्तते। पत्युः— पशुपतेः, मतं नादरणीयम्। कुतः? असामञ्जस्यात्। असामञ्जस्यं चान्योन्यव्याघाताद्वेदविरोधाच्च। मुद्रिकाषट्कधारणभगासनस्थात्मध्यानसुराकुम्भस्थापनतत्स्थदेवतार्चनगूढाचारश्मशानभस्मस्नानप्रणवपूर्वाभिध्यानानि, अन्योन्यविरुद्धानि। वेदविरुद्धं चेदं तत्त्वपरिकल्पनमुपासनमाचारश्च। वेदाः खलु परं ब्रह्म नारायणमेव जगन्निमित्तमुपादानं च वदन्ति

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etc. Similarly the Kālāmukhas also speak of as the means of securing all fruit in this world as well in the other world — eating in the skull-vessels; bath by the ashes from the corpse, (and) eating of it, wearing the staff, keeping up a pot of wine, and worship of the gods with that as an altar, etc.—

'The bracelet of the rosary of beads in the hand, and one mass (knot) of matted hair, on the head, the skull and the bath with the ashes...'

etc.; this it is all known in the Books describing the Saiva philosophy— Likewise by some sort of special operation, they speak of even persons belonging to other castes securing the status of a Brāhmaṇa and securing the highest stage in life in

'One becomes a Brāhmaṇa in a moment by merely becoming initiated; a human being becomes an ascetic by adhering to the Kāpāla vow.'

—There this is said (in reply) '(Not) of (Paśu)pati on account of the absurdity.' The word Na continues from (the Sūtra) 'Not in one, on account of the impossibility.' Patyuḥ—of Paśupati — this view should not be respected. Whence? On account of the absurdity. And the absurdity is there on account of mutual hittings (fault-findings) and opposition to the Vedas. The wearing of the six Mudrā badges; contemplation upon oneself seated in the Bhaga-posture; keeping up a pot of wine; worshipping the deity placed upon it; secret practices; bath with the ashes in the cemetery; meditation preceded by (the utterance of) Om,— these are mutually contradictory. And this postulating of the Reality is opposed to the Vedas, as also the worship and practice. The Vedas, indeed, speak of the Highest Brahman, Nārāyaṇa alone, as the instrumental as well as the material cause of the world—

'नारायणपरं ब्रह्म तत्त्वं नारायणः परः' (म. ना. १३।१)

'नारायणपरो ज्योतिरात्मा नारायणः परः' (म. ना. १३।१)

'तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति' (छा. ६।२।३)

'सोऽकामयत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति' (तै. २।६)

'तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत' (तै. २।७।१)

इत्यादयः। परब्रह्मभूतपरमपुरुषवेदनमेव च मोक्षसाधनमुपासनं वदन्ति

'वेदाहमेतं पुरुषं महान्तमादित्यवर्णं तमसस्तु पारे' (तै आ. ३।११)

'तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति नान्यः पन्था अयनाय विद्यते'। (तै आ. ३।११)

इत्यादिना, एकतां गताः सर्वे वेदान्ताः। तदितिकर्तव्यताभूतं कर्म च वेदविहितवर्णाश्रमसंबन्धि यज्ञादिकमेव वदन्ति

'तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसानाशकेन। ... एतमेव लोकमिच्छन्तः प्रव्राजिनः प्रव्रजन्ति' (बृ. ४।४।२२)

'Brahman, constituted of Nārāyana, is the Reality, Nārāyana the Highest.' (Ma. Nā. 13·1)

'The light is constituted of Nārāyana, the Ātman, the Highest Nārāyana' (Ma. Nā. 13 1)

'It reflected— May I be many; may I procreate' (Chā. 6·2 3)

'He desired— May I be many, may I procreate' (Tai. 2 6)

'It modified of its own accord, the Ātman' (Tai. 2·7·1)

etc. All Upanisadic passages agreeing (whole-heartedly) with

'I knew this Purusa, great, Āditya-coloured and beyond the darkness' (Tai. Ā. 3·11)

'Knowing him thus, he becomes immortal here, no other path exists for going away' (Tai. Ā. 3·11)

etc. speak of worship, as the means of salvation— the knowledge of (surrendering to) the highest Purusa alone, who has become the Highest Brahman. And passages like

'Him of this nature, Brāhmanas desire to know, by the recitation of the Vedas, by sacrifice, by gifts, by imperishable penance... desiring for such world alone, wander about, ascetics renouncing the world' (Br 4·4 22)

speak of sacrifice etc., connected with caste and stage of life, ordained by the Vedas, as the (religious) act which is prescribed as what is to be done.

इत्यादयः । केवलपरतत्त्वप्रतिपादनपरनारायणानुवाकसिद्धतत्त्वपराः केषुचिदुपासनादि-विधिपरेषु वाक्येषु श्रुताः प्रजापतिशिवेन्द्राकाशप्राणादिशब्दा इति,

'शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववत्' (ब्र. सू. १।१।३१)

इत्यत्र प्रतिपादितम् । तथा

'एको ह वै नारायण आसीन्न ब्रह्मा नेशानः' (महा. १)

इत्यारभ्य

'स एकाकी न रमेत' (महा. १)

इति सृष्टिवाक्योदितं स्रष्टारं नारायणमेव समानप्रकरणस्थाः

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' (छा. ६।२।१)

इत्यादिषु साधारणाः सद्ब्रह्मादिशब्दाः प्रतिपादयन्ति, इति

'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' (ब्र. सू. १।१।२)

इत्यत्र प्रतिपादितम् । अतः, वेदविरुद्धतत्त्वोपासनानुष्ठानाभिधानात्पशुपतिमतमनादरणीयमेव ॥ ३५ ॥

अधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३६ ॥

[323] वेदबाह्यानामनुमानाद्धि केवलनिमित्तेश्वरकल्पना । तथा सति दृष्टानुसारेण कुलालादिवदधिष्ठानं कर्तव्यम् । न च कुलालादेर्मृदाद्यधिष्ठानवत्पशुपतेर्निमित्तभूतस्य

It has been propounded in the Sūtra—

'The instruction is from the Śāstric point of view, as in the case of Vāmadeva' (Bra. Sū. I. 1·31)

that the words Prajāpati, Siva, Indra, Ākāśa, Prāṇa etc., known from the Sruti in some passages dealing with the injunctions about worship etc., refer to the Reality proved in the chapters dealing with Nārāyaṇa, devoted to the propounding of only the highest Reality. Similarly beginning with

'One alone, verily, was Nārāyaṇa; neither Brahmadeva, nor Īśāna (Śiva)' (Mahā. 1)

in

'He, alone, could not find enjoyment' (Mahā. 1)

the words Sat, Brahman, etc., common to

'The existent alone, gentle one, was this in the beginning' (Chā. 6·2·1)

etc., being found in the same context, propound Nārāyaṇa himself, the creator ushered in passages dealing with creation— This has been propounded in (the Sūtra)

'From whom, the origination etc., of this.' (Bra. Sū. I. 1·2)

Therefore, the doctrine of Paśupati is certainly not to be respected, owing to the mention of acts of worship of Reality, opposed to the Vedas. ॥ 35 ॥

And on account of the impropriety of (Īśvara being) the supervising agency ॥ 36 ॥

[323] In the case of those opposed to the Vedas, the postulation of [illegible] inference. That being [illegible] potter etc, in con- [illegible] *potter etc., being the* supervising agency of earth etc., can Paśupati, the instrumental cause, appropriately be the supervising agency of the Pradhāna, on account of his being

प्रधानाधिष्ठानमुपपद्यते, अशरीरत्वात्। सशरीराणामेव हि कुलालादीनामधिष्ठानशक्तिर्दृष्टा। न चेश्वरस्य सशरीरत्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्, तच्छरीरस्य सावयवस्य नित्यत्वेऽनित्यत्वे च

'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्' (ब्र सू १।१।३)

इत्यत्र (पृ २१२) दोषस्योक्तत्वात् ॥ ३६ ॥

करणवच्चेन्न भोगादिभ्यः ॥ ३७ ॥

यथा भोक्तुर्जीवस्य करणकलेवराद्यधिष्ठानमशरीरस्यैव दृश्यते, तद्वन्महेश्वरस्याप्यशरीरस्य प्रधानाधिष्ठानमुपपद्यत इति चेत्— न, भोगादिभ्यः। पुण्यपापरूपकर्मफलभोगार्थं पुण्यपापरूपादृष्टकारितं हि तदधिष्ठानम्। तद्वत्पशुपतेरपि पुण्यपापरूपादृष्टवत्तया तत्फलभोगादि सर्वं प्रसज्येत। ततो नाधिष्ठानसंभवः ॥ ३७ ॥

अन्तवत्त्वमसर्वज्ञता वा ॥ ३८ ॥

वाशब्दश्चार्थे। पशुपतेः पुण्यपापरूपादृष्टवत्त्वे जीववत्, अन्तवत्त्वम्, सृष्टिसंहारास्पदत्वम्, असर्वज्ञता च स्यादित्यनादरणीयमेवेदं मतम्।

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without a body For, in the case of the potter etc, only when they are possessed of bodies, is seen the power of a supervising agency Not again, in the case of the Lord, is his being possessed of a body, to be admitted on account of the blemish involved in his body,— whether eternal or non-eternal,— being possessed of parts,— spoken of (p 212) in (the Sūtra)

'*Because Sāstra is the cause*' (Bra. Su I 1 3)

॥ 36 ॥

If like the sense organs — No, on account of the enjoyment etc ॥ 37 ॥

If (it be argued) that just as in the case of the enjoyer, the Jiva, although not possessed of a body is seen the supervising of sense-organs and the body,— in the same way, in the case of the great Iśvara, though not possessed of a body, is appropriate his supervising over the Pradhāna— (we reply)— No, on account of the enjoyment etc For that supervising agency is caused by the Unseen constituted of merit and demerit, for the sake of the enjoyment of the fruit of Karman constituted of merit and demerit Like that, in the case of Pasupati also, would be forthcoming on account of his being possessed of Unseen constituted of merit and demerit, all the enjoyment etc, of the fruit of that Therefore (there is) no possibility of any supervising agency (existing) ॥ 37 ॥

And having an end or absence of omniscience ॥ 38 ॥

The word Vā is in the sense of Ca (and) If Paśupati were to be possessed of the Unseen constituted of merit and demerit, there would be as in the case of the Jiva — having an end, being subject to creation and dissolution and absence of omniscience, and so, this doctrine is definitely not to be respected

'विरोधे त्वनपेक्षं स्यात्' (जै. सू. १।३।३)

इत्यादिना वेदविरुद्धस्यानादरणीयत्वे सिद्धेऽपि पशुपतिमतस्य वेदविरुद्धताख्यापनार्थम्

'पत्युरसामञ्जस्यात्' (ब्र. सू. २।२।३५)

इति पुनरारम्भः। यद्यपि पाशुपतशैवयोर्वेदाविरोधिन इव केचन धर्माः प्रतीयन्ते, तथापि वेदविरुद्धनिमित्तोपादानभेदकल्पनापरावरतत्त्वव्यत्ययकल्पनामूलत्वात्, सर्वमसमञ्जसमेव, इत्यसामञ्जस्यादित्युक्तम् ॥ ३८ ॥

पशुपत्याधिकरणं समाप्तम् (७)

उत्पत्त्यसंभवात् ॥ ३९ ॥ (अधिकरण ८, सूत्राणि ३९–४२)

[324] कपिलादितन्त्रसामान्याद्भगवदभिहितपरमनिःश्रेयससाधनावबोधिनि पञ्चरात्रतन्त्रेऽप्यप्रामाण्यमाशङ्क्य निराक्रियते। तत्रैवमाशङ्क्यते—

परमकारणात्परब्रह्मभूताद्वासुदेवात्संकर्षणो नाम जीवो जायते। संकर्षणात्प्रद्युम्न-संज्ञं मनो जायते। तस्मादनिरुद्धसंज्ञोऽहंकारो जायते, इति हि भागवतप्रक्रिया। अत्र जीवस्योत्पत्तिः श्रुतिविरुद्धा प्रतीयते। श्रुतयो हि जीवस्यानादित्वं वदन्ति

Although it has been established in

'When there is a conflict (with the Śruti) (the Smṛti) would be without scope' (Jai. Sū. 1·3·3)

etc., that something opposed to the Vedas is not fit to be respected; in order to announce that the Paśupati doctrine is opposed to the Vedas, there is again the attempt in (the Sūtra).

'(Not) of (Paśu-) pati, on account of the absurdity'. (Bra. Sū. II. 2·35)

Although certain features in the doctrines of the Pāśupatas and Saivas are apprehended as not quite opposed to the Vedas, still on account of these being based on the postulating of the difference between the instrumental cause and the material cause, and the topsy-turvy idea of high and low entities, opposed to the Vedas, everything is nothing but absurd,— this has been said in (the Sūtra), on account of the absurdity. ॥ 38 ॥

Here ends the Paśupatyadhikaraṇa (7)

On account of the impossibility of origination ॥ 39 ॥
(Adhikaraṇa 8, Sūtras 39–42)

[324] Having (first) raised a doubt about the authoritative nature also of the doctrine of the Pañcarātras, which teaches the means of the highest bliss, mentioned by the Lord, on account of its being on the same level as the system of Kapila and others— that is (now) being removed. In this connection this is the doubt raised—

From Vāsudeva, the original cause, who is the Highest Brahman, is born Jīva by name Saṅkarsana; from Saṅkarṣaṇa is born the Mind bearing the appellation Pradyumna; from him is born the Ahaṁkāra called Aniruddha.— this, indeed, is the theory of the Bhāgavatas. Here is apprehended the origination of the Jīva, which is opposed to the Śruti; for, the Srutis

'न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चित्' (का २।१७)
इत्याद्याः ॥ ३९ ॥

न च कर्तुः करणम् ॥ ४० ॥

संकर्षणात्प्रद्युम्नसंज्ञं मनो जायत इति कर्तुर्जीवात्करणस्य मनस उत्पत्तिर्न संभवति

'एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च' (मु २।१।३)

इति परस्मादेव ब्रह्मणो मनसोऽप्युत्पत्तिश्रुतेः। अतः श्रुतिविरुद्धार्थप्रतिपादनादस्यापि तन्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं प्रतिषिध्यत इति ॥ ४० ॥

[325] एवं प्राप्ते, प्रचक्ष्महे—

विज्ञानादिभावे वा तदप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४१ ॥

वाशब्दात्पक्षो विपरिवर्तते। विज्ञानं चादि चेति परं ब्रह्म विज्ञानादि। संकर्षणप्रद्युम्नानिरुद्धानामपि परब्रह्मभावे सति तत्प्रतिपादनपरस्य शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं न प्रतिषिध्यते। एतदुक्तं भवति—

भागवतप्रक्रियामजानतामिदं चोद्यं यज्जीवोत्पत्तिर्विरुद्धाभिहितेति। वासुदेवाख्यं परं ब्रह्मैवाश्रितवत्सलं स्वाश्रितसमाश्रयणीयत्वाय स्वेच्छया चतुर्धावतिष्ठते, इति हि तत्प्रक्रिया। यथा पौष्करसंहितायाम्

'*The wise one* (*Jiva*) *is neither born, nor dies*' (Kā 2·17)
etc, speak of the beginninglessness of the Jiva ‖ 39 ‖

Not again, from the agent, the instrument ‖ 40 ‖

From the Jiva, the agent, is not possible the origination of mind, the instrument as (stated in)— From Sankarsana is born the Mind bearing the appellation Pradyumna— on account of the origination of even the mind from the Highest Brahman itself being described in the Sruti—

'*From this one is born the Prana, mind and all the sense-organs*' (Mu 2·1·3)

Therefore, on account of the propounding of something opposed to the Srutis the authoritative nature of this system also is repudiated ‖ 40 ‖

[325] This (prima facie view) being reached, we say (in reply)—

But, on account of (their having) the nature of Vijñāna etc., no repudiation of that ‖ 41 ‖

On account of the word Vā the view is turned away. Vijñānādi— Vijñanam ca ādi ca— (Vijñāna, the original) the Highest Brahman When Sankarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha also are possessed of the nature of the Highest Brahman, the authority of the Sāstra aiming at propounding the same cannot be repudiated This is what is intended to be said—

This argument against, viz the origination of the Jiva is spoken of as opposed (to the Srutis), is (advanced) by those who have not understood the Bhāgavata theory For, that (Bhāgavata) theory is— The Highest Brahman itself called Vāsudeva affectionate towards those resorting to it, stays fourfold by its sweet will, as being fit to be resorted to by those resorting to it, as (is stated) in the *Pauskara-samhitā*—

'कर्तव्यत्वेन वै यत्र चातुरात्म्यमुपासते ।
क्रमागतैः स्वसंज्ञाभिर्ब्राह्मणैरागमं तु तत् ॥'

इत्यादि । तच्च चातुरात्म्योपासनं वासुदेवाख्यपरब्रह्मोपासनमिति सात्वतसंहितायामुक्तम्

'ब्राह्मणानां हि सद्ब्रह्मवासुदेवाख्ययाजिनाम् ।
विवेकदं परं शास्त्रं ब्रह्मोपनिषदं महत् ॥'

इति । तद्धि वासुदेवाख्यं परं ब्रह्म संपूर्णषाड्गुण्यवपुः सूक्ष्मव्यूहविभवभेदभिन्नं यथाधिकारं भक्तैर्ज्ञानपूर्वेण कर्मणाभ्यर्चितं सम्यक्प्राप्यते । विभवार्चनाद्व्यूहं प्राप्य व्यूहार्चनात्परं ब्रह्म वासुदेवाख्यं सूक्ष्मं प्राप्यते, इति वदन्ति । विभवो हि नाम रामकृष्णादिप्रादुर्भावगणः । व्यूहो वासुदेवसंकर्षणप्रद्युम्नानिरुद्धरूपश्चतुर्व्यूहः । सूक्ष्मं तु केवलषाड्गुण्यविग्रहं वासुदेवाख्यं परं ब्रह्म । यथा पौष्करे

'यस्मात्सम्यक्परं ब्रह्म वासुदेवाख्यमव्ययम् ।
तस्मादवाप्यते शास्त्राज्ज्ञानपूर्वेण कर्मणा ॥'

इत्यादि । अतः संकर्षणादीनामपि परस्यैव ब्रह्मणः स्वेच्छाविग्रहरूपत्वात्

'Where, indeed, is worshipped the fourfold Ātman as a matter of duty by the Brāhmaṇas, in their own names taken in the (proper) order, that is the Śāstra (Āgama)'

etc. And that worship of the fourfold Ātman is the worship of the highest Ātman called Vāsudeva,—this is spoken of in the *Sātvata-saṁhitā*—

'For the Brāhmaṇas, indeed, who worship the Reality, Brahman, called Vāsudeva, is the great Brahmopaniṣad, the highest Śāstra teaching discrimination.'

That Highest Brahman called Vāsudeva, indeed, with the body of the sixfold qualities in toto, differentiated by the difference— subtle, group, and glory, is well attained, being worshipped by the devotees in conformity with their qualification, with Karman preceded by knowledge. They say— After having attained to the group, from the worship of the glory (manifestation), there is secured the subtle Highest Brahman called Vāsudeva, from the worship of the Vyūha. For, Vibhava, indeed, is the host of manifestations such as Rāma, Kṛṣṇa ; Vyūha,— the fourfold group constituted of Vāsudeva, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha The Sūkṣma (subtle), on the other hand, is the Highest Brahman called Vāsudeva, having only the group of six qualities as the body. As (has been stated) in the *Pauṣkara*—

'Inasmuch as there is the highest and the good Brahman called Vāsudeva, the immutable; therefore, it is secured from the Śāstra by means of Karman preceded by knowledge'

etc. Therefore, in the case of Saṅkarṣaṇa and others also, being the form of the body taken at will by the Highest Brahman itself, there is the non-repudiation of the authoritative nature of the Śāstra describing that, on account of the mention of the origination of the aggregate of bodies at will, due to affection for those resorting to it, which is authoritatively established in the Sruti (passage) itself,

'अजायमानो बहुधा विजायते' (तै आ ३।१२)

इतिश्रुतिसिद्धस्यैवाश्रितवात्सल्यनिमित्तस्वेच्छाविग्रहसंग्रहरूपजन्मनोऽभिधानात्, तदभिधायिशास्त्रप्रामाण्यस्याप्रतिषेध इति। तत्र जीवमनोऽहंकारतत्त्वानामधिष्ठातारः संकर्षणप्रद्युम्नानिरुद्धा इति तेषामेव जीवादिशब्दैरभिधानमविरुद्धम्, यथाकाशप्राणादिशब्दैर्ब्रह्मणोऽभिधानम् ॥ ४१ ॥

विप्रतिषेधाच्च ॥ ४२ ॥

[326] विप्रतिषिद्धा हि जीवोत्पत्तिरस्मिन्नपि तन्त्रे। यथोक्तं परमसंहितायाम्

'अचेतना परार्था च नित्या सततविक्रिया।
त्रिगुणा कर्मिणा क्षेत्र प्रकृते रूपमुच्यते ॥
व्याप्तिरूपेण सम्बन्धस्तस्याश्च पुरुषस्य च।
स ह्यनादिरनन्तश्च परमार्थेन निश्चित ॥'

इति। एवं सर्वास्वपि संहितासु जीवस्य नित्यत्ववचनाज्जीवस्वरूपोत्पत्तिः पञ्चरात्रतन्त्रे प्रतिषिद्धैव। जन्ममरणादिव्यवहारस्तु लोकवेदयोर्जीवस्य यथोपपद्यते तथा

'नात्मा श्रुते' (ब्र सू २।३।१८)

इत्यत्र वक्ष्यते। अत', जीवस्योत्पत्तिस्तत्रापि प्रतिषिद्धेति जीवोत्पत्तिवादनिमित्ताप्रामाण्यशङ्का दूरोत्सारिता।

'Not being born, he is born in various ways' (Tai Ā 3 12)
There because Saṅkarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha (are respectively) the supervisors of the principles Jīva mind and Ahamkāra,—the denotation verily, of them by the words Jīva etc, is not contradictory, like the denotation of Brahman by the words Ākasa Prāna etc ॥ 41 ॥

And on account of the contradiction ॥ 42 ॥

[326] The origination of the Jīva is contradicted even in this system As has been said in the *Paramasamhita*—

(Prakrti is) non sentient, and for the sake of another, eternal with constant modification possessed of three qualities,— (such) a nature of Prakrti is the province of those who go in for Karman
There is the relation in the form of invariable concomitance, between it and the Purusa, and that (relation) is without beginning and without end, and it is (so) concluded in the light of the highest Reality

—On account of Jiva being spoken of as eternal in all the *Samhitas* without exception the origination of the nature of Jiva is certainly contradicted in the Pañcaratra system As to the practical description about origination death etc, in the world and in the Vedas of the Jīva— how it is appropriate, would be stated in (the Sutra)

'Not the Ātman on account of the Sruti (Bra Su II 3 18)

—So the origination of Jīva is refuted there as well Therefore the doubt regarding the authoritative nature (of the Pañcarātra) caused by the dispute about the origination of the Jīva, is flung far away

यच्चैव केषाञ्चिदुद्घोषः साङ्गेषु वेदेषु निष्ठामलभमानः शाण्डिल्यः पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रमधीतवानिति साङ्गेषु वेदेषु पुरुषार्थनिष्ठा न लब्धेति वचनाद्वेदविरुद्धं तन्त्रमिति, सोऽप्यनाघातवेदवचसामनाकलिततदुपबृंहणन्यायकलापानां श्रद्धामात्रविजृम्भितः । यथा

'प्रात प्रातरनृत ते वदन्ति पुरोदयाज्जुह्वति येऽग्निहोत्रम् ।'
(ऐ ब्रा ५।३१।६)

इति, अनुदितहोमनिन्दोदितहोमप्रशंसार्था, इत्युक्तम् । यथा च भूमविद्याप्रक्रमे नारदेन

'ऋग्वेद भगवोऽध्येमि यजुर्वेद सामवेदमथर्वण चतुर्थमितिहासपुराण पञ्चमम्'
(छा ७।१।२)

इत्यारभ्य, सर्वविद्यास्थानमभिधाय

'सोऽह भगवो मन्त्रविदेवास्मि नात्मवित्' (छा ७।१।३)

इति भूमविद्याव्यतिरिक्तासु सर्वासु विद्यास्वात्मवेदनालाभवचन वक्ष्यमाणभूमविद्याप्रशंसार्थं कृतम् । अथवा, अस्य नारदस्य साङ्गेषु वेदेषु यत्परतत्त्वं प्रतिपाद्यते तदलाभनिमित्तोऽयं वादः । एवमेव शाण्डिल्यस्येति पश्चाद्वेदान्तवेद्यवासुदेवाख्यपरब्रह्मतत्त्वाभिधानाद्व-

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As regards this big shout by some—Sāṇḍilya studied the Pañcarātra-śāstra, not securing any definite basis in the Vedas along with their accessories (limbs)—and so, on account of the statement—a definite basis for salvation was not secured in the Vedas with their accessories (limbs)—the (Pañcarātra) *system is opposed to the Vedas*— This *also is the* (*wanton*) display merely of faith, by those who have not even smelt (much less understood) the words of the Vedas, and who have not even the faintest idea of the series of reasonings by way of amplification of that (system) For instance,

'*Morning after morning, they speak falsehood, who sacrifice with the fire-sacrifice before the rise of the Sun*' (Ai Bra 5 31 6)

—This is stated for the sake of censure of the sacrifice before sunrise, and the praise of the sacrifice after sunrise And as for instance in the introduction to the Bhūmavidyā, by Nārada,—beginning with—

'*I study, Your Reverence, Ṛgveda, Yajurveda, Sāmaveda, Atharvana—the fourth* (*Veda*), *Itihāsa-Purāna the fifth* (*Veda*)'
(Cha 7 1·2)

and having mentioned all the different sciences, the statement about not securing the knowledge of one's own Ātman in (the study of) all Vidyās, different from the Bhūmavidyā, is made in (the passage)

'*That I, Your Reverence, am the knower of Mantras alone, not the knower of Ātman*' (Cha 7 1·3)

for the purpose of the praise of Bhūmavidyā that is going to be described Or, this discussion is due to the non-acquisition of that highest Principle which is propounded in the Vedas with their accessories, on the part of this Nārada This same (explanation is applicable in the case) of Sāṇḍilya—this is known from the mention of the highest Brahman-principle called Vāsudeva, which is fit to be known afterwards from the Vedānta Similarly, because the

गम्यते। तथा वेदार्थस्य दुर्ज्ञानतया सुखावबोधार्थशास्त्रारम्भः परमसंहितायामुच्यते

'अधीता भगवन्वेदाः साङ्गोपाङ्गाः सविस्तराः ।
श्रुतानि च मयाङ्गानि वाकोवाक्ययुतानि च ॥
न चैतेषु समस्तेषु संशयेन विना क्वचित् ।
श्रेयोमार्गं प्रपश्यामि येन सिद्धिर्भविष्यति ॥'

इति।

'वेदान्तेषु यथासारं संगृह्य भगवान्हरिः ।
भक्तानुकम्पया विद्वान्संचिक्षेप यथासुखम् ॥'

इति च। अतः स भगवान्वेदान्तवेद्यः परब्रह्माभिधानो वासुदेवो निखिलहेयप्रत्यनीककल्याणैकतानानन्तज्ञानानन्दाद्यपरिमितोदारगुणसागरः सत्यसंकल्पः, चातुर्वर्ण्यचातुराश्रम्यव्यवस्थयावस्थितान्धर्मार्थकाममोक्षाख्यपुरुषार्थाभिमुखान्भक्तानवलोक्य, अपारकारुण्यसौशील्यवात्सल्यौदार्यमहोदधिः स्वस्वरूपस्वविभूतिस्वाराधनतत्फलयाथात्म्यावबोधिनो वेदानृग्यजुःसामाथर्वभेदभिन्नानपरिमितशाखान्विध्यर्थवादमन्त्ररूपान्स्वेतरसकलसुरनरदुरवगाहांश्चावधार्य, तदर्थयाथात्म्यावबोधि पञ्चरात्रं शास्त्रं स्वयमेव निरमिमीत, इति निरवद्यम्।

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sense of the Vedas is very difficult to comprehend, the introduction of the Sāstra, for the purpose of the easy understanding of the sense, is spoken of in the *Paramasamhitā*—

'By me, Your Reverence, have been studied the Vedas, with the accessories and sub-accessories in all their details, by me also have been heard the subsidiary works embellished with logical reasoning. But in all these, I do not see anywhere, not fraught with doubt the path of salvation by which there will be the accomplishment (of my desired object)'.

And also

'The divine Hari, having duly got together the essence in the Vedāntas, summarised it for easy understanding—the wise one, feeling compassion for his devotees.'

Therefore, that divine Vāsudeva, called Parabrahman, to be known from the Vedānta, the ocean of all unlimited noble qualities such as being uniformly auspicious, endless, knowledge, bliss etc, that are the opposite of everything fit to be abandoned with thoughts fulfilled,—having beheld the devotees abiding by the arrangement of the four castes and the four stages of life, and looking up to the human purpose in life, known as duty, prosperity, desire, and salvation,—that big ocean of limitless mercy, good nature, affection and generosity,—having definitely ascertained the Vedas giving right knowledge about his own nature, his manifestations, his worship and the fruit thereof, differentiated separately as Rk, Yajus, Sāma, and Atharva, with innumerable recensions, constituted of injunctions, glorificatory passages and *Mantras*,—as extremely difficult to plunge into, by all gods and men other than himself,—himself created the Pañcarātra Sāstra correctly interpreting their sense—and so, everything is all right

[327] यत्तु परैः सूत्रचतुष्टयं कस्यचिद्विरुद्धांशस्य प्रामाण्यनिषेधपरं व्याख्यातं तत्सूत्राक्षरानुगुणं सूत्रकाराभिप्रायविरुद्धं च। तथाहि—

सूत्रकारेण वेदान्तन्यायाभिधायीनि सूत्राण्यभिधाय वेदोपबृंहणाय च भारतसंहितां शतसाहस्रिकां कुर्वता मोक्षधर्मे ज्ञानकाण्डेऽभिहितम्—

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य इच्छेत्सिद्धिमास्थातुं देवतां कां यजेत सः॥' (म. भा. १२।३२१।१)

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[327] As to (the fact) that these four Sūtras have been explained by others, as concerned with the repudiation of the authoritative nature of some contradictory details, that (is) not in conformity with the letter of the Sūtra and is contrary to the intention of the Sūtrakāra—To explain the same—

By the Sūtrakāra after having mentioned the Sūtras explaining the arguments in the Vedāntas, has been stated in the Jñāna-section in the Mokṣa-dharma, while composing the Bhāratasamhitā (the *Mahābhārata*) containing a hundred thousand (verses), for the purpose of the elucidation (amplification) of the Vedas, beginning with—

'A householder, and a Brahmacārin, a Vānaprastha, and a Saṁnyāsin—(of these) who wishes to secure the ultimate success (Mokṣa), to which deity should he sacrifice?' (MBh. 12·321·1)

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'ऋग्यजुःसामभिर्जुष्टमथर्वाङ्गिरसैस्तथा ।' (म. भा. १२।३२२।३७)
'भविष्यति प्रमाणं वा एतदेवानुशासनम् ।' (म. भा १२।३२२।४१)

इति । सांख्ययोगशब्दाभ्यां ज्ञानयोगकर्मयोगावभिहितौ । यथोक्तम्

'ज्ञानयोगेन सांख्यानां कर्मयोगेन योगिनाम् ।' (गी. ३।३)

इति । भीष्मपर्वण्यपि

'ब्राह्मणैः क्षत्रियैर्वैश्यैः शूद्रैश्च कृतलक्षणैः ।' (म. भा. ६।६२।३८)
'अर्चनीयश्च सेव्यश्च पूजनीयश्च माधवः ।
सात्वतं विधिमास्थाय गीतः संकर्षणेन यः ॥' (म. भा. ६।६२।३९)

इति । कथमेवं ब्रुवाणो बादरायणो वेदविदग्रेसरो वेदान्तवेद्यपरब्रह्मभूतवासुदेवोपासनार्चनादिप्रतिपादनपरस्य सात्वतशास्त्रस्याप्रामाण्यं ब्रूयात् ?

ननु च —

'सांख्यं योगः पञ्चरात्रं वेदाः पाशुपतं तथा ।
किमेतान्येकनिष्ठानि पृथङ्निष्ठानि वा मुने ॥' (म. भा. १२।३३७।१-२)

इत्यादिना सांख्यादीनामप्यादरणीयतोच्यते । शारीरके तु सांख्यादीनि प्रतिषिध्यन्ते ।

'Approved by Ṛk, Yajus, and Sāma; and likewise, by the Atharvāṅgiras (Atharvaveda)' (MBh. 12·322·37)

'And this doctrine alone would be authoritative.' (MBh. 12·322·41)

By the words Sāṅkhya and Yoga, are denoted the Jñānayoga and Karmayoga. As has been said

'Of the Sāṅkhyas, by the Jñānayoga; of the Yogins, by the Karmoyoga' (Gītā 3·3)

In the *Bhīsmaparvan* also,

'By the Brāhmaṇas, Ksatriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras, with the sacraments (Laksaṇa) duty performed' (MBh. 6·62·38)

'Mādhava is to be worshipped and is to be waited upon, and is to be respected,—(Mādhava) who has been glorified by Saṅkarṣaṇa after the manner of the procedure laid down in the Sātvata system' (MBh. 6·62·39)

—How could Bādarāyaṇa, the foremost of the knowers of Vedas, speak of the unauthoritative nature of the Sātvata Sāstra that aims at propounding the meditation and worship etc., of Vāsudeva who is the Highest Brahman to be known from the Vedas?

I say again (says the objector)—By passages like

'Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pañcarātra, the Vedas, likewise the Pāśupata—do these, (O) Sage, point out to one (principle) or to many (principles) separately? (MBh. 12·337 1-2)

is stated that the Sāṅkhya, and other (systems) are also fit to be respected; but in the *Śārīraka* (Sūtras, Brahmasūtras), Sāṅkhya and others are repudiated. Therefore, this system also falls in the same category as those—(We

अत इदमपि तन्त्रं तत्तुल्यम् — नेत्युच्यते । यतस्तत्रापीममेव शारीरोक्तन्यायमवतारयति । किमेतान्येकनिष्ठानि पृथङ्निष्ठानि वा ? इति प्रश्नस्यायमर्थः — किं सांख्ययोगपाशुपतवेदपञ्चरात्राण्येकतत्त्वप्रतिपादनपराणि पृथक्तत्त्वप्रतिपादनपराणि वा ? यदा, एकतत्त्वप्रतिपादनपराणि, किं तदेकं तत्त्वम् ? यदा तु पृथक्तत्त्वप्रतिपादनपराणि, तदैषां परस्परविरुद्धार्थप्रतिपादनपरत्वाद्वस्तुनि विकल्पासंभवाच्च, एकमेव प्रमाणमङ्गीकरणीयम् । किं तदेकम् ? इत्यस्योत्तरं ब्रुवन्

'ज्ञानान्येतानि राजर्षे विद्धि नानामतानि वै ।
सांख्यस्य वक्ता कपिलः' (म. भा. १२।३३७।६०)

इत्यारभ्य सांख्ययोगपाशुपतानां कपिलहिरण्यगर्भपशुपतिकृतत्वेन पौरुषेयत्वं प्रतिपाद्य

'अवान्तरतपा नाम वेदाचार्यः स उच्यते ।' (म. भा. १२।३३७।६१)

इति वेदानामपौरुषेयत्वमभिधाय

'पञ्चरात्रस्य कृत्स्नस्य वक्ता नारायणः स्वयम् ।' (म. भा १२।३३७।६३)

इति पञ्चरात्रतन्त्रस्य वक्ता नारायणः स्वयमेवेत्युक्तवान् ।

एवं वदतश्चायमाशयः – पौरुषेयाणां हि तन्त्राणां परस्परविरुद्धवस्तुवादितया-

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say) No, because there also, the (Sūtrakāra) applies this same reasoning itself stated in the Śārīra (Sūtras)—This is the purport of the question,—Are these pointing to one, or, are they pointing out to many?—Are the Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pāśupata, Veda, and Pañcarātra—Do these aim at propounding one Principle or do they aim at propounding many principles separately? If they aim at propounding one principle, what is that Principle? If, on the other hand, they aim at propounding many principles then, because they aim at propounding mutually contradictory matter, and because there cannot be any possibility of an alternative in the case of an object (in reality), one authoritative principle alone should be accepted. What is then that?—Giving answer to this—beginning with

'(O) Royal sage, know these knowledges as different views, verily: Kapila is the speaker of the Sāṅkhya' (MBh. 12·337·60)

—having declared that Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Pāśupata (systems) are human products, being composed (respectively) by Kapila, Hiranyagarbha and Paśupati, —having propounded that the Vedas are *not a human product* in (the passage)

'He is called the preceptor of the Vedas, by name 'Avāntaratapas' (MBh. 12·337·61)

he has himself stated that Nārāyana is the propounder of the Pañcarātra in

'Nārāyana himself (is) the speaker of the entire Pañcarātra'. (MBh. 12·337·63)

In speaking thus, this is his intention—Because the doctrines composed by a human agency speak of mutually contradictory things and because on account of the fact that they speak of things contrary to what are to be known from the Vedas from which every tinge of blemish such as shortcomings

पौरुषेयत्वेन निरस्तप्रमादादिनिखिलदोषगन्धवेदवेद्यवस्तुविरुद्धाभिधायित्वाच्च यथावस्थितवस्तुनि प्रामाण्यं दुर्लभम्। वेदवेद्यश्च परब्रह्मभूतो नारायणः। अतः, तत्तत्तन्त्राभिहितप्रधानपुरुषपशुपतिप्रभृतितत्त्वस्य वेदान्तवेद्यपरब्रह्मभूतनारायणात्मकतयैव वस्तुत्वमभ्युपगमनीयम्, इति। तदिदमाह

> *'सर्वेषु च नृपश्रेष्ठ ज्ञानेष्वेतेषु दृश्यते।*
> *यथागमं यथान्यायं निष्ठा नारायणः प्रभुः।'* (म. भा. १२।३३७।६३-६४)

इति। यथागमं यथान्यायम्—इति न्यायानुगृहीतं तत्तदागमोक्तं वस्तु परामृशतो नारायण एव सर्वस्य वस्तुनो निष्ठेति दृश्यते। अब्रह्मात्मकया तत्तत्तन्त्राभिहितानां तत्त्वानाम्

> *'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म'* (छा. ३।१४।१)
> *'विश्वं नारायणः'* (ना. १३)

इत्यादिना सर्वस्य ब्रह्मात्मकतामनुसंदधानस्य नारायण एव निष्ठेति प्रतीयते, इत्यर्थः। अतः, वेदान्तवेद्यः परब्रह्मभूतो नारायणः स्वयमेव पञ्चरात्रस्य कृत्स्नस्य वक्तेति तत्स्वरूपतदुपासनाभिधायि तत्तन्त्रमिति च तस्मिन्नितरतन्त्रसामान्यं न केनचिद्भावयितुं शक्यम्। अतस्तत्रैवेदमुच्यते—

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removed on account of (the Vedas) not being composed by a human agency; an authoritative nature can hardly be accepted from them in respect of the real nature of a thing. And the (entity) fit to be known from the Vedas is Nārāyana, the Highest Brahman Therefore, the various principles such as Pradhāna, Purusa, Paśupati mentioned in the various systems, must be admitted to have the nature of reality, only on the basis of their having Nārāyana as their Ātman, who is the Highest Brahman to be known from the Vedāntas. To the same effect he says—

> *'In the case of all these knowledges (systems), (O) best of kings, is seen in conformity with the Āgama (the human Śāstra) and in conformity with reasoning, that Lord Nārāyana is the ultimate End.'* (MBh. 12·337·63-64)

Yathāgamam Yathānyāyam—While considering the entity mentioned in the various Āgamas, favoured by reasoning,—it is seen that Nārāyana alone is the ultimate end (goal) of all entities The sense is—On account of the principles mentioned in the various systems not having Brahman as their Ātman, it is apprehended that Nārāyana alone is the ultimate end, owing to everything being referred to, as having Brahman as its Atman in (passages)

> *'All this, verily, (is) Brahman'* (Chā. 3·14·1)
> *'The universe, Nārāyana'.* (Nā. 13)

Therefore, because Nārāyana, the Highest Brahman and fit to be known from the Vedāntas is himself the exponent of the entire Pañcarātra, and because that system describes meditation on him and his nature;—it is not possible for anybody to regard that as being on the same level as the other systems. So, it has been stated there itself—

'एवमेकं सांख्ययोगं वेदारण्यकमेव च ।
परस्पराङ्गान्येतानि पञ्चरात्रं तु कथ्यते ॥' (म भा. १२।३३६।७६)

इति । सांख्यं च योगश्च सांख्ययोगम् । वेदाश्चारण्यकानि च वेदारण्यकम् । परस्परान्वितान्येकतत्त्वप्रतिपादनपरतयैकीभूतान्येकम् पञ्चरात्रम्, इति कथ्यते ।

एतदुक्तं भवति—सांख्योक्तानि पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वानि योगोक्तं च यमनियमाद्यात्मकं योगं वेदोदितकर्मस्वरूपाण्यङ्गीकृत्य तत्त्वानां ब्रह्मात्मकत्वं योगस्य च ब्रह्मोपासनप्रकारत्वं कर्मणां च तदाराधनरूपताममिदधति ब्रह्मस्वरूपं प्रतिपादयन्त्यारण्यकानि । एतदेव परेण ब्रह्मणा नारायणेन स्वयमेव पञ्चरात्रतन्त्रे विशदीकृतम्, इति । शारीरके च सांख्योक्ततत्त्वानामब्रह्मात्मकतामात्रं निराकृतम्, न स्वरूपम् । योगपाशुपतयोश्चेश्वरस्य केवलनिमित्तकारणता परावरतत्त्वविपरीतकल्पना वेदबहिष्कारकृताचारो निराकृतो न योगस्वरूपं पशुपतिस्वरूपं च । अतः

'सांख्यं योगः पञ्चरात्रं वेदाः पाशुपतं तथा ।
आत्मप्रमाणान्येतानि न हन्तव्यानि हेतुभिः ॥' (म भा १२।३३७।१)

इति तत्तदभिहिततत्तत्स्वरूपमात्रमङ्गीकार्यं जिनसुगताभिहिततत्त्ववत्सर्वं न बहिष्कार्य-

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'Here is stated the one Pañcarātra—the Sānkhya and the Yoga (systems) as also the Vedas and the Forest-treatises, these mixed up mutually—' (MBh 12 336 76)

Sānkhya and Yoga—Sānkhyayoga, the Vedas and the Āranyakas—Vedāranyaka, connected with each other, owing to their propounding one Principle, become one—these are spoken of as the Pañcarātra

This is what is meant to be said—The twentyfive principles mentioned in the Sānkhya (system), and the Yoga, constituted of control, regulation etc , spoken of in the Yoga (system) having accepted the nature of the Karmans put forth in the Vedas, the Āranyakas (forest-treatises) propounding the nature of Brahman mention that the Principles have Brahman as their Ātman, and Yoga is a mode of meditation on Brahman, and the Karmans have the nature of the worship of that (Brahman) And this same has been made quite clear in the Pañcarātra by Nārayana himself, the Highest Brahman In the Śārīraka (Sūtras) what is repudiated is merely the nature of the principles mentioned in the Sānkhya (system) as not having Brahman as their Ātman, and not their own nature In the case of the Yoga and the Pāśupata systems what is repudiated is — Isvara being only the instrumental cause, perverse ideas about the principles high and low, practices outside the pale of the Vedas , and not the nature of Yoga, or the nature of Paśupati Therefore, in (the passage)

'Sānkhya, Yoga, Pañcarātra, the Vedas, likewise the Pāśupata —these admitting Ātman as the Pramāna should not be attacked with logical reasonings (logical syllogisms) (MBh 12 337 1)

it is stated that only their varied natures mentioned in them are to be admitted, not is everything to be bycotted like the principles mentioned by

मित्युच्यते,

'यथागम यथान्याय निष्ठा नारायण प्रभु ।'　　(भा १२।३३७।६४)

इत्यनेनैकार्थ्यात् ॥ ४२ ॥

उत्पत्त्यसभवाधिकरण समाप्तम् (८)

इति श्रीमद्भगवद्रामानुजाचार्यविरचिते शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्ये द्वितीयाध्यायस्य द्वितीय• पाद ॥

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the Jainas and the Bauddhas, on account of this having the same sense as

'Lord Nārāyana is the ultimate End, in conformity with Āgama and in conformity with reasoning'

(MBh 12 337 64)

॥ 42 ॥

Here ends the Utpattyasambhavādhikarana (8)
Here ends the Second Quarter of the Second Chapter in the Commentary on the Sārīraka-mīmāmsā composed by the Revered Preceptor Rāmānuja

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[115] Adhikaraṇa 5 comprises eight Sūtras (5-12). The विषयवाक्य is the passage सदेव...तदैक्षत बहु स्याम् etc., from the *Chāndogya* according to most Bhāṣyakāras: Madhva refers to स एतस्मात् पुरिशयं पुरुषमीक्षते as the विषयवाक्य and remarks that Brahman being also ईक्षणीय cannot be said to be indescribable. Vallabha also regards Brahman as व्यवहार्य. There is general agreement that the Adhikaraṇa is directed against the Sāṅkhyas and shows that Pradhāna cannot be the cause of the world.

[116] The Pūrvapakṣin says that the expression सत् refers to Pradhāna. The expression इदं points out to the world as चेतनभोग्यभूतविकार, and सत् is the गुणसाम्यावस्थ-कारण, without any विशेषs, and thus there is कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वम् as also एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम् (the प्रतिज्ञा). The दृष्टान्तs, एकेन मृत्पिण्डेन etc., are the उदाहरण and कार्यत्व is the हेतु (the हेतु is implied). Thus, the important members of a *syllogism are there*—प्रतिज्ञा, हेतु and दृष्टान्त; and hence प्रधान *can be established* by inference—

The world has Pradhāna (called सत्) as the cause

Because it is the कार्य

As the jar etc., is the कार्य of the मृत्पिण्ड.

[117] The refutation of the above view is as follows—Pradhāna is अचेतन; the Sruti definitely attributes ईक्षण (which is a चेतनधर्म) to the सत्; hence प्रधान cannot be the cause of the world. Rāmānuja rightly points out that *in this* Adhikaraṇa, it is *only the interpretation of the Sruti passages* with which the Sūtrakāra is concerned; the question whether the कार्य can be विलक्षण from the कारण *is dealt with in II-1 4, logically. As regards the* Pūrvapakṣin's view that a regular inference is intended here, the reply is—No हेतु or logical mark is specifically given here, the दृष्टान्त is also not backed by any statement of the व्याप्ति; the दृष्टान्त is merely given to show how it is not impossible to understand the एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञान, even though no व्याप्ति is forthcoming, that is all.

[118] The Pūrvapakṣin argues that the expression ईक्षति can be understood *figuratively, like the expressions* तत्तेज ऐक्षत *etc. Popularly also* in expressions like 'the paddy crops are waiting for rain', a चेतनधर्म is attributed to the अचेतन entities. The answer is—ईक्षति cannot be used figuratively as the सत् is actually designated as आत्मन् by the Śruti itself. आत्मन् is definitely चेतन, and the अचेतन प्रधान can never be called आत्मन्.

[119] The Śruti explicitly says that salvation is nothing but merging into the Sat after the fall of the body. If Pradhāna were the Sat, salvation would *mean*, being merged into an अचेतन—which is quite absurd.

[120] If Sat was intended to mean Pradhāna, the Sruti would have hastened to add that one desirous of salvation should keep the सत् at arm's length—this the Sruti has not done. Hence Sat can only be Brahman.

[121] The 'एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम्' प्रतिज्ञा would be meaningless if Pradhāna were the cause of the world. सर्व includes both चेतन and अचेतन; how can चेतन be the कार्य of अचेतन? By the knowledge of the अचेतन प्रधान, the knowledge of चेतन is impossible.

[122] The Śruti points out that the चेतन-जीव merges into the Sat in the *state of deep sleep, and the सुषुप्त जीव is described as being closely associated* with the प्राज्ञ-आत्मन्. This is impossible if सत् meant Pradhāna. Sat can only mean therefore the Highest Brahman, the Puruṣottama.

The वृत्तिकार is Ṭaṅka whom Rāmānuja quotes occasionally in his Bhāṣya.

[123] In all the Śruti passages dealing with the creation, the आत्मन्, सर्वेश्वर is spoken of as the cause. गति means प्रवृत्ति.


[124] In scores of Śruti passages, सर्वज्ञत्व, सर्वशक्तिमत्त्व, सर्वाधारत्व, सत्यकामत्व etc., are described as the attributes of सत्. If the Pūrvapakṣin believes in the Śruti, he must be prepared to admit all such attributes, not only some which could be somehow or other associated with Pradhāna; no recourse to अर्धजरतीयन्याय would help him.

There is practically no controversy about the interpretation of this Adhikaraṇa. The expression अशब्दम् however calls for some comment; अशब्दम् means 'what is not substantiated by the Sruti (शब्द)', hence Pradhāna is declared by Rāmānuja to be आनुमानिक (known from inference). The *Kāthaka*, however, describes Brahman as अशब्दमस्पर्शम् (315); hence probably the Sāṅkhya is tempted to see there a reference to the Pradhāna itself, as the Pradhāna is without any Guṇas (Rāmānuja explains अशब्द as void of the ordinary Guṇas in his commentary on Brahmasūtra I. 2·2). ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् could also mean—'Brahman is not अशब्द (without any qualities) as ईक्षण is associated with it.' But this is entirely against the whole tenor of the Adhikaraṇa. The Sūtrakāta purposely has perhaps used this vague expression.

[125] The Ānandamayādhikarana comprises eight Sūtras (13–20). It is a controversial topic. Saṅkara gives two interpretations, the second of which is warmly criticised by Rāmānuja at length.

The topic dealt with is — What is referred to by Ānandamaya in the *Taittirīya*; does Anandamaya mean the inmost Ātman or the Paramātman? The Siddhānta is that Anandamaya refers to the Paramātman.

The *Taittiriya* describes the Ānandamaya Kośa (sheath) as the inmost Kośa—thus



Each succeeding Kośa is described as तस्यैष एव शारीर आत्मा यः पूर्वस्य।

and the section at the end states ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा. The Pūrvapakṣin's view is as follows :—

[126] The series of Kośas ends at the Ānandamaya; nothing is mentioned as being inside it. In expressions like जीवेन, आत्मना the Jiva and Atman are found used in case-co-ordination. Jiva is but Brahman with the अचित्, hence ईक्षापूर्विका सृष्टि can also be attributed to Jiva. So आनन्दमय is just Jiva bereft of Avidyā and Acit, that is, Brahman itself which was introduced at the beginning with ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्.

(शाखाचन्द्रन्याय — the maxim of the moon being pointed out, after having first pointed out bigger objects, the trees and the branches as the reference-points. So here the inmost Atman is described after first having described the outer sheaths अन्नमय, प्राणमय etc. It is the same as अरुन्धतीदर्शनन्याय)

[127] The expression ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा does not show that Brahman is different from आनन्दमय, as it is not definitely stated so by the Sruti as एतस्मादानन्दमयादन्योऽन्तर आत्मा ब्रह्म. Just as Jiva is described as having different limbs, head, etc., Brahman is described as having different limbs प्रिय, मोद, प्रमोद, etc. But Brahman is always अखण्डरूप.

The relevant extracts from the *Taittiriya* are given below for the proper understanding of the whole question :—

ॐ ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्। तदेषाभ्युक्ता — सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ··· तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः। आकाशाद्वायुः। वायोरग्निः। अग्नेरापः। अद्भ्यः पृथिवी। पृथिव्या ओषधयः। ओषधीभ्योऽन्नम्। अन्नात्पुरुषः। स वा एष पुरुषोऽन्नरसमयः। तस्येदमेव शिरः। अयं दक्षिणः पक्षः। अयमुत्तरः पक्षः। अयमात्मा। इदं पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा। तदप्येष श्लोको भवति। अन्नाद्वै प्रजाः प्रजायन्ते...

तस्माद्वा एतस्मादन्नरसमयात् । अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा प्राणमयः । ''' स वा एष पुरुषविध एव''' तस्य प्राण एव शिरः । व्यानो दक्षिणः पक्षः । अपान उत्तरः पक्षः । आकाश आत्मा । पृथिवी पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा । ''' तस्यैष एव शारीर आत्मा । यः पूर्वस्य ।

तस्माद्वा एतस्मात्प्राणमयात् । अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा मनोमयः । तेनैष पूर्णः । स वा एष पुरुषविध एव ''' तस्य यजुरेव शिरः । ऋग् दक्षिणः पक्षः । साम, उत्तरः पक्षः । आदेश आत्मा । अथर्वाङ्गिरसः पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा । तदप्येष श्लोको भवति । यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते । अप्राप्य मनसा सह । आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् ।। न बिभेति कदाचन ॥ तस्यैष एव शारीर आत्मा । यः पूर्वस्य ।

तस्माद्वा एतस्मान्मनोमयात् । अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः । तेनैष पूर्णः । स वा एष पुरुषविध एव ।'''तस्य श्रद्धैव शिरः । ऋतं दक्षिणः पक्षः । सत्यमुत्तरः पक्षः । योग आत्मा । महः पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा । तदप्येष श्लोको भवति । विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते । कर्माणि तनुतेऽपि च । विज्ञानं देवाः सर्वे । ब्रह्म ज्येष्ठमुपासते ॥ विज्ञानं ब्रह्म चेद्वेद । तस्माच्चेन्न प्रमाद्यति ।...तस्यैष एव शारीर आत्मा । यः पूर्वस्य ।

तस्माद्वा एतस्माद्विज्ञानमयात् । अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा, आनन्दमयः । तेनैष पूर्णः । स वा एष पुरुषविध एव । ''' तस्य प्रियमेव शिरः । मोदो दक्षिणः पक्षः । प्रमोद उत्तरः पक्षः । आनन्द आत्मा । ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा । तदप्येष श्लोको भवति । असन्नेव स भवति । असद्ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत् । अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्वेद । सन्तमेनं ततो विदुः ॥ तस्यैष एव शारीर आत्मा । यः पूर्वस्य ।

सैषा, आनन्दस्य मीमांसा भवति—

युवा स्यात्साधुयुवाध्यायकः । आशिष्ठो द्रढिष्ठो बलिष्ठः । तस्येयं पृथिवी सर्वा वित्तस्य पूर्णा स्यात् । स एको मानुष आनन्दः ।

ते ये शतं मानुषा आनन्दाः स एको मनुष्यगन्धर्वाणामानन्दः । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य ।

ते ये शतं मनुष्यगन्धर्वाणामानन्दाः । स एको देवगन्धर्वाणामानन्दः । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य ।

ते ये शतं देवगन्धर्वाणामानन्दाः । स एकः पितॄणां चिरलोकलोकानामानन्दः । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य ।

ते ये शतं पितॄणां चिरलोकलोकानामानन्दाः । स एक आजानजानां देवानामानन्दः । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य ।

ते ये शतमाजानजानां देवानामानन्दाः । स एकः कर्मदेवानां देवानामानन्दः । ये कर्मणा देवान-पियन्ति । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य ।

ते ये शतं कर्मदेवानां देवानामानन्दाः । स एको देवानामानन्दः । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य ।

ते ये शतं देवानामानन्दाः । स एक इन्द्रस्यानन्दः । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य ।

ते ये शतमिन्द्रस्यानन्दाः । स एको बृहस्पतेरानन्दः । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य ।

ते ये शतं बृहस्पतेरानन्दाः । स एकः प्रजापतेरानन्दः । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य ।

ते ये शतं प्रजापतेरानन्दाः । स एको ब्रह्मण आनन्दः । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य ।

Thus if मानुष-आनन्दः is taken as the unit,

मनुष्यगन्धर्व-आनन्दः	—	100	मानुष-आनन्दs	
देवगन्धर्व-आनन्दः	—	100^2	,,	100×100
चिरलोकलोकपितृ-आनन्दः	—	100^3	,,	$100 \times 100 \times 100$
आजानजदेव-आनन्दः	—	100^4	,,	

कर्मदेव–आनन्दः	—	100^5	मानुष-आनन्दs
देव–आनन्दः	—	100^6	,,
इन्द्र–आनन्दः	—	100^7	,,
बृहस्पति–आनन्दः	—	100^8	,,
प्रजापति–आनन्दः	—	100^9	,,
ब्रह्मणः आनन्दः	—	100^{10}	,,

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* ब्रह्मानन्द is only 100^6 मानुष-आनन्द (the student should read in this connection the article by *R. D. Karmarkar, published in B. O. R. I.* Vol. XXVIII. Pp. 281–288).

	अन्नरसमयः	प्राणमयः	मनोमयः	विज्ञानमयः	आनन्दमयः	
शिरः	इदमेव	प्राणः	यजुः	श्रद्धा	प्रियम्	
दक्षिणः पक्षः	अयं	व्यानः	ऋक्	ऋतम्	मोदः	
उत्तरः पक्षः	अयं	अपानः	साम	सत्यम्	प्रमोदः	पुरुषविधत्व
आत्मा	अयं	आकाशः	आदेशः	योगः	आनन्दः	
पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा	इदं	पृथिवी	अथर्वाङ्गिराः	महः	ब्रह्म	

The Pūrvapakṣin further argues—

[**128**] The Śruti passage असन्नेव स भवति, असद्ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत्, etc., shows that ब्रह्मज्ञान and ब्रह्माज्ञान *mean* आत्मासद्भाव and आत्मसद्भाव; *such a statement is not found* in the case of ज्ञान and अज्ञान of the आनन्दमय, so ब्रह्मन् is different from आनन्दमय. If we look carefully into the statement of the Śruti, we find that पृथिवी, महः etc., are also called पुच्छ and प्रतिष्ठा and *those statements are followed by* अन्नाद्वै प्रजाः प्रजायन्ते etc., thus showing that पृथिवी etc., do not point out to पुच्छ only, but to the अन्नमयपुरुष etc. So, असन्नेव etc., do not point out to any पुच्छ other than आनन्दमय. It is just a figurative description. You cannot say that Brahman has no अवयवs, for in that case Brahman cannot be पुच्छ either. So आनन्दमय simply means आनन्द itself and प्रत्यगात्मन् can very well be आनन्दमय.

[**129**] The Siddhānta is that आनन्दमय is the परमात्मन्—

(1) The आनन्द of Brahman is described as most extensive repeatedly in the Sruti. Such an आनन्द cannot be attributed to Jīva.

(2) *आनन्दमय is inside, and therefore different from the विज्ञानमय meaning* जीव possessed of विज्ञान or बुद्धि. An entity which is constituted of विज्ञान must obviously be different from विज्ञान. (It is true प्राणमय has to be taken to mean प्राण only, for the usual sense of मय—constituted of—is impossible there. But विज्ञानमय can be explained in the normal way). The Sruti uses the expression विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते—this is to be explained as follows—Often a धर्म denotes the धर्मिन् ; विज्ञान, a धर्म, can refer to one possessed of विज्ञान; or विज्ञान can be taken in the sense of an agent as the Lyut termination has more than one sense; or just as नन्दन

means नन्दयतीति, so विज्ञान means विजानातीति, that is, the जीव who is चेतन. Hence the division विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च met with in the Śruti means really चेतन and अचेतन. In certain recensions विज्ञान is used in place of आत्मन्. So विज्ञान means विज्ञातृ, just as in the Śruti itself अन्न means अन्नरसमय. The Sūtrakāra himself in भेदव्यपदेशात् (I. 1-18) explicitly shows that Jiva is different from the Paramātman.

(3) (P. 271) The objector:—If Jiva is different from the Paramātman, how can the सामानाधिकरण्य in जीवेन, आत्मना and तत्त्वमसि be explained? So it is better to hold that जीव is the आनन्दमय.

The Siddhāntin:—The Śruti tells us that the wonderful world was created by the Highest, from mere संकल्प. Jīva is चेतन and can have संकल्प, but how can Jiva even in the pure state, create such a world? Actually, the Sūtrakāra would tell us in Adhyāya IV, that tha Released soul has no jurisdiction over the creation of the world. How can the miserable, despicable Jīva be equated with Brahman, the mine of auspicious qualities? Possibly the objector might say that one of the two is Mithyā. We ask him the question, which one is Mithyā—the हेयसंबन्ध, or being the mine of auspicious qualities in the case of Brahman? Now (to start with) हेयसंबन्ध is obviously due to Brahman being the resort of Avidyā; and being the resort of Avidyā, and being the mine of auspicious qualities are quite inconsistent.

The objector:— That is why I say that the हेयसंबन्ध is मिथ्या.

The Siddhāntin:—This does not help your position at all. You hold that the Sāstra aims at driving away the मिथ्या हेयसंबन्ध which is not the पुरुषार्थ, but this cannot be there in the face of the uniform auspicious nature of Brahman.

(P. 273) The objector:—I admit that this is an impossible position But in view of the Śruti statement तत्त्वमसि and एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम्, Brahman and Jiva have got to be regarded as identical and to regard Brahman as the resort of Avidyā appears to show the only way out of the difficulty.

The Siddhāntin :—It is wrong to take to an illogical position even to make the Śruti passages consistent. If you hold that हेयसंबन्ध is real and कल्याणैकतानत्व is false, you make your position more absurd. If the Śāstra, out to destroy all ताप due to हेयसंबन्ध, were to tell us that हेयसंबन्ध is real and कल्याणैकतानत्व is just illusion, then the less we look to the Śāstra for guidance, the better for all of us!

The objector :— I now say that Brahman is निर्विशेष and चिन्मात्र only, and everything else — जीवत्व, सत्यसंकल्पत्व, जगत्कारणत्व, कल्याणगुणाकरत्व etc., is false.

The Siddhāntin :—This would make your position most absurd. What about the एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम्? If everything else is false, there is no ज्ञातव्य left! If the सर्वविज्ञान is परमार्थविषय, like the एकविज्ञान, then only it can be known. Surely, by knowing the real शुक्ति, you cannot know the unreal रजत!

[130] The objector :— You are deliberately misunderstanding me. एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम् means simply-Brahman is निर्विशेष, and so everything else is known as असत्य.

[132] The objector:—My contention is as follows—A सामानाधिकरण्य involves more than one entity or word. Just as घट is different from पट, an entity characterised by one विशेषण is bound to be different from one characterised by another विशेषण. Therefore though the words are put in the same case, they can denote ऐक्य only after propounding the nature of the entity through the विशेषणs.

The Siddhāntin:—The above procedure is valid only when the different धर्मs cannot be thought of together in one and the same entity. In नीलमुत्पलम्, दण्डिन् etc., there is no विरोध between the धर्मs, on the contrary, the expressions do tell us of the entity as possessed of the धर्मs. Otherwise, there is no point in having more than one word to describe an entity, if only स्वरूपमात्र is aimed at; one word could easily do that; if another word is needed, that means that the स्वरूप is सविशेष. In सोऽयं देवदत्त., which is the basis of recognition, the देशद्वयसंबन्धविरोध is easily removed by understanding the कालभेद. That shows that सामानाधिकरण्य as a rule denotes एकार्थ as particularised by one or more विशेषणs. Jaimini also endorses this view, when he tells us that the object is one when जाति and गुण are known to refer to one and the same action.

[133] The objector:—I understand the injunctive passage अरुणया, एकहायन्या गवा सोमं क्रीणाति as under:—I agree, अरुणया denotes the reddish colour right up to the substance (cow), as a Guna is only a mode of the substance· still the red colour cannot as a rule be connected with the एकहायनी (one-year-old cow). You cannot have two sentences out of the passage—he purchases (Soma) by the one-year-old cow; and he purchases by the reddish colour—So अरुणया must mean reddish colour, inclusive of the whole object enjoined (the feminine gender connotes all prescribed substances). So, the reddish colour cannot be connected as a rule with the one-year-old.

The Siddhāntin.—अरुणया (denoting the द्रव्य particularised by the reddish colour) and एकहायन्या (denoting the द्रव्य) being put in the same case, point out to अर्थैकत्व, the word अरुणया also points out the विशेषणविशेष्यभाव (between गुण and द्रव्य) and both these can be connected with the क्रयाख्यकर्मन् without any conflict. The connection with क्रयकर्मन् of एकहायनी is understood from the वाक्य, but not the connection with the reddish colour; thus no question of वाक्यार्थद्वय can arise. अरुणया denotes अरुणिमविशिष्टद्रव्य and एकहायनी denotes एकहायनीमात्र, so that सामानाधिकरण्य means विशिष्टद्रव्यैक्य which is known from different words Thus रक्तः पटो भवति is one वाक्य, because it gives the एकार्थ—the cloth is there, the connection with the red colour is known from the word रक्त itself. So सामानाधिकरण्य points out to सर्वविशेषणविशिष्ट-एकार्थ. काष्ठैः स्थाल्याम्, ओदनं पचेत्—here there is no difficulty in understanding simultaneously one क्रिया denoted by many कारकs.

[134] As to the contention of the objector, that where the द्रव्य is actually mentioned, the गुणशब्द should point out only to गुण,—अरुणया should only point out to the reddish colour—, our reply is, this is nowhere the experience. पटः शुक्लः—here we understand a piece of cloth characterised by whiteness, not merely whiteness: पटस्य शुक्लः—here शुक्ल means the white colour, but that is on account of the fact that पटस्य and शुक्लः are not in the same case, *not because* पट

[135] The Pūrvapakṣin—आनन्दमय is described here as शारीर आत्मा (who can only be जीव, being connected with the body); so आनन्दमय can not be different from Jiva.

The Siddhāntin—The expression शारीर आत्मा is used in the Section concerned, in connection with all the कोशs, and means Paramātman only. The *Subāla-śruti* also speaks *of all* तत्त्वs, पृथिवी, *etc., as the* शरीर *of the Paramātman.* The Vedānta-Śāstra is called शारीरशास्त्र, because शारीर means Paramātman (इदं परं ब्रह्माधिकृत्य प्रवृत्तं शास्त्रं शारीरकम्).

[136] The Pūrvapakṣin—आनन्दमय cannot be other than जीव, because मय, according to Pāṇini, means विकार (Paramātman cannot be a विकार). Though मय is also used in the sense of प्राचुर्य, that meaning does not suit here. The series of the कोशs starts with अन्नमय which can only mean 'constituted of Anna, that is, a विकार of Anna', so the same sense must be resorted to in the case of the subsequent मय series. Even if प्राचुर्य is taken to be the sense, आनन्दमय would mean 'full of a lot of bliss', which certainly implies some misery—may be a very small portion—which can not exist in the Paramātman. In popular parlance also (e. g. पर्णमयी जुहू, दर्भमयी रशना) मय is used very frequently in the sense of विकार. In the case of जीव, his संसारित्वावस्था is the विकार and so, आनन्दमय is Jīva.

(P. 292) The Siddhāntin—We agree that मय means both विकार and प्राचुर्य. But what sense suits a particular expression would depend upon propriety, impossibility, other means of proof etc, and common sense generally; and not upon statistical frequency. Thus—

अन्नमय—Here मय means विकार; this is agreed to by all.

प्राणमय—Here the sense विकार is impossible, and so common sense tells us that the sense should be प्राणवृत्तिमत्ता, प्राणमय means functioning with the five—प्राण, अपान etc., just as अन्नमयः यज्ञः means 'Sacrifice abounding in food.'

Now, if मय could have the sense of प्राचुर्य in respect of प्राणमय (consistency about the sense विकार is sacrificed here already), what harm is there if आनन्दमय means आनन्दप्रचुर? आनन्दप्रचुरत्व cannot imply the existence of some misery, which is to be ascertained by another means of proof. (A word should not be burdened with more than one sense). The संसारित्वावस्था is not the विकार of जीव who is ज्ञानानन्दैकस्वरूप. In the संसारदशा the ज्ञान and आनन्द of जीव become contracted on account of his Karman. That is all.

[137] आनन्दमय is not Jīva who is आनन्दयितव्यः the आनन्दयितृ, the Paramātman, as stated in the Śruti, must be different from Jīva whom he makes full of delight.

[138] The expression in the Śruti, describing Brahman as सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं and as प्राप्य by the Jīva, shows that Jīva is different from आनन्दमय (Brahman), for प्राप्य and प्रापक must be different.

[139] The objector says that सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं can be understood to refer to शुद्धस्वरूप in the state of release, of the Jīva himself. The answer is (P. 295)

—that is inappropriate For, after all, Jīva cannot be said to be विपश्चित् fully; he is अविपश्चित् in the संसारदशा, such a truncated विपश्चित्त्व cannot be ascribed to Brahman (The Advaitin's view that Brahman is निर्विशेष is wrong. It cannot explain why the attributes ascribed to Brahman, विपश्चित्त्व, जगत्कारणत्व, आनन्दैकतानत्व etc., should have been mentioned by the Śruti at all).

[140] The Śruti definitely mentions आनन्दमय as different from अन्नमय etc. This Sūtra भेदव्यपदेशाच्च is generally held to go against the Advaita view. The Advaitin can easily explain it away by saying that it refers to व्यवहारावस्था and not to शास्त्रदृष्टि.

[141] The आनन्दमय can create from his own desire (सोऽकामयत), he requires no material like the प्रकृति of the Sāṅkhyas, to work upon (अनुमान is taken in the sense of प्रकृति or the अचेतन material. It might mean 'inference' also). Jīva cannot manage this. So आनन्दमय is different from Jīva.

[142] The Sruti says that Jīva becomes one full of Ānanda, and has his आनन्दयोग from the आनन्दमय. How can A who secures something from B, be the same as B ? The Śruti sometimes uses the expression आनन्द, and not आनन्दमय, but that need not cause any worry, for विज्ञान also is used in place of विज्ञानमय. Actually all—अन्न, प्राण, मनस्, विज्ञान are spoken of as Brahman by the Śruti, so आनन्द also refers to Brahman only. Thus आनन्दमय is different from Jīva, Pradhāna etc.

There is not much of a difference of opinion about the interpretation of the Sūtras in this Adhikaraṇa. Sūtra 18, कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा admits of some different interpretations. Madhva takes अनुमान to mean inference, and says that inference, being just a subjective matter, need not be given any importance. Śaṅkara (also Vallabha) understands Prakṛti by अनुमान This is objected to by some, on the ground that the Sāṅkhya doctrine had already been refuted in the last Adhikaraṇa. Sankara is aware of this and says ...निराकृतमपि प्रधानं पूर्वसूत्रोदाहृता कामयितृत्वश्रुतिमाश्रित्य प्रसङ्गात् पुनर्निराक्रियते गतिसामान्यप्रपञ्चनाय *Rāmānuja's interpretation—The Paramātman does not stand in need of any* Acetana material like Prakṛti, as he can create any thing by his will alone—is certainly better.

Beginning with Sūtra 12, the remaining part of the Pāda of the First Adhyāya concerns itself with the discussion of particular expressions in the Śruti-passages, which admit of more than one possible interpretation, in order to show that the expressions refer only to the Highest Brahman; thus आनन्दमय (परमात्मन् or प्रत्यगात्मन्), अन्न (परमात्मन् or हिरण्यगर्भ, अक्षिपुरुष), प्राण (परमात्मन् or प्राणदेवता), ज्योति (परमात्मन् or आदित्यादि); प्राण (परमात्मन् or वायु, देवता, जीव). This would show that the discussion is not about the choice between ब्रह्मन् and जीव only, as is understood by some, but one between ब्रह्मन् and the entities that could be उपास्य (that is, between निरुपाधिक ब्रह्मन्, and सोपाधिक ब्रह्मन्). Hence Śaṅkara is perfectly justified in the introductory observations made on this Adhikaraṇa—द्विरूपं हि ब्रह्मावगम्यते। नामरूपविकारभेदोपाधिविशिष्टं तद्विपरीतं च सर्वोपाधिविवर्जितम्। ...तत्राविद्यावस्थायां ब्रह्मण उपास्योपासकादिलक्षणः सर्वो व्यवहारः। . एवं सत्यनुभवकारणमप्यात्मज्ञानमनुपाधि-

[135] The Pūrvapaksin—आनन्दमय is described here as शारीर (who can only be जीव being connected with the body) ; so आनन्दमय can not be different from Jiva

The Siddhāntin—The expression शारीर आत्मा is used in the Sect concerned, in connection with all the कोशs, and means Paramātman only. The *Subāla-śruti* also speaks of all तत्त्वs, पृथिवी, etc, as the शरीर of the Paramātman. The Vedānta-Sāstra is called शारीरशास्त्र, because शारीर means Paramātman (ब्रह्माधिकृत्य प्रवृत्त शास्त्रं शारीरकम्)

[136] The Pūrvapaksin—आनन्दमय cannot be other than जीव because मय, according to Pānini, means विकार (Paramātman cannot be a विकार) Though मय is also used in the sense of प्राचुर्य, that meaning does not suit. The series of the कोशs starts with अन्नमय which can only mean 'constituted of Anna, that is a विकार of Anna', so the same sense must be resorted to in case of the subsequent मय series. Even if प्राचुर्य is taken to be the sense, आनन्दमय would mean 'full of a lot of bliss', which certainly implies misery—may be a very small portion—which can not exist in the Paramātman. In popular parlance also (e g पर्णमयी जुहू, दर्भमयी रशना) मय is used very frequently in the sense of विकार. In the case of जीव his संसारित्वावस्था is the विकार and आनन्दमय is Jiva

(P 292) The Siddhāntin—We agree that मय means both विकार and प्राचुर्य. But what sense suits a particular expression would depend upon propriety, impossibility, other means of proof etc, and common usage generally and not upon statistical frequency. Thus—

अन्नमय—Here मय means विकार this is agreed to by all

प्राणमय—Here the sense विकार is impossible, and so common sense that the sense should be प्राणवृत्तिमत्ता प्राणमय means full with the five—प्राण, अपान etc, just as अन्नमय यज्ञ means abounding in food

Now, if मय could have the sense of प्राचुर्य in respect of प्राणमय (concern about the sense विकार is sacrificed here already), what harm is there means आनन्दप्रचुर? आनन्दप्रचुरत्व cannot imply the existence of some misery is to be ascertained by another means of proof (A word should be burdened with more than one sense) The संसारित्वावस्था is not the state who is ज्ञानानन्दैकस्वरूप. In the संसारदशा the ज्ञान and आनन्द of जीव become contracted on account of his Karman. That is all

[137] आनन्दमय is not Jiva who is आनन्दयितव्य; the आनन्दयितृ Paramātman as stated in the Sruti, must be different from Jiva whom full of delight

[138] The expression in the Sruti, describing Brahman as and as प्राप्य by the Jiva, shows that Jiva is different from आनन्दमय (for प्राप्य and प्रापक must be different

[139] The objector says that सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं can be understood to ब्रह्मस्वरूप in the state of release of the Jiva himself. The answer

[144–45] The answer is that it is the Paramātman (परमशिव, according to श्रीकर) who is meant for qualities like अपहतपाप्मत्व can only belong to the Paramātman whose body is not कर्मवश्य (as is the case with the ordinary Jivas) but created out of his own सत्त्व and so अप्राकृत

[145 A] Sūtra 22—भेदव्यपदेशात् points out that the Sruti distinguishes clearly the Jiva from the Paramātman (The Advaitin cannot object to this for, according to him the सोपाधिकजीव is different from the निरुपाधिकजीव)

[145 B] The question is what is meant by the well-known words आकाश etc, in the various Sruti passages Do they mean Paramātman or different entities literally understood as such ?

[146] The Pūrvapaksin argues that the word आकाश means the well-known great element आकाश (आकाश can mean आत्मन् *etymologically* आप्नोति, इति, because आकाश is all-pervading) and so other characteristics like ईक्षण etc, should be understood figuratively आकाश is said to be a कार्य that only means that the स्थूलावस्था of आकाश is the कार्य and its सूक्ष्मावस्था is the कारण

(P 312) The answer is—Qualities like निखिलजगत्कारणत्व, सर्वस्माज्ज्यायस्त्व etc, can refer to the Paramātman only Simply because a word is commonly known to mean something, *that is no valid argument to ascertain its real* import, that has to be proved by other means of proof Brahman can also be called आकाश etymologically (आकाशते, आकाशयति, इति) so, आकाश refers to the Paramātman only

The eighth Adhikarana contains only one Sutra According to विज्ञानभिक्षु, the विषयवाक्य is—य एष अन्तर्हृदये आकाश and लिङ्गानि, स यथ सैन्धवि इत्युत्तरवाक्ये वक्ष्यमाण दृष्टान्तादीनि ।

[147] Adhikarana 9 contains only one Sutra the विषयवाक्य is from the *Chandogya* कतमा सा देवतेति प्राण इति The Siddhanta is—Though the word प्राण is *well-known in the sense of life-breath on which depend the stability and* activity of the entire भूतजात प्राण must refer to Brahman alone (प्राणयति सर्वाणि भूतानि) which can be the जगत्कारण and is possessed of omniscience सत्यसङ्कल्पत्व etc Madhva says विष्णुरेव प्राण अत एव, श्रीश्च ते लक्ष्मीश्च पत्न्यौ, इत्यादि तल्लिङ्गादेव विज्ञानभिक्षु refers to यदा सुप्त स्वप्न न पश्यति as the विषयवाक्य and explains लिङ्गात् as ऊर्णनाभिदृष्टान्त रूपात्

[148] Adhikarana 10 contains four Sutras (25–28) The विषयवाक्य is—यदत परो दिवो ज्योतिर्दीप्यते from the *Chāndogya* (Here for पृष्ठेष्वनुत्तमेषु read पृष्ठेषूत्तमेष्वनुत्तमेषु Like *परावर, उत्तमानुत्तम means—High and low) According to Madhva it* is दि मे कर्णौ पतयतो (explained as विष्णुरेव ज्योति । कर्णादीनां विचरणाभिधानात् ।)

The Pūrvapaksin says the word ज्योतिस् means the well-known आदित्य etc, here is no परमात्मलिङ्ग (characteristic) mentioned and the ज्योतिस् is actually identified with the digestive fire

The answer is that in the previous passages the परमपुरुष is definitely connected with द्यु, and the identification of ज्योतिस् with the digestive fire, as described in the *Gita* shows that it is परमपुरुषात्मक

विशेषद्वारेणोपदिश्यमानमप्यविवक्षितोपाधिसंबन्धविशेषं परापरविषयत्वेन संदिह्यमानं च वाक्यगतिपर्यालोचनया निर्णेतव्यं भवति।... एवमेकमपि ब्रह्मापेक्षितोपाधिसंबन्धं निरस्तोपाधिसंबन्धं चोपास्यत्वेन ज्ञेयत्वेन च वेदान्तेषूपदिश्यत इति प्रदर्शयितुं परो ग्रन्थ आरभ्यते। Sūtras 16, 17, 19 refer to the Jīva as different from Brahman, but as Śaṅkara has always maintained that Brahman is two-fold, सोपाधिक (जीव etc.), and निरुपाधिक, the Advaita doctrine is in no way affected by that. Śaṅkara is, however, obviously uneasy about the interpretation of this Adhikaraṇa, especially because the highest is called आनन्दमय and not आनन्द. Actually there is hardly any अभ्यास of the Ānandamaya and Śaṅkara does not like the मय termination to be taken in the sense of प्राचुर्य. So, taking advantage of the expression ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा, which comes at the end of the Section, Śankara very cleverly says that the matter under consideration is,—whether Brahman has Anandamaya as its ' Avayava ' or is independent of it, and suggests the interpretation of the Sūtras accordingly. All this savours of special pleading and only shows that Saṅkara is more interested in explaining the Sruti passages than the Sūtras.

Rāmānuja in his commentary on this Adhikaraṇa launches a spirited attack on the निर्विशेष Brahman of the Advaitins and treats elaborately of the सामानाधिकरण्य relation between तत् and त्वं in तत्त्वमसि. He does not cover any new ground, but merely elaborates what has been already stated in his comments on I. 1. 1. Thus the old arguments that Brahman cannot be the resort of Avidyā, for, in that case Brahman being screened by Avidyā would itself be no more, as its nature स्वप्रकाशत्व is endangered thereby, and that सामानाधिकरण्य must mean एकार्थ as particularised by the different atrributes—these are again vigorously put forth. In order to strengthen his position, Rāmānuja discusses अरुणया, एकहायन्या सोमं क्रीणाति in the light of Jaimini's criteria, and shows that there is no वाक्यभेद here, if the expression is taken to mean that the Soma is to be purchased by a one-year-old cow of reddish colour. Rāmānuja's arguments are certainly convincing enough, but they do not affect the अद्वैत doctrine. According to the later Advaitins, तत्त्वमसि is a case of what is called जहदजहल्लक्षणा —तत् and त्वं are identical, because त्वं gives up the विशिष्ट sense and only means चैतन्य like तत्. Rāmānuja naively asks—How can सर्वविज्ञान be there by एकविज्ञान or अश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति be justified—if there is only एक Brahman without any विशेष ? The answer is—सर्वविज्ञान is एकविज्ञान itself and the श्रुतं भवति does not mean the hearing of something else. Rāmānuja's solution of the problem is that प्रकारप्रकारि-भाव should be admitted and that both चेतन and अचेतन elements form the body of the Paramātman, the Puruṣottama Sūtra 16 is read as.. च गम्यते by Vallabha and ..वर्णिकमेव गीयते by Srīkara Sūtra 19—कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा is interpreted as कामश्चेतनधर्मः, अतोऽनुमानपर्यन्तमर्थमबोधयद्वाक्यं न तिष्ठतीत्यर्थः। (वल्लभ), विशेषतो विस्तरश्चानुमीयते स्मर्यते, इत्यनुमानम्, प्रधानादिकम्...नोपेक्षणीयम्। (विज्ञानभिक्षु).

[143] Adhikaraṇa 7 contains two Sūtras (21–22). The discussion centres on what is meant by अन्तरादित्ये हिरण्मयः पुरुषः and अन्तरक्षिणि पुरुषः, referred to in the *Chāndogya.* The Pūrvapakṣin argues that the expressions refer to some extraordinary Jīva having a lot of पुण्य to his credit, as his connection with the body is also mentioned.

54] According to Rāmānuja, the reference to Brahman, the worship, by words denoting Jīva and Acit, is for the purpose of ıg the three-fold worship by resorting to ब्रह्मस्वरूपानुसंधानम् (as in सर्वं ·, ·भोक्तृशरीरतया and भोग्यभोगोपकरणतया, अनुसंधानम्. Sankara gives two ons :—(1) If the objector says that Brahman is propounded here, ould be a *three-fold* उपासन—जीवोपासन, मुख्यप्राणोपासन and ब्रह्मोपासन. But rrect, for ब्रह्मोपासन is the only हिततम-उपासन (2) Even in ब्रह्मवाक्यs, istics of जीव and मुख्यप्राण are not impossible to think of; a three-प्राणधर्मेण, प्रज्ञाधर्मेण and स्वधर्मेण can be propounded. So long as ulti-ोपासन that is understood to be the हिततम, no harm is done.

arter (I.1) deals with expressions and passages where स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्ग ıd according to Śankara. Rāmānuja says that it propounds म, नारायण) as वेदान्तवेद्य.

I · 2

ter contains six Adhikaraṇas and thirty-three Sūtras.

āmānuja here summarises in an admirable manner what has ı the first Quarter. He uses as many as nine different अभ्यधायि, अवृम, उपापादिम, समादधीमहि, उदैरिम, समगस्महि, आतिष्ठामहि ly the sense —It is expounded or we expound. In the last d out—

ighest Brahman is the sole cause of Bliss and the creator world. (I-1.2)

is शास्त्रैकप्रमाण. (I-1.3)

inta passages agree in referring to such Brahman. (I-1.4)

of the world is the चेतन Brahman, not Pradhāna, as (I-1.5)

ıll of unsurpassed bliss is different from Jīva. (I-1 13)

ed of a natural unique refulgent form. (I-1.21)

a etc., mean Brahman alone. (I-1.23)

Brahman. (I-1.25)

stric point of view, the परमपुरुष can be denoted by

l Quarter deals with अस्पष्टजीवलिङ्ग passages which are ıdealing with प्रधान or क्षेत्रज्ञान्तर्भूतवस्तुविशेष. स्पष्टजीवलिङ्गवाक्यs Quarter, and in the fourth Quarter are discussed support the Vedānta tenets.

hikaraṇa contains eight Sūtras, the विषयवाक्य is सर्वं तं क्रतुं कुर्वीत मनोमयः प्राणशरीरो भारूप ... एतद्ब्रह्म from the

[149] The Pūrvapaksin argues—The previous passage refers to the Gāyatrī metre and not to the परमपुरुष.

The answer is—Gāyatrī does not mean the metre so called, because that cannot be सर्वात्मक The passage enjoins the contemplation of Brahman itself as Gāyatrī. Brahman is चतुष्पद् (one foot—all creatures, and three feet in the sky) ; Gāyatrī (usually त्रिपदा) is sometimes seen to be चतुष्पदा also, hence the identification. Similarly the Virāj metre (10 syllables in a quarter) is identified with the ten—wind, fire, the sun, the moon, water (आधिदैवत), breath, speech, eye, ear, and mind (अध्यात्म) in the संवर्गविद्या, वायु and प्राण being the संवर्गs (absorbers).

[150] The word Gāyatrī means Brahman, because it is described as having भूत, पृथिवी, शरीर and हृदय as the four feet.

The objector points out that in the previous passage ज्योतिस् is described as being '*in* the heaven'; in the present passage it is said to be '*beyond* heaven'; thus the references are different. The answer is—But there is definitely अर्थैक्यभानैक्य and there is no difficulty in recognising the same entity in both places, just as the popular expressions वृक्षाग्रे श्येनः and वृक्षाग्रात्परतः श्येनः practically mean the same thing.

[151] Adhikaraṇa 11 contains four Sūtras (29–32).

Sūtra 29 — The विषयवाक्य is प्राणोऽस्मि प्रज्ञात्मा etc., uttered by Indra in the Pratardana episode in the *Kausītakī*. मध्व refers to ता वा एताः शीर्षे श्रियाश्रिताश्च and remarks अत्रापि प्राणो विष्णुरेव, तं देवाः प्राणयन्त., इत्याद्यनुगमात्. Indra asked Pratardana to worship him who was प्राण and प्रज्ञात्मन् The Pūrvapakṣin maintains that here at any rate Indra who is so well-known is the Prāna and Ātman. The answer is that the reference is to the Paramātman as the expression आनन्दोऽजरोऽमृत shows. Indra is not अजर, अमृत etc.

[152] Though Indra says मामुपास्स्व, that does not mean that he is the Paramātman; the स्वात्मोपदेश is due to आत्मनि संबन्धबहुलत्व or परमात्मासाधारणसंबन्ध. सर्वाधारत्व, सर्वकर्मकारयितृत्व, लोकेश्वरत्व etc., referred to in the *Upanisad* can belong only to the Paramātman Bhāskara takes अध्यात्मसंबन्ध to means आत्मनि, उपरि वर्तमान संबन्धः.

[153] Indra's reference to himself in मामुपास्स्व is quite correct from the Sāstric point of view, like Vāmdeva's statement अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्च—for everything is Brahman. शास्त्रदृष्ट्या is variously explained as under—

अहमेव परं ब्रह्म, इत्यार्षेण दर्शनेन (शङ्कर)
मामेव, इति परमात्मानमेवोपास्यत्वेन (रामानुज)
कः शोकः ... को मोह', इत्यादि शास्त्रम् (निम्बार्क)
शास्त्रम्, अन्तर्यामी (मध्व)
अनेन जीवेनात्मना...इत्यादिशास्त्रदृष्ट्या (श्रीकण्ठ and श्रीकर)
तत्त्वमसीत्यादिशास्त्रीयज्ञानादेव (विज्ञानभिक्षु).

It would be seen that the Advaitin can convincingly establish his Advaita by referring to the शास्त्र (परमार्थ) दृष्टि—अहं ब्रह्म is the शास्त्रदृष्टि, अहमिन्द्रस्त्वाप्दमहनम् is the व्यावहारिक (सोपाधिक) दृष्टि.

[154] According to Rāmānuja, the reference to Brahman, the object of worship, by words denoting Jīva and Acit, is for the purpose of propounding the three-fold worship by resorting to ब्रह्मस्वरूपानुसंधानम् (as in सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म), भोक्तृशरीरतया and भोग्यभोगोपकरणतया, अनुसंधानम्. Śaṅkara gives two interpretations:—(1) If the objector says that Brahman is propounded here, then there would be a three-fold उपासन—जीवोपासन, मुख्यप्राणोपासन and ब्रह्मोपासन. But *this is not correct, for* ब्रह्मोपासन *is the only* हिततम-उपासन (2) *Even in* ब्रह्मवाक्यs, the characteristics of जीव and मुख्यप्राण are not impossible to think of; a three-fold ब्रह्मोपासन—प्राणधर्मेण, प्रज्ञाधर्मेण and स्वधर्मेण *can be propounded.* So long as ultimately it is ब्रह्मोपासन that is understood to be the हिततम, no harm is done.

This Quarter (I. 1) *deals with expressions and passages where* स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गs could be found according to Śaṅkara. Rāmānuja says that it propounds Brahman (पुरुषोत्तम, नारायण) as वेदान्तवेद्य.

I·2

This Quarter contains six Adhikaraṇas and thirty-three Sūtras.

[155] Rāmānuja here summarises in an admirable manner what has been expounded in the first Quarter. He uses as many as nine different expressions प्रत्यपादि, अभ्यधायि, अवृम, उपापादिम, समादधीमहि, उदैरिराम, समगरिष्महि, आतिष्ठामहि and अब्रूमहि to convey the sense —It is expounded or we expound. In the last Quarter *was pointed out*—

(1) The Highest Brahman is the sole cause of Bliss and the creator in sport of the whole world. (I–1·2)

(2) Brahman is शास्त्रैकप्रमाण. (I–1·3)

(3) All Vedānta *passages agree in referring to such* Brahman. (I–1·4)

(4) The cause of the world is the चेतन Brahman, not Pradhāna, as ईक्षण is predicated of it. (I–1·5)

(5) Brahman full of unsurpassed bliss is different from Jīva. (I–1 13)

(6) It is possessed of a natural unique refulgent form. (I–1·21)

(7) Akāśa, Prāna etc., mean Brahman alone. (I–1·23)

(8) Jyotis refers to Brahman. (I–1·25)

(9) From the Śāstric point of view, the परमपुरुष can be denoted by words, इन्द्र etc.

(156) This second Quarter deals with अस्पष्टजीवलिङ्ग passages which are likely to be misunderstood as dealing with प्रधान, or क्षेत्रज्ञान्तर्भूतवस्तुविशेषs. स्पष्टजीवलिङ्गवाक्यs are dealt with in the third Quarter, and in the fourth Quarter are discussed passages that appear not to support the Vedānta tenets,

[157] *The first Adhikaraṇa contains eight Sūtras, the* विषयवाक्य *is* सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म ... क्रतुमयः पुरुष ... स क्रतुं कुर्वीत मनोमयः प्राणशरीरो भारूपः ... एतद्ब्रह्म from the *Chāndogya.*

मध्व's विषयवाक्य is स यश्चायमशरीरः प्रज्ञात्मा; श्रीकर understands दहरं ... परमेश्वरभूतम् ... उपासितव्यम् as the passage under discussion.

Rāmānuja alone gives two interpretations of the Sūtra सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात्—one relating to the मनोमयः प्राणशरीरः and the other relating to सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म. Most Bhāṣyakāras treat the passage as a whole. In the first interpretation, Rāmānuja emphasises प्रसिद्धोपदेश, and in the second, सर्वत्र (सर्वं referring to both चेतन and अचेतन).

The Pūrvapakṣin contends that as मनस् and प्राण serve as उपकरण्s for the Jīva, मनोमयः etc., can refer only to the Jīva; the Paramātman is without Prāṇa and Manas (अप्राणो ह्यमनाः). Brahman mentioned at the beginning cannot be the उपास्य as the passage शान्त उपासीत independently refers to it and cannot have any connection with स क्रतुं कुर्वीत. So जीव is the मनोमय. The concluding expression एतद्ब्रह्म can be explained as being merely glorificatory (पूजार्थं) of the Jīva.

[158] The answer is—Everywhere in the Upaniṣads, the Paramātman alone is described as मनोमय etc. मनोमयत्वम् means विशुद्धेन मनसा ग्राह्यत्वम् and प्राणशरीरत्वम् is equal to प्राणस्याधारत्वं नियन्तृत्वं च; अप्राणो ह्यमना. means that the Paramātman's ज्ञान is not dependent upon the mind or the Prāṇa. Or, शान्त उपासीत may be taken as an injunction to worship the all-pervading Brahman, and स क्रतुं कुर्वीत...refers to the same as possessed of मनोमयत्व etc.

[159] Rāmānuja now gives an alternative explanation. The passage under discussion is सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति शान्त उपासीत The Pūrvapaksin contends that Brahman here means प्रत्यगात्मन्. The Paramātman cannot be सर्वं (which must include even impure हेय entities). In some places Brahman is spoken of as सविशेष and the प्रत्यगात्मन् freed from the उपाधिs is Brahman itself. The expression तज्जलान् (being merged into, etc.,) can refer to Jīva, as the modifications are caused by Karman and Avidyā.

[160] The answer is that Brahman is Paramātman as तज्जलान् can refer only to the Highest Brahman which produces, sustains and dissolves all beings, without any restriction. Brahman alone can be सर्वात्मक; the दोषs belonging to the शरीर (which is the प्रकार) cannot exist in Brahman (the प्रकारिन्). Brahman is also the अधिप of the Jiva who is करणाधिप. It seems that Rāmānuja unnecessarily brings the Advaitin as an opponent, merely to have a fling at him.

[161] The contention of the objector that the Jīva also has सर्वतादात्म्य is wrong, because the Jīvas being different for each body can never be identical. Even in the case of the Released Souls, the Jivas have only a restricted power (as would be explained by the Sūtrakāra in Adh IV) inasmuch as they have nothing to do with the creation etc., of the world. So, the word Brahman must refer to the Paramātman alone.

[162] The attributes mentioned in the *Chāndogya*, मनोमय, भारूप etc., cannot by any means refer to the inmost Ātman.

भास्वररूप —possessed of extraordinary lustre-

आकाशात्मा—(1) The Ātman of even Ākāśa, the cause of everything, (2) what is self-illumining and illumines others.

सर्वकर्मा—whose कर्मन् is the whole world, or who is responsible for all acts

सर्वकामः—*possessed of pure desires.*

सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसः—not possessed of प्राकृत रसs and गन्धs *This is the* meaning of अशब्दम्, अस्पर्शम् etc.

अभ्यात्तः—here the termination is used to show the agent; one who enjoys

अवाकी—not a prattler; he does not need to advertise his greatness.

अनादरः—not caring for anything, as he has already secured every kind of ऐश्वर्य.

—These expressions befit only the Paramātman.

[163] Jīva is just a glow-worm compared to the Paramātman who is like the Sun. Jīva with his association with the body subject to unlimited misery, whether free or bound, can never possess the attributes of the Paramātman.

In this Prakaraṇa again, Jīva is said to reach the Brahman (the destination); प्राप्य and प्रापक must obviously be different. Śrīkara reads कर्मकर्तृव्यपदेशात् (without the च).

Further, Brahman is said to be the Ātman of the *Jīva* — एष मे, आत्मा. *Here* मे *(Genitive case) refers to Jīva and* आत्मा *(Nominative case) to* Brahman. Similarly in the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, it is said अयम्, अन्तरात्मन् (locative case), पुरुषः (उपास्यः nominative case). So these शब्दविशेषs show the Jīva (उपासक) and Paramātman (उपास्य) as different.

The *Gītā-passages clearly speak of the* शारीर *as the* उपासक *and the* Puruṣottama as the उपास्य.

[164] The objector says— In एष मे आत्मान्तर्हृदये, etc., the Ātman is said to reside in the tiny heart, and is also called more subtle than the व्रीहि or यव seed, or आराग्रमात्र, so the Ātman must mean the Jīva, for, the Paramātman is सर्वगत, भूतयोनि etc.

The answer is— अर्भकौकस्त्वम् and अणीयस्त्वम् are mentioned for the sake of उपासना (by the Jīva) and should not be taken literally. Śaṅkara remarks in connection with *Sūtras 3–6, that the difference between Brahman and Jīva is* due to the उपाधिs; Rāmānuja's explanation is that the Paramātman is called अणु, अर्भकौकः etc., for the sake of Upāsanā, which means that the व्यपदेश is not real. So, ultimately it appears that Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja are in the same boat. For, if परमात्मन् + उपाधिs = जीव, *then* परमात्मन् *is equal to* जीव—उपाधिs (which is exactly Śaṅkara's position). The expression तद्व्यपदेश is significant (this would be expounded further in our notes on II–3.29).

[165] The objector says that if the Paramātman, like the Jīva resides in the body, he would be partaking in the happiness and misery associated with the body. The answer is— The enjoyment of happiness and

misery depends on Karman of the nature of merit and demerit, which is not possible in the case of the Paramātman. Śaṅkara and others take वैशेष्य to mean difference (between the natures of Brahman and Jiva). Rāmānuja's explanation (वैशेष्य = कर्मवश्यत्व):is certainly more pertinent.

[166] In the *Kāṭhaka*, some one is described as the Eater of Brahma and Kṣatra, using Death as a condiment. Madhva takes tho विषयवाक्य to be स यद्यदेवासृजत तत्तदत्तुमध्रियत, and Vijñānabhikṣu refers to the *Madhuvidyā* (य इमं मध्वदं वेद ... ततो न विजुगुप्सते).

The objector says that the Paramātman can not be the enjoyer (as was proved in the last Adhikaraṇa); so, obviously Jiva must be the Eater referred to. The answer is (P. 346)— Jiva cannot be the eater of all the चराचर; eating of the चराचर, with Mṛtyu as the appetiser can only mean the withdrawing of the चराचर world in his body by the Paramātman. Further, it is clear that the whole context refers to the Paramātman alone. The expression क इत्था वेद shows दुरवबोधत्व which cannot be referred to the Jiva who is certainly not दुरवबोध.

(P. 347) The objector says — The next passage ऋतं पिबन्तौ etc., refers to two entities, possessed of the same nature, as it is usual to group only such two together. ऋत means कर्मफल; so, one of the two is certainly the Jiva; the second one cannot be the Paramātman as he cannot have any कर्मफलभोग. So, the other one must be either बुद्धि or प्राण (both are the उपकरणs of the Jiva and could be spoken of as Jiva's companions). And as the context is the same, the Eater also could be Jiva himself.

[167] The Siddhāntin says — The two can only be जीव and परमात्मन्. If the Pūrvapakṣin be pleased to notice the passages further on, he would find that तं दुर्दर्शं etc., can refer only to the Paramātman, and या प्राणेन संभवत्यदिति etc, to Jiva alone (Jiva is called अदिति—अत्ति, इति; Jiva exists with प्राण and enters the cave, along with the elements, in various forms). In the circumstances ऋतं पिबन्तौ must be taken in a popular sense, like the passage छत्रिणो गच्छन्ति (where we do not want to suggest that every one holds the umbrella, but a respectable number, not even the majority out of the throng, carries an umbrella). So, even if Jiva alone is capable of ऋतपान, the Paramātman may be associated with him Rāmānuja himself feels that this is none too convincing, so adds that ऋतं पिबन्तौ should be explained as involving the प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकभाव; that is, Jiva (प्रयोज्य) drinks and the Paramātman (प्रयोजक) makes the Jiva drink.

Śrīpati reads गुहाप्रतिष्ठावात्मानौ instead of गुहां प्रविष्टावात्मानौ.

Sūtra 12 — It is clear from the particular actions in the context, such as उपासकत्वोपास्यत्व, प्रापकत्वप्राप्यत्व, अज्ञत्वसर्वज्ञत्व (छायातपौ), that the Jiva and Paramātman are meant. Sankara refers to the passage आत्मानं रथिनं विद्धि in this connection. श्रीकण्ठ says that न जायते म्रियते... refers to Jiva and अणोरणीयान्... to the Paramātman. Madhva says— यः सेतुरीजानानाम् ..इति। न च जीवे समन्वयोऽभिधीयते.

[168] The objector still persists in his view that the whole प्रकरण is जीवपर, emphasising the doubt in the minds of people as to whether the Jiva

exists or not when he has departed from this life, referred to in the third boon asked by Naciketas.

The Siddhāntin says— Naciketas had never any illusion about the fact of Jīva persisting after death, and of the Atman being different from the body, as is clear from his offering himself as Dakṣiṇā in the sacrifice, when he found that his father was offering only lean, emaciated cows as Dakṣiṇā, and feared that the sacrifice would not yield its full fruit thereby (the fruit of the सर्वस्वदाक्षिण sacrifice can be enjoyed only after the destruction of the body). He therefore, a dutiful son that he was, asked the first boon that his father should not be angry with him; and the second boon was that he should have the knowledge of Agnividyā yielding fruit after death. So, the passage येयं प्रेते विचिकित्सा... must be interpreted so as to refer to something more than देहातिरिक्तात्मज्ञान which Naciketas already had. The passage, therefore, is not शरीरवियोगमात्राभिप्राय, but सर्वबन्धविनिर्मोक्षाभिप्राय.

[169] There was every justification for Naciketas to be sceptical about the nature and scope of Mokṣa, for philosophers held different views about it. Thus—

(1) Some (the Buddhist Idealists) regard Moksa to consist in the annihilation of the nature of Ātman constituted of Vijñāna.

(2) Some hold that the annihilation of Avidyā in the case of Ātman who is pure consciousness, is Mokṣa.

(3) Others (the Vaiśeṣikas) hold that Mokṣa is characterised by the extinction of the particular qualities admitted in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy in the case of the Ātman who is stone-like.

(4) The Advaitins regard Mokṣa to be the absence of Upādhis and the consequent nature of the Jiva as the Ātman who is Apahatapāpman.

(5) The Viśiṣṭādvaitins, on the other hand, who are experts in the Vedic lore regard Mokṣa to be the realisation of the Paramātman who is the one cause of the whole world, the mine of auspicious qualities, the Ātman of all, full of unlimited bliss and knowledge, on the part of Jiva freed from the entanglement of Avidyā and the beginningless Karman. (Rāmānuja loves to pat himself on the back).

In order to test Naciketas who had asked about the nature of Moksa and the means for securing it, Death first tested him with various allurements, and ultimately told him about the worship of the Paramātman, which leads to Moksa, the highest abode of Viṣṇu. All this shows that the Eater is the Paramātman alone.

[170] The third Adhikaraṇa contains six Sūtras (as against Saṅkara who does not read Sūtra 16, and hence, according to him there are only five Sūtras here).

The विषयवाक्य is the passage य एषोऽक्षिणि दृश्यते... from the *Chāndogya*. Vijñānabhiksu alone refers to the passage एष त आत्मा सर्वान्तरो... मृत्युमत्येति ।

The question is — Who is the person in the eye (the human image seen in the eye of some one standing before you) ? The Pūrvapakṣa is—

(1) It is the प्रतिबिम्बात्मन् who is so well-known and who is actually seen.

(2) It may be the जीवात्मन्, because his presence is known by looking into the eye. A dead man's eye does not show any reflection.

(3) It may be some Deity presiding over the eye, as the Sruti describes the eye being occupied by the Deity —

The Siddhānta is that all the three alternatives are inadmissible; for, the various qualities संयद्वामत्व etc., are possible in the Paramātman alone. Hence the person in the eye is the Paramātman himself.

The Paramātman is specifically described as controlling the eye etc., and is actually *perceived by the Yogins, as such.*

The Śruti categorically says कं ब्रह्म खं ब्रह्म, thus showing that Brahman is to be worshipped in that manner.

(P. 355) The objector here says that Brahman cannot be the matter in hand here, as after giving instruction about the Brahmavidyā (प्राणो ब्रह्म कं ब्रह्म *etc.,*) *the Sruti switches on to Agnividyā which is described as* having an independent fruit, सर्वायुःप्राप्ति, संतत्यविच्छेद etc. The answer is that Agnividyā is a part of Brahmavidyā, because the word Brahman occurs in both, and Agni himself says in continuation that Upakosala's preceptor would further inform him of the course to the destination, which shows that Agnividyā is a part of Brahmavidyā and is to be taught to one who is entitled to know *Brahmavidyā. Besides, the fruit of the Agnividyā is in no way opposed* to Mokṣa

[171] The objector says — If so, why did not Agni give full instruction to Upakosala ? Why did he tell Upakosala that his preceptor would instruct him about the Arcirādi course (आचार्यस्तु ते गतिं वक्ता) ?

The answer is — Agni first taught Upakosala *the nature of Brahman in* general, and left the details to the preceptor, because the Sruti has distinctly laid down that instruction given by the preceptor (who has won the confidence of the pupil) is always more effective, and accordingly detailed information about the प्रकृत Brahman itself is given later on. All this shows that the Paramātman is अक्ष्याधार.

[172] The objector says it is possible to argue that in the case of कं ब्रह्म खं ब्रह्म, as in the case of नाम ब्रह्म मनो ब्रह्म, only ब्रह्मदृष्टि (प्रतीकोपासना) is intended on the well-known Akāśa and popular happiness.

The answer is given in Sūtra 16 (which is not read by Sankara and is unnecessary, as it does not add to what has been told in Sūtra 15 सुखविशिष्टाभिधानादेव च). The passage यदेव कं तदेव खं shows that ख is no other than Brahman which is the उपास्य and is described in correlation with प्राण, being the abode and controller of Prāṇa. And that same Brahman is प्रकृत as having the eye as the abode.

Sūtra 17—The अक्षिपुरुष and the Arcirādı course taught to Upakosala, obviously intended for one who has mastered the Upaniṣads and wh seeking Mokṣa. So, the अक्षिपुरुष can be the Paramātman alone.

Sūtras 18—Jiva cannot be the अक्षिपुरुष, as he stays in the eye occasior (when some one is standing in front), and again, Jīva is not confined to eye alone; he can be said to abide in all the sense-organs; the Deity without staying in the eye, could control the eye by the rays. In the case both Jıva and Deity, undiluted अमृतत्व etc., cannot exist. So, the अक्षिपुरुष is Paramātman alone.

[173] The fourth Adhıkarana contains three Sūtras. The विषयवाक् the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* passage यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन्...एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः । (Kā recension); the Mādhyandina recension gives some minor variati (*instead of* विज्ञाने, आत्मनि *is read*).

The *question is*—*Who is the Antaryāmin? The Pūrvapakṣin says* t the inmost Ātman is meant, as the later passage calls the Antaryāmin द्रष्टा, —which implies that seeing, hearing depend upon the sense-organs, and expression नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा shows that no other perceiver exists. So, the प्रत्यगा alone is the Antaryāmin.

The Siddhānta ıs —The Paramātman is the Antaryāmin, as attribu like सर्वप्रशासनियन्तृत्व, सर्वेश्वरत्व, सर्वज्ञत्व, सत्यसंकल्पत्व etc., referred to in the text cann be ascribed to the प्रत्यगात्मन्. The *Subālopanısad* also corroborates this. Seei hearing etc., in the case of the Paramātman *do not depend upon the* sen organs, but on his own संकल्प.

[174] Rāmānuja and Srīkaṇṭha *read* शारीरश्च *as a part of the Sūtra* (2 All other Bhāṣyakāras read शारीरश्च with the next Sūtra. स्मार्तम् means प्रध (described in the Kapila-smrti of the Sānkhyas). There is no difference opinion as regards the meaning of the Sūtra. Both Pradhāna and Jīva cann be the Antaryāmin as they cannot have the attributes (peculiar to t *Paramātman) actually mentioned. It is difficult to agree with Rāmānu* There is hardly any point in measuring Pradhāna and Jiva with the same yar stick viz. अतद्धर्माभिलाप. On the other hand, with शारीरश्च joined to the ne Sūtra, the Sūtrakāra is able to point out that both the recensions— Kānva ar Mādhyandina—definitely speak of the Jīva as different from the Paramātma (य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्, विज्ञाने तिष्ठन् the variant shows that विज्ञान *is* आत्मन्). Aga एनमधीयते fits in better if शारीरश्च is not divorced from the Sūtra proper Nimbārk reads the Sūtra as न शारीरश्चोभयेऽपि हि भेदेनैनमधीयते.

The fifth Adhikarana contains 3 Sūtras *and the* विषयवाक्य *is* अथ परा य तदक्षरमधिगम्यते । यत्तद्रेश्य...यद्भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ति धीराः (from the *Mundaka*), also अक्षरात्परत परः from the same.

The question is, what ıs meant by अक्षर (possessed of the attribute अदृश्यत्व etc.,) and अक्षरात्परतः परः ?

The Pūrvapakṣin says that अक्षर means प्रकृति as no चेतनधर्म like द्रष्टृत्व i referred to it and पर means the समष्टिपुरुष (अक्षरात्परतः परः means one who is beyon

the अक्षर *which* is पर, that is, अक्षरात् and परत refer to the same entity), so that प्रकृति and पुरुष are intended here प्रकृति is the सूक्ष्मरूप of पृथिवी etc , (hence it is अदृश्य) and भूतयोनि as it produces the whole विकारजात as is clear from the Spider-illustration, and पुरुष is well-known as being beyond the प्रकृति

The Siddhānta is — The पर is the परमपुरुष, for, the attributes सर्वज्ञ, सर्वविद् refer to him alone The context clearly shows that अक्षर, the भूतयोनि is ultimately spoken of as सर्वज्ञ and अक्षरात् परत पर must mean the पर who is beyond the पर (समष्टिपुरुष) beyond the अक्षर, that is, अक्षरात् परत refers to two entities — अक्षर and पुरुष, and the other expression पर refers to the Paramātman So, अक्षर means only the अचेतन भूतसूक्ष्म

Further (Sūtra 23), Pradhāna and Purusa are described as definitely distinguished and different from the Bhūtayoni Aksara, in the Section under consideration It is clear that the main idea is to propound the Brahmavidyā, so that by the knowledge of one, the knowledge of all could be had And this knowledge of the form of devotion is emphasised both in the Śruti and the Smrti, The Aksara is spoken of as the producer of विश्व, not merely of the अचेतन, and the fruit of such अक्षरज्ञान is non-return to this Samsāra, and not the transcient fruit to be had from sacrifices etc All this shows that by अक्षर we must understand the Paramātman deriving it as अश्नुते इति, or न क्षरति, इति or नामान्तराभिलाप्ययोग्यक्षरणाभावात्, or स्वविकारव्याप्त्या.

The Sruti (Sūtra 24) describes the form of the Aksara which can only be applicable to the Paramātman Thus—

Agni — the head
The Sun and the Moon — the eyes
Quarters — the ears
The Vedas — speech
The Wind — Prana (the vital breath)
The Universe — the heart
The Earth — the feet.

पद्भ्यां पृथिवी— the instrumental पद्भ्या should be taken in the sense of the nominative

[175] The sixth Adhikarana contains nine Sūtras and the विषयवाक्य is the passage in the *Chāndogya*, dealing with the Vaiśvānara Ātman Baladeva reads Sūtra 25 as वैश्वानरसाधारणशब्दविशेषात्

The question is what is exactly denoted by the word Vaisvānara which can have as many as four senses— (1) The digestive fire which consumes whatever is eaten, the noise heard when one closes the ears is the noise of this Jāṭharāgni itself, (2) The third great element Agni or Tejas, (3) The Deity so called, and (4) The Paramātman

The objector says it is not possible to come to any definite conclusion, as the various attributes described in the passage concerned can be applicable to all the four

(P. 380) The Siddhānta is— Only the Paramātman is meant, for though Vaiśvānara is a common term, certain special features mentioned in the Sruti can refer to the Paramātman alone. Thus—

The five sages —(1) Prācīnaśāla, the descendant of Upamanyu (2) *Satyayajña, son of Pulusa* (3) *Indradyumna, Bhāllaveya* (4) *Jana* Sārkarāksya, and (5) Buḍila, Āśvatarāśvi, met together and pondered over the *Ātman* and Brahman (को न आत्मा. किं ब्रह्म), *and decided to go to Uddālaka* Āruni who was studying the Vaiśvānara, for guidance Uddālaka thinking that *his knowledge about* Vaiśvānara was imperfect, *suggested to his distinguished* visitors that they all should repair to Asvapati Kekaya in that connection. Kekaya *received them with due ceremony and requested them to stay on* there till the sacrifice which he was about to perform was over and that he would *give to each of them the Daksinā which he had offered to each of the* sacrificial priests They all, however, persisted in requesting Aśvapati to *enlighten them about Vaiśvānara Aśvapati knowing that his visitors had a* hazy partial notion about Vaiśvānara, (like the blind men ascertaining the form *of an elephant by taking hold of the trunk, tusk, leg etc*, अन्धगजन्याय) *elucidated* from them their ideas and added that it was a good plan of theirs to go to him, otherwise, *they would have come to a great disaster for insulting or belittling* Vaiśvānara—

Name	Notion about Vaiśvānara	Name given to Vaiśvānara	Aśvapati's comment	Nature of the disaster
(1) औपमन्यव	द्यौ or heaven	सुतेजा (सुततेजा)	(तव सुतं प्रसुतमासुतं कुले दृश्यते) Head of the Atman	The loss of the head
(2) सत्ययज्ञ	आदित्य	विश्वरूप	(तत्र बहु विश्वरूपं कुले दृश्यते) Eye of the Ātman	Blindness
(3) इन्द्रद्युम्न	वायु	पृथग्वर्त्मा	(त्वां पृथग्बलय आयान्ति पृथग्रथश्रेणयोऽनुयान्ति) Prāna of the Ātman	Loss of the Prana
(4) जन	आकाश	बहुल	(त्वं बहुलोऽसि प्रजया च धनेन च) Trunk of the Ātman	Loss of the Trunk
(5) बुडिल	आप	रयि	(त्वं रयिमान् पुष्टिमानसि) Bladder of the Ātman	Bursting of the bladder
(6) उद्दालक	पृथिवी	प्रतिष्ठा	(त्वं प्रतिष्ठितोऽसि प्रजया च पशुभि) Feet of the Atman	Loss of movement of the feet

(Aśvapati's comments are actuated by a play upon the names सुतेजा विश्वरूप etc, suggested One would have expected that worshipping Vaisvānara as the eye, feet etc, would ensure the safely of that sense-organ, but Asvapati threatens the loss of that same because that was belittling the Vaiśvānara). The Viśvānara Atman has (1) head (Sutejas), eye (Viśvarūpa), Prāna

(the wind); trunk (Bahula), the bladder (Rayi), feet (the earth) — to complete the picture, the *Upanisad* adds — chest (the altar), hair (sacrificial grass), heart (the Gārhapatya fire), mind (Anvāhāryapacana fire), mouth (Āhavanīya fire) — presumably to boost the sacrificial accessories.

All this shows that the Vaiśvānara Ātman, the fruit of whose worship is the removal of all sins etc., is the Paramātman.

P. 381 — आत्मनो व्रतस्थतया प्रतिग्रहयोग्यता ज्ञापयन् — Instead of व्रतस्थतया, there is a variant वृत्तस्थतया (on account of being of good conduct). प्रतिग्रहयोग्यता seems to have been used in the sense of 'being fit to receive presents from'. Aśvapati hastens to assure his visitors that they should have no compunction in receiving presents from him (one hesitates to receive gifts from one who has amassed his fortune in an illegal or immoral manner). He was a good ruler known for his righteousness and observance of vows — 'In my kingdom there are no thieves, nor misers, nor drunkards, nor those who do not observe fire-worship, nor the unwise, nor the licentions, nor harlots either' (न मे स्तेनो जनपदे न कदर्यो न मद्यपः । नानाहिताग्निर्नाविद्वान्न स्वैरी स्वैरिणी कुतः ॥)

[176] The form with the various limbs of the Vaiśvānara described here is also well-known in the Sruti and the Smrti as belonging to the Paramapurusa, which enables one to infer that the Vaiśvānara is the Paramātman. In the *Muṇḍaka* Agni is said to be the head, but Agni is elsewhere said to be heaven (असौ वै लोकोऽग्निः), so there is no discrepancy. In the *Mahābhārata etc., more details — the sky is the navel, fire is the mouth—are* added; but it is clear that there is no difficulty in understanding that one and the same entity (the Paramātman) is described. Here and there some minor changes are noticed in the description in various works; for instance, the sky is said to be the navel; Agni, the mouth — but they do not vitiate the main idea that the heaven etc., are described as the limbs of the Vaiśvānara and Kekaya gives these limbs, their proper attributes and names.

(Sūtra 27) — The objector points out that the Śruti does not countenance the view that Vaiśvānara is the Paramātman. Thus — Vaiśvānara is equated with Agni (स एषोऽग्निर्वैश्वानरः), he is described as staying in the heart and is imagined to be the three fires, and also as being the abode of the *offerings to Prāna, and as abiding in a human form in the Purusa*

The answer is — The description of Vaisvānara like that is intended for facilitating the worship of the Highest Brahman itself. Agni does not mean the digestive fire which can never have the three worlds as its body. Agni must mean the Paramātman The *Gītā* also says that the Lord takes the form of Vaiśvānara and the Śrutis speak of *the* Vaiśvānara *as the Purusa also.*

(Sūtra 28) For the same reasons, Vaiśvānara cannot be the third Mahābhūta or any Deity either.

[177] (Sūtras 29–31) — Three different views are referred to here as to how अग्निर्वैश्वानरः can be explained properly. Jaimini holds that the word Agni, like the word Vaiśvānara, directly denotes Paramātman; just as the word वैश्वानर (विश्वेषां नराणां नेता) was taken to mean Paramātman by having

recourse to etymology. Agni also (अग्रं नयतीति, अग्निः) can mean the Paramātman through etymology.

(Sankarācārya explains वैश्वानर as विश्वश्चायं नरः, विश्वेषां वायं नरः, विश्वे वा नरा अस्य, विश्वानरः परमात्मा, सर्वात्मत्वात् विश्वानर एव वैश्वानरः, तद्धितोऽनन्यार्थः, राक्षसवायसादिवत् — *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* on I·2·28)

(Sūtra 30) The reason why the Paramātman is described as प्रादेशमात्र and अभिविमान, is according to Āśmarathya, that the limitless becomes manifested in the form limited by the regions, heaven etc., for facilitating worship. Śankara says — प्रदेशेषु वा हृदयादिषूपलब्धिस्थानेषु विशेषेणाभिव्यज्यते। Āśmarathya is again referred to in I·4·20, where Śankara remarks आश्मरथ्यस्य तु यद्यपि जीवस्य परस्मादनन्यत्वमभिप्रेतं तथापि प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेरिति सापेक्षत्वाभिधानात्कार्यकारणभावः कियानप्यभिप्रेत इति गम्यते। Here also अभिव्यज्यते: shows that Āśmarathya is not a full-fledged Advaitin.

(Sūtra 31) Rāmānuja seems to take अनुस्मरण to mean उपासना and refers the पुरुषवर्मविषयत्व of the Highest Brahman. Śankara more appropriately takes the Sūtra to refer to प्रादेशमात्र and remarks प्रादेशमात्रहृदयप्रतिष्ठेन वायं मनसानुस्मर्यते तेन प्रादेशमात्र इत्युच्यते (the Highest is called प्रादेशमात्र, because he resides in the प्रादेशमात्र heart and is meditated upon by the mind).

(Sūtra 32)—Jaimini says that the equation of chest etc., with the altar etc., is to point out that the प्राणाहुति gone through day after day is a kind of Fire-sacrifice. Śankara, on the other hand, refers to the प्रादेशमात्रश्रुति itself, remarking समानप्रकरणे वाजसनेयिब्राह्मणं द्युप्रभृतीपृथिवीपर्यन्तान्त्रैलोक्यात्मनो वैश्वानरस्य, अवयवानध्यात्ममूर्धप्रभृतिषु चुबुकपर्यन्तेषु देहावयवेषु संपादयत्प्रादेशमात्रसंपत्तिं परमेश्वरस्य दर्शयति.... सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययत्वाच्च संपत्तिनिमित्तां प्रादेशमात्रश्रुतिं युक्ततरां जैमिनिराचार्यो मन्यते।

(Sūtra 33) Rāmānuja refers to the प्राणाग्निहोत्र as means of the worship of the वैश्वानर. Śankara refers to मूर्धचुबुकान्तराले परमेश्वर as described in the *Jābālopaniṣad*, and remarks तस्मादुपपन्ना परमेश्वरे प्रादेशमात्रश्रुतिः। अभिविमानश्रुतिः प्रत्यगात्मत्वाभिप्राया। प्रत्यगात्मतया सर्वैः प्राणिभिरभिविमीयत इत्यभिविमान, अभिगतो वायं प्रत्यगात्मत्वात् विमानश्च मानवियोगात्, इत्यभिविमानः। अभिविमिमीते वा सर्वं जगत्कारणत्वादित्यभिविमानः॥ In the passage तस्य ह वा एतस्य—, तस्य refers to वैश्वानर and एतस्य to the worshipper.

I 3

This Quarter also discusses passages in the Sruti which are ambiguous (अस्पष्ट) and ultimately shows that they refer to Brahman Incidentally matters like whether the gods and the Śūdras are entitled to perform sacrifices, (which are not strictly relevant), are also considered.

[178] The first Adhikarana contains seven Sūtras; the विषयवाक्य is the passage from the *Mundaka* यस्मिन्द्यौः ..तमेवैकं जानथ आत्मानम् . The question is—what is to be understood by the द्युभ्वाद्यायतन, whether Brahman or some other entity, Jiva ?

The objector says that Jiva is the आयतन, because in the next passage, नाडीसंबन्ध, बहुधा जायमानत्व are mentioned (these attributes can be applicable only to Jiva). Likewise his being the abode of the mind along with the five Prāṇas is definitely mentioned. So द्युभ्वाद्यायतनत्व must be interpreted to mean that the

Jiva is the आयतन of heaven, earth etc., owing to his Karman in the संसारावस्था and to his increased ज्ञान in the मुक्तावस्था.

[179] The Siddhānta is — Paramātman alone is the आयतन, because there are the expressions अमृतस्यैष सेतुः and आत्मानम्, which cannot refer to Jiva (सेतुः — from सि to bind, leading to अमृत: or like a bridge taking one over to अमृत; आत्मन् — आप्नोति, इति, *one who pervades everything as the Controller*). The Paramapuruṣa is spoken of in the *Taittiriya Āraṇyaka* and the *Gitā*, as taking various forms, and as being the support of the Nāḍis, in the *Mahā Nārāyaṇopaniṣad.* Rāmānuja explains स्वशब्दात् as परब्रह्मासाधारणशब्दात्. According to Śaṅkara it means आत्मशब्दात्, and the doubt is whether the आयतन is some entity which is the farther end oft heb ridge of अमृत or the श्रुतिप्रसिद्धवायु or the Jiva.

संततं शिराभिस्तु लम्बत्याकाशसंनिभम्। — आकाशसंनिभम् means clear or bright as the sky. If the reading is आकोशसंनिभम्, the meaning would be 'like the आकोश'. Actually the word आकोश is not given by Apte or Monier Williams. आकोश probably means the same as कोश — bud, lotus-bud, as the heart is often spoken of as हृत्कमल.

[180] (Sūtra 2) आयतन must refer to the Paramātman, for the additional reason that it is referred to as प्राप्य by those who are liberated. Rāmānuja alone reads ... व्यपदेशाच्च instead of ... व्यपदेशात्.

(Sūtra 3) Rāmānuja and Śrikaṇṭha read this Sūtra with प्राणभृच्च; others take प्राणभृच्च as a separate Sūtra. The आयतन cannot be the प्रधान (अनुमीयते, इति अनुमानम् or if we read आनुमानम् – अनुमानप्रमितत्वात्), for there is no word denoting that; for the same reason the Jiva is out of question. तच्छब्द is the प्रधानजीवप्रतिपादकशब्द. अर्थाभावे यदव्ययमित्यव्ययीभावः —*Thibaut takes no notice of this passage*, which seems to be quite unnecessary, unless it is intended to show off the writer's acquaintance with grammar. अतच्छब्द is an अव्ययीभाव compound (not a तत्पुरुष as that would mean 'something other than तच्छब्द' as अब्राह्मण means 'one who is not a ब्राह्मण' — that is, अ means here तदन्यत्व) so, here न (an अव्यय) is compounded with तत् .. (न तत्–अतत्) as here no other पदार्थ is intended; only negation is the idea.

[181] (Sūtra 4) In the passage समाने वृक्षे .. Jiva and Paramātman are clearly described as different. Vallabha reads the Sūtra as भेदव्यपदेशाच्च.

(Sūtra 5) The context shows that the whole Section refers to Brahman alone. Bhāskara reads the Sūtra as प्रकरणाच्च.

(Sūtra 6) In the passage द्वा सुपर्णा.... the प्रत्यगात्मन् (जीव, क्षेत्रज्ञ) and the परमात्मन् are clearly differentiated—the प्रत्यगात्मन् as enjoying the कर्मफल, and the Paramātman as merely abiding within the body. Śaṅkara says, ताभ्यां च स्थित्यदनाभ्यामीश्वरक्षेत्रज्ञौ तत्र गृह्येते ..यदापि पैङ्गयुपनिषत्कृतेन व्याख्यानेनास्यामृचि सत्त्वक्षेत्रज्ञावुच्येते तदापि न विरोधः कश्चित्। कथम्? प्राणभृद्धीह घटादिच्छिद्रवत्सत्त्वाद्युपाध्यभिमानित्वेन प्रतिशरीरं गृह्यमाणो द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं न भवतीति निषिध्यते। यस्तु सर्वशरीरेषूपाधिभिर्विनोपलक्ष्यते परमात्मैव स भवति।

[182] (Sūtra 7) — The second Adhikaraṇa contains two Sūtras. The विषयवाक्य is यत्रान्यत्पश्यति...स भूमा etc ; from the *Chāndogya*. Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Nimbārka and Madhva refer to भूमा भूमा त्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्य', the latter portion of the same passage.

The question is — what is meant by भूमन् (vast, big) ? Rāmānuja here gives the etymology of भूमन् The termination इमन् is added to words पृथु etc. (प्रथिमन्) optionally to indicate 'the state of So बहु + इमन् (in the sense of बहोर्भाव), becomes भू + मन् (the इ of इमन् is dropped and बहु is replaced by भू) that is भूमन्, vastness, भूमन्, being described as the opposite of अल्प, does not refer to सङ्ख्या, but means वैपुल्य, and consequently, one possessed of वैपुल्य

[183] The question is — what is referred to by भूमन् ? The objector says, भूमन् must refer to the प्रत्यगात्मन् (जीव) The context shows that Sanatkumāra is instructing Nārada who is keen on crossing over grief Sanatkumāra tells Nārada that the Vedas, Sāstras, etc, studied by him are just 'Nāman' and Brahman should be worshipped as Nāman Nārada then asks — is there anything beyond or superior to Nāman ? — the answer of Sanatkumāra is — Yes Vak is superior to Nāman Thus, the question of Narada, and the answer of Sanatkumāra pointing out to something superior to what Narada has spoken of, refer successively to (1) नामन् (2) वाक् (3) मनस् (4) संकल्प (5) चित्त (6) ध्यान (7) विज्ञान (बल) (8) अन्न (9) अप् (10) तेजस् (11) आकाश (12) स्मर (13) आशा and (14) प्राण. प्राण is called father, mother etc and one abusing the father, mother etc, is spoken of as the killer of father etc A dead person is not called the killer because a dead one cannot abuse The instruction ends with प्राण There is no further query by Nārada like अस्ति भगवो प्राणाद्भूय Jiva alone can have प्राण, hence जीव is referred to by भूमन् Further the expression एष तु वा अतिवदति य सत्येनातिवदति shows that one who has realised the Prāna, has realised truly, and therefore, सत्यवदन is a part of the प्राणोपासना which ensures सुखविपुलता and thus the भूमगुणविशिष्ट जीव can be said to cross over grief and the expression अहमेवाधस्तात् etc, describes the glory of the जीव (अतिवदति — speaks boldly and confidently, on account of the realisation of reality)

[184] The Siddhāntin s answer is — By भूमा we must understand the Paramātman for, the instruction in the Sruti extends to the परं ज्योति which is to be reached by the सम्प्रसाद (प्रत्यगात्मन्), and सत्य always denotes the Highest Brahman which is mentioned after and over and above प्राण एष तु, अतिवदति य सत्येनातिवदति (सत्येन is उपलक्षणे तृतीया) shows on account of the use of तु (but) that सत्य is different from प्राण being over and above the same सत्यवदन cannot be a part of the प्राणोपासना, because the expression सत्य meaning Brahman is actually used In expressions like एष तु वाग्निहोत्री य सत्यं वदति, the अग्निहोत्रिन् and the सत्यवादिन् are one and the same, there being no other alternative available A प्राणविद् aims at सातिशय (hence limited) पुरुषार्थ, but a परब्रह्मविद् secures निरतिशयपुरुषार्थ Further प्राण is, after all, produced from आत्मन् and is inferior One who crosses over grief must be one different from the one denoted by the word Prāna

(P 405) It is true that no question like अस्ति भगव प्राणाद्भूय is asked, but one cannot always rely upon the question and answer to determine the import of a passage that is never the sole criterion to decide the matter Thus — From Nāman up to आशा, the preceptor did not call the worshipper of these as अतिवादिन्, but the प्राणवेदिन् is called an अतिवादिन् The pupil thought

that the आत्मोपदेश was over there and refrained from putting any query further But the kind-hearted preceptor knowing that the pupil had not really understood the Atman, himself adds the अतिवादित्व of one who understands Satya (Brahman) that assures निरतिशयपुरुषार्थ And the preceptor further dilates on the स्वरूप of the ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कार, by telling the pupil that मति, श्रद्धा, निष्ठा, कृति, the means for securing the realisation should be thoroughly known, and finally refers to भूमा involving निरतिशयविपुलसुख as the one thing to be known By knowing भूमन्, one experiences no दुःख as a matter of course

[185] The objector says that the world is experienced as different from Brahman, full of misery, with only a limited measure of happiness, how can it ever be सुखरूप, even when it is regarded as being ब्रह्मात्मक ? The answer is that सुख and दुःख depend upon the Karman of the Jivas one freed from Avidyā has no Karman to his credit. To a jaundiced eye, everything appears yellow, not to the eye free from jaundice In the eye of a prince an ordinary toy *per se* would be a worthless thing, but when he knows that the toy is a gift of his father, the toy becomes asssociated with an agreeable nature In the same manner, one who realises the world as the sportive उपकरण of the omniscient auspicious Lord, sees no grief and enjoys unlimited bliss as the Lord is आनन्दमय

So the भूमा, designated as सत्य is different from the प्रत्यगात्मन्, and is the Highest Brahman

[186] (Sūtra 8) The attributes of Bhūman अमृतत्व अनन्याधारत्व, सर्वात्मत्व सर्वोत्पादकत्व etc , referred to in the Sruti can belong only to the Paramātman

In passages like अहमेवाधस्तात् the अहंग्रह refers to the Paramātman who is the Ātman of the प्रत्यगात्मन् The अहंग्रहोपासन is for the purpose of the realisation of the Paramātman

[187] The third Adhikarana contains three Sūtras and the विषयवाक्य is एतद्वै तदक्षर अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्व from the *Brhadaranyaka*

The question is — What does अक्षर signify — the प्रधान or the जीव or the Paramātman ?

(1) अक्षर may mean प्रधान as in the passage अक्षरात्परत पर, अक्षर obviously refers to प्रधान, which is the well-known sense first coming up to one's mind प्रधान also can be called the कारण of आकाश as it is the cause of all विकारजात

[188] This can be easily refuted as the Sruti speaks of अक्षर as the support of the farthest limit of आकाश, not merely of the region where the wind moves So, it cannot be प्रधान The word अक्षर by its अवयवशक्ति itself (न क्षरतीति) denotes what is immutable and does not stand in need of another प्रमाण

(P 414) (2) Why should not अक्षर mean जीव ? Jiva is certainly the support of all अचिद्वस्तु and the attributes अस्थूल etc , do fit in with जीव The *Gitā* statement कूटस्थोऽक्षरम् उच्यते surely refers to the प्रत्यगात्मन्

(Sūtra 10) This Sūtra refutes the contention viz अक्षर refers to Jiva The Sruti passage speaks of सर्ववस्तुविधरण on the part of अक्षर, and this is not possible in the case of the प्रत्यगात्मन्, whether in संसारावस्था or in मुक्तावस्था

(Sūtra 11) अन्यभावः—प्रधानादिभावः. The वाक्यशेष in the Sruti passage definitely propounds that अक्षर has not the state of the अचेतनप्रधान (अदृष्टं द्रष्टृ — etc); and *that it is the* द्रष्टृ *of everything; or,* अन्यभावः *means* अन्यस्य सद्भावः अन्यभावव्यावृत्तिः and shows that nothing else exists. That means अक्षर cannot have प्रधानभाव or प्रत्यगात्मभाव.

Again, the अक्षर is described as directing all sacrificial and pious deeds, and as ensuring अमृतत्व for one who knows it. This is possible only in the case of the परब्रह्मभूत-पुरुषोत्तम.

ददतो मनुष्याः प्रशंसन्ति — ददतः *is acc.-plu; those giving gifts; people praise* those who give gifts.

[189] (Sūtra 12) The fourth Adhikaraṇa *contains only one* Sūtra. The विषयवाक्य is यः पुनरेतं त्रिमात्रेणोमित्यनेनैवाक्षरेण परं पुरुषमभिध्यायीत... from the *Praśnopanisad.*

The question is — What is meant by परं पुरुषम् — Brahmadeva (जीवसमष्टिरूपः) or the Puruṣottama ?

(P. 418) The objector says — The समष्टिक्षेत्रज्ञ Jīva is meant. The context shows that *the worshipper of* एकमात्र प्रणव (ओम्) *goes to* मनुष्यलोक, *that of* द्विमात्र, *to* अन्तरिक्षलोक, and the worshipper of त्रिमात्र reaches the world of Brahmadeva; and the one to be meditated upon by such a worshipper can be only Brahmadeva, the Lord of Brahmaloka, the समष्टिपुरुष over and above the जीवव्यष्टिपुरुष. This *having been settled, the attributes referred to have to be somehow explained.*

The answer is — The परपुरुष is the Paramātman. For, the Paramātman is designated as the object of realisation; the जीवघन cannot be ईक्षतिकर्म, as in his case, as also in the case of Brahmadeva, the Karman determines his form. The world of Brahmadeva is perishable and so cannot be *the destination of* those whose sins are driven away. Only Visnu's highest place can be the proper destination. Besides, the world of Brahmadeva only is not beyond अन्तरिक्षः so many other worlds intervene between. So, ईक्षतिकर्म is the Paramātman.

Rāmānuja *reads* ईक्षतिकर्म *separately;* others take ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात् as one expression. (ईक्षतिकर्मत्वेन व्यपदेशात्). Nimbārka follows Rāmānuja who seems to be unnecessarily going out of the way here.

[190] This Adhikaraṇa contains ten Sūtras ; the विषयवाक्य is यदिदमस्मिन्ब्रह्मपुरे दहरं पुण्डरीकं वेश्म दहरोऽस्मिन्नन्तर आकाश...from the *Chāndogya.*

The question is—*what is referred to by the* दहराकाश *in the heart-lotus,* the element आकाश, or the प्रत्यगात्मन् or the परमात्मन् ?

The objector says दहराकाश means the महाभूत—आकाश, for, that is the well-known *sense.*

The answer of the Siddhāntin is—The दहराकाश can be the Paramātman only, *for the following reasons—*

(1) The qualities निरुपाधिकात्मत्व, अपहतपाप्मत्व, सत्यकामत्व, सत्यसंकल्पत्व, mentioned in the subsequent passages point to the Highest Brahman only.

(2) The knower of the दहराकाश secures सत्यसंकल्पत्व.

(3) The दहराकाश (उपमेय) is compared to the भूताकाश (उपमान) उपमान obviously must be different from the उपमेय. *It cannot be argued that this* उपमानोपमेयभाव is due to the दहराकाश being limited by the heart; for in that case the दहराकाश would not be, as is actually stated, the resort of heaven, earth etc. The दहराकाश (परमात्मन्) is compared to the भूताकाश, simply to point out that it is not tiny, although abiding in the heart-lotus, just as the Sun travelling very fast (a thousand miles per hour) is often spoken of as moving like an arrow shot.

(P. 423) *The objector points out that the expression* दहरोऽस्मिन्नन्तर आकाशस्तस्मिन्यदन्तस्तदन्वेष्टव्यम्... shows that *something within* the दहराकाश is to be searched for; and that अन्वेष्टव्य could only be the Ātman mentioned, एष आत्मा... So, it is not proper to understand Brahman by दहराकाश. The answer is—The Sruti itself has referred to the दहराकाश as Brahman, as is clear from the context considered as a whole; so तस्मिन्यदन्तर्वर्ति must refer to the गुणजात (गुणाष्टक—eight गुणs, referred to in the passage—अपहतपाप्मा, विजरः, विमृत्युः, अशोकः, अविजिघत्सः, अपिपासः, सत्यकाम, सत्यसंकल्पः) (*Chā.* 8 1·6). *अपहतपाप्मत्वादि etc.; and not to any other* entity. It is also pointed out in the text that one who understands Brahman with its गुणाष्टक is able to move at will in all the worlds.

Śaṅkara also remarks—तस्माद्वाक्योपक्रमेऽपि दहर एवाकाशो हृदयपुण्डरीकाधिष्ठान सहान्तःस्थैः समाहितैः पृथिव्यादिभिः सत्यैश्च कामैर्विशिष्ट उक्त इति गम्यते। स चोक्तेभ्यो हेतुभ्यः परमेश्वर इति। Rāmānuja, who holds that the Highest has all the auspicious qualities, finds no difficulty in explaining that the qualities are अन्तर्वर्ति in the दहराकाश. But Śaṅkara holding his theory of the निर्गुण Brahman, cannot possibly talk of any entities, Pṛthivi etc., as abiding in Brahman. He could easily have asserted that what was inside the दहराकाश was the Brahman. But in the face of other passages and the context, he could not take up that position. He apparently has to rely upon his last resource in such matters, viz. to declare that this description is after all meant for the purposes of उपासना, and is not to be taken literally.

(Sūtra 14)—Baladeva reads तथा for तथाहि in the Sūtra

गति:—ब्रह्मलोकविषया गतिः, ब्रह्मलोकः (ब्रह्म च लोकश्च)

शब्द:—दृष्टं श्रुत्यन्तरे 'सता सोम्य...' etc (शङ्कर)

and *लिङ्गम्:—प्रजानां गतिः, तेषामेवैष ब्रह्मलोकः इति वाक्यशेषो लिङ्गम्। अथवा लिङ्गं सामर्थ्यं* ब्रह्मैव लोक इति विशेषणसमासपरिग्रहे। (भास्कर)

परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि गमनमन्यत्राभिधीयमानं दृष्टम्—'एवमेव ..सम्पद्यामहे' इति।...अथवा, सेयमेव गतिरस्य दहराकाशस्य परब्रह्मतां गमयति। गतिरस्य परब्रह्मत्वे पर्याप्तं लिङ्गम्।...ब्रह्मैव लोक इति लिङ्गदर्शनसामर्थ्यं च। *Rāmānuja* gives two interpretations (others agree in general with Śaṅkara.) He takes the गमन to refer to the state of सुषुप्ति, and to the गमन at all times also to the Paramātman who is the Inner Controller.

T[illegible] (a Sūdra) being the स्थपति (Chief or [illegible] is a कर्मधारय compound, *so that Brahman* [illegible] t is taken as ब्रह्मणः लोकः (a genitive तत्पुरुष

compound), then Brahman and Loka would have different abodes, which can not be accepted. In the same way, if निषाद् and स्थपति are one and the same, the expression is a कर्मधारय compound. If स्थपति is different from the निषाद्s (निषादानां स्थपतिः), निषादस्थपति would be a तत्पुरुष compound.

(Sūtra 15) अस्य-परस्य ब्रह्मणः, अस्मिन्-दहराकाशे. जगद्धिधरण (supporting the world) ascribed to the दहराकाश can be the feat of Brahman alone.

(Sūtra 16) The word Ākāśa, associated with the attributes अपहतपाप्मत्व etc., is certainly more well-known as meaning Brahman, than meaning the महाभूत-आकाश.

(Sūtra 17) The objector says that the वाक्यशेष directly refers to the Jīva as different from Brahman (एष संप्रसादो...परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य...एष आत्मा). We could not take दहराकाश as भूताकाश (as आकाश cannot be compared to आकाश); but we can understand प्रत्यगात्मन् by the दहराकाश. आकाश can mean जीव (आकाशते, इति) as he also illumines.

The answer is— Jīva cannot be the entity referred to, as the attributes अपहतपाप्मत्व etc., are impossible in the case of the Jīva.

(Sūtra 18) The objector says that the subsequent statement of Prajāpati ...स सर्वांश्च लोकानाप्नोति etc., clearly shows that it is the Jīva who is referred to. Prajāpati points out how सुख and दुःख are associated with the Jīva possessed of the body, the result of his Karman, and how they do not exist when the Jīva is freed from the body; that is to say, the Jīva is described as he is in the state of संसार and in the state of Mokṣa अपहतपाप्मत्व etc , can exist thus in the case of Jīva.

The answer is— It is not the usual nature of Jīva that is described here, but the nature of Jīva freed from कर्मबन्ध. Even in the मुक्तावस्था, Jīva cannot have the power to support the whole world etc., as the Sūtrakāra himself would point out in IV 4 17. The liberated Jīva even has only limited powers. So, the दहराकाश can be only the Paramātman, possessing all powers always.

जीवोऽत्राविर्भूतस्वरूपो...परमात्मत्वरूपेणायं जीवो विवक्षितः । (भास्कर)
परमेश्वरप्रसादादाविर्भूतस्वरूपो मुक्त उच्यते । (मध्व)
पश्चादाविर्भूतस्वरूप आविर्भूतापहतपाप्मत्वादिकोऽत्र प्रतिपाद्यते, न संसारी (श्रीकर)
नित्याविर्भूतस्वरूपः परमात्मा दहरः, आविर्भूतस्वरूपो जीवस्तु न (निम्बार्क).

Nimbārka very clearly differentiates the Paramātman (who is *always* आविर्भूतस्वरूप) from the Jīva (who is आविर्भूतस्वरूप under certain circumstances and the दहराकाश refers to the former only. It would be seen that this Sūtra practically vindicates Śaṅkara's position, viz. the Jīva freed from the उपाधिs is Paramātman himself, The objector has in his mind the संसारि-जीव as referred to by the दहराकाश. Sankara in his Bhāsya on Sūtra (19) says— परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य...स्वेन-रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते, इति शब्दस्य पारमार्थिकं स्वरूपं परं ब्रह्म तद्रूपतयैनं जीवं व्याचष्टे न जैवेन रूपेण ।...प्राग्विवेक-विज्ञानोत्पत्तेः शरीरेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिविषयवेदनोपाधिभिरविविक्तमिव जीवस्य दृष्ट्यादिज्योतिःस्वरूपं भवति ।... एवं मिथ्याज्ञानकृत एव जीवपरमेश्वरयोर्भेदो न वस्तुकृतः ।...अपरे तु वादिनः पारमार्थिकमेव जैवं रूपमिति मन्यन्तेऽस्मदीयाश्च केचित् । तेषां सर्वेषामात्मैकत्वसम्यग्दर्शनप्रतिपक्षभूतानां प्रतिबोधायेदं शारीरकमारब्धम् ।...

(Sūtra 19) अन्यार्थश्च परामर्शः is explained by others as follows–अन्यार्थोऽयं जीवपरामर्शः, न जीवस्वरूपपर्यवसायी, किं तर्हि परमेश्वरस्वरूपपर्यवसायी । (शङ्कर)

अनादिकालप्रवृत्त प्रत्यक्षादि-माणासिद्धस्तुभोक्त्रादिरूप परामृश्येत । (भास्कर)

जीवपरामर्शः परमात्मनो जीवरूपाविर्भावहेतुप्रदर्शनार्थः । जीवपरामर्शस्तु परमात्मप्रतिपादनार्थो न तु जीवस्यैव प्रतिपादनार्थ इत्यर्थः । (निम्बार्क)

(Sūtra 20) Srikara reads अल्पश्रुतिरिति in place of अल्पश्रुतेरिति If the objector contends that the reference to the small measure of the दहराकाश fits in well with the आराग्रमात्र Jīva, not with Brahman which is greater than every thing, the answer is that the Sūtrakara has already disposed of the same in I 2 7. The *reference is for the sake of meditation*

(Sūtra 21) The Pratyagātman is not the दहराकाश, as only he who is freed from the Pratyagātman secures परमसाम्य with Brahman तदनुकार —Similarity with that, the अनुकार्य Brahman is the दहराकाश

(*Sūtra 22*) The *Gita also refers* to the परमसाम्यापत्तिलक्षण परब्रह्मानुकार (मम साधर्म्यमागता) Nimbarka reads the Sūtra as अपि तु स्मर्यते Sankara and others as अपि च स्मर्यते । Sankara takes the Sūtras अनुकृतेस्तस्य च and अपि च स्मर्यते as forming a separate Adhikarana the विषयवाक्य being तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति from the *Mundaka* Rāmānuja objects to this procedure on two grounds— (1) There is no point in having recourse to this Sruti passage to prove the परब्रह्मत्व for that is already proved by the Sūtras I 2 22 I 3 1 and I 1 25 (where Brahman is distinctly known to be भारूप) No Pūrvapaksa can therefore arise, and (2) अनुकार can not mean अनुभान Ramānuja s arguments are hardly convincing Surely there is room for अविशङ्का in the passage तमेव भान्तमनु ,—who is referred to by तमेव, तेजोधातु or प्राज्ञ आत्मा ? Again अनुकार is not confined only to समानस्वभाव entities अनुकृति can be legitimately understood to mean अनुभान It must be admitted however that the च in अनुकृतेस्तस्य च favours this Sūtra as corroborating what has been stated before Sankara more properly *refers to the Gita passages* न तद्भासयते सूर्यः, and यदादित्यगतं तेजः by स्मर्यते च

(Sutra 23) According to Ramanuja Sutras 23–41 constitute the sixth Adhikarana called the Pramitādhikarana Within this Adhikarana, Ramanuja admits three subsidiary Adhikaranas which we have labelled as 6 A 6 B and 6 C (instead of 7, 8 9) in order to avoid any confusion Sutras 25–29 constitute the Devata—adhikarana 6 A Sūtras 30–32 Madhvadhikarana 6B, and Sutras 33–40, Apaśūdrādhikarana 6 C The विषयवाक्य is अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो ईशानो भूतभव्यस्य from the *Kathopanisad* The question is—who is the अङ्गुष्ठमात्र ? The *objector* says that it can only be the Pratyagātman who alone can be of the measure of a thumb (Sankara here refers to the अङ्गुष्ठमात्र-पुरुष dragged out of Satyavat s body, by Yama—in the story of Savitri in the *Mahābhārata*)

The Siddhānta is that the Paramātman is अङ्गुष्ठमात्र because the Sruti itself says ' he is the ruler of the भूतभव्य (ईशानो भूतभव्यस्य) which the Jiva can

never be. The विषयवाक्य according to मध्व is ऊर्ध्वं प्राणमुन्नयति...He remarks, वामनशब्दादेव विष्णुरिति प्रमितः. श्रीकण्ठ takes प्रमित. to mean निश्चित. विज्ञानभिक्षु explains प्रमितः as स्पष्टमवगतः, or प्रकर्षेण मितोऽत्यल्पः.

(Sūtra 24) The Paramātman is rightly said to be अङ्गुष्ठमात्र, as he abides in the heart which is अङ्गुष्ठमात्र, for the sake of worship by human beings. The heart of donkeys, horses etc., is bigger than the thumb, but here only human beings are to be taken into account. स्थितं तावदुत्तरत्र समापयिष्यते— There remains (स्थितं) still more to be said in this connection, but that would be taken up and disposed of, when the matter is discussed in Sūtras 40 and 41, after some topics are dealt with in passing, in Sūtras 25-39. Śankara, Bhāskara, and Madhva take Sūtras 24-25 as a separate Adhikaraṇa.

(Sūtra 25) Śrīkara reads तदुपर्युपरि, and Baladeva तदुपर्यपि च.

Badarāyaṇa holds the view that the Śāstra has jurisdiction over beings superior to men, like gods, Sādhyas etc., as they have the necessary qualifications for the worship of Brahman. The gods and others have the desire to know Brahman; they have the necessary physical capacity (they have hands and feet; they practise Brahmacarya, and go to different preceptors, Indra wields the thunder-bolt—such descriptions in the *Brāhmaṇas* etc, show that the gods have bodies). The glorificatory passages वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता etc, refer to the glory of the deity concerned, as actually existing in the deity. So, there is no earthly reason why gods etc, should be prevented from going in for the necessary उपासना s or विद्या s.

[195] (Sūtra 26) The objector refers to one practical difficulty if the gods are admitted to have a body. When more sacrifices than one are being performed at the same time by different men, and if some god, say Indra, is invoked to accept the offerings, how can Indra possessing one body, be present at different sacrifices? The answer is—Gods can assume more than one body simultaneously (why, even sages like Saubhari are known to have more than one body).

Srīkara reads...प्रवृत्तेर्दर्शनात् in place of प्रतिपत्तेर्दर्शनात्.

अनेकप्रतिपत्ति—अनेकस्वरूपप्रतिपत्ति, or विग्रहवतामपि कर्माङ्गभावचोदनास्वनेका प्रतिपत्तिर्दृश्यते । नाविदेकोऽपि विग्रहवानेकत्र युगपदङ्गभावं न गच्छति, यथा बहुभिर्भोजयद्भिर्नैको ब्राह्मणो युगपद्भोज्यते । क्वचिच्चैकोऽपि विग्रहवाननेकत्र युगपदङ्गभावं गच्छति, यथा बहुभिर्नमस्कुर्वाणैरेको ब्राह्मणो युगपन्नमस्क्रियते । (Sankara).

—अनेकेषां देवतापदप्राप्तेर्दर्शनात् (मध्व).

—बहवोऽत्र कर्माणि प्रवर्तमाना दृश्यन्ते । अथवा, सर्वपदार्थानामनेका प्रतिपत्तिर्बहुधोपयोगो दृश्यते (वल्लभ)

—योगशरीरिणा व्यवहितविप्रकृष्टनानादेशीयपदार्थेष्वनेकेषु प्रतिपत्तेरुपालम्भात् ।

सौभरि is described in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. He, although old, wanted to marry and approached Māndhātṛ who had fifty daughters. Māndhātṛ, presumably to make fun of the old sage said that he was willing to offer him any daughter of his, who would accept him. Saubhari, possessed of Yogic

power, married all the fifty daughters and enjoyed them (by having fifty similar bodies).

(Sūtra 27)—The objector points out that if Indra and other gods have अनित्य and changeable bodies, that would mean that the Vedic शब्द is also अनित्य, for only an अनित्य शब्द can represent an अनित्य entity. Thus Vedic words would be अर्थशून्य and अनित्य.

The answer is— It is from the नित्य Vedic words that the different इन्द्राद्यर्थs come into being. The word इन्द्र means the आकृति (जाति) विशेष of Indra and not the इन्द्रव्यक्तिविशेष. इन्द्रजाति is नित्य throughout. This is known from the Sruti (प्रत्यक्ष) and the Smrti (अनुमान) passages, such as ... वेदेन नामरूपे व्याकरोत्; स भूरिति व्याहरत्स भूमिमसृजत। (*Taitt. Brā.*) and अनादिनिधना ह्येषा वाक्. ... (*Manu*) etc.

Sankara in his Bhāsya discusses in detail the question about the नित्यत्व of the वर्णs, quoting Upavarsa—वर्णा एव तु न शब्दः. He also says प्रत्यक्षं श्रुतिः, प्रामाण्यं प्रत्यनपेक्षत्वात्। अनुमानं स्मृतिः, प्रामाण्यं प्रति सापेक्षत्वात्.

श्रीकर reads ... चेन्नान्त प्रभवात्.

(Sūtra 28) अत एव—नियताकृतेर्देवादेः (श.); शब्दप्रभवत्वात् (भा.); शब्दस्य नित्यत्वादेव (म.); - अस्मादेव हेतोः, चकाराद्ब्रह्मतुल्यत्वम् (व.), Nimbārka does not read च in the Sūtra.

[196] (Sūtra 29) Vallabha reads ... रूपत्वादावृत्ताः, and Vijñānabhiksu ... विरोधदर्शनात्

The objector says that in the case of ordinary Pralayas (world-dissolution), when only व्यक्तिs are dissolved and आकृतिs continue, it is possible to speak of the वेदनित्यत्व, but what happens when the महाप्रलय occurs, sweeping away everything— व्यक्ति and जाति etc? The answer is— परमेश्वर creates the new सृष्टि possessing the same नामरूप as before, as is made clear by the Sruti and Smrti passages. He by his Yogic power remembers everything.

Most Bhāsyakāras including Śankara refer to सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत् (Rg.), Rāmānuja does not refer to this very apt passage.

According to Rāmānuja, the देवताधिकरण ends here. He remarks अतो देवादीनामप्यर्थित्वसामर्थ्ययोगाद्ब्रह्मविद्यायामधिकारोऽस्तीति सिद्धम्।

[197] (Sūtra 30) Jaimini is of opinion that the gods are not competent to study मधुविद्या etc. In the मधुविद्या, for instance, आदित्य is to be worshipped as देवमधु; how can the god आदित्य be both the worshipped and the object of worship, which he has to be for the knowledge of मधुविद्या? So, it is better to say that the gods have no अधिकार for such विद्याs.

(Sūtra 31) Śrikara reads this Sūtra as ज्योतिषाभावाच्च The passage तं देवा ज्योतिषा ज्योतिरायुर्होपासतेऽमृतम्. shows that the gods have अधिकार for the worship of परब्रह्मन् (ज्योतिस्) and not for इतरोपासन. Śaṅkara explains the Sūtra as तस्मिन् (ज्योतिर्मण्डले) आदित्यादयो देवतावचनाः शब्दाः प्रयुज्यन्ते।

[198] (Sūtra 32) Bādarāyaṇa, however, thinks that the gods have the necessary अधिकार for all विद्याs It is clear that in the Madhuvidyā कार्यकारणोभयात्मकब्रह्मोपासन is enjoined. Again the gods in this Kalpa would certainly have

अर्थित्व for being gods in the succeeding कल्पs also. So everywhere ultimately ब्रह्मन् is found to be the उपास्य. (Rāmānuja quotes the वृत्तिकार here to support this view) The word तु in the Sūtra is taken to mean that the view of Bādarāyana (the reputed author of the Brahmasūtras) is the Siddhānta view.

[199] (Sūtras 33–39) The अपशूद्राधिकरण discusses the question whether Sūdras have अधिकार for the different विद्याs

The Pūrvapaksin argues that the Śūdras have the अधिकार, for, they have the necessary अर्थित्व and सामर्थ्य like others They may not have अधिकार for the performance of Agnihotra and other sacrifices (because the Śāstras expressly forbid them to do so), but in the case of ब्रह्मोपासन which emphasises meditation, a Sūdra who may not have studied the Vedas, but only the Purānas etc., can have the knowledge of the worship of Brahman Vidura (the son of a maid), Vyasa's दासीपुत्र was a Śūdra, but a Brahmanistha all the same In the *Chāndogya*, Jānaśruti (who is actually addressed as Śūdra) is known to have learnt the Samvargavidyā from Raikva All this shows that Śūdras are competent to learn Brahmavidyā.

The *Siddhānta is— Śūdras are not competent Even the* ब्रह्मोपासना requires the study and knowledge of the Vedas, the knowledge of Itihāsa and Purānas also is only corroborative of that of the Vedas, and it might help the Sūdra to get rid of his sin, but it does not entitle him to secure Brahmavidyā Vidura and others became ब्रह्मनिष्ठ, because of the study of the Vedas etc., in their past births, it was just their प्रारब्धकर्मन् that made them *Sūdras* in their present birth.

As regards the case of Jānaśruti (who is actually addressed as शूद्र) who is allowed to study the Samvargavidyā it can be shown that शूद्र does not mean 'one of the Śūdra caste', but something else Thus —

Jānaśruti, who was a very pious person noted for his liberality, once heard the conversation between two swans that were flying by his mansion One of the swans admonished the other that he should behave respectfully while passing by Jānasruti's mansion The other in wonder asked, who that Jānasruti was, who was being glorified in terms applicable to Raikva (Rāmānuja adds that the two swans were some good Samaritans who wished that Jānaśruti should know the Brahmavidyā) Jānaśruti immediately on getting up from his bed, sent his A D C to find out Raikva Jānaśruti then approached *Raikva (who was attired in a filthy manner, and* was taking his abode in a cart) with six hundred cows, gold coins, a chariot with mules etc , and requested Raikva to teach him the worship of the deity whom he worshipped Jānaśruti was asked by Raikva to take back the presents (because he thought that they were not sufficient or that he did not like the bargaining involved) Raikva addressed Jānaśruti as Sūdra Then Jānaśruti came back with more presents, his daughter included, and Raikva was satisfied with his sincerity, and said that he was willing to teach him the Samvargavidyā even if only the daughter had been offered to him—

This context shows that the expression शूद्र is used in order to point out the त्रिकालज्ञत्व of Raikva who knew that Jānaśruti was full of sorrow (शुक्) as he lacked the Brahmavidyā, and so he had hastened (रैक्वस्य सकाशं प्रति, आद्रवणात्) to Raikva. शोचति, इति शूद्र:, शुच् + र (in accordance with the Sūtra of Pāṇini (शुचेर्दश्च) becomes शूद् + र, शूद्र. अतः शोचितृत्वमेवास्य शूद्रशब्दप्रयोगेण.

भल्लाक्ष—भद्राक्ष, used derisively.

आजहार (भवान् understood) or आजहर्थ (छान्दसः प्रयोग). It appears that the writer of the *Upanisad* exhibits a sense of humour, in suggesting that the *old filthy Raikva was really influenced by the beauty of Jānaśruti's daughter*, in deciding to teach the Saṁvargavidyā to Jānaśruti. Śaṅkara explains शूद्र as शुचमभिदुद्राव, शुचा वाभिदुद्रुवे, शुचा वा रैक्वमभिदुद्रावेति शूद्रः। अवयवार्थसंभवाद्रूढ्यर्थस्य चासंभवात्।

Bhāskara refers to the reading शूद्रस्य for शुगस्य.

[200] (Sūtra 34) Excepting Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha, others read this and the next Sūtra as one Sūtra. (Śrīkāntha reads क्षत्रियत्वगतेश्च).

Jānaśruti was not a Sūdra, but a Kṣatriya, because he is described as a great giver of gifts and food, and as a big chief having an A D. C. in his service.

(Sūtra 35) An additional reason is given, viz. that in the later passage in the *Upanisad* describing the Saṁvargavidyā, Abhipratārin Caitraratha, who was undoubtedly a Ksatriya (एतेन वै चैत्ररथं कापेया अयाजयन्) is mentioned (समानानामेव हि प्रायेण समभिव्याहारा भवन्ति, Śankara). So Jānaśruti, referred to in the same context, must also have been a Ksatriya.

(Sūtra 36) In the case of Brahmavidyā, the Sruti often refers to the Upanayana ceremony; a Śūdra is not entitled to any संस्कार.

(Sūtra 37) Satyakāma Jābāla when asked by the Preceptor who his father was, replied that he did not know about his father, as his mother, a maid, had many masters to serve. The Preceptor was struck by this truthful answer, and immediately accepted Satyakāma as his pupil, remarking that only a Brāhmana could have spoken the truth— नैतदब्राह्मणो विवक्तुमर्हति, समिधं सोम्याहरोप त्वा नेष्ये न सत्यादगाः— All this shows that Satyakāma was not a Sūdra. So, the *Pūrvapaksin can not make any capital out of this episode of Satyakāma to* prove that Sūdras have अधिकार for the Brahmavidyā.

(Sūtra 38) The Smṛtis definitely prohibit a Sūdra from studying the Vedas, it is also ordained that one should not recite the Vedas in the presence of a Sūdra.

[201] (Sūtra 39) Manu categorically says that one should not instruct a Sūdra in Dharma or Vrata. Dire punishments like the cutting of the tongue or pouring molten lead in the ears, are prescribed for the infringement.

Excepting Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Srīkaṇṭha, others take Sūtras 38 and 39 as one Sūtra.

The frantic sophisticated manner in which an attempt is made to der the अधिकार to the Sūdras to study the Brahmavidyā, in the Sūtras in tl Apaśūdrādhikarana, appears to us to reflect the state of things obtaining the period about the beginning of the first century B C, when the Brahm sūtras secured their present shape Possibly owing to the spread of Buddhisn the Aryans, became very jealous of their cultural heritage and were nc prepared to allow the Sūdras the same status as theirs We are inclined t think that this Adhikarana was added when passions were running high, an it was felt that an authoritative decision should be at hand on this point we look dispassionately at the episodes of Jānasruti and Satyakāma, we woul be more or less convinced that both of them were really Sūdras, but thei teachers overlooked this, and impressed by the sincerity of the pupils, under took to instruct them The argument that Jānasruti could not have been Sūdra because he was rich and liberal, is hardly convincing (Was not th purchaser of Hariscandra one belonging to the fourth caste?) That person belonging to the same caste are spoken of together in an episode, betrays onl some special pleading, and cannot by any means be a convincing argument

[**202**] Rāmānuja winds up his Bhāsya on the Pramitādhikarana with a powerful attack on the Advaitins He says that the Advaitins have nc right to talk about the Sūdras having no अधिकार for the Brahmavidyā They hold that everything else than Brahman is illusion and that Moksa is th removal of the illusory Bandha by the knowledge of Reality If it be so what matters it if someone secures that knowledge without having studiec the Vedas and the Sāstras? Even from an Āptavakya the knowledge ot Reality can be had *not only from the Vedas that are Apauruseya*. *Manu lays* down that the Veda-knowers should not teach the Vedas to the Sūdras But the Veda-knowers are surely beyond the pale of the Nisedha-śastra If a Brāhmana by meditating upon the Sruti passage 'that thou art' can get rid of the illusion about the world, a Sūdra also by cogitating upon the instruction given by an Āpta can secure the same result Thus the Vedānta passages in the Sruti do not appear to serve any purpose in the case of the Veda-knowers One can even argue that the Sūdras are likely to derive greater benefit from the Vedas and so they deserve all the more to have the अधिकार for the Brahmavidyā which means in effect, that there would be none so poor to do reverence to the poor Upanisad-lore! What can the Sruti do for an Advaitin? The Sruti is also an illusion according to him

But one who holds that knowledge is of the form of devotion,— the Visistādvaitin—believes implicitly in the Sāstra and undertakes the Upāsanā in accordance with the tenets, regulations regarding the duties of the castes and stages of life and ultimately gets rid of the *Karmabandha* He naturally would not even dream of allowing the अधिकार for the Sūdras, as it is completely at variance with the Sastric injunctions

Rāmānuja's criticism of the Advaita-view contains no fresh arguments Saṅkara has never said that the Sāstra has no value, his contention is that till the knowledge of Reality or Brahman flashes forth, that is in the Vyavahārāvasthā, the Sāstric injunctions have got to be strictly followed (the Sūdras thus have to act according to the dictates of the Śāstras that lay down their duties), after the realisation of Brahman, the Brahman-knower has no use of the Sāstras but that does not mean that he is free to act in any way he likes as a matter of fact, a Brahman-knower could but act in a strictly righteous manner So, the sympathy of Rāmānuja for the 'Tapasvini' Sruti supposed to be ill-treated by the Advaitins, has no locus standi at all

[203] (Sūtra 40) Rāmānuja refers to the passage यदिदं किंच from the *Kāthaka*, which comes between अङ्गुष्ठमात्र पुरुष and अङ्गुष्ठमात्र पुरुषोऽन्तरात्मा (the विषयवाक्य in Sūtra 23), and argues that as the topic and the context are the same this Sūtra is the continuation of Sūtras 23 and 24, and further corroborates the statement about the Paramātman being अङ्गुष्ठमात्र (Sankara takes this and the next Sutra as forming a separate Adhikarana) Ramānuja s arrangement is quite unsatisfactory Apart from the fact that Sūtras 40–41 are to be regarded as a continuation of Sūtras 23–24,—not an unobjectionable procedure in itself,—the expression शब्दादेव in Sūtra 23 shows that the Sabda itself proves the Paramātman to be अङ्गुष्ठमात्र, and no corroboration is required Again प्राण एजति does not show that एजन or कम्पन is a characteristic feature of an अङ्गुष्ठमात्र entity. Vijñānabhiksu gives the best explanation (he seems to read the Sūtra as प्राण कम्पनात्)— ब्रह्म प्राण प्राणशब्दवाच्य भवति। कम्पकत्वगुणयोगादित्यर्थः ।

(Sūtra 41) The विषयवाक्य according to Vijñānabhiksu is तच्छुभ्रं ज्योतिषां ज्योति, he explains the Sūtra as ब्रह्म ज्योतिशब्दवाच्य भवति। ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानस्वरूपतया प्रकाशत्वगुण योगादित्यर्थः । Ramānuja says that this Sūtra also gives the reason why the अङ्गुष्ठप्रमित is the Highest Brahman which appears to be quite far-fetched

[204] (Sūtra 42) Rāmanuja takes Sūtras 42–44 as one Adhikarana, the विषयवाक्य being आकाशो वै नामरूपयो Sankara takes this Sūtra as forming a separate Adhikarana, so also Vijñanabhiksu who takes यावान्वायमाकाश as the विषयवाक्य

The Pūrvapaksin says that आकाश means the मुक्तात्मन् who had been referred to before नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता refers to his पूर्वावस्था दहराकाश is already proved to be Brahman but here the प्रजापतिवाक्य which intervenes speaks of the मुक्तावस्थ-आत्मन्

The answer is—आकाश means Brahman because there is the mention of the attribute नामरूपयोर्निर्वहितृत्व which is not possible in the case of the प्रत्यगात्मन् or मुक्तावस्थ-आत्मन् निर्वोढृत्व means productive capacity and not association as the Pūrvapaksin seems to understand it Such a निर्वोढृत्व is not possible in the released Soul, though he is the matter in hand so we must understand the दहराकाश, which is the उपास्य, as being referred to here Further the word आकाश is never used in the sense of the प्रत्यगात्मन्

आकाशशब्दवाच्य पुरुषोत्तम । जीवात् परमात्मन अर्थान्तरत्वेन व्यपदेशात्। ब्रह्मत्वामृतत्वादेव्यपदेशाच्च। (निम्बार्क) ब्रह्म आकाशशब्दवाच्य भवति। उभयोरेवाकाशब्रह्मणो सर्वेषु पदार्थेषु अन्तरत्वव्यपदेशात्। आदि- शब्देन नित्यत्वासङ्गत्वसूक्ष्मत्वादयो गुणा ग्राह्या। (विज्ञानभिक्षु)

[205] (Sūtra 43) The objector points out that शुद्धावस्थप्रत्यगात्मन् is the same as परमात्मन्, according to the Sruti So, no अर्थान्तर is intended by आकाश

This Sūtra gives the answer—The Paramātman is a different entity from the प्रत्यगात्मन् who in the सुषुप्ति stage *goes to* the परमात्मन्, and at the time of उत्क्रान्ति goes away from the body which is enveloped by the प्राज्ञ आत्मन् The enveloper and the enveloped, the goer and the one gone to must be different

[206] (*Sūtra 44*) *The Sruti designates the Paramātman as* सर्वस्याधि- पति सर्वस्येशान etc जगत्पतित्व, जगद्विधारण, सर्वेश्वरत्व etc, cannot be associated with the प्रत्यगात्मन् even in the मुक्तावस्था So, नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता आकाश can only mean the Paramātman

[207] This Quarter considers several Śruti passages which seem to refer to certain technical terms in the Sānkhya philosophy. It is shown by the Siddhāntin that the passages refer to Brahman and the Vedantic doctrine.

The first Adhikaraṇa contains seven Sūtras and the विषयवाक्य is...महत: परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात् पुरुषः परः from the *Kāṭhaka*. The question is—what is meant by अव्यक्त? The Pūrvapakṣin says—महत्, अव्यक्त and पुरुष are definitely Sāṅkhya terms; अव्यक्त therefore means Pradhāna (आनुमानिकम्), पुरुष is the twenty-fifth principle beyond which nothing exists, according to the Sāṅkhyas and so the expression पुरुषान्न परं किंचित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः can be properly explained in the light of the Sānkhya philosophy.

[208] The Siddhānta is—Looking to the context and the metaphorical description of the body, अव्यक्त must mean here शरीर. Thus—The रूपक (metaphorical description) is as follows—

आत्मन् is the रथिन् (warrior in the chariot)
शरीर — रथ.
बुद्धि — सारथि (the charioteer)
मनस् — प्रग्रह (the reins)
इन्द्रियs — हय (the horses)
विषयs — objects perceived by the sense-organs, and the destination reached is the highest abode of Viṣṇu.

So also,

अर्थ > इन्द्रियs
मनस् > अर्थ
बुद्धि > मनस्
महदात्मन् > बुद्धि
अव्यक्त > महत्
पुरुष — (nothing beyond him)

(> showing 'being पर') Being पर cannot refer to the कार्यकारणभाव, for, that is impossible; it refers to वशीकार्यत्व: the पुरुष being the अन्तर्यामिन् is obviously परतम).

[209] According to the Sānkhyas, प्रकृति (प्रधान, अव्यक्त) is the producing cause of the seven विकृतिs, (बुद्धि (महत्), अहंकार and the five तन्मात्रs) and the sixteen विकारs (Five Jñānendriyas, five Karmendriyas, five Mahābhūtas and Manas). The *Kāthaka* passage refers only to being पर. शब्द and other अर्थs cannot be the cause of Indriyas; Manas cannot be the cause of Arthas The word बुद्धि means महत्, so that महतो महान्परः becomes meaningless, महत् cannot be a विशेषण of आत्मन् either (in आत्मा महान् परः). Thus the *Kāthaka* passage can be understood only as a metaphorical description. The same thing is propounded in the passage यच्छेद्वाङ्मनसी प्राज्ञ (मनसी ought to be मनसि, it is a Vedic form).

[210] तद्यच्छेज्ज्ञान आत्मनि (ज्ञान means बुद्धि, ज्ञाने and आत्मनि refer to two abodes, आत्मनि वर्तमाने ज्ञाने) ज्ञानमात्मनि महति (महान् आत्मा is the doer).
तद्यच्छेच्छान्त आत्मनि (तत् means तं कर्तारं, व्यत्ययेन नपुंसकलिङ्गता)—
(शान्त आत्मनि is equal to अन्तर्यामिणि परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि).

[211] (Sūtra 2)—If it be objected that the शरीर is व्यक्त; how can it be referred to by the word अव्यक्त?—The answer is, the unmodified subtle element itself becomes the body when modified, and is fit for being the means for the activity leading to पुरुषार्थ, like a chariot.

[212] (Sūtra 3)—The objector says that the Sāṅkhyas also speak of भूतसूक्ष्म as the cause of the elements. The answer is—But there is this difference. According to the Vedāntins, the अव्यक्त and its modifications are able to function, *not independently as the Sāṅkhyas hold, but only by being the body of the* परमपुरुष *and having him as their Ātman. Śruti and Smṛti (Gītā, Viṣṇu-purāṇa)* passages definitely speak of प्रकृतिविकृतिपुरुष as being परमपुरुषात्मक. अर्थवत्-प्रयोजनवत्. श्रीकर reads the Sūtra as तदधीनत्वात्तदर्थवत्.

[213] (Sūtra 4) If प्रधान was intended to be referred to by अव्यक्त, it ought to have been spoken of as ज्ञेय in the text (because the Sāṅkhyas talk of Mokṣa *as* due to the knowledge of both व्यक्त and अव्यक्त). *But it is not so* described here. *Śaṅkara remarks*—आम्नातं तु रथरूपकक्लृप्तशरीराद्यनुसरणेन विष्णोरेव परमं पदं दर्शयितुमयमुपन्यास इत्यनवद्यम्।

[214] (Sūtra 5) Madhva reads प्रकरणात् as a separate Sūtra. The objector points out that अव्यक्त is referred to as ज्ञेय in the subsequent passage—अशब्दमस्पर्श...निचाय्य तन्मृत्युमुखात्प्रमुच्यते. The answer is—The context shows that it is the प्राज्ञ-परमपुरुष—*who is mentioned here as fit to be meditated upon. The* attributes अशब्द etc., are appropriate in the case of the परमपुरुष alone

[215] (Sūtra 6) Vallabha reads त्रयाणामेवमुपन्यास ..and Vijñānabhikṣu as त्रयाणामपि...The three questions pertain to अग्नि, जीव and परमात्मन्. Madhva takes त्रयाणां to be पितृसौमनस्यस्वर्गप्राप्तिपरमात्मना (*but* पितृसौमनस्य *cannot be regarded as* a प्रश्न). Naciketas asked for three boons, but no question was asked in respect of the first boon. Questions direct or implied were asked later. Thus—While asking for the second boon, information about the Fire-worship leading *to* heaven was asked (त्रिणाचिकेता—पाकयज्ञ, हविर्यज्ञ and सोमयज्ञ *are meant.* or यजन, अध्ययन and दान). The third boon referred to the nature of Mokṣa, and the means thereof. Then Naciketas further asked about the worship of the उपास्य Brahman which was entirely *different from Dharma,* Adharma, Bhūta, Bhavya etc. Yama then instructed Naciketas about Om-worship, Viṣṇu's highest abode etc. Not a word about Avyakta is to be found directly or implied in this whole context.

(Sūtra 7) Bhāskara notes the reading महत्त्ववच्च. Just as in the passage बुद्धेरात्मा महान् परः, महत् is not taken to mean the Sāṅkhya Mahat-principle, because of its being in case-coordination with Atman, Avyakta, described as being beyond Atman, cannot refer to the Sāṅkhya principle so called. Bhāskara *says*— महच्छब्दो बुद्धौ सांख्यैः प्रयुक्तस्ततोऽन्यत्रापि वेदे दृश्यते। तथाव्यक्तशब्दः शरीरे भविष्यति। Vijñānabhikṣu remarks—यथा महत्तत्त्वमन्तःकरणविशेषः आत्मनश्चेष्टाश्रमलक्षणशरीरमेव सचक्षुरादिभिः संयुज्य स्वकार्यजनने क्षमं भवति न स्वतन्त्रमिति सर्वैरभ्युपगम्यते तथैव प्रधानमप्यचेतनत्वाविशेषादुचितमित्यर्थः। Madhva includes the next Sūtra चमसवदविशेषात् in the first Adhikaraṇa.

[216] (Sūtra 8) The second Adhikarana contains three Sūtras and the विषयवाक्य is the passage अजामेकां from the *Śvetāśvatara*.

The Sānkhyavādin claims that the passage in question refers to the प्रकृति (or प्रधान) Thus—

अजा — प्रकृति is अविकृति or unborn

लोहितशुक्लकृष्णा — possessed of सत्त्वरजस्तमोगुणs

बह्वी प्रजा सृजमाना — the विकृतिs and the sixteen-fold विकार come from प्रकृति.

अज— the पुरुष enjoying the प्रकृति, when infatuated

The Siddhāntin's answer is—The etymological meaning requires to be understood in the light of the context etc , which alone can fix the particular meaning Thus the passage in question gives only a general idea about some entity unborn, etc चमसवत्—Like the चमस (चम्यते इति, out of which something is eaten a cup) but what particular size and shape the cup is, cannot be known from the etymology, but the passage इदं तच्छिर एष ह्यर्वाग्बिलश्चमस ऊर्ध्वबुध्न tells us that the head is a चमस with the hole (the mouth) down and the bottom up (usually the चमस is ऊर्ध्वबिल अर्वाग्बुध्न)

अजा might very well mean a she-goat

लोहितशुक्लकृष्णा—tri-coloured, red, white and black (or light, water and food) अज—a he-goat,—and so on So, the Sānkhya cannot jump to the conclusion that अजा means the प्रकृति (which is अनज्ञात्मिका) Various passages from the Upanisads (*Cūlika Śvetāśvatara*) and from the *Gītā*, point out to the same fact.

[217] (Sūtra 9) The Sruti itself in passages like ज्योतिषा ज्योति gives us a specific directive to conclude that ज्योतिरुपक्रमा means ब्रह्मकारणिका That the अजा has Brahman for its cause is clear from the description of Brahman as abiding in the heart-cave for the sake of worship and from its being the cause of the seven Prānas and Lokas The Taittiriyas actually mention this in their texts The *Śvetāśvatara* also clearly understands अजा to be परब्रह्मशक्ति Sankara says ज्योतिःप्रमुखा चतुर्वैविध्यभूतग्रामस्य प्रकृतिभूतेयमजा प्रतिपत्तव्या, and Bhaskara, ज्योतिरुपक्रमो यस्या सा ज्योतिरुपक्रमा श्रीधर reads ज्योतिरुपक्रमात्तया

[218] (Sūtra 10) But how is this अजा called लोहितशुक्लकृष्णरूपा, or how can such an अजा be ज्योतिरुपक्रमा ? The answer is according to Ramānuja—The passage describes the creation (कल्पनम् means सृष्टि, cf धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत्) that is to say, the Prakrti is described both in the कारणावस्था (at the time of the Pralaya, सूक्ष्मरूपेण) and the कार्यावस्था (at the time of creation, विभक्तव्यक्तनामरूपेण) just as आदित्य, though one in the कारणावस्था, is described as मधु for being fit to be enjoyed by the deities Vasu etc. in the कार्यावस्था (मधुत्वकल्पनम् = उदयास्तमयकल्पनम्) It is not clear why Rāmānuja should have gone out of his way to explain कल्पन as creation The usual meaning of कल्पन, fancy, superimposition certainly suits the context better Besides कल्पन meaning creation does not fit in well with मध्वादि

[219] It looks as if Rāmānuja wants to have a dig at Sankara somehow and attacks him for his interpretation of अजा as तेजोबन्नलक्षणा Rāmānuja asks naively enough—What is meant by तेजोबन्नात्मिका एका, अजा ?—

(1) If the meaning is तेजोबन्नानि, they being many, अजा cannot be called एका Even if the त्रिवृत्करण is admitted, that would not make the three fold entity one, as the idea of बहुत्व would still persist (Rāmānuja here conveniently forgets that his Visiṣṭādvaita is open to this very objection)

(2) (A) Is modified (तेजोबन्नरूपेण) Brahman meant? In that case the idea of बहुत्व would persist

(B) Is the unmodified Brahman in its natural form meant? In that case, the expression लोहितशुक्लकृष्णानाम् would be meaningless How can Brahman in its natural form be possessed of many forms?

(3) Is some other entity which produces तेजोबन्न meant? Why not then accept the कारणावस्था of तेजोबन्न described in the Śruti as the meaning of the word अजा?

All this seems to be beside the point in no way does this controvert Sankara's position

Rāmānuja further says that the superimposition of the अजा on the प्रकृति serves no purpose but is positively harmful What is the point in superimposing the nature of a she goat who is contemptible, responsible for some casual creation and having occasional connection with the he-goat etc ? To speak of the wise Ksetrajña as having nothing to do with the Prakrti and at the same time to talk of his connection with the Prakrti, is the height of absurdity !

Rāmānuja has allowed himself to lose the proper sense of proportion in his criticism The Sruti passage, for the sake of convenience is comparing the unborn Prakrti to a she goat (taking advantage of the pun on the word Aja), that is all Ramanuja cannot be unaware that a comparison has to be understood only to a limited extent and his fulminations have no real basis

[220] (Sutra 11) The third Adhikarana contains three Sūtras (11–13), and the विषयवाक्य is यस्मिन् पञ्च पञ्चजना from the *Brhadāranyaka* Srikara reads सत्योपग्रहणादपि

The question is what is meant by पञ्च पञ्चजना ?

The Pūrvapaksin says—Obviously the twenty-five well known principles admitted by the Sānkhyas are meant here (1 Prakrti + 7 Vikrtis + 16 Vikaras + 1 Purusa)—because पञ्चजना is a समाहार compound (पञ्चजना being a Vedic form the proper form would have been पञ्चजनी) the meaning is —Five groups of five, that is twenty-five

The Siddhānta is—

(1) पञ्चजना is not a समाहार compound it is not fair to describe some expression as regular in the Vedic Sanskrit, when the form can be properly explained otherwise

(2) According to the Pāṇini Sūtra, पञ्चजना: can be taken as a संज्ञा word.

(3) Like सप्त सप्तर्षयः, the पञ्चजन्s are spoken of as पञ्च.

(4) पञ्च पञ्च does not necessarily mean 25 (5 × 5); it can mean 10 also (5 + 5).

(5) Even if पञ्च पञ्च be understood to mean 25, we cannot understand here the twenty-five principles of the Sāṅkhyas; for, these Sāṅkhya principles are different from those referred to in the Sruti passages as ब्रह्मात्मक.

(6) Further, the Sruti passage speaks of आत्मन् and आकाश as different from the twenty-five (principles); that would make the principles twenty-seven, or पञ्च पञ्च would have to be taken to mean twenty-three (to stand by the number 25) !

(7) If it be suggested that we might take one प्रकृति to be three प्रकृतिs (referring to सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस्) so as to get the number twenty-five, then बुद्धि (महत्) and अहंकार would also have to be taken as three-fold each,— so the number would rise to twenty-nine !

(8) पञ्च पञ्चजना: must mean *five* groups of five each. The Sāṅkhya can only show *four* groups of five (5 Karmendriyas, 5 Jñānendriyas, 5 Mahābhūtas and 5 subtle elements).

So पञ्चजन must mean something else.

(Sūtra 12) पञ्चजना: means on the strength of the वाक्यशेष—प्राण, श्रोत्र, चक्षुस्, अन्न and मनस्.

[221] (Sūtra 13) The Kāṇva recension does not read अन्न; so to make up the number five, we should understand ज्योतिस् in place of अन्न; so that पञ्चजन्s mean ultimately the sense-organs–प्राण (connected with वायु) represents the organ of touch; चक्षुस्, the organ of sight; श्रोत्र, the organ of hearing; अन्न (connected with the earth) represents the organ of smell as also the organ of taste (अद्यते, अनेनेति, अन्नम्) and मनस्, by which one meditates.

Sankara remarks—कैश्चित्तु, देवाः पितरो गन्धर्वा असुरा रक्षांसि च, पञ्चजना व्याख्याताः, अन्यैश्च चत्वारो वर्णा निषादपञ्चमाः परिगृहीताः । क्वचिच्च 'यत्पाञ्चजन्यया विशा' इति प्रजापरः प्रयोगः पञ्चजनस्य दृश्यते । तत्परिग्रहेऽपीह न कश्चिद्विरोधः । Modern scholars take पञ्चजनाः equal to पञ्चकृष्टयः, पञ्चक्षितयः (tribes), or as meaning the five tribes यदु, पुरु, तुर्वश etc., named after the sons of Yayāti

[222] (Sūtra 14) The fourth Adhikaraṇa contains two Sūtras and the विषयवाक्य refers to passages which proclaim the जगत्सृष्टि from सत्, असत्, अव्याकृत etc. श्रीधर reads तथा for यथा in the Sūtra.

The Pūrvapakṣin says that the Sruti passages do not with one voice refer to Brahman as the cause of the world. सत्, असत्, अव्याकृत can equally claim to be called the cause; अव्याकृत is the same as अव्यक्त, that is, the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas; प्रधान can be called Brahman (on account of its vastness) and आत्मन् (on account of its pervading nature). It is true that the attributes ईक्षण etc., can not be literally applied to the अचेतन Pradhāna, but they can be understood in the sense of 'being eager or ready to create.'

The answer is—Everywhere the omniscient, all-powerful Highest Brahman is mentioned as the cause of आकाश etc, in the various passages dealing with creation.

[223] (*Sūtra 15*) *In the passage* असद्वा , *where* असत् *seems to be the cause, it is clear that Brahman itself is called* असत्, because there was no distinction of name and form then, the same Brahman continues to be referred to अव्याकृत also denotes the Brahman with its form unmodified, which enters into everything to act as the controller, and the modifier. The words Brahman and Ātman cannot be denoting Pradhāna which has a limited vastness and pervading capacity

Rāmānuja begins his comment on this Adhikarana with the remark पुन प्रधानकारणवादी प्रत्यवतिष्ठते, that is, he considers the Sānkhya doctrine to be the target of criticism *In the rest of the fourth Quarter also, he is at pains to* show that the विषयवाक्यs concerned deal prima facie with the Sānkhya doctrine Because the first two Adhikaranas can be understood easily as directed against the Sāṅkhyas Rāmanuja thinks that the whole of the fourth Quarter deals with the Sāṅkhya doctrine There is nothing to show that the Sūtrakāra had this in mind It is generally accepted that the whole of the first Adhyāya is concerned with the 'Samanvaya' idea, showing that various words and passages in the ultimate analysis point to Brahman In the first three Quarters of the first Adhyāya, emphasis was laid on the meaning of individual words and *expressions in the Sruti in this Quarter emphasis is laid on various passages* or Vākyas There was no occasion for the Sutrakāra to single out the Sāṅkhya doctrine for attack here, later on, the Sankhyavadin gets more than his due share in the second Adhyāya The attempts of Rāmanuja and Nimbārka to associate all the Adhikaranas in this Quarter, with the Sankhya doctrine are hardly convincing For instance, in this very Adhikarana, the Pūrvapaksin takes his stand upon अव्याकृत meaning अव्यक्त, प्रधान (but this point has been already disposed of before) *Sankara rightly regards the Purvapaksa as* referring to passages where the creation is described in different ways, and remarks—सत्यपि प्रतिवेदान्त सृज्यमानेष्वाकाशादिषु क्रमादिद्वारके विगाने (discrepancy) न स्रष्टरि किंचिद्विगानमस्ति । कुत ? यथाव्यपदिष्टोक्ते । The passages concerned, all agree in pointing out to Brahman only as the one creator

[224] (Sūtra 16) The fifth Adhikarana contains three Sūtras (16–18) and the विषयवाक्य is the passage यो वै बालाक एतेषां पुरुषाणां कर्ता यस्य चैतत्कर्म स वै वेदितव्य from the *Kausitaki Brāhmana*

Rāmānuja begins his Bhāsya on this Sūtra with पुनरपि साङ्ख्य प्रत्यवतिष्ठते । The Sāṅkhya argues that it is the *Purusa*, the enjoyer who is stated here as being fit to be known In यस्य चैतत्कर्म कर्मन् constituted of merit and demerit can belong only to the Ksetrajña (कर्मन् cannot refer to the world) Further, the reference to the beating with the stick, of the person asleep certainly refers to the जीवात्मन् as is clear from the expression अस्मिन् (जीवात्मनि) प्राण एवैकधा भवति Even if अस्मिन् and प्राणे are taken as *showing two abodes* प्राणे *would* mean वागादि-

करणग्रामे and so, the matter in hand here is the पुरुष, and the पुरुषाधिष्ठित-प्रधान is the cause of the world.

According to Śaṅkara the question is— who is the वेदितव्य,—जीव or मुख्यप्राण or परमात्मन्? The Pūrvapakṣin says that it may be प्राण, actually mentioned in the वाक्यशेष, or जीव who is the enjoyer described as awakening when struck by the stick. जीव can be called प्राण, for he is the प्राणभृत्. Rāmānuja's idea that the प्रधान is intended by the Pūrvapakṣin is quite unsatisfactory.

[225] *The Siddhānta is—The Paramātman* alone is वेदितव्य. एतत्कर्म can with propriety mean the whole world, not merely पुण्यापुण्य or some क्रिया as is clear from the context. पुरुषाणां means आदित्यमण्डलाद्यधिकरणानां पुरुषाणाम्. Read the following comments by Saṅkara—परमेश्वर एवायमेतेषां पुरुषाणां कर्ता स्यात्, कस्मात्, उपक्रमसामर्थ्यात्।...कर्तृत्वं चैतेषां पुरुषाणां न परमेश्वरादन्यस्य स्वातन्त्र्येणावकल्पते।...यस्य वैतत्कर्म, इत्यपि नायं परिस्पन्दलक्षणस्य धर्माधर्मलक्षणस्य वा कर्मणो निर्देशः। तयोरन्यतरस्याप्यप्रकृतत्वात्, असंशब्दितत्वाच्च।...प्रत्यक्षसंनिहितं जगत्सर्वनाम्नैतच्छब्देन निर्दिश्यते।...य एतेषां पुरुषाणां जगदेकदेशभूतानां कर्ता, किमनेन विशेषेण, यस्य कृत्स्नमेव जगदविशेषितं कर्मेति...एवं ब्राह्मणपरिव्राजकन्यायेन सामान्यविशेषाभ्यां जगतः कर्ता वेदितव्यतयोपदिश्यते।

[226] (Sūtra 17) Bhāskara reads this and the next Sūtra as one Sūtra. Baladeva reads अन्यार्थस्तु for अन्यार्थं तु.

The objector's contention is that the passage contains definite indicatory marks of जीव and प्राण, such as being the resort in the state of deep sleep, and the description of Prāṇa being एकधा भवति etc.; and so Brahman cannot be referred to here.

The answer is—In Sūtra I-1 31, during the discussion about the Pratardana-vidyā, we arrived at some definite principles for dealing with similar situations—these principles were :—

(1) One should pay proper attention to the Upakrama and the Upasamhāra.

(2) When it is decided that the passage in question refers to Brahman, that should be taken as the deciding factor.

(3) Other characteristics noted have got to be harmonised with that.

Applying these principles to the present case, *it is clear* that in the Upakrama (ब्रह्म ते ब्रवाणि) of the passage in question, Brahman is described; in the middle portion यस्य चैतत्कर्म shows that Brahman is hinted at and in the Upasamhāra, the knower is described as securing स्वाराज्य etc. So the passage as a whole undoubtedly refers to Brahman. In the Pratardana-vidyā, the जीवलिङ्ग and मुख्यप्राणलिङ्गs were explained as referring to Brahman for the purpose of Upāsanā. Here also प्राण एवैकधा भवति etc., shows that प्राणशरीरब्रह्मोपासना is referred to.

[227] (Sūtra 18) According to Jaimini, however, the जीवसंकीर्तनं अन्यार्थं is for the sake of propounding the nature of Brahman as distinct from जीव. This is clear from the question and the exposition. In the question-passage, जीव (different from the प्राण) becomes awake and the question refers to Brahman; the व्याख्यान also points out to the Paramātman as different from the जीव.

[228] The view that the question and exposition refer to Jīva, and that the सुषुप्तिस्थान is the नाडीs, is wrong; for, it is shown that the सुषुप्तिस्थान is Brahman itself, and that the जीव is merged into Brahman referred to by the word Prāṇa.

And some recensions actually refer to the Paramātman as distinct from the विज्ञानमय Jīva, and the word Akāśa is already proved to denote the Paramātman himself.

So, neither the पुरुष nor the प्रधान of the Sāṅkhyas is referred to in the Upaniṣad-passages.

[229] (Sūtra 19) — The sixth Adhikaraṇa contains five Sūtras, and the विषयवाक्य is the well-known passage न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय... from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*.

The question is, who is the आत्मन् referred to as द्रष्टव्य, मन्तव्य etc ? Rāmānuja states अत्र हि कापिलतन्त्रासिद्धपुरुषतत्त्वावेदनपरं वाक्यं क्वचिद्दृश्यते..., and so the आत्मन् may be the कापिलपुरुष, or the Paramātman is meant. Rāmānuja is hardly convincing in taking the Atman to refer to the Sāṅkhya पुरुष; the reference to the जीवात्मन् is quite pertinent. (The Sāṅkhya पुरुष is neither a doer nor an enjoyer and no one could possibly think of him, but Rāmānuja somehow or other wants to connect the whole of this fourth Quarter with the Sāṅkhya doctrine).

The Pūrvapakṣin says—Jīvātman is referred to here. The Jīva alone can have प्रियत्व with reference to पति, जाया etc; he is also connected with उत्पत्ति and विनाश; the अमृतत्व can be explained as referring to the nature of the *Jīva as* divorced from Prakṛti; and so, आत्मविज्ञानेन सर्वं विज्ञातं भवति is in order. This means that the पुरुषाधिष्ठिता प्रकृति is the cause of the world.

[230-32] The answer is—अमृतत्व can not be had by the realisation of the Jīva, but only by that of the Paramātman. The सर्वविज्ञान due to आत्मविज्ञान can point only to the Paramātman. By knowing the चेतन जीवात्मन् one can not know the अचेतन प्रपञ्च. The qualities महत्त्व etc., can exist only in the Paramātman. जीवात्मनस्तु कामाय can hardly be construed with आत्मा द्रष्टव्यः. There would be the fault of वाक्यभेद, if the two passages are understood independently. So, the passage as a whole must mean that the Paramātman who is अत्यर्थप्रिय of the Ātman should be realised and not पति, जाया etc., that are dependent upon the Highest. (The philosophical idea in the passage न वा अरे पत्युः...is that the realisation of the Self is the one way of realising all experience. From a popular point of view the statement is equally correct as it is for the sake of one's own self that a person seeks other objects).

[233] (Sūtra 20) विज्ञानभिक्षु reads the Sūtra as लिङ्गमित्याश्मरथ्यः. Āśmarathya holds that जीव, आत्मन् etc., must refer to the Paramātman; otherwise, एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम् cannot take place. Jiva is ब्रह्मकार्य and कारणकार्यैक्य has to be admitted.

[234] (Sūtra 21) Audulomi holds that the Jīva secures the nature of the Paramātman after he is ready to depart from the body and hence जीव can denote Paramātman.

[235] (Sūtra 22) *Kāśakṛtsna holds that the word Jīva denotes* Brahman itself which stays as Atman in the Jīvātman forming its body.

Saṅkara very clearly points out the difference in the three views as under :—

(१) काशकृत्स्नस्याचार्यस्याविकृतः परमेश्वरो जीवो नान्य इति मतम्।

(२) आश्मरथ्यस्य तु यद्यपि जीवस्य परस्मादनन्यत्वमभिप्रेतं तथापि प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेरिति सापेक्षत्वाभिधानात्कार्यकारणभावः कियानप्यभिप्रेत इति गम्यते।

(३) औडुलोमिपक्षे पुनः स्पष्टमेवावस्थान्तरापेक्षौ भेदाभेदौ गम्येते (*Śaṅkara holds that the* view of Kāśakṛtsna is in accord with the Sruti तत्त्वमसि etc.)

Auḍulomi *thinks that the identity of* जीव *and* परमात्मन् *is due to the* कार्यकारणभाव as is propounded by the illustrations of the drum, the conchshell and the lute (स यथा दुन्दुभेर्हन्यमानस्य न बाह्याञ्शब्दाञ्शक्नुयाद्ग्रहणाय दुन्दुभेस्तु ग्रहणेन दुन्दुभ्याघातस्य वा शब्दो गृहीतः etc., that is to say, when दुन्दुभिशब्दसामान्य is understood, शब्दविशेषs are automatically understood; or in order to effectually grasp or control the sounds, you should control the drum or the beater of the drum). Aśmarathya who is a भेदाभेदवादिन्, says that the solemn declaration एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम् is possible if somehow there is the identity of Jīva and the Paramātman. Auḍolomi is a Dvaitin; he believes that the Vijnānātman after departure from the body becomes one with the Highest, through the power of knowledge, meditation etc.

There is no doubt that *the view of Kāśakṛtsna is the view of Saṅkara.* Whether the Sūtrakāra has mentioned the three views without showing his preference for any one of them, or whether he agrees with Kāśakṛtsna cannot be ascertained for certain. Rāmānuja takes अवस्थिति to mean अन्तः, अवस्थितिः, referring to the idea that the Paramātman is the Antaryāmin.

(*Sūtra* 23) The seventh Adhikarana contains seven *Sūtras*, and the विषयवाक्य is यथा सोम्यैकेन... in the Svetaketu-episode, from the *Chāndogya*.

Rāmānuja introduces his comment with एवं निरीश्वरसाङ्ख्ये निरस्ते सति सेश्वरसाङ्ख्य- प्रत्यवतिष्ठते, which is not convincing. The Sūtrakāra does not appear to know the distinction as सेश्वर and निरीश्वर साङ्ख्य. (he calls the सेश्वरसाङ्ख्य, योग in the second Adhyāya—एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः II. 1. 3). If at all, the Pūrvapaksin could be a पाशुपत as is clear from the Sūtra पत्युरसामञ्जस्यात् II. 2. 35 according to Rāmānuja himself.

The objector says that passages like मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् (*Śve.*) and मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सूयते सचराचरम् (*Gītā*) *show that the* उपादानकारण *and the* निमित्त- कारण of the world are different (like मृत्तिका and the कुलाल in the case of the घट). So Brahman can only be the निमित्तकारण and the प्रधान is the उपादानकारण.

The answer is—The Śruti by giving the illustrations of मृत्पिण्ड, लोहमणि and नखनिकृन्तन, shows that there is the कार्यविज्ञान from the कारणविज्ञान If Brahman were only the निमित्तकारण, the whole जगत् could not be known. And the प्रतिज्ञा is एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं भवति. So, Brahman must be both the उपादान and the निमित्तकारण. There is no difference between उपादान and निमित्त as both are identical according to the Śruti. The whole world, in the कारणावस्था, is ब्रह्मात्मक. The word अव्यक्त used in some contexts means the अविद्वस्तुशरीर Brahman. It is true that in the

case of normal effects, the material cause and the instrumental cause are different, but this is not applicable in the case of the omniscient all powerful Brahman which can be both the निमित्त and the उपादान of the world

[241] (Sūtra 24) The Sruti itself tells us that Brahman by its own संकल्प created the world

(Sūtra 25) In the *Taittirīya Brāhmana*, in answer to the question—what was the उपादान and what the means, when Brahman created the world?—it is stated that Brahman itself was the उपादान and the means (उपकरणानि) as well

[242] (Sūtra 26) The passage तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत shows that the Ātman was both the कर्मन् and the कर्तृ (अविभक्तनामरूप आत्मा कर्ता विभक्तनामरूप कार्यम्)

[243] (Sūtra 27) Rāmānuja and श्रीकण्ठ read परिणामात् as a separate Sūtra Saṅkara explains alternatively परिणामादिति वा पृथक्सूत्रम्। तस्यैषोऽर्थः—इतश्च प्रकृतिर्ब्रह्म यत्कारणं ब्रह्मण एव विकारात्मना परिणामः सामानाधिकरण्येनाम्नायते—सच्च त्यच्चाभवत्। निरुक्तं चानिरुक्तं च इत्यादिनेति। Rāmānuja understands by परिणाम, the world being the body of Brahman, and Brahman being the Ātman of the world यस्य मृत्युः शरीरम्—here मृत्यु means the परमसूक्ष्म—अचिद्वस्तु The Sūtrakāra uses the expression परिणाम (which Sankara himself explains as विकार) and not विवर्त This is taken to mean that the Sūtrakāra does not accept the विवर्तवाद It must be noted in this connection that Rāmānuja says अत एव ब्रह्मणो निर्दोषत्वनिर्विकारत्वश्रुतयश्चोपपन्ना, which suggests that विकार or परिणाम may be real as well as औपाधिक

(Sūtra 28) The Sruti actually describes Brahman as भूतयोनि (योनि meaning उपादान)

(Sūtra 29) The eighth Adhikarana contains only one Sutra with which the fourth Quarter of the first Adhyāya comes to an end

The various passages in the Upanisads dealing with the cause of the world have thus been shown to refer to Brahman alone The repetition of व्याख्याता in the Sutra shows that the Adhyāya ends here

Vallabha like Rāmānuja, explains the fourth Quarter as concerned with the refutation of the Sankhya doctrine According to Madhva all the *expressions Avyakta Ajā Prakrti etc ultimately denote Visnu it is only in* popular usage that they denote worldly objects Jiva Prāna can also refer to Visnu, for they exist on account of Visnu alone and rest in him Similarly the words Sūnya Abhāva etc denote Visnu

Sankara explains एतेन सर्वे in the last Sūtra to mean अण्वादिकारणवादाः adding that the Sūtrakara has given much attention to the Pradhanakaranavada of the Sankhyas because the Sankhyas who admit the identity of Karya and Karana are nearer to the Vedantins and because Dharmasutrakāras like *Devala uphold the same* Other philosophers like the *Vaiśesikas holding the* atomic theory condemned by the Vedanta deserve no consideration and deserve to be censured In view of this exposition Sankara is charged with inconsistency by some for having explained only the first two Adhikaranas in

the fourth Quarter as referring to the Sāṅkhya doctrine. They think that Rāmānuja is right in describing the whole of the fourth Quarter as connected with the Sāṅkhya as the Pūrvapakṣin. This criticism of Śaṅkara, we think, does not do proper justice to him. Śaṅkara rightly regards the whole of the first Adhyāya as expounding the समन्वय of the various Vedānta passages in describing Brahman. He definitely regards the Sāṅkhya opponent as the Pradhānamalla, but he is also aware that other philosophers opposed to the Vedānta were keen on interpreting some passages as favouring their own doctrines and so he takes due note of them also. Further Śaṅkara points out that the refutation of the Pradhānakāraṇavāda is not confined only to the fourth Quarter, but actually begins with the Sūtra ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् (I.1.5) in the first Quarter and is constantly before the Sūtrakāra. We have already pointed out how Rāmānuja's attempt to postulate the Sāṅkhya opponent in every Adhikaraṇa in the fourth Quarter, is far-fetched and unconvincing.

The first Quarter of the Second Adhyāya considers and refutes the objections raised by the Sāṅkhyas (Pradhānakāraṇavādins) the Vaiśeṣikas (Anukāraṇavādins) etc, against the Brahmakāraṇavāda of the Vedāntins

The first Adhikaraṇa contains two Sūtras

[244] The objector taking cudgels on behalf of the Sāṅkhyas argues his case as under —*It is agreed to by all that Kapila was a great sage his teachings* therefore deserve to be treated with great respect. It is true that the Smṛti which is opposed to the Sruti should normally be discarded Manusmṛti and other similar works teach the Brahmakāraṇavāda in conformity with the Sruti and they also deserve to be respected It would be possible to accommodate both Kapilasmṛti and Manusmṛti on the lines of peaceful co-existence as follows —Manusmṛti should be accepted as an authority on matters dealing with Dharma and the practical way of life the Kapilasmṛti (which deals only with philosophical matters) should be taken as an authority on problems like the creation of the world Thus would unnecessary conflict be avoided

The answer of the Siddhāntin is—Truth admits of no compromise To accept the *Smṛti of Manu who is lauded by the Sruti* (*यद्मनुरवदत् तद्भेषजम्*), as authority only in part is meaningless, this Ardhajaratīyanyaya does justice to no one If Kapilasmṛti is accepted, Manusmṛti, so loyal to the Sruti must go to the wall This can never be accepted The legitimate duty of a Smṛti is to clarify and to corroborate the teaching of the Sruti which can never be looked upon as a handmaid to any Smṛti

P 557—पू प्राणिन etc —The commentator, Haradatta Misra takes प्राणिन to mean प्राणवन्त । सर्वे एव ब्रह्मादीनि स्तम्बपर्यन्तानि प्राणिन हेतुफलसबन्धरहितस्य असंसारिण उपलब्ध्यधिष्ठान पू सर्वे प्राणिन । If प्राणिन *is taken as Gen sing it goes with गुहाशयस्य* there is the reading सर्वे एव गुहाशयस्य गुहा is the हार्दाकाश or प्रकृति The idea is the same as in एको देवो सर्वभूतेषु गूढ

[245] (*Sūtra 2*) *Ramanuja takes* च *to mean* '*but* (*चोदिताशङ्कानिवृत्त्यर्थ*) which is unnecessary इतरेषां—महदादितत्त्वानां (Sankara) स्मृतिपूक्ताना कणादीनां (Madhva) Ramanuja seems to take इतरेषां to mean मन्वादीनां कपिलदृष्टप्रकारेण तत्त्वानुपलब्ध (*subjective genitive*) *not convincingly* इतर cannot refer to स्मृति (the form would have been इतरासां) or to दाप (as in that case the Sutra would be superfluous)

[246] (Sūtra 3) This second Adhikaraṇa containing only one Sūtra is merely an *अतिदेश of the* last Adhikaraṇa The Yogasmṛti (of Hiraṇyagarbha) should also be rejected on the same grounds on which the Kapilasmṛti was rejected, such as—*Yogasmṛti does not advocate Brahmakaranavada looks upon* Iśvara as only the Instrumental cause of the world Hiraṇyagarbha could be subject to Rajas Tamas etc and cannot be regarded as an authority etc

[247] (Sūtra 4) The third Adhikaraṇa contains nine Sūtras, and *deals* with the question of the चेतन शुद्ध Brahman being the cause of the अचेतन अशुद्ध

world which is quite different from Brahman Madhva takes Sūtra 4 as forming a separate Adhikaraṇa.

The Pūrvapakṣin says—We actually perceive that the world is अचेतन, अशुद्ध, दुःखात्मक etc., while Brahman is चेतन, शुद्ध, आनन्दमय etc. The Śruti also actually speaks of the division, विज्ञान and अविज्ञान. Now a Kārya (e. g. घट, रुचक) is not विलक्षण from the Kāraṇa (मृत्, सुवर्ण). So, Pradhāna which is सलक्षण with the कार्य (जगत्) can alone be the cause of the world. And we are perfectly justified in resorting to reasoning (Tarka) in this case; Manu himself says that Tarka is useful in understanding Dharma, Śruti also in using the expression आत्मा... मन्तव्यः supports this

Some one might point out here that we can regard जगत् as चेतन, with the चैतन्यगुण not being manifested, so that the चेतन Brahman can be the cause of the चेतन जगत्; this would respect the सालक्षण्य of Kārya and Kāraṇa The answer to this view-point would be—It is absurd to hold that the जगत् where the चैतन्यगुण is *never* manifested is चेतन. You might as well talk of the bearing of children by the barren mothers in the assembly of sons of barren women! This again involves the fault of mutual interdependence—First one accepts that the चेतन Brahman is the cause of the world and then concludes on the strength of सालक्षण्य, that the jar etc., are possessed of unmanifested चैतन्य,—the assumption that the jar etc, are possessed of चैतन्य, makes one conclude that Brahman is the cause of the world!

[248] There can be no relation of cause and effect between two विलक्षण things. सालक्षण्य of the कार्य with the कारण does not mean—(1) कार्य is possessed of *all* the धर्मs of the कारण—in that case, कार्य and कारण would be the same and there would be no कार्यकारणभाव (2) कार्य does not possess some धर्म or other of the कारण—this is not true in the case of the चेतन Brahman and अचेतन world, for the Dharma 'Existence' is there in both. So, सालक्षण्य must mean कारणस्वभावस्य कार्येऽनुवृत्ति, such अनुवृत्ति exists not in the case of Brahman and the world. If it is argued that कार्यकारणभाव is seen between विलक्षण things, as for instance, from the चेतन पुरुष are produced अचेतन—केशनखदन्तलोमानि; from the अचेतन cow-dung the वृश्चिक, from the चेतन spider the अचेतन thread—the answer is that even in these cases the अचेतन part produces the अचेतन-कार्य.

[249] If it is argued that the Sruti itself speaks of the earth, waters, Prāṇas etc, as speaking like चेतन beings and the Purāṇas also describe rivers, oceans etc, as acting like चेतनs, the answer is.—

(Sūtra 5) By the earth etc, are to be understood, the deities presiding over the elements etc., who are actually referred to as देवताs (देवताशब्देन विशेष्य पृथिव्यादयोऽभिधीयन्ते) and the देवताs are described as entering (अनुगति —अनुप्रवेश) the sense-organs So, the अचेतन world cannot be कार्य of the चेतन Brahman, It is better therefore to say that the प्रधान is the cause of the world, on the strength of the Smṛti passages backed by Tarka

[250] (Sūtra 6) The Siddhāntin's answer is—We actually perceive कार्यकारणभाव between विलक्षण things, the माक्षिक originates from the कृमि. सालक्षण्य means

आरम्भानुवृत्ति and that is not seen in the case of माक्षिक and कृमि. So, there is nothing wrong in the विलक्षण Brahman being the cause of the world. According to Madhva, Sūtras 5 and 6 form an independent Adhikaraṇa. He also reads दृश्यते च for दृश्यते तु here, and दृश्यते तु as an additional Sūtra after Sūtra 3.

[251] (Sūtra 7) If it is argued—if Brahman (कारण) is different from the world (कार्य), that means, the world is Asat in Brahman—the answer is—In the last Sūtra only the सालक्षण्य rule in the case of कार्यकारण was denied, the position that Kāraṇa itself becomes modified into the Kārya and so is in a sense different from Kārya has not been given up by us. Saṅkara says—...असत्तर्हि कार्यं प्रागुत्पत्तेरिति प्रसज्येत। अनिष्टं चेतनन्कार्यवादिनस्तवेति चेत् (that is, if कार्य is different from कारण, that means it is असत् before production; this goes against the सत्कार्य doctrine which shows that कार्य is always सत्—this is the objection) प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात्। प्रतिषेधमात्रं हीदं नास्य प्रतिषेधस्य प्रतिषेध्यमस्ति। यथैव हीदानीमपीदं... कार्यं कारणात्मना सदेवं प्रागुत्पत्तेरपीति गम्यते। that is, the प्रतिषेध is mere verbal, and does not refer to any tangible object; just as when we say 'The वन्ध्यापुत्र does not exist', this does not imply that the वन्ध्यापुत्र did exist some time, somewhere. It is just a verbal denial about वन्ध्यापुत्र who never existed. Madhva understands असत् as referring to the passage असदेवेदमग्र आसीत्, and explains the प्रतिषेध as referring to सदेवेदमग्र आसीत्—that is, the Sruti itself denies the असत्. This is much too simple. Saṅkara's explanation is surely more subtle and philosophical.

[252-53] (Sūtra 8)—The objector argues—What would be the position at the time of Pralaya (dissolution), when Kārya (Jagat) is merged into the Kāraṇa (Brahman)? The दोषs of the world would then be associated with Brahman (सुवर्णे इव कुण्डलगता विशेषाः). This means that the Vedānta passage describing Brahman to be omniscient etc., would all be absurd. The argument that the Cit and Acit entities are the body of the Highest Brahman and so their दोषs would not contaminate Brahman, is wrong. Because, in the first place, चित् and अचित् cannot be the body. A शरीर is known to be the compound of elements, a means for *enjoyment, with sense-organs etc. Now an* अचित् *can* never be such a body; much less the चेतन who is ज्ञानैकाकार.

[254] Even if we accept *the definition of* शरीर *as* भोगायतन*, that does not* help us. A mansion is a भोगायतन but is never known to be a शरीर. The place where one enjoys happiness etc., is one's body—this also is meaningless, for one can enjoy happiness etc., by entering into some one else's body. Further no such restriction can be placed on Īśvara who is स्वतःसिद्ध, आनन्दमय etc. To understand शरीर *to mean what belongs to one who controls its movement* according to his will, would not do. The body of a person afflicted with disease is not controlled by the will of the owner; the dead body knows no law. Statues, dolls that are controlled by some one are not known to be his bodies. The Cetana (Soul) cannot be the body of Īśvara who has no hands, feet etc. So, there cannot be the relation *शरीरशरीरिभाव between Brahman* and the world; if there is that relation, Brahman would be contaminated. Anyway the absurdity of the Vedānta passages so interpreted cannot be got over.

This interpretation of the Sūtra involving the शरीरशरीरिभाव etc., given by Rāmānuja is hardly convincing. *He explains* अपीतौ as अपीतिपूर्वकसृष्ट्यादिप्रदर्शनार्थम् which is not quite pertinent. The Pūrvapaksin says that he is prepared to *grant that* असत् *is merely a* प्रतिषेध *as stated by the Siddhāntin, but when there* is reabsorption at the Pralaya, would not Brahman be as good as असत्? It *appears to us that* तद्वत् *in the Sūtra should* mean असद्वत्. *Rāmānuja does not* make it quite clear what he understands by तद्वत्. Vasudeva Shastri Abhyankar *gives three interpretations.* तद्वत्— (1) सुवर्णकुण्डलादिवत्, सुवर्णकुण्डलादिदृष्टान्तस्य बुद्धिस्थत्वात्, (2) तच्छब्देन, जगतः परामर्शः (3) तच्छब्देनानन्तरप्रत्ययो न तु वति। तच्छब्देन जगन्निष्ठा अपुरुषार्था परामृश्यन्ते। *Sankara gives five undesirable contingencies*—(1) कार्यवत् (2) भोक्तृभोग्यविभागेन, उत्पत्तिर्न प्राप्नोति, (3) मुक्तानामपि पुनरुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् (4) अपीतावपि विभक्तमेव जगदवतिष्ठेत (5) कारणव्यतिरिक्तं कार्यं न संभवति.

[255-56] (Sūtra 9) Rāmānuja says that Brahman itself has the संकोचविकासात्मककार्यकारणभावावस्था and so there is no contradiction, and gives the दृष्टान्तs—शरीरगतदोषs, बालत्व, युवत्व, स्थविरत्व etc., (not obtaining in the आत्मन्) आत्मगतगुणs, ज्ञानसुख etc., (not experienced in the शरीर), and points out that the word शरीर (ordinarily used to refer to कर्मफलभोगहेतु) does not mean the same thing in the case of Īśvara whose शरीर is not the result of any Karman. The दृष्टान्तs chosen by Rāmānuja are not quite apt. Usually a दृष्टान्त refers to something which is popularly well-known. Sankara gives the शराव, रुचक, चतुर्विधभूतग्राम, the juggler not affected by his Māyā, the seer of the dream etc., as the दृष्टान्तs, and makes the following astute remarks—अनन्यत्वेऽपि कार्यकारणयोः कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वं .. अयत्नं चेदमुच्यते कार्यमपीतावात्मीयेन धर्मेण कारणं संसृजेदिति। स्थितावपि समानोऽयं प्रसङ्गः ... कार्यस्य तद्धर्माणां चाविद्याध्यारोपितत्वान्न तैः कारणं संसृज्यत इति। Srikara reads the Sūtras as न च दृष्टान्ताभावात्.

[257] (Sūtra 10) Baladeva and Nimbārka read the Sūtra as स्वपक्षे दोषाच्च. *The defects pointed out by the Sānkhyavādin in the Brahmakāranavāda* are found in the Prakrtikāranavāda of the Sānkhyas also. According to the Sānkhyas, the Purusa is quite उदासीन, and प्रकृतिसंनिधान is the cause of the world. प्रकृतिसंनिधान cannot belong to पुरुष, nor is it a modification of प्रकृति as it is merely the अध्यासकार्य; if it is natural, it would be always there and so even the liberated ones would be subject to अध्यास.

. *This Sūtra is put in to remind the objector of the saying*—'Those who live in glass-houses should not throw stones at others'. The objector's own *doctrine* is open to the same objections which are advanced by him against the Siddhāntin's doctrine. It is best therefore to follow the dictum in the Slokavārtika—यत्रोभयोः समो दोषः परिहारोऽपि वा समः। नैकः पर्यनुयोक्तव्यस्तादृगर्थविचारणे.

[258] (Sūtras 11 and 12) Except Rāmānuja and Srikara, other Bhāsyakāras read *these two Sūtras as one Sūtra.* अपि in तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादपि is more properly explained, if directly connected with अन्यथानुमेयम्.

The Siddhāntin says that the doctrines of Buddha, Aulūkya, Aksapāda, Jainas, Kapila, Patañjali, which are opposed to one another and are based upon

unstable reasoning should be discarded; only the ब्रह्मकारणवाद based upon the Śruti should be accepted.

शाक्य—Gautama Buddha; so called because he had resorted to the Sāka tree for the practice of Yoga—(or, because he belonged to the clan of that name).

औलूक्य—The son of Ulūka, also called Kaṇāda (who swore by the कण or परमाणु, or who lived on small particles of grain), the founder of the Vaiśeṣika school of philosophy.

अक्षपाद—(so called because he had eyes on his feet, as he refused to see Vyāsa with his normal eyes, as he differed from him) Gautama, the author of the *Nyāyasūtras*.

क्षपणक—The Jaina ascetic.

कपिल—The founder of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy.

Patañjali—The author of the *Yogasūtras*.

The doctrines of all these are refuted in detail in II. 2. later on.

The Siddhāntin points out that it is impossible for any one to find out any inference which is absolutely flawless, if he were to depend upon logic alone; because what one regards as flawless is shown to be defective by some person more clever than he. So, reasoning based upon the infallible Sruti alone is our safe guide. Śaṅkara in his Bhāṣya makes the following observations in this connection:—...न प्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्काणां शक्यमाश्रयितुं पुरुषमतिवैरूप्यात्...प्रसिद्धमाहात्म्यानुमतानामपि तीर्थकराणां कपिलकणभक्षप्रभृतीनां परस्परविप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनात्। ...एतदपि हि तर्काणामप्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्केणैव प्रतिष्ठाप्यते।...अयमेव तर्कस्यालंकारो यदप्रतिष्ठितत्वं नाम...न हि पूर्वजो मूढ आसीदित्यात्मनापि मूढेन भवितव्यमिति किंचिदस्ति प्रमाणम्...

अनिर्मोक्ष—तर्काप्रतिष्ठानदोषादनिर्मोक्ष.

Śaṅkara gives another interpretation, as संसाराविमोक्ष...

[259] (Sūtra 13) The fourth Adhikaraṇa contains only one Sūtra. The refutation of the Sāṅkhya is applicable to other doctrines not favoured by the Veda (those of the Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas, Bauddhas, Jainas), because they suffer from the fault of तर्काप्रतिष्ठितत्व.

शिष्टापरिग्रहाः—शिष्टाः (परिशिष्टाः) च, अपरिग्रहाः (वेदापरिगृहीताः)—Sankara explains the expression as शिष्टानामपरिग्रहाः (परिगृह्यन्ते, इति परिग्रहाः, न परिग्रहाः, अपरिग्रहाः).

[260] (Sūtra 14) The fifth Adhikaraṇa contains only one Sūtra. Rāmānuja explains भोक्त्रापत्तेः to mean ब्रह्मणः सशरीरत्वे तस्य भोक्तृत्वापत्तेः (Rāmānuja regards the Highest as having both the चित् and the अचित् world as its body). So, if Brahman has a body, it would be subject to happiness and misery like the Soul, by being an enjoyer. The answer is—The enjoyment of happiness and misery is not due to being possessed of a body, but due to Karman; now Brahman is अपहतपाप्म and there is no chance of any Karman affecting Brahman in any way.

[261] लोकवत्—A king has a body, so also has his servant; but both

do not enjoy or suffer in the same way. A king is able to protect himself and comes out unscathed in an epidemic etc, but not his servant. Rāmānuja's explanation and his popular illustration are hardly convincing.

Sankara takes भोक्त्रापत्ति as उपलक्षणार्थं, meaning both भोग्यस्य भोक्त्रापत्तिः and भोक्तुः भोग्यापत्तिः. It is true that the Sūtrakāra does not actually say इतरेतरभावापत्तिः, but that does not vitiate Saṅkara's explanation which appears to us to by more to the point. It seems that the Sūkrakāra in this Sūtra does not directle refer to the कार्यकारणभाव, but incidentally refers to a general objection to the ब्रह्मकारणवाद. Thus having so far proved that कार्य and कारण can be विलक्षण, and कार्य cannot be असत्, the Sūtrakāra refutes the objection that if Brahman were the कारण, how could there be the relation of भोक्तृ and भोग्य which is so patent in the world ? The answer is —We do see in popular life a similar division. Foam, waves, bubbles are recognised as different from the sea, though all are just water; (Sankara adds that these विकारs are due to उपाधिs and are real from the व्यावहारिक point of view). Śankara's illustration is certainly more apt. It is clear that no भोक्तृभोग्यभाव is found in the case of वीची, तरङ्ग etc, but the illustration is intended merely to show how mutual difference is possible.

[262] Rāmānuja criticises Śankara for his reference to the भोक्तृभोग्यविभागाभाव as the Pūrvapaksin's idea in this Sūtra. He says that an Advaitin who believes in the world as created by सोपाधिक Brahman has no right to talk about any real भोक्तृभोग्यविभाग as both भोक्तृ and भोग्य are सोपाधिक. No real modification is admitted by the Advaitins. Actually no one ever doubts that there is no identity between भोक्तृ and भोग्य. Sankara's defence would be that the whole discussion is on the plane of व्यावहारिकावस्था.

According to Madhva the Sūtra refers to the condition of the Released soul who is absolutely different from Brahman.

(Sūtras 15-20) *The sixth Adhikaraṇa contains six Sūtras, and the* विषयवाक्य is...वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं...from the *Chāndogya.* According to Madhva the passage in question is किं स्विद् आरम्भण (from Rg-81-2) where all उपकरणs are denied.

[263] This is an important Adhikarana where the relation of Kārya and Kārana is thoroughly discussed and the non-difference of the Kārya (world) from the Kārana (Brahman) is established.

The Vaiśesikas advocate the असत्कार्यवाद, that is, the Kārya is not सत् prior to its production and is a different thing from the Kārana. They argue that the Kārya *cannot be* अनन्य *from the Kāraṇa, because.*

(1) Kārya and Kārana are apprehended as different. e. g the threads, clod of earth etc, are different from the cloth, the jar etc.

(2) Different words are used to denote Kārya and Kārana.

(3) The purpose served by Kārya is different from that served by Kārana (water is brought in a jar, not in a clod of earth).

(4) Kārana is prior and Kārya is posterior.

(5) Kārya and Kāraṇa have different shapes.

(6) Even when Kāraṇa (clod of earth) exists, Kārya (jar) can be destroyed.

(7) Kāraṇas (threads) are many in number, Kārya (cloth) is one.

(8) If Kārya existed prior to its production, what use is the productive operation? If Kārya and Kāraṇa are one, nothing can be accomplished by the कारकव्यापार, or the कारकव्यापार would always be there and there would be no नित्यानित्यविभाग.

(9) The argument that Kārya is first unmanifest, and is made manifest later by कारकव्यापार, cannot stand; for, being manifest would require the aid of some manifester, that would require another manifester and so on; there would thus be the fault of endlessness. If the Kārya requires no manifester, it would always be manifest; if the manifester is produced anew, that means that the Kārya was असत् before.

(10) If कारकव्यापार only makes something manifest which was unmanifest before, the कारकव्यापार of घट would make manifest करक (hail) etc., also, which are equally unmanifest!

(11) It is not the कारकव्यापार that produces a particular कार्य, but the शक्ति of the कारक; so घटकारकशक्ति produces घट only, not पट etc.

(12) So, कार्य must be taken to be असत् before and is produced by the कारकव्यापार.

[264] *Rāmānuja then states the views of the Advaitins on this point.* First, he refers to those who hold that the Jīva is associated with अविद्या—

(1) Kārya is not different from Kāraṇa in reality; कार्य is the offshoot of अविद्या, useful only for the व्यवहारावस्था. मृत्तिका is the सत्य in the case of घट, शराव which are really असत्, because मृद्द्रव्य alone persists in घट etc. The सत् alone is imperishable, and the कार्य associated with उपलब्धि and विनाश can be described as अनिर्वचनीय.

(2) कार्य cannot be produced at all—Unmodified कारण cannot obviously produce कार्य, otherwise कार्य would be constantly produced; a special modification of कारण cannot produce the कार्य, as the special modification would require another modification to bring it into effect and so on; there would thus be the fault of अनवस्था.

(3) Even if कारण were to be influenced by देश, काल etc., the faults pointed out above (2) remain.

(4) But we actually see gold to be the कारण, and स्वस्तिक, रुचक etc., to be the कार्य—How can we go against such a प्रतीति? The answer is—The प्रतीति is false. हेमन् cannot produce itself (हेमन् alone is the सत्य in the स्वस्तिक); the स्वस्तिक is not different from gold, as it is recognised as gold. Another form of gold, रुचक, cannot be formed out of स्वस्तिक, gold is not seen there as having the form of स्वस्तिक. So, all this means that कार्य as apart from कारण is false and so is the world apart from Brahman.

[265] (5) Strictly speaking, मृत्तिका, सुवर्ण etc., the कारण्s are equally

false like the कार्यs, as Brahman alone is सत्य. It has been already proved before (P.31) that शास्त्र is a more powerful प्रमाण than प्रत्यक्ष, as it involves no दोष, is posterior to प्रत्यक्ष (in accordance with the अपच्छेदन्याय), not dependent upon anything else and is निरवकाश. Jiva is not false, for Brahman itself is the Jiva in all bodies, as the Sāstra assures us. In order to account for the division, जीव, ईश्वर, बद्ध, मुक्त etc., Brahman must be taken to assume the forms of different Jivas; otherwise, there would be identical experience of pleasure and pain in all the bodies (if there is only one Jiva, viz. Brahman).

[266] Some Advaitins argue differently—Brahman is one, but the Jivas are so many reflections of Brahman, due to the various उपाधिs. The Śruti statement अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य shows that the Jivas are not different from Brahman, but the सुखदुःखादिव्यवस्था depends upon the imaginary or औपाधिक difference. The objector may argue that this अविद्या or कल्पना cannot belong to Brahman which is all pure, nor to the Jivas, owing to the fault of इतरेतराश्रयत्व (जीवभाव is due to अविद्या, and अविद्या has Jiva as its resort). The answer would be that अविद्या and जीवभाव are अनादि, and secondly, अविद्या being अवस्तु, अनुपपन्न by its very nature, the दोषs like इतरेतराश्रयत्व can hardly touch it. Actually the Jivas are not different from Brahman, and दोषs are due to उपाधिs, and so mere delusion; otherwise, there would be no salvation for the Jivas. Such delusion has no beginning and so it is futile to inquire into the cause thereof.

[267] The Advaitins who hold Brahman to be associated with अविद्या controvert the above view as under:—

(1) To speak of Jiva with his natural unimagined form as the resort of Avidyā is as good as saying that Brahman is the resort of Avidyā.

(2) If Jiva's form is an imagined one, that would mean that Jiva is जड (as you cannot imagine another चेतन form for a चेतन).

(3) If अविद्या is stated to be the resort of the natural form characterised by an imagined form, the answer is that it is impossible; for the particular form can first come only from अविद्या.

(4) The division of बन्ध, मोक्ष etc., does not require the जीवाज्ञान; such a division is further impossible even if अविद्या resorts to Jiva; for, salvation is nothing but the destruction of Avidyā. So, when one Jiva is मुक्त, the अविद्या (which must be taken to be one indivisible) is no more there, so the result would be — all the Jivas would be मुक्त! Or, there would be no मुक्ति for any one, even if only one remains in bondage! If to get out of this difficulty, अविद्याभेद for different जीवs is admitted, we shall have to consider what the जीवभेद is. जीवभेद is not natural (as the जीवाज्ञानवादिन्s themselves say) and to imagine अविद्याभेद to account for it is futile. Further, what is the nature of this अविद्या causing जीवभेद? If it is Brahman, then the जीवाज्ञानवादिन् is giving up his position and is becoming ब्रह्माज्ञानवादिन्, forgetting his own view that the अविद्या is postulated to explain जीवभेद. To say that the different अविद्याs responsible for the बन्धमोक्षव्यवस्था themselves give rise to जीवभेद involves the fault of इतरेतराश्रयत्व. The maxim of the seed and the sprout (where the seed that produces the sprout is *different from* the seed that comes out of the sprout) is of no avail

here, as the अविद्याs are *the same* for both the functions. If different जीवs come from different अविद्याs, the Jivas would be momentary and the faults of अकृताभ्यागम and कृतप्रहाण etc., would be there. If अविद्याप्रवाह is admitted, then the जीवप्रवाह would be अनादि, but we all want the जीव to be ध्रुव till he is released.

[268] As to the specific arguments advanced by the Jīvājñānavādin, the refutation is as under :—

(1) As अविद्या is not a वस्तु, वस्तुदोषs like इतरेतराश्रयत्व do not affect अविद्या—This would mean that अविद्या would cling to Brahman and the released Souls, and would not affect the Jivas. When अविद्या is destroyed by तत्त्वज्ञान, then either the जीव would also be destroyed, in which case मोक्ष would mean the destruction of the very nature of Jiva; if Jīva remains as he is, then what purpose is served by the destruction of Avidyā?

[269] (2) As regards the प्रतिबिम्ब idea, the view of the opponent is—

	Mirror			
मुख (बिम्ब) ——	——	——प्रतिबिम्ब	——	मलिनत्व, विमलत्व etc.
ब्रह्मन्——	अविद्या (associated with जीव).	— जीव	——	अल्पत्व, मलिनत्व दोषs (औपाधिकदोषs)

Now this view is untenable, if we scrutinise the दृष्टान्त carefully. In the case of the reflection in the mirror, the दोषs cease to exist when the mirror is removed; but what happens to the reflection—does it exist or not? If it exists, then the Jiva (प्रतिबिम्बस्थानीय) also would remain as he is and there would be no salvation; if it does not exist, Jīva also would cease to exist. Again, who cognises the औपाधिकदोष? Not the बिम्ब (Brahman), nor the प्रतिबिम्ब (जीव), as the *mirror* and the reflection (which are both अचेतन) *cannot* cognise the अल्पत्वादिदोष in the दृष्टान्त. And there cannot be any seer other than Brahman and *Jīva*.

[270] (3) Further, there cannot be found any one who can be conscious of the Jīva imagined by Avidyā. Avidyā is अचेतन, and Jīva is merely a figment of imagination (like the silver in the conch-shell); so, both are out of question. Brahman cannot be the कल्पकः; for, in that case Brahman would be associated with Ajñāna. The Śruti says that Brahman is responsible for ईक्षा (स ऐक्षत); if this is done without the अनादि-अविद्या, we must associate अज्ञान with Brahman.

(4) Could not Brahman do this with its माया?—The answer is—No. माया is the cause of परभ्रम, and अज्ञान is the cause of स्वभ्रम. Māyā does not help the juggler in perceiving anything, it is the cause of infatuating others. If माया enables Brahman to cognise the Jivas, माया would be the same as अविद्या.

[271] (5) To say that अविद्या is the cause of विपरीतदर्शन, but माया is the cause of मिथ्यादर्शन of entities other than Brahman, is also unhelpful. Brahman would not be able to infatuate others merely by माया. When चन्द्रैकत्व is realised the cause of द्विचन्द्रज्ञान is अविद्या itself.

(6) Can we not distinguish between अविद्या and माया as — अविद्या is the cause of अपुरुषार्थदर्शन, while माया is not ? — This would not do. द्विचन्द्रज्ञान is not पुरुषार्थ; but its cause is अविद्या, and so one tries to get rid of it. If माया is not concerned with अपुरुषार्थदर्शन, it would always be tied with the nature of Brahman and there would be clearly duality which is against the purport of the श्रुति. The argument that माया is अपरमार्थ and अनित्य and so no harm is done, is also not valid. What purpose does this Māyā serve? The infatuation of Jīva, which is not the पुरुषार्थ, or mere sport cannot be the प्रयोजन. What kind of sport can one have with imaginary means, appearing as false? So, Brahman must be regarded as associated with the अनादि Avidyā, which enables it to perceive multiplicity in itself.

[272] (7) As far as the Advaitin is concerned, बन्धमोक्षव्यवस्था, बद्धमुक्तशिष्याचार्यव्यवस्था etc., are all imaginary, whether one अविद्या or many अविद्याs are admitted, like things seen in a dream. This can be easily proved by the following syllogisms—

(A) बन्धमोक्षव्यवस्थाः स्वपरव्यवस्थाश्च स्वाविद्याकल्पिताः
अपारमार्थिकत्वात्,
स्वप्नदृष्टव्यवस्थावत् ।

(B) शरीरान्तराणि मयैवात्मवन्ति
शरीरत्वात्,
एतच्छरीरवत् ।

(C) शरीरान्तराणि मदविद्याकल्पितानि
शरीरत्वात्, कार्यत्वात्, जडत्वात्, कल्पितत्वात्,
एतच्छरीरवत् ।

(D) विवादाध्यासितं चेतनजातम् अहमेव
चेतनत्वात्,
(यदनहं तदचेतनं दृष्टं) यथा घट ।

(8) Actually, the बद्धमुक्तव्यवस्था is all the more impossible in the case of the Dvaitins. The aeons (Kalpas) are infinite, so even if only one becomes मुक्त *in each Kalpa* all are bound to be released in course of time! It might be argued that the Ātmans are also infinite (and cannot be counted); so some are bound to be अमुक्त—To this we reply that for the supreme Īśvara, Ātmans that are different from one another, are fit to be counted, and the Ātmans likewise are perishable like the jar etc. Brahman also would be परिच्छिन्न really, on account of the association with देश and काल. Thus both Brahman and the Jīvas would be subject to origination and destruction, which is against the Sruti.

[273] So, it is better to hold that Brahman, which is स्वप्रकाश, gets transformed in an illusory manner into the world, through the power of the beginningless Avidyā, and the world is not different from Brahman.

To this, the Dvaitin (the Vaiśesika) replies as under:—

[274] (1) To talk about the Avidyā concealing the nature of the

स्वप्रकाश Brahman is meaningless, *as that would in effect result in the destruction* of the nature of Brahman.

(2) The *argument* that the अनुवर्तमानकारण (मृद्) only is सत्य, the व्यावर्तमानकार्य (घटशरावादि) being असत्य, is also invalid. The association of a thing with उपलब्धि and विनाश proves its अनित्यत्व and not मिथ्यात्व which is possible only when a thing is contradicted, although connected with the same देश and काल. A counter-syllogism can be put forth to prove this—

घटादिकार्यं सत्यम्
देशकालादिप्रतिपन्नोपाधावबाधितत्वात्,
आत्मवत्।

(3) It is wrong to say that no कार्य can originate from कारण, whether modified or unmodified, because we actually see that the कारण, modified by its association with देश, काल and other factors, does produce the कार्य. This cannot be gainsaid by any one.

[275] (4) Similarly, gold can be the cause of स्वस्तिक etc., helped by a suitable agency. The कार्य (स्वस्तिक) is surely seen to be different from gold, and is actually experienced as such; it is not illusion as it is not contradicted during the period of its perception and destruction.

[276] (5) It is wrong to say that by only one Ātman, all bodies are possessed of Ātman. If it were so, there would be the experience of pleasure and pain due to all bodies in one and the same person. (Saubhari could ex-*perience pleasure etc., in the different bodies assumed by him, there being only* one Atman). The Ātman is the knower, the same as Aham. It is absurd to regard bodies as imagined by Avidyā, as their experience is uncontradicted. The different सुखदुःख-व्यवस्था points out to the difference of the चेतन entities. The syllogisms मयैवात्मनि मदविद्याकल्पितानि etc., are fallacious as according to you the Atman is merely चिन्मात्र different from अहं, त्वम् etc.

[277] (6) If everything other than निर्विशेषचिन्मात्र is false, efforts to secure मोक्ष, such as दर्शन, श्रवण are also false, the teachers of Moksa are false; the knowledge of तत्त्वमसि etc., being false cannot bring about freedom from bondage, like the knowledge of things seen in dreams. Illusion etc., belong to the knower, not to ज्ञप्ति, no प्रकाश can belong to what is निर्विशेष. According to you व्यावहारिक-सत्य is also false, being अविद्याकार्य; you cannot rely upon श्रुति either, because श्रुति also is equally अविद्याकार्य

[278] (7) The argument, पश्चात्तनबाधादर्शन, to prove Brahman to be सत्य, even though known from अपारमार्थिकज्ञान, is also invalid. When an entity is known *to be false through experience, it is immaterial whether it is later contradicted* or not. When one says 'Reality is but शून्य', that cannot be obviously contradicted later on, but it is fallacious all the same, दोषमूलत्व being there. सत्यमिथ्यार्थव्यवस्था and लोकव्यवहार are possible only if there is a real knower, and real knowledge which is not illusory,

[279] (8) The *argument that illusion presupposes some real* अधिष्ठान (सन्मात्र Brahman) is also wrong, as illusion can be produced by wrong and faulty

ज्ञातृज्ञान etc. If सन्मात्र is to be admitted all the same, दोषदोषाश्रयत्व, ज्ञातृत्व etc., would have to be admitted as real.

[280] (9) Brahman is different from अविद्या, and so is वस्तुतः परिच्छिन्न, and is liable to all भेदप्रयुक्तदोषs. Ātmans are many and can be counted, or they can be said to be असंख्येय in the same sense as jars (past, present and future) are असंख्येय. Hence बद्धमुक्तव्यवस्था is possible, even if the आत्मन्s are अनन्त.

[281] (10) If अविद्या is not different from Brahman, Brahman would be अविद्यात्मक. आनन्त्य only refers to its not being limited by space and time. As for the भेदवादिन्s, *(and according to Rāmānuja as well) there is* त्रिविधपरिच्छेदराहित्य (वस्तुतः and, due to देश and काल) which is the cause of आनन्त्य.

All this shows that Kārya is different from Kāraṇa and the entire world the effect of Brahman, is different from Brahman.

Rāmānuja tries to refute the above views of the Kānādas, and the Advaitins (holding Avidyā to be associated with Brahman or Jīva). Actually there was no need to bring in the Advaitins as Pūrvapaksins; for they are सत्कार्यवादिन्s. But Rāmānuja could not resist the temptation of striking at the Advaitins wherever possible. The result has been a considerable confusion in the treatment of the subject, which could have been avoided. The arguments and counter-arguments of the three Pūrvapakṣins suffer from unnecessary repetition and do every thing to bewilder the reader.

[282] The Sruti passages actually using the expression आरम्भण and those of similar import show clearly that the world made of चित् and अचित् is not different from the Highest Brahman. The context in which Śvetaketu asks for the instruction about एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं and the illustrative examples, मृत्पिण्ड etc., make this abundantly clear. घट is a विकार that is just a संस्थानविशेष of मृत्तिका and not a different entity (as देवदत्त grown old is not different from the child देवदत्त), it is just a name. Usually विकार is taken to mean परिणाम, a real transformation (while विवर्त means an illusory change). The Śruti passage वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् does not appear to make such a distinction. *The passage does not say* मृत्तिकैव सत्या (but सत्यम्, which implies that what is सत्य in घट is the मृत्तिकातत्त्व, everything else is असत्य). We say, it is true, that घट is destroyed, though मृत्तिका is there, but that does not mean मृत्तिका and घट are different, for घट is a मृत्तिका-अवस्थाविशेष. This also explains how कारकव्यापार, which brings *about the* अवस्थाविशेष, *is necessary. We do not admit* कार्य *to be a mere* manifestation of the कारण. There is no contradiction in saying that the सत् कार्य is originated; for, उत्पत्ति is but the association with a later संस्थान, and the destruction of the earlier संस्थान. So the कार्य is सत् in all its अवस्थाs. सत्कार्यवाद does not *rule out the change over to another state; it does not mean that the* कार्य *as a* whole is सत्.

When Brahman is said to be अद्वितीय, it means that Brahman has no other controller as it is possessed of all powers. It also of its own accord thinks of being many and produces the world which is thus not different from it.

Entering the entire चिदचिद्वस्तु, with the Jīva that has itself as the Ātman, Brahman brings forth name and form of various kinds Thus Brahman is seen both in कारणावस्था and कार्यावस्था This incidentally removes the objection that Brahman would be affected by the दोषs due to the expression इदं सर्वं ब्रह्म, as Brahman itself is जगच्छब्दवाच्य Various Sruti passages endorse the same So, the world is not different from the Highest Brahman In short, Brahman with the चित् and अचित् entities as its body can be denoted by the word सर्वं. it is in the कारणावस्था when the चित् and अचित् entities are in a subtle state, undistinguishable by name and form, it is in the कार्यावस्था when in a gross state, with name and form capable of being distinguished

[283] The followers of Saṅkarācārya (ब्रह्माज्ञानवादिन्s) speak of Brahman (कारण) as सत्य and the world (कार्य) as मिथ्या They cannot explain the अनन्यत्व of कार्य and कारण How can there be identity between सत्य and मिथ्या? They must admit either Brahman is मिथ्या or the जगत् is सत्य! (Rāmānuja conveniently forgets that the मिथ्यात्व of जगत् is to be viewed from the पारमार्थिक plane)

The followers of Bhāskara speak of कार्य as सत्य, but say that the difference of Jīva and Brahman is due to उपाधिs while अनन्यत्व between them is natural. But this would lead to the conclusion that Brahman which is निरवयव would be subject to modification, and would be कर्मवश्य like the Jīva or Jīva would have अपहतपाप्मत्व etc This would be quite in conflict with the Sruti

According to the followers of Yādavaprakāśa, Brahman is सन्मात्र at the time of dissolution, it remains quite tranquil with all experience sublated, at the time of creation it is in the state of division into—enjoyer, object of enjoyment and controller (these three are सदात्मनैक, as घट, शराव etc are मृदात्मनैक) But this view is contradicted by Sruti, Smṛti Itihāsa Purāṇa and logic! No one can ever admit the सन्मात्र as over and above Iśvara The followers of Yādavaprakāśa speak of Iśvara as a portion of सन्मात्र and as being the controller which shows that the कारणभूत Isvara cannot be सन्मात्र The Sruti speaks of ज्ञानबलक्रिया as the natural possession of the Lord By ज्ञानबलक्रिया we must understand ज्ञानशक्ति, बलशक्ति and क्रियाशक्ति which are always in Isvara though ज्ञान, बल and क्रिया may not be always apparent (Just as we can call a person पाचक even when he is not actually engaged in cooking, because he has the ability to cook) Further, to regard Isvara as a portion of Sat is not countenanced by Sruti which speaks of Isvara as the Highest, having no one equal or superior to him If there is सन्मात्र alone व्यवहारयोग्यता etc, about घट and पट would not be there as also the different क्रियाs associated with them

[284] (Sūtra 16) This Sutra answers the objection—How can we say that the words मृद् (कारण), घट (कार्य) etc, refer to the different अवस्थाs of one and the same entity, and not to different entities?

Rāmanuja explains the Sūtra as कुण्डलादिकार्यसद्भावे कारणभूतहिरण्यस्योपलब्धेः Srikara

agrees with him. Sahkara, Bhāskara and Nimbārka understand *the Sūtra* as कारणभावे कार्यस्योपलब्धेः, which appears more pertinent. विज्ञानभिक्षु says—भावः सत्ता, उपलब्धि', अभिव्यक्ति', सत एव कारणव्यापारादभिव्यक्तिर्भवति ।

The plain meaning of the Sūtra is कार्य is अनन्य from कारण, because it is ound only when the कारण is there.

Sahkara notices another reading भावाच्चोपलब्धेः (प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धिभावाच तयोः (कार्यकारणयोः) अनन्यत्वमित्यर्थः).

Rāmānuja says that Kārya is कारण in a different state, because it is so recognised. The gold ear-ring (कार्य) is surely known by all as gold. This recognition is not due to the existence of the same genus (जाति), because genus requires a number of व्यक्तिs, but here कुण्डल and हिरण्य are but one द्रव्य. If it be objected that in the case of गोमय (कारण) and वृश्चिक (कार्य), we do not recognise गोमय in the वृश्चिक, the answer is that there also we recognise the पृथिवीद्रव्य ! In the case of धूम (कार्य) and अग्नि (कारण), we do not recognise अग्नि in the धूम; this is true; but that is so because अग्नि is there only a निमित्तकारण: the real कारण is आर्द्रेन्धन. Rāmānuja unnecessarily creates trouble for himself in explaining the Sūtra in such an elaborate manner.

(Sūtra 17) Rāmānuja, Srikantha and Srikara read the Sūtra as सत्त्वाच्चापरस्य; Sahkara and others read सत्त्वाच्चावरस्य.

[285] *The* अपर (कार्य) *is known to be in the* कारण, *and is expressed as* such in the Śruti (सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्) and in popular parlance (घटशराव etc., were but मृत्तिका before). *Madhva explains* अवरस्य *as* तदधीनस्य साधनस्य सत्त्वात्. *The* कार्य (अवर) is posterior and exists in the कारण in the form of कारण—This explanation *by Sankara makes the point clearer.*

(Sūtra 18) The objector says that as a matter of fact, the Sruti says everything was असत् in the beginning and people also say that घट etc, did *not* exist before—The answer is—असत् refers to संस्थानान्तर only, that is to say, the सूक्ष्मदशा. This is obvious from the वाक्यशेष (तदसदेव सन्मनोऽकुरुत ..), and from reasoning—घटोऽस्ति means the association of मृद् with पृथुबुध्नोदराकार and नास्ति, the association with the opposite अवस्था (and not with the घटाभाव apart from that) and from other Śruti passages like सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् · तद्धेदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत् । तन्नामरूपाभ्यां व्याक्रियत etc. Sahkara, Bhāskara, Vijñānabhiksu etc, read युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच्च as a separate Sūtra.

[286] (Sūtra 19) पटवच्च—The दृष्टान्त is explained in various ways —

यथा तन्तव एव व्यतिषङ्गविशेषभाज पट इति नामरूपकार्यान्तरादिकं भजते तद्वद्ब्रह्मापि (रामानुज and भास्कर).

संवेष्टितप्रसारितपटन्यायेन (पट is the same whether rolled or stretched) एवानन्यत्कारणात्कार्यम् । (शङ्कर, and निम्बार्क); साधनान्तरेण हि पटादिरुद्दिष्टेष्टा (मध्व).

यथा संवेष्टित' पटो न व्यक्तं गृह्यते विस्तृतस्तु गृह्यते, तथा, आविर्भावानाविर्भावेन जगतोऽपि । (वल्लभ).

(Sūtra 20) Saṅkara reads the Sūtra as यथा च प्राणादि. Just as वायु, although one, is able to perform the various functions associated with प्राण, अपान etc., in the same way one Brahman becomes responsible for the multifarious world and its functions. Other explanations are :—

यथा च लोके प्राणापानादिषु प्राणभेदेषु प्राणायामेन निरुद्धेषु...जीवनमात्रं कार्यं निर्वर्त्यते...। न च प्राणभेदानां प्रभेदवतः प्राणादन्यत्वं समीरणस्वभावाविशेषात्। एवं कार्यस्य कारणादनन्यत्वम्। (Śaṅkara)

यथा वा प्राणेन्द्रियादिः शरीरविगमे लोकान्तरं गच्छन्नपि स्वव्यञ्जकस्थूलशरीराभावान्नोपलभ्यते तथैव कार्याणीत्यर्थः। (विज्ञानभिक्षु).

The five Prāṇas are :—हृदि प्राणो गुदेऽपानः समानो नाभिसंस्थितः। उदानः कण्ठदेशस्थो व्यानः सर्वशरीरगः ॥

(Sūtra 21) The seventh Adhikaraṇa contains three Sūtras. Sūtra 21 is the पूर्वपक्षसूत्र.

[287] The objector says that Sruti passages like तत्त्वमसि clearly show that Brahman and Jiva are one; that means Jīva is the creator of the world. If it i: so, why has the Jīva created this world full of misery and trouble ? Why has he not created it purely conducing to his welfare ? Thus Jiva can be charged with हिताकरण and अहितकरण etc. It would be wrong to charge the Jiva with such serious faults. Something must therefore be wrong with our premises. इतरस्य शारीरस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वं, यद्वा, इतरस्य च ब्रह्मणः शारीरात्मत्वं (शङ्कर).

[288] (Sūtra 22) The Siddhāntin says—The Śruti all the same definitely points out that Brahman is different from and superior to Jīva.

Śaṅkara makes the following remark—

कथं भेदाभेदौ विरुद्धौ संभवेयाताम्। नैष दोषः, आकाशघटाकाशन्यायेनोभयसंभवस्य तत्र तत्र प्रतिष्ठापितत्वात्।...समस्तस्य मिथ्याज्ञानविजृम्भितस्य भेदव्यवहारस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानेन बाधितत्वात्। तत्र कुत एव सृष्टिः कुतो वा हिताकरणादयो दोषाः ? अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितनामरूपकृतकार्यकरणसंघातोपाध्यविवेककृता हि भ्रान्तिर्हिताकरणादिलक्षणः संसारो न तु परमार्थतोऽस्तीत्यसकृदवोचाम...

श्रीकर takes तु in the sense of निश्चय.

[289] (Sūtra 23) Rāmānuja explains the Sūtra as follows.—Stones etc., *cannot be identical with Brahman, so Jīva also cannot be possessed of* Brahmabhāva. He *understands* तदनुपपत्ति *to mean* ब्रह्मभावानुपपत्तिः; *normally* तत् should refer to what has gone before, in this case, the हिताकरणादिदोष.

यथा च लोके पृथिवीत्वसामान्यान्वितानामप्यश्मनां केचिन्महार्हाः, अन्ये मध्यमवीर्याः, अन्ये श्वावसप्रक्षेपणार्हाः प्रहीणा, इत्यनेकविधं वैचित्र्यं दृश्यते, एवमेकस्यापि ब्रह्मणः कार्यवैचित्र्यं चोपपद्यते...तदनुपपत्तिः परपरिकल्पितदोषानुपपत्तिः। (शङ्कर). अश्मकाष्ठतृणादेरचेतनस्येव जीवस्याप्यज्ञत्वादिना सर्वज्ञत्वादियुक्तादीश्वरादत्यन्तविजातीयत्वश्रवणात्तयोरैक्यभावानुपपत्तिः (श्रीकण्ठ).

यथा हि ब्रह्मणः पाषाणादिरूपत्वं नोपपद्यते जडाजडत्वादिवैधर्म्यात्, एवं जीवरूपत्वमपि नोपपद्यते, सर्वज्ञत्वाज्ञत्वसंसारासंसारादिवैधर्म्यादित्यर्थः। (विज्ञानभिक्षु).

Perhaps the simile is to be understood thus—Just as though everything is Brahman, no one could charge the अचेतन element of creating the world and being liable to the हिताकरणादिदोष; in the same way the Jīva also could not be charged like that.

Rāmānuja attacks the Māyāvādins who explain the difference between

Brahman and Jīva as referring to the association with Avidyā. For, if that is admitted, everything सर्वज्ञत्व, सर्वेश्वरत्व etc., would be some thing just fancied by Avidyā. The Sūtrakāra on the other hand speaks of Brahman as the real cause of the world to be known from the Vedānta passages, and attempts to show that Smṛti and reasoning also support the same. There is hardly any reference to Māyā here. The Sūtrakāra apparently believes in a real भेद.

[289 A] (Sūtra 24) The eighth Adhikaraṇa consists of only two Sūtras.

The objector says:—We find in this world that an agent is able to produce the कार्य, only with the help of several instruments; a potter has to make use of his Daṇḍa, Cakra etc., to produce the jar. But Īśvara being one without any second, cannot produce the world.

The answer is:—It is not a universal rule that every agent does require the help of external means; what is needed is that he must have the inherent power to produce the effect. For instance, milk produces curds without any visible external means (the heat and change in temperature contribute only to the rapidity of the change into curds; if the milk had no power in itself heat etc., would be of no avail).

(Sūtra 25) Similarly, the gods etc., are known to create things by mere Saṁkalpa (or thought).

Rāmānuja adds—देवादीनां वेदावगतशक्तीनां दृष्टान्ततयोपादानं ब्रह्मणो वेदावगतशक्तेः सुखग्रहणायेति प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। Saṅkara explains देवादि as देवाः पितर ऋषयः, and gives additional instances—तन्तुनाभश्च स्वत एव तन्तून् सृजति। बलाका चान्तरेणैव शुक्रं गर्भं धत्ते। पद्मिनी चानपेक्ष्य किंचित्प्रस्थानसाधनं सरोन्तरात्सरोन्तरं प्रतिष्ठते, remarking कुलालादिदृष्टान्तवैलक्षण्यमात्रस्य विवक्षितत्वादिति। यथा हि कुलालादीनां देवादीनां च समाने चेतनत्वे कुलालादयः कार्यारम्भे बाह्यं साधनमपेक्षन्ते न देवादयः, तथा ब्रह्म चेतनमपि न बाह्यं साधनमपेक्षिष्यत इत्येतावदह्वयं देवाद्युदाहरणेन विवक्ष्याम।

[290] (Sūtra 26) The ninth Adhikaraṇa contains six Sūtras (26–31).

The objector points out that the Sruti describes Brahman to be निरवयव; so when Brahman thought of बहुभवन, the whole Brahman must have been transformed and there would be no Brahman left. The Śruti asserts both निरवयत्व and बहुभवनत्व of Brahman without being सावयव; how is this possible? विज्ञानभिक्षु reads निरवयत्वशब्द and बलदेव, शब्दव्याकोपो.

(Sūtra 27). The answer is—श्रुति is our highest tribunal; it is not for us to question the authority of the Sruti even if contradictory statements are made by the Śruti.

This is obviously a very tame and unconvincing answer. Sankara undoubtedly scores over other Bhāṣyakāras by bringing in his Māyāvāda here to explain away the contradiction ... अविद्याकल्पितरूपभेदात्। न ह्यविद्याकल्पितेन रूपभेदेन सावयवं वस्तु संपद्यते...अविद्याकल्पितेन च नामरूपलक्षणेन रूपभेदेन व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मकेन तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीयेन ब्रह्म परिणामादिसर्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते। पारमार्थिकेन च रूपेण सर्वव्यवहारातीतमपरिणतमवतिष्ठते। That the Sūtrakāra does not avail himself of the Māyāvāda, shows that the Sūtra-

kāra either did not hold that view or that he deliberately kept the position vague to allow the commentators to give their own solution.

(Sūtra 28) In the case of the Ātman also, the qualities associated with the अचेतन घट etc., are superimposed upon the चेतन, but they do not affect the नित्य-आत्मन्, owing to भावस्वभाववैचित्र्य. This is very cumbrous. Śaṅkara refers to the creation in the dream by the Ātman, where wonderful creation is effected without any modification in the Ātman. Śaṅkara's explanation is certainly more convincing.

[291] (Sūtra 29) The Brahmavādin is able to remove the contradiction between being निरवयव and having modification not of the whole, by referring to the विचित्र powers of Brahman. The प्रधानकारणवादिन् and the अणुकारणवादिन् who point out to the निरवयवत्व, शब्दकोप and कृत्स्नप्रसक्ति *defects in the* ब्रह्मकारणवाद, suffer from the same दोष, in their doctrines. Thus—प्रधान is निरवयव (even if it be said that सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् are the अवयवs, that does not improve matters; that would mean the गुणs are the कारण and not the प्रधान, and in that case the twenty-five Tattvas of the Sāṅkhyas would have to be raised to twenty-seven, as प्रधान would be three entities !) and so would not be able to produce a स्थूल effect which implies the coming together of different parts ! The atoms are admitted to be निरंश and निष्प्रदेश and *they also cannot bring forth any gross* creation ! So, it is better for these objectors to keep quiet and not to make themselves ridiculous.

निम्बार्क and बलदेव read स्वपक्षे दोषाच्च.

(Sūtra 30) Śaṅkara takes Sūtras 30 and 31 as constituting a separate Adhikaraṇa. Nimbārka and Baladeva read the Sūtra as सर्वोपेता सा तद्दर्शनात्.

The Sruti actually says that the परा देवता *(Brahman) is possessed of all* powers, add so, the matter is beyond dispute.

(Sūtra 31) If it be argued that Brahman is without a body and sense-organs, and so it cannot create any thing, the answer is what is already given in the Sūtras,—शब्दमूलत्वात्, विचित्राश्च हि.

(Sūtra 32) The tenth Adhikaraṇa consists of five Sūtras. This is a Pūrvapakṣa Sūtra.

[292] The Pūrvapakṣin says:—Though Īśvara is possessed of all wonderful powers, he cannot create the world. All activity in this world is undertaken to serve some purpose, some स्वार्थ or परार्थ. Īśvara has no स्वार्थ to secure, he is आप्तकाम, he has no परार्थ either; what परार्थ can be aimed at, in creating a world full of misery ?

(Sūtra 33) The Siddhāntin's answer is—The creation of the world is mere sport on the part of the Lord; no प्रयोजन need be presumed in the case of *activity undertaken by one's own* संकल्प.

[293] (Sūtra 34) *The objector points out that even though the* creation is admitted to be the outcome of mere sport, the fact remains that the world is full of misery and there is disparity noticeable all round, involving

happiness for some, misery for others etc. This shows that Īśvara is both partial and cruel.

The answer is—Īśvara cannot be charged with वैषम्य and नैर्घृण्य, as he creates in conformity with the past Karman of the Jīvas themselves.

Śaṅkara remarks—सृज्यमानप्राणिधर्माधर्मापेक्षा विषमा सृष्टिरिति नायमीश्वरस्यापराधः। ईश्वरस्तु पर्जन्यवद् द्रष्टव्यः। यथा हि पर्जन्यो व्रीहियवादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति, व्रीहियवादिवैषम्ये तु तत्तद्बीजगतान्येवासाधारणानि सामर्थ्यानि कारणानि भवन्ति, एवमीश्वरो देवमनुष्यादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति। देवमनुष्यादिवैषम्ये तु तत्तज्जीवगतान्येवासाधारणानि कर्माणि कारणानि भवन्ति। Śaṅkara in this connection quotes from the *Kausītaki Brāhmaṇa*, एष ह्येव साधु कर्म कारयति तं यमधो निनीषते...which taken at its face value seems to make Īśvara directly responsible for the evil in the world!

(Sūtra 35) The objector points out that Īśvara can be absolved from blame, once the creation has been brought about, so that the Karman of the Jīvas becomes responsible for the वैषम्य etc. But, what was the position *before the creation*, when Īśvara began to write upon a clean slate as it were? There could be no Karman then. How can the वैषम्य be accounted for?

The answer is—The Saṁsāra is Anādi, and so, the question, what was the state of things in the beginning, does not arise. This अनादित्व of संसार is both proper and is vouchsafed by the Śruti and the Smṛti.

Rāmānuja seems to take उपपद्यते as associated with अविभाग (यतस्तदानीं ब्रह्म परित्यक्तनामरूपं ब्रह्मशरीरतयापि पृथग्व्यपदेशानर्हमतिसूक्ष्ममवतिष्ठते). It is better to take both उपपद्यते and उपलभ्यते as going with अनादित्व.

This अनादित्व argument is really a confession of defeat on the part of the Siddhāntin; besides this makes Īśvara more or less superfluous as the Karman is quite competent to regulate the conditions in the world.

(Sūtra 36) All the Dharmas, which are described as lacking in Pradhāna and Aṇu, are found in Brahman, so no objection should be taken to Brahman being the cause of the world.

Śaṅkara takes Sūtras 34–35 and the last Sūtra (37) as separate *Adhikaraṇas*.

Madhva takes Sūtras 21–26 to refute the contention that Jīva is an independent creator. Sūtras 27–31 prove that the Parameśvara is the real creator and is possessed of marvellous powers; and on the authority of the Śruti we can say that Īśvara can work without any Upakaraṇas and so forth.

This Pāda, usually called the Tarkapāda, refutes the rival doctrines of the Sāṅkhyas, Vaiśeṣikas, Bauddhas, Jainas and Pāśupatas, and the last Adhikaraṇa (according to Rāmānuja) upholds the Pāñcarātra or the Bhāgavata doctrine as the Siddhānta view.

[294] The first Adhikaraṇa contains 9 (according to Śaṅkara 10) Sūtras and refutes the Sāṅkhya doctrine. According to Madhva, Sūtras 1–4, Sūtra 5, Sūtra 6, Sūtras 7–8, and Sūtras 9–10 form separate Adhikaraṇas dealing *respectively with Nirīśvara-Sāṅkhyas,* Cārvākas, Pradhāna being subordinate to Puruṣa, and Puruṣa being subordinate to Pradhāna.

Saṅkara and others read प्रवृत्तेश्च (in the first Sūtra) as a separate Sūtra.

Rāmānuja gives a detailed resume of the Sāṅkhya doctrine, quoting extensively from the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa (about 150 A. D.) :—

(1) मूलप्रकृतिः—(सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यरूपा.) प्रधानम्, the परमकारण.

(2–8) Seven प्रकृतिविकृतिs (1 महत् or बुद्धि; 2 अहंकार and the five तन्मात्रs (subtle शब्द, स्पर्श, रूप, रस and गन्ध) अहंकार is three-fold :—

(1) वैकारिकः सात्त्विकः—इन्द्रियs etc.

(2) तैजसः, राजसः—Helps 1 and 3.

(3) भूतादिः, तामसः—Produces the महाभूतs.

(9–24) Sixteen विकारs—(5 महाभूतs, आकाश etc., + 5 ज्ञानेन्द्रियs, वाक् etc., + 5 कर्मेन्द्रियs + मनस्).

(25) पुरुष is neither प्रकृति nor विकृति, नित्य, निष्क्रिय, चैतन्यमात्र, different for each body, neither an agent nor an enjoyer.

The Prakrti really is the agent, but people wrongly attribute कर्तृत्व to the पुरुष. When this wrong notion is at an end, Mokṣa or Apavarga follows.

The main point refuted here is that Pradhāna is the cause of the world.

The Sāṅkhyas argue :—The world with its multifarious forms is सत्त्वरजस्तमोमय or सुखदुःखमोहात्मक, and can have for its कारण only प्रधान or अव्यक्त which is सरूप with the world owing to its being गुणत्रयसाम्य, for the following reasons :—

(1) The finite modifications must have for their cause something unmodified and infinite.

(2) These *modifications* have a समन्वय *all the same pointing out to a* common cause.

(3) They proceed with their activity due to some source of their power.

(4) The relation of cause and effect points out to some original cause which is causeless.

(5) At the time of Dissolution, the effects do merge into some ultimate cause.

If it be said that कार्य *can be produced from many causes, that would* lead to the fault of endlessness. It is better therefore to say that only one कारण (प्रधान), which is अपरिमित, सरूप (with the world), possessed of the necessary power, from which are produced the various effects and into which are they merged at the time of Dissolution, is the cause of the world.

The Siddhāntin says :—The Pradhāna (अनुमीयत इति, अनुमानम्—Pradhāna) cannot be the cause, for it is अचेतन, and an अचेतन not supervised over by a चेतन cannot do the planning necessary for producing any effect; neither can an अचेतन carry on any activity (mere possession of the three Guṇas which are but द्रव्यधर्मs and not द्रव्यस्वरूप, cannot make प्रवृत्ति possible).

[295] (Sūtra 2) The objector says — It is not a universal rule that an अचेतन always requires the help of a चेतन to carry on its activity. Milk produces curds; water from the cloud produces the modification of the liquid in the coconut etc , *without any help from any other agency. Why should* not Pradhāna be active in a similar way ?

The answer is :— Even in the case of the milk and water, there is प्राज्ञाधिष्ठितत्व (as the Śruti says योऽप्सु तिष्ठन् etc.). Rāmānuja adds that Sūtra II·1-24 उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेति चेन्न क्षीरवद्धि, does not contradict the present Sūtra, for there what was refuted was the existence of any *outside* agency, not the प्राज्ञाधिष्ठितत्व.

Saṅkara explains the similes as — यथा क्षीरमचेतनं स्वभावेनैव वत्सविवृद्ध्यर्थं प्रवर्तते, यथा च जलमचेतनं स्वभावेनैव लोकोपकाराय स्यन्दते...Bhāskara agrees with Saṅkara. Nimbārka and Vijñānabhikṣu combine both the ideas, स्वतः परिणाम and activity for some specific purpose (वत्सविवृद्धये, वृक्षादिविवृद्धये).

[296] (Sūtra 3) If Pradhāna is not in any way dependent upon a चेतन, its प्रवृत्ति would always go on and there would be no Dissolution (प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्ति-व्यतिरेकेण अनवस्थिते', Pradhāna is not engaged in any activity different from प्रवृत्ति; if प्रवृत्ति and निवृत्ति are not dependent, there would be no प्रलय).

Nimbārka explains :— If no प्रवर्तक other than प्रधान exists, and if प्रवृत्ति and निवृत्ति of प्रधान go on in an unbridled manner, there would be the fault of endlessness.

Saṅkara says :— There is neither प्रवर्तक nor निवर्तक other than प्रधान (पुरुष is उदासीन), अनपेक्षत्वाच्च कदाचित् प्रधानं महदाकारेण परिणमते कदाचिन्न परिणमते...

Rāmānuja points out that even when प्राज्ञ (ईश्वर) is admitted to be the supervisor, he cannot be charged with वैषम्य and निर्दयत्व as the विषमसृष्टि is the effect of the Karmans of Jivas. This does not mean that no अधिष्ठातृ is required and that Pradhāna can go through the necessary activity, being possessed of various powers *of modification.* The Śāstra properly understood, *makes it* quite clear that the Karmans and their fruits are dependent upon the grace of the Lord who is responsible for the Śāstra itself. Hence Pradhāna in the absence of the प्राज्ञ-अधिष्ठातृ *is powerless to achieve anything.*

[297] (Sūtra 4) The objector says that the activity of the Pradhāna without the प्राज्ञ, may not come into being, but the modification of the

Pradhāna can take place on its own, like the grass eaten by a cow, turning into milk in due course.

The answer is :—The objector's view is wrong. For, the grass eaten by a bull or thrown away, does not produce milk, but only when eaten by a cow, it is transformed into milk. So here too the hand of the प्राज्ञ is evident.

अन्यत्र—Most Bhāṣyakāras take this to mean धेनोरन्यत्र, and

अभावात्—क्षीरपरिणामाभावात्,

Madhva takes अन्यत्र=ईश्वरादन्यत्र, and अभाव as referring to the creation of the world.

[298] (Sūtra 5) Śaṅkara and others read this Sūtra after the 8th Sūtra.

The objector says :—I may grant that the Pradhāna is not capable of any activity by itself, but it can create the world in union with the Puruṣa, for the enjoyment by, and the release of the Puruṣa. This kind of fruitful co-operation is seen for instance, when a lame fellow, sitting on the shoulders of a blind man can proceed to his destination, or a piece of iron moves on, when in proximity with the magnet. The answer is :—Your illustrative instances are incompetent to sustain your point of view. According to the Sāṅkhyas, the Puruṣa is absolutely निष्क्रिय and उदासीन, while the blind man can be active in a variety of ways. In the case of the magnet also, other factors than mere juxtaposition must be understood to come into play; mere पुरुषसंनिधान which is always there, would lead to नित्यसर्ग, or there would be neither बन्ध, nor अपवर्ग.

[299] (Sūtra 6) According to the Sāṅkhyas creation-activity is due to the disturbance in the equilibrium of the three Guṇas, when one Guna preponderates over the others. At the Dissolution, the Guṇas are on the same level, there is no factor to produce any वैषम्य in them; so re-creation cannot result. If creation takes place in spite of this, there would be no cessation of creation at any time. So, प्राज्ञाधिष्ठितत्व has got to be admitted in the case of प्रधान.

(Sūtra 7) Whatever other inferences or illustrative instances the Sāṅkhya may put forward, he can not get away from the fact that the Pradhāna lacks the power of being a knower.

(Sūtra 8) Even if some inference is admitted or Pradhāna is taken to be possessed of ज्ञ-शक्ति, (अभ्युपगम may refer to प्रधानसिद्धि or ज्ञशक्ति), the Pradhāna can have no प्रयोजन or purpose to serve. According to the Sāṅkhya, the Pradhāna serves the purpose *viz.*, the enjoyment by the Puruṣa and his release. But both these प्रयोजनs are impossible. How can the निष्क्रिय निर्विकार Purusa enjoy? *If he can enjoy, he would be enjoying always* (as the प्रकृतिसंनिधान *is* there for all time) and there can be no question of release or अपवर्ग in his case.

[300] (Sūtra 9) Lastly, the Sāṅkhya doctrine is a bundle of contradictions :—Thus

(1) Prakrti is दृश्य and भोग्य, and the Purusa द्रष्टृ and साक्षिन्; and at the same time प्रकृति is the means of मोक्ष, and Puruṣa is चैतन्यमात्र and निष्क्रिय etc.

(2) Mokṣa is also associated with Prakṛti which is the means thereof.

(3) प्रवृत्ति of the Prakṛti is for the sake of the release of the Puruṣa I

(4) साक्षित्व, द्रष्टृत्व etc., are impossible in the case of the नित्यनिर्विकारनिष्क्रिय Puruṣa, as also, any illusion due to superimposition; these do not belong to Prakṛti either, as they are चेतनधर्मs.

(5) Mere संनिधान is of no avail.

(6) Prakṛti is said to be bound down and released; how can it then be obliging the Puruṣa ?

(7) If संनिधि is taken to mean स्वरूपसद्भाव, then both बन्ध and मोक्ष would be नित्य, as the स्वरूप is नित्य.

[301] The doctrine of the Advaitins is still more absurd. No अविद्या, साक्षित्व, अध्यास etc., are possible in the case of the कूटस्थनित्यस्वप्रकाश Brahman. The Sāṅkhyas, admitting पुरुषबहुत्व as they do, can somehow justify the regulated *arrangement about birth and death, but the Advaitins believing in only one* Brahman, can not have that consolation even. The appeal to the उपाधिs and the division into पारमार्थिक and अपारमार्थिक are also meaningless as the nature of Brahman can never be affected.

The विप्रतिषेध according to Śaṅkara is as follows — परस्परविरुद्धश्चायं साङ्ख्यानामभ्युपगमः। क्वचित्सप्तेन्द्रियाण्यनुक्रामन्ति क्वचिदेकादश। तथा क्वचिन्महतस्तन्मात्रसर्गमुपदिशन्ति, क्वचिदहंकारात्। तथा क्वचित् त्रीण्यन्तःकरणानि वर्णयन्ति, क्वचिदेकमिति। प्रसिद्ध एव तु श्रुत्येश्वरकारणवादिन्या विरोधस्तदनुवर्तिन्या च स्मृत्या।

The Sāṅkhya doctrine *of evolution of the world,—the idea of the three Guṇas, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, Purusa and Prakrti etc ,—can be rightly* regarded as the oldest contribution to philosophical thought. There are traces of the Sāṅkhya in the *Upaniṣads*, the *Mahābhārata* (where variations in the details are found) and the *Purāṇas*. Kapila is the reputed founder of the Sāṅkhya system, but it is doubtful whether Kapila is at all a historical personality. *The system is traditionally said to be handed down from Kapila* to Āsuri, Pañcaśikha and others. Pañcaśikha (or Vārsaganya) is known to have written the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* (60000 verses) which was apparently abridged by Īśvarakṛṣṇa (150 A D.) in his *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*, which is now regarded as the standard work on the Sāṅkhya system. There are '*Sāṅkhya-sūtras*' (in six Adhyāyas), *but they are obviously quite a late work not known to* Śaṅkarācārya. The *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī*, a commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* (of Vācaspatimiśra) and the *Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya* (of Vijñānabhikṣu), a commentary on the Sūtras are also regarded as authoritative. The *Bhagavadgītā* is much influenced by the Sāṅkhya doctrine and there is every *reason to believe that Buddhism also owes a great deal to the Sāṅkhyas.*

The Sūtrakāra's attack on the Sāṅkhya is mainly on the doctrine of the Acetana Prakṛti producing the world and the clear-cut division of the two entities, Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Under no circumstances can the Acetana Prakṛti be active; if activity is its nature, it would be always active. Puruṣa

being absolutely निष्क्रिय can not be helpful in any way. This is the burden of the Sūtrakāra's criticism which appears to be quite cogent and effective.

[302] (Sūtra 10) — Śaṅkara takes this Sūtra as a separate Adhikaraṇa, and explains it as refuting the objection to Brahman (cetana) being the cause of the world (acetana) on the ground of विलक्षणत्व between the cause and the effect. As Rāmānuja rightly points out that in that case the Sūtra should have properly found a place in the विलक्षणत्वाधिकरण in the last Pāda. Rāmānuja takes Sūtras 10-16 as forming one Adhikarana, but curiously enough connects the expression असमञ्जसम् in Sūtra 9 of the last Adhikaraṇa with Sūtra 10, a questionable procedure. There is no doubt the Sūtra refers to the atomic theory of the Vaiśesikas, and the Vedāntin points out the very flagrant defect therein, that the कार्यकारणसारूप्य asserted by the Vaiśeṣikas is vitiated by the description of the production of the Dvyaṇuka, Tryaṇuka etc., from the atoms.

According to the Vaiśeṣikas, the atoms are the smallest indivisible parts with six sides (facing the four main quarters, and the higher and the lower) :—

An atom has the पारिमाण्डल्य (sphericity) dimension.

Two atoms make one Dvyaṇuka which has अणुपरिमाण and is also ह्रस्व.

Three Dvyaṇukas (or three Paramāṇus) make one त्र्यणुक which has महत् परिणाम, and is दीर्घ.

(Four Tryaṇukas make one चतुरणुक etc. There are some variations in this procedure also).

Now something which is by nature अणु and ह्रस्व cannot produce an entity which is महत् and दीर्घ. This can be achieved only if the atoms have parts, but then the atoms would not be the *smallest* and *indivisible*, and there would be the अनवस्थादोष. If the atoms have no parts, the union of a thousand atoms even would not produce a bigger magnitude than that of one atom. A mountain and a mustard seed would have the same magnitude as both are made of *infinite* atoms.

So this creation of the world, successively from the atoms, Dvyaṇukas etc., is impossible, and the other views of the Vaiśeṣikas are also likewise untenable.

Rāmānuja takes वा in the Sūtra to mean च.

[303] (Sūtra 11) The Vaiśeṣikas say that the first movement in the Paramāṇus is due to अदृष्ट Now this अदृष्ट cannot belong to the Paramāṇus, as अदृष्ट is the result of पुण्य and पाप of the Jīvas; if it belongs to the परमाणुs, it would always be functioning The अदृष्ट belonging to the Jīvas cannot be responsible for the movement in the Paramāṇus. If mere connection with the Jīvas is responsible for the movement, the अदृष्टप्रवाह being नित्य, there would be constant creation. Again, it can not be argued that any अदृष्ट gives its fruit only after being matured, and so there would not be constant creation; for, at the time of Dissolution, when every thing perishes, it is ridiculous to suppose that the अदृष्टs of all Ātmans become mature simultaneously. Similarly all the

अदृष्ट cannot be ready to function at the same time when creation takes place. The Vaiśesikas do not admit Iśvara in their system, so they cannot claim the Lord's will as the cause That means there cannot be any activity associated with the atoms

[304] (Sūtra 12) The Vaiśesikas admit Samavāya (Intimate relation) to account for the relation between the five अयुतसिद्ध (not known to be joined or separated) entities, such as

(1) Part and the whole (threads and the piece of cloth)
(2) Quality and the possessor of the quality (whiteness and the white cow),
(3) Motion and the moving object (movement and the moving cow),
(4) Genus and species (घटत्व and घट), and
(5) Particularity and नित्यद्रव्य

This intimate relation is different from Samyoga (connection) which exists between objects that are perceived as separate (the connection between the hand and the book) *This* समवाय *is understood by* इहप्रत्यय *in the form* इह तन्तुषु पटः, and is नित्य as it persists till the object is destroyed

• The Siddhāntin says —It is unnecessary to admit समवाय as a special relation घट—घटत्व (घटगुण etc), for, in order to account for the relation between घट and समवाय, we will have to admit another समवाय and there would ensue the fault of अनवस्था If it be said that समवाय can perform its function by its very nature, then why should not जातिगुण etc have the same nature ? Why do you want to discriminate between the two ? Further, you first admit an unheard of entity, viz समवाय and then imagine some nature for it ! You can not correct one mistake by making another ! Whether Samavaya is regarded as नित्य or अनित्य, the same fault is there

[305] (Sūtra 13) If समवाय is नित्य the जगत् connected with it would also be नित्य which is absurd

(Sūtra 14) The Vaiśesikas regard the atoms as subtle and partless and at the same time as possessed of रूप, रस etc (A पार्थिव atom is *possessed of* रूप, रस, गन्ध and स्पर्श a watery atom of रस गन्ध and स्पर्श a light-atom, of रूप and स्पर्श and the wind atom of स्पर्श) Now a पार्थिव atom possessed of *four* qualities must surely be more gross, and also अनित्य being possessed of parts ! Thus your idea of the nature of atoms is contradicted by perception and there fore absurd

[306] (Sūtra 15) If to avoid this fault, the objector were to say that the atoms are not possessed of रूप रस etc , then the products of atoms पृथिवी etc, would be void of रूप etc (as कार्यगुणs according to the Vaiśesikas are produced by the कारणगुणs) Thus, whether the atoms are possessed of रूप etc , or not the absurdity does remain

(Sūtra 16) The Vaisesika docrine deserves to be rejected unceremoniously, as it does not admit the सत्कार्यवाद and is opposed to Sruti and reasoning

The Sānkhya doctrine deserved some consideration as it admitted some tenets at least, favoured by the Sruti, but the Vaiśesika deserves to be shown no quarter whatsoever

In the case of the Sānkhyas, the Sūtrakāra attacked their weakest point viz they could not account for the activity of the acetana Prakrti, in the case of the Vaisesikas also, the Sūtrakāra shows that there cannot be any *movement among the atoms which cannot function in the absence of any* Cetana The Vaiśesikas admit the असत्कार्यवाद, that is कार्य is a new thing created by the कारण and then make a futile attempt to show how two different things can be connected by admitting Samavāya etc

The Vaiśesikas are so called, because they admit Viśesa (particularity) as one of the categories, which enables one to distinguish one entity from another They divide the world into six categories— (1) Dravya (substance), (2) Guna (quality), (3) Karman (motion), (4) Samanya (genus), (5) Viśesa (particularity) and (6) Samavaya (Intimate relation) Later on Abhāva (negation) was added as the seventh category (Some of these categories are to be found in the Aristotelian scheme of division) The Vaisesikas presumably were the first to advocate the atomic theory of creation in an elaborate manner (The Greeks also independently had arrived at a similar theory) The Bauddhas and Jainas have also their own theory of the atoms, some regard the atoms as having six or eight sides as being material as well as non-material (sense-organs and the mind) The Vaiśesikasūtras of Kanāda probably were written about the 1st century B C or A D Kautilya does not mention the Vaiśesikas The important works available are the *Bhasya* of Prasastapāda *Nyāyavartika* of Uddyotakara, (7th century), *Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Udayana (10th century) etc Naiyayikas (who emphasised the dialectical aspect) and the Vaiśesikas are generally bracketed together there is no material difference in their views

[307] (Sūtra 17) Sutras 17–26 form one Adhikarana, and refute the doctrines of the Vaibhasika and Sautrantika Bauddhas

The Bauddhas are also परमाणुकारणवादिन्s *like the Vaiśesikas (who are* called अर्धवैनाशिकs as out of the six or seven Padarthas admitted by them only सामान्य and समवाय are नित्य) The Bauddhas are called वैनाशिकs, as according to them everything is momentary (सर्वं सत् क्षणिकम्)

There are four well-known schools of Buddhism advocating सर्वास्तित्व (or बाह्यार्थ) वाद—, विज्ञानवाद and शून्यवाद—

(1) The वैभाषिकs—Realists who consider the बाह्यार्थs as both perceptible and inferable —अर्थs can be divided as बाह्य (भूत–भौतिक) and आभ्यन्तर (चित्त–चैत्त)

(2) The सौत्रान्तिकs—Realists who regard the बाह्यार्थs as only अनुमेय

(3) The विज्ञानवादिन्s—Idealists—(योगाचारs) according to whom बाह्यार्थs do not exist विज्ञान is the only सत् अर्थs are like those in a dream.

(4) The शून्यवादिन्s—(माध्यमिकs) Nihilists according to whom everything is void

[308] (Sūtra 18) The बाह्यार्थवादिन्s explain *the creation as under*— The atoms of पृथिवी, possessing four Guṇas (रूप, रस स्पर्श and गन्ध), the atoms of Water possessing three Guṇas (रूप रस and स्पर्श), the atoms of Light, possessing two Guṇas (रूप and स्पर्श), and the atoms of Vāyu, possessing स्पर्श, coalesce and संघातs (aggregates) of शरीर, इन्द्रिय and विषयs come into existence, Eogism exists internally in the body, the stream of ज्ञान is the Ātman, and so comes into being the mundane practical life

The Siddhāntin's reply is —Even with the two-fold समुदाय (अणुहेतुक पृथ्व्यादिभूतात्मक , and पृथिव्यादिहेतुक शरीरेन्द्रियविषयरूप) there would not be the creation of the जगदात्मकसमुदाय For, according to the Buddhists, everything is क्षणिक (It is *generally accepted by philosophers, that an entity must exist at least for three* moments to produce something—the first moment is necessary for the entity to come into existence, the second moment is utilised in getting ready for production and the third moment sees the production) Where is the time for the atoms to coalesce or to get cognised and to be fit for practical purposes? Where are the objects which can be cognised by the विज्ञानात्मन्? Both the Ātman and the objects are momentary ' A cannot make use of what B has cognised ' and so on

According to Sankara the उभयहेतुकसमुदाय is —

अणुहेतुको भूतभौतिकसंहतिरूप, and स्कन्धहेतुक पञ्चस्कन्धीरूप (रूपविज्ञानवेदनासंज्ञासंस्कार-संज्ञकाः पञ्चस्कन्धाः) He takes तदप्राप्ति to mean समुदायभावानुपपत्ति (as the समुदायिन्s are अचेतन as no स्थिर चेतन who can be the controller or enjoyer is there, activity would not in any form have any chance to exist a momentary thing is incapable of any operation)

[309] (Sūtra 19) The Buddhist opponent says that the संघातs are possible, as we believe in प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद (इदं प्रतीत्य प्राप्येदमुत्पद्यते) or dependent origination which *does not require any Cetana to guide the process Thus we* believe in a chain of dependent causes—

(१) अविद्या → (२) संस्कार → (३) विज्ञान → (४) नामरूप → (५) षडायतन → (६) स्पर्श → (७) वेदना → (८) तृष्णा → (९) उपादान → (१०) भव → (११) जाति → (१२) जरामरणशोकपरिदेवनादुःखदुर्मनस्ता → (१) अविद्या etc

(1) अविद्या—Believing the क्षणिक entities to be स्थिर
(2) संस्कार—रागद्वेष etc
(3) विज्ञान—चित्ताभिज्वलन
(4) नामरूप—Pṛthivī etc
(5) षडायतन—(Five ज्ञानेन्द्रियs and Manas)
(6) शरीर—Body
(7) वेदना—Feelings.

(Rāmānuja does not refer to the other members of the chain) There is thus a circular chain of twelve links, each preceding link producing the succeeding one, and the last producing the first (commentators are not unanimous as regards the connotation of the individual members of the chain)

The Siddhāntin's answer is:—Your chain-concept might explain how the preceding member of the chain produces the succeeding one, but you cannot explain how the *chain as a whole* comes into existence. The individual members of the chain cannot be the cause of the chain which is their resort. A momentary thing cannot be the cause of any संहति; so long as you do not believe in any permanent entity, nothing can come into existence.

[309] (Sūtra 19) When the succeeding thing is being produced, the preceding thing is no more, that means something comes out of nothing; the अभाव of the पूर्वक्षण घट might produce everything in the world in that case! If you say only सजातीय thing could be produced (घटपूर्वक्षण can produce घट and not गो, महिष etc.,) then you would have to explain how one particular thing (which is not स्थिर, and so *can not be connected with* देश *and* काल) *can produce another* thing which exists not at that moment. This you cannot do.

[310] (Sūtra 20) If you say that the effect can originate in the absence of any cause, then anything can originate always everywhere. Besides, *this goes against your own declaration that four causes (Indriya-Adhipati,* auxiliary factors like light, resort and knowledge of the preceding क्षण) produce the effect. If you hold that the existence of the पूर्वक्षण is itself the cause of the उत्तरक्षण, that would mean that कार्य and कारण are produced simultaneously, or क्षणिकत्व and स्थिति stay together!

[311] (Sūtra 21) The Bauddhas regard everything as क्षणिक and संस्कृत (modified) excepting three things —

(1) प्रतिसंख्यानिरोध — Deliberate destruction (संख्या-बुद्धिः, प्रतिसंख्या-बुद्धि opposed to the entity, that is, the desire to destroy it by force). This is स्थूल (e. g. when घट is destroyed with the blow of a stick.)

(2) अप्रतिसंख्यानिरोध — The invisible destruction or sublation which wears down an entity day after day. This is सूक्ष्म.

(3) आकाश.

All these three are mere अभाव, *and* निरुपाख्य *and* निरन्वय. *The Siddhāntin* says that the two kinds of निरन्वय destruction are not possible. उत्पत्ति and विनाश are mere different states of one and the same स्थिर entity (This has been already established in II. 1.15). No traceless destruction of a सत् thing can be pointed out. In the case of a lamp extinguished also, we must admit just अवस्थान्तरापत्ति, not its total destruction. (Śaṅkara says that both the निरोधs *cannot be either* सन्तानगोचरौ *or* भावगोचरौ).

[312] (Sūtra 22) It has been thus proved that there cannot be तुच्छात् (तुच्छ-*unsubstantial*) उत्पत्तिः *and* उत्पन्नस्य तुच्छतापत्तिः, admitted by the Bauddhas. A तुच्छ thing (क्षणिक is surely तुच्छ) can only produce a तुच्छ world. The Bauddhas themselves do not admit or experience the world as तुच्छ. If there is निरन्वयविनाश after the विनाश of one moment, everything would be तुच्छ, and something arising out of this तुच्छ is bound to be तुच्छ. There is दोष thus in both ways.

both योग, and आचार—the teachings of the teacher,—are distinguished from the Mādhyamikas who only followed the आचार.)

[316] The Yogācāras do not believe in the existence of बाह्यार्थ. They argue as follows :—*In order to perceive an object, the usual procedure is :—* There is first the connection of the अर्थ with the इन्द्रिय, then of the इन्द्रिय with मनस् (or बुद्धि), then of the मनस् with the Ātman—

घट—चक्षुस्—मनस् (बुद्धि)—आत्मन्—(घटज्ञानवानहम्, or ज्ञातता is produced in the घट).

Now, unless the बुद्धि becomes घटाकारा, no perception can take place. So whether the अर्थ actually exists or not is immaterial; the बुद्धि can be घटाकारा even if the अर्थ does not exist (as in a dream). So, it is better to assume that अर्थ actually exists in the बुद्धि and appears as it were out-side. This विज्ञान-प्रवाह is but वासना (and *is* क्षणिक *as well*). अर्थवैचित्र्य *is due to* वासनावैचित्र्य. ज्ञान and अर्थ are as a rule experienced together and so अर्थ is not different from ज्ञान Even those who believe in the existence of बाह्यार्थ have got to admit अर्थसारूप्य of the ज्ञान· विज्ञानमात्र *is therefore the only reality and no* बाह्यार्थ *exists.* (*The* विज्ञानवादिन्s admit only the विज्ञानस्कन्ध, out of the five स्कन्द्s admitted by the सर्वास्तित्ववादिन्s, that is responsible for this mundane existence.)

[317] *The Siddhāntin's answer is :—The contention of the* Vijñānavādin is opposed to all experience and is absurd. Everyone knows that the cognition घटमहं जानामि implies that there is a knower and also an object that *is to be known.* The view that नील and नीलबुद्धि are one, because they are experienced *together is equally absurd.* अर्थवैचित्र्य is the cause of ज्ञानवैचित्र्य. वासना also, which according to *you is produced by the* पूर्वनष्टज्ञान cannot *influence* any उत्तरज्ञान either. ज्ञान is correlated with the अर्थ, like the प्रभाश्रय with the प्रभा of a lamp.

[318] (*Sūtra 28*) The objector (Vijñānavādin) says :—*We find* that the cognitions in a dream are अर्थशून्य; why should not those in the waking state be equally अर्थशून्य ?

The answer is — *There is a lot of difference between* स्वप्नज्ञान and जागरितज्ञान—

स्वप्नज्ञान is produced as a result of निद्रादिदोष, and is contradicted when the स्वप्न *ceases.*

जागरितज्ञान is not contradicted and is produced in the normal way.

If all cognitions were अर्थशून्य, nothing can be proved; inference bereft of any base is also unhelpful.

(Sūtra 29) A cognition totally अर्थशून्य is nowhere found, as it is never devoid of a knower and the object of knowledge. स्वप्नज्ञान, for the matter of that, is believed by us (followers of Rāmānuja) to be as real as the जागरितज्ञान.

Śaṅkara in his Bhāṣya remarks that although the Sugata (Buddha) preached the बाह्यार्थवाद, taking into account the limited intelligence of his pupils, his main doctrine is the विज्ञानवाद. The बाह्यार्थवाद was developed in the Hinayāna, while the Vijñānavāda and the Sūnyavāda were fostered by the Mahāyāna,

Asaṅga (circa 250 A D.) systematised the Vijñānavāda There is no doubt that the beginnings of the Vijñānavāda and the Sūnyavāda go back to some period before the Christian era The Vijñānavāda comes nearest to the Advaita of Saṅkara who is often (wrongly) described as a Buddhist in disguise by his opponents The Vijñānavādin Bauddha believes विज्ञान (also the विज्ञानप्रवाह or आलयविज्ञान) as क्षणिक having no स्थिर resort Saṅkara says that all superimposition or अध्यास is made on the one eternal changeless Brahman Thus Saṅkara and the Vijñānavādin differ fundamentally The Sūtra वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् finds Saṅkara (according to whom the world is but Māyā) trying to prove that the जागरितपदार्थs are real and essentially different from स्वाप्नपदार्थs. This is not surprising, for Saṅkara tries to show how from the व्यावहारिक point of view स्वप्नज्ञान is different from the जागरितज्ञान in order to refute the Vijñānavādin जागरितज्ञान is contradicted, according to the Advaitins, when Brahman is realised Till that time, जागरितज्ञान is real and can be distinguished from the स्वप्नज्ञान The Vijñānavādin who believes in the क्षणिकत्व of all entities cannot avail himself of any excuse to establish his view-point It must be added that the Vijñānavādins also came to distinguish between परिनिष्पन्न, संवृति and परिकल्पित सत्यs, in course of time

Rāmānuja does not read the Sūtra क्षणिकत्वाच्च

[319] (Sūtra 30) This Adhikaraṇa containing only one Sūtra is directed against the Sūnyavādins and completes the refutation of the Bauddhas Saṅkara takes the Sūtra to refer to the refutation of the Bauddhas as a whole. According to Madhva the last Sūtras refute the Idealists and the Nihilists are refuted after the Realists

Sūnyavāda represents the high-water-mark of Buddhist philosophy (सुगतमतकाष्ठा) Sūnya (or void) is the only reality it is self-established because only that Sat which is not Sūnya can have any cause Sūnya is imperishable it cannot be produced from itself The argument that Sūnya-cognition being a भ्रम must have some real base, is not valid, as it is found that illusion can be produced from unreal objects etc

The answer is—People understand words like भाव and अभाव to refer to different states of some real object The very statement सर्वं शून्यम् speaks of the reality of something If you try to prove शून्यत्व by some means of proof, that means you do believe in the सत्यत्व of some proof In short, सर्वशून्यत्व is the most absurd doctrine.

Sankara condemns the Bauddha doctrine as a whole thus —सर्वप्रकारेण यथायथाय वैनाशिकसमय उपपत्तिमत्त्वाय परीक्ष्यते तथा तथा सिकताकूपवद्विदीर्यत एव। (He had said under the last Sūtra, शून्यवादिपक्षस्तु सर्वप्रमाणविप्रतिषिद्ध इति तन्निराकरणाय नादर क्रियते) अपि च, बाह्यार्थ-विज्ञान शून्य-वादत्रयमितरेतरविरुद्धमुपदिशता सुगतेन स्पष्टीकृतमात्मनोऽसबद्धप्रलापित्व प्रद्वेषो वा प्रजासु, विरुद्धार्थप्रतिपत्त्या विमुह्येयुरिमा प्रजा इति।

[320] (Sūtra 31) The sixth Adhikaraṇa comprises four Sūtras and is directed against the Jainas

Bhāskara does not read this Sūtra.

उभयथा is interpreted variously :—

अविद्यानिरोध सम्यग्ज्ञानाद्वा सपरिकरात्स्यात् स्वयमेव वा ।

पूर्वस्मिन्कल्पे निर्हेतुकविनाशाभ्युपगमहानिप्रसङ्गः, उत्तरस्मिंस्तु मार्गोपदेशानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गः । उभयथापि दोषादसमञ्जसमिदं दर्शनम् । (शङ्कर)

सन्तानस्य सन्तानिव्यतिरिक्तवस्तुत्वाभावात्, सन्तानिना च क्षणिकत्वात् । (निम्बार्क)

मोक्षार्थकोपदेशस्य वैयर्थ्यापत्ते, मरणमोक्षरूपयोर्यथोक्तनिरोधयोरनङ्गीकारात्तदङ्गीकारे चासंभवस्योक्तत्वादिति । (विज्ञानभिक्षु).

It does not appear from Rāmānuja's comments that he had any clear idea about the exact implication of the two निरोधs Śankara is more explicit. The Bauddhas had to admit a deliberate निरोध to account for the निर्वाण which can be had by following the path of conduct laid down by Buddha On the other hand, the invisible natural निरोध due to क्षणिकत्व had also to be admitted as leaving no trace behind The Siddhāntin points out that the deliberate निरोध is opposed to the सूक्ष्मनिरोध, which, on its part, is opposed to any मार्गोपदेश by Buddha. The Buddhist can not have it both ways If the सूक्ष्मनिरोध goes on continuously, निर्वाण is bound to come in due course, why should one go in for some trouble to accomplish it ?

[313] (Sūtra 23) As Buddha himself had declared वायुराकाशसंनिश्रय', the Bauddhas had to admit आकाश as a non-क्षणिक entity, although of the nature of अभाव.

The Siddhāntin points out that आकाश cannot be अभावमात्र—

अभाव is four-fold–प्रागभाव, antecedent negation, प्रध्वंसाभाव, negation caused by destruction, अन्योन्याभाव, mutual negation and अत्यन्ताभाव, total negation '—

(1) If आकाश were to be the प्रागभाव or प्रध्वंसाभाव of पृथिवी etc , the वर्तमानजगत् would be निराकाश !

(2) If आकाश were to be अन्योन्याभाव, we would not be experiencing आकाश between two entities !

(3) Total negation of पृथिवी etc , as आकाश is unthinkable.

(4) Actually आकाश is चाक्षुष and the श्रुति describes the actual part played by आकाश in the पञ्चीकरण process

Sankara remarks—आवरणाभावमात्रमाकाशमिच्छन्ति एकस्मिन्सुपर्णे पतत्यावरणस्य विद्यमानत्वात्सुपर्णान्तरस्योत्पित्सतोऽनवकाशत्वप्रसङ्गः । अपि च निरोधद्वयमाकाशं च त्रयमप्येतन्निरुपाख्यमवस्तु नित्यं चेति विप्रतिषिद्धम् । न ह्यवस्तुनो नित्यत्वमनित्यत्वं वा संभवति, वस्त्वाश्रयत्वाद्धर्मधर्मिव्यवहारस्य । धर्मधर्मिभावे हि घटादिवद्वस्तुत्वमेव स्यान्न निरुपाख्यत्वम् ।

[314] (Sūtra 24) The very fact that there is अनुस्मरण (remembrance or recognition) in the form 'This is the same thing that I had seen before' presupposes that the ज्ञातृ is not क्षणिक. The क्षणिकवादिन् cannot say that the remembrance is due to सादृश्य of the things seen, for that also requires the ज्ञातृ to be one Besides no proof can be forthcoming to show that प्रत्यभिज्ञा is due to सादृश्य

The क्षणिकत्व of घट etc , can not be proved by प्रत्यक्ष It is true that प्रत्यक्ष enables us to understand वर्तमानत्व, अवर्तमानाद् व्यावृत्ति but that does not prove that it

is a different thing, it only shows वर्तमानकालयोग्यतामात्र, वस्त्वन्तरत्व is due to its being associated with different times

The अनुमान,—घटादि क्षणिकम्

अर्थक्रियाकारित्वात्, सत्त्वाच्च,

यदक्षणिक शशविषाणादि तदनर्थक्रियाकार्यसच्च ।

is already shown to be fallacious, there is no कार्यकारणभाव between the हेतु and the साध्य On the contrary, the अनुमान proves exactly the opposite—घटादि स्थिरम्, अर्थक्रियाकारित्व *is possible only if an entity stays for more than one moment* Recognition can be with reference to one and the same entity A Buddhist has no right to put forth any अनुमान for, the अनुमातृ is no more when he is just stating his प्रतिज्ञा and *it is absurd to say that another should complete his task !*

Sankara *almost abuses the Buddhist opponent in his comments* on this Sūtra अनन्तरामनन्तरामात्मन एव प्रतिपत्तिं प्रत्यभिजानन्, एककर्तृकामोत्तमादुच्छ्वासादतीताश्च प्रतिपत्तीरा जन्मन आत्मैककर्तृका प्रतिसन्दधान कथ क्षणभङ्गवादी वैनाशिको नापत्रपेत ? . प्रत्ययान्तरमेव चेत् सादृश्य-विषय स्यात्, तेनेद सदृशमिति वाक्यप्रयोगोऽनर्थक स्यात्, सादृश्यमित्येव प्रयोग प्राप्नुयात् । .

[315] (Sūtra 25) Rāmānuja takes this Sūtra as directed against the Sautrāntika opponent who argues that an entity *even though not existing at* the time of ज्ञान can be ज्ञानविषय The अर्थ by reason of its स्वाकारसमर्पण even though perishing itself can be inferred by the ज्ञानाकार that means ज्ञानवैचित्र्य is due to the अर्थ itself The answer is—The नीलादि form of घट experienced *even after* घट is no more cannot belong to the घट nowhere is it seen that a dead thing transmits its form to something else ज्ञानवैचित्र्य due to अर्थवैचित्र्य can take place only if the अर्थ exists at the time of the production of the ज्ञान

(Sūtra 26) According to Rāmanuja, this Sūtra refers to faults common to the doctrines of both the Vaibhāsikas and Sautrāntikas This is an unnecessary cumbrous procedure

If we accept the क्षणिकत्व idea and its corrolary, origination from असत्, and causeless destruction, this world would be a veritable Paradise to live in one can get whatever one wants without striving for it अविद्या etc, would automatically vanish and all fruit, here and hereafter, and *Moksa would be* secured even by the idle and the lazy !

Read Sankara's comments on the last and the present Sutra—नाभावाद्भाव उत्पद्यते । यद्यभावाद्भाव उत्पद्येत अभावत्वाविशेषात्कारणविशेषाभ्युपगमोऽनर्थक स्यात् । अपि च चतुर्भिश्चित्त-चैत्ता उत्पद्यन्ते परमाणुभ्यश्च भूतभौतिकलक्षण समुदाय उत्पद्यत इत्यभ्युपगम्य पुनरभावाद्भावोत्पत्ति कल्पयद्भि-रभ्युपगतमपह्नुवानैर्वैनाशिकै सर्वो लोक आकुलीक्रियते ।

यदि चाभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिरभ्युपगम्येत, एव सत्युदासीनानामनीहमानानामपि जनानामभिमतसिद्धि स्यात् । अभावस्य सुलभत्वात् । कृषीवलस्य क्षेत्रकर्मण्यप्रयतमानस्यापि सस्यनिष्पत्ति स्यात् । कुलालस्य च मृत्संस्क्रिया-मप्रयतमानस्याप्यमत्रोत्पत्ति । तन्तुवायस्यापि तन्तूनतन्वानस्यापि तद्वानस्येव वस्त्रलाभ । स्वर्गापवर्गयोश्च न कश्चित्कथचित्समीहेत । न चैतद्युज्यतेऽभ्युपगम्यते वा केनचित् ।

(Sūtra 27) The fourth Adhikarana containing three Sūtras is directed against the Yogacāras who are विज्ञानमात्रास्तित्ववादिनः The Yogācāras (who follow

both योग, and आचार—the teachings of the teacher,—are distinguished from the Mādhyamikas who only followed the आचार.)

[316] The Yogācāras do not believe in the existence of बाह्यार्थ. They argue as follows :—In order to perceive an object, the usual procedure is :—There is first the connection of the अर्थ with the इन्द्रिय, then of the इन्द्रिय with मनस् (or बुद्धि), then of the मनस् with the Ātman—

घट—चक्षुस्—मनस् (बुद्धि)—आत्मन्—(घटज्ञानवानहम्, or ज्ञातता is produced in the घट).

Now, unless the बुद्धि becomes घटाकार, no perception can take place. So whether the अर्थ actually exists or not is immaterial; the बुद्धि can be घटाकार even if the अर्थ does not exist (as in a dream). So, it is better to assume that अर्थ actually exists in the बुद्धि and appears as it were out-side. This विज्ञान-प्रवाह is but वासना (and is क्षणिक as well). अर्थवैचित्र्य is due to वासनावैचित्र्य. ज्ञान and अर्थ are as a rule experienced together and so अर्थ is not different from ज्ञान Even those who believe in the existence of बाह्यार्थ have got to admit अर्थसारूप्य of the ज्ञान· विज्ञानमात्र is therefore the only reality and no बाह्यार्थ :exists. (The विज्ञानवादिन्s admit only the विज्ञानस्कन्ध, out of the five स्कन्दs admitted by the सर्वास्तित्ववादिन्s, that is responsible for this mundane existence.)

[317] *The Siddhāntin's answer is :—The contention of the* Vijñānavādin is opposed to all experience and is absurd. Everyone knows that *the cognition घटमहं जानामि implies that there is a knower and also an object that* is to be known. The view that नील and नीलबुद्धि are one, because they are *experienced together is equally absurd. अर्थवैचित्र्य is the cause of ज्ञानवैचित्र्य.* वासना also, which according to you is produced by the पूर्वज्ञान cannot influence any उत्तरज्ञान *either. ज्ञान is correlated with the अर्थ, like the प्रभाद्रव्य with the प्रभा of* a lamp.

[318] (Sūtra 28) The objector (Vijñānavādin) says :—We find that the cognitions in a dream are अर्थशून्य; why should not those in the waking state be equally अर्थशून्य ?

The answer is — There is a lot of difference between स्वप्नज्ञान and जागरितज्ञान—

स्वप्नज्ञान is produced as a result of निद्रादिदोष, and is contradicted when the स्वप्न ceases.

जागरितज्ञान is not contradicted and is produced in the normal way.

If all cognitions were अर्थशून्य, nothing can be proved; inference bereft of *any base is also unhelpful.*

(Sūtra 29) A cognition totally अर्थशून्य is nowhere found, as it is never *devoid of a knower and the object of knowledge. स्वप्नज्ञान, for the matter of* that, is believed by us (followers of Rāmānuja) to be as real as the जागरितज्ञान.

Śankara in his Bhāṣya remarks that although the Sugata (Buddha) preached the बाह्यार्थवाद, taking into account the limited intelligence of his pupils, *his main doctrine is the* विज्ञानवाद. The बाह्यार्थवाद was developed in the *Hinayāna,* while the Vijñānavāda and the Sūnyavāda were fostered by the Mahāyāna,

Asaṅga (circa 250 A D) systematised the Vijñānavāda There is no doubt that the beginnings of the Vijñānavāda and the Sūnyavāda go back to some period before the Christian era The Vijñānavāda comes nearest to the Advaita of Saṅkara who is often (wrongly) described as a Buddhist in disguise by his opponents The Vijñānavādin Bauddha believes विज्ञान (also the विज्ञानप्रवाह or आलयविज्ञान) as क्षणिक having no स्थिर resort Saṅkara says that all superimposition or अध्यास is made on the one eternal changeless Brahman Thus Saṅkara and the Vijñānavādin differ fundamentally The Sūtra वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् finds Saṅkara (according to whom the world is but Māyā) trying to prove that the जागरितपदार्थs are real and essentially different from स्वाप्नपदार्थs. This is not surprising, for Saṅkara tries to show how from the व्यावहारिक point of view *स्वप्नज्ञान is different from the जागरितज्ञान in order to refute the Vijñānavādin* जागरितज्ञान is contradicted, according to the Advaitins, when Brahman is realised Till that time, जागरितज्ञान is real and can be distinguished from the स्वप्नज्ञान The Vijñānavādin who believes in the क्षणिकत्व of all entities cannot avail himself of any excuse to establish his view-point It must be added that the Vijñānavādins also came to distinguish between परिनिष्पन्न सद्वृति and परिकल्पित सत्य, in course of time

Rāmānuja does not read the Sūtra क्षणिकत्वाच्च

[319] (Sūtra 30) This Adhikarana containing only one Sutra is directed against the Sūnyavādins and completes the refutation of the Bauddhas Saṅkara takes the Sutra to refer to the refutation of the Bauddhas as a whole, According to Madhva the last Sūtras refute the Idealists and the Nihilists are refuted after the Realists

Sūnyavāda represents the high-water-mark of Buddhist philosophy (सुगतमतकाष्ठा) Sunya (or void) is the only reality it is self established because only that Sat which is not Sūnya can have any cause *Sūnya is imperishable it cannot be produced from itself* The argument that Sunya-cognition being a भ्रम must have some real base, is not valid, as it is found that illusion can be produced from unreal objects etc

The answer is—People understand words like भाव and अभाव to refer to different states of some real object The very statement सर्वं शून्यम् speaks of the reality of something If you try to prove शून्यत्व by some means of proof, that means you do believe in the सत्यत्व of some proof In short, सर्वशून्यत्व is the most absurd doctrine

Sankara condemns the Bauddha doctrine as a whole thus'—सर्वप्रकारेण यथायथाय वैनाशिकसमय उपपत्तिमत्त्वाय परीक्ष्यते तथा तथा सिकताकूपवद्विदीर्यत एव। (He had said under the last Sutra, शून्यवादिपक्षस्तु सर्वप्रमाणविप्रतिषिद्ध इति तन्निराकरणाय नादरः क्रियते) अपि च, बाह्यार्थ विज्ञान शून्य-वादत्रयमितरेतरविरुद्धमुपदिशता सुगतेन स्पष्टीकृतमात्मनोऽसम्बद्धप्रलापित्व प्रद्वेषो वा प्रजासु, विरुद्धार्थप्रतिपत्त्या विमुह्येयुरिमाः प्रजा इति।

[320] (Sūtra 31) The sixth Adhikarana comprises four Sūtras and is directed against the Jainas

The Jaina doctrine is summarised by Rāmānuja thus .—

(1) The world consists of Jīva and non-Jiva; there is no Īśvara.

(2) The world is made up of six substances :—

(a) Jīva—बद्ध, योगसिद्ध and मुक्त

(b) धर्म pervades the whole world and is a द्रव्य, the cause of activity·

(c) अधर्म also pervades the world and is स्थितिहेतु.

(d) पुद्गल — (atom) is possessed of the qualities, वर्ण, गन्ध, रस, स्पर्श and is two-fold — परमाणुरूप, and संघातरूप in the form of four elements, body, universe etc.

(e) काल is अणुरूप and is the cause of the व्यवहार dealing with past, present and future.

(f) आकाश is infinite.

(3) Substances other than अणुरूप are called अस्तिकाय (अस्ति, इति कायते (talked of) इति, that is, a पदार्थ)—जीव, धर्म, अधर्म, पुद्गल and आकाश.

(4) The chief entities helpful for, and concerned with Mokṣa are —
मोक्षोपाय consists of Right knowledge, Right action and Right conduct.
जीव is possessed of the qualities ज्ञान, दर्शन, सुख and वीर्य.
अजीव is everything fit to be enjoyed by the जीव.
आस्रव is the means for enjoyment, sense-organs etc.

बन्ध is the four-fold घातिकर्मन् (1) ज्ञानावरणीय (which comes in the way of securing right knowledge); (2) दर्शनावरणीय (this is opposed to सम्यग्दर्शन) — the idea that there can be no Mokṣa from the Jaina doctrine, (3) मोहनीय (opposed to वीर्य), (4) अन्तराय (all that obstructs those striving for मोक्षमार्ग)— These four are called घातिकर्मन्s as they annihilate the highest good.

The four अघातिकर्मन्s are — वेदनीय (which forms the body which carries a name), नामिक (which is the embryo), गोत्रिक (which is the स्थितिहेतु of the body), आयुष्क (which enables the body to carry on, and is the cause of सुख, दुःख etc.).

(5) निर्जर is austerities practised as enjoined by the Arhat (e. g. plucking the hair etc.)

(6) संवर — the control of the sense-organs.

(7) मोक्ष is the resumption of the natural state on the part of the Jīva when freed from राग, क्लेश etc.

The atoms admitted by the Jainas are एकस्वभाव and not four-fold as held by the Vaiśeṣikas. The differentiation occurs when they undergo modification

The Sūtrakāra takes note of only two Jaina doctrines—(1) स्याद्वाद and (2) the देहपरिमाण of the Jīva.

The स्याद्वाद or सप्तभङ्गिनय (seven ways of looking at an entity) is the special doctrine advocated by the Jainas. Commentators are not of much help in understanding what स्याद्वाद actually means or is driving at. The main conception of स्याद्वाद is this :—

In order to understand an entity rightly, we must take into account all its facets and look at it from different angles, so that our conception should not be one-sided. Let us take the example of a घट (स्यात् means 'May be', it eschews the possibility of any definiteness):—

(1) घटः, अस्ति is only an imperfect idea about घट, for, घट is *not* in the form of पट.

(2) घटः, न, अस्ति is also imperfect; for, घट *is* in the form of घट.

(3) घटः, अस्ति च न, अस्ति च—This involves same kind of contradictory ममज्ञान.

(4) घटः, अवक्तव्य—This is वदतो व्याघातः, if घट is अवक्तव्य, how can you say घटः, अवक्तव्यः even ?

(5-7) घटः, अस्ति च, अवक्तव्यः; न, अस्ति च, अवक्तव्यः अस्ति च नास्ति च, अवक्तव्यः— These are by themselves imperfect and untenable ideas.

An entity can be known rightly, only when it is understood from all points of view; any doctrine which emphasises only one or more of these seven ways, cannot give us a complete picture of the object.

[321] The Siddhāntin's refutation is—This अनेकात्मकत्व doctrine is untenable. How can the pairs अस्तित्व, नास्तित्व; नित्यत्व, अनित्यत्व, भिन्नत्व, अभिन्नत्व etc., which are opposite to each other be found in one and the same entity ? अस्ति, नास्ति— these ideas referring to time are always associated with a द्रव्य and can be hardly thought of, *independently*.

If the objector asks—Is not your Brahman सर्वात्मक ?—The answer is—Brahman is सर्वज्ञ, सर्वशक्ति etc., and the whole चित् and अचित् is its body. The Jainas admit six different द्रव्यs, and hence they cannot properly account for एकत्व as well as अनेकत्व etc., in one place, because the द्रव्यs lack identity with one another. The defects pointed out in the परिमाणवाद elsewhere apply to the Jaina doctrine as well.

Rāmānuja does not deal in detail with the स्याद्वाद doctrine except pointing out *to the inherent improbability of opposite attributes staying* together. Sankara also contents himself with stating that the Jaina doctrine, in the ultimate analysis is useless for practical purposes, being but अनिर्धारित or संशयज्ञान, and shows how the Jaina doctrine of पञ्चास्तिकाय, सम्यग्दर्शन etc., can be subjected to the स्याद्वाद idea and no definite guidance can be had from it. This criticism however does not *satisfactorily meet the contention of the Jainas* that अनेकात्मकत्व does not necessarily lead to संशय and it is possible to adjust one's conduct from a broader point of view.

(Sūtra 32) The Jainas believe that the Jiva has the dimension of the body, they also believe in re-birth But this view is untenable. When the Jiva with the body of an elephant, *becomes an ant, how can the huge* dimension of an elephant find entrance into the tiny ant ? That means only a fraction *of the Jiva can enter into the ant* This is absurd.

If the Jainas argue that the Jiva has the power to contract and to expand and so there is no absurdity here, the answer is—

(Sūtra 33) If the Jiva really undergoes contraction and expansion, he would be अनित्य, and no better than a jar

(Sūtra 34) The Jaina says—Jiva has really only one dimension, viz which he has when he has secured salvation for, after Moksa, there is no taking to another body but in that case, the dimensions prior to Moksa must be regarded as pseudo-dimensions, and the दोष pointed out can not be got over

अन्त्यस्य —मोक्षावस्थजीवपरिमाणस्य (Most Bhāsyakāras)

अवस्थित —नित्यत्वात्, (all except मध्व—अवस्थैभावेन)

उभयो —आत्मन तत्परिमाणस्य, आद्यमध्यमपरिमाणयो (Majority of the Bhāsyakāras), वादिप्रतिवादिनो (विज्ञानभिक्षु) आत्मन तद्देहस्य च (मध्व)

अविशेष —एकपरिमाणत्व (Most Bhāsyakāras) नित्यत्वं (विज्ञानभिक्षु)

Jainism is a very old system of philosophy Jadabharata a son of Iksvāku is said to be the first तीर्थंकर Pārśvanātha, the 23rd तीर्थंकर, lived a couple of centuries earlier than Gautama Buddha Mahavira an elder contemporary of Gautama Buddha was the twenty-fourth तीर्थंकर and he put Jainism on a firm basis

Both Jainism and Buddhism originated in Magadha (Bihar) and were based on the earlier current philosophical doctrines Both Gautama and Mahāvira came from a royal family, but disgusted with the pomp and splendour took to asceticism and preached their doctrines for a long time, travelling extensively throughout Bihar Both of them lived during the period of Bimbisara and Ajātaśatru Gautama secured his enlightenment under the Bodhi tree at Gayā Both Gautama and Mahavira can be regarded as Reformers of the Hindu religion they do not seem to have preached against faith in the Hindu Divinites or even against the caste system as such

Jainism did not at any time take up a militant attitude against Hinduism It laid great stress on Ahimsā and Tyāga (renunciation) and showed a practical way of life and was able to influence Hindu religion to a great extent It does not believe in any God believes in the देहपरिमाण of the Jiva from the practical point of view (what is the point in believing the Soul to be all-pervading, if the particular body alone is his भोगायतन and comes under his jurisdiction ?)

Buddhism, on the other hand from the very beginning basking under powerful royal patronage, was more ambitious and militant In order to out-wit Hinduism the original Hinayana gave place to Mahāyana which made Buddha practically a God and incorporated many popular ideas found in the Puranas The result was disastrous for Buddhism for, that deprived Buddhism of its independent view-point, and with Sankaracārya successfully attacking the philosophical tenets of Buddhism, and the Hindus accepting Buddha as an avatara of Visnu Buddhism had to clear out from the land of its birth and succeeded in establishing itself in Ceylon Indonesia Japan and China where it had not to compete with powerful indigenous tenets When royal patronage

ceased, people in general forgot Buddhism, so much so that the celebrated Aśoka edicts and the big Buddha statues remained renoticed, uncared for, for more than two thousand years, till the British drew attention to them in the 19th century A. D. !

Both Jainism and Buddhism have an extensive canonical literature written in Ardhamāgadhī and Pāli respectively. The Jainas are divided into two sects, the Śvetāmbaras (white-robed) and the Digambaras (wearing no apparel), who do not differ much in their philosophical tenets.

[322] (Sūtra 35) The seventh Adhikaraṇa contains four Sūtras and is directed against the Pāśupatas who are worshippers of Rudra in some form or other.

Rāmānuja mentions four sects — कापाल, कालामुख (Bhavabhūti describes this in his *Mālatimādhava*) पाशुपत and शैव. They hold that Paśupati (the Lord of पशुs — souls) is only the निमित्तकारण of the world, and that Mokṣa or salvation comes from wearing the characteristic symbols (earrings, marks of ashes, the rudrākṣa, matted hair etc.) and from residing in the cemetery, drinking wine etc. They also hold that anybody can become a Brāhmaṇa by being initiated into their order, and a Yati by observing the vows of the कापाल — All these doctrines are completely at variance with the Vedic tradition. —

The Paśupati-doctrine deserves to be rejected because it is full of contradictions (such as, some emphasising पूजन, ध्यान; others, the मुद्रिकाधारण and various abhorrent practices) and is opposed to the Vedas which proclaim Nārāyaṇa as the material and the instrumental cause of the world, and prescribe certain necessary duties for the different Varṇas and declare Mokṣa as arising from the realization and worship of the Paramapuruṣa or Brahman.

[323] (Sūtra 36) Rāmānuja does not read the Sūtra संबन्धानुपपत्तेश्च before this.

If Pasupati, like the potter, is the निमित्तकारण, he would have to be provided with some अधिष्ठान (substratum) like Pradhāna, just as the potter has the मृत्तिका. But as Paśupati has no body (if he were to have a body, it would be अनित्य) he can make no use of the अधिष्ठान.

(Sūtra 37) If the objector says— the Jīva, although without a body, can have the sense-organs and the body as the अधिष्ठान; why should not Paśupati have his अधिष्ठान in the same way?—the answer is the body and the sense-organs are the result of the Karman of the Jīva, in order that he might experience the objects of enjoyment. But the Paśupati has no Karman; hence no अधिष्ठान is possible in his case.

Saṅkara explains करणवत् to mean ' like the body ' and also ' possessed of a body '

(Sūtra 38) If Paśupati were to be subject to पुण्यापुण्यकर्मन् like the Jīva,

he would cease to be omniscient, and would be subject to origination and destruction.

The Saiva or Pāśupata doctrine can be regarded as perhaps the oldest. Rudra is well-known in the Ṛgveda and Yajurveda as an important deity. There is no doubt that Rudra (later called शिव, ईशान etc.) was originally the God of the non-Vedic tribes residing in forests and on mountains, and might have the phallic worship associated with him from the very beginning. After Rudra was admitted in the Vedic pantheon, he became the symbol of asceticism and purity. Later on, several bad and immoral practices came to be introduced into the cult, greater and greater importance being shown to outward forms of worship.

Nakuleśa (or Lakuleśa) is said to be the systematiser of this cult.

[324] (Sūtra 39) The eighth Adhikaraṇa contains four Sūtras and according to Rāmānuja, establishes the Pāñcarātra doctrine as the Siddhānta.

पञ्चरात्र has been variously explained :—

(1) Five 'nights' or topics — (1) परो भगवान्, and the four Vyūhas— (2) वासुदेव (परमात्मन्), (3) संकर्षण (Jiva), (4) प्रद्युम्न (mind) and (5) अनिरुद्ध (egoism).

(2) Five ways of worshipping the Lord — (1) अभिगमन (visit to the temples), (2) उपादान (collecting material for worship), (3) इज्या (worship), (4) स्वाध्याय (muttering prayers), and (5) योग (concentration).

(3) Five topics—(1) तत्त्व, (2) मुक्तिप्रद, (3) भुक्तिप्रद, (4) यौगिक, and (5) वैशेषिक which are discussed to the Samhitās (Āgama).

(4) Five manifestations—पर, व्यूह, विभव, अन्तर्यामिन् and अर्चा.

The objector argues:—

The followers of the Pañcarātra-Āgama say that (वासुदेव → संकर्षण → प्रद्युम्न → अनिरुद्ध) संकर्षण (जीव) originates from वासुदेव, mind from Jīva, and egoism from mind. Now the Sruti is emphatic about Jīva being नित्य and अनादि.

(Sūtra 40) Similarly, the mind (a करण) can not be produced by the agent (कर्तृ), as a दण्ड is not produced by the potter.

So, the Pāñcarātra view, being opposed to the Sruti should be rejected.

[325] (Sūtra 41) This and the next Sūtra justify the प्रामाण्य of the Pāñcarātra. वा is equal to तु (but); विज्ञानादि-विज्ञानं च, आदि च that is, the Highest Brahman तत्-अप्रतिषेधः—(तत्-शास्त्रप्रामाण्य).

The Siddhāntin says:—The Pāñcarātra system does not speak of actual origination. What is meant is that the Highest Brahman of its own will, manifests itself in four forms. This is made quite clear in the *Sātvatasaṁhitā*. The Highest Brahman, possessed of the six attributes, ज्ञान, ऐश्वर्य, शक्ति, बल, वीर्य and तेजस्, is the सूक्ष्म, by the worship of विभव (रामकृष्णादिप्रादुर्भावगणः

the avatāras Rama, Krsna etc), one reaches the व्यूह (the four-fold mode, वासुदेवसङ्कर्षणप्रद्युम्नानिरुद्ध) and from व्यूह, *one goes to* सूक्ष्म (*वासुदेवाख्यं पर ब्रह्म*) *This is* quite in accordance with the Sruti which tells us that the Highest, himself unborn, is manifested in various ways Just as Brahman is designated by the words आकाश, प्राण etc , there is nothing objectionable if सङ्कर्षण, प्रद्युम्न etc , are designated by the words, जीव मनस् etc

[326-27] (Sūtra 42) Actually, the origination of Jiva is contradicted by the *Paramasamhitā* and other works

Rāmānuja here attacks Saṅkara for his interpretation of this Sūtra as referring to the वेदनिन्दा in the Pāñcarātra as Sāndilya is described there as not securing solace in the Vedas and taking to the Pañcarātra doctrine Rāmānuja says that the वेदनिन्दा there is for the purpose of exalting the पाञ्चरात्र which enabled Sāndilya to understand the परतत्त्व and for showing that the Vedas are difficult to understand Nārāyana himself is said to have promulgated the Pāñcarātra doctrine, so no objection should be taken to it Saṅkhya, Yoga, Upanisads etc , are not to be condemned outright whatever is acceptable in them is admitted in the Pañcarātra

Rāmānuja practically stands alone in describing this last Adhikaraṇa as being in favour of the Pañcarātra doctrine Nimbārka sees in it a refutation of Saktivāda (Sakti alone can not create the world)

तदप्रतिषेध —उत्पत्त्यसंभवास्याप्रतिषेध (शङ्कर, भास्कर)
—तच्छास्त्रप्रामाण्यप्रतिषेधो मा भूत् (श्रीकण्ठ)
—स्मृतिविरोधश्रुतिविरोधयोरप्रतिषेध (श्रीकर)
—ईश्वराणामप्रतिषेध (वल्लभ)

There is hardly any doubt that Rāmānuja s interpretation is far from convincing —

(1) The second Quarter is clearly intended to refute other doctrines
(2) The Sūtrakāra had no real reason to refer to his own view here,
(3) विज्ञानादिभावे वा — The meaning of वा as meaning अपि is more suitable
(4) तदप्रतिषेध — here तत् more properly refers to उत्पत्त्यसंभव and not to शास्त्रप्रामाण्य as Rāmānuja takes it
(5) The explanation of the last Sūtra विप्रतिषेधाच्च by Rāmānuja as विप्रतिषिद्धा हि जीवोत्पत्तिरस्मिन्नपि तन्त्रे covers the same ground as the सूत्र उत्पत्त्यसंभवात्
(6) विप्रतिषेधाच्च more probably refers to an additional argument for refutation as its use elsewhere shows

Saṅkara is also not happy over this Adhikarana he frankly says that he accepts many views of the Pañcarātras excepting the origination of सङ्कर्षण and others and rightly remarks that if all the four Vyuhas are ईश्वरs (being possessed of विज्ञान etc) there is likely to be chaos it is unnecessary to admit more than one Iśvara, besides origination implies some अतिशय between कार्य and

कारण. Sankara refers to the following विप्रतिषेध—*गुणगुणित्व idea is not in harmony* with the idea आत्मानं एवैते भगवन्तो वासुदेवाः, and the वेदप्रतिषेध or वेदनिन्दा by Sāṇḍilya.

It appears to us that Nimbārka's view that शक्तिवाद is refuted here, is the most plausible. After refuting the Pāśupata doctrine which says only पशुपति is the कारण of the world, the Sūtrakāra could naturally be expected to refer to the शक्ति (female element) doctrine, in this Adhikaraṇa for being refuted. Siva alone is powerless to create, so also is शक्ति (the Mother) without the association with Siva.

The Pāñcarātra (or, the Bhāgavata) doctrine has a powerful stronghold on the people of India even now. The idea of Bhakti can be traced to the Ṛgvedic times, some of the hymns to Varuṇa breathe an atmosphere of fervent Bhakti. The Upaniṣads emphasising Dhyāna, Upāsanā etc., put Bhakti on a firm basis (as Rāmānuja has shown in his Bhāṣya). Both Pāṇini and Patañjali make reference to Bhakti. With the installation of images for worship, Bhakti influenced the people at large and the Purāṇas propagated the doctrine of a personal God who could grant salvation to his devotees. The *Viṣṇupurāṇa* and the *Bhagavadgītā* became the chief scriptures for the Bhāgavatas, Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa being the chief Deity for worship. Rāmānuja, curiously enough, does not seem to attach much importance to the *Bhāgavata purāṇa* which glorifies Kṛṣṇa so much. Gradually the worship of deities of lesser importance or of local deities came into vogue and the doctrine of Bhakti preached fervently all over India, by saints in a language which could be understood by the masses, came to be firmly established, along with the inevitable degeneration due to emphasis being laid on outward forms of worship, so palatable to the common man.

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